




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ISLAMIST TERRORISM TODAY: GLOBAL AND REGIONAL LEVELS

The main feature of global terrorist activity in the past two years has been its unprecedented growth. The total number of terrorist incidents in 2005 almost reached the 5,000 mark (to be more precise, there were 4,924 incidents), nearly 85 percent more than the number in the previous “peak” years of 2004 (2,646) and 2002 (2,649), and was an absolute record in the history of terrorism.

Two regions—the **Middle East and Persian Gulf states** (3,035, or 62 percent of terrorist incidents worldwide) and **South Asia, including Afghanistan** (1,238 terrorist incidents, or 25 percent of the total)—led in the number of terrorist incidents in 2005 by a wide margin. In all of the remaining regions the number of terrorist incidents was significantly less (from seven in East and Central Asia to 247 in Western Europe).¹

Figure 1. Number of Terrorist Incidents Worldwide (1998-2005)




Along with the number of terrorist incidents, the second most important indicator of terrorist activity is the number of its victims. In 2005 alone, over 8,000 people (8,161) died in terrorist incidents worldwide. This is a record number, and is significantly higher than in the previous year (5,068 dead in 2004) and nearly double the number in 2001 (4,571 victims), when the most lethal terrorist incidents in human history, those of September 11, 2001, were carried out. In 2005, the two regions with the greatest number of terrorist incidents also led in the number of victims by a large margin. In the Middle East and the Persian Gulf states alone, 6,469 people died at terrorist hands (79 percent of all killed in terrorist incidents), while in



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South Asia 1,159 individuals died (14 percent of the total number killed). In all other regions the number of victims of terrorism was far less (187 in Africa, 141 in Latin America, etc.)

Figure 2. Number of Dead as a Result of Terrorist Incidents (1998–2005)



The Middle East and South Asia have not always led in the number of terrorist incidents and terrorist victims over the course of the past eight years (see Table 1).² Although the Middle East has been among the top three regions leading in the number of terrorist incidents throughout 1998-2005, it only reached the top spot in 2004-05; South Asia (including Afghanistan) has been among the top three since 2001 and led in the number of terrorist incidents in 2002 and 2003. As for the number killed during terrorist incidents, the Middle East and Persian Gulf region (including Iraq) has only been the leader since 2003, while in 1998-99 it was only in third place in this category, and in 2000-01—that is, in the run-up to the incidents of September 11—it only occupied fifth place in the number killed in terrorist incidents. During the same period of time, South Asia was consistently one of the top three in numbers of victims, but was only in first place in 2000 and 2002.

Table 1. Regions of the World with the Most Terrorist Incidents and Greatest Number of Victims, 1998–2005

Year	Regions with the Most Terrorist Incidents	Regions with the Greatest Number of Fatalities from Terrorism
2005	ME, SA, WE	ME, SA, Afr.
2004	ME, SA, WE	ME, SA, EE
2003	SA, ME, WE	ME, SA, EE
2002	SA, ME, LA	SA, ME, EE
2001	WE, ME, SA	NA, SA, LA
2000	WE, ME, LA	SA, LA, SEA
1999	WE, ME, LA	EE, SA, ME
1998	EE, WE, ME	Afr., SA, ME

(EE – Eastern Europe, LA – Latin America, ME – Middle East and Persian Gulf, NA – North America, SA – South Asia including Afghanistan, SEA – Southeast Asia, WE – Western Europe.) Table compiled on the basis of data in the MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, 1998–2005.

It is indicative that at the turn of the century—all the way through 2001—the first place in terms of the number of terrorist incidents was held not by Asian regions but by Europe: in 1999-2001 Western Europe led in terms of the number of terrorist incidents and in 1998 Eastern Europe (including Russia) did. In those years not one of the Asian regions led in terms of terrorist victims: in 1998 the greatest number of fatalities was suffered in Africa, in 1999 in Eastern Europe/Russia, in 2000 in South America, and in 2001 in North America (largely due to the unprecedented number of victims of the September 11 incident in the United States).

A NEW TYPE OF TERRORISM

These data indicate, first of all, that the “war on terrorism” that began after September 11, 2001 and the reaction to it shifted the main target of global terrorist activities towards western and southern Asia. Second, we see a close correlation between the shift of terrorist activity worldwide and the gradual shift of the regional focus of the global campaign against terrorism led by the United States: from the retaliatory operation in Afghanistan to military action that was not directly related to the fight against terrorism (primarily, the U.S. intervention in and occupation of Iraq). Third, if at least one of the main goals of the international anti-terrorist campaign was the general lessening of the threat of terrorism worldwide, then five years later we are faced with the opposite result, that is, the steady and unprecedented growth of terrorist activity on a global scale.

The second key trend in the development of terrorism today is the accelerating erosion of the division between domestic and international terrorism. If the former can be understood as terrorism that is strictly limited by territory or is carried out by citizens (or against citizens) of just one country, while the latter is terrorist activity carried out on the territory or by or against citizens of more than one state, then the traditional differentiation of these two concepts is becoming more and more irrelevant. The erosion of the line between domestic and international terrorism is partially the result, as in earlier years, of the *internationalization* of certain aspects of terrorist activities: the conduct of terrorist acts outside of the country where they are mainly based/country of origin, as well as the establishment of a system to raise funds abroad.

However, there is an even more serious phenomenon that has been gathering attention of late: the *transnationalization* of terrorism: from the energizing of cooperation between independent groups in various countries to the creation of full-fledged transnational terrorist networks. As the al-Qa’ida example and the activity of the numerous autonomous and semi-autonomous cells in the post-al-Qa’ida jihadist movement in particular indicate, this sort of transnational network has global (*unlimited*) goals and operates on a global scale, making it possible for us to speak of the globalization of terrorism. Although these transnational networks do not substitute for the great diversity of groups making use of terrorist methods and goals that are *limited* by a particular local or regional context and are not directly led by the transnational networks, there is an undeniable demonstration effect at play and the networks often actively cooperate with the other groups (for instance, in post-Saddam Iraq).

To sum up, today it is more relevant to speak of various levels of terrorism than of “international” and “domestic” terrorism: about more traditional *local or regional terrorism* and about “new” *global terrorism*.

That said, it is precisely *extremist ideology* and *organizational capabilities* (structural form) that remain the most important strategic resources and comparative advantage of terrorist organizations, regardless of their level of operation. In the first half of the 21st century, Islamic extremism of the jihadist variety continued to remain the dominant ideology of transnational terrorism on the global level. Its role continued to grow at the local and regional level as well in Islamic regions where, it should be noted, it was often connected to radical nationalism both in the form of ethnic separatism (Kashmir, Philippines, Northern Caucasus, etc.) and national liberation (Iraq and the Palestinian territories). As for organization, the trend on both levels continued to be the spread of network elements and organizational forms ever more broadly. Its effect was greatly to strengthen a new peculiar organizational phenomenon that was not char-



acteristic of either classical networks or hierarchical ones: the effective multi-level coordination of activities via common strategic directives.

Terrorist organizations' main resources, regardless of their level, are ideology and organization. These complement their financial and technical capabilities. Here two trends are worth noting.

First and foremost, there is terrorists' growing use of new, quickly developing *information and communication technologies*, resources, and skills, not only in order to broaden their audience, base of support, and the strength of the demonstration effect and societal resonance of terrorist incidents, but also for organization-building itself and the proliferation of extremist ideology. In our opinion, current terrorist groups' information and communication capabilities and ever more *effective and sophisticated public relations* are no less, and possibly more, important than the armaments, munitions, explosive materials, and means of delivery they use (which, even in large-scale incidents such as the explosions in Madrid in March 2004 or in London in July 2005, can be relatively conventional, accessible, and inexpensive).

The second trend is the growth in the degree of financial autonomy of armed, non-state players in the contemporary world—up to and including complete financial independence and self-sufficiency. This is, incidentally, not just characteristic for terrorist organizations. It is important to emphasize that terrorists are attaining a high level of financial autonomy not just thanks to their ever-increasing immersion in the shadow economy and cooperation with organized crime, but also via completely legal means (from participation in legal businesses to the use of funds originally collected as legal, religious donations for their own aims). Terrorists' successful search for new sources and means of funding and their transition to partial or full self-funding is in large part the result of the long-term trend towards the gradual but persistent *reduction of so-called state support for terrorism* on a global scale.³

Let us briefly examine the chief types of terrorism and trends in contemporary Islamist terrorism by looking, first, at the example of the terrorist attacks in London of July 2005 as an example of transnational jihadist terrorism in its post-al-Qa'ida form and, second, at terrorism as one of the main tactics of the Iraqi insurrection. Iraq has become a zone of cooperation between transnational jihadist networks and local groups, combining Islamist extremism and local nationalism. Thirdly, if in Iraq the Islamist groups of mixed nationalities involved in insurrection were only formed in the mid-2000s, in the other hotbed of regional tension—the drawn-out Palestinian-Israeli and, more broadly, Arab-Israeli conflict, which became a full-scale war between Israel and Lebanon in 2006—the combination of Islamism and radical nationalism has already become traditional. It has been most noticeable in the two largest militarized, religious, social, and political movements: the Palestinian Hamas and Lebanese Hezbollah movements. Although the activities of both organizations go far beyond the scope of terrorism, one cannot ignore them—particularly given the sharp July-August 2006 escalation in the conflict in the Middle East.

“NEW TERRORISM” TAKES CENTER STAGE: THE LONDON TERRORIST INCIDENTS OF JULY 2005

Along with the 2004 terrorist incidents in Madrid, the terrorist attacks in London on July 7, 2005 have been the most noticeable manifestation of “new terrorism” in the current decade.

U.K. citizens and facilities have been the victims of terrorist attacks by mujahedin before. In November 2003, vehicles filled with explosives blew up at the U.K. consulate and the HSBC Bank in Istanbul (killing the U.K. consul general); British citizens were victims of the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States; the October 12, 2002 events in Bali (Indonesia); and the March 11, 2004 terrorist acts in Madrid that were all carried out by Islamist groups. However, the explosions in London on July 7, 2005 were the first successful attacks in history carried out on the territory of the United Kingdom itself. Further, in the year since July 2005 at least three similar terrorist attacks on U.K. territory were prevented.⁴ Finally, on August 10, 2006 the

United Kingdom was struck by a great air transport crisis after the authorities provided information on the preventive interdiction of plans by British Islamist terrorists to blow up several transatlantic airlines using dozens of suicide bombers and liquid explosives, causing the terrorist threat level to be raised to the highest level—critical—for several days.

It is significant that on the eve of the terrorist incidents of July 2005, in May of that year, the U.K. threat level was lowered from “severe general” to “substantial.”⁵ Furthermore, even then the basis for this decision was questionable, given that the number of “primary investigative targets” linked to terrorism in the United Kingdom had grown from 250 in 2001 to 500 in July 2004, and 800 by July 2005, and the British Security Service had warned no longer ago than March 2005 that the most significant threat to the United Kingdom and its interests overseas at that time came from al-Qa’ida and associated networks.⁶

The technical, financial, and other parameters of the July 7 incidents were not greatly different from those of other terrorist attacks launched by mujahedin in other countries since September 11, 2001. Nevertheless, it is still useful to examine these parameters, since they differ greatly from the stereotypes spread by the media.

As a result of three nearly simultaneous explosions in the London underground and an additional explosion that went off an hour later in a bus in Tavistock Place, 56 people were killed and over 700 injured. The police and intelligence services had received no warning of the attacks.⁷ The bombs were home-made (in an apartment rented for the purpose in Leeds) using readily available, inexpensive materials and equipment. Although the do-it-yourself manufacture of explosives from these materials is fairly dangerous, it does not require any special expertise: open-source information and, perhaps, the advice of a person familiar with the preparation of such devices is sufficient.⁸ The terrorists carried the potent explosives to the sites where they were to be detonated in rucksacks (of 2-5 kg each), and detonated them using regular batteries.⁹ The cost of the entire operation, including the apartment rental, necessary materials, transportation costs both within the United Kingdom and during foreign trips, totaled less than £8,000. The group funded itself from completely legal sources, and there is no evidence that it could have received any financial assistance from outside (its main resources were provided by its leader, Mohammed Siddeque Khan, who had worked at a regular job for three years and had taken out a personal bank loan of £10,000).¹⁰

The psychological and social characteristics as well as the backgrounds of the four terrorist suicide bombers were similar to previous terrorist incidents of this sort. Most important was that practically *nothing special distinguished them* from thousands of their peers, co-workers, neighbors, and friends and if there was a difference, then at first glance it was in their favor. The terrorists’ ages ranged from 18 to 30, two of them lived independently, were married, and each had a child, while the other two lived with their parents; three of them were second-generation U.K. citizens of Pakistani descent who were well integrated into British society. Although they grew up in the poor Leeds suburb of Beeston, they belonged to the middle class and did not want for anything, while the father of one of the terrorists was a successful local businessman. The leader of the group, Siddeque Khan, had graduated university, was actively engaged in social work and public assistance (he worked with invalids and children with difficulties), and was considered to be a talented teacher at his main place of work and in general a good example for area children. Not one of the members of the group had had problems with the police (the only thing that was somewhat atypical for the area where they lived), all of them actively participated in the social life of their community (visited clubs, books stores, etc.) and, like the members of other terrorist cells, spent quite a bit of time recreating outside (involved in sports, hiking, etc.)¹¹

Although they were religious and did not hide this fact (they prayed at work and visited one of the area mosques on Fridays, though they were not tied to any particular one), there were no concrete indications of religious extremism noted in any of them.¹² Not one of the three Britons of Pakistani descent were the followers of any of the extremist Islamic clerics active on British territory right up to the final period of time (and only the fourth member of the group, Jermaine Lindsay, who was of Jamaican origin and had converted to Islam in 2000 and was generally less



well integrated into British society, may have been under the influence of the radical British mullah Abdallah al-Faisal).¹³ Furthermore, not long before the terrorist incidents—apparently in order to dispel any possible suspicions—one of the group’s members returned to the western style of dress, another shaved off his beard, etc.

Thus, if there was no personal social adversity, no indoctrination by radical mullahs, and no direct order from a foreign terrorist group, what motivated this most recent group of European Islamist suicide terrorists? The same things that motivated similar groups in the past: recent global political events (Afghanistan, Iraq, etc.) were seen as a threat from the west led by the United States with the active participation of its loyal ally the United Kingdom, directed at the entire Moslem *umma* (community); the result was a reaction in the form of “religious martyrdom.” The traditional “suicide bomber farewell video” recorded by Siddeque Khan and broadcast on the Qatari television station Al-Jazeera on September 1, 2005, as well as his will, clearly testify to this. This documentary evidence is basically dedicated to the idea of the “injustices,” humiliations, and “cruelties and atrocities,” that “Muslims throughout the world” are subjected to by the western countries. Extolling the “heroes of our time”—the leaders of the jihadist movement “dear sheikh” Osama bin Laden, Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi—Siddeque Khan submits that the support citizens of western countries provide their “democratically elected governments” is the main reason why average citizens are “directly responsible” for the actions of their states and the main justification for strikes on civilians. Associating himself with the entire *umma*, Siddeque Khan addresses British citizens and residents of other western countries: “*your support of [your governments] makes you directly responsible, just as I am directly responsible for protecting and avenging my Muslim brothers and sisters*” and “*until we feel security, you will be our targets.*”¹⁴

The example of the group that committed the terrorist attacks of July 7, 2005 in London yet again testifies to the dynamic development and transformation of the jihadist movement in recent years, with which analysts simply “cannot keep up.” Indeed, the structural organization of the transnational jihadist movement at the beginning of the 21st century is in transition from a more clearly established organizational, ideological, and financial “nucleus” (al-Qa’ida) to an ever more amorphous, decentralized, spread-out network and the more active spread of cells in a method akin to “franchising.” These cells share the ideology and general orientation of al-Qa’ida and use its name as a “brand,” but are not directly tied to it organizationally: neither in the case of the Leeds group in the United Kingdom¹⁵ nor in the case of the Islamists who carried out the terrorist attacks on the trains in Madrid on March 11, 2004 is there reliable evidence of their connection to al-Qa’ida.¹⁶

In this “spread-out” network organization we see the signs of a “segmented, polycentric, ideologically integrated network” (SPIN). However, one should remember that in reality most terrorist organizations are hybrids of network and hierarchical elements at both the lower and higher levels. For example, the jihadist movement, despite the predominance of network features, has certain hierarchical elements as well. They are present both at the level of individual cells (the role of Siddeque Khan as the clear leader of the Leeds group) and within the framework of the movement as a whole (the presence of leaders, perhaps not in the classical sense but more in the ideological sense of the word, such as Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and the deceased Abu Musab al-Zarqawi). Typically, mixed, hybrid organizations are not the result of conscious organizational policy but developed organically, through natural adaptation to living conditions.

The jihadist movement cannot be reduced to a standard modern, impersonal functional- ideological network (like the anti-globalization movement) not only due the fact that it has a mixed form, but also because the network’s hierarchy is not pure, but instead has multiple levels. The fact is that in contrast to anti-globalization networks, a few shared ideological beliefs alone are not enough to ensure the effective functioning of the jihadist movement’s separate semi- or wholly autonomous cells in various locations towards a common goal. This organizational problem is solved with the aid of a model that is not characteristic either of networks or hierarchies “in their pure form”¹⁷—the *effective coordination* of the actions of lower-level semi- or completely autonomous cells not via centralized control (as in hierarchies) or through negoti-

ations and reciprocal agreements (as in networks), but with the *aid of a strategic directive, formulated in the most general form.*

When there are only informal, latent connections, this sort of strategic coordination with the aid of general directives can only be effective in two cases. Either the movement's ideology itself must already include sufficiently clear instructions about particular actions or it makes it possible to formulate strategic goals in such a way that they can be realized using various methods under a variety of circumstances and will still count as actions towards a common objective. The most ambitious and militarized version of Islamic extremism and the concept of a global jihad in response to western actions viewed as "unfair," "criminal," and "directed against all Muslims" satisfies both requirements as an ideology for a widespread, multilevel, and segmented "post-al-Qa'ida" jihadist movement. Here modern information technologies play an irreplaceable role, the Internet in particular, in helping the mujahedin to organize the movement and to attribute easily a common purpose to separate actions. Dozens of groups and cells throughout the world that are quite similar to each other but not connected in any way have the opportunity quickly to claim "virtual" responsibility for any action that corresponds to the global goals of the movement as a whole.

In addition to a general ideology, effective coordination of the actions of separate cells in the jihadist movement also require a higher level of reciprocal social obligations and interpersonal confidence, which neither network or mixed organization by themselves can ensure. The mujahedin are united not only by an abstract ideological closeness and a feeling that they are independent units that belong to a single network. The members of lower-level cells, as a rule, are also joined together by very close personal relations, which were often established even before they joined the jihadist movement. Here we are not chiefly talking about archaic clan relations but about ties of friendship and personal contacts, community ties, and shared experiences (at school, work, and social activities), that is, we are talking about a group of close friends, about an association, a distinctive "brotherhood" of like-minded believers.¹⁸

Typically, a group of Muslims (either living in a foreign land or the children of immigrants, usually well integrated into western society) bound together by ties of friendship or, somewhat less typically, kinship, attends mosque together, rents housing, or just gets together on a regular basis. Gradually such a group, made up of from four to 8-10 people, becomes internally integrated (as a rule, on the basis of an aggravated feeling of alienation from the surrounding society and a radical rejection of the policy of the authorities of the country of residence), and is politicized and radicalized on the basis of anti-western Islamic ideology, frequently under the influence of the group leader—a spiritual mini-authority and mentor. Radicalization and the pursuit of a new "fictitious" family in the form of a jihadist cell is often provoked by a socio-cultural "upheaval" (changing the country of residence, groups of close contacts, etc.), and intensified by the "virtual" influence and demonstrational effect of major world events—from the September 11, 2001 terrorist incident to the armed intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq. At some stage this sort of group may come to the conclusion that "empty conversation" is useless and that they must begin to engage in "propaganda via action." After this the "circle," as a rule, ceases to attend mosque and begins actively to seek contacts with active participants (veterans) of the jihadist movement and ways to organize terrorist attacks. It is significant that more and more frequently this internal self-indoctrination is almost spontaneous in nature, not directly tied to radical mosques or other centers of Islamic extremism in the west (!) and does not require the influence of well-known radical preachers (like, for example, the British mullahs Abu Hamza, Abdullah al-Faisal, Abu Qatada, or Omar Bakri Muhammad).¹⁹

Finally, the experience of the jihadist cell in Leeds confirms that the main strategic resource of the mujahedin is not the weapons they use, which can be easily obtained and inexpensive, and not even funding methods (which can be completely legal) or the scale of funding (today even large terrorist attacks are relatively inexpensive). The mujahedin's main strategic resource is extremist ideology together with a unique, flexible organizational model that makes it possible to coordinate effectively not through direct control from a particular center, but via a common strategic purpose and orientation along with strict discipline and internal integration even at the micro-level of individual cells.



Thus, today's transnational jihadist movement combines extremist religious trends with very modern organizational forms and information technology. This means that the global jihad cannot be reduced to "network tribalism" or relegated to the level of the tribal or clan-based skirmishes in Afghanistan or the inter-communal clashes in Iraq. The most active mujahedin are not tribal leaders but educated Muslim students and other members of the middle class, like the group of British Muslims who organized the July 2005 terrorist incidents in London (or those arrested in August 2006 in connection with possible plans to blow up transatlantic airliners).²⁰ The most beneficial soil for the generation of today's mujahedin is located in the areas of closest contact with the west, either directly (in the Muslim diasporas in western countries or in areas with a western economic, military, and cultural presence and influence) or indirectly (for example, in Muslim countries with ruling regimes viewed as allies or "agents" of the west and, particularly, the United States).

IRAQ: THE COMBINATION OF TERRORIST METHODS AND INSURGENT WAR

As mentioned above, the highest level of terrorist activity in two recent years was observed in the Middle East, where the number of terrorist incidents and victims far exceeded that of the region with the second-highest level of terrorist activity, South Asia. It is noteworthy that the high level of terrorism seen in the Middle East in the middle of the first decade of the 21st century is caused not by the long-standing Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but by the situation in Iraq, where coalition troops led by the United States are still engaged and the formation of a new, pro-western regime is encountering great difficulties. They are facing an Iraqi resistance movement made up of a variety of groups that use extremely varied methods—from guerilla attacks against the foreign troops and local security forces to terrorism and inter-communal (sectarian) violence.

The Iraqi resistance movement is very dynamic in nature. It is developing and changing form (including in response to the policy and actions of the United States and the regime it is supporting in Baghdad) nearly as rapidly as the jihadist movement at the transnational level, discussed above. Three years after the occupation of Iraq, the insurgent movement has traveled far.

In the early stages the rebels practically began from zero: despite widespread opinion, there is not complete certainty that in the early 2000s Saddam Hussein had prepared a detailed strategy of guerrilla warfare in the case of a military defeat. This is confirmed by the fact that in the first few months after the overthrow of the Iraqi regime it was relatively quiet, with almost no resistance to the U.S. troops. The first insurgent cells only began to be formed later, and on a completely different basis; that is, not so much and not merely because they belonged to the Baathist regime, but also on the basis of a mix of professional, family/clan, neighborhood/communal, regional, and other ties. Furthermore, the motivation of the insurgent groups initially appeared patriotic and nationalistic; it only gradually began to be more religious in nature than based on the discredited Baathist ideology.²¹

At that stage the insurgent movement consisted of many small localized groups, which appeared as rapidly as they disappeared. Either no one claimed responsibility for the majority of attacks, or several groups claimed it immediately. It is significant that at that stage not only did the first guerilla attacks against coalition forces garner popular support, but even the first terrorist attacks against international facilities, including the UN representative office,²² were not rejected by the population. After all, terrorist attacks on local citizens were not yet widespread and were attributed to foreign fighters/mujahedin, even though their presence in the early stages of resistance was very limited²³ (just as there was only a very small number of suicide attacks in the beginning). Generally speaking, by 2004 the intensity of guerilla and terrorist attacks by insurgents began to reach 40-50 per day, while in early 2005 they had grown to 50-60 attacks per day.²⁴

The level of local popular support for the rebels has varied over time and depending on the region and concrete community (for example, in contrast to the Sunnis and a substantial part

of the Shi'ites, the majority of Kurds support coalition forces, seeing the weakening of the Iraqi state as a chance to improve the position of their community and realize their separatist aspirations). Since the beginning of the occupation, support for the insurgents among both the Sunni and Shi'ite population has grown, to which disappointment over the political process and dissatisfaction with the military operations of coalition forces made significant contributions. The peak of this interdenominational support resulted from the events of spring/summer 2004: the U.S. siege of the Sunni Fallujah and the suppression of agitation among the Shi'ites in April and August, including operations against armed units under the leadership of Muqtada al-Sadr ("the Mahdi Army"). However, the rapprochement of Shi'ite and Sunni rebels proved to be short-lived. The radicalization of the resistance, the increasing frequency of the use of less selective, more fatal attacks that caused increasing Iraqi civilian deaths, most of whom were Shi'ite, as well as the conscious policy of the coalition forces to encourage sectarian friction facilitated the aggravation of inter-communal contradictions and prevented the creation of a united insurgent Sunni-Shi'ite front.

Since late 2004 the resistance movement has been ever more predominantly Sunni in nature, although this does not mean that the rebels have the general support of Sunni population.²⁵ This contributed to the consolidation of the armed opposition to foreign troops and the pro-American regime on the basis of *Sunni fundamentalism and radical Iraqi nationalism* and forced the rebels to pay more attention to propaganda. It must be emphasized that the predominantly Sunni nature of the resistance in late 2004 is to a certain degree a reflection of the ethnic and religious basis of the government that the United States is forming in postwar Iraq (with the reliance of the Kurds and moderate Shi'ites) and the anti-insurgent strategy they have chosen. This strategy has been generally anti-Sunni, with some reliance on the Kurdish Peshmerga militia and the partial loyalty of militarized Shi'ite units.

By 2005, in contrast to its chaotic beginnings, several relatively uniform and larger groups had been formed within the insurgent movement. They had already become well organized, combined network characteristics with the necessary level of centralization, were able to react flexibly to changes in the political situation, and had created their own system of propaganda with the use of the latest information technology.

"Tanzim al-Qa'idat fi Bilad al-Rafidayn" (the al-Qa'ida organization in Mesopotamia) became one of the largest groups, known in U.S. sources as "Al-Qa'ida in Iraq," which the United States added to its list of foreign terrorist organizations in October 2004. Before his death on June 7, 2006 in the Baghdad suburbs as the result of a U.S. air strike, it was headed by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. According to statements made by the organization, two of its 15 brigades are staffed with suicide attackers (one of them solely by Iraqi volunteers).²⁶ Throughout 2005, the "al-Qa'ida organization in Mesopotamia," which uses many foreign fighters, actively worked to make its image more "Iraqi" in nature. Moreover, even U.S. sources recognize that the majority of its members are Iraqis, and that as a whole foreign fighters make up only 4-10 percent of all rebels in Iraq.²⁷ The group is an active participant in the Iraqi resistance, though U.S. sources are inclined to exaggerate its role in the insurgency.

"Jaish Ansar al-Sunna" (the guerillas of the army of the Sunna) is a group that combines Islamism and Iraqi patriotism, and has, in addition to military units, a political wing. One of the most nationalist groups is "Al-Jaish al-Islami fil-Iraq" (Islamic army in Iraq). Al-Jabha al-Islamiya lil-Moqawama al-Iraqiya (Islamic front for the Iraqi resistance) is the most active group on the propaganda front. Along with these organizations, there are a whole series of smaller insurgent groups, such as the Jaish al-Rashideen (army of the first four caliphs), Harakat al-Moqawama al-Islamiya (Islamic resistance movement), Jaish al-Taifa al-Mansoura (army of the victorious community), Jaish al-Mujahedin (army of the mujahedin), and about 30-40 more groups.

In contrast to their behavior during the early stages of resistance, in 2005-2006 a single group would, as a rule, take responsibility for any large armed action; the issuance of statements claiming participation in such activities by several groups at once became rare, indicating an increase in consensus and, possibly, coordination of action between them. Moreover, in spite



of the severe anti-guerrilla measures undertaken by coalition forces—regular special operations, raids, “mopping up operations,” mass searches (about 8,000 in the two years beginning in May 2003), mass arrests and detentions (about 80,000 Iraqis during the same period),²⁸ and the insurgents’ loss of enclaves such as the Fallujah resistance stronghold as well as the loss of a number of their leaders (including as important a figure as Abu Musab al-Zarqawi) —they have not panicked and armed actions have not ceased. On the contrary, we see the further strengthening of the insurgent movement and its endeavors to combat the “occupiers and their accomplices,” up to and including joint declarations and operations, to say nothing of the “division of labor” that has been evident among the various groups.³³

The gradual ideological convergence of resistance fighters on the basis of an amalgam of the military and radical jihadist forms of Islamism with Iraqi nationalism is blurring the ideological and other differences between the foreign mujahedin and Iraqi insurgents. The presence of coalition forces in Iraq, seen as an “occupation,” is still the most important element binding the various groups together, causing an ideological and organizational convergence between various elements of the resistance; it is unclear whether this would remain the case if these forces were to depart. Nevertheless, the insurgent movement is not at all as heterogeneous and divided between Iraqis and foreign mujahedin as one might conclude from U.S. sources. The U.S. government continues (in part for political and propagandistic reasons) to insist that these divisions are increasing steadily,²⁹ and is basing its anti-guerrilla and counterterrorist strategy in Iraq on this notion.

Essentially, the opposition insurgent groups are not simply unified in their lack of a desire to enter into negotiations with the U.S. coalition and the new Iraqi authorities, but in addition see a real chance of realizing their primary goal: the expulsion of foreign forces from Iraq and the simultaneous punishment, including everything up to physical destruction, of the “turncoats” among the Muslim population who have gone over to the side of the enemy.³⁰ However, aside from this very concrete task neither the resistance movement as a whole nor any of its constituent groups have put forward any clear political program for the future of Iraq after the expulsion of the foreign forces.

Note that the Islamic radicalization of the Iraqi resistance helped the rebels to establish a religious base for the indiscriminate use of violence, the victims of which may be civilians. The possibility of random or unavoidable civilian deaths in the fight against coalition forces and the resistance to the political institutions of the “collaborationist” regime places the insurgent leadership in a moral dilemma. This dilemma was “solved” though a radical interpretation of the concept of jihad (holy war), according to which an action should be judged not by its results, but by its goals. In other words, “collateral” civilian victims are considered permissible and justified when the goal of an action—either direct or indirect—was to destroy the forces, power, or influence of the “enemy.” Furthermore, attempts by the enemy to hide among the local population are not seen as an obstacle to exacting retribution from that enemy. In this case, actions which may result in the death of innocent civilians are seen as justified and the civilian victims, like the fighters responsible for their loss, are viewed as “martyrs” (the only difference being that the latter meet death voluntarily, while the former are “unwilling martyrs”).

As far as acts of “pure terrorism” consciously directed against civilians are concerned, it should be emphasized that to date armed Iraqi resistance groups have very rarely taken direct responsibility for such acts. One case were the statements by al-Zarqawi approving the simultaneous bombings in Baghdad and Karbala in March 2004 during the Shi’ite holiday of Ashura (when over 180 people perished) and the attack on the leader of one of the largest Shi’ite organizations, the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, Ayatollah al-Hakim in December of the same year. Although these statements can be interpreted as an acknowledgement of participation in these terrorist acts, even al-Zarqawi denied the participation of his organization in the bombings in the sacred Shi’ite cities of Karbala and Najaf in the same month.³¹

It should be noted here that while the United States is trying, not without reason, to blame “foreign mujahedin headed by al-Zarqawi” for causing the internecine strife in Iraq, it is also provoking sectarian conflicts by relying on a variety of tribal and other groups in its fight with the

insurgents, in accordance with the “divide and conquer” principle. It is no surprise that each successive terrorist attack not only inflames internecine clashes, but also increases anti-American sentiments among the Iraqis.

WAR AND CRISIS IN THE MIDDLE EAST: BEYOND TERRORISM

In 2005-06 the Middle East remained the world’s most problematic region, not only from the point of view of terrorism, but also of military activity. Indeed, the new spurt of violence in the Middle Eastern conflict zone was tied not so much to terrorist attacks on innocent civilians by non-state actors, as to the regional war between Israel and the Shi’ite military and political group Hezbollah, in Lebanon, and Israel’s incursion into Lebanon. The number of civilian victims, primarily of Israeli military strikes in just the first month after the beginning of military actions (from July 12 to the beginning of the armistice on August 14, 2006³²), is comparable to the average number of annual victims of terrorist activity in the Middle Eastern conflict zone.

During the crisis various types and levels of conflicts and interests became interlaced. Among the local conflicts one of the most significant is the continuing Lebanese-Israeli conflict. Both Hezbollah’s military capabilities, which Israel views as a threat to its security, and the unresolved problem of Lebanese prisoners seized by Israel during the occupation before the year 2000 continue to play a destabilizing role, particularly given the increasing role of Hamas in the Palestinian Authority.

On the regional level, the conflict both in Lebanon and in the region as a whole between the interests of Israel, on the one hand, and Syria and Iran, on the other; all of these states’ attempts to alter the balance of power in the Middle East; the continuation of the Arab-Israeli conflict; and the undecided Palestinian question are all destabilizing the situation. The situation is made still more extreme by the continuing crisis and growing resistance to the foreign military intervention in Iraq.

Finally, the situation can also be viewed in the broader international context. Primarily, that means examining the conflicts between the United States and regional players such as Syria and, especially, Iran.

However, the latest crisis in the Middle East has concrete implications where terrorism/antiterrorism is concerned as well. At a minimum, it raises two critical questions on which there is no international agreement.

The first issue is the fundamentally new relationship between terrorism itself, i.e. *non-state terrorism* (by sub-national or transnational groups and networks), and so-called *state-supported terrorism*. While state support for terrorist groups has gradually decreased, especially with the end of the Cold War, this relationship has changed radically in favor of non-state terrorist organizations, which espouse extreme ideologies, have flexible and mobile organizational structures, are politically autonomous, and are ever more financially independent. This change requires a fundamental shift away from previous ideas and estimates regarding terrorist threats to security, which were predominantly aimed at pressuring “state sponsors of terrorism.” Unfortunately, as the development of the Iraqi, Palestinian-Israeli, and general Middle Eastern conflicts indicate, these changes are either given insufficient consideration by some states, including the main external actor in the region—the United States—or they consciously ignore them.

This changed relationship of non-state to state-supported terrorism may vary somewhat and be more or less noticeable depending on the region, but it can be identified clearly on a global scale. This was one of the reasons why Russia objected at the July 2006 G8 Summit in St. Petersburg (which coincided with a serious deterioration of the situation in the Middle East) to attempts to accuse Syria and Iran directly of escalating the conflict between Hezbollah and Israel. Even where, as in the present case, the interests of militarized non-state groups and several regional states are similar or even coincide, and even when the groups have old ties to state actors,³³ it would be a great exaggeration to say that Hezbollah’s actions are directly con-



trolled by Syria or Iran and ordered by Damascus or Tehran.³⁴ More generally, the main reason for the continuous instability in the region is not so much the “evil” influence of Syria and Iran (which, like Israel, are undoubtedly ready to do a great deal to protect their strategic interests), as in the failure to solve the Israeli-Palestinian question, as well as, in the past few years, the deteriorating situation in Iraq. Against this backdrop Lebanon, which had nearly managed to recover from the ruin of a protracted civil war and two foreign occupations (by Israel and Syria), seemed a unique “bright spot” until the recent Israeli invasion of July 2006. Although the predictions of a new sectarian war in Lebanon have not come to pass thus far, Hezbollah’s domestic political position was not weakened but strengthened by the war with Israel, a fact likely to have ambiguous consequences for that nation’s brittle sectarian balance, among other issues.

The second, even more critical problem, which is particularly urgent in the anti-terrorist context, is the question of what to do if the state is weak and the sectarian/nonstate group, or movement, is comparatively strong and popular. Although such a group may previously have used terrorist methods and maintain the possibility of using them in future, it could also become the main political representative of its community and enjoy the broad support of the local population. Certainly, this problem goes far beyond terrorism. It is important to understand that the key here is not the comparative “strength” or “weakness” of the state’s power (in its traditional sense as the degree of centralized state control), but the state’s *ability to function* (functionality, or capability) under specific political, ethnic, religious, socioeconomic, and regional conditions. For example, in a country that is as variegated in the sectarian sense as Lebanon, which is made up of several large communities (Maronites, Orthodox, Sunni, Druz, Shi’ite, etc.), the state is *forced* to remain relatively weak and decentralized in order to function under post-conflict conditions (to maintain some political stability and a brittle sectarian balance and create the conditions for social and economic development). Its role is in many ways limited to serving as an arbitrator of sectarian conflicts. This multi-sectarian state as a whole, and its army in particular, are able to function (functional) in the sense that they are able to maintain law and order inside the country, especially among the various communities, but they are weak in the sense that they can neither prevent attacks by local militarized groups into foreign territory, nor protect the country from external aggression. It is clear that attempts to use shortcuts to artificially “strengthen” and centralize the state and “force” it to create a powerful military capability not only have few chances for success, but also threaten to destroy domestic political stability and the sectarian balance, which was restored with such difficulty after the decades of civil war and armed outside intervention. If the international community, in the form of the UN Security Council, insists on overloading this state with responsibilities for security, including external defense, it must be prepared to undertake the lion’s share of the efforts needed to support this (including maintaining the demarcation between communities, ensuring border control, etc.)

In its most extreme form this problem can be formulated as follows: what should be done if a nonstate military/political organization is not just stronger than the state (which makes it impossible for domestic forces to undertake its disarmament and demilitarization), but also cannot be destroyed from outside without: a) completely destroying its base of public support inside the country (up to engaging in genocide against the entire community), and b) destabilizing the entire state and undermining its capabilities by destroying its domestic sectarian and/or sociopolitical balance? Let us examine this problem by looking at Hamas and Hezbollah.

In the first few decades of its existence, Hamas, which grew out of the Gaza Strip branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, was dedicated to religious and humanitarian activities, only later began engaging in armed struggle, including the use of terrorist methods. Note that Hamas, like many groups of this type, has two dimensions and is pursuing two levels of goals. On the religious side its ultimate goal is fundamentalist in nature and is focused on the creation of an Islamic state, for which “Allah is its target, the Prophet is its example, and the Koran is its constitution.”³⁵ Ideologically, such groups are not just radical, but dream about the possibility of living in “another dimension” analogous to the “first Muslim society.”

Given that for the foreseeable future this society cannot be realized and the idea of its possible creation is to a considerable extent irrational, Islamic organizations must somehow exist “in the meanwhile” and support their activities, in the expectation of a gradual advance to this distant purpose. In this “infinite” interval of time between the present and the far-off “bright future,” the Islamists are concentrating their activity on the society around them, from those most deprived to the dissatisfied among the elites. Hamas is a very clear example of this combination of proclaimed ideological goals that are unobtainable and incomparably more pragmatic social and sociopolitical aims. In particular, it is an acknowledged fact that the volume, variety, and breadth of the scope and effectiveness of Hamas humanitarian activities considerably exceed the levels of similar activities by the official authorities, the Palestinian National Authority. It is precisely this everyday social work “among the masses,” using the alternative network of social assistance centers, schools, hospitals, etc. that Hamas has created, that has become the organization’s main strategic resource, ensuring it the support of a substantial part of the Palestinian population, especially in the Gaza Strip, and an electoral victory in January 2006.

In contrast to Hamas, which was originally established as a religious movement and only turned to armed opposition and the use of terrorist methods after decades had passed, Hezbollah arose as part of the Lebanese Shi’ite community’s resistance to Israeli occupation (Southern Lebanon in 1982-85 and border regions in 1985-2000), and was a direct reaction to this occupation. Freeing southern Lebanon of Israeli troops was the organization’s main military and political goal through their withdrawal in May 2000, which, on the one hand, was seen as a great victory for Hezbollah, but on the other hand also deprived it of its main reason for maintaining a powerful military capability and presented the organization with its first serious strategic choice. This choice was related to the dual—military and political—or even multi-dimensional nature of the movement. On the one hand, for decades Hezbollah had been conducting guerrilla warfare against foreign troops, including the use of terrorist methods (which, however, never surpassed the importance of assaults, sorties, and artillery attacks by military units) and continued to preserve and even to develop its military capabilities in the six years after the withdrawal of Israel from southern Lebanon—capabilities that Israel sees as a direct threat to the security of its northern regions. On the other hand, since Lebanese society and the Lebanese state are made up of a union of various sectarian communities, Hezbollah was, first, able to become the main organization for the largest Shi’ite community in the country, after erecting whole network of social services: from hospitals and schools to its own media (the al-Manar television network and a large number of newspapers and periodicals) and undertaking a reconstruction campaign (Jihad al-Bina) in the parts of the country that had suffered economic damage while under foreign control during the long civil war. Second, Hezbollah actively participated in the political process, gaining seats in the Lebanese parliament and ministers in the coalition government via elections. Third, as the political representative of the largest Lebanese community and the only group that possesses military units that could at least to some degree defend the country from an external enemy, Hezbollah has laid claim to a broader role on both the national and inter-sectarian levels, having become one of the country’s main nationalist forces. Fourth, thanks to its ties to Iran and Syria, Hezbollah has become not just a sectarian and national, but also an important regional actor. Finally, the movement’s radical international Islamist ideology has ever broader international resonance both in the Muslim world and beyond its borders.

Hezbollah’s complex, multi-dimensional nature and, particularly, its embeddedness in Lebanon’s sectarian mosaic and the regional context explains why the primary task of the military campaign launched by Israel in July 2006—the destruction of Hezbollah’s military capabilities—could not be achieved (at least, not in the way that the goal was formulated). First of all, another Israeli intervention in Lebanon actually recreates the circumstances to which the Hezbollah movement owes its formation and decades-long existence. In other respects the effect of a new Lebanese-Israeli war on Hezbollah is unclear: on the one hand, it strengthens the movement’s military profile and the position of its most radical elements, while on the other hand it not only further consolidates public support for Hezbollah among Lebanon’s Shi’ite community, but also strengthens its national (and not just narrowly sectarian) image, visibility, and platform.



Generally speaking, multi-dimensional Islamist nationalist movements such as Hamas and Hezbollah cannot be successfully dealt with at the national (intra-Palestinian and intra-Lebanese) and regional levels without a balanced approach taking into account both *security* and support for government *functionality* or the make-up of the state. Do we really have to note that this sort of balanced approach cannot be attained through military intervention? On the contrary, it does not just imply, but requires, first and foremost, domestic political transformation and the further politicization of non-governmental actors at the national level—a process that Hamas and Hezbollah have already begun in recent years.

This strategy must be combined with legitimate international security assurances for the region (both for Israel and for its neighbors), reinforced by international aid—first, for complex, multi-sectarian states like Lebanon, with traditionally weak central authority, which, as we have shown, are weak for a reason. Finally, over the long term a final demilitarization and/or partial “etatization” and establishment of some controls over the militarized capabilities of Islamic movements like Hamas and Hezbollah is hardly likely without a renewal and progress in the efforts to settle the conflict in the Middle East (and in other centers of regional tension, Iraq first and foremost).

CONCLUSION

Transnational networks that operate globally and groups based and operating—often for decades—at the local level may not only be close ideologically. There are several structural parallels among them, their leaders, and their rank-and-file members, and at times there may even be direct contacts between them (for instance, as we have seen during the armed resistance in Iraq). However, this does not “automatically” mean that current local Islamist groups that use terrorism as one of their tactics of armed resistance belong to a “global jihad” that is directed and inspired from without.³⁶

Local and global terrorist organizations can be distinguished by the scale of their goals: unlimited, existential goals in the case of the global jihad and limited local or national goals in the case of local insurgent, separatist, or other Islamist groups. Each of these two levels of terrorism has a large degree of autonomy and its own dynamics and path of development. Thus, we cannot speak of a confrontation with some sort of “global Islamist terrorist Internationale” that is completely integrated from the local to the global level, but instead must deal with a far more complicated problem: confronting Islamist terrorism on a variety of levels. 🗨️

Notes

¹ The statistics in this paper have been calculated on the basis of the data in the National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT) Terrorism Knowledge Base, Oklahoma, 2005, <<http://www.tkb.org>>. All of the statistics only apply to the period after 1998, inclusive, since the database only includes data on both international and “domestic” terrorist incidents from that date forward.

² Ibid.

³ For more details, see Ekaterina Stepanova, “Countering Terrorist Financing,” *International Trends*, Vol. 3, No. 2 (8) (May-August 2005), <<http://www.intertrends.ru/seven/006.htm>>, last accessed November 21, 2006, pp. 66-73.

⁴ *Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005* (London: The Stationary Office, May 11, 2006), <<http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/hc0506/hc10/1087/1087.pdf>>, last accessed November 21, 2006, p. 30.

⁵ *Intelligence and Security Committee Report into the London Terrorist Attacks on 7 July 2005* (London: The Stationary Office, 2006), <http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/publications/reports/intelligence/isc_7july_report.pdf>, last accessed November 21, 2006, pp. 17-18. The top four levels of terrorist threat range from “substantial” to “critical.”

⁶ Ibid, pp. 8-9.

⁷ Ibid, p. 13.

⁸ Ibid, p. 11; *Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London*, pp. 4, 23.

⁹ *Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London*, pp. 4-5.

¹⁰ Ibid, p. 23.

¹¹ Ibid, pp. 13, 16-17.

¹² Ibid, pp. 14-16.

¹³ Ibid, p. 18.

¹⁴ As cited in *ibid*, p. 19.

¹⁵ *Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London*, p. 31.

¹⁶ The Spanish authorities did not find evidence of any organizational tie between the group responsible for the bombing of the train in Madrid's Atocha station in March 2004 and the al-Qa'ida leadership either. See, for example, *First report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team appointed pursuant to resolution 1526 (2004) concerning Al-Qaida and the Taliban and associated individuals and entities* (New York: UN Document S/2004/679, August 25, 2004), p. 8.

¹⁷ For more details on the specifics of current terrorist organization, see Ekaterina Stepanova, "The Organizational Forms of the Global Jihad," *International Trends*, Vol. 4, No. 1 (10) (January-April 2006), <<http://www.intertrends.ru/tenth/008.htm>>, last accessed November 21, 2006.

¹⁸ For example, as in the case of the London terrorists, the explosions in Casablanca, Morocco in May 2003 were carried out by mujahedin who had literally "grown up on the same street." According to data cited by American psychologist Marc Sageman, who put together information about active participants in the jihadist movement, "friendly ties" played an important role in joining the jihad for 68 percent of mujahedin (moreover, most of them joined the jihad not individually but in small "clusters of friends.") Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004).

¹⁹ *Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London*, p. 29.

²⁰ Of the two dozen individuals arrested in relation to this affair whose names have been officially published, all of the British Muslims are only a bit over 20 years of age (just one is over 30), and they are all students, employed in the service or medical industry, or entrepreneurs. See, for example, "Air Plot' Suspects: Names Released," BBC News, August 11, 2006; "Financial Sanctions: Terrorist Financing," Bank of England Press Release, August 24, 2006 <<http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/news/2006/082.htm>>; "CPS Authorises Charges in Alleged Aircraft Terror Plot," Crown Prosecution Service Press Release, August 21, 2006 <http://www.cps.gov.uk/news/pressreleases/149_06.html>.

²¹ For more detail, see Ekaterina Stepanova, "The Challenge of Terrorism in Post-Saddam Iraq: A View from Russia," *Program on New Approaches to Russian Security (PONARS) Policy Memo No. 325* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), April 2004). <http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/pm_0325.pdf>.

²² Even though the United States was unable to secure a UN mandate in support of military intervention in Iraq, the United Nations has by no means been popular among Iraqis, due to its role in the embargo against Iraq in the 1990s.

²³ In the first half year of the occupation, the Islamists did not take responsibility for a single significant action of resistance.

²⁴ According to General Richard Myers, Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, as cited in "Iraqi Insurgency Undiminished," BBC News, April 27, 2005.

²⁵ Particularly given the passive unacceptance of a significant portion of the population with regards to methods like suicide attacks aimed at Iraqis who are standing in long lines in an attempt to obtain some type of employment (including in the new security structures) or the increasing frequency of bombings in public places.



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²⁶ "In Their Own Words: Reading the Iraqi Insurgency," *International Crisis Group (ICG) Middle East Report*, No. 50 (February 15, 2006), p. 1.

²⁷ *Country Reports on Terrorism 2005* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. State Department Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, April 2006), p. 131. According to government data, the total number of insurgents in Iraq may reach as many as 20,000. The well-known bipartisan Iraq Study Group report estimates the number of foreign jihadists in Iraq at 1,300. See *The Iraq Study Group Report*, Washington, DC, 2006, p. 10 <http://www.bakerinstitute.org/Pubs/iraqstudygroup_findings.pdf>.

²⁸ Carl Conetta, *Vicious Circle: The Dynamics of Occupation and Resistance in Iraq* (Cambridge, MA: Project on Defense Alternatives Research Monograph #10, May 18, 2005, <<http://www.comw.org/pda/0505rm10.html>>, last accessed November 21, 2006.

²⁹ For example, the al-Qa'ida organization in Mesopotamia specializes more in suicide attacks against U.S. forces and facilities, while Jaish Ansar al-Sunna focuses more on Iraqi security forces.

³⁰ *Country Reports on Terrorism 2005*, p. 130.

³¹ "In Their Own Words: Reading the Iraqi Insurgency," pp. ii, 14.

³² *Country Reports on Terrorism 2004* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. State Department Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, April 2005), p. 61.

³³ According to official Lebanese government reports in late August 2006, between July 12 and August 12, 2006, 1,287 Lebanese died as a result of Israel's military operation against Lebanon, while more than 4,000 individuals were wounded. Of the 157 Israelis killed, 118 were military servicemen. As cited in Rosbizneskonsalting, August 20, 2006.

³⁴ Thus, for instance, although Iran's ayatollahs are viewed by Hezbollah as having a great deal of authority, in practice there has yet to be a case where Iranian spiritual leader Ali Khamenei has changed or insisted on cancelling a decision made by the Consultative Council, Hezbollah's highest governing body, of which Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah has been secretary general since 1992.

³⁵ One could equally argue that Israel is acting under Washington's direct orders.

³⁶ The text of the Hamas covenant is available in English translation on the site of the Avalon Project at Yale Law School: *Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement*, August 18, 1988, <<http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/mideast/hamas.htm>>. See in particular Article 5.

³⁷ Nor are they, similarly, objects without willpower that are completely controlled and manipulated by regional powers.