Chronology

The U.S. Senate proposes a policy of "advise and consent" on the ratification of the Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II). The treaty never comes into force.
26.01.1996

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Blog entries: обычные вооружения

11.03.2015

On March 10th of this year, at a regular meeting of the Joint Consultative Group (JCG) of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), A.Y. Mazur, the head of the Russian delegation, issued a statement that suspended the Russian Federation’s participation in the group’s meetings, effective March 11, 2015.  “Therefore, Russia is ending its actions in the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, announced in 2007, completely.”

10.03.2015

According to the Common Position, “Member States shall deny an export licence for military technology or equipment which would provoke or prolong armed conflicts or aggravate existing tensions or conflicts in the country of final destination.“  In addition, the document stipulates that member states must refuse from exporting if there is a threat that “intended recipient would use the military technology or equipment to be exported aggressively against another country or to assert by force a territorial claim.“

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