Chronology

Russia and India signed an international agreement on cooperation in the construction of 4 additional units at Kudankulam, as well as on the construction of nuclear power plants according to Russian projects on new sites in India
05.12.2008
The end of the strategic offensive arms reduction period under the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START I Treaty)
05.12.2001
The Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START I), transformed by the Lisbon Protocol of 1992 comes into force
05.12.1994
The adoption of Memoranda on Security Guarantees on the part of Russia, the U.S. and the UK. The memoranda are needed because of Ukraine, Byelorussia and Kazakhstan joining NPT.
05.12.1994
Ukraine joins the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear weapons state.
05.12.1994
A U.S. sea-borne aircraft with an atomic bomb onboard crashes 200 miles from Okinawa.
05.12.1965
The first world nuclear propelled surface ship, the icebreaker Lenin, is commissioned.
05.12.1957
France sets up an atomic bomb development committee within the Commissariat for Atomic Energy.
05.12.1956
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PIR PRESS NEWS

04.12.2020

"The development of nuclear energy in Saudi Arabia is a forward-looking and important task. The State Atomic Energy Corporation “Rosatom” has every chance to become one of the KSA’s key partners in the development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy because it already has extensive experience in working with nuclear newcomer countries in difficult climatic conditions with lack of the necessary infrastructure", ‒ Inna Rodina, PIR Center intern. 

01.12.2020

“It is difficult for me to say how many pillars PIR Center is based on, but one of them is definitely the interns. Their hard work, intelligence, and creativity make a substantial contribution to our work», ‒ Sergey Semenov, Nuclear Nonproliferation & Russia Program Coordinator.

27.11.2020

International security is not a center of the world, but a reflection of profound processes that nowadays are characterized by a growing randomness and shrinking planning horizon. Confidence, privacy and confidentiality of diplomacy are deteriorating. Ensuring security requires not only technical, but also political decisions. Under such circumstances the aim of the Russian foreign policy is to find a balance between development and security amidst an incoming new wave of globalization. To secure its status of a great power, Russia needs to preserve its relevance among other players and play a role of additional element to the situation of unsteady equilibrium.

Syrian chemical weapons – a solution found?

On September 9, 2013 during the press conference in London Secretary of State John Kerry, replying to a question, said: “Syrian President Bashar al-Assad could avoid a U.S. military strike by surrendering all his chemical weapons within a week to international community”. The White House tried to downgrade the statement referring to it as a figure of speech, and pointing to the fact that Damascus would never comply. Nevertheless, the proposition was taken up by Russian MFA and delivered to Syrian side by the Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov. After that Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Muallem said that “Damascus welcomes Russian initiative”, which was also supported by the UN, Arab League, EU, China, Iran and, with some reservations, by the USA. Congress vote on military intervention to Syria was delayed. US President Barack Obama declared, that he is ready to examine Russian proposition.

Russia and the USA are ready for cooperation

The idea that the USA and Russia could work together on WMD threat reduction isn’t new. On June 21, 2013 PIR Center President Vladimir Orlov in his comments to Kommersant newspaper (in Russian) on a perspectives of Russian-American cooperation in WMD security, said: “Nowadays Russia at its own expense is completing the destruction of our stocks of chemical weapons. But the parties could transfer their cooperation in this field to third countries”. The experience of the Russian Federation and the United States in combating the spread of WMD, according to PIR Center President, will be in demand in the Middle East (including Syria). The upcoming opportunity could not only resolve the Syrian chemical weapons question, but also become a solid basis for US-Russian cooperation.

Our analysis

Authors indicate an urgent threat connected to the Syrian chemical weapons: “A far more serious threat, however, is the possibility of chemical weapons being seized by the rebels. There is no comprehensive information about the size of the Syrian stockpile of chemical weapons and precursors. This lack of information makes it more difficult to keep track of the state of the Syrian WMD arsenals. The world's secret services - especially the US and Israeli agencies - are keeping a very close watch on the Syrian chemical weapons sites. Nevertheless, there is still a real threat of those weapons falling into the hands of rebels or Islamist terrorists.”

Current situation in Syria develops almost exactly the same way as was predicted by PIR Center authors: “Clearly, in case of confirmation that Syrian government troops have used weapons of mass destruction, the existing balance of power will shift <…>. The United States <…> will gain broad international support for a legitimate military operation to secure all known Syrian chemical weapons sites. Little is known about the Syrian chemical weapons stockpiles. There is, therefore, a real possibility that not all of these stockpiles will be taken under strict international control, and that some of them will end up in the hands of radical Islamists. The situation in Syria, meanwhile, will probably unfold according to the Iraqi scenario”.

PIR Center experts have already proposed their recommendations for solving Syrian question and reiterate their position. In the article «Prospects for resolving the problems of nuclear security and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East: the experience of the Global Partnership» to be published in the Security Index journal Artem Blashchanitsa says: “The only acceptable alternative is the one, wherein the main concerned parties for the peaceful settlement will achieve a ceasefire regime between Damascus and National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces.

PIR Center experts Artem Blashchanitsa, Aleksandr Plugarev and Aleksandr Cheban in the article for Russia Confidential, stress the idea that such a scenario “will become possible if the United States, Russia and other countries manage to exert effective diplomatic pressure on both of the warring factions and force them to agree to a ceasefire”. In June PIR Center experts proposed the following recommendations for achieving such scenario:

  * The United States, Russia and other countries should exert effective diplomatic pressure on both of the warring factions and force them to agree to a ceasefire. The situation has reached a dead end; it is therefore important to make sure that we will get a peaceful stalemate instead of a pointless bloodbath, with a growing risk of chemical weapons use.

 * The United States, Russia and Iran might then be able to reach a compromise, and identify some mutually acceptable (or equally inconvenient, but practical) ways of safeguarding their own interests in that conflict

* If the negotiations succeed, the next logical step after forming a national reconciliation government must be for that government to declare all existing chemical weapons arsenals and sites, and to begin eliminating those arsenals - possibly with international help.


Evgeny Buzhinsky, Lieutenant-General (ret.), PIR Center Vice President:

“We need to understand all the difficulties of the process of elimination of Syrian chemical weapons. I cannot remember such a huge and difficult operation in history.

First of all, there is a difficulty of verification. Syria faces a civil war right now, and observers, who will be sent to secure the chemical facilities, would face a great danger (all observers were evacuated from Syria with the beginning of civil war in 2011)”. Not many Europeans will agree to become observers under such conditions. We could expect that Americans will be ready to accept these conditions, providing their own security, but in this case Damascus would hardly agree to tolerate a large armed American contingent on his soil.

Secondly, chemical weapons are not normally moved from the country and are disposed on-site during several years.

If due to the urgency of task we imply the physical transportation, the operation becomes unprecedented. The most ambitious project up to date, on the experience of which we can rely, was the withdrawal of Soviet nuclear weapons from Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine to Russia. Back then, in the beginning of 1990-s in the framework of Lisbon agreement, the operation ended successfully, but it took several years to complete the task even with a transportation scheme, special trains, special containers, and direct railway connection. With Syrian chemical weapons there will be a need for improvisation. The only way to transport the chemical weapons would be by sea, and to get to the ports you will have to use the roads. In that case there is a high possibility of facing a rebel attack. Even if we suppose, that all chemical weapons in Syria is stored in a binary condition (which is not confirmed), it is still dangerous.

Thirdly, the funding question appears – such sorts of expenses are definitely not included in the current Russian budget.

Nevertheless, I believe, that Russia is ready to actively participate in the realization of this proposal to prevent the overthrowing of Bashar al-Assad. We have seen on several occasions how the limited strikes with clearly marked targets developed into military operations supporting one side of the conflict.”

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