The internationally negotiated Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) of 14 July 2015, or the Iran nuclear agreement, concluded between Iran, the P5+1,and the EU is widely considered to be a very important political, diplomatic, mutually beneficial achievement which contributes greatly to the strengthening and indeed survival of the NPT. Since the entry into force of the JPCOA in January 2016, the IAEA has consistently verified Iran’s compliance with all of its international safeguards obligations under the JCPOA, which constitute the strictest safeguards regime ever applied to any NPT State Party.

I do not accept the argument that that the transition period in Washington is taking longer than usual, and the real game will start soon. Nor do I think that just separating the nuclear nonproliferation agenda issues from the broader context of security agenda could help. This will just mislead all of us, whether the Korean Peninsula or the Middle East, or even the US-Russian relations are concerned because – I will repeat it again – the US-Russian nonproliferation and arms control relations are more than ever part of a more complex strategic relationship between the two countries.

"All I have to say to Trump, abandon this reckless game before it’s too late! You are deluding yourself if you think you’ve been dealt all the trump cards. Your imaginary perfect is the enemy of the good. The JCPoA is a good deal. Signed not only by the United States, but also by six other countries (including Russia), it is working well. All the parties are abiding by their commitments. There can be no deal with Iran without Iran itself. Your imaginary grand bargain is a folly; it has no basis in reality."

The time has come for stepping up bilateral economic cooperation with Iran. It is also time to offer the country full SCO membership, without waiting for the UN Security Council sanctions to be lifted. Up until now, these sanctions were used as a flimsy excuse to deny membership to Tehran. Now that even Washington is finally talking about the lifting of sanctions, it is high time for Russia to give fresh impetus to its strategic cooperation with Iran.

On the one hand, Syria was not obliged to destroy its chemical arsenals, simply because several other countries in that region, Israel in particular, are not members of other nonproliferation agreements. Israel has nuclear weapons. But it would be fair to say that Syria’s chemical weapons are not an effective deterrent against Israel. It makes no military sense for the Syrian regime to have chemical weapons. In actual fact, these weapons constitute a risk, rather than strengthen Syria’s security.