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Blog entries: Vladimir Orlov

18.11.2019

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference kicks off in less than 6 months’ time. Both Russia and the United States are on the final stretch of their respective preparations for that key international security event. Our two countries bear special responsibility. First, the Treaty designates them (and the United Kingdom) as the NPT depositary states; they are the guardians of the Treaty’s letter, so to speak. Second – and most important – between the two of them, Russia and the United States control over 92 per cent of the world’s nuclear weapons, thereby retaining their status as nuclear superpowers. Of course, the world has changed since the NPT entered into force back in 1970. Some superpowers have collapsed, only to be succeeded by others... but in nuclear matters, the bipolar world order has not changed much since the Cold War. In an era of dangerous erosion of international norms, the NPT remains the cornerstone of the global security architecture. Are Russia and the United States ready to work responsibly and cooperatively for the sustainability of the Treaty?

15.07.2018

Helsinki is a chance – not even for a breakthrough, but for some light at the end of the tunnel. It’s a chance to leave the ‘crisis management’ phase behind, a chance to start defusing the confrontation and mending fences. A chance to send a signal to the rest of the world. The world is waiting.

07.03.2018

I do not accept the argument that that the transition period in Washington is taking longer than usual, and the real game will start soon. Nor do I think that just separating the nuclear nonproliferation agenda issues from the broader context of security agenda could help. This will just mislead all of us, whether the Korean Peninsula or the Middle East, or even the US-Russian relations are concerned because – I will repeat it again – the US-Russian nonproliferation and arms control relations are more than ever part of a more complex strategic relationship between the two countries.

20.10.2017

"All I have to say to Trump, abandon this reckless game before it’s too late! You are deluding yourself if you think you’ve been dealt all the trump cards. Your imaginary perfect is the enemy of the good. The JCPoA is a good deal. Signed not only by the United States, but also by six other countries (including Russia), it is working well. All the parties are abiding by their commitments. There can be no deal with Iran without Iran itself. Your imaginary grand bargain is a folly; it has no basis in reality."

03.07.2017

When Presidents Putin and Trump meet in a few days from now in Hamburg, they should use a narrow window of opportunity to stop the freefall of the bilateral relationship and make progress at least in some of the following areas (as I suggested as early as in December 2016, prior to Trump’s inauguration). First, they should aim to work together against terrorism. Second, Putin and Trump should do their utmost to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Third, preventing an arms race in cyberspace should become their joint  priority. Fourth, Russia and the United Stated can work together on putting out the various conflagrations in the Middle East. Fifth and last (but not least), the two countries should put an end to their puerile exchange of sanctions and countersanctions, and begin revitalizing their trade, economic, and humanitarian cooperation. 

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