In the past decade we have all witnessed, and some have directly participated, in increasing the quality and quantity of weapons throughout the world. Suffice it to say that by 2006 global military expenditures had reached the incredible sum of $1.1 trillion.\textsuperscript{1} The U.S. defense budget makes up fully half of this amount: this is evidently the source of the offensive nature of U.S. military and political strategists’ conceptual views, as well as the reason for their aggressive implementation. It is the Americans who set the tone and force everyone else, both allies and partners as well as opponents, to emulate them to the extent their financial, scientific, and technical capabilities allow, in order to ensure that the already doubtful balance of power is not completely destroyed. This is a great disservice that our American partners are doing to the rest of humanity. Yet it has become unfashionable to talk about and consider restraining the growth in defense budgets. Thus, for the foreseeable future the trend of continuing increases will remain.

THE CRISIS FACING DISARMAMENT POLICY

The rapid speed of improvements in military technology, the swift adoption of new technologies by the armed forces of many states and, as a result, the amendment of military doctrines to envision the use of military force to combat new threats and geopolitical challenges have all taken the global community unawares. As a result of this already fairly protracted period of confusion, the international legal underpinnings of arms control—which took decades to form—has begun to grow antiquated. In many ways it no longer meets current needs.

In recent years, the implicit balance that long existed between efforts in the area of classical disarmament on the one hand and in the sphere of combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) on the other has been destroyed. However, here we in no way intend to set these two concepts against each other. Taken together, they constitute the essence and content of the global disarmament process. This is made quite clear by an enumeration of the well-known 13 practical steps towards the realization of Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), adopted by the participants of the NPT Review Conference in New York in 2000.\textsuperscript{2} As is well known, this document includes the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the negotiation of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices (Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, or FMCT), the early entry into force and full implementation of START-2 and conclusion of START-3 as soon as possible while preserving and strengthening the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability and as a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons, and the application of the principle of irreversibility to nuclear disarmament measures, along with many other provisions.
One can note with satisfaction that on December 25, 2006 the Russian president signed the federal law *On the Ratification of the Agreement between the Government of the Russian Federation and the CTBTO Preparatory Commission on Measures Regarding International Monitoring System Facilities, envisaged by the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty*. The world has waited for the United States to take steps to ratify the CTBT for a long time, which would help to remove any serious doubts about the ultimate intentions of the United States.

However, subsequent events have shown that there is generally little justification to hope for serious progress in the area of nuclear disarmament. At least until the middle of the 21st century nuclear weapons will confidently occupy an exclusive spot in the arsenals of the recognized nuclear weapon states and strengthen their positions in the militaries of unofficial nuclear powers (India, Pakistan, and Israel). The capabilities of these latter states, which are not limited by any agreements, may soon become comparable to the nuclear arsenals of such powers as France, the United Kingdom, and China (Chinese nuclear capabilities are now estimated to total about 200 warheads; in 2004, they were estimated to be as high as 402).

Certainly, not everything looks so bleak. In the past 10-12 years the number of nuclear warheads in the U.S. and Russian arsenals, as a result of various treaties, has been more than halved. But the rest of the world is justified in considering this to be too little. On September 30, 2005 the United States and Russia announced the completion of downblending 250 tons of HEU, enough for about 10,000 nuclear warheads, under the 1993 HEU-LEU Agreement. At the turn of the 21st century the illusion arose that we were on the eve of a breakthrough. On November 13, 2000 the recently elected Russian president, Vladimir Putin, announced, “We see no grounds that would prevent further deep reductions in strategic offensive weapons. As is well known, we have proposed to the U.S., including at the highest levels, that the attainment of radically reduced levels of our countries’ nuclear arsenals—down to 1,500 warheads for each country—should be set as a goal, which can quite feasibly be reached by the year 2008. But neither is this the limit: we are prepared in future to consider even lower levels.” Even General Goodpaster, who was president of the influential Atlantic Council of the United States in the late 1990s and a well-known hawk in his day, promoted the idea of START-3, START-4, and START-5 with a final result of a total level of 1,000 nuclear warheads for each of the official nuclear weapon states.

But this did not happen. Radical Republican conservatives came to power in the United States who were convinced that the American century was coming, a century of protracted, undisputed U.S. military and political supremacy. They viewed well-known promoters of détente like Henry Kissinger as defeatists. Moreover, according to renowned American political scientist Rose Gottemoeller, President George W. Bush “has used two principles to dramatically change the United States’ conduct of its arms control policy: first, emphasize unilateral action […] and second, be willing to discard arms control mechanisms that might be considered outdated or harmful to U.S. interests.”

The consequences of Washington’s choice continue to be felt to this day. The ABM Treaty was quickly lost, and START-2 too disappeared for political reasons. START-3 was replaced by the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), which differs significantly from previous treaties between the two countries. The traumatic reaction to the dramatic and unexpected events of September 11, 2001 marked the time to move towards the use of force, including unilaterally, to destroy terrorists throughout the world. One of the primary tasks became denying terrorists access to WMD. In 2003, Washington’s Iraq catastrophe began; it continues to this day. The global war on terror has become the Republican administration’s main political trump card, and has led to the revision of nuclear doctrinal concepts and the possible use of nuclear weapons. The world has witnessed the advent of the U.S. concept of a “new triad.” Classical disarmament has been pushed firmly into the background.

We see excessive enthusiasm for the issue of WMD nonproliferation not only in the transfer of the center of gravity of diplomatic and negotiating work from disarmament to nonproliferation, but also in the transfer of personnel: negotiators and experts in key state participants in the negotiating process, like the United States and Russia, have been transferred from organizations involved in negotiating strategic and conventional weapons issues (organizations now in fairly rapid decline) to quite amorphous and very politicized organizations dealing with nonpro-
liferation issues. And some political scientists have introduced the traditional, unhurried process of bilateral negotiations into the analysis of multilateral nonproliferation issues. Thus, the number of individuals who are thoroughly versed in disarmament issues and know how to conduct negotiations competently has been greatly weakened on both sides of the ocean. Moreover, in 2005 the seventh NPT Review Conference in New York suffered a phenomenal failure, when agreement could not even be achieved on an abbreviated final communiqué. This can, in part, be blamed on the stagnation of the classical nuclear disarmament process.

It is clear that none of the important areas of arms control mentioned above should be held hostage to another. In both spheres significant problems that threaten security and stability, and could give rise to regional and even global crises, have been accumulated in equal degrees; as a rule, these problems affect Russia’s direct interests. There is an indissoluble connection between these two spheres. For instance, the eminent expert Nikolai Sokov believes that the ineffectiveness of the current nonproliferation regime and, as it is now fashionable to assert, international organizations’ incapacity to stop the spread of illegal WMD programs, could lead to a new role for nuclear weapons as an important element of so-called “counterproliferation.” The North Korean nuclear tests in early October 2006 will undoubtedly be cited to support this approach.

Russia has inherited the traditions in the area of the fight for disarmament. The decrease in its activities in this area has ended. There is every reason to expect that Russia will present proposals aimed, if not at stopping, then at least at slowing the most dangerous aspirations of those who believe that there are neither commonsensical nor other limits to their ambitions.

One of the basic tenets of Russian military doctrine is that Russia must have sufficient nuclear capabilities to cause “predetermined damage” to any aggressor “in any situation.” In other words, Russian nuclear forces must be able to survive a massive unexpected attack and respond by inflicting on the aggressor the aforementioned “predetermined damage.” Essentially, the concept of nuclear deterrence, which has proven itself over the course of many years, is based on this approach.

Today one often hears, albeit unofficially, the more militant Republicans in Washington say that given their current military superiority, including in the area of nuclear weapons, the United States can beat any enemy in a nuclear conflict. This attitude was expressed in a sensational article in the journal Foreign Affairs written by two little-known experts. The article can essentially be seen as a provocative probing of world reaction to ideas that are being examined in the Pentagon. Donald Rumsfeld recently left, without having achieved a final victory in Iraq. Immediately thereafter, a Defense Science Board report appeared that was quickly “leaked” to the press. It poses the question of whether further negotiations on strategic nuclear force reductions should be rejected and whether the U.S. deterrence capability should be retained and strengthened since “Russia’s future as a democratic state remains uncertain.” This could, if it actually becomes administration policy, seriously complicate any further steps towards nuclear disarmament. In any case, the vagueness of Washington’s position on negotiations to replace START-1 with a new agreement is not coincidental, to say the least. The Foreign Affairs article apparently originated in the same circles and was in part aimed at cheering up the Pentagon and distracting it from its agony in Iraq and Afghanistan.

CHALLENGES FACING RUSSIA

The Russian leadership noted the appearance of the U.S. concept of a “new triad.” In a report to a meeting of the Russian armed forces leadership on October 2, 2003, Minister of Defense Sergei Ivanov focused attention on the possibility that U.S. nuclear weapons may once again become real military tools, if certain technological advances are applied to them. Here we are talking about a transformation from a deterrent force into battlefield weapons. In practice, this means lowering the threshold for the use of nuclear weapons, which is indeed implied by the “new triad” concept. Naturally, this means that the general staffs of various states will have to restructure military command and control and the principles upon which the use of their armed forces are based.
For its part, the Russian leadership has now adopted the “principle of preemption” against international terrorists, thereby increasing its flexibility of action and ability to oppose dangerous trends in a timely manner. However, this does not imply the use of nuclear weapons. Of course, for the foreseeable future, in the absence of a direct military threat, Russia must not burden itself with catastrophic ideas about maintaining nuclear parity not only with the official nuclear states as a group, but even with the United States alone. We do not have the right to repeat the mistakes that cost the Soviet Union so dearly. But maintaining a persuasive nuclear deterrent as a key element of ensuring strategic stability is a duty of the nation’s leadership to its people, a fact that was expressed clearly in the 2000 “Fundamentals of Military Doctrine,” where it said: “The Russian Federation maintains the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use against it and/or its allies of nuclear or other types of weapons of mass destruction, as well as in response to large-scale aggression using conventional weapons where Russian national security is threatened.” Thus, the right to a nuclear first strike is maintained under certain circumstances. This requires not just a reconsideration of our approaches to nuclear force structure, but also the allocation of the necessary financial and material resources in full measure, in order to ensure the survivability and controllability of our reduced nuclear capabilities at the highest level of reliability, taking into account the continual improvements in both nuclear and non-nuclear offensive weapons in modern warfare.

To date our strategic nuclear forces have not attained the necessary level. If we consistently work towards this goal, then provocative thoughts about the possibility of conquering us in a nuclear conflict will not arise. Russia should on no account be drawn into another nuclear arms race, something on which our American partners are evidently secretly relying.

To indicate the seriousness of our intention to protect our national security and territorial integrity, we believe that the Russian leadership must adopt a sort of “pre-nuclear deterrence system” as a political signal. This system would also be based on long-range high precision weapons, which would be used to destroy “high value targets” on the territory of a potential aggressor in order to demonstrate a willingness to respond to threats through escalation if necessary. This would provide significant flexibility and a plan for initial actions. In the overwhelming majority of situations the very existence of this “pre-nuclear” deterrence system will serve as the key deterring factor. In this the author shares many of the views of the well-known Russian strategic weapons expert Alexander Saveliev. Attaining this sort of capability does not require the construction of new forces.

THE U.S. “NEW TRIAD” DOCTRINE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR DISARMAMENT

The 2002 Nuclear Posture Review outlined the key trends in the development of U.S. nuclear force structure in the coming five to ten years. They are in part the result of the new U.S.-Russian relations in the strategic sphere, where both sides have reached an understanding that they no longer see each other as enemies and are ready to work together to combat new challenges and risks, particularly in the area of international terrorism. The most important idea embraced in the “new triad,” if we do not separate it from the well-known old term strategic triad, is somewhat disorienting. According to the new document, it consists of:

- offensive strike systems (both nuclear and non-nuclear);
- defense (both active and passive);
- revamped defense infrastructure, which will ensure a timely reaction to threats that arise.

This “new triad” is tied together by the C2 command and control system and corresponding reconnaissance capabilities. The idea has yet to obtain its final form, and attempts to sell it to the U.S. Congress to date have met with only mixed success, due to the likely high costs of implementation as well as possible political costs. But one should keep in mind that although the strategic nuclear elements of the old triad would only become one part of the “new triad,” ICBMs, SLBMs, and nuclear-
armed strategic bombers would continue to play a decisive role in nuclear policy. It is clearly stated that Russia’s nuclear capabilities remain an issue of concern. If U.S.-Russian relations deteriorate seriously in future, the United States may need to reexamine the levels of its nuclear forces and related planning. Thus, agreed levels could also be revised. Indeed, the structure of the old strategic nuclear forces has remained the same; moreover, Washington does not plan to go lower than the level of 2,200 nuclear warheads (in addition to about 1,500 in reserve). Furthermore, work on the development of a new ICBM to replace the Minuteman III has already begun; it is scheduled to enter service in 2018. This sort of plan cannot be explained by any strategic goals other than an intention to preserve a powerful nuclear deterrent aimed against Russia. The recent decline in U.S.-Russian relations clearly strengthens this idea, and even the possible accession of a Democrat to the presidency is not likely to change this constant component of U.S. policy.

New nuclear systems under consideration include high-precision nuclear warheads with a yield of about 10 tons (so-called “micro-nukes”) for the destruction of hardened, buried targets; 1,000-ton yield nuclear warheads for battlefield use (so-called “mini-nukes”); nuclear warheads for the anti-missile defense system with yields of about 100 tons (also “mini-nukes”); as well as several other new types of nuclear weapons. The intention is to reequip the Minuteman III with W-87 warheads and retain the W-88 warheads on the Trident 2 SSBN, which is exclusively designed for rapid destruction of hardened targets: ICBM launch silos, sites where mobile ICBM launchers are based, and underground military command centers. It is no secret that these are the components of the nuclear infrastructure of just one country: Russia. The well-known opponents of these plans, Democratic Senators Edward Kennedy and Dianne Feinstein, expressed themselves very clearly in this regard. The former noted that current policies “jeopardize the entire architecture of nuclear arms controls so carefully negotiated by our leaders over our lifetimes,” while Senator Feinstein said that “This administration seems to be moving toward a military posture in which nuclear weapons are considered just like other weapons ... a usable instrument of military power.” One can only hope that now that the U.S. Congress is once again controlled by Democrats, these esteemed senators will maintain their policy views, which may open up possibilities for cooperating with them and, at the very least, the U.S. rejection of the more offensive notions. Russia appears to have a good chance to propose another vision of the nuclear future.

During his meeting with Defense Minister Ivanov in Alaska in August 2006, his then-U.S. counterpart Donald Rumsfeld announced, “The United States is looking into the possibility of taking a relatively small number of our ballistic missiles and taking a nuclear weapon off and putting a conventional weapon on a ballistic missile. We would be happy to see the Russian government decide to do the same thing.” The U.S. Air Force believes that several dozen ICBMs could be refitted with nonnuclear warheads over the course of two years for a relatively small sum. It is becoming clear that under the pretext of the dire need to combat international terrorism, they are proposing the introduction of various high-precision nonnuclear strike forces, in some cases circumventing START-1 provisions. As evidence, note the reequipping of several SSBNs as “special purpose” boats. The United States already has projects like the Minotaur II and Minotaur III, where an increase in the power of nonnuclear missiles and SLBMs is planned through the use of higher energy explosives and other technologies. It would appear that the idea here is to increase counter-force options.

Donald Rumsfeld’s proposal to reequip a portion of ICBMs and SLBMs with nonnuclear warheads is apparently seen in Washington as a way to remove them from the limits of existing international agreements. Understanding the vacillations in their argumentation is difficult. Although the absence of the necessary level of transparency makes it impossible to determine what warhead is on a missile, the idea of discussing the relatively nonconfrontational problem of “the false identification of a non-nuclear strike” has been neglected. U.S. specialists hold forth as though this question has already been solved, even proposing separate launch sites for ICBMs with non-nuclear warheads, in particular at bases in California and Florida. Apparently U.S. strategy views this ambivalence as advantageous, and they need at least Russia’s tacit agreement to this reorganization of the strategic forces.
Now we are stuck with this problem and the question is no longer so much about “identification” as about ensuring the strategic stability both sides traditionally like solemnly to declare. The latter is feasible, thanks to an increase in the predictability of the actions of both parties and the regular removal of goads for a first strike. However, we have still not dealt with the problem. Probably we should make use of it to re activate talks with the United States about the future of strategic arms, something our partners are persistently avoiding.

COULD HIGH-PRECISION WEAPONS REPLACE NUCLEAR WEAPONS?

The eminent Russian scientist and designer, general director of the State Scientific Center for Aviation Systems and member of the Russian Academy of Sciences Yevgeny Fedosov has written, “The main landmarks of the 21st century—a globalized economy, a post-industrial information society, and increased terrorism—are not completely compatible with nuclear weapons.”26 The military conflicts that we have seen in the past decade testify to the birth of a new type of war.

The concept of a “front” has been erased; it was basically absent in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Instead the concept of “non-contact military actions” emerged. Precision weapons were used as the main weaponry (as a rule, cruise missiles with a broad range of operation), as well as guided smart bombs and new methods of reconnaissance, targeting, and delivery like unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Ground forces were only used after the crushing defeat of the enemy for holding territory, mopping up operations, and eliminating any remaining pockets of resistance. None of this would require the use of nuclear weapons, regardless of all of the talk about the importance of mini-nukes for the destruction of hardened facilities or terrorist groups hidden in deep caves.

In Fedosov’s opinion, highly developed countries that have valuable infrastructure are under increasing public pressure to prohibit the absolute weapon—nuclear weapons—just as chemical and bacteriological weapons have been banned. On January 8, 2007, clearly responding to this attitude, the prominent former statesmen Henry Kissinger, George Schultz, William Perry, and Sam Nunn, who have expended considerable efforts in the past to argue for the irreplaceable role of nuclear weapons, proposed in the Wall Street Journal that reliance on nuclear weapons gradually be replaced, to debunk the powerful aura that accompanies them. This is not a new idea. In 1999, the “nuclear hawk” Paul Nitze also came out with the idea of rejecting nuclear weapons. In the United States this sort of enlightenment is sometimes referred to as the “retired politicians and generals syndrome.” It is not surprising that many people currently working in the State Department, even those dealing with disarmament issues, had not even heard of the article written by the four former statesmen. At the same time as the retired policymakers are promoting disarmament, the current administration is moving in the opposite direction: the United States has adopted the Complex 2030 program that envisions the in-depth modernization of eight key U.S. nuclear weapons complex facilities and at least seven of the nuclear warheads that are now employed on nuclear weapons. These two trends are likely to continue fighting it out throughout the first half of the 21st century.

If Russia falls behind in the technological development and construction of precision weapons (both defensive and offensive), serious new risks and threats may arise. For the Russian military, moving to a mix of nuclear and non-nuclear weaponry (primarily, narrowing the gap with the United States and NATO in the equipping and developing of principles for the use of precision weapons by ground forces, the air force, and the navy in combat operations) should become a priority task in the near future. This does not mean that there should not also be attempts to limit the use of precision weapons by the United States and other Western countries through legal treaties and other agreements.

Under the current circumstances, the view of the role of tactical nuclear weapons is beginning to change; in U.S. policy these weapons are beginning to lose their importance.27 Several concepts are being advanced that agree that it would make sense to develop a new international agreement that would cover both strategic and tactical warheads and delivery systems. It is unlikely that such negotiations could become a reality in the foreseeable future. Adding all
nuclear powers to negotiations on the reduction of the nuclear weapons, however, is long overdue.

SPACE ON THE AGENDA

The issue of space is an ever greater topic of concern. Several memorable anniversaries will be marked in 2007: 150 years since the birth of Konstantin Tsiolkovsky, the founder of theoretical cosmonautics; 100 years since the birth of Sergei Korolev, responsible for the Sputnik program; 50 years since the launch of the first artificial satellite; and 40 years since the signing of the Outer Space Treaty (which entered into force on October 10, 1967). As is well known, the treaty forbids the placement of nuclear weapons and other forms of WMD in space, the establishment of military bases and facilities in space, and the conduct of military maneuvers there. However, the issue of the deployment of weapons in space has arisen with new force recently, since the current agreement does not completely cut off the deployment of weapons in space based on new physical principles. Technical advances in the area of laser technology and electronics have nearly made it possible for certain countries to obtain military superiority over all others in space, particularly in the context of antimidle defense.

Russia has already officially stated at the United Nations that it is prepared to declare formally that it would not be the first nation to deploy weapons in space. Our partners, the Americans first and foremost, did not respond. Furthermore, on October 18, 2006 Washington promulgated a new national space policy based on a document signed by the U.S. president on August 31, 2006. This document supersedes presidential directive NSC-49/NSTC-8 of September 14, 1996. An initial analysis of the new document indicates, in my opinion, that the United States, acting unilaterally, is trying to ensure that it has complete freedom of action in space in its own national interests. It has declared its refusal to consider new legal norms of a prohibitive or limiting nature. It has proclaimed that Washington does not intend to allow other countries to have capabilities in space that it views as “hostile” to U.S. national interests. The right to determine what is “hostile,” naturally, remains the right of the United States alone. Moreover, the U.S. Defense Department has been given the task of developing ways to prevent possible enemies from maintaining their freedom of action in space. Basically, the new U.S. space policy openly proclaims the long-term doctrine of achieving supremacy in space. This new doctrine does not directly discuss the possibility of deploying weapons, including nuclear weapons, in space. However, the Pentagon’s task—to use capabilities in space to ensure an integrated multi-echelon antimissile defense system—fits perfectly in the tasks of the “new triad,” and for this reason alone demands that discussions with the United States be held over the legitimacy of such an approach.

On February 10, 2007, speaking in Munich at an international conference on security policy, Russian President Vladimir Putin expressed his belief that an attempt to militarize space could lead to unpredictable consequences for the international community, and provoke nothing less than what occurred at the beginning of the nuclear era. The Russian president noted that Moscow had prepared a draft of an agreement to prevent the weaponization of outer space and would send it to all of its partners as an official proposal. The “moment of truth” will come. Will a serious international discussion begin?

How realistic is it for such a discussion to begin given the current circumstances? There are provisions in U.S. doctrine that speak of the U.S. adherence to the idea of all countries conducting research or otherwise using space for peaceful purposes, as well as its support for mutually beneficial international cooperation. Apparently the United States is not completely closing the door to negotiations over some types of legal regulation of space activity.

While the U.S. Administration is declaring its opposition to the development of new legal instruments to prevent the further militarization of space, Russia should increase its efforts to keep space free of new types of weapons and develop measures that would help to ensure the predictability of the strategic situation in space. We will have enough allies in this area.

One should also keep in mind that the U.S. approaches to the space issue, like its approaches to other disarmament processes, follow a familiar pattern. First, as a rule the Americans are the
initiators of new arms races. Second, their unconcealed aim is to attain the maximum military advantage and attempt to maintain it for as long as possible. Third, it is becoming typical that even if they do not avoid the negotiations process itself, they avoid any obligations that might tie their hands or limit their maneuverability. Finally, the United States is trying to remove its most advanced military technology and weaponry from international and bilateral control.

On January 11, 2007, the People’s Republic of China unexpectedly conducted an anti-satellite weapon test. At a height of over 800 km in space, the KaiTuoZhe-2 missile destroyed the Feng Yun 1S satellite launched in 1999. Regardless of all of the disagreements in the analyses of the technical and legal aspects of the Chinese test, it is plain that the Chinese were sending a clear signal to the world that they do not plan to leave space to the Americans, and are prepared to fight for its use in the interests of their national security. There is a signal for Russia here too. We need clearly to determine and guard our own interests, and at the same time push public opinion to support the peaceful use of space.

WITHOUT TRUST, WITHOUT IRREVERSIBILITY

The current administration in Washington came to disarmament with the idea that the time of legally enforceable agreements was over, and that we should lean more on confidence-building measures and the like. The time of President Reagan, with his famous “trust, but verify,” was transformed into “we insist on the complete verification of you, but you should not claim the right to verify us.”

The problem is that Russia and other countries trust the United States less and less. And the situation is approaching a critical phase. START-1, with its carefully developed system of mutual information exchange and monitoring of implementation, will expire in 2009. Before the G8 summit in St. Petersburg, President Vladimir Putin called on our American partners to begin a dialogue about replacing this key treaty with appropriate agreements. The year 2007 has come and the matter has barely been touched. Doubts arise: is the Bush Administration, which became a “lame duck” administration after the November 2006 elections, capable of constructive achievements in the disarmament sphere?

To date, Russia has attained one far-reaching arms control achievement with the George W. Bush Administration: the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), the fulfillment of which will lead to the dismantlement of an additional 1,000 nuclear warheads. But it too will end fairly soon: in 2012. A high estimation of this agreement on behalf of the global community was given by U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan, who nevertheless took the opportunity to remind all that “the United States and the Russian Federation... must do more, including... pursuing arms control agreements that entail not just dismantlement but irreversibility” (emphasis mine—author).

The latter is of fundamental value. The SORT agreement, due to U.S. obstinacy, does not resolve the problem of reversible capabilities, that is, the majority of warheads are removed from service but not destroyed—they are simply put in storage. If needed, they can be returned to use. In the mid-1990s, U.N. Under-Secretary General Jayantha Dhanapala pushed the idea of decoupling—removing warheads from delivery systems and storing them separately—a concept very similar to the one used in SORT. However, even then many experts expressed doubts that this would be an effective disarmament measure. They said that this was more of a confidence-building measure. But it was already clear to experts that the very construction of this agreement was vulnerable to abuse. Under these circumstances, the slogan “verify” is particularly urgent where the United States is concerned, since it intends to maintain 1,500 nuclear warheads in so-called “reserves.” The U.S. and Russian approaches have diverged.

This has also been made fairly clear by the consequences of the Bush Administration’s destruction of the ABM Treaty. Recent plans to establish a so-called third missile site in Europe very near Russian territory, for the deployment of part of the multi-echelon missile defense system, allegedly against Iranian missiles, was in fact a step planned long ago. The point here is not the Iranian threat so much as U.S. plans to obtain yet one more lever to use to pressure not just Russia, but its European allies as well.

DISARMAMENT RETURNS
NUCLEAR TESTING

Russia’s strategic relations with the United States take a variety of forms, from the great number of issue areas where we relate on a bilateral basis to our mutual interactions within the framework of various multilateral agreements and negotiations. Here I would like to point out two particular sore points: ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the issue of the compliance protocol to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC).

In the case of the CTBT, on its enormous financial and technological superiority the United States initially expected to suffocate its partners in the nuclear club, Russia and China first and foremost, through the tenacious embraces of the CTBT. The Republicans inherited this policy from the Democrats. To some extent, they also based, and continue to base, their calculations on the idea that given a moratorium on nuclear testing (the moratorium beginning in 1992 under the CTBT along with the longer-term unilateral Soviet moratorium), the speed of the degradation of Russian nuclear weapons would grow sharply and the years with the CTBT in force would conclusively lock in the significant U.S. nuclear advantage.

Indeed, in a number of areas Russian nuclear warheads may be inferior to the most advanced U.S. nuclear warheads. But because our construction occurred under less “stressed” conditions, our experts were able to install higher margins of reliability, given the uncertainties about factors related to aging. This practice paid for itself many years ago, though the issue requires the continued vigilance of our nuclear specialists. But what about the Americans? Despite all of their contrivances and precision construction, U.S. nuclear warheads have proven to be quite capricious and extremely sensitive to the effects of aging. An analysis of the intentions expressed in the Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) program indicates that it is precisely ensuring the reliability of warheads that has become a difficult issue for them. In the RRW program they declare that their goals will be met without nuclear tests. Whether they can succeed in this is a big question. At the very least, the as-yet-unsuccessful attempts by the current administration to obtain congressional approval for a reduction of the timeline to ready the Nevada Test Site from 36 months to 18 months raise suspicions. The United States has become a hostage to its earlier policy and is going to try to find any possible way to renew tests of the reliability of its nuclear arsenal at the minimum political cost to itself. Therefore, we should also expect increased attempts to reinvigorate the “race” for scientific and technological advances between the nuclear weapons complexes of the nuclear weapon states. Huge expenditures are already being made on computer simulation and on the equipping of test ranges for non-explosive testing. We should expect that there may be additional big surprises emanating from the United States in this area in future.

Although Russia (unlike the United States, which is betting on a preemptive and preventive disarming strike) only has plans to use nuclear weapons as a response to aggression, we too need more powerful munitions. Since we do not have a surplus of nuclear weapon delivery systems, we must maintain the existing arsenal at the necessary quantitative levels (though this does not mean the current levels cannot be reduced). This also ensures the success of nuclear deterrence. As the great Lomonosov wrote to Count Shuvalov in his letter of November 1, 1761, this “is the task of maintaining the military art in times of lasting peace.”

NEW THEATERS OF MILITARY ACTION

The group of individuals currently in control of the U.S. Republican Party is actively carrying out a “revolution in military affairs” that was actually begun under President Bill Clinton. Basically, the idea is that the U.S. military should be re-equipped with new technology and optimized so that the U.S. leadership can project U.S. power globally, to any part of the world. Naturally, these aspirations required a political framework, which took the form of the “revolution in strategic affairs” concept. However, the George W. Bush Administration has expanded his predecessor’s plans considerably.

Under this revolution, the U.S. military has begun operating in fundamentally new theaters. It is astonishing, but most of these new theaters have proven to be on former Soviet territory: the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Caspian Sea, etc. The realization of this concept in practice should
be closely watched by the Russian leadership. For example, why do we need the creation of the so-called Caspian Guard according to a U.S. scenario, which naturally involves the critical participation of the U.S. Armed Forces, a country neither geographically nor politically belonging to the region? After all, Russia has already proposed the creation of a military force to ensure Caspian security (CASPFOR). Why compete?

IS THE CFE NEEDED?

The conclusion of the 1990 Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) was a great achievement of multilateral diplomacy and negotiation. When the CFE was concluded, hopes were raised that we were on the way to strengthening European security and stability. Initially, this was true. For 16 years all of the treaty States Parties, Russia first and foremost, reduced heavy weaponry by a combined total of 63,500 pieces, while military personnel were reduced by more than two times: to three million persons. The CFE is still a key element in NATO-Russia relations, but is gradually losing its urgency and its logic.

Firstly, thanks to the radically changed political and strategic situation in Europe, already questionable concepts like flank limitations within national borders, which currently only apply to Russia and, partially, to Ukraine, are, in our opinion, completely senseless. In their day, they greatly interfered with Russia’s ability to conduct counter-terrorist operations in the North Caucasus. The author, as a participant in developing the mandate for the CFE negotiations, remembers well how Russia compromised with the West, particularly Turkey, in determining where the border of the so-called “exclusion zone” would be drawn through Turkey in Asia Minor where, according to the Turkish military, they were undertaking counterterrorist operations against rebel “mountain Turks” (in reality, Kurds). The West did not meet Russia half-way in the North Caucasus until the United States and Europe themselves were affected.

Even today, they continue to remind us about the so-called “complete fulfillment” of the Istanbul Commitments and have therefore blocked ratification of the adapted CFE Treaty for many years. This raises two questions. The first is whether there is a common understanding, in the West in particular, as to what the “complete fulfillment of the Istanbul Commitments” is? And second, in our view the current version of the adapted CFE Treaty has so aged that it must be adapted anew, taking into account the elimination of the “gray zone” when the three Baltic states joined NATO and the consequences of the most recent NATO expansion, as a result of which the states now entering the Western bloc are now using arms quotas that they formerly acquired as states that did not belong to this bloc.

As an active participant in the negotiations, I still remember one of the remarkable NATO arguments in favor of as large reductions as possible in what were then Soviet weapons: the very particular regional pattern of the force posture on Soviet (Russian) territory. We asked our NATO counterparts why they insisted on these complications, and if they really thought we intended to attack them. To which they very calmly replied: “No, we are certain that you do not plan to attack us, but you have military capabilities that project into sensitive NATO regions, so we need geographical troop limitations in addition to quantitative limits.” Mikhail Gorbachev decided to meet the wishes of our Western partners halfway, given that it appeared that they were making sincere declarations about friendship and cooperation, including the assertion that they had no intention of expanding NATO. We all know what happened then. It is time to show the West common sense in practice and make reciprocal moves.

A lot of water has flowed under the bridge since that time. Russia lived through a long period of weakness that our partners took advantage of as much as they could. It has come time to tell our NATO partners the same thing they once told us: “You may not intend to attack us, but your military capabilities and, most importantly, their deployment along Russia’s borders, raise our honest suspicions, and even Russia-NATO cooperation can by no means remove all of our concerns.”

As a person involved in formulating the CFE Treaty, it is especially sad for the author to realize that the treaty’s current form does not meet currently ensure equal security for all countries on the European continent, and moreover does not sufficiently meet Russia’s own national secu-
rity interests. However, rejecting the outdated, but very important document without proposing anything in its place is easy. It would be more proper and reasonable if Russia were to come out with a full-fledged vision for the provision of security in Europe today and in the future, taking into account present realities, that could incorporate current ideas about ensuring the balance of interests of all countries.

More than 100 years ago, one of the first Russian experts in geopolitics, Aleksey Vandam (the pen name of Major General of the Imperial General Staff Aleksey Edrikhin), wrote an interesting recommendation: “In Europe we should by no means put our head on the pillow of agreements with peoples whose skill in the fight for life is much more advanced than our own; we must rely on ourselves alone.” This observation by the tsarist general and Russian patriot appears especially accurate today, when we more and more often hear Western statements averring that Russia’s energy riches should supposedly belong to the entire world (by which they mean the West).

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The Bush Administration and the Putin Administration are both entering the presidential election cycles in their countries. The acting heads of state in these two countries are not likely to have time to solve all of the problems that have accumulated in the area of arms control. But we have the right to expect that they at least start projects so that their successors can continue this work of global importance, strengthening security and strategic stability, particularly in the nuclear sphere. It appears that Russia is basically ready for this. But are our American partners?

Carl von Clausewitz wrote, “People’s main error is that they fear today’s misfortunes more than consequences of dangerous new military technologies and classes of weapons through timely political and legal steps. Otherwise, a long and debilitating arms race and new, difficult crises and confrontations await us once again.

Notes


19 Ibid.


21 Dvorkin, Kamennov, Kirichenko, et al., op. cit., p. 60.


25 Ibid.

26 Rossiyskoye voyennoye obozreniye, No. 5 (May), 2004, pp. 6-7.


30 Oleg Vladikin, “Proschitalis i rasstrelyali” (They miscalculated and shot), Moskovskiy novosti, No. 4 (1371), February 2-8, 2007.
