France has taken essential steps towards the process of disarmament and is resolutely committed to endorse its special role as a nuclear-weapon state. However, some experts have highlighted a level of ambiguity in the French rhetoric, for instance, in the light of the INF Treaty. In fact, by working on different fronts, France has been trying to find the right balance between deterrence and non-proliferation as well as between national interests and international commitments. As a result of the changing strategic context and the growing threats, has France been able to consolidate its political discourse? This blog gives an overview of the French stance on the NPT, TPNW, and the INF Treaty to evaluate the ongoing trends in the field of non-proliferation.

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference kicks off in less than 6 months’ time. Both Russia and the United States are on the final stretch of their respective preparations for that key international security event. Our two countries bear special responsibility. First, the Treaty designates them (and the United Kingdom) as the NPT depositary states; they are the guardians of the Treaty’s letter, so to speak. Second – and most important – between the two of them, Russia and the United States control over 92 per cent of the world’s nuclear weapons, thereby retaining their status as nuclear superpowers. Of course, the world has changed since the NPT entered into force back in 1970. Some superpowers have collapsed, only to be succeeded by others... but in nuclear matters, the bipolar world order has not changed much since the Cold War. In an era of dangerous erosion of international norms, the NPT remains the cornerstone of the global security architecture. Are Russia and the United States ready to work responsibly and cooperatively for the sustainability of the Treaty?

I do not accept the argument that that the transition period in Washington is taking longer than usual, and the real game will start soon. Nor do I think that just separating the nuclear nonproliferation agenda issues from the broader context of security agenda could help. This will just mislead all of us, whether the Korean Peninsula or the Middle East, or even the US-Russian relations are concerned because – I will repeat it again – the US-Russian nonproliferation and arms control relations are more than ever part of a more complex strategic relationship between the two countries.

The paper concludes that noteworthy changes in the international nuclear non-proliferation regime are hardly expected. Being useful for legal formalization of the non-nuclear weapon status of a state giving up nuclear military program and for further monitoring of related obligations, the NPT and non-proliferation regime overall can’t stop a development of nuclear weapons if a state decides to do so. In turn, the prospects of nuclear proliferation (or non-proliferation) depend on peculiarities of the strategic situation in a particular region and its evolution.