Security Index: A Russian Journal on International Security

Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:
http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rsec20

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Version of record first published: 18 Mar 2010.

To cite this article: (2010): MULTILATERAL APPROACHES TO NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT: PLANNING THE NEXT STEPS, Security Index: A Russian Journal on International Security, 16:1, 47-59

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/19934270903570687

Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group

MULTILATERAL APPROACHES TO NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT: PLANNING THE NEXT STEPS

Nuclear disarmament is one of the hot topics today. The more it is negotiated, the more there is the understanding that nuclear disarmament is a multilateral process, which should involve different actors and different aspects. At present, there are certain items on the short-term agenda—the strategic offensive arms reduction treaty between Russia and the United States, the 2010 NPT Review Conference, the CTBT ratification, etc. What's next? Which other steps should be taken to promote nuclear disarmament? What are the limits of the possible?

All these questions are answered by Director of the Department of Security and Disarmament Affairs of the Russian Foreign Ministry Anatoly Antonov; First Secretary of the Embassy of Norway to Moscow Kari Eken Wollebaek; PIR Senior Vice President Gennady Evstafiev; Director of *Rosatom's* International Cooperation Department Mikhail Lysenko; Senior Lecturer in International Relations of the St. Petersburg State University Anastasia Malygina; Director of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies of the Monterey Institute of International Studies William Potter; Advisor to the Chief of the General Staff Alexander Radchuk; PIR Center Executive Board Chairman Roland Timerbaev; and Senior Fellow of the *Observer* foundation Nandan Unnikrishnan.[1]

WILLIAM POTTER (MONTEREY INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL STUDIES): These are the best of times and the worst of times when it comes to nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation. It is the best of times in terms of the new political climate for disarmament due in large part to the change in administration in Washington and the political space for serious discussions about disarmament afforded by the *Road to Zero* initiative launched a little over two years ago by George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn. It also is the worst of times in terms of the number of new and continuing nuclear challenges we face, among the most difficult of which are those posed by non-state actors.

On May 3, 2010, a four-week negotiation of the 2010 NPT Review Conference will begin in New York. This conference will be the first review conference since the disastrous one in 2005, at which delegates devoted most of their energy and time debating an agenda and ended without any substantive agreements. Although a lot has changed since then, it is by no means certain that any meaningful progress on disarmament will be reached at the 2010 Review Conference. Among the major challenges will be: the degree to which key states parties perceive major threats to the NPT and their own security; the extent to which these perceptions of threat lead countries to demonstrate flexibility in their negotiating postures; the readiness of a small number of states to flout the will of the overwhelming majority of states parties and block consensus; the presence of any political grouping that can serve as a bridge between nuclear weapon states (NWS) and non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) and help forge common ground on pressing proliferation, peaceful use, and disarmament issues; the readiness of states parties to focus on key regional security issues, and especially that of the Middle East; the extent to which the *P-5*, the EU, and the Non-Alignment Movement (NAM), among other groups, serve as constructive coalitions in search of common ground on pressing proliferation, peaceful use, and disarmament issues, or instead use these political groupings to constrain forward motion and pursue at best a lowest common

ISSN 1993-4270 (print)/ISSN 2151-7495 (online) DOI: 10.1080/19934270903570687

denominator approach; the headway the United States and Russia makes in its bilateral strategic arms reductions negotiations.

In 2000, for example, many key states perceived the NPT to be in grave danger and adopted flexible postures that enabled the Conference to reach consensus on the 13 practical steps. The U.S. government, at that time, adopted the very shrewd and sensible approach that since it could accept 95 percent of what the New Agenda Coalition was proposing, it would embrace the New Agenda Coalition (NAC) proposal and let other NWS say ''no'' if they were so inclined. As a result, the United States in 2000 almost always was on the majority side, while China, Russia, and France often were isolated and found themselves in an awkward minority position resisting the disarmament measures endorsed by most assembled delegates. For its part, the NAC was able to moderate the more extreme positions usually taken by some of its NAM members and to find common ground between NWS and NNWS.

In 2000 another key factor contributing to the success of the Review Conference was the *P-5* proposal at the very start of the meeting, which removed the most contentious issue from the conference—that of ballistic missile defense (BMD). Thanks to this action by the *P-5*, the conference was able to proceed smoothly and to adopt a number of significant measures related to disarmament, nonproliferation, peaceful use, and the strengthened review process.

In contrast to 2000, in 2005 a number of countries were not anxious to reach agreement at the Review Conference. This certainly was the case for Iran, but the same also could be said regarding the United States and Egypt, both of which frequently adopted obstructionist positions which made it difficult to agree on an agenda for the meeting, much less substantive matters.

Against this backdrop, the recently concluded 2009 NPT PrepCom offers some hope that states will adopt more flexible positions in 2010. The good news is that an agenda for the Review Conference was agreed upon and states largely acted in a business-like fashion. Most countries particularly appreciated the less polemical and flexible stance taken by the United States, whose delegation was led by Rose Gottemoeller. The United Kingdom and Russian Federation also were seen as generally constructive in their interventions. Unfortunately, the same cannot be said about France and China, who appeared more inclined to play the role of nuclear *nay-sayers*. France, for example, did its best to block adoption of the PrepCom agenda, and its interventions on various issues indicate that it was very uncomfortable with the new U.S. vision of a world free of nuclear weapons. As such, one may anticipate that it will be difficult to get France to support many forward-looking proposals that seek to advance disarmament in a significant fashion at the 2010 Review Conference. China also acted very cautiously at the 2009 PrepCom and appeared to be unprepared and unwilling to discuss substantive issues. None of the nuclear weapon states any longer can rely upon the United States to block most disarmament initiatives, and may find themselves in an awkward position should new disarmament objectives be proposed. For Russia, the most difficult issues may relate to new efforts to reduce further non-strategic nuclear weapons, building on the 2000 NPT Final Document.

Should the Obama administration be successful in gaining ratification of the CTBT in advance of the Review Conference, that action would be widely regarded as a major boost to disarmament and the strengthening of the NPT. Personally, I doubt very much that the administration will be able to secure the necessary votes prior to the May Review Conference.

One issue that is likely to be very contentious at the next Review Conference is the implementation (or lack thereof) of the 1995 Review Conference Resolution on the Middle East. Egypt undoubtedly will make serious consideration of this a condition for progress on all other issues. In this regard, it was very surprising at the 2009 PrepCom that Egypt, having obtained language that it wanted on the Middle East, failed to push for adoption of the Chair's revised substantive recommendations to the Review Conference due to problems it had with other issues involving disarmament.

Although debate and disagreement over disarmament issues typically have characterized past NPT Review Conferences, my impression is that with the new orientation toward disarmament taken by the Obama administration, the most difficult issues on which to find common ground at the 2010 Review Conference may well involve those related to peaceful use. At the current time, there is a huge gulf between the views of the NWS and leading members of NAM on what must be done to prevent the spread of sensitive fuel cycle technologies, the role of fuel assurances, the Additional Protocol, and other nonproliferation initiatives which they regard as infringing on their ''inalienable rights'' to peaceful use. I believe that unless we better understand the complexity of

NAM politics and perspectives and seek to engage additional NAM representatives in the NPT process, it will be nearly impossible to make headway on disarmament, nonproliferation, peaceful use, and counter nuclear terrorism issues.

I would hope that the *P-5* can play a much more constructive role in 2010 than was the case in 2005. Although it will not be easy to reach consensus among the *P-5*, a statement on their behalf on the subjects of legally binding negative security assurances, the diminished role of nuclear weapons in their national security policies, and/or a roadmap for implementing the 1995 Middle East Resolution, would go a long way in gaining support from many NNWS for issues of great concern to the NWS such as implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (and other measures to combat nuclear terrorism), universalization of the Additional Protocol, and adoption of multinational fuel arrangements such as the NTI fuel bank proposal and the Russian proposal for a multinational fuel center at Angarsk.

Nuclear-weapon-free zones are also an approach to disarmament and nonproliferation that has been one of the least noted but most successful in recent years. Today, nearly the entire Southern Hemisphere is nuclear-weapon free, and with the entry into force of the Central Asian NWFZ on March 21, 2009, NWFZs also now extend into the Northern Hemisphere. Very shortly I also expect the African zone to enter into force as only one more ratification is required. What is lacking is NWS support for NWFZs, and more specifically their conclusion of protocols to existing zones promising negative security assurances for parties to the zone.

Finally, let me say a few words about education as a very significant but usually overlooked approach to promoting both disarmament and nonproliferation. Thanks in particular to the efforts of Japan, the issue has been brought up in the NPT review process where it enjoys widespread and diverse support. If the good news is that almost all states endorse the general concept of disarmament and nonproliferation education, the bad news is that relatively little progress has been made to date in translating that support in principle into meaningful action.

ALEXANDER RADCHUK (GENERAL STAFF OF THE RUSSIAN ARMED FORCES): For nearly four decades nuclear arms reduction was the business of two countries—the U.S.S.R/Russia and the United States. The series of bilateral agreements in this area, the first of which was signed in 1972, will probably continue and the whole world is used to the fact that these two powers possessing the largest amount of nukes should be responsible for the disarmament process as well. All others should allegedly join them some time later as soon as the two achieve certain agreed ceilings. However, in the process of bilateral reductions, Russia and the United States have already cut down their arsenals by five.

One should take into account that the United States is in the process of revising its nuclear policy and the new *Nuclear Posture Review* should define the real strategy in this sphere. It should be approved by early 2010. In the wake of the global economic crisis the international community must probably be more interested in some other matters, such as financial and economic issues. But despite being put off, the issue of nuclear disarmament is on the agenda again.

Above all, this is related to the traditional apprehensions that Russia and the United States, like in the Cold War times, might launch a nuclear conflict, which will be disastrous. Or perhaps there is a habit to assume that the interaction on strategic offensive arms will help to encourage dialogue on other bilateral and global matters. It may also be a hope that the new agreement/new parameters will involve other nuclear weapon states in the process of nuclear disarmament. One can hardly find easy solutions in this area. Therefore, all current plans for a nuclear-weapon-free world, so-called *nuclear zero*, look theoretical and seem to have little to do with the reality. Such proposals do not resolve the core of the problem. One must remember that until now nuclear weapons (as a most sophisticated attribute of military might and the might of the state in general) remain the most reliable security assurance. We have lived through the changes, the so called third *wave* of development of our civilization as Toffler put it, but we still cannot define—what are the nukes today? Are they the mightiest of the mighty, the most powerful lethal weapons, or merely a small step towards new even more effective and disastrous weapons? And besides, are the military ways of inter-state conflict resolution and national security maintenance out of date? And if not, will nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence continue to be an efficient way of overcoming contradictions? Or will they vanish from the deadly arsenal of rivalry?

One has to admit that in the last six decades the existence of nuclear weapons helped to maintain global peace. It works even now, even though in some specific forms. The example of North Korea and Iran is eloquent—for them nuclear weapon programs (the D.P.R.K really has a working

program, while Iran, as many experts assume, has more an illusion of a program) is a working tool to ensure security and engage other countries in a more or less constructive dialogue. There are no enforcement operations against those countries. If Saddam Hussein had had WMD, let alone nuclear weapons, there would have been no wars in the Gulf. And Yugoslavia, as we all know, did not possess nuclear weapons.

This is why the NPT and other disarmament process are impaired. However, despite the impediments, the process has started and even intensified recently. The splash of interest in the world free of nuclear weapons coincides with the spread of new high-precision weapons, which are effective in regional conflicts. Are they replacing the nukes? The CNN reports about smart cruise missiles hitting a dictator's window (and, hence, providing for regime change and bringing democracy to the conflict region) look much more humane than the photos of Hiroshima and Nagasaki ruined in the course of nuclear bombing. So there is some progress here. The outcome of transition from a nuclear hammer to a conventional needle is the same—the tasks and objectives remain intact, but the ways of achieving them are different. It is noteworthy that the states that have provided for such transition, as far as the tools are concerned, still rely on the good old approaches in targeting and setting objectives.

The proposal to facilitate the movement towards a nuclear-weapon-free world makes us think about the results of such a process. One may remember Ronald Reagan's idea of nuclear disarmament. To put it in short, it consists of the following statements: national security should not depend on nuclear weapons; it is necessary to conceive the transition from arms limitation to nuclear disarmament; missile defense is the key to nuclear arms elimination; and one should abandon the doctrines of protracted nuclear warfare. Perfect! Imagine all this has become true. Nonetheless, the consequences may differ and they will depend on the objectives.

What should be the basis for national security? Some international mechanisms? But they do not work or are not effective, or are selective. And the military power is still the most secure means of defense. Thus, missile defense is a real key to the problem, but I would like to remind you that such systems cannot only fight nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, but also conventional weapons, and can serve as efficient tools of space control. The one who controls space in the twenty-first century controls the world.

What if we abandon the concept of protracted nuclear warfare? Certainly, if it results in the elimination of wars as such, this would be great. And if not? What if, on the contrary, it would lead to quick high-precision nuclear microstrikes? During the Gulf War such deliberations could be found in the press. And smart high-precision weapons will be an ideal cover for such operations, especially if news and information flows are under control.

Despite such difficult circumstances and various obstacles, the idea is ripe. The intensification of disarmament started in January 2007 when four distinguished gentlemen from the United States published their article and stirred the discussion. Finally, in June 2009 UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon made an address in preparation for World Peace Day and launched the campaign under the slogan of WMD elimination. He argued that without zealous effort in this area mankind will still be endangered with the nuclear weapon stocks. However, the solution to the dilemma is yet to be found, i.e. what comes first: the peril to humanity from nuclear weapons, or the existence of threats to humanity as such, which causes the emergence and development of nuclear weapons?

One may claim that Russia and the United States have passed their way to nuclear disarmament and even formulated a certain roadmap for others. Hence, the nuclear disarmament process now depends on the speed and desire of other countries to join this path. Nuclear weapon states seem to understand the necessity of such steps; they have their vision and approaches to this process. And one may hope that these pieces of the puzzle (which are so far separate) will eventually make a huge and comprehensive map, which will show mankind the way towards a nuclear-weapon-free world and towards peace on our planet.

KARI EKEN WOLLENBAEK (EMBASSY OF NORWAY): Norway believes in effective multilateralism, and nuclear disarmament is high on our agenda.

A world free of nuclear weapons has been a longstanding aim of Norway's foreign policy, even during the Cold War. This goal was reconfirmed in the white paper on disarmament and nonproliferation submitted to the Norwegian Parliament in 2008. In general, Norway seeks the highest level of security for all, at the lowest possible level of armament.

Briefly looking back, the positive momentum for nuclear disarmament following the end of the Cold War contributed to the landmark indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995. And it helped to forge agreement on the 13 steps to achieve complete disarmament at the NPT Review Conference in 2000.

This momentum has, however, been lost due to a number of challenges such as the nuclear ambitions of Iran and North Korea, the threat of nuclear terrorism, the stalled negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) and the failure to achieve universal ratification of the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).

However, I hope and believe we are now at a turning point. Former and present leaders in several countries have called for renewed commitment to the elimination of nuclear weapons. The joint statement by Presidents Obama and Medvedev in April 2009 was an important signal. The leaders of the two largest nuclear weapon states committed themselves to demonstrating leadership in reducing the number of nuclear weapons in the world.

It is crucial that national leaders in all states should engage personally with and make a national priority of nuclear disarmament and realizing the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons.

National leaders should seek to involve key domestic stakeholders and their populations in particular. Moreover, disarmament is an interdisciplinary endeavour and national leaders should also seek to engage experts from all relevant areas, including science, diplomacy, politics, law, and the military.

It is very encouraging that the United States and Russia are committed to reducing the number of nuclear weapons in the world significantly. It will also be important to engage China, and other states that possess nuclear weapons, in a strategic dialogue to develop a cooperative approach to nuclear security.

In order to pave the way for even deeper cuts, non-nuclear weapon states should cooperate with nuclear weapon states to develop the technology needed for verifying disarmament. Nuclear weapon states should seize the opportunity presented by reductions in nuclear weapon numbers to demonstrate this technology. In this spirit, Norway has established a partnership with the United Kingdom and *Vertic*. The aim is to develop systems that enable us to verify that actual disarmament has taken place, while at the same time protecting sensitive information.

Another important step is for all states that possess nuclear weapons to make every effort to reduce their reliance on these weapons as a contribution towards their elimination.

Nuclear weapon states are also encouraged to change the operational status of their nuclear weapons in order to increase decision time in the event that use is contemplated, and to take other steps to promote strategic stability.

The entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is crucial to prevent a new nuclear arms race. Until the treaty enters into force, the existing moratorium on nuclear testing should be strengthened. Each state that has tested nuclear weapons in the past should pledge that it will not be the first to resume testing. We hope that the United States will ratify the CTBT as soon as possible.

A Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT) is vital to advance disarmament and prevent proliferation. In addition to starting negotiations on an FMCT, the international community should consider the creation of a voluntary Fissile Material Control Initiative (FMCI) to enhance the security and transparency of all nuclear material, including material that may not be subject to an FMCT. Norway is encouraged by the decision in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) to begin negotiations on a verifiable FMCT.

The establishment of regional nuclear-weapon-free zones is an important contribution by non-nuclear weapon states to achieving the *zero* option. Norway has been financing a project carried out by a South African institute to secure the last accessions needed for the Treaty of Pelindaba to enter into force.

Eliminating nuclear arms requires a robust and credible non-proliferation regime. All states that have not yet done so should adopt a Comprehensive Safeguard Agreement and an Additional Protocol. In addition they should sign, ratify, and implement all relevant multilateral instruments to enhance the safety and security of their nuclear materials. We must close existing loopholes and empower the IAEA.

In order to help avert the awful prospect of nuclear terrorism, all states that possess nuclear weapons are urged to take all necessary measures to ensure that their weapons do not fall into unauthorised hands.

We should aim to create a non-discriminatory system of nuclear fuel supply in close collaboration with the IAEA. In this regard, a serious and sustained dialogue between producer and consumer is needed so that consumers have an opportunity to explain their needs and suppliers have an opportunity to tailor arrangements and incentives accordingly. Norway has pledged financial support to a planned fuel bank under the auspices of the IAEA. We have also voiced our support for the Russian proposal to create a reserve of low-enriched uranium and the German proposal to establish a Multilateral Enrichment Sanctuary Project. In our view these three proposals are compatible and complementary to each other.

During the International Conference on Nuclear Disarmament in Oslo on February 26–27, 2008, the idea was launched to convene a broadly based high-level Intergovernmental Panel on Nuclear Disarmament, analogous to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, to advise governments on the core requirements for abolishing nuclear weapons.

The 2005 Review Conference was unsuccessful. The international community is now at a crossroads. If we should fail at the 2010 NPT Review Conference, the NPT runs the risk of gradual erosion. That would undermine our common security. A successful NPT conference in 2010 is therefore a crucial multilateral step towards nuclear disarmament.

We have some reasons to be optimistic. The NPT Prepcom in New York in May 2009 was guided by a positive spirit, and all the procedural questions were resolved.

The prime task of the 2010 Review Conference will be to revive a broad-based, common understanding of how to address nuclear dangers, and how to ensure that peaceful nuclear applications can be ensured in a more secure world without nuclear weapons. The Review Conference should agree on a programme of work up to 2015, as well as steps to be taken beyond that date.

If we are to succeed, all states' parties must fulfil their obligations to the NPT. The three pillars are closely interlinked. There can be no NPT à la carte. Full nuclear disarmament can only be achieved when there is full confidence that no one can circumvent the nonproliferation regime.

The much needed steps to tighten up the nonproliferation regime can only be taken if there is an unequivocal and irreversible process towards complete elimination of existing nuclear arsenals. Strengthened nonproliferation must also facilitate peaceful uses.

If we are to succeed in 2010, we must take an innovative approach. We must build bridges, we must reach out across regional groupings and overcome past polarizations. The NPT process must not be considered a zero-sum game. The 2010 outcome must be a win–win for all.

There is a risk that the NPT could be eroded, but we have a choice. It is up to the world community to consolidate and further strengthen the NPT and to move forward with multilateral steps on nuclear disarmament. Norway hopes that the world community will seize this opportunity.

ANATOLY ANTONOV (RUSSIAN MFA): President Dmitry Medvedev maintained on June 20, 2009 that ''the majority of countries stand today for the world free of nuclear weapons. And Russia shares this noble goal.'' It is not the first time the president has turned to the idea of nuclear-weapon-free world. The same message was conveyed by Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva in March 2009. Our nation would clearly like to improve the current situation in the area of strategic stability, to strengthen the security of all states, to enhance communications among the states and build confidence.

In recent years the international security regimes have been shaking from old and new challenges. The end of the Cold War did not make the world safer. There is a lack of trust among the nations; nuclear choice is regarded by many as the most effective means of providing national security and increasing political influence in the world.

What is the current situation in the sphere of nuclear disarmament? It would be unfair to deny the substantial success. As far as Russia is concerned, it complies with its international commitments fully and ahead of schedule. In 2001 we reached the ceilings in strategic delivery systems and warheads reduction stated in the START Treaty. An important disarmament issue is the indefinite

INF Treaty, in accordance with which we have completely eliminated two types of such land-based weapons. The SORT Treaty is being successfully implemented.

At present, many nuclear disarmament plans, e.g. the 2000 NPT Review Conference proposals (this was the latest conference that decided on the need to strengthen the treaty), have not been carried out. There is no ABM Treaty, START II did not enter into force, the CTBT's coming into effect is miles away, the FMCT talks have not even started (albeit they were supposed to finish by now, as the 2000 NPT Review Conference claimed).

The situation is complicated and it is understood in many parts of the world. The international community is bustling with initiatives—the Hoover Four, the Global Zero project, the Evans-Kawaguchi commission, the Luxembourg forum, etc. We welcome all constructive steps that may suggest ways out of the current disarmament impasse. We realize that the most important thing is to create a favorable international climate for complete abolition of nuclear weapons, i.e. strategic stability should be strengthened, the parties should comply with the principle of refraining from strikes, and there should be equal security for all.

Such an ambitious goal as *nuclear zero* can be considered only in connection with other international issues, including regional conflict settlement, reliable functioning of key disarmament and nonproliferation mechanisms, return of nuclear weapons to national territories, refusal to deploy unilaterally global missile defense systems, prevention of weaponization of outer space, and verified stoppage of the conventional arms race.

It is clear that the key role in the nuclear disarmament process belongs to the U.S.–Russian agreements on strategic offensive arms limitation and reduction. The cornerstone here is the 1991 START Treaty, which has fully accomplished its mission. Hence, nowadays when we focus on elaborating a new legally binding agreement on arms reduction, it should contain the most valuable and effective parts of the previous treaty.

It is important to keep the link between strategic offensive and defensive arms. Real progress in nuclear disarmament cannot be attained if the process is undermined by unilateral deployment of global missile defense systems. Such actions lead to the erosion of strategic stability and provide for an imbalance in the global regime of checks and balances. We explicitly set forth a constructive alternative—the efforts of all states interested in preventing potential missile threats should be combined. Our package proposal on strategic cooperation with all concerned parties is still on the negotiation table.

We need specific arrangements on non-deployment of weapons in outer space, on the unacceptability of rearming nuclear strategic offensive arms with conventional warheads, on prevention of the conventional arms race. Without such solutions, it would be difficult to expect sustainable and coherent development of the nuclear disarmament process.

Taking into account the significance of U.S.–Russian agreements in the strategic sphere, it would still be simplistic to confine the nuclear disarmament issues to bilateral arrangements. We expect that the 2010 NPT Review Conference will provide for a frank discussion on additional contributions by other nuclear weapon states. They should be able to join the Russian and U.S. efforts in the foreseeable future.

Quite soon we will also have to involve other countries with nuclear potential, besides the *P-5*. It is impossible to imagine the situation when nuclear weapon states party to the NPT disarm, while others (who find themselves beyond these commitments) will maintain and build up their nuclear arsenals. It is also unacceptable to use NPT membership for the implementation of nuclear weapon programs.

Of course, there are certain tasks for the Conference on Disarmament, where we could continue the collective talks on nuclear disarmament prospects. The recent developments in Geneva, including the approval of the agenda, raise some hopes. Somehow it certainly reminds us of the situation at the Conference about 10 years ago. Then the agenda was approved nearly at the end—we enthusiastically started the negotiations and then in January we had to confirm the decision on continuation of talks. We hope that this will not be the case this time.

Russia stands for the earliest possible launch of negotiations on FMCT at the Conference. There are all the conditions for that. We will suggest at the 2010 NPT Conference reaffirming the importance of such work in Geneva as another step towards nuclear disarmament and strengthening of the nuclear nonproliferation regime.

Another important factor contributing to step-by-step progress towards *nuclear zero* is the earliest possible entry into force of the CTBT. Russia ratified this treaty in 2000 and undertakes efforts to ensure its coming into effect. The compliance with a nuclear test moratorium (even though it is an important measure) cannot replace the legal commitments contained in the CTBT. We hope that all parties, on which the entry into force of the treaty depends, will sign and ratify it soon. We are encouraged by the positive signs coming from Washington about the readiness to work at the CTBT ratification. But, even if the United States ratifies the treaty tomorrow, this will not mean its entry into force the day after tomorrow. The negotiations with our colleagues in South Asia indicate that these countries are far from taking any principal decision in favor of ratification.

One of the key things for sustainable nuclear disarmament would be to strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Much has been done to set up effective mechanisms for the prevention of diversion of nuclear weapons and nuclear materials to non-state actors, notably terrorists. Among such steps is the adoption of Resolution 1540 of the UN Security Council, the launch of the U.S.–Russian initiative on combating acts of nuclear terrorism, joint action in export controls, strengthening of the IAEA verification procedures. But much more should be done. The results of the 1540 Committee prove this. The resolution was passed five years ago, but not all countries have submitted their first reports on national monitoring systems for goods and technologies that can be used for WMD production. Only 76 states take part in the Russian–U.S. initiative on fighting the acts of nuclear terrorism. And what about the others? Why don't they participate in such evidently useful activities?

The solution is yet to be found for the Iranian and North Korean nuclear programs. We are concerned with the fact that it is difficult even to define the deadlines for any politico-military settlement of these issues.

There is a need for realistic measures to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones. In the Middle East we are far from saying that the region is close to the establishment of such a WMD zone. Hence, at the 3rd PrepCom Russia put forward the initiative on starting the preparations for such a zone in the Middle East. And we were pleased with the fact that nearly the entire *nuclear five* supported the message. The EU was also quick to respond and to back our proposal.

There are other issues in the area of nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation. They can be a topic for a long talk. The Russian experts are ready for dialogue with their colleagues on these matters. And we hope that in 2010 at the NPT Review Conference we will be able to agree on the set of specific measures in the sphere of nuclear disarmament, nuclear nonproliferation and peaceful nuclear energy uses.

NANDAN UNNIKRISHNAN (*OBSERVER*): The topic of nuclear disarmament has once again emerged as one of the central issues of international affairs, primarily because of four eminent Americans. William Perry, Henry Kissinger, George Shultz, and Sam Nunn have once again revived the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons.

However, then Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in his address to the United Nations voiced this vision in June 1988. In fact, he proposed an action plan that had essentially four points: a binding commitment by all nations to eliminate nuclear weapons in three stages by 2010; all nuclear countries should participate in the process of nuclear disarmament and, in addition, all other countries should be part of the process; there should be tangible progress at each stage to demonstrate good faith and build the required confidence; changes in doctrines, policies, and institutions to sustain a world free of nuclear weapons. He also advocated the creation of a Comprehensive Global Security System under the aegis of the United Nations.

The earlier l986 Delhi Declaration on principles for a nuclear-weapon-free and non-violent world signed by then Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi already had the gist of these proposals.

But, the world was clearly not ready to pursue this vision at that stage, which is why Rajiv Gandhi, probably ruefully, said at the United Nations: ''Left to ourselves, we would not want to touch nuclear weapons. But when tactical considerations, in the passing play of great power rivalries, are allowed to take precedence over the imperative of nuclear nonproliferation with what leeway are we left?''

This lack of response to Rajiv Gandhi's impassioned appeal probably is the reflection of the differences India had with other nuclear powers on the linkages between disarmament and arms control.

Western experts often argue that India is wrong to focus on the inequities of arms control rather than on taking advantage of arms control to push towards nuclear disarmament. However, they are rather missing the point. India shares the belief that nuclear disarmament is a desirable goal. There are no disagreements there. But arms control in itself will not achieve this goal unless clear, specific and unequivocal targets are established as a roadmap to the ultimate destination.

In 1954 Jawaharlal Nehru, India's first Prime Minister, had proposed a ''standstill agreement'' on nuclear tests. Essentially this proposal was for a nuclear test ban, but for Nehru this was only one step towards a specific goal of complete nuclear disarmament. Today we have the CTBT. Assuming that it comes into force, this agreement clearly shows that a treaty based on arms control principles rather than disarmament goals does not bring us closer to a world free of nuclear weapons. The same strains are today visible in the Non-Proliferation Treaty—the NPT. As long as nuclear weapons are perceived as instruments of influence and global standing, nuclear disarmament is highly unlikely. Nuclear weapons have to be delegitimized for the vision of a nuclear-weapons-free world to become a reality.

In other words, the Indian position is that the logic of arms control in the modern world makes steps in arms control terms a goal in themselves. This will never lead us to a world free of nuclear weapons unless these are steps on the long and arduous road to complete nuclear disarmament.

This brings us to the situation in the world today. Many new security threats and challenges have emerged. Primarily of course is the danger of terrorists and non-state actors acquiring nuclear materials and devices. The A.Q. Khan network episode shows the complexity of the issues involved as well as the culpability of some leading nations in nuclear proliferation. Also, many countries are today pursuing programs aimed at improving their nuclear complexes. In addition, IAEA Director General Mohammed El Baradei recently warned that there could be nearly 30 ''virtual new weapon states'' in the near future.

Which brings us back to the question of how realistic is the world's commitment to nuclear disarmament. I cannot see a situation in the near future where nuclear weapon countries apart from the United States agree to dispense with their nuclear arsenals. For example, a nuclear and missile technology race is on in Asia, which is not likely to abate soon. A situation that may force India to adjust its stance on arms control negotiations. India may not be able to eschew arms control negotiations per se. Particularly if India and China are successful in introducing sea-based nuclear weapons, then the need for CBMs between the two countries will become imperative. Also, given the situation in India's neighborhood, India will have to evolve a position on BMD.

However, despite all this, one has to acknowledge that there is today greater interest in nuclear disarmament today than in the past three decades. This momentum should not be lost.

Professor Rajagopalan argues that supporting the call for a Nuclear Weapons Convention may be one way to sustain the momentum. He notes that the success of the Chemical Weapons Convention provides us with hope that a NWC may be even easier to achieve. He also argues that it is important to maintain and promote the so-called *nuclear taboo*.

Among other steps would be delegitimizing nuclear weapons, changing nuclear doctrines to accept the ''no first use'' postures, de-alerting nuclear weapons, and promoting confidence-building measures between countries that possess nuclear weapons but do not as yet discuss these issues with each other.

It will require great political courage for nations to begin consider nuclear disarmament as a matter of global interest that supersedes national interest. Just as the world is learning to work together on climate change it is high time to view nuclear disarmament as something that enhances everyone's security.

ROLAND TIMERBAEV (PIR CENTER): I would like to say a few words about the cut off in production of weapon-grade fissile materials. This is an old problem—it is over 50 years old. In the 1950s it was set forth by the United States which had an obvious superiority over the Soviet Union in the amount of such materials. And our response was—we are ready to discuss the cut-off in fissile materials, but together with the elimination of all nuclear weapons and stocks.

The talks stopped. There were several attempts to resume them. And only recently in 2009 there was again some growing interest in the matter. The interest is obvious, since it is a rational, logical way to nuclear disarmament. And besides, this would be a multilateral nuclear disarmament, since FMCT would involve official and non-official nuclear weapon states.

Due to the large number of problems, one should formulate and approve the basic treaty with some principal commitments, i.e. on verification. Specific agreements, specific verification procedures will be elaborated later, in due time. There are precedents like this. The NPT is based on these principles—Article III provides for the conclusion of the agreement between this or that state party and the IAEA by a certain deadline. And the coming treaty should also contain such deadlines. Sometimes they are difficult to meet. The *Euratom* prepared the agreement in 1971 and it entered into force only in 1979, even though the initial deadline was 18 months. So there is a need for a basic treaty with the commitment to sign verification agreements within a certain time limit.

Real nonproliferation is possible only if Article VI of the NPT is complied with. It is evident. Years after the NPT adoption has brought new challenges, and it means that Article VI does not work well, despite the titanic efforts to ensure its implementation. Nowadays Russia and the United States negotiate a new agreement, but it is not enough. And FMCT is an obvious contribution to Article VI and the cause of nonproliferation.

GENNADY EVSTAFIEV (PIR CENTER): We find ourselves in the situation when there is a certain window of opportunities—the U.S. administration is ready for negotiations. And this window, if we miss the chance, may close for a long time, or even forever. I would like to speak today more about nuclear arms reduction, since *nuclear zero* cannot be seen even in the distant future. The movement itself is important. Many politicians will have to find the strength and courage to make steps towards this *zero*, to overcome selfish approaches towards national security maintenance. If this is not the case, we won't be able to speak about any *nuclear zero*.

Nowadays one can hardly see political will or clear vision of the experts and the military on how to move and how long it will take to move to a world free of nuclear weapons. Today it is fashionable to speak about roadmaps. To a certain extent, this is a tactical term, which covers the lack of large-scale and well-developed ideas. There is a roadmap for the Middle East, for the negotiations with the United States—five–six points which are commonplace, they should not even be invented, but simply agreed on and executed. Therefore, such a roadmap is useful only to make a discipline of thought and to realize the ideas somehow.

Roadmaps in nuclear disarmament should not involve only Russia or the United States. European nations and China should not wait until we achieve some point. Why can't they develop their own roadmaps in parallel to the Russian–U.S. efforts and move in the same direction? Such a plan, for instance, could provide for the sufficient transparency of their nuclear arsenals to the level equal to the transparency of nuclear forces of Moscow and Washington. I mean annual notifications on the composition, number, and types of nuclear explosives, the sites of nuclear arms production facilities, etc. This would mean the introduction of some limited and simplified (at least) verification regime. This would be a great contribution! Otherwise when we have some accomplishments, they will only start the process. The process should start today—this is the task.

The situation is aggravated by the fact that there are a number of de facto nuclear weapon states in the world. They have no restrictions from the point of rules and norms. They are not states parties to the NPT—and, hence, there is a problem of ensuring universality of the NPT. And instead of solving this issue we weaken the treaty, make some concessions to certain states, e.g. through the Nuclear Suppliers Group, etc. The international community could offer such countries, first, to expose their nuclear potential, to submit the aforementioned data on the amount and production sites. Second, such states could take the commitments on freezing their nuclear arms production, but only after declaring the real number of available nuclear weapons and agreeing to cease the production of new ones. Third, the progress would be to pledge to comply with the NPT, CTBT, and other international treaties and even the agreement to accept and apply the verification procedures in the future (even before such treaties enter into force, like the CTBT). Then we will ensure that such de facto nuclear weapon states follow the same path and with the same pace as the rest of the world that moves towards *nuclear zero*.

The NPT should become a universal treaty; the same should happen to the missile technology control regime (MTCR). We may want it or not, but there is a clear link between nuclear weapons

and delivery systems. Nowadays the MTCR is an elite club, and Russia does nothing to make it a global community.

We speak about the need to ratify the CTBT. Nuclear weapons should exist for a long time to come. Major players have not conducted nuclear tests for a long. Russia has had a moratorium for 20 years now. The stockpiles of weapons are aging. There is no better way of checking them than tests. When the CTBT is finalized, key actors—Russia, the United States, and perhaps China—should be allowed to have one to two check tests once in 7 to 10 years, in order to ensure that their still existing nuclear munitions are in normal shape. None would need the world free of nuclear weapons if something worse happens that we cannot even think of. So as soon as we move to the *nuclear zero*, we should also provide for some compensation mechanisms to save the world if some emergency occurs.

Each state has its own vision of national security mechanisms. And the question is how to maintain national security with the lack of nuclear weapons or after their substantial reduction. We should not move to this era with blind eyes and rely only on the promises of our leaders and officials. We should establish joint task forces from experts, above all from Russia and the United States, who could forecast the developments, identify and analyze the weak points and painful issues for each participant in order to avoid long and fruitless discussions afterwards. Only then we will be able to achieve the agreements and have sufficient trust to move towards a world free of nuclear weapons. It is not a matter of a roadmap for tomorrow, it is a long-term professional effort by the experts, who could help the civil servants and the governments to find the right solutions.

ANASTASIYA MALYGINA (ST. PETERSBURG STATE UNIVERSITY): The elaboration of the NPT is an example of how to regulate scientific progress at the international level. The limits for the military-technical advancement of nuclear science were set up and peaceful nuclear energy projects got the green light. Moreover, the countries that voluntarily refrained from using nuclear technologies in the military sphere got the privileges in the area of intense peaceful nuclear energy uses. One can hardly find the same examples in the pre-nuclear epoch, when the state would undertake restrictions in technical progress in the area of weapons production, at the same time being sure that it would bring victory. The nonproliferation regime was born only because a number of states voluntarily abandoned the idea of possessing nuclear weapons.

The availability of nukes as such restricts the actions of leading players and this is a stabilizing factor in global politics. However, such stabilization results in preservation of existing problems rather than solutions. Nuclear deterrence by nature can be applied against a state actor. However, new international and national security challenges originate mainly from non-state forces. It becomes obvious that the existence of nuclear weapons in the era of transformation of international relations does not help to strengthen international security, but rather exacerbates the resolution of many key issues and promotes destabilization.

At the same time, nuclear weapons are only the means to carry out the deterrence strategy. The polemics about nuclear disarmament and *nuclear zero* in principle focuses on the search for replacement mechanisms, for other deterrence tools. Nonetheless, the very obsession with deterrence as a prerequisite for international stability is not the ultimate truth—deterrence existed for half a century and it did not fail, but this does not mean that it works fine or that it works at all.

New approaches to nuclear disarmament should take into consideration the context for the existence of nuclear weapons. If the vector of development set by the technocratic paradigm has led to a systemic crisis (in the time of existence of nuclear weapons), perhaps it is necessary to change radically the course of further development (it would be difficult to refrain from technological progress though), or at least to correct the basic assumptions for the international security system.

The countries reject chemical and biological weapons because the threats originating from their very existence are higher than the benefits of possessing them. Such logic does not always work with respect to nuclear weapons—simply because the latter became a myth and got new esthetics. The nukes today cannot be alienated from the symbolic might of the state; they provide the evidence of its high technological level of development, and they have a huge psychological impact on a potential adversary.

At present the countries that would like to develop their nuclear programs have no unsurpassable obstacles. Legal and political barriers created by the international community since the 1950s can make this task complicated but cannot stop such efforts. History demonstrates to us examples of

when high motivation can help to overcome such impediments. Under the current circumstances, basic knowledge about the creation of a simple nuclear explosive device is available to a large number of specialists all over the world. Even if we eliminate all nuclear weapons on the planet, one cannot guarantee that they will not be reinvented and manufactured in the future. The same principle works with respect to certain states. If one can force a state to abandon its nuclear program and the military component of its nuclear complex, there are no assurances that in 8 to 10 years this state will not be able to revive its technological capabilities.

If we speak about additional stimuli for nuclear disarmament, they can be found in the adjustment of sociopolitical assessments and the change in the mentality of national political elites. In the post-industrial world efforts to strengthen a nonproliferation regime should affect the willingness of international actors to use nuclear technologies for military purposes. In order to ensure that the state does not strive to possess nuclear weapons, one should focus on the reasons for seeking them. In the era of information revolution and globalization it is impossible to stop the transfer of knowledge and technology, so the solutions should not be based on restricting the barriers for proliferation of materials and equipment. It is important to concentrate efforts on making the international environment less explosive and conflict-prone.

MIKHAIL LYSENKO (*ROSATOM*): I would like to say a few words about the priorities for *Rosatom* in the area of nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation. This work goes in several directions.

First of all, by implementing the intergovernmental agreements we make our specific contribution to the elimination of stockpiles of weapon-grade fissile materials. For instance, one may mention the HEU–LEU deal with the United States. By now we have processed and shipped to the United States 353 tons of highly enriched uranium out of 500 tons envisaged in the agreement. They were downgraded into low enriched uranium. If we apply the IAEA calculations, which maintain that 25kg of uranium (enriched over 20 percent) and 8kg of plutonium are enough to produce a nuclear explosive device, we have eliminated by far about 16,000 nuclear munitions. And if we take into account 500 tons, this would mean the destruction of potential 20,000 nuclear warheads. A different parallel is possible—500 tons of HEU blended into LEU would be enough to produce 10 billion MWh of electricity.

Another agreement is also with the United States on disposal of excessive weapon-grade plutonium. It provides for the dumping of 34 tons of such plutonium by using it in the civilian nuclear energy sector. It is equal to the elimination of 8,500 plutonium-based nuclear munitions by both parties.

We have the agreement on shutting down the plutonium-production reactors. In 2009 we nearly shut down the last (of three) Russian plants that fabricate weapon-grade plutonium and, hence, finalized the many years of successful work together with the United States. We did it ahead of schedule because initially such a shutdown was planned for 2010. As a replacement, we constructed thermal power plants to supply Siberia with energy.

Secondly, Rosatom withdraws spent nuclear fuel from the Soviet-made research reactors abroad. There is a program based on the agreements with the IAEA, the United States, and other countries. It covers nearly 14 states and Russia has taken back about 900kg of fuel. Nearly 20 Russian companies are involved in this process. In many cases instead of spent nuclear fuel we supply the countries with LEU and help to convert the research reactors to functioning on LEU fuel.

Third, we work at multilateral initiatives in the area of the nuclear fuel cycle. We continue to implement the Russian initiative on the establishment of a global infrastructure for the nuclear fuel cycle, e.g. the International Uranium Enrichment Center in Angarsk. Russia is setting up on its territory and with its own resources the physical stock of LEU to ensure guaranteed supplies of nuclear fuel for the IAEA member states. Together with the IAEA Secretariat we have elaborated a basic bilateral agreement on creating such stocks and a model agreement to be signed by the Agency with the recipients of such fuel.

There are different proposals from other countries on this matter, i.e. the U.S. idea of forming a fuel bank, the German proposal, etc. We do not regard them as competing initiatives, but rather as complementary suggestions and we welcome them and any future proposals in this area.

Fourth, we work at implementation of experimental industrial and research projects in order to develop sustainable and proliferation-resistant nuclear energy systems, above all next-generation reactor technologies. One of them is the fast-breeder reactor—it is a matter of great significance for us. We are currently developing such power plant at Beloyarskaya nuclear power plant—BN-800. It will use mixed uranium and plutonium fuel, i.e. it will be a closed fuel cycle. And it should become operational by 2014.

High-temperature gas-cooling reactors are also the basic element of hydrogen energy production. Such technologies may help to introduce nuclear energy in such a critical sphere as motor fuel production. They should be ready by 2030.

The international thermonuclear experimental reactor (ITER) is another project. Its planned capacity is up to 500MW. It will be self-supplied with fuel and does not provide for the proliferation of fissile materials, as they are not used there at all. By 2018 we should get a controlled thermonuclear reaction. The next step will be to achieve the capacity of 1GW by mid-century. And finally—to establish an industrial system with the capacity of 100GW or more by the end of the twenty-first century. The international community is working intensely on this project, the deadlines are vague and theoretical, but they are based on real calculations.

Fifth, we have launched the international project under the IAEA auspices. It is aimed at development of innovative nuclear reactors and fuel cycles. Nearly 30 countries are involved and the project proceeds step by step. The first stage has been achieved—the methodology has been elaborated and it would help the countries to apply standard solutions to nuclear energy development. Such issues as nonproliferation, nuclear safety and security, disposal of nuclear waste, spent fuel, environment, etc. are taken into account. The project considers the possibility of developing small mobile nuclear systems.

It is important to develop the nuclear energy sector. There is a unique U.S.–Russian agreement on cooperation in peaceful nuclear energy uses. For the first time in post-Soviet history it provides for the framework of an equal technological partnership between Russia and the United States. The agreement reflects the global mission of two nuclear weapon states—not only to reduce and control nuclear weapons, but also to use nuclear technologies and materials for peaceful purposes both bilaterally and in third party countries.

The 123 Agreement is unique due its scope—it facilitates cooperation in all spheres of the nuclear fuel cycle, including reactor technologies, nuclear material trade, information flows, transfers of technologies and goods, etc. The document clarifies the prospects for industrial and technological interaction, cooperation on nuclear fuel reprocessing, contributes to joint efforts in developing fast-breeder reactors for the sake of creating closed nuclear fuel cycles, unexhausted resources for nuclear energy sector, and a cardinal solution to proliferation problems.

The agreement paves the way for scientific cooperation between Russian and U.S. laboratories, e.g. the initiatives for the development of new-generation reactors.

Due to the problems with ratification of the agreement in the United States, Russian parliamentarians and experts are debating whether Moscow can deal without the 123 Agreement. If it does not enter into force, it would be a great loss, a missed long-term opportunity for both countries, even though, of course, we can *survive* without it, since our nuclear industry is self-sufficient.

Further steps in the area of nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation will be to start the negotiations in Geneva on FMCT, to complete the talks on the START replacement treaty; to remove HEU from research reactors abroad and to convert them to work with LEU; to implement the aforementioned multilateral projects aimed at involving plutonium in the closed fuel cycle and to create such cycles; to encourage international cooperation in the area of peaceful nuclear energy uses.

NOTE

[1] The discussion took place at the conference ''Multilateral Approaches to Nuclear Disarmament: Planning the Next Steps'' held by the PIR Center on July 3, 2009 with the financial support of the NTI and the Foreign Ministry of Norway.