The Monterey Conference
April 9, 1992

The sponsors and the organizers of this conference were able, with the generous help from the foundations, to bring together for the first time in one forum a wide spectrum of eminent personalities from the governments, legislatures, academic world and media of Belarus', Kazakhstan, Russia, Ukraine, and also the US, UK and Canada. So, this is indeed a unique gathering.

In my view, the conference has been very productive by bringing to the fore problems but also indicating ways for their solution.

#1. The nuclear problems that the 4 independent states face today are truly immense. And these problems were never discussed or analyzed in the past by qualified independent experts in what was then the Soviet Union for a very simple reason that there were no such independent experts. They just did not exist. They were badly needed then, which could help to avoid many tragedies of the past, like those of Chernobyl or Kyshtym. Such experts are in a still greater demand now, at the time of the disintegration of a NWS.

#2. The prevailing problems are organically and intrinsically common for all 4. The entire nuclear infrastructure - both military and civilian - was built by the single nuclear establishment, administered from one focal point well known to those present here from the former SU by its Moscow address - Ordynka street. And this establishment was, perhaps, the most closely kept secret in one of the most closed societies in human history. In terms of secrecy I would not hesitate to compare it to the nuclear establishment which is being uncovered by the UN and IAEA in Iraq and the one which will, hopefully, be uncovered in not too distant future in North Korea.

Since the problems are common, there is a natural basis for cooperation among emerging nonproliferation communities of the 4 independent states. If at this time there may exist some reluctance or allergy (hopefully seasonal) to collective action on the governmental level, appropriate efforts on the part of non-governmental communities or individuals may prove to be more acceptable. I hope that this conference in Monterey will provide a helpful stimulus to such cooperation. It is encouraging that the Association for Nonproliferation was established in Moscow just on the eve of this conference.

#3. I believe that, in general, the management of nuclear energy - in whatever form it may be used and for whatever purposes it may be intended - requires an international approach.
Internationalization is, in my view, the most effective, if not the only way to deal with the mounting problems which nuclear energy poses before mankind. To name a few - the dismantlement of nuclear warheads and safe and environmentally secure storage of Pu and HEU; safety of nuclear power plants, clean-up of radiation polluted areas; waste management and waste disposal and so on and so forth.

Fortunately, there exists an effective multilateral mechanism - the IAEA, which provides a good framework and a good starting point for the incremental development of a more comprehensive international regime, capable of dealing with an ever increasing number of nuclear energy issues.

The discussions at the conference have demonstrated that there is a clear need for urgent consideration of ways of implementing a statutory provision of the IAEA on international plutonium storage (IPS). The IPS regime is important not only for military, but also for civil Pu. According to current estimates more than 300 tons of civil Pu might have been separated around the world by the turn of the century, in addition to hundreds of tons of Pu and HEU released from warheads.

The IPS under the IAEA custody and safeguards might remove concerns and fears that may be entertained by some former Soviet republics with regard to weapons-grade material from warheads which are to be stored in Russia.

#4. The discussion has made it unmistakably clear that nuclear weapons cannot be treated as an instrument of politics, or for pursuing political or any such kind of benefits or gains, still less for posturing. Politics and nuclear weapons just do not mix. This conference convincingly reaffirmed the widely held view, based on the 45-year experience, that nuclear weapons may have only one raison d'être - if any raison d'être at all - that of deterrence. Any other treatment of nuclear weapons cannot be accepted or tolerated by the civilized world community.

#5. Democratic society can provide the best possible, though not, of course, ideal, - since there is no such thing as an ideal society, - environment for the sustained development of nuclear energy. This kind of energy needs openness, independent control, highest possible technology, democratic decision-making processes. All of this can best be provided by a democratic society. The existence of innumerable nuclear assets in FSU is an additional reason why there is a need to move as fast as possible to democratic societies in CIS countries. Nuclear predicament may be done away with only in conditions of democracy.

#6. The peoples inhabiting the vast landmass which was called the USSR have always had a globally oriented outlook and felt responsibility for the peace and security of the world at large, in particular after the former Soviet Union became a NWS.
The manufacture and the possession of the nuclear weapons by the FSU was not the result of the free choice by the people. However, the existence of these weapons is a hard and inescapable reality. No less real is the fact that the way this problem will be managed will affect not only the fate of the FSU, but that of the rest of the world.

Of special concern to everybody is what kind of impact this will have for the international nonproliferation regime. There is no doubt that proliferation-risk countries are carefully watching nuclear related developments in the FSU and would like to use to their benefit any potential loopholes that may appear in the existing internal and external nuclear control in the FSU.

The international nonproliferation system has been based on the close cooperation among NPT depository nuclear weapons states, recently joined by the two other NWS, and an ever growing number of nations strongly supporting NPT. This cooperation has made possible a continuous significant increase in the membership of the NPT which now numbers 151 parties. Recent success of the Warsaw meeting of the NSG on which we were briefed by Carl Thorne is yet another evidence of the ongoing process of strengthening the NPT regime.

But there are still quite a few de facto nuclear or threshold countries, lying for the most part along the southern and south-eastern brim of the FSU. Any roll-back in their nuclear stance can be achieved – and I think it can be achieved – only through concerted efforts by all consistent advocates of nuclear nonproliferation.

However the peoples of the 4 independent states may be occupied today by their internal political, economic and social problems which are indeed of enormous dimensions and of critical urgency, it would be suicidal to isolate oneself from the issues which are of direct concern to the security and well-being of these states.

I do believe that this conference will make its contribution to the important and overriding goal of nuclear nonproliferation.