

**Confidential**

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# RUSSIA

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April 22, 2013

PIR Center and its partners report from Venice:

## HOW TO REACH AN AGREEMENT WITH IRAN

### ANNOTATION

*On 16-17 March the Strategic Studies Network from Near East South Asia (NESA) Center of the US National Defense University convened a task force to develop a draft agreement on the Iranian nuclear program. The group - consisting of P5+1, EU, GCC (Gulf Countries Council), Israeli, and Turkish experts and practitioners - reached a shared understanding on a broad package that included a draft agreement, a phased reciprocal sequencing chart, and a draft of bilateral US-Iranian "side letter" as a first step toward normalizing relations with Iran, all of which are appended to this report.*

*The Strategic Studies Network wishes to express its sincere gratitude to Ca' Foscari University of Venice for providing the conference venue, as well as to the Network member institutions. This report draws on the presentations and input of the meeting participants. The meeting was held under the Chatham House Rule and this report reflects the conveners' interpretation of conference proceedings. It does not necessarily represent the views of all participants, many of whom wish to remain anonymous due to the sensitive nature of the topic.*

*The report data are updated as of March 28, 2013 and do not reflect the progress of negotiations in Alma-Ata in April 2013.*

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## WHAT'S THE DEAL: CRAFTING AN AGREEMENT ON IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM

Renewed negotiations surrounding Iran's nuclear program have generated considerable commentary where the biggest headlines involve the military dimensions of the issue - debates over the relative merits of military action to destroy or delay Iran's acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability<sup>1</sup> versus deterrence or containment of a nuclear-armed Iran. Others shift the focus to diplomatic efforts and debate the potential scope of these negotiations - whether they should be narrowly focused on Iran's nuclear program or encompass a broad set of issues constituting a *grand bargain*.

What is missing from the conversation, however, is a thorough examination of how the various policy prescriptions articulated to date might be reflected in authentic negotiations. The problem today is not so much that there is a dearth of recommendations for the scope, sequence, or substance of a deal. Quite the opposite, there is a glut of recommendations - many of them echoed in these pages. Rather, the challenge is that the policy threads articulated to date remain to be woven into a coherent cloth. It is the aim of this report and accompanying documents to complete this task.

*Our aim is to provide the policy community with a specimen of an agreement that it can examine, dissect, and enhance. It will do so by briefly examining the shape that an internationally acceptable arrangement might take through discussions of the scope of such an agreement as well as the substance and sequence of the commitments undertaken by the parties. It will add nuance and texture by addressing the interests and concerns of important players that will not have a seat at the negotiating table but whose views will nonetheless inform the positions of those crafting a deal.*

Appended to this report are the more valuable elements of the effort: a draft agreement as Appendix 1; an example of a *side letter* - an often overlooked but essential element in fashioning a successful outcome to negotiations - as Appendix 2; and a chart that visually depicts the sequencing of parties' commitments within the broad package outlined by the draft agreement and side letters as Appendix 3.

### SCOPE OF THE AGREEMENT

This report assumes that a negotiated settlement concerning Iran's nuclear program is the optimal outcome for all parties involved<sup>1</sup>. It is understood that this is far from a point of consensus in the international community. In fact, debates about whether an agreement is necessary were quite spirited within the task force itself. While acknowledging the merits of this viewpoint, it was agreed that the assembled experts should nevertheless articulate the likely interaction of the tools at policymakers' disposal in fashioning a realistic, successful, and internationally accepted agreement on Iran's nuclear program.

To that end, the draft agreement developed by this task force mirrors the current negotiations in that the parties to the agreement are the so-called P5+1 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the US, and the UK), also known as the EU3+3, and Iran. While these six entities occupy the negotiating table, they are not the only

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<sup>1</sup> The issue of Iran's nuclear program has generated as much sustained attention as would result in a range of policy prescriptions regarding the substance, scope, and sequence of negotiations. They are simply too numerous to be adequately addressed here but many are echoed in the draft agreement. This report and the draft agreement that follows are not intended to be the answer to resolving the Iranian nuclear question. The package presented here is not an advocacy piece, nor a set of recommendations for policymakers. Rather, it is intended to move the intellectual and policy exchange from the realm of the abstract into a practical investigation of the elements that might constitute a successful and internationally acceptable agreement.

participants involved. The security and economic interests of others such as the GCC states, Turkey, and Israel are also implicated and will therefore inform the positions of those formulating a deal.

Moreover, while its antipathy with Washington is well-known, Tehran also perceives security dilemmas from a number of players not part of the P5+1 that some suggest can only be overcome by acquiring a nuclear weapons capability. Iran will therefore likely seek an agreement that is cognizant of these regional security concerns. In order to avoid the pitfalls associated with negotiating the *grand bargain* thus implied, the task force first structured the draft in a way that it assured Iran that the direction of travel of negotiations is to "facilitate the full reintegration of the Islamic Republic of Iran into the international community"<sup>2</sup> and, second, conceived of a broad package of instruments that support the central focus of the enterprise: a draft agreement on Iran's nuclear program.

*The agreement itself is narrowly focused on establishing the civil nature of Iran's nuclear program but concurrently articulates the expressed intention of all parties to negotiate on long-term strategic objectives with the ultimate goal of normalizing Iran's relations with the outside world. Assuring Tehran of genuine movement toward reducing tensions was seen as crucial for building confidence in the negotiations process. It might also bolster a key driver of negotiations - that Iran has more to gain through cooperation than seeking a nuclear weapons capability.*

In addition to major negotiations, the task force envisioned a series of external bilateral talks among the various parties that would act as supporting mechanisms for the multilateral deliberations to develop a settlement on the issue. For example, the US and other key countries will likely need to engage in discussions with the Islamic Republic on a range of economic, security, human rights and political issues that will reassure Iran that the door to acceptance by the global community is truly open. Appendix 2 of this report provides a rough example of the material in a *side letter* - in this case from the US to Iran - that may accompany the negotiations. Such talks and side letters would outline the intentions and understandings among the various parties outside of the four corners of the draft agreement but nonetheless support its aims.

#### SUBSTANCE OF THE AGREEMENT

Success in multilateral negotiations is difficult enough to achieve in the best of circumstances where trust exists among the parties. It is all the more difficult following decades of mutual recrimination and the suspension of diplomatic relations. It is for this reason that the draft agreement is structured in confidence-building phases with reciprocal obligations on all sides. The task force developed a text in which each party will benefit from each phase of the agreement and have an incentive to continue with the process through to the following phase. This structure is difficult and time consuming to assemble but ensures that neither side undertakes commitments dependent on the pledges of the other party's future actions. Rather, each party can point to a concrete success at the completion of each phase before proceeding to the next. The task force included a chart in Appendix 3 to graphically depict the phased sequencing and reciprocal obligations contained in the draft agreement.

First, the draft agreement contains a variety of provisions focused on establishing the civilian nature of Iran's nuclear program and underwriting its conditional right to enrich uranium exclusively for civil purposes. The agreement implicitly acknowledges the growing acceptance within the international community that continued Iranian uranium enrichment is now unavoidable and even necessary for bringing the Islamic

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<sup>2</sup> Draft Agreement, first sentence.

Republic's nuclear program under the desired monitoring and supervision. On a practical level, Tehran is unlikely to suspend enrichment while others determine whether its nuclear program is trustworthy. Accepting continued Iranian enrichment at low levels under alternative controls therefore seems to be a necessary component of an agreement. Moreover, Iran's right to enrich uranium for civilian purposes is endorsed but limited for the duration of the agreement in order to dispel fears that Iran is covertly pursuing a break-out nuclear weapons capability. Alternatively, should Iran fail to fulfill its obligations, the concerns about Iran's true intentions will be confirmed.

These suspicions are further addressed in the draft agreement by obliging Tehran to resume the implementation of the IAEA Safeguards Agreement Additional Protocol, permitting IAEA inspectors unrestricted access until the organization's suspicion of possible military dimensions of its nuclear program have been rescinded. IAEA verification of the civil nature of Iran's program is now entirely civil will likely take two to three years and will require its complete cooperation.

*Before Iran is expected to fully implement IAEA inspections, however, the draft agreement accords it a "grace period" of 180 days within which Iran will not be penalized for voluntary disclosures of additional undeclared nuclear activity, materials, or past NPT violations including violations of its safeguards agreement. It is unlikely that Tehran would declare past violations or fully cooperate with the IAEA without such a grace period. Indeed, amnesty for prior undisclosed nuclear activities as was granted to Libya in 2003 and Romania in 1991 would provide the Islamic Republic with an opportunity to persuade the international community that it is now fully committed to transparency and cooperation regarding its nuclear program.*

Finally, a key element of the task force's deliberations centered on the need to accurately set expectations on the lifting of sanctions. It must be made clear to Iran that any such effort will be time consuming, cumbersome, and at least in the case of the United States, involves sticky domestic issues involved with unraveling sanctions issued in law. Obstacles also exist within the United Nations sanctions regime. For example, the draft agreement calls for the United Nations Security Council not to impose additional sanctions on Iran so long as it is in compliance with this agreement even though continuing to enrich uranium as permitted in the compact would contravene five binding UNSC resolutions. This major concession is intended to reciprocate Iran's willingness to go beyond its legal obligations to establish confidence in its nuclear program.

Another component of the agreement allows the UNSC members to overcome this problem of being locked in by previous sanctions-imposing resolutions requiring Iran to suspend enrichment. The agreement calls for a UNSC resolution declaring that confidence has been restored in Iran upon the Islamic Republic's implementation of the Additional Protocol. Such a resolution would remove some of the existing restrictions and allow the UN system to begin the process of lifting sanctions should Iran continue to fulfill its obligations.

## APPENDIX 1: DRAFT IRAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM AGREEMENT

In order to promote international peace and security and facilitate the full reintegration of the Islamic Republic of Iran into the international community, the parties to this agreement seek a comprehensive, long-term and proper solution to the Iranian nuclear issue consistent with relevant UN Security Council resolutions and other international obligations. To that end, this agreement sets out a fixed five year term framework within which the parties agree to undertake activities that go beyond their rights and duties under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) framework in order to build the mutual trust and confidence necessary to achieve this condition. It is expected that the provisions in this agreement will be met on or before its expiration; thereby restoring international confidence in Iran's nuclear program and restoring its position as a Non-nuclear Weapon State Party (NNWS) to the NPT in good standing.

The parties to the agreement are: the Islamic Republic of Iran (hereafter referred to as Iran), People's Republic of China (China), the European Union (EU), the Republic of France (France), the Republic of Germany (Germany), the Russian Federation (Russia), the United States of America (USA), and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (UK).

### **Article I - Civilian Nature of Iran's Nuclear Program and Integrity of the Non-Proliferation Regime**

The parties to this agreement acknowledge Iran's rights as a Non-Nuclear Weapon State Party (NNWS) to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and its concomitant duties toward the international community are acknowledged and enforced in full. In particular, Iran's conditional right to enrich uranium for solely peaceful civil purposes, such as the research, production, and use of nuclear energy, is recognized by the parties. In turn, Iran restates its conformity with its NPT obligations and its commitment to forswear military research or any other military dimension in all aspects of its nuclear energy program and apply rigorous safeguards to its activities to ensure Iran's compliance with these obligations. Iran will answer all extant questions relating to the Possible Military Dimensions (PMDs) of its program. This agreement controls in the case of a conflict with any United Nations Security Council Resolution.

To that end, the parties agree to a sequenced, three-phased agreement to build confidence in one another as they progress in this framework.

#### *Phase 1*

1. In phase one, to be undertaken expeditiously upon the entry into force of the agreement, Iran agrees to:

- a. Join all applicable international nuclear safety agreements.
- b. Verifiably freeze (not dismantle) all activities at the Fordow facility.<sup>3</sup>
- c. Lock the Iranian nuclear program in its current configuration, including the current level of uranium enrichment, and the currently known number of centrifuges and existing cascades as re-reported by the IAEA in its quarterly report on Iran. This commitment to non-expansion means that Iran will not add more cascades than those reported in the most recent IAEA report preceding the agreement nor can it launch rotating centrifuges (without gas).

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<sup>3</sup> Israel and the US have insisted on closing Fordow in the past and may continue to do so.

- d. Verifiably restrict enrichment to current known locations.
- e. Verifiably cease enrichment beyond 5% U-235 and cap enrichment at 5% U-235 at a level that meets domestic needs with an exception allowing enrichment to 20% U-235 sufficient for the Tehran Research Reactor.<sup>4</sup>
- f. Within 180 days from the entering into force of this agreement, disclose the existence of undeclared nuclear material and activities and/or acknowledge any past violations of the NPT or of its safeguards agreement.
- g. Verifiably send to Russia its domestic stockpile of low-enriched uranium (LEU) - Uranium enriched to 20% or below - every six months for incorporation into fabricated fuel assemblies for the Bushehr nuclear power plant, the Tehran Research Reactor, and possibly other light water reactors.<sup>5</sup>
- h. Refrain from engaging in research and/or development of any potential militarization of the nuclear program as described in Articles I and II of the NPT.

2. China, the EU, France, Germany, Russia, the USA, and the UK agree to:

- a. Reaffirm Iran's legitimate right to uranium enrichment for solely peaceful civilian purposes and recognize Iran's commitment to a non-militarized nuclear program.
- b. Pledge not impose penalties on Iran should it voluntarily disclose the existence of additional un-declared nuclear material and activities and/or acknowledge any past violations of the NPT or of its safeguards agreement during the 180 day disclosure period discussed in I(1)f. Any such disclosures will be reported to the UNSC for information purposes only.
- c. Pledge not to impose additional nuclear-related UNSC sanctions while Iran is in full compliance with its above stated obligations.<sup>6</sup>
- d. In preparation for the implementation of the agreement, each entity will provide a transparent assessment of their respective nuclear-sanctions regimes vis-a-vis Iran and will outline the technical measures necessary for lifting these sanctions.
- e. Respect the sovereignty of Iran and the right of self-determination of the Iranian people to choose their political destiny.

3. France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the European Union agree to:

- a. Expeditiously suspend the implementation of non-UNSC nuclear-related sanctions upon the entering into force of this agreement including those against:
  - i. Iran's Central Bank
  - ii. Iran's energy industry
  - iii. travel restrictions on civilian individuals not associated with the Iranian nuclear program
- b. Pledge not to impose additional sanctions while Iran is in full compliance with its above stated obligations.

4. Russia agrees to accept domestic stockpile of low-enriched uranium from Iran and provide the fuel assemblies necessary for the operation of the Bushehr Nuclear plant and Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) every six months.

5. The US agrees to pledge not to impose additional sanctions while Iran is in full compliance with its above stated obligations.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> As reported in the New York Times of 27 February regarding the discussions in Kazakhstan. See <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/28/world/middleeast/iran-nuclear-talks.html?pagewanted=all&r=0>

<sup>5</sup> In response and to gain time, Iran might propose to down-blend its stockpile of 19.75% U-235 with natural or depleted uranium in order to bring it below 5% U-235 and to keep the material in Iran. The P5+1 would likely welcome such a move, but would not view it as a sufficient confidence-building measure.

<sup>6</sup> Such a concession is vigorously criticized by some nuclear non-proliferation experts who argue that it would not only make it easier for Tehran to obtain a break-out nuclear weapons capability, but also justifies Iran's neighbors in making similar demands.

<sup>7</sup> Taking "regime change" off the table in an effort to address one of Iran's security concerns.

## *Phase 2*

6. In phase two, Iran agrees to:

- a. Continue implementation of I(1)a, b, c, d, e, g, and h.
- b. Following the 180 day disclosure period outlined in phase one, resume implementation of the IAEA Safeguards Agreement Additional Protocol, permitting IAEA inspectors unrestricted access until all suspicion of possible military dimensions have been rescinded and all commitments within this agreement are verified by the IAEA.<sup>8</sup>
- c. Verify the locking of the Iranian nuclear program in its current configuration described in I(1)c.
- d. Verify suspension of research and/or development of any potential militarization of the nuclear program as described in I(1)(h).
- e. In conjunction with Russia and the IAEA, conduct stress tests of the Bushehr reactor to ensure its safety and share the complete results with neighboring countries in the vicinity of the reactor concerned with the safety of these facilities.
- f. Following I(6)b and I(6)c, unfreeze Fordow facility.

7. China, the EU, France, Germany, Russia, the USA, and the UK agree to:

- a. Continue implementation of I(2)c, d, and e.
- b. Following Iran's return to implementation of the IAEA Safeguards Agreement Additional Protocol and pending its ratification, the UNSC will declare that confidence has been restored in Iran.

8. France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the European Union agree to continue implementation of I(3).

9. Russia agrees to:

- a. Continue implementation of I(4).
- b. In conjunction with Iran and the IAEA, conduct stress tests of the Bushehr reactor to ensure its safety and share the complete results with neighboring countries in the vicinity of the reactor concerned with the safety of these facilities.

10. The United States agrees to:

- a. Continue implementation of I(5).
- b. Upon IAEA confirmation of unrestricted access described in I(6)b, expeditiously suspend the implementation of non-UNSC nuclear-related sanctions issued under Executive Order against Iran's Central Bank.
- c. Upon IAEA confirmation of unrestricted access described in I(6)b, expeditiously suspend the implementation of the nuclear-related sanctions on the Iranian energy industry issued under Executive Order upon the signing of this agreement.

## *Phase 3*

11. In phase three, Iran agrees to:

- a. Continue the implementation of I(1)a, b, d, e, g; I(6)c and d.
- b. Verifiably send to Russia all the spent fuel discharged from its Heavy Water Research Reactor at Arak.
- c. Ratify the IAEA Safeguards Agreement Additional Protocol within two years of the entering into force of this agreement, permitting IAEA inspectors unrestricted access

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<sup>8</sup> El Baradei in 2005: "Given Iran's past concealment efforts over many years, transparency measures should extend beyond the formal requirements of the Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol and include access to individuals, documentation related to procurement, dual use equipment, certain military owned workshops and research and development locations" IAEA GOV/2005/67 para. 50.

until all suspicion of possible military dimensions have been rescinded and all commitments within this agreement are verified by the IAEA as outlined in Article II.

12. China, the EU, France, Germany, Russia, the USA, and the UK agree to:

- a. Continue implementation of I(2)c, d, and e.
- b. After all suspicion of possible military dimensions have been rescinded the UNSC would review and, if satisfied, return the "Iranian nuclear file" to the IAEA and revoke previous resolutions, specifically Resolution 1696 that demands Iran's cessation of uranium enrichment.

13. France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the European Union agree to continue implementation of I(3).

14. Russia agrees to:

- a. Continue implementation of I(4) and I(9)b.
- b. Assist Iran in storing and disposing of spent fuel as well as ensuring that safety and security standards are met at the Bushehr Reactor.
- c. Receive all spent fuel discharged from Iran's Heavy Water Research Reactor at Arak.

15. The United States agrees to continue implementation of I(5).

## **Article II - Supervision**

1. The IAEA will supervise the nuclear-related components of this agreement, including its annexes, and employ their best efforts to avoid any violation of its terms. The parties agree to the following supervisory arrangements:

- a. Review quarterly reports of the IAEA on the Iran file to ensure compliance with relevant sections of this agreement and annexes subject to IAEA verification.
- b. Periodic verification of the implementation of the provisions and annexes will be carried out not less than monthly by the supervisory body unless otherwise agreed by the parties.
- c. Additional verifications within 48 hours after the receipt of a request by any of the parties.
- d. The supervisory body will report their findings to all parties.
- e. The IAEA supervisors will enjoy freedom of movement and other facilities necessary for the performance of their task.

2. The parties agree that the IAEA should take all decisions necessary to assure the effective implementation of its supervisory responsibilities.

3. The United Nations Secretary-General or designee will supervise the non-nuclear provisions of this agreement contained in the annexes.

## **Article III - Dispute Resolution**

1. Disputes arising from the implementation and application of the nuclear-related provisions of this treaty shall be resolved by referral to a neutral panel of three arbiters approved by the parties.

2. The panel will be established by the Secretary-General or his designee within the secretariat established for the purpose.

## **Article IV - Review and Amendments**

The parties will review the agreement annually and amend by consensus if deemed necessary.

The following annexes further detail the commitments of China, the EU, France, Iran, Russia, the US, and the UK to one another beyond nuclear-related issues.

### **Annex I - Energy**

1. Upon the entering into force of this agreement China, the EU, France, Russia, the US, and the UK agree to support research and development in renewable, sustainable, and efficient energy, including nuclear energy.

2. Upon Iran's fulfillment of all of its commitments in this agreement China, the EU, France, Germany, Russia, the US, and the UK agree to:

- a. Provide technological and financial assistance necessary for Iran's peaceful use of nuclear energy, and support for the resumption of technical cooperation projects in Iran by the IAEA.
- b. Support for construction of a light water reactor based on state-of-the-art technology.
- c. Provide legally-binding nuclear fuel supply guarantees.
- d. Cooperate with regard to management of spent fuel and radioactive waste.

### **Annex II - Security**

1. Expeditiously upon the entering into force of this agreement China, the EU, Germany, France, Russia, the US, and the UK agree to:

- a. Endeavor to improve the entities' relations with Iran and build mutual trust.
- b. Encourage direct contact and dialogue with Iran.
- c. Support Iran in playing an important and constructive role in international affairs.
- d. Promote dialogue and cooperation on non-proliferation, regional security and stabilization issues.
- e. Work with Iran and others in the region to encourage confidence-building measures and regional security.
- f. Establish appropriate consultation and cooperation mechanisms.
- g. Support for a conference on regional security issues.
- h. Reaffirm that a solution to the Iranian nuclear issue will contribute to non-proliferation efforts.
- i. Help provide a framework for a regional dialogue on the entire range of nuclear issues, including a Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone with the participation of all countries in the Middle East.
- j. Reaffirm the obligation under the UN Charter to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter, noting in particular the impermissibility of the use of force or threats to use force of any kind against the IAEA verified nuclear facilities and against the personnel of such facilities.
- k. Cooperate on Afghanistan, including on intensified cooperation in the fight against drug trafficking, support for programs on the return of Afghan refugees to Afghanistan; cooperation on reconstruction of Afghanistan; cooperation on guarding the Iran-Afghan border.
- l. Cooperate in the development of effective emergency response capabilities (e.g., seismology, earthquake research, disaster control, etc.).

### **Annex III - Economy**

1. Expeditiously upon the entering into force of this agreement China, the EU, Germany, France, Russia, the US, and the UK agree to:

- a. Initiate steps toward the normalization of trade and economic relations such as improving Iran's access to the international economy, markets, and capital through practical support for full integration into international structures, including the World Trade Organization.
- b. Create the framework for increased direct investment in Iran and trade with Iran.
- c. Provide, as necessary, assistance to Iran's economic and social development and humanitarian needs.

2. Upon Iran's fulfillment of all of its commitments in this agreement the USA agrees to cease its opposition to the construction of the gas pipeline between Iran and Pakistan.

#### **Annex IV - Agriculture**

1. Expeditiously upon the entering into force of this agreement China, the EU, Germany, France, Russia, the US, and the UK agree to:

- a. Support for agricultural development in Iran.
- b. Facilitate Iran's complete self-sufficiency in food through cooperation in modern technology.

#### **Annex V - Environment, Infrastructure**

1. Expeditiously upon the entering into force of this agreement China, the EU, Germany, France, Russia, the US, and the UK agree to:

- a. Assist in the development of transport infrastructure, including international transport corridors.
- b. Support the modernization of Iran's telecommunication infrastructure, including possible removal of relevant export restrictions.

#### **Annex VI - Civil Aviation**

1. Expeditiously upon the entering into force of this agreement China, the EU, Germany, France, Russia, the US, and the UK agree to:

- a. Commence civil aviation cooperation
- b. Support Iran in renewing its civil aviation fleet.
- c. Assist Iran to ensure that Iranian aircraft meet international safety standards.

2. Upon Iran's fulfillment of all of its commitments in this agreement China, the EU, Germany, France, Russia, the US, and the UK agree to remove restrictions on manufacturers exporting aircraft to Iran.

#### **Annex VII - Education**

1. Expeditiously upon the entering into force of this agreement China, the EU, Germany, France, Russia, the US, and the UK agree to:

- a. Facilitate the study of Iranian nationals at universities within the participating countries, particularly in degree areas such as civil engineering, agriculture and environmental studies.
- b. Support partnerships among Higher Education Institutions, e.g. public health, rural development, joint scientific projects, public administration, history, and philosophy.

APPENDIX 2: SAMPLE CONTENT OF "SIDE LETTER" FROM USA TO IRAN

Upon the verification by IAEA monitors that they have full and unfettered access to all nuclear facilities of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran), the President of the United States of America (US) commits to re-move all nuclear-related executive branch sanctions implemented under the authority of the Office of the President in the form of Executive Orders. At the same time, the US will commit to advocacy with the UNSC, EU, and other international institutions and countries to remove nuclear-related sanctions in a transparent and sequenced fashion based upon the provisions enacted when the sanctions in question were imposed and Iran's fulfillment of the confidence building measures detailed in the agreement on Iran's Nuclear Program.

Moreover, should Iran disclose previously undisclosed violations of the NPT or of its safeguards agreement during the period articulated in the Nuclear Program Agreement, the US will publicly recognize Iran for its cooperation with the IAEA as a clear indication that all parties to the agreement have moved on from the past and have entered an era of mutual respect.

After all suspicions of possible military dimensions have been rescinded by the IAEA, the President will endeavor to seek legislative action to withdraw nuclear-related sanctions implemented under the authority of US law duly passed by Congress and signed by the President.

The President will begin discussions on removing certain other sanctions such as those related to terrorist activity and human rights violations implemented under Executive Orders as part of a strategic dialogue framework based on the reciprocal principles of non-aggression and territorial integrity. In these talks, the US will endeavor to seek cooperation with Iran in the areas of: counter-narcotics, consequence management for natural disasters, student and cultural exchanges, visa relaxation and consular relations, economic cooperation, and environmental cooperation.

Satisfactory progress in this strategic dialogue and with full compliance with the Nuclear Program Agreement will lead the President to endeavor to seek the necessary legislative action to withdraw sanctions related to terrorism or other non-nuclear issues.



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Moscow-Geneva, May 2013

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[...]

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3.1. Individual club members are entitled to:

3.1.3. Receive a copy of the Russia Confidential exclusive analytical newsletter by e-mail in chosen language (English or Russian). According to the Club Terms and Conditions, the transfer of the bulletin to third parties is not allowed.

[...]

3.2. Corporate Club members are entitled to:

3.2.3. Receive two copies of the Russia Confidential exclusive analytical newsletter by e-mail in chosen language (English or Russian) or in both languages simultaneously. Share the bulletin with the other representatives of the corporate member. According to the Club Terms and Conditions, the transfer of the bulletin to third parties is not allowed.

[...]

**4. The duties of the Club members**

4.1. All members of the Club must:

4.1.6. Not to share the Russia Confidential analytical newsletter, as well as the Password to the Club section of the PIR Center web-site with individuals and legal entities who are not members of the Club.

[...]

**6. Russia Confidential**

6.1. The Russia Confidential exclusive analytical newsletter is issued by the Trialogue Ltd by PIR Center's order for the Club members' private use only.

6.2. The newsletter contains exclusive analytical materials on international security, foreign and domestic policy of Russia and the CIS, prepared by the PIR Center's staff and invited experts specially for Russia Confidential.

6.3. The newsletter materials are confidential and must not be quoted and transfer to the non-members for at least 30 days since the day of issue.

6.4. 30 days after the day of issue the Trialogue Ltd can remove the exclusive and confidential status of the material, after which in such cases it is to be published in other PIR Center's editions and can be used by the Club members for quoting.

6.5. The newsletter is disseminated via e-mail between the Club members once a month in Russian or in English, depending on the choice of the Club member.

6.6. The Club member can also receive a paper copy of the newsletter in chosen language.

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Dear Members of the Trialogue Club International,

**In 2013 the Trialogue Club celebrates its 20<sup>th</sup> Anniversary!**

Today the Trialogue Club is a unique community of leading diplomats, experts, businessmen. In 2013 the Club members will attend 5 Club meetings with leading Russian and foreign experts on international security, will receive 4 issues of the Security Index journal, 12 issues of the Russia Confidential analytical bulletin and will receive **invitations to all PIR Center's events** as well as **several pleasant surprises** for our permanent members.

As you know, we welcome and appreciate when the Club members recommend the Club membership and participation in the Club meetings to others. Apart from the fact that such recommendation automatically opens the door to membership in the Club, **it is also rewarded by us in one of two ways**, which are described below. I hope that you will be interested in this offer.

Sincerely,  
**Dr. Dmitry V. Polikanov**  
 Chairman of the Trialogue Club International

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| <b>10%</b>  | for 1 new corporate Club member           |
| <b>10%</b>  | for 2 new individual Club members         |
| <b>15%</b>  | for 3 new individual Club members         |
| <b>20%</b>  | for 4 or more new individual Club members |
| <b>20%</b>  | for 2 new corporate Club members          |
| <b>30%</b>  | for 3 new corporate Club members          |
| <b>35%</b>  | for 4 and more new corporate Club members |

| <b>Option 2 – Lump-sum compensation in cash</b> |   |
|---|---|
| <b>100 USD</b>                                  | for 1 new corporate Club member           |
| <b>200 USD</b>                                  | for 2 new corporate Club members          |
| <b>300 USD</b>                                  | for 3 new corporate Club members          |
| <b>500 USD</b>                                  | for 4 and more new corporate Club members |