Chronology

The U.S. Senate proposes a policy of "advise and consent" on the ratification of the Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II). The treaty never comes into force.
26.01.1996

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Blog entries: Iran

21.08.2018

The internationally negotiated Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) of 14 July 2015, or the Iran nuclear agreement, concluded between Iran, the P5+1,and the EU is widely considered to be a very important political, diplomatic, mutually beneficial achievement which contributes greatly to the strengthening and indeed survival of the NPT. Since the entry into force of the JPCOA in January 2016, the IAEA has consistently verified Iran’s compliance with all of its international safeguards obligations under the JCPOA, which constitute the strictest safeguards regime ever applied to any NPT State Party.

tags: Iran
07.03.2018

I do not accept the argument that that the transition period in Washington is taking longer than usual, and the real game will start soon. Nor do I think that just separating the nuclear nonproliferation agenda issues from the broader context of security agenda could help. This will just mislead all of us, whether the Korean Peninsula or the Middle East, or even the US-Russian relations are concerned because – I will repeat it again – the US-Russian nonproliferation and arms control relations are more than ever part of a more complex strategic relationship between the two countries.

tags: Iran
20.10.2017

"All I have to say to Trump, abandon this reckless game before it’s too late! You are deluding yourself if you think you’ve been dealt all the trump cards. Your imaginary perfect is the enemy of the good. The JCPoA is a good deal. Signed not only by the United States, but also by six other countries (including Russia), it is working well. All the parties are abiding by their commitments. There can be no deal with Iran without Iran itself. Your imaginary grand bargain is a folly; it has no basis in reality."

tags: Iran
07.05.2015

When the latest issue of the Security Index journal was just about to go to print, I chanced to see a quote from Andreas Hoefert, chief economist of the UBS, a Swiss bank. Speaking last December about the 2015 global economic forecast released by his bank, he had this to say: “We need to be conscious that forecasts are usually more wrong than right. We have so many examples of blunders in forecasts. Maybe the biggest forecast error ever made was by noted economist Irving Fisher, who claimed in September 1929 that ‘equities have reached a permanent plateau”.

tags: Iran
13.11.2014

Unlike with Bushehr 1 (wherein the 10-year contract on the procurement of Russian fuel ends in 2021), Russia will deliver all of the fuel for the eight future units.  Rosatom is also undertaking the obligation to take back the spent nuclear fuel. Thus, it will not be necessary for Iran to increase its enrichment capacity in order to provide itself with material for fuel for the NPP (one of the reasons why Iranians insisted on the further expansion of their nuclear program)

tags: Iran
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