Chronology

The signing of the Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the Government of the French Republic on Cooperation in the Nuclear Energy Sphere.
19.04.1996

PIR Center Blog

06.03.2019

The OSCE Ministerial Council held in Milan, Italy, on 6-7 December had not promised any breakthroughs in the politico-military dimension and its outcomes were predictably modest. The only document related to this domain (or, in traditional terms, to the “first basket”) that was adopted was the Declaration on OSCE Efforts in the Field of Norms and Best Practices on Small Arms and Light Weapons and Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition. Apparently, this subject is uncontroversial enough to be the common denominator for the 57 OSCE participating states.

09.11.2018

From the point of view of regional security, disruption of the INF Treaty is dangerous to Russia since Ukraine still retains the potential to produce intermediate and short-range missiles and will no longer have constraints under the treaty. This may add further fuel to tensions between Russia, European countries and the United States.

21.08.2018

The internationally negotiated Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) of 14 July 2015, or the Iran nuclear agreement, concluded between Iran, the P5+1,and the EU is widely considered to be a very important political, diplomatic, mutually beneficial achievement which contributes greatly to the strengthening and indeed survival of the NPT. Since the entry into force of the JPCOA in January 2016, the IAEA has consistently verified Iran’s compliance with all of its international safeguards obligations under the JCPOA, which constitute the strictest safeguards regime ever applied to any NPT State Party.

15.07.2018

Helsinki is a chance – not even for a breakthrough, but for some light at the end of the tunnel. It’s a chance to leave the ‘crisis management’ phase behind, a chance to start defusing the confrontation and mending fences. A chance to send a signal to the rest of the world. The world is waiting.

07.03.2018

I do not accept the argument that that the transition period in Washington is taking longer than usual, and the real game will start soon. Nor do I think that just separating the nuclear nonproliferation agenda issues from the broader context of security agenda could help. This will just mislead all of us, whether the Korean Peninsula or the Middle East, or even the US-Russian relations are concerned because – I will repeat it again – the US-Russian nonproliferation and arms control relations are more than ever part of a more complex strategic relationship between the two countries.

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