

China's Policy on Korean Peninsula Nuclear Issue and China–Russia Strategic Coordination

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Abstract: North Korea has frequently conducted nuclear and missile tests in 2016 and 2017. The United States and South Korea decided to deploy antimissile systems in South Korea, adding to the complexity of the situation on the Korean Peninsula. Northeast Asia faces severe challenges in peace and security. China strongly condemns the Democratic People's Republic of Korea nuclear tests and missile launch plans and supports the United Nations Security Council's sanctions on North Korea, advocates resumption of the Beijing six-party talks as soon as possible, and aims at resolving the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue through political and diplomatic means. China has constantly opposed the United States in deploying the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) antimissile system in South Korea, indicating that the United States partly ambitions to strengthen the global antimissile system, which concerns peace and stability in Northeast Asia. Unfortunately, such action involved relevant countries in breaking the process of maintaining regional strategic stability. China and Russia hold similar or common positions on the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula and THAAD antimissile system. Strengthening China–Russia strategic coordination and cooperation will help promote denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and eliminate the negative impact of U.S. deploying antimissile systems in South Korea.

Introduction

In 2017, the situation in the Korean Peninsula became more tense especially considering the most recent possible hydrogen bomb test as well as two missile launches that took place continually in September. It goes without saying that nuclear and missile tests conducted by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) significantly accelerated. The United States and South Korea decided to deploy Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) antimissile system, complicating the situation in Korean peninsula all the more. DPRK nuclear issue expanded to the Korean Peninsula, causing more complexity to the problems faced by this area. China and North Korea share border. Thus, the Korean Peninsula situation is directly related to China's national security issues. China supports the United Nations Security Council's sanctions against North Korea while strongly opposing the deployment of THAAD antimissile system of the United States in South Korea. China puts forward a "dual-track approach" and "double suspension" as the first steps in initiating dialog in accordance with the "road map" carved out by Russia to defuse North Korea, aiming to resolve the issue through dialog and negotiation in a peaceful manner. China and

Russia hold similar or common positions on the Korean Peninsula. Strengthening strategic coordination and cooperation between China and Russia will contribute to settlement of the nuclear issue and realize denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula to jointly safeguard peace and prosperity of the Korean Peninsula and stability in Northeast Asia.

China's position on the DPRK nuclear issue

China has long adhered to denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and actively participated in settlement of the DPRK nuclear issue. In the beginning of 90s, DPRK nuclear issue gradually worsened, and China reduced military weapon assistance to DPRK. China also supported the *DPRK-U.S. Nuclear Agreed Framework*, which was reached by both sides in 1994. China officially launched the DPRK nuclear issue six-party talks in Beijing in 2003. China, as one of representatives, actively participated in the DPRK nuclear issue Beijing six-party talks. On September 19, 2005, "919 Common Statement" concerning DPRK nuclear issue was issued in Beijing six-party talks, on which a broad consensus was reached in terms of settlement of the DPRK nuclear issue. China actively engaged in diplomatic mediation by guaranteeing provision of energy assistance to the DPRK, pledging to provide security to promote DPRK's final rollback of the nuclear program and achieve denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. North Korea conducted its first underground nuclear test in 2006, whereas China supported Resolution 1718, which was adopted by the UN Security Council to condemn the DPRK nuclear test, and decided to impose sanctions on the DPRK. In February 2007, the fifth round of six-party talks on the DPRK nuclear issue set up five working groups to study settlement of the Korean Peninsula issue, and China was the leading character of the working group on the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Since 2008, the Beijing six-party talks on the DPRK nuclear issue stalled, and Russia actively called for a resumption of these conferences and played an active role in maintaining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and realizing denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

In 2009 and 2013, North Korea, despite the international community's opposition, once again conducted not only nuclear tests but also numerous missile launches. While supporting and implementing the UN Security Council's resolution on the DPRK sanctions and although maintaining its contacts with the DPRK in economic ties, China and DPRK has never achieved high-level visits since Kim Jong-un came to power. News about Kim Jung-un's visit to China has been constantly reported. In August 2012, when Jang Song-thaek, previous chief of the Central Administrative Department of Workers' Party, visited China to convey to the Beijing government that

Kim Jung-un hoped that the idea of visiting China in September can be realized, but it was indirectly rejected by Beijing due to the tight schedule of Chinese leaders.¹ Later, in the 2014 Lunar New Year and the same year in September, Pyongyang expressed the wish to visit China but was once again rejected.² On September 3, 2015, China held the parade of 70th Anniversary of Victory of Anti-Japanese Aggression War when a rumor spread that Kim Jung-il will visit China. However, Choe Ryong-Hae was the one who attended the commemoration. When Ri Su-yong, Vice Chairman of the 7th Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, visited China, he was received by Chinese President Xi Jinping. However, his visit still failed to facilitate the Sino-DPRK top meeting. This failure can be attributed to several reasons.

First, China considers cutting its long-standing brotherly ties with the DPRK (“去血盟化” in Chinese), hoping to normalize the relationship with the country. Thus, the attitude toward DPRK requires some adjustments. On the other hand, both sides face difficulty in reaching a consensus on the DPRK nuclear issue. North Korea has repeatedly said that it will not give up the development of nuclear weapons and refused to resume the six-party talks. China cannot see the sincerity of the DPRK on the Korean Peninsula issue.

On January 6, 2016, North Korea carried out a fourth hydrogen bomb nuclear test. On February 7, 2016, North Korea launched *Kwangmyongsong-4* by carrier rocket and was accused of ballistic missile test activity. China condemned North Korea's nuclear tests and missile launches as serious violation of UN Security Council resolutions and claimed that such tests threatened China's national security and intensified tensions on the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia. Beijing was supportive of UNSCR 2270 adopted by the UN Security Council. Resolution 2270 is the most severe sanction resolution imposed on the DPRK, prohibiting the country from carrying out any activities related to development of nuclear technology and ballistic missiles. At the Conference of the Security Council for the creation of a new draft resolution of DPRK, Liu Jieyi, China's Permanent Representative to the United Nations, pointed out that China has expressed its clear opposition. China has consistently adhered to denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, insisted on maintaining peace and stability on the peninsula, and resolutely aimed to resolve the problem through dialog and consultation. The Chinese government has taken measures to prohibit export of all weapons and related materials and technologies to the DPRK and to reject the North Korean Ocean Shipping, which is listed in Council resolution 2270 (2016), to

¹ 朝鲜惹怒北京 金正恩 10 月访华遭中国婉言拒绝 http://hao.news/news/detail_152865.html (accessed July 21, 2017)

² 曝中国对金正恩访华要求反应冷淡 因朝鲜拒绝弃核 http://news.ifeng.com/mil/video/detail_2014_06/19/36903510_0.shtml (accessed July 21, 2017)

implement the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2270 and to impose severe sanctions on DPRK. China has also frozen its financial relations with DPRK, including prohibition of Chinese financial institutions in establishment of new branches in North Korea or establishment of new branches of the Bank of Korea in China, to prevent financing North Korea's nuclear test and missile programs; import of North Korea to produce coal, iron, iron and gold ores, titanium, vanadium, and rare earth minerals should also be prohibited. However, this prohibition came with exemptions: first, such transactions have to be determined to be exclusively for purposes of people's livelihood and unrelated to generating revenue for nuclear or ballistic missile programs or other activities of DPRK prohibited by resolutions. Second, the coal must be confirmed to have originated outside and was transported through DPRK solely for export from the Port of Rajin, is unrelated to generating revenue for nuclear or ballistic missile programs or other activities of DPRK prohibited by resolutions, and has undergone procedures associated with those requirements.³

On September 9, 2016, the DPRK carried out its fifth nuclear test, i.e., the second nuclear test in 2016. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China issued a statement expressing its firm opposition to North Korea's disregard of the general opposition of the international community to nuclear tests again and strongly urged DPRK to abide by denuclearization commitments and relevant resolutions of the Security Council and stop taking actions that can worsen the situation.⁴ Hua Chunying, Foreign Ministry spokeswoman, said at the Regular Press Conference of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that China strongly urged all parties to focus on the overall situation, cautiously avoid further mutual stimulus, promote denuclearization of the peninsula, and exert actual effort in achieving peace and stability on the peninsula.⁵ On 10 September, Morgulov (Russian Deputy Foreign Minister) and Wu Dawei (special representative for Korean Peninsula Affairs of China) conversed over telephone. On September 12, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov spoke with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, with whom he exchanged views on the DPRK nuclear test and situation on the Korean Peninsula, condemning the DPRK's behavior and stressed that concerned parties should take steps but refrain from taking inappropriate action that can further escalate the tension. Wang Yi also adhered to political and diplomatic coordination to resolve the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue and agreed to continually coordinate the Sino-Russian position on this

³ See https://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/AC.49/2016/34&referer=/english/&Lang=C (accessed July 21, 2017)

⁴ See <http://web.archive.org/web/20160909054711/http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/zyxw/t1396145.shtml> (accessed July 21, 2017)

⁵ See http://web.archive.org/web/20160909132232/http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/fyrbt_673021/t1396202.shtml (accessed July 21, 2017)

issue. On September 13 and 14, 2016, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi had phone calls with Yun Byung-se (South Korea's Foreign Minister) and Fumio Kishida (Japan's Foreign Minister), respectively. Over the phone, Foreign Minister Wang Yi reiterated his opposition to the DPRK nuclear test. South Korea's Foreign Ministry said afterward that Wang Yi agreed to adopt a new sanction resolution at the UN Security Council. The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs said the two sides agreed to work together for the UN Security Council to adopt a new sanction resolution.⁶

China supports the UNSCR 2356 which was passed on June 2, 2017. Resolution 2356 was adopted in response to North Korea's violation and ignorance of the Security Council's resolutions on nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. Compared with Resolution 2345 and 2321, sanctions are sterner in Resolution 2356. In addition to reiterating past sanctions, Resolution 2356 places penalty on 14 North Korea government officials and 4 organizations. The resolution aims to cut off North Korea's foreign exchange revenue. Thus, the country would have no access to related materials or technology used for nuclear test or missile launches.

China supports the Security Council's sanctions against North Korea and restates its firm stance in denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. China also stresses that the only way to solve the North Korean nuclear issue lies not in economic sanction or force but rather in resuming six-party talks. Only through political or diplomatic measures can the North Korea nuclear issue be solved. In terms of economic sanction, China emphasizes that it should not bring any harm to North Korean citizens, isolate North Korea in the name of sanction, or sever the possibility to resolve the North Korea issue through political and diplomatic manners. China's President Xi Jinping pointed out in an interview with TASS on July 4th that China highly focuses on the condition of Korean Peninsula and adheres to the goal of denuclearization and peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula. Xi also said that as the peninsula issue had long-standing historical and complicated reasons, its resolution required treatment of both symptoms and causes and concern from all related parties. Therefore, China advocates a parallel-tracking approach, which requires both North Korea to suspend nuclear activities and the alliance of South Korea and the U.S. to suspend large-scale military exercise. Russia shows support for China's advocacy for the two countries in holding the same or similar stances toward the issue. The international community makes affirmative responses and calls on all related parties to act in cooperation with China and Russia's peace-making efforts. The international community also appeals that all parties concerned should shoulder their own responsibility and showcase their willingness to achieve the same goal, which is to bring denuclearization to the right

⁶ 外交部长王毅与日韩外长通电话 讨论朝鲜核问题
http://www.guancha.cn/Neighbors/2016_10_14_374458.shtml (accessed July 25, 2017)

track of dialog and communication.⁷ Economic sanctions against North Korea pose no significantly influence China's economic benefits. The trade volume between China and North Korea reached 6.4 billion dollars in 2016, making up a very small fraction of China's total trade volume. Most of the revenue came from coal trading, for earnings generated by exporting coal to China was the pillar of North Korea's economy. However, as China prohibited coal import from North Korea as a response to Resolution 2321 on February 18th, 2017, Sino-Korea trade revenue dropped drastically. According to statistics released by the China Customs, total trade revenue between the two countries in the first 5 months of 2017 totaled 2.05 billion dollars.⁸ At present, China mainly exports light textile products to North China.⁹ Meanwhile, according to Reuters, China is largely reducing the number of North Korean workers in China for further implementation of the resolution.¹⁰ In recent years, China has provided North Korea with humanitarian aid, including crude oil, food, training about infrastructure construction, medical treatment, and agriculture.¹¹

China's position toward antimissile system of THAAD

China upholds a policy of mutual benefits and maintains good neighborly and friendly relations with South Korea in the long term. Since Park Geun-hye came to power in 2012, China and South Korea have maintained close relations and actively advanced cooperation in fields of economy, trade, and investment. However, China is strongly opposed to the U.S. THAAD missile defense system in South Korea, which lifts palpable threats to China's national security, and breaks especially the strategic balance that China and the United States have kept for a long time. This defense system will trigger a new arms race and threaten peace and stability of involved regions and the world.

From January to February in 2016, South Korea announced that it and the United States deployed the THAAD missile defense system in South Korea in response to the DPRK nuclear test and missile program. The United States and South Korea thus established a special working group and conducted negotiations about the missile defense system from March to April. China has expressed serious concern about the deployment of the U.S. THAAD missile defense system in South Korea. Chinese President Xi Jinping, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of

⁷ Си Цзиньпин: на перспективы китайско-российских отношений мы смотрим с полным оптимизмом <http://tass.ru/opinions/interviews/4379492> (accessed August 10, 2017)

⁸ China Customs Statistics <http://www.chinacustomsstat.com/asp/1/Index.aspx> (accessed August 10, 2017)

⁹ 陈垦. 浅析 21 世纪初的中朝经贸关系[J]. 今日中国论坛, 2013, 7: 58-59.

¹⁰ Fewer North Korean Workers Come to China as Border Trade Tightens <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-northkorea-insight-idUSKBN13N2EA> (accessed August 10, 2017)

¹¹ China's Engagement of North Korea: Challenges and Opportunities for Europe <https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/Chinas-engagement-North-Korea.pdf> (accessed August 10, 2017)

Defense all have expressed strong opposition to deployment of the defense system in southern South Korea and also articulated concerns and opposition to the United States and South Korea through diplomatic channels and media. On February 15, 2016, Foreign Ministry Spokesman Hong Lei expressed at a Regular Press Conference grave concerns at the possibility that the U.S. may deploy the U.S. THAAD missile defense system on the Korean Peninsula. As we all know, the U.S. THAAD missile defense system, especially its X-band radar, monitors far beyond the peninsula and can reach deep into the Asian hinterland, which is more than for the defensive purpose. This system is inimical to both China's strategic security and security of other countries in the region. China distinctly and firmly objected that related countries plot to damage the strategic security of China through the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue.¹² On the next day, Vice Foreign Minister Zhang Yesui also said during an interview by Xinhuanet that China expressed serious concerns about the launch of the U.S. THAAD missile defense system in South Korea. Deploying the U.S. THAAD missile defense system in Korea will exacerbate regional tensions and damage China's strategic security and security of other countries in the region. China objected to this situation. Relevant parties were advised to focus on this issue and act with caution.¹³ On February 23, Chinese ambassador to South Korea Qiu Guohong met in the parliament with Kim Jong-In, the representative of the Democratic Party, the largest party out of office. Qiu repeated China's opposition to the deployment of the U.S. THAAD missile defense system. In case that South Korea deployed the system otherwise, such condition will cut the relations between China and South Korea and all efforts exerted for development of bilateral relations. He also upheld that "the deployment of THAAD would lead to a vicious circle and break the regional strategic balance resulted in an arms race and a confrontation as it were in the Cold War, deteriorating the situation and growing unease."¹⁴

On July 8, 2016, the United States and South Korea reached an agreement on the deployment of the U.S. THAAD missile defense system in South Korea. Regarding this matter, Chinese Defense Ministry spokesman Yang Yujun said that China will pay close attention to the issue and consider adopting necessary measures to safeguard strategic security and regional strategic balance.¹⁵ China's foreign ministry expressed strong dissatisfaction and summoned American and South Korean's

¹² 外交部就朝鲜半岛核问题等答问实录 http://news.china.com.cn/txt/2017-04/17/content_40637514.htm (accessed August 10, 2017)

¹³ 张业遂：中方反对在韩国部署“萨德”反导系统——外交部副部长张业遂接受新华社采访 http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/wjbxw_673019/t1340956.shtml (accessed August 15, 2017)

¹⁴ 韩政府召见中国驻韩大使抗议其涉萨德言论 <http://world.huanqiu.com/exclusive/2016-02/8598853.html> (accessed August 10, 2017)

¹⁵ Заявление МИД России в связи с решением о размещении американской системы ПРО в Республике Корея

http://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2349040?p_p_id=101_INSTANCE_cKNonkJE02Bw&_101_INSTANCE_cKNonkJE02Bw_languageId=ru_RU (accessed August 15, 2017)

ambassadors to China. The deployment of the U.S. THAAD missile defense system concedes the goal of denuclearization of the peninsula, undermines peace and stability of the area, and violates achievements required through dialogs. This deployment will seriously tilt the balance of strategic security in the region including China. China strongly urged the United States and South Korea to stop the deployment of missile system, cease to add complexity to the situation, and end damaging China's strategic security. The Foreign Ministry said that the United States and South Korea, putting aside sharp opposition from the countries concerned, announced that they will deploy the U.S. THAAD missile defense system in South Korea. China expressed strong dissatisfaction and resolute opposition and had summoned the United States and South Korean ambassadors to China to present solemn representations.¹⁶

China has been highly concerned about the development of antimissile system in the United States, with particular vigilance against its plans to deploy the forefront of early-warning radar. The Chinese government considers that "The global missile defense program will undermine the international strategic balance and stability. And it is detrimental to international and regional security and it also exerts a negative impact on the nuclear disarmament process. All parties should not deploy missile defense systems that have the capability and potential of strategic defense overseas or carry out relevant international cooperation." Depending on the US diplomatic report disclosed by WikiLeaks, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs has expressed three concerns about missile defense in the Sino-US security dialogs. First, this missile defense destroys strategic stability. Second, Japan's antimissile radar can threaten China under the cooperation of America and Japan. Third, spreading of antimissile technology to Taiwan may enhance Taiwan's offensive missile technology.¹⁷ Given South Korea's proximity to mainland China, strategic impact of deployment of X-band radar in Korea will far exceed that of the same type of radar deployed in Japan. The latter cannot raise strong concern in China. In peacetime, deployment of the X-band radar in Korea by the United States can help in observance of China's strategic missile test (missiles are usually launched from the eastern coast of China and land on northwest China) and improve its monitoring accuracy in regions covering Bohai Sea and the Yellow Sea, where missile tests are usually conducted. As a result, America can continuously collect data of relevant targets and enhance its capability to intercept China's strategic missiles in return. In warfare, deployment of X-band radar in South Korea rather than deployment of early-warning radar in Japan can help the United States much earlier track China's strategic missiles against the United States. Observing warheads and processes of baits' releases is expected to help

¹⁶ 国防部新闻发言人就美韩决定部署“萨德”反导系统发表谈话

<http://military.people.com.cn/n1/2016/0709/c1011-28539248.html> (accessed August 31, 2017)

¹⁷ 外交部声明 <http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/zyxw/t1378537.shtml> (accessed August 31, 2017)

recognize missiles. Early-warning time of long-haul missiles launched from China's coastal waters is more than half as short as the time of X-band radar in Japan. Other early-warning radars and interception systems in the United States will add to formation of more effective defense systems to threaten China's strategic missiles.

As to military security, deployment of "AN/TPY-2" radar in South Korea by the United States also influences China's conventional deterrent capability. China's naval forces are relatively weak, and thus, it has to maximize its strengths. Land-based short and middle-range missiles are China's trump card to respond to surrounding conflicts. South Korea is only a few hundred kilometers from Beijing and eastern coastal areas. If the United States deploys long-range radar "AN/TPY-2" in Korea, detection of early-warning radar can be advanced to some hundreds of kilometers in China. Once conflicts arise between China and Japan, "AN/TPY-2" radar will transmit China's data through the Japan–US joint command system to the antimissile system of Japanese land Self-Defense Force "Patriot," systems of Self-Defense Force, the "Aegis" antimissile system of Japan–US, and other interception systems. The radar will then intercept and destroy attacking missiles to substantially increase defensive capacity of the US military base in Japan, US aircraft carrier battle groups, and other strategic objectives to offset China's "anti-intervention" to a certain extent. Therefore, once the United States deploys "AN/TPY-2" radar in South Korea, Japan will be emboldened to provoke China more intensively than before, threatening security and stability in Northeast Asia.

China believes that deployment of a missile defense system in South Korea poses a serious threat to China's security. This situation will break the balance of strategic forces between China and the United States. Thus, China's strategic nuclear deterrent declines. The U.S. antimissile system is built on the brink of the eastern part of China borders, trapping China in the defense system of the United States. It will allow the United States to acquire absolute military status, thus increasing risks of warfare.

China firmly opposes establishment of a global antimissile system by the United States while actively seeking countermeasures. On February 28, 2017, the People's Daily published a comment which said that, "the history of international relations has long proved that troubling others is to trouble themselves; to sacrifice the security of other countries to strengthen their own security is a typical unreasonable behavior. He will be hoisted by his own petard. Sticking to the deployment of the U.S. THAAD missile defense system will breach the goal of denuclearization of the peninsula, undermine the peace and stability of the peninsula and violate the achievements required through dialogs. It will seriously tilt the balance of strategic security in the region including China. The security of any country should not be based on the

detriment of the security of other countries. No country will keep aloof to those who encroach our own security. China would advise relevant countries to take a responsible attitude to cope with international relations and regional issues, never keep following a wrong path, and never underestimate the will and strength of China to defend security.”¹⁸ On July 5, 2017, Chinese President Xi Jinping severely condemned U.S. THAAD missile defense system in South Korea during an interview by Tass. This condemnation seriously breaks the balance of strategic security in regions, including China and Russia, breach the goal of denuclearization of the peninsula, and undermine peace and stability of the peninsula. China has taken opposing stands and shown notable concern to this issue. China and Russia maintain close communication and coordination on the THAAD issue at all levels. Both sides hold high-level agreement on the nature and danger of this problem. China and Russia bitterly oppose deployment of antimissile system and strongly urge relevant countries to stop and cancel related deployment. Two sides will either collectively or personally take necessary measures to protect security and maintain regional strategic balance.¹⁹

In May 2017, China's People's Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) tested missiles in Bohai Sea, which as new equipment, were carried out to respond to the THAAD. THAAD was first designed for ballistic missile without terminal mobility and although improved afterwards, can only respond to ballistic missile with restrained terminal mobility to a certain degree. At present, fast terminal speed of ballistic missiles with terminal mobility, such as Dongfeng-15B, Dongfeng-21C/D and Dongfeng-26, still make THAAD system powerless before them.²⁰

China–Russia Coordination and Cooperation on Nuclear Issue of Korean Peninsula and THAAD

China and Russia play important roles in the East Asia and stand on similar or shared position in the matter of Korean Peninsula. The reinforced Sino-Russia strategic coordination and cooperation bears significance in promoting settlement of disputes concerning nuclear power and THAAD antimissile system on the Korean Peninsula and jointly protecting the national security of the two countries and peace and stability across Northeast Asia.

¹⁸ 中国战略安全利益不容肆意侵害

http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2017-02/28/nw.D110000renmrb_20170228_2-21.htm (accessed August 31, 2017)

¹⁹ Си Цзиньпин: на перспективы китайско-российских отношений мы смотрим с полным оптимизмом
<http://tass.ru/opinions/interviews/4379492> (accessed August 31, 2017)

²⁰ “萨德”即将完成部署之际 中国火箭军亮了 <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=chd6qXJp8Zo> (accessed August 31, 2017)

Both China and Russia urge denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, strongly condemn repeated nuclear tests and missile launches of North Korea against the decision of UN Security Council, support and enforce sanction resolutions placed by UN Security Council, and agree to seek political and diplomatic solutions to the nuclear issue on the peninsula by resuming six-party talks in Beijing. On Nov. 30, 2016, Russia pointed out in the latest edition of Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation that, “Russia has always championed a non-nuclear status for the Korean Peninsula and will support its denuclearization in every possible way, believing that this objective can be attained through the six-party talks. The Russian Federation will keep up its efforts to establish a mechanism for maintaining peace and security in Northeast Asia, and will also strive to expand economic cooperation within the region.”²¹ On Jan. 11, 2017, the Chinese government put forward in the White Paper on China's Policies on Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation (the White Paper) that, “In January and September this year the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) conducted two nuclear tests and launched missiles of various types, violating UN Security Council resolutions and running counter to the wishes of the international community. China has made clear its opposition to such actions and supported the relevant Security Council resolutions to prevent the DPRK's further pursuit of nuclear weapons. China will continue to work with the international community and strive for denuclearization and long-term peace and stability of the peninsula and of Northeast Asia as a whole.”²²

China and Russia are holding opposition toward the deployment of American THAAD antimissile system in South Korea, believing that such deployment belongs to America's strategic arrangement to construct the global antimissile system and intention to realize the arc antimissile network crossing Europe and Asian-Pacific Region. Once the THAAD is built in South Korea, a protection network covering Northeast Asia for the U.S. and intercepting ballistic missiles in all higher, middle, and lower altitudes with THAAD, Patriot 3, and different types of Aegis, respectively, will take shape. Nominally, this network is the defense facility against potential nuclear attacks from North Korea to South Korea and the U.S. military base. However, it is actually an essential part of America's global strategy and Asian-Pacific strategy.

America aims to sustain its absolute military advantage in Northeast Asia and to develop new strategic containment over China and Russia. America's deployment of THAAD in South Korea will weaken nuclear deterrence of China and Russia, which

²¹ Концепция внешней политики Российской Федерации (утверждена Президентом Российской Федерации В.В.Путиным 30 ноября 2016 г.) <http://static.kremlin.ru/media/acts/files/0001201612010045.pdf> (accessed August 31, 2017)

²² 《中国的亚太安全合作政策》白皮书（全文）
http://www.scio.gov.cn/zxbd/wz/Document/1539488/1539488_1.htm (accessed August 31, 2017)

may upset the balance of strategic powers around the Northeast Asia and the entire world as well as pose serious threat to peace and safety of China, Russia, and Northeast Asia areas. As described by Lieutenant-General Poznikhir, the First Deputy Chief of the Main Operations Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Federation's Armed Forces, "construction of the U.S. National Missile Defense (NMD) will upset the developed balance of world military powers." "America's intention to gain significant advantage over Russia and China in the strategic weapon system will probably lead to unexpected result." "Protected by the umbrella of NMD, America will attempt to unilaterally settle all the international and regional problems based on the imagined unassailability and impunity ... thus may lower the nuclear threshold to warn the actions of enemy."²³ Chinese government stated in the White Paper on Asia-Pacific Security Cooperation that, "Antimissile defense system concerns the global strategic stability and mutual trust between major nations. China has been stressing the deliberation into the antimissile defense issues, since neither the construction of strategic stability and mutual trust nor the development of inclusive global and regional safety layouts can benefit from the cold-war-style military alliance and the global and regional antimissile defense systems."²⁴ Foreign Minister Wang Yi pointed out that "We firmly safeguard our legitimate interests and strategic security environment against the deployment of the THAAD on the peninsula under the pretext of the nuclear issue."²⁵

China and Russia have been actively initiating dialogs and consultations to coordinate standings and develop cooperation on the nuclear issue on Korean Peninsula and THAAD deployment in South Korea. On July 4, 2017, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov signed joint statement on the Korean Peninsula issues on behalf of the two ministries. The statement announced that both China and Russia deemed the declaration of ballistic missile launch released by North Korea on July 4 unacceptable and a severe violation against relevant decision of UN Security Council and strongly urged North Korea to sincerely conform to requirements placed by Security Council's decision. This statement also delivered the two governments' grave concern towards situation development of Korean Peninsula and surrounding areas, the opposition against any words and deeds that intensify tensions and disputes, the appeal to relative countries to exercise restraint and avoid provocative behaviors or bellicose speeches, and unconditional willingness to participate in dialog and contribute active efforts to ease tension. The two countries suggested that North Korea should make volunteer political resolution to announce

²³ ПРО США угрожает безопасности России и Китая - Генштаб ВС РФ
https://tvzvezda.ru/news/vstrane_i_mire/content/201610111128-k3nf.htm (accessed August 31, 2017)

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ 外交部部长王毅在2016年国际形势与中国外交研讨会开幕式上的演讲
<http://www.mfa.gov.cn/chn/pds/ziliao/zyjh/t1421108.htm> (accessed August 31, 2017)

suspension of nuclear tests and ballistic missile launches, whereas the U.S. and South Korea should suspend large-scale joint military drill. China and Russia called on each party to comply with promises illustrated in the “919 Joint Statement” and reactive dialog process that comprehensively solves problems on the peninsula. Military enforcement is not supposed to be an option for resolution of problems on the Korean Peninsula. China and Russia reiterated that deployment of THAAD system in Northeast Asia significantly compromises the national strategic safety interests of China, Russia, and other countries within the region. It also contributes little to the nuclear-free Korean Peninsula or regional peace and stability. Both parties object to deployment of THAAD, urge relative nations to immediately terminate and cancel such deployment, and agree to implement necessary practices to effectively safeguard security interests of both countries and strategic balance across the region.²⁶

Foreign ministers of China and Russia and their deputies have maintained close communication and exchanged positions. Telephone conversations and meetings have been carried out repeatedly between Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi and between Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Morgulov and Chinese Special Envoy to DPRK Wu Dawei/Assistant Foreign Minister Kong Xuanyou. Since June of 2015, at deputy ministerial level, China and Russia initiated the Northeast Asia Security Consultation, which has been undertaken for four times in 2016. On October 27, 2016, the fifth China–Russia Northeast Asia Security Consultation was opened in Beijing, during which both parties expressed concerns to continuing exercises of missile and nuclear tests by North Korea and endeavor of America and South Korea, tipping the strategic balance in Northeast Asia toward themselves, and mentioned the negative impacts from THAAD deployment in South Korea. According to the two sides, sustainable strategic stability in Northeast Asia must deepen the dialog and coordination between China and Russia. Thus, the two nations will defend their regional security interests.²⁷ The sixth China–Russia Northeast Asia Security Consultation was staged in Moscow, Russia on January 12, 2017. The two parties pointed out that “the destructive effects of the employment of THAAD system in South Korea on the regional stability and security” and reached an agreement that, “innovative and constructive strategy must be collectively sought to pull the situation out of current dead end, relieve and eliminate the military and political disputes in Northeast Asia, thus to build the coordination of nuclear and

²⁶ 中华人民共和国外交部和俄罗斯联邦外交部关于朝鲜半岛问题的联合声明
<http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/wjbzhd/t1475362.shtml> (accessed August 31, 2017)

²⁷ О пятом раунде российско-китайского Диалога по безопасности в Северо-Восточной Азии http://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2507405?p_p_id=101_INSTANCE_cKNonkJE02Bw&_101_INSTANCE_cKNonkJE02Bw_languageId=ru_RU (accessed August 31, 2017)

other issues on the Korean Peninsula on the guaranteed strategic stability and regional peace.”²⁸

China and Russia have actively launched military cooperation that concerns antimissile defense. The research center of Russian Aerospace Defense Forces witnessed Aerospace Security-2016, the first joint computer-enabled antimissile defense exercise, which were implemented by China and Russia in May 23–29, 2016 and intended to perform drill joint actions against ballistic missiles and cruise missiles.²⁹ On Mar. 30, 2017, Wu Qian, spokesman of Ministry of National Defense of China announced in a Regular Press Conference to exercise the second joint antimissile defense drill in 2017.³⁰

China and Russia have been actively promoting the restart of Beijing six-party talks and establishment of peace and security mechanism on both the Korean Peninsula and Southeast Asia. Sanctions, isolation, and pressure implemented on North Korea have not resolved the nuclear issue on the peninsula. THAAD is not only unhelpful for settlement of the North Korea nuclear dispute but also further complicates settlement, intensifies regional tensions, and advances regional arms race as North Korea will hardly suspend development plan of nuclear missile or initiate denuclearization when its regime and national security are faced with serious external threats and insufficient security assurance. To settle the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula, we should promote establishment of peace and security mechanism on both Korean Peninsula and Southeast Asia as well as create harmonious conditions for the settlement. New proposals are put forward in terms of resumption of the six-party talk. Some suggest the “5+1” mode similar to the talk with Iran, namely China, Russia, the U.S., Japan, South Korea plus North Korea. Such mode is inadvisable in that it does not help build the trust with North Korea, which is an important party regarding the nuclear issue on the peninsula. It may give North Korea a sense of being targeted against, thus cause the failure of resolving the issue. Another proposal advocates to include Britain and France into the Korean Peninsula nuclear negotiations, namely, increase the number of parties involved. It is also undesirable given the possibility of further complicating the negotiation.

Vorontsov points out that since China shares a border of 1,420 kilometers with North Korea, nearly 100 times more than that of Russia, China should play a more active

²⁸ О шестом раунде российско-китайского Диалога по безопасности в Северо-Восточной Азии
http://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2591192 (accessed August 31, 2017)

²⁹ Россия и Китай провели первые совместные компьютерные учения по ПРО
<http://www.rbc.ru/politics/28/05/2016/5749b2809a7947a444afc1a4> (accessed August 31, 2017)

³⁰ 国防部：今年中俄两军将举行第二次反导联合演习
<http://news.sina.com.cn/o/2017-03-30/doc-ifycwyxr8853019.shtml> (accessed August 31, 2017)

role while Russia is more of a supportive character. No matter which nation takes the lead, it is crucial that both sides are on the same page. It will be especially disappointing to see the abrupt change of decision in the last minute when China and Russia already reach an agreement beforehand. For example, in March 2016, China surprisingly changed the position in supporting the “Rajin-Hassan Project” in the last minute, which is detrimental to Russia’s economical and political interest.³¹

Similarly, Russia vetoed UN statement on North Korea’s missile test on April 20, 2017, indicating that it is due to lack of “through dialogue” in language while it was guessed that the intention of Russia was another story.³² Vorontsov also warns that it will be extremely dangerous for either country to use forceful measures. There are scholars proposing to clandestinely send troops and blockade the nuclear facility of North Korea, like the “vezhliviye lyudi” (“polite people”) leading the silent invasion of the Crimea. Such action will only lead to unexpected catastrophe given the utterly different situation (composite of citizens, sovereignty, leadership etc.) between Crimea and North Korea.³³

Just as Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying said, “China was not the ‘focal point of the conflict’ after North Korea’s sixth nuclear test on September 3, 2017. “The various directly involved parties should take responsibility. Any attempt to wash their hands of the issue is irresponsible.”³⁴ Russia's foreign ministry also points out, “Regrettably, aggressive rhetoric is the only thing coming from Washington.”³⁵ It goes without saying that the U.S. must liberate itself out of the cold war mentality, abandon the policy of seeking military advantages and strategic containment in Northeast Asia, and stop building safety of America and its allies on threat to safety of other nations. To this end, it is indispensable to push forward negotiation on the nuclear issue of Korean Peninsula, realize replacement of armistice with peace treaty, sign the Korean postwar peace agreement, and achieve normalization of diplomatic relations between North Korea and the U.S./Japan. Priority should also be given to drive North Korea toward openness and cooperation, ease tensions on the peninsula, discuss establishment of peace mechanism that ensures peace and safety of Korean Peninsula, and gradually develop a cooperation system that protects peace and security in Northeast Asia. Comprehensive settlement of nuclear and THAAD issues

³¹ The content is compiled by the author on July 28, 2017 based on the interview with Alexander Vorontsov, the head of the Department for Korean and Mongolian Studies and the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russia Academy of Sciences.

³² Russia vetoes UN statement on North Korea's missile tests
<http://www.cnn.com/2017/04/19/asia/russia-un-veto-north-korea/index.html> (accessed August 31, 2017)

³³ *Ibid.*

³⁴ 2017年9月15日外交部发言人华春莹主持例行记者会
<http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cena/chn/fyrth/t1493476.htm> (accessed September 16, 2017)

³⁵ В МИДе ответили США на призыв продемонстрировать нетерпимость к ракетным запускам КНДР
<https://govoritmoskva.ru/news/134681/> (accessed September 16, 2017)



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on the Korean Peninsula can only be facilitated by creation of peaceful and steady peninsula situation and harmonious and sound Northeast Asian environment.