

Excerpts from the Summary of the SuPR (Sustainable Partnership with Russia) group Gstaad meeting.

February 2-3, 2011

2.11.

Assessing Iran's missile capabilities, some members of the Group concluded that Iranian missile threat to Europe, though should not be ignored, should not be exaggerated. According to their estimates, Iran should not be able to strike Western Europe before 2014 or the United States before 2020 – at the earliest. They believed that the military utility of Iran's current ballistic missiles is limited because of its poor accuracy, so missiles are not likely to be decisive if armed with conventional, chemical, or biological weapons.

2.12.

At the same time, the latent Iranian nuclear program is not going to disappear by itself, some members of the Group argued. Thus, in their view, it is Moscow's and Washington's role to reduce the risk of Iran obtaining nuclear weapons by re-energizing bilateral consultations on the issue, elevating its level and making certain joint conclusions and assessments public to demonstrate to Iran that both have same or similar position on Iran.

2.13.

Though such consultations should be primarily on Iran, it should not be limited to this country and should cover the whole Middle East, some members of the Group added. But this can only be possible if they have a common understanding of the risks, manage to produce a common list of options, promote an intensification of diplomatic actions and prevent any military strike against Iran.

2.14.

Any military strike against Iran, under any pretext, as some SuPR members emphasized, would be dangerous and counterproductive.

2.15.

In a view of some Group members, as the talks with Iran by the "nuclear five" and Germany continue, it would be helpful if the fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor is fabricated by the end of this year in order to have it in a timely manner in case the negotiations with Iran regarding this issue turn into a positive mode.

2.16.

At a certain stage, some members of the Group suggested, Turkey can be invited to such consultations as the third party or as an observer.

2.17.

At a later stage, some members of the Group suggested, Russia can and should facilitate the United States direct bilateral talks with Iran