“Assessing the role of nuclear P5 in ensuring strategic stability”

Sofya Shestakova, Non-Resident Fellow at PIR Center,
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The P5 process was established in 2008.

The first meeting of the P5 process was held in London in 2009.

A permanent dialogue mechanism of all five official nuclear-weapon states on nuclear issues.

Membership – Russia, the United Kingdom, France, the United States, China

Informal nature of meetings

This dialogue has no clear structure or formal procedures, and the rhythm of the meetings and their agendas have developed over time.
The definition of “strategic stability” was first agreed upon in the 1990 US-USSR Joint Statement as “the ratio of US and Soviet strategic forces in which there are no incentives to launch a first strike”
POSSIBLE DIRECTIONS
For the P5 dialogue on strategic stability

Jointly identifying the conditions for nuclear disarmament and continuing to support them

Maintaining transparency and building confidence

Nuclear risk reduction
IN 2021 RUSSIA'S PROPOSAL TO DEVELOP A NEW STRATEGIC SECURITY EQUATION

- Missile defence;
- Among offensive weapons, special attention should be paid to strike systems used in a first counterforce strike on the territory of the other side to neutralise its deterrence potential or to weaken such potential;
- Ensuring the security of space activities and preventing an arms race in space.

It seems also appropriate to consider the impact of hypersonic and cybernetic technologies, dual-use developments in artificial intelligence, space and robotics on nuclear risks.
Significant documents adopted by the P5

Joint Working Paper *On Strategic Risk Reduction* was unveiled on December 7, 2021

Joint Statement *on Preventing Nuclear War and Avoiding Arms Races* dated January 3, 2022
A nuclear war could not be won and must never be fought
TRANSPARENCY AND CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES
Further process to enhance transparency of nuclear doctrines

Comprehensive program of briefings for experts from other countries on disarmament cooperation initiated by Russia and the US

Similar proposal was partly reflected in the 2011 Vienna Document on OSCE Confidence- and Security-Building Measures

System of notification of exercises beyond strategic bomber exercises
NOTIFICATION SYSTEM

Within the framework of the START Treaty, the US and Russia exchange notifications of ICBM and SLBM test launches and telemetry data.

The UK and France have experience in notifying conventional arms launches and major exercises under the Vienna Document 2011.

There is a Sino-Russian agreement on notification of launches of ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles.

The UK and Norwegian initiative to explore technical and procedural problems associated with a future nuclear disarmament verification regime.