

**International Security  
Nonproliferation  
Arms Control**

**DIGEST OF THE RUSSIAN JOURNAL**

**YADERNY KONTROL**

**(NUCLEAR CONTROL)**

**Volume 5, № 3**

Summer 2000

**PUBLISHER: PIR - CENTER FOR POLICY STUDIES  
IN RUSSIA**

Moscow, 2000

*Yaderny Kontrol (Nuclear Control) Digest. Volume 5, No.3. Summer 2000*

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**DIGEST OF THE RUSSIAN JOURNAL  
YADERNY KONTROL  
(NUCLEAR CONTROL)**

**International Security. Nonproliferation. Arms Control.**

**Volume 5**

**N 3 (15)**

**Summer 2000**

Published four times a year since 1996

Contains selected analytical articles from *Yaderny Kontrol*, a journal published in Russian six times a year

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Subscriptions worldwide (Russian and English editions): please, send requests to fax +7+095-234-9558 or e-mail: [info@pircenter.org](mailto:info@pircenter.org). Checks or wire transfers. Express mail delivery.

**Circulation:**

Russian journal: 2,000 copies

English Digest: 800 copies

**Signed for printing**

on June 9, 2000

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- The editors wish to express special thanks to the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies for making this publication possible through its support of the PIR-Center for Policy Studies in Russia

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*Yaderny Kontrol (Nuclear Control) Digest. Volume 5, No.3. Summer 2000*

Editorial**NEW ARMS REDUCTION  
AGREEMENTS REQUIRE  
STRATEGIC THINKING**

On April 14, 2000, the State Duma ratified START II. This was a long-awaited decision in Russia, in the USA, and in Europe. However, the way out from the *nuclear deadlock* is yet to be found. The ratification is only the first step to facilitate the negotiations and, despite its importance, it will carry little meaning without further endeavors. It is necessary to understand that START II has been ratified in Russia on terms which make its prompt entry into force practically impossible.

Some experts and politicians here in Moscow, who realized the *trick*, have rushed to describe the parliamentary decision in terms of *political tennis*: Russia *threw the ball into the US court* and now the progress of nuclear disarmament will depend on the US Senate, which so far refuses to ratify the protocol relating to START II and the set of ABM agreements. President Putin also mentioned that the START II ratification is a propagandistic step to a large extent. Nonetheless, Moscow is ready for START III negotiations and, presumably, for simultaneous discussions on amending the ABM Treaty.

Obviously, at present, it is impossible to achieve a breakthrough in nuclear disarmament. Nuclear disarmament can't always be a bilateral US-Russian process, since the provisions of such agreements now affect the interests, power capabilities and might of other states. In the last 10-15 years, the world has dramatically changed and, in the process of discussing the nuclear arms reduction issues, Russia and the USA can't take into account only the positions of each other. A number of states and non-state actors striving to raise their influence in the international system are accumulating power and becoming potential threats to Russia and the United States. Moreover, they may try to use this force not only in the regions, where the interests of the two superpowers lie, but against the territory of the two states.

Under these circumstances, Russia and the USA have to review their attitude towards certain aspects of the nuclear balance. The USA dreams of strategic defense, Russia speaks about

increasing the role of tactical nuclear weapons or about deterring regional and local menaces with the help of strategic offensive arms. Each party is yet to determine the role of nuclear weapons in the modern world and their significance (we can't preclude or even presume that they will have different visions of the problem). In such conditions, it is quite difficult to seek any fundamentally new agreements and elaborate a new logic of nuclear disarmament.

At present, the parties need provisional agreements, which won't infringe their interests and will enable them to get out of the *nuclear blind alley*: to preserve the major treaties and negotiation mechanisms; and to enjoy a timeout by maintaining the emerged nuclear balance, so that in the future they may conclude new agreements.

This logic calls for the modification of the ABM Treaty in such a manner that defines a limited missile defense system, which won't undermine Russia's deterrence potential. Russia should obtain appropriate technical and political assurances.

The provisional character of such agreements doesn't mean that the parties can't now form the basis for new qualitative nuclear arms limitations. For instance, it would be reasonable if START III provided for the verified withdrawal and storage of nuclear material from the warheads attributed to the launchers to be eliminated. In the future, this may become the first step to ensure the irreversibility of nuclear disarmament.

The ratification of START II enables the parties to resume the process of nuclear disarmament and the corresponding talks. However, the ratification itself (bearing in mind that the treaty hasn't yet entered into force) won't solve the current problems of nuclear disarmament. They are yet to be resolved. The features of the START-ABM-NMD compromise are becoming clearer. But these agreements won't be the last, and should be followed by other treaties.

We believe that right now it is useful to think at least one move ahead of the current position. Not every political *grand master* is able to see things from such a strategic perspective. However, if such strategic thinking succeeds, the new agreements may have a chance of avoiding the fate of START II.

## PIR Center News

### Summer 2000

**2000, March 15.** The PIR Center published a report "*The State Duma and Arms Control*".

The attitude of the State Duma towards the arms control agenda has always been important from the point of Russia's image in the world. The results of the 1999 parliamentary elections give us hope that the decision-making process in the State Duma concerning the arms control issues will change.

The report prepared by the PIR Center reflects the influence of international politics and national security matters on the electoral struggle, studies the positions of the parties elected to the State Duma in the area of arms control and analyzes the prospects for legislative work in this sphere. The report is based on program documents of the parties and the statements of their leaders to the mass media.

The authors emphasize the growing importance of foreign policy issues in the electoral struggle, which is connected with the high degree of public concern about the prospects of further relations between Russia and NATO, above all the USA. 'Unlike in 1991-1996, the public is now anxious about the external vulnerability of the state. This has made the problem of nuclear deterrence into a subject of broad public discussion, which has increased the knowledge (or the illusion of knowledge) of the Russians about nuclear matters.

'The present-day structure of the State Duma enables us to conclude that the decision-making mechanism in the area of foreign policy and arms control will be based on a complicated combination of interests and concessions, since none of the factions can form a sustainable majority in parliament. As a result, when it comes to a clash of lobbyist interests of various groups it will now be more difficult to make the opinions concur. On the other hand, the various factions and groups in the State Duma will be able to come to an agreement on those matters

which support a consensus opinion and which do not affect the economic interests of various clans. This may concern the cooperation on environmental and nuclear safety and security, implementation of the CW elimination agreements.'

At the same time, the key factor determining the foreign policy decision-making process will be the situation in Chechnya, which has provoked the most serious confrontation with the West.

Much will depend on the State Duma's ability to have more influence on developing the disarmament and international security policy of the Russian Federation. This would enable the state to enlarge the variety of views integrated into the process, since the Duma is more transparent than the executive bodies.

On the basis of these observations, the authors draw several conclusions concerning the prospects for disarmament and nuclear discussion at the level of actual political decision-making.

The appendix to the report contains materials characterizing the positions of political parties in the area of arms control.

The report was prepared within the framework of the PIR Research Project "*Arms Control and Nonproliferation: Platforms for Russia's Major Political Parties, Blocs, and Presidential Candidates*", begun in July 1999. The authors of the report are PIR Senior Research Associate Dr. Dmitry Evstafiev, PIR Research Associate Sergei Reshetnikov, and PIR Junior Researcher Dmitry Kovchegin.

The report is available in English in the PIR Reports series.

**2000, March 27.** Director of the PIR Center Vladimir Orlov decided to restore the post of Deputy Director and appointed PIR Editor Dmitry Polikanov to this post.

Dmitry Polikanov is Grand Ph.D. (Political Science), Associate Professor, expert on African affairs and conflict management, author of two books and a number of articles.

He graduated the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO) with honors. Dmitry Polikanov, who is Research Associate in the Institute for African Studies, has been working for the PIR Center as a part-timer for 18 months and provided for a smooth functioning and sustainable development of two projects - publishing of *Yaderny Kontrol Digest* and *Arms Control Letters* newsletter. The success was achieved thanks to Polikanov's professional skills, diligence and initiative. Our foreign partners have marked many times Polikanov's professional qualities.

Dmitry Polikanov took up the duties of Deputy Director since March 27, 2000.

**2000, April 18.** The PIR Center held a meeting of the Research Council "*Russia: Nuclear Weapons and Nonproliferation in the Context of the Coming NPT Review Conference*".

In the course of the meeting, the participants discussed the results of the report based on the all-Russian poll "*Russians on Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Challenges*" conducted upon the request of the PIR Center; they also touched upon a broad range of issues concerning the coming NPT Review Conference, including:

- the nuclear arms proliferation and world stability; the implementation of the NPT;
- the readiness of the nuclear weapon states for joint actions in the area of nuclear disarmament;
- the prospects of the CTBT ratification and the negotiations on START III;
- the risk of *washing out* the ABM Treaty.

PIR Director Vladimir Orlov, Senior Advisor Roland Timerbaev, Research Associate Ivan Safranchuk and Senior Advisor Yevgeny Maslin delivered the reports on the aforementioned issues.

Among other members of the Research Council participating in the debate were Yury Fyodorov (Institute for North American and Canadian Studies), Ildar Akhtamzyan (MGIMO), Dmitry Litovkin (*Krasnaya Zvezda*), Natalya Kalinina (Government Office), Vasily Krivokhizha (Russian Institute

for Strategic Studies), Vladimir Belousov (*Osnova* Center), Vladimir Misyuchenko (State Duma), Elina Kirichenko (Institute for World Economy and International Relations), Andrei Zobov (the *Carnegie* Center), and Anatoly Bulochnikov (Center for Export Controls).

The meeting was held in the off-record mode.

**2000, April 19.** The PIR Center held the press conference "*Putin's Russia: New Arms Control Agenda*" in the National Press Institute.

PIR Director Vladimir Orlov, Senior Advisor Roland Timerbaev, Research Associate Ivan Safranchuk participated in the press conference.

The mass media were represented by *Interfax* news agency, *Kyodo Tsusin*, *Moskovskaya Nemetskaya Gazeta*, Federal News Agency, *AiF-Novosti*, *Russky Zhurnal*, *Garant-Park*, the officials from the press service of the Russian MOD, etc.

**2000, April 24-May 19.** Director of the PIR Center Vladimir Orlov and PIR Senior Advisor Roland Timerbaev attended the 6<sup>th</sup> NPT Review Conference held in New York.

On May 18, Vladimir Orlov made a report at the annual meeting of the NGO Committee on Disarmament, which was held at the UN Headquarters and devoted to the 2000 NPT Review Conference. Dr. Orlov gave the Russian view of the situation in the arms control area, mentioned the problems confronting Russian NGOs in the area of arms control and nuclear nonproliferation. Among other participants of the meeting were Rebecca Johnson, Director of the *Acronym* Institute (UK), William Potter, Director of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the MIIS (USA), Joseph Cirincione, Director of the CEIP Nonproliferation Program (USA), Senator Douglas Roche (Canada) and others.

**2000, May 4-5.** Director of the PIR Center Vladimir Orlov participated in the PONARS Conference in Washington.

Beside the PONARS members, the Conference united numerous representatives of the US executive and legislature. The participants discussed a wide range of issues concerning economic and military security, Russia's foreign

and domestic policy, the relationship between the federal authorities and the regions of the Russian Federation, the prospects of US-Russian relations and their possible transformation.

Vladimir Orlov made a report at the arms control panel and commented on the prospects of Russian nonproliferation policy. Other speakers were Alexander Pikayev (Moscow *Carnegie Center*), Pavel Podvig (MPhTI) and Nikolai Sokov (MIIS).

**2000, May 24.** The PIR Center held a meeting with the delegation of participants of the international seminar "*Changing Nuclear Policy and Military Doctrine: Prognosis for Confidence Building and Disarmament*" convened by the *International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War* (IPPNW).

The PIR Center was represented by Director Vladimir Orlov, Deputy Director Dmitry Polikanov, Senior Advisor Roland Timerbaev, Advisor Vasily Lata, Research Associate Ivan Safranchuk, Junior Research Associate Dmitry Kovchegin, Intern Daniel Sumner. The IPPNW delegation contained Francis Lee (USA), Gillian Reeve (Great Britain), Hans Levander (Sweden), Klas Lundius (Sweden), Henrik Lundius (Sweden), Christina Vigre-Lundius (Sweden), Anneli Schmauch (Sweden), Leonore Wide (Sweden), Jan Prawitz (Sweden), Lars Poulmeier (Germany), Roman Dolgov (Russia), Oksana Khabib (Russia).

In the course of open discussion, the parties exchanged their views on the ABM-NMD-START issues, the future of nuclear weapons, and the problems of safety and security of the Russian nuclear arsenal. Besides, the parties touched upon the provisions of the Russian military doctrine and the *Concept of National Security*.

**2000, May 25.** The PIR Center held the meeting with the delegation of the Swedish Armed Forces Headquarters.

Director Vladimir Orlov and Research Associate Ivan Safranchuk represented the PIR Center. The Swedish delegation comprised Colonel Ulf Mahler, Lt.-Col. Roland Ahnstrand, Commander Mikael Larm, Captain Christian Allerman, Lena Dyberg, Klas Ekstrom, and Martin Bissmark.

The parties discussed the START-ABM-NMD issues, the current developments in this area and various aspects of the Russian security policy.

**2000, May 30.** The PIR Center held the press conference "*The US-Russian Summit and the Prospects of the ABM-NMD-START Dialogue*" in the National Press Institute.

The PIR Center was represented by Director Vladimir Orlov, Advisor Vasily Lata and Research Associate Ivan Safranchuk.

Various foreign and Russian mass media participated in the conference, including the *Voice of Russia*, *RIA-Novosti*, the *Federal News Service*, *TV-Tsentr*, *Interfax*, *Moskovskii Komsomolets*, *Voice of America*, *Liberation*, *Kyodo Tsusin*, *Tokyo Shimbun*, *Mainichi*, *CBC* and others.

**2000, June 2.** The PIR Center held the meeting of the PIR Research Council "*The Results of the NPT Review Conference*".

The key speakers were Deputy Director of the Department on Security and Disarmament of the MFA Boris Kvok, PIR Senior Advisor Roland Timerbaev and Director of the PIR Center Vladimir Orlov.

In the course of the meeting, the participants discussed the results of the NPT Review Conference, which took place in New York on April 24-May 19, 2000. The attention was focused on the work of the Russian delegation at the conference, the new nonproliferation challenges emerging in the world and the assessment of the prospects of the NPT regime.

Among those, who attended the meeting, were Vladimir Belousov (*Osnova Center*), Marina Belyaeva (Minatom), Mikhail Vinogradov (Committee of Scientists for Global Security), Yury Zabaluyev (MOD), Natalya Kalinina (Government Office), Alexander Kalyadin (IMEMO), Elina Kirichenko (IMEMO), Vasily Krivokhizha (RISI), Eduard Kryuchkov (MEPhI), Yury Marakhovsky (FIS), Yevgeny Maslin (PIR Center), Vladimir Novikov (RISI), Pavel Podvig (Center for Environment, Security, and Disarmament at the MPhTI), Gennady Khromov (*Glavkosmos*), Susan Hyland (British Embassy), Surendra Gadekar, Arjun Makhijani (IEER), Michele Boyd (IEER).

## Summary

### **Yaderny Kontrol (Nuclear Control) Journal of the PIR Center for Policy Studies Volume 6, No. 2, March-April, 2000**

Oleg Bukharin in his analysis "*Physical Protection Efficiency: Lessons from the US NRC Specialized Programs*" maintains, 'The threat of terrorism has become a real factor in the life of the modern society and one can't expect that it will disappear in the foreseeable future. According to the September 1999 report by the advisory commission to the US Government, the problem of terrorism in the next 25 years will exacerbate and may become one of the major national security challenges. One of the gloomiest forecasts of the report is that US citizens will have to die on US soil and, probably, the death toll will be high.'

'The NPR specialized programs are the core of the anti-terrorist efforts at the commercial enterprises of the nuclear complex. Since their inception about 20 years ago, these programs have changed the approach to the organization and control over the physical protection. The functional tests are still the decisive factor for assessing the readiness of the nuclear facilities to repel sabotage. The experience of the NRC and the US DOE contains many invaluable lessons, which can and should be used by the nuclear supervisory authorities in other states. The transfer of methodology and the exchange of experience in conducting the functional verification should become an important element of the US-Russian cooperation in the area of MPC&A.'

Alexander Yakovenko in his article "*International Legal Aspects of Nuclear Sources and Nuclear Energy Use in Outer Space*" says that 'the intensive development of space technology and the production of piloted and unmanned spacecraft have predetermined the necessity to develop along with the solar plants some other efficient energy sources on board the spaceships. These sources are the nuclear plants, whose usefulness for a number of spacecraft is accounted for by

their compact structure and long term of operation.

'In 1992, the UN approved the principles of nuclear energy use in outer space. The pretext for the elaboration was the incident with the Soviet Kosmos-954 satellite, which had a nuclear reactor on board and entered the atmosphere over Northern Canada in January 1978.

'Since 1998, the UN Space Committee has been discussing the proposals on adjusting the aforementioned principles, taking into account the new requirements made by a number of states to enhance the radiation safety.'

Igor Khripunov and Dmitry Nikonov, in their commentary "*Restructuring and Reduction of the US Military Nuclear Complex*", state that 'The reduction in the US DOE nuclear laboratories and in the military nuclear complex is inevitable and is caused by the new nuclear strategy and the continued freezing of NPP construction.

'Despite the decreasing share of work connected with research and construction in the military nuclear area in the national laboratories, it has been found unreasonable to convert them radically, or in other words to charge them with principally new tasks.

'The practice of transferring these laboratories to the large private companies facilitates the solution of a number of social issues concerning the emerging excess in the labor force. Thanks to the strong US economy, the costs of creating new jobs and compensations for the redundant workers and communities are minimal.

'In the conditions of economic crisis in Russia and a sharp decrease in the appropriated budgetary funding for the military nuclear complex, the US experience in restructuring its facilities can be extremely important for the understanding of the process, but its practical use will continue to be limited.'

The issue also contains the information from the PIR's missile, nuclear and BW dossiers.

**Yaderny Kontrol (Nuclear Control)**  
**Journal of the**  
**PIR Center for Policy Studies**  
**Volume 6, No. 3, May-June, 2000**

Prof. Anatoly Shevtsov in his analysis "*The ABM Treaty: The Cornerstone of Strategic Stability or an Apple of Discord*" points out that 'Russia's refusal to negotiate with the USA the adaptation of the ABM Treaty to a new strategic situation in the world contradicts a number of the treaty's provisions and the bilateral agreements reached in Cologne. If Russia doesn't change its policy towards such negotiations, this may have dramatic consequences for the process of strategic arms reduction, since such a position encourages the USA to withdraw from the treaty. This will mean the collapse of all existing international strategic arms reduction agreements. Taking into account Russia's economic situation, it will be impossible to maintain the strategic stability if the arms reduction treaties cease to be effective. The collapse of the strategic arms reduction agreements may have unpredictable consequences for the USA as well, since this will create the pre-requisites for the militaristic political forces to come to power.'

Grigory Rapota, First Deputy Minister of Commerce, in his interview with *Yaderny Kontrol Journal*, "*The Ministry of Commerce Should Regulate All Issues Concerning Military-Technical Cooperation*", argues that 'We will never sell arms to those states, from which weapons might reach Chechnya and be used against us. However, in general, we don't have many restrictions. For instance, we can't sell arms to states which fall under UN embargoes or supply such weapons systems, whose proliferation will breach Russia's international commitments.'

The issue also contains the information from the PIR's missile, nuclear and BW dossiers.

**Hot Topic**

**THE FUTURE OF THE ABM  
TREATY**

**by Pavel Podvig,**  
**Center for Environment, Security**  
**and Disarmament,**  
**Moscow Institute of Physics and**  
**Techniques (MPhTI)**

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 Translation into English. Abridged version

The fate of the ABM Treaty is the focal point of the US-Russian arms control agenda. The problem of developing the missile defense system is intertwined with a number of issues concerning the breakup of the Cold War pattern of relationship based on the interaction of two nuclear superpowers with nearly equal capabilities. Nowadays, it depends on Russia and the USA whether this transition to a newly-forming model of relations will be peaceful or will be marked with serious difficulties. At present, the limit of mistakes has been practically exhausted by the two states and their allies; this is why all participants of this process should be more cautious.

The present article is an attempt to study the positions of the parties, their approaches to the matter of missile defense deployment and existing problems in this area. Despite the complicated character of the current situation, there is a window of opportunity. There is still room for compromise, especially if the problem of the ABM Treaty is interpreted in a broader sense as an item of the arms control agenda.

**The US Position: 'Limited Defense'**

The key event of the last year concerning the preservation of the ABM Treaty is the January 1999 decision of the US administration to propose Russia to explore the possibility of amending this international agreement. This motion of the US executive meant the abandonment of the long-lasting official position of the Democrats in power implying that the ABM Treaty should be kept as it is.

The shift in the US policy occurred for a number of reasons, including the increasing support for the plans of missile defense development on the part of the Congress. It is noteworthy that the program of NMD deployment is quite popular with the American public. Anyway at the political level the idea of NMD development is endorsed and the debate mostly concerns the pace of its deployment.

The backing of the US missile defense plans is based on three major arguments (although the actual variety of them is much wider). Firstly, the NMD deployment is the only real way to protect the USA from the menace of world *pariahs*. It is believed that the relations with these states cannot be based on the principle of deterrence. Hence, if they acquire WMD and intercontinental delivery systems the USA will have to rely on missile defense to resist the challenge.

Secondly, the United States possesses the technology, which enables it to develop a missile defense system capable of repelling limited missile attacks. Although many experts doubt this, the point of view prevails among decision-makers, who do not take into account the costs of developing such a system.

Thirdly, the USA is sure that the planned deployment won't affect the strategic balance with Russia and, therefore, is not aimed against Russia. As a result, Russian resentment to reviewing the ABM Treaty provisions is not understood in the USA. Moreover, the Russian insistence on preserving the treaty is often regarded as an attempt to restrain the US sovereignty in the issue, which is considered, fairly or not, to be decisive for maintaining national security.

It is worth mentioning that at present, the plans of NMD deployment are endorsed by both parties in the USA, unlike it was in the past. This state of affairs is a result of the successful activities of the *Rumsfeld* Commission established by the Congress to assess the threats originating from the third countries. The July 1998 report of the Commission stated that the security challenges were more realistic than had been

earlier supposed. Soon after the report North Korea conducted a test launch of a three-stage missile, which proved the conclusions of the Commission and served as a serious argument for the proponents of missile defense, who urged for the NMD deployment at the earliest possible date.

Another result of the Commission's work, which reflected dramatic changes in public opinion, was the January 1999 bill on national missile defense introduced in the US Congress. According to this bill, the US policy is 'to deploy as soon as technologically possible an effective National Missile Defense system capable of defending the territory of the United States against limited ballistic missile attack' (whether accidental, unauthorized, or deliberate). Unlike prior similar bills, this act was approved by the overwhelming majority in both Houses. The US administration declared that President Clinton wouldn't use his veto and in July 1999 he signed the law, reaffirming the US intentions to deploy the NMD system. The adoption of the law became a vivid example of the shift in the official US attitude towards the ABM Treaty. Moreover, the legislative process demonstrated that there was no serious political force in the USA capable of securing the ABM Treaty from amendments.

Under these circumstances, the Russian objections can be hardly expected to have an impact on the US decision to deploy the NMD system or to withdraw from the ABM Treaty. The only thing that may ruin the US plans is the high cost of the system, its inability to resist countermeasures, and the low efficiency of technologies in solving the security problems, which can be settled only with political means. There is no doubt that these factors will be eventually taken into consideration and the NMD system won't be deployed. However, at present, Russia will have to cope with the US plans in the area of missile defense. The position of Moscow is decisive, for it may encourage the abandonment of these plans or, on the contrary, facilitate the US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, what will have significant consequences hampering nuclear arms reduction.

### **Russia: 'No Amendments to the ABM Treaty'**

Russia's reaction to the review of the ABM Treaty was extremely negative. Practically all comments of the Russian government officials emphasized that Russia would insist on full compliance with the ABM Treaty as it was.

Russia's objections to the amendment of the treaty have been repeatedly voiced by official representatives and independent experts. The main argument against any negotiations on modifying the treaty is that this review will inevitably affect the substantive provisions of the agreement and will deprive it of the ability to restrain the development of missile defense systems capable of eliminating the strategic balance. Any limited missile defense system aimed at protecting the national territory will become a base for deploying a more advanced system. Below we will prove that this statement is absolutely correct and, therefore, the Russian position is quite solid.

Besides, Russia is suspicious of the US arguments in favor of the limited missile defense. For instance, it calls into question the conclusions of the *Rumsfeld* Commission implying that, in the next few years, Third World countries will be able to develop ICBMs capable of hitting US territory. The most contentious argument for Moscow is that the system to be developed is not targeted at the Russian Federation.

It is noteworthy that Russia's apprehensions that the NMD system may be used against its strategic nuclear forces are not completely groundless. In the conditions of bilateral strategic offensive arms reduction, any system with ever-limited capabilities may have a serious impact on the strategic balance. Moreover, Washington admits that the NMD system will be developed in such a manner as to expand it if required.

Despite quite serious objections against the amendments, Russia has taken no real steps to impede this process. Russian government officials have confined themselves to tough statements. For instance, reportedly, the letter of President Yeltsin to President

Clinton of November 1999 stated that the US intentions to deploy the NMD system could lead to the collapse of the whole system of arms control agreements.

Another measure taken by Russia was to submit to the UN General Assembly a draft of a resolution criticizing the US plans in the area of missile defense and its willingness to withdraw from the ABM Treaty. The General Assembly passed the resolution, it was approved by China and France but its influence on the US policy should not be overestimated.

As far as practical steps are concerned, the Russian Government and the State Duma acted as if the proposal to review the treaty hadn't existed. The Duma ratified the Federal Law on START II, which stipulated the implementation of the Russian commitments under START II for the preservation of the ABM Treaty. Moreover, in accordance with the law, START II won't be effective unless the set of documents is ratified. It consists of the *Memorandum of Understanding Relating to the ABM Treaty* aimed at providing succession after the breakup of the Soviet Union and the demarcation agreements. The latter comprise a number of *Agreed Statements* attempting to establish the criteria for distinguishing between the ABM and the TMD systems and to regulate the problems of testing for such weapons.

Thus, the Russian position is based on the assumption that the USA won't withdraw from the ABM Treaty and the process of negotiations on nuclear arms reduction will go on. In these conditions, it is alarming that Russia lacks any specific line of behavior to provide for an adequate response to the US activities that may run counter to the terms of the ABM Treaty.

### **The ABM Treaty and the Negotiations on Nuclear Arms Reduction**

Although Russia is persistent in refusing to accept any amendments to the ABM Treaty, it is quite difficult to legitimize this reaction. According to Article XIII of the ABM Treaty, each party can propose amendments to the agreement. Thus, Russia won't be able to

refrain from discussing the US proposals, though it is free to reject them.

The proposal to commence such negotiations was first mentioned during the Moscow visit of US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright in January 1999. At that time, Russia's reaction was negative and no agreement was attained.

Later, the issue was raised at the G-8 summit in Cologne in late June 1999. One of the results was the *Joint Statement* of the two presidents maintaining that 'both parties affirm their existing obligations under Article XIII of the ABM Treaty to consider possible changes in the strategic situation that have a bearing on the ABM Treaty and, as appropriate, possible proposals for further increasing the viability of this Treaty.' Formally, the *Joint Statement* says nothing about Russia's eagerness to amend the ABM Treaty. Russia has simply reiterated its willingness to comply with the commitments under the treaty. However, for the first time in the last few years Russia agreed to increase 'the viability of this Treaty'. Obviously, the USA interpreted this statement by the Russian President as the consent to consider the amendments to the ABM Treaty, in which Washington is interested. The USA toned down its position on START III and agreed to discuss the provisions of this treaty before the entry into force of START II.

The first consultations to consider the START III and ABM issues took place in Moscow in August 1999. The parties recognized that these consultations were a complete failure, since Russia refused to discuss the amendments to the ABM Treaty, whereas the USA was ready to speak about START III only in linkage with the ABM Treaty. Later these consultations went on but there has been no news of any breakthrough at the negotiations.

In fact, it is quite difficult to expect success from the consultations launched in August 1999. The thing is that the negotiations started thanks to mutual concessions, hence any progress depends on the willingness of the parties to seek a compromise. In this case, it would mean Russia's eagerness to discuss

the amendments and the US readiness to draft START III. Nonetheless, neither party has demonstrated such willingness.

As a result, Russia has found itself in an extremely difficult situation. Russia believes that START II without START III is an unfair treaty. After the US proposal to modify the ABM Treaty and the Cologne agreements the fate of START III (and hence, the correction of START II shortcomings) will depend only on the Russian concessions in the area of missile defense. Thus, even if we discard the *tough* scenario, i.e. the US withdrawal from the treaty, Russia will find itself in a quite unfavorable situation when it will have to implement START II without any hope for improving its provisions.

#### **Limited Missile Defense or a Base for the National Missile Defense?**

The logic of the current situation implies that the problem of the essence of amendments to the ABM Treaty, which so far has hardly been discussed in Russia, may become the core issue at the US-Russian negotiations on strategic arms this year.

The existing US plan of NMD development provides for the system's deployment in Alaska at the first stage of its implementation. Initially, the missile defense system in Alaska will have about 20 interceptors. However, even at the first stage, the USA may deploy up to 100 interceptors there. The fulfillment of this plan will require amending the ABM Treaty to increase the number of areas of deployment from one to two (the ABM site in Grand Forks cannot be shut down, since such a step would require the dismantlement of its radar). Another measure to be taken at the initial phase of deployment is to construct new decimeter radars in the areas where early warning radars are located. New radars will accomplish the tasks of early warning of missile attack and of detecting the dummy targets. Later the deployed missile defense system is supposed to be reinforced with space surveillance and target designation means.

It is necessary to point out that the implementation of the US plans will

inevitably circumvent the fundamental provisions of the ABM Treaty. The deployed system is designated to defend the national territory, regardless of the number of deployment sites and interceptors. The development of such a system or a base for such a defense is prohibited by Article I of the ABM Treaty.

Russia emphasizes that the modification of the treaty to allow for the limited missile defense will have to cover Article I and, hence, will be equal to the elimination of its key constraint. As a result, the parties may lose the ability to curb the arms race in the area of defensive and offensive weapons, which is one of the functions of the ABM Treaty.

#### **Is the ABM Treaty Worth Changing?**

The major problem for Russia in the near future is the way to respond to US attempts to ruin the system of arms control agreements, of which the ABM Treaty is a part.

One of the variants, and it seems to be the principal response, is to stand for preserving the ABM Treaty. Evidently, this has turned out to be ineffective, since the USA has many times demonstrated its readiness to withdraw from the treaty if necessary. This withdrawal may lead to the Russian refusal to carry out the commitments under START I and START II.

Unfortunately, under the current circumstances, the refusal to implement the provisions of START treaties won't enable Russia to maintain the strategic balance with the USA. The problem is that the structure of Russian strategic nuclear forces is determined not by the treaties' limits but by actual economic capabilities of the state (although, naturally, such an act will enable Moscow to economize a considerable amount of money). Even if Russia refrains from eliminating heavy ballistic missiles or from deploying land-based MIRVed ICBMs it won't possess more than 2,000-2,500 warheads in the next 8-10 years.

Doubtless, the USA won't keep the level of nuclear forces at 6,000 warheads, as provided

in START II, or higher. At the same time, Washington will be able to maintain complete superiority over the Russian nuclear arsenal and shift this dominance to possess the most destabilizing weapons with high counter-force potential. It is worth remembering that none of the ABM constraints will work in this situation.

This last condition distinguishes the aforesaid scenario from a more favorable situation when Russia agrees to amend the ABM Treaty. On the one hand, any amendment will affect the key provision of the treaty as described above. On the other hand, the ABM Treaty can be modified to preserve certain limits on the development of missile defense systems.

In practical terms, Article I of the treaty might be changed in the following manner.

At present, paragraph 2 of this article states that 'Each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems for the defense of the territory of its country and not to provide a base for such a defense, and not to deploy ABM systems for the defense of an individual region except as provided for in Article III of this Treaty.'

This wording implies that the treaty bans the deployment of any missile defense system of the territory, except for the site described in Article III.

This pattern may be used to modify Article I, which could make an exception for the limited national missile defense, whose structure must be stated in the Protocol to the treaty. Then, the article would read something like the following: 'Each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems for a defense of the territory of its country and not to provide a base for such a defense, and not to deploy ABM systems for defense of an individual region except as provided for in the Protocol to this Treaty.'

The specific structure of the limited missile defense system can be determined to enable the USA to deploy a system, comprising 200-300 interceptors located in two-three or more areas. Although there is no doubt that such

system will be a base for a stronger defense, the certain constraints on the deployment of missile defense will work and will allow Russia to take required retaliatory measures if the USA strives to expand the system beyond the agreed limits.

At the same time, in the course of revising the treaty, Russia can insist on strengthening some of its provisions. For instance, it should urge for the ban on tests and deployment of any space-based interceptors. The amendments may provide for confidence-building measures, which will enable the parties to be surer about long-term intentions of each other and will compensate to a certain extent for the easier ways of withdrawing from the treaty.

The main gain will be the continued dialogue on disarmament. It will help Russia to maintain parity with the USA in the area of strategic offensive arms, to work at improving bilateral relations and overall climate in the world, and to profit from this favorable position by persistent efforts to curtail the missile defense programs. This Russian policy will be the strongest argument in favor of canceling the missile defense plans.

Obviously, if Russia follows this scenario it will have to take visible diplomatic efforts at the negotiations on the ABM Treaty and at more important arms reduction talks. It will have to take certain measures to strengthen the military-industrial might of the country, since the missile defense programs will be shut down only if Russia convinces the USA and its allies in the ability and willingness to maintain the strategic balance.

The ABM Treaty is not likely to be preserved as it is. However, this should not mean the end of the arms control dialogue, which suits Russia's interests more than ever before. Much will depend on Russia's position and its ability to find a way out of the current complicated situation.

## **Hot Topic**

### **THE US-RUSSIAN SUMMIT: NEGOTIATIONS ON THE ABM- NMD ISSUES AND START III**

**by Ivan Safranchuk**  
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Translation into English. Abridged version

The US-Russian summit is over. On June 4, 2000, the US and Russian presidents held two rounds of talks and discussed a wide range of issues paying much attention to the nuclear arms control matters.

#### **On the Eve of the Summit**

On the eve of Clinton's visit to Russia, Vladimir Putin set forth an initiative on developing the joint US-Russian missile defense system. After this statement, the military and diplomatic sources in Russia commented that the statement dealt with the idea of sub-strategic missile defense.

Taking into account the fact that the initiative was put forward in the interview with *NBC*, one can presume that Putin tried to address the foreign audience, the US administration in particular. His aim was to seize the initiative on the eve of the talks and to turn the discussion into a favorable direction for Russia, i.e. to impose on the USA the dialogue on the issue, which Washington was not ready to discuss. At the same time, the statement indicated Russia's willingness to negotiate the ABM Treaty.

#### **The Documents of the Summit**

On June 4, 2000, the presidents signed four joint statements, including the *Joint Statement by the Presidents of the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Principles of Strategic Stability*.

This document seems to be a maximum possible compromise at the current stage of bilateral dialogue on START III and the ABM Treaty. The major provisions of the statement are the following:

- the parties agree that the key objective of all nuclear arms reduction treaties is the maintenance of strategic stability (paragraph 1), which is interpreted as a capability for deterrence (paragraph 2);
- the parties agree that the 1972 ABM Treaty is a cornerstone of strategic stability and the essential contribution to reductions in offensive forces (paragraph 5);
- at the same time, the parties agree that the international community faces a dangerous and growing threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, and stress their desire to reverse that process, including through existing and possible new international legal mechanisms (paragraph 6). The presidents called on their ministers and experts to prepare a report with concrete measures to combat new threats (paragraph 14);
- the parties agree that the 1972 ABM Treaty can be modified to enhance its viability and to strengthen the treaty, taking into account any changes in the international security environment (paragraphs 8 and 9);
- the parties announce that the discussions will intensify on START III and ABM issues in accordance with the Moscow Statement of 1998 and Cologne Statement of 1999 (paragraph 4);
- the parties agree that the issues of strategic offensive arms cannot be considered in isolation from the issues of strategic defensive arms (i.e. stress the interrelationship between START III and the ABM Treaty) (paragraph 15).

Some additional comments on the position of Russia and the USA were made at the press conference by the two presidents. Vladimir Putin reaffirmed that the parties have common notion of the new security challenges: 'the starting point for the possibility of seeing new threats arrive, we have a commonality'. At the same time, Putin emphasized that 'we are against having a cure, which is worse than a disease'.

President Putin also stated that 'Russian side cannot but express its satisfaction' with the results of the negotiations. Bill Clinton was more reserved in his assessment of the situation, at least of the arms control component of the talks. At the press

conference he actually admitted that the parties failed to reach any breakthrough at the talks: 'We've had good discussions, both last night and today, on a range of common interests, including nonproliferation and arms control. We expressed our differences with clarity and candor. And I, for one, appreciate that. The importance of this relationship to ourselves and the world demands that we take every opportunity we can to find common ground, and that where we cannot find it, we express our differences with clarity and candor.'

Meanwhile, the US president reiterated the US understanding that the *Joint Statement on Principles of Strategic Stability* enables the parties to modify the ABM Treaty: 'We have acknowledged that the ABM Treaty foresees the possibility of changes in the strategic environment that might require it to be updated.' Vladimir Putin made no objections on this remark.

#### **The Results of the Summit**

One can state that the Russian position on the ABM issues has changed. Russia refused for a long time to recognize the existence of the threats, which the USA was going to reverse with the help of national missile defense system. Russia tried to prove that North Korea and Iran were far from developing long-range missiles. However, the Russian proposal to set up the global system of control over missile launches, which was laid down by President Yeltsin for the first time at the G-8 summit in Cologne in 1999, was a kind of acknowledgement of the existing threats in the area of nuclear and missile proliferation. At the same time, the parties perceived differently the scale of such challenges. At present, they have stated the common understanding of the security threats. The difference lies in the approaches to combat such menaces. Russia has also agreed to include in the *Joint Statement on Principles* the possibility of making amendments to the ABM Treaty. All this can be regarded as the Russian concessions.

Meanwhile, one can also speak about some shifts in the US policy. If earlier the USA pointed out its readiness to withdraw from the ABM Treaty in response to Russia's unwillingness to modify the agreement, nowadays, Washington reaffirmed the importance of the treaty by calling it 'a

cornerstone of strategic stability' and of all nuclear disarmament agreements. Moreover, when Clinton was asked about the US readiness to abandon the ABM Treaty if it was not modified, he gave an equivocal answer and stressed that he didn't want the USA to withdraw from the treaty. The mitigation of the US position on this matter (if it is a real mitigation) may become a prerequisite for achieving compromise on the modifications. It was very difficult for Russia to speak about changing the treaty in the conditions when the USA constantly demonstrated its willingness to abandon it. Under those circumstances, any compromise would have meant a disgrace for Russia, since it would have been interpreted as Russia's concessions to the US threats to withdraw from the agreement.

Bill Clinton set the framework for the possible deal on START III and ABM-NMD issues. Russia should agree to amend the ABM Treaty, the USA accepts Russia's proposals on the levels of nuclear arsenal for START III: 'We had previously agreed to a range of 2,000 to 2,500 on START III. If we were to come down below that, it would require us to change our strategic plan. And we believe it would be much better, if we were going to do that, if we could also know that we were defending ourselves against a new threat, which we believe is real. So we will continue to discuss all these things. Let me say, I am certain - I am eager to get down to the START II levels, and I am eager to go below the START II levels, but I also want to try to solve the new threat, as well. And I will do whatever I can to achieve both objectives.'

The parties agreed to consider the START III and ABM issues in conjunction. This means, in practice, that the modification of the ABM Treaty will depend on how much Russia needs START III. In fact, there is one peculiar moment in this situation. The Russian diplomats expected the official negotiations on START III to begin immediately after the START II ratification without discussing the problem of ABM amendments. At the same time, they ignored the 1997 Helsinki Joint Statement on the parameters of further nuclear arms reductions, since this document provided for the immediate commencement of the START III talks after START II entered into force. The Russian expectations on launching the negotiations after the ratification (and not after the entry into force) were based on the 1998 *Joint Statement by Presidents of the USA and*

*Russia on Common Security Challenges at the Threshold of the XXI Century* signed during the Moscow summit, which provided for the start of START III negotiations immediately after the START II ratification by Russia.

In this connection, a particular attention should be drawn to paragraph 4 of the *Joint Statement on Principles* of June 4, 2000: 'discussions will intensify on further reductions in the strategic forces of the United States and Russia within the framework of a future START-III Treaty, and on ABM issues, in accordance with the Moscow Statement of 1998 and Cologne Statement of 1999 by the Presidents.'

In 1998, in Moscow, the parties didn't approve any special statement on START III or on the ABM Treaty. Thus, they presumably mean the *Joint Statement on Common Security Challenges* of September 1998 (it is not clear why it was called the Moscow Statement of 1998, since several documents had been signed at the Moscow summit in 1998 and each of them can be regarded as "the Moscow statement") and the aforementioned provision on commencing the START III negotiations right after the START II ratification by Russia. Hence, Russia leaves open the opportunity for demanding the commencement of START III talks regardless of the amendments to the ABM Treaty.

The results of the US-Russian summit didn't clarify the prospects for further nuclear arms reductions. At the same time, the positions of the parties became closer. It would be premature to predict if such rapprochement can become the basis for actual agreements later this year or not. Russia and the USA availed each other of the opportunity to fix the positions they stand for. Now it is likely that each party will wait for further concessions from the other partner.

The situation is like this: Russia needs START III, the USA needs the amendments to the ABM Treaty. Either party would like to sign the respective agreements as soon as possible but at the same time, Moscow and Washington can afford to wait for some time. Meanwhile, the two states will continue the dialogue on these issues and will try to exert pressure on each other. The recent Putin's proposal to develop the ABM system in cooperation with Europe should be regarded in this context.

**Polemics****START III: THE PROBLEMS OF  
EQUAL SECURITY**

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[This article was originally published in  
*Yaderny Kontrol*, No. 3, Vol. 6,  
May-June, 2000]

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*Abridged version*

After the signature of START I in 1991, and its coming into effect in 1994, the negotiation process concerning further reduction of US-Russian nuclear arsenals has significantly slowed down for a number of objective reasons.

In early 1993, the presidents of the two superpowers signed START II limiting the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads to 3,000-3,500. The terms of the treaty provide for two stages of arms reduction, the first of which covers seven years after START I entry into force. The unique feature of START II from the point of international legal practice was that it was signed before the prior agreement became effective. We can hardly call this accidental. The process was boosted with the political changes in 1991-1992 that resulted in the breakup of the Soviet Union. At present, START II has already been ratified by the US Senate and by the State Duma but hasn't come into effect yet.

Presumably, the acceleration of work on START II resulted in some reciprocal mistakes: the USA underestimated the reaction of the Russian parliament, which occurred after thorough consideration and heated public debate on the matter. Russia ignored the necessity of a comprehensive military-technical expert examination of the treaty before its signature. As a result, the political situation has reached a stalemate, which impedes the progress in achieving

START III, whose basic characteristics (2,000-2,500 nuclear warheads) were agreed by the two presidents in Helsinki on March 21, 1997.

Obviously, in future, as the quantitative parameters of nuclear arsenals decrease, the deterrence policy will depend on the qualitative characteristics of weapons. Hence, the resentment to reducing the level of nuclear arms will naturally grow, since this issue concerns the national security of either state.

This is why we believe that it is extremely important to have a common mutually agreed concept of nuclear arms reduction and modernization in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. This concept can be worked out only in the course of the joint efforts of *nuclear club* members, above all, Russia and the USA. The initiative should be based on the principles of equal security, transparency and adequate understanding of the role of the nuclear weapons in deterrence. And this concept may become an underlying motivation for the cautious steps to conclude the nuclear arms reduction and limitation treaties.

It is difficult to challenge the stabilizing role of strategic nuclear forces (SNF) in the post-World War history of mankind. It is evident and it is a fact, not opinion. In the beginning of a nuclear age, when the USA had the nuclear monopoly, the threat of a global conflict was quite realistic. This is proved with the declassified archives containing multiple plans of US nuclear attacks to destroy the USSR.

The Cuban crisis of 1962 demonstrated the obvious significance of the nuclear factor and its capability to prevent the escalation of political conflicts into military confrontation. The arms race in the 1970s with an already excessive number of weapons was a serious economic burden and posed the threat of operational emergency situations. However, by the mid-1980s, the chances of a war between the two superpowers, which would have inevitably involved the rest of the world, were slim, mainly thanks to the availability of nuclear weapons with high deterring characteristics.

On the one hand, nuclear weapons played an exclusive and stabilizing role, which was a positive trend. On the other hand, the necessity to stop the arms race and to start mutual and balanced nuclear arms reduction was obvious. The balance to be sought was the balance of stability and not the balance of power with its quantitative characteristics. Nuclear weapons are not tanks or guns. Their supreme role is to maintain peace not war. This is why unilateral advantages in nuclear-political matters mean mutual defeat, since world peace is at stake. The advantages give birth to temptations and nuclear danger increases, whereas the efficiency of deterrence diminishes.

If we agree with this conceptual approach, then it is natural to ask: 'What minimal level should be chosen so as not to affect the interests of stability?' Such a question is not easy to answer. For decades, the strategic forces of the USSR and the USA have been based on the principle of building up nuclear arsenals and improving their characteristics (yield and precision).

When in the early 1970s MIRVed missiles emerged in the USA (1970) and in the Soviet Union (1974), they boosted the arms race making this process irrepressible.

The enhancement of ICBMs and SLBMs reached the level when a launcher with re-entry vehicles could hit as many targets as the number of warheads it carried. In the early 1980s, the political and military circles began to discuss the possibility of making a preventive strike against strategic delivery systems of the enemy and on the principles of deterrence, i.e. the ability of SNF to perform a retaliatory nuclear strike with devastating consequences for the adversary. There was no unambiguous answer. And this uncertainty caused mutual fear and new concepts resulting in a new turn of the arms race. For instance, the counter-force potential of ICBMs and SLBMs was constantly growing due to the increased precision and yield. One SS-18 or MX missile armed with 10 MIRVs could hit 10 highly fortified targets - ICBM silos. The SLBMs had the same combat capabilities for pre-emptive nuclear strikes - an alarming trend, taking into

account that the naval component of the triad has always been the US strong point, whereas the land-based forces have always been the Russian prerogative.

Nonetheless, the USA regarded the land-based MIRVed ICBMs as the only destabilizing factor. On September 28, 1991, in Atlanta, President Bush called for complete elimination of MIRVed ICBMs. SLBMs were left beyond the scope of the initiative, although they were also an effective means to destroy the silos.

The idea of weakening the destabilizing counter-force characteristics of Russian and US SNF became the fundamental principle of START II. According to START II, the nuclear arsenals should be sharply reduced to 3,500 warheads with simultaneous elimination of land-based MIRVed ICBMs. Meanwhile, the submarines will preserve the MIRVed SLBMs. Hence, the treaty is illogical even as far as the fundamental principles are concerned. It is fundamentally unfair and requires significant amendments. Thus, START II can't weaken the destabilizing counter-force potential of nuclear arsenals.

It is noteworthy, that in January 1992, President Yeltsin proposed to reduce the SNF to 2,000-2,500 warheads, although the USA spoke about 4,700 warheads. At that time, Russia also proposed to eliminate all ballistic missiles with MIRVs - both land-based and sea-based. The USA wasn't ready to take such a radical decision concerning its naval component.

So, is there any way out now? We believe that there is, if the USA and Russia work out and conclude START III, which will correct all shortcomings of the previous agreements and eliminate the aforementioned counter-force potential, including MIRVed SLBMs. This would enhance mutual security and global stability at a substantially lower quantitative level of nuclear arsenals.

What basic parameters can be used in such treaty? It is not worth discussing the quantitative characteristics, since they have already been determined in Helsinki.

As far as counter-force potential is concerned, let's study two variants:

- weakening the combat efficiency of the SLBMs;
- conversion of the SLBMs to single-warhead missiles.

The combat efficiency of hitting the target, like a silo launcher, with the pre-set durability and the lack of missile defense is determined by two factors: precision and yield. If these characteristics are reduced the counter-force capabilities of the naval forces will diminish.

What should be decreased? Precision is more critical but it is practically impossible to control its deliberate deterioration. At the same time, the yield of a warhead mounted on an SLBM may become the topic for military-technical and political discussions at the future START III talks.

Nowadays, the US SLBMs (Trident II) are armed with rather powerful warheads (W88), which can destroy the highly fortified silos of ICBMs and the ICBMs themselves. If these warheads are replaced with lower-yield charges, the possibility of destroying the silos can be reduced to make it senseless to use MIRVed SLBMs in the first pre-emptive strike at silo launchers, since many ICBMs will be able to survive this attack and to maintain deterrence.

The USA may use W76 warheads, which have been developed for Trident I missiles and are still operational. The number of such warheads (approximately 1,900) is quite comparable to the planned levels of nuclear arms reduction under START III. Russian MIRVed SLBMs can be also armed with warheads having a similar yield.

Naturally, the question is how to verify that the warheads have a nearly equal yield. The experience of developing the warheads for strategic ballistic missiles enables to find a correlation between the yield and the external parameters of the warhead - its size (e.g. the body of the warhead) and weight. This correlation can be proved by the joint expert examination of the US national laboratories and Russian nuclear centers.

Nowadays, we know more about each other than 10 years ago and can see that the level of physics and technical progress in arms is nearly the same. Hence, it is not necessary to have information on the design of the foreign warhead, to assess its yield using some non-intrusive methods. Such an analytical procedure will enable us to arm the SLBMs with warheads that have a low counter-force potential, under strict verification procedures.

And only reciprocal reduction of the counter-force potential of the US-Russian naval forces will mean a logical nuclear arms limitation process and a minimization of the nuclear threat.

However, the above statement is true in the situation of *status quo* in missile defense, i.e. when the 1972 ABM Treaty is fully observed.

Nowadays, the situation with this treaty becomes more and more worrisome and vague. The USA is conducting activities to develop a missile defense system, which is prohibited under the ABM Treaty. Meanwhile, missile defense is a destabilizing factor for maintaining strategic balance. On the one hand, the large-scale deployment of missile defense undermines the conceptual basis of the nuclear arms reduction process. On the other hand, it is capable of provoking another turn of the arms race.

This is why it is vital for START III to preserve the ABM Treaty. The parties should make such commitment an integral part of the new agreement to provide for a legally binding document to curb the development of the US NMD system.

Another significant factor to maintain mutual security (along with a reduced destabilizing offensive potential of nuclear arms) is the deactivation of launchers, as discussed in Helsinki. The de-alerting measures can comprise a wide variety of means, including the removal of warheads and their separate storage at storage facilities under reciprocal control. Although these activities seem to be quite attractive, they are not easy to implement. The most complicated thing is SLBMs' deactivation. This problem hasn't

been solved even in principle but it may help to promote de-targeting and to rule out the potential risk of accidental unauthorized launch of a nuclear warhead.

Moreover, this will destroy the arguments of those who advocate the deployment of NMD as a means to prevent accidental launches of ICBMs and SLBMs.

Nuclear political and military problems are complicated and sensitive. This is why before negotiating START III, it is useful to work out, discuss and approve preliminary framework agreements on the matter.

As we can see, if Russia's proposals are taken into account, two scenarios are possible. They do not cover all issues but may serve as a platform for discussion. If these variants are included in the framework agreements it will allow the parties to eliminate potentially dangerous discrepancies that emerged during START II preparation. We would like to point that it's high time the parties reduced the number of sea-based cruise missiles possessing a range exceeding 2,000 km. This issue was mentioned in the Helsinki Joint Statement. These cruise missiles are not included in the SNF structure but are capable of accomplishing strategic missions. This also requires the ban on the use of nuclear arms on the aircraft assigned to the aircraft carriers.

START III if drafted well can correct the well-known shortcomings of START II and provide for the strengthening of the global stability to the benefit of the world and the future of the nations.

## Interview

### **VICTOR YESIN: 'RUSSIA WILL RESORT TO ITS NUCLEAR ARSENAL ONLY WHEN IT COMES TO THE ISSUE OF "TO BE OR NOT TO BE" FOR THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION'**

**[This article was originally published in Russian in *Yaderny Kontrol*, No. 2, Vol. 6, March-April, 2000]**

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*On April 21, 2000, Acting President Vladimir Putin signed a new military doctrine. The major difference from the 1993 document is a new approach toward nuclear weapons use. The changes affected not the concept of nuclear weapons use but the conditions when they can be employed. One of the authors of the new doctrine - Victor Yesin, head of the Department of Military Construction of the Security Council staff, - comments on some provisions of the document in his exclusive interview with the PIR Center.*

Victor Yesin pointed out 'that the draft of the military doctrine was prepared by the inter-agency working group at the General Staff of the Russian Federation, which united experts from the Security Council staff, ministries and agencies, leading research institutions and public organizations. On April 9, 1999, the draft was considered at the meeting of the state commission on military construction and was supported in general. However, the meeting found it necessary to make substantial amendments to the document.

'On September 29, 1999, the corrected draft was submitted for discussion to the expanded meeting of the MOD ministerial board, which was attended by representatives of all ministries and agencies responsible for the state military security. The draft was generally approved and on October 9, 1999, it was made public. Since that moment, the discussion has involved not only military experts, but the general public.

'The draft of the military doctrine evoked responses from abroad, above all in the USA and among NATO member states. We received many comments, proposals and recommendations. They all were systemized, analyzed and summarized by the editorial commission consisting of the representatives of all military and law-enforcement agencies, the MFA, the Ministry of Economics, senior officials of the President's Office, the Security Council staff and the Government staff. Marshal Igor Sergeev, Russian Defense Minister, chaired the commission.

'All important proposals and objections were directly or indirectly included in the draft of the military doctrine. The work on the draft took into account all modern requirements for the state military doctrine. The basic requirements are the systematic presentation of views and principles, scientifically grounded provisions, integration of military doctrine provisions into the system of legal and other documents related to the military construction. This is why we had no doubt that on February 4, 2000, at the Security Council meeting presided by Acting President Vladimir Putin the presented document would be approved. Moreover, the text of the doctrine meets Russia's national interests and enables the state to maintain its military security.

'The systematic character of the doctrine's underlying principles involves several criteria. First of all, these are major substantive criteria of the new doctrine: transparency, continuity of views, adequate response to the objective military threats and realistic approach, given the socioeconomic capabilities of the state. Secondly, these are *status* criteria: compliance with the Constitution, other Russian legislation, and international law, the combination of military and non-military (sociopolitical) means to maintain military security, the capabilities to implement the doctrine. And finally, these are the flexibility of the doctrine and its susceptibility to the political changes in the world.

'Some provisions of the draft have a certain innovative character. These relate to the definition of the military doctrine as a

systemized combination, concentrated in one document, of official views and principles determining the military-political, military-strategic, and military-economic basic provisions aimed at maintaining the Russian military security. The adoption of this notion is decisively important from the point of theory and practice. It sets the framework of this military-political document, its scope, structure, role and place in the system of other state documents concerning military construction.

'Thus, the structure of the doctrine consists of a few principal sections – an introduction, a conclusion and three chapters: geopolitical, strategic and military-economic fundamentals of the state development. This structure is accounted for by the objective interdependence of geopolitics, military strategy and military economics. The introduction mentions that the current military doctrine will become a document for the period of transition characterized by the formation of a democratic state, multi-sector economy, military reforms, and dynamic transformation of the international system.

'It would be wrong to say that the new doctrine differs significantly from the 1993 document. The doctrine develops the 1993 provisions, applies to the military sphere and specifies the basic principles set forth in the *Concept of National Security* approved on January 10, 2000 by Vladimir Putin's decree. It focuses on the systematic analysis of the military-political situation and implies the defensive character of the doctrine, what results from Russia's commitment to peace and maintaining its national security. The section concerning military-political fundamentals gives a systematic assessment of the political situation, external and internal military security challenges, sets out the major ways to maintain the military security and outlines the military organization of the state and the chain of command.

'The key difference in this part of the document is the lack of excessive politicizing. Nowadays, we do not specify the enemy and the geographical sources of external threats. The world is developing swiftly, the priorities change and the former enemies

may become allies and vice versa. This is why, we can say that our doctrine is pragmatic and is adjusted to the transformation of global political and economic trends. Moreover, we have refrained from global claims and focused on the internal problems: combating terrorism and separatism, strengthening the territorial integrity of the state. This is the major difference between the Russian document and the doctrines of the Western states, the USA in particular, since the latter keeps the right to protect its national interests in all regions of the world. For that reason, we believe that the existing variant of the military doctrine will be a long-term, topical document, which will serve as a basis for the military construction of the state in the foreseeable future.

'The lack of evident opposition to the Russian policy in the world, as laid out in the introduction to the military doctrine, meets Russia's peaceful aspirations. However, we have recently faced the unwillingness of some Western states to listen to the Russian opinion in seeking the solution for some global problems, e.g. waging war against Yugoslavia in violation of the UN Security Council resolution, etc. These factors have been taken into account in the military doctrine. The military-strategic section contains provisions defining the character of modern wars and armed conflicts, the basic principles of using armed forces and their major missions. These provisions were worked out bearing in mind actual and potential threats to Russia in the foreseeable future. The military-economic section states basic objectives, principles and priorities of military-economic factors in maintaining the military security, the goals of mobilization and military training, analyzes international and international military cooperation.'

## Commentary

### **RUSSIA'S NEW MILITARY DOCTRINE**

**by Andrei Gordiyenko,  
Trialogue Center**

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Translation into English. Abridged version

On April 21, 2000, Acting President Vladimir Putin signed Decree No. 706 "On Adopting the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation", which entered into force on April 22.

The work on this document reached a decisive stage in October 1999 and in the next few months, the Ministry of Defense received more than 3,000 amendments and proposals on the document from military and civil experts. This was the official reason for not completing the elaboration of the document in March, as planned by the MOD's leadership.

However, we can presume that there were some other reasons for that. The development of the military doctrine has always depended on the ministry's leadership. Previously, in the times of confrontation between the MOD and the Council of Defense, two draft variants of the doctrine were produced. The ministers changed, the tasks for the working group changed too, and this impeded the work. In this connection, it is noteworthy that the delay over the completion of the new military doctrine coincided with the widely discussed possibility of Igor Sergeev's retirement. Only when all doubts concerning the further status of the minister were dispelled, did work on the doctrine come to an end.

At first sight, the adopted doctrine differs significantly from the October 1999 draft.

Above all, the very definition of the military doctrine has changed. In the 1999 draft the military doctrine was the 'a systemized aggregation of fundamental official views, concentrated in a single document, on

preventing wars and armed conflicts, on their character, on the ways of conduct, and on the organization of the state and social activities to provide military security of the Russian Federation and its allies'.

In the new document, the military doctrine is 'the aggregation of official views determining the military-political, military-strategic and military-economic guidelines to provide military security of the Russian Federation.'

The document has undergone many amendments. However, the most of them are of editorial character (the reshuffling of words, sentences, and paragraphs); in some sections, the sequence of statements has been changed.

Some amendments were made to the structure of the documents. The sections remained the same: military-political, military-strategic, and military-economic guidelines. However, in the first section, the subsection "*Managing the maintenance of military security*" was renamed as "*Directing the military organization of the state*" (the contents have changed slightly) and was placed after the subsection entitled "*Military organization of the state*". The subsection entitled "*Construction and preparing of the military organization of the state*" has been left out in the adopted document. Practically all provisions of this subsection have been moved to the subsection "*Military organization of the state*".

The second section has been left without the subsection "*Mission of the Armed Forces and other forces*". With small changes, the contents of this subsection were moved to the subsection entitled "*The basic principles of using Armed Forces and other forces*". Besides, the adopted document, unlike the 1999 draft, lacks a special "*Conclusion*" section.

The general principle determining the nature of the doctrine is its defensive character, stated in the introduction: 'The military doctrine has an exceptionally defensive character predetermined with the organic combination of a persistent commitment to peace and the firm resolution to defend national interests and ensure the military

security of the Russian Federation and its allies.'

#### **Military-Political Guidelines**

The adopted document, unlike in the 1999 draft, contains no description of two trends in the world development - the formation of the unipolar and multi-polar world. This paragraph from the 1999 draft was incorporated practically in full in the *Concept of National Security* approved by Vladimir Putin in January 2000.

The list of 'the key features of the military-political situation' contains among other things the following factors:

- 'the decreasing threat of waging a large-scale war, including nuclear war';
- 'the increasing regional arms race';
- 'the proliferation of nuclear arms and other types of WMD and their delivery systems';
- 'the exacerbating information rivalry'.

Among the main factors destabilizing the military-political situation, the doctrine mentions 'the violation of international treaties and agreements in the area of arms limitation and disarmament' and the attempts to weaken or ignore 'the existing mechanisms for maintaining international security (above all, the UN and the OSCE)'.

Analyzing 'the major threats to military security', the doctrine emphasizes that the 'threat of direct military aggression against the Russian Federation and its allies in its traditional forms has diminished, thanks to the positive changes in the international situation, to pursuing an active peaceful foreign policy course by our country, and to maintaining a sufficient level of Russian military might, above all the potential for nuclear deterrence.'

When there is little probability of direct aggression, including nuclear attack, against Russia, 'the major external threats' relating to the nuclear sphere are 'the activities aimed at undermining global and regional stability through interdicting the work of Russian systems of state and military control, systems providing for the normal functioning and combat viability of the strategic nuclear

forces, missile attack early warning, missile defense, controlling outer space, and for the normal functioning of nuclear munitions storage facilities, nuclear energy facilities, nuclear and chemical industry facilities, and other potentially dangerous objects.' So, the external threats originate from the existence of Russian nuclear and strategic facilities, which implies that they may fall the victims of sabotage or other similar activities.

The list of internal threats focuses on terrorism: five out of six named threats relate to terrorism. It is noteworthy that the list of external threats also includes diversion and terrorist activities. Unfortunately, the doctrine doesn't try to correlate in detail all these factors.

The doctrine implies that nuclear arms play an important role in 'providing state military security'. This comes from the following provisions:

- Russia 'preserves its nuclear power status to deter (prevent) aggression against it and its allies';
- 'accurately fulfils international agreements concerning strategic offensive arms and missile defense, and is ready to provide for further reduction of its nuclear arms bilaterally - with the USA - and multilaterally - with other nuclear weapon states - to the minimal levels meeting the requirements of strategic stability';
- 'stands for attributing a universal character to the regime of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, for the dramatic enhancement of the efficiency of this regime, for the stopping and comprehensive banning of tests';
- 'promotes the expansion of confidence-building measures in the military sphere, including mutual exchange of military information, coordination of military doctrines, plans, and military construction, and of military activity' (this provision presumably relates to the nuclear area as well, although the document doesn't specify this).

In comparison to the 1999 draft, the nuclear-related provisions of the doctrine haven't

changed significantly. Somehow, the document states the Russian nuclear policy in a more streamlined way: whereas in the 1999 draft, the provisions concerning nuclear weapons were dispersed throughout the document, most of them are now concentrated in one part of the doctrine - in the subsection entitled "*Maintaining military security*". The substantive amendment to the 1999 draft is the disappearance of the provision stating that Russia stands 'for complete elimination of nuclear arms in the future as an ultimate goal'.

The doctrine reveals some details of the Russian nuclear policy. The document states that Russia must have a potential for nuclear deterrence ensuring 'the infliction of required damage to any aggressor, either a state or a coalition, under any conditions'. The doctrine doesn't mention directly Russia's right to the first use of nuclear weapons. However, the document maintains that 'the Russian Federation keeps the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear arms and other WMD against it or its allies, and in response to a large-scale aggression with the use of conventional arms in situations critical for the national security of the Russian Federation.' In fact, this practically means the declaration of the right to the first use of nuclear weapons. The document continues with the declaration of the negative safeguards regarding non-nuclear weapons states, 'Russia will not use nuclear arms against the NPT member states not possessing nuclear weapons if there is no invasion or any other attack against the Russian Federation, its Armed Forces or other troops, its allies, or against a state, to which it is tied with security commitments, carried out or supported by a non-nuclear weapon state jointly or due to alliance commitments with a nuclear weapon state.'

Taking into account the significance of nuclear weapons, the development and improvement of nuclear deterrence forces is marked as a top-priority for the military construction and military organization of the state.

#### **Military-Strategic Guidelines**

The sections starts with the classification of modern wars, in accordance with three criteria:

- military-political objectives;

- employed combat means (nuclear - with the use of nuclear weapons or other types of WMD; conventional - with the use of conventional arms only);
- scale (local, regional, and global).

The doctrine admits the possibility of world and regional nuclear warfare and argues that a conventional world war 'will be characterized by a high probability of escalating to a nuclear level'. The doctrine suggests that any nuclear conflict, either global or regional, will result from a non-nuclear confrontation. If we combine these provisions with the description of threats this means that Russia doesn't see the danger of direct nuclear aggression and practically rules out the possibility of sudden nuclear attack.

#### **Military-Economic Guidelines**

One of the priority tasks of maintaining military security with military-economic means is to provide for 'the qualitative improvement of the strategic arms complex'. One of the major tracks in this area is 'the implementation of international commitments on reduction and limitation of Armed Forces and arms, as well as on the maintenance of international security and peace.'

Analysis of the approved military doctrine demonstrates that the authors of the document have managed to get rid of the key contradictions of the 1999 draft. The new document has become more laconic, logical and streamlined.

Nonetheless, the problem of homogeneity of the provisions of the military doctrine and the *Concept of National Security* remains. For instance, the formulas of the *Concept* contained in the section "*National security threats*" (in the part relating to the military threats) hardly correspond with the appropriate section of the military doctrine. The *Concept* states in the aforementioned section that 'the aggravation of ethnic relations and *the exacerbation of international relations* generate a wide range of internal and external threats to the national security of the state.' At the same time, the doctrine argues that 'the threat of direct military aggression against the Russian Federation and its allies in its traditional forms has diminished thanks to the *positive changes in the international situation*'.

#### **Analysis**

### **MODERNIZATION OF NUCLEAR ARSENALS: HOW TO SET THE RULES OF THE GAME**

**by Mikhail Vinogradov,  
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**This article was originally published in Russian in *Yaderny Kontrol*, No. 2, Vol. 6, March-April, 2000]**

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The contemporary policy of nuclear-weapon states has a certain ambiguity. On the one hand, the NWS pledged to fulfil their commitments under Article VI of the NPT: to reduce the nuclear arsenals with the ultimate goal of their complete elimination. On the other hand, in the short- and medium-term perspective, only two states - Russia and the USA - actively participate in this process, reducing their nuclear arsenals in accordance with the bilateral agreements on strategic offensive arms and the reciprocal unilateral initiatives in the area of tactical nuclear weapons. However, the pace and the amount of reduction depend on the nuclear deterrence strategy. According to the November 1997 US presidential directive on the general mission and objectives of strategic nuclear forces, the United States will continue to rely on nuclear weapons as a *cornerstone* of national security for an indefinite length of time. The US Senate refusal to ratify the CTBT in October 1999 dispelled the illusions of a future involving a nuclear-free world. This measure in conjunction with the intentions to develop the NMD system may undermine the existing agreements on nuclear arms reduction and cause a new turn in the arms race, covering not only Russia and the USA but other states as well. In the *Concept of National Security*, Russia affirmed the mission of the Armed Forces to provide nuclear deterrence to prevent nuclear and large-scale or regional conventional war.

If the process of nuclear arms reduction continues (or even if a new arms race begins), it will be necessary to find the correct approach to solve one of the important military-technical problems: namely, to define permitted and outlawed ways of carrying out the modernization of existing nuclear arsenals and of developing new nuclear munitions.

In the next few years, the Russian MOD plans to invest up to 28% of all funds appropriated for the acquisition of arms into the radical modernization of the strategic nuclear forces. The modernization of land-based missiles (mobile and silo-launched) is under way. High-yield liquid-fuel MIRVed missiles are being replaced with single-warhead Topol modifications. To modernize the naval forces, in 1996, the construction of the Yury Dolgoruky nuclear-powered submarine started in Severodvinsk; the submarine will presumably be armed with a solid-fuel missile system. A new generation of air-launched cruise missiles with a range of up to 5,500 km has been developed for heavy bombers. All this will help to ensure effective deterrence and to maintain Russia's security while the quantitative parameters of the Russian SNF are decreasing.

In accordance with the memorandum on nuclear weapons stockpiles signed by President Clinton in February 1996, the USA is implementing a long-term plan (until 2002-2006) to manufacture the nuclear arms components. Among other measures, the plan envisages to perform 13 modernization programs for the existing nuclear munitions by 2001. In most cases, the modernization is being carried out to enhance nuclear safety. The advisability of this work is not in question. However, some other activities are aimed at upgrading the qualitative characteristics of certain munitions. For instance, the Sandia National Laboratory upgrades B-61 air bombs to replace B-53. The bomb is capable of penetrating the ground and going several meters down before explosion. It can be used to destroy the well-protected underground facilities such as silo launchers, command and communication centers, etc. This measure means an increase in the counter-force potential and hence, the

possibility of employing the bomb with aggressive intentions, making the first pre-emptive strike to disarm the enemy.

Another important direction is the work to develop new types of nuclear munitions. According to some sources of information, the US DOE on the request of the US Space Command and the US Strategic Command conducted research on the so-called *frequency* munitions. The major effect of this device is selectively amplified electromagnetic pulse. If the weapon detonates at a height of 50-100 km, a high-intensity pulse is capable of disrupting the work of any electronic equipment within a 1,000-km area. The R&D activities were reportedly postponed but the intention to develop a weapon for the first *dazzling* strike speaks for itself.

The CTBT embodied great hopes for limiting the development capabilities and qualitative modernization of nuclear munitions. Nonetheless, some experts believe that the treaty contains certain reservations, which should be clarified in the process of ratification. One of the shortcomings is the lack of an agreed definition for permitted and banned types of thermonuclear research, including the inertial confinement of deuterium-tritium mixture with a laser beam.

The importance of this issue and the need for a multilateral consensus on permitting or prohibiting such experiments results from the fact that upon submitting the CTBT for ratification to the Senate, the US administration declared its understanding that the activities not covered by the treaty comprised inertial thermonuclear and similar experiments. Nowadays, the inertial laser and beam thermonuclear research is conducted in a number of non-nuclear weapon states, e.g. Germany. Upon signing the CTBT, Germany stated that the provisions of this treaty should be implemented to avoid hampering the research on nuclear fusion.

Another area of developing new advanced nuclear munitions is the use of modeling. For instance, since 1995, the DOE Office of Defense Programs has reportedly been implementing the "*Science-Based Stockpile*

*Stewardship*" program. The aim of this project is to develop a complicated computer modeling system to replace nuclear tests and to conduct virtual tests, as part of the long-term strategy to make nuclear weapons development based on modeling rather than tests. To succeed in this area, the USA needs supercomputers and different technological equipment to conduct the experiments, as well as the classified archives from previous physical tests, which can be used to assess the results of the micro-scale experiments. According to the five-year plan, a supercomputer center will be set up, capable of performing one thousand billion operations per second. In the beginning of the XXI century, the world's most powerful laser system to imitate nuclear tests will start working. It is the so-called National Ignition Facility, whose declared mission is to conduct research to ensure the safety of nuclear weapons. However, according to some experts, the system will carry out the development of principally new types of weapons and assess the new physical principles required to design nuclear weapons.

Russia plans to implement the activities to maintain its nuclear arsenal, without violating the CTBT provisions. Russia will fulfil the federal program for that purpose and makes every effort to catch up in the area of computer modeling. For instance, the joint Russian-Indian center for computer research has been established, equipped with the Indian supercomputer - PARAM-10000 - capable of performing 100 billion operations a second. Another example is the establishment on November 5, 1999, of the Inter-Agency Supercomputer Center (ISC) at the Russian Academy of Sciences. At present, the ISC has a 16-processor system U2250 made by *Hewlett Packard* with 15 billion operations per second. Along with this system, the ISC possesses a 96-processor modification of the Russian-made MVS-1000 system developed by the Scientific-Research Institute *Kvant* (Quantum). The total capacity of all systems in the Center amounts to 230 billion operations per second. In accordance with the federal program, Russia will maintain the scientific and technological potential and high professional level of the

scientists, designers and employees of the Russian nuclear centers. At Novaya Zemlya, the defense experiments are under way and the test site is ready for conducting nuclear tests. However, it was emphasized that such tests may take place only if any nuclear-weapon state withdraws from the CTBT. As far as experiments are concerned, the series of non-nuclear (hydrodynamic or sub-critical) explosions were conducted in the Matochkin Shar Strait, using the dummy nuclear explosive devices. The total yield of explosions didn't exceed 10 kg of TNT. The tests were conducted to verify the level of safety of the existing nuclear arsenal, to check the efficiency of additional measures to enhance the safety and reliability of previously developed nuclear munitions and to study the possibility of extending their service life. The results of the experiments are being used to modernize the existing nuclear munitions. This process will cover mainly the mechanical and electronic assemblies of the devices and chemical explosives. They will be replaced with components made of modern and technically perfect materials. The assembly containing fissile material will remain the same, since its further modernization is senseless.

Work to modernize the nuclear arsenal is under way in other NWS. Great Britain is arming the Navy with new *Vanguard*-type SSBNs equipped with Trident II SLBMs. In the framework of modernization of national nuclear forces, a research center is developing a new generation of warheads for these SLBMs. The UK appropriated 1.35 billion pounds for that purpose. The declared goal is to replace the out-of-date warheads, which have no reliable systems of control against accidental launches. These activities are similar to those of the USA, which also replaces the nuclear warheads mounted on Trident SLBMs.

France is constructing new *Triomphant*-type SSBNs with M-45 and M-5 ballistic missiles. France, like the USA, pays much attention to computer modeling in the area of nuclear weapons. In October 1993, it started the implementation of the program "*Preparation for limiting nuclear tests*", which is aimed at replacing natural nuclear tests with

mathematical modeling of nuclear explosion (with new software and parallel data processing) and physical modeling (with the help of lasers and X-ray sources). According to the French Committee on National Defense and Armed Forces, this program is designated for verifying the quality and safety of operational munitions without huge energy-releasing tests. According to some estimates, the financing of the program amounts to \$2 billion.

China allocated \$9.6 billion to build up and modernize its nuclear might. The program of modernization will presumably be aimed at developing new types of MIRVed missiles and decreasing the size and weight of warheads. In August 1999, at one of the test ranges, China launched for the first time a mobile DF-31 ICBM. The next in the list is a DF-41 missile, the second type of solid-fuel MIRVed missile. The laboratory computer tests of this missile have recently been successfully completed. China strives to develop the naval component - Beijing is rearming the *Xia*-type nuclear-powered submarines with new missiles with extended range (8,000 km) and increased precision. According to former Director of the Information Department of the China's State Council Qian Qichen, China has developed the technology for production of neutron bombs, mini-nukes and micro-nukes.

The Indian and Pakistani leadership also intends to improve their nuclear forces. The information available to experts proves that Indian specialists have achieved significant progress in developing nuclear munitions with a yield not exceeding 1 kiloton, neutron and thermonuclear munitions with a controlled yield. However, India, as well as Pakistan, lacks the statistical data, which can be obtained from natural tests. It is important to prevent such data from being transferred to the two states, and to make this restriction legally binding.

The conclusion is that the modernization programs, which are currently being implemented in the NWS, will enable these states to maintain advanced weapons on active duty until 2020-2025 without substantive additional expenditure.

However, the character of these programs is sometimes doubtful from the point of global, regional and national security.

The large scale of modernization of existing nuclear weapons and the development of new launchers and warheads in different countries, which is not covered by international verification mechanisms and may pose a threat of destabilization and insecurity at the regional and global levels, make us speak about the advisability of taking efficient measures to curb these activities. Taking into account the complicated character of the matter, which affects the national interests of the participants and the area of state secrets, the task of laying down a plan that would be universally acceptable is quite difficult. The solution may be found on several levels involving various different parties. Today it is impossible to organize negotiations involving all NWS together, both officially recognized and *de facto* nuclear powers. Russian experts believe that the process should start bilaterally between Russia and the United States, who both have considerable experience in talks and unprecedented achievements in transparency in the sensitive area of nuclear arms reduction.

In the process of negotiating START III, it is reasonable to move from simple to more complicated issues. Firstly, the parties may analyze how well the START I and START II provisions, which place restrictions on modernization and the invention of new launchers, meet with modern requirements, and state in the new treaty the positions of the parties on the extension or amendments to the existing documents. As far as definitions of permitted and prohibited activities are concerned, START III should preferably reflect the agreed positions of the parties. Taking into account that the thorough analysis of this problem may take much time (a lesson drawn from the work to specify some provisions of START I), this may impede the conclusion of START III at the earliest possible date. Hence, the parties may fix the principal approaches to this kind of work and their commitment to finish the elaboration of a separate agreement on this

matter, which shall be the integral part of START III.

The document should provide for the limitations on the types of works, e.g. ban on developing devices initiating other assemblies rather than nuclear primer. Unlike fissile material, which is difficult to acquire or produce, a *pure* thermonuclear charge can be fuelled with the hydrogen isotope easily extracted from water. This is why the development of technology to produce fusion weapons at such plants as the National Ignition Facility in the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory should be prohibited.

One may presume that it will be difficult to determine the measures of reciprocal verification of permitted activities and the ways of preventing outlawed work. If such US-Russian agreement appears, this will be a leap forward in strengthening international security.

It is worth remembering that the situation with the 1972 ABM Treaty may hamper this process, although, according to the latest news, the USA is ready to introduce some changes in its position.

In the conditions of scientific and technological progress, mankind may find itself facing the challenge of completely new weapons, which could have characteristics similar to WMD. According to the existing classification, WMD include nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. The current international agreements on prohibiting the development, production and eliminating the stockpiles of CW and BW, and on dramatic nuclear arms reduction demonstrate the willingness of the world community to get rid of WMD and remove the threat of their use. This trend will be strengthened and become irreversible if the hopes for the agreement on limiting the dangerous methods of nuclear weapons modernization are realized. However, so far, there is no treaty banning the development and production of principally new types of weapons, whose effects differ from classical WMD effects, although the world community should move to block progress in this area.

## Review

### DEALING WITH COLD WAR NUCLEAR LEGACY: RUSSIAN PERSPECTIVE

by **Roland Timerbaev,**  
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*Abridged version*

The Cold War has left us a huge nuclear legacy which poses great proliferation risks and places on the humankind an enormous financial burden. Billions that were spent on nuclear weapons will have to be matched now by countless sums of money to be allocated for safe management, reduction and disposition of this legacy.

In addition, many countries have accumulated unwarranted amounts of excess fissile material, in particular separated civil plutonium.

#### **Plutonium Inventory**

Since World War II some 1,200 metric tons of plutonium have been produced in nuclear reactors. Of those 1,200 tons over 250 are weapon-grade plutonium. And of these Russia possesses up to 150 tons, United States - 85 tons, United Kingdom - 7.6, France - 6-7, China - 1.7-2.8 tons, Israel - 300-500 kg, India - 150-250 kg (estimates by the US Department of Energy).

One should also note that more than 200 tons of civil plutonium have been separated. France has accumulated some 70 tons of civil plutonium, Britain - 50, Russia - 30, Japan - 21, Germany - 17, United States - 14.5, Argentina - 6, India - 1 ton, etc. (estimates by US DOE).

#### **Highly Enriched Uranium**

In 1994, the inventory of Russian HEU was estimated at 1,270 tons. In 1993, Russia and the United States concluded a contract for the sale of 500 tons of Russian HEU after it is downblended. The contract is for 20 years and would amount to \$12 billion.

According to US Government Accounting Office, by December 31, 1998, the United States received 1,487 tons of LEU which was downblended from 51 tons of weapon-grade uranium. Russia received \$940,000 for the supply of this uranium.

Since the *United States Enrichment Corporation* (USEC) was privatized there have been continuous problems with the Russian-American uranium deal. US Congress ended last year's session without giving financial help to the USEC. The company was asking the government to make up the difference between the price it can get for diluted HEU and the price its contract requires it to pay to Russia - about \$200 million.

#### **Russia's Nuclear Weapon Arsenal**

According to estimates by some independent Russian experts, the Russian arsenal was downsized since late 1980s to present day from 30,000 to 14,000 warheads. It is expected that, irrespective of START II or START III, the number of strategic and tactical warheads may go down to 5,500 by 2003 and to 3,500 by 2007.

The US operational arsenal was reduced since 1985 from 23,000 to 9,600 strategic and tactical warheads.

#### **Russia's Nuclear Weapon Complex**

At the height of the Cold War it consisted of over 20 major facilities, most important of them spread among ten closed nuclear cities, which could produce 3,000-4,000 warheads per year. Now this complex consists of 17 facilities, with a total employment of about 130,000 (of which 75,000 personnel are part of the defense program).

Russia has halted production of HEU and plutonium for weapons purposes in 1988 and 1994, respectively, and has put three cities out of the defense program altogether. Warhead production is less than one tenth of Cold War levels. There is a large-scale warhead dismantlement effort underway (about 1,500 warheads are dismantled annually), and defense research has declined. Employment in nuclear weapons laboratories has contracted to one-third of the Cold War levels.

Despite these changes, Russia still maintains twice as many nuclear facilities and four times as many defense program personnel than the United States.

The Minatom's 1998 program for nuclear complex restructuring and conversion called for ending warhead production at two of four facilities by 2000, halting warhead dismantlement at two facilities by 2003, and consolidating HEU/Pu component manufacturing at one site. By the 2004, the plan called for a reduction in the number of defense program personnel in all closed cities to 40,000, and a reduction at the serial production complex from 40,000 to 15,000 workers. However, even after the plan is implemented the complex would likely have a capacity to manufacture 1,000-2,000 warheads per year. Actual production now amounts to about 200-300 warheads per year, the same as in the United States.

#### **Russian Policy *Vis-a-Vis* Plutonium Disposition**

In 1998, Minatom adopted *Russian Federation's Concept of Managing Weapon-Origin Plutonium Released as a Result of Nuclear Disarmament*, which set the goal of its use for energy purposes in nuclear reactors. Plutonium immobilization could be considered only for radioactive waste containing plutonium.

President Yeltsin declared that up to 50 tons of weapon-origin plutonium would be released from defense program. Similar statement was made by the President of the United States. Present American plans provide for two methods for disposing of surplus plutonium: approximately 17 metric tons will be immobilized in ceramic material surrounded by vitrified high-level waste and up to 33 metric tons will be irradiated as MOX fuel in reactors.

#### **Plans of Using MOX Fuel**

Russia is planning the use of MOX fuel for burning plutonium. Due to scarcity of funds these plans, however, develop very slowly.

There is a joint US-Russian-Canadian project called *Parallex* to burn over one hundred grams of Russian Pu and over one hundred

grams of American Pu in mixed oxide fuel in the experimental CANDU reactor at Chalk River. It is envisaged that the experiment may lead to the burning of substantial amounts of plutonium from dismantled nuclear weapons in Russia and the United States. The shipment of US plutonium to Canada was completed early this year.

#### **Storage of Fissile Material**

In view of the existence in nuclear-weapon-states of large amounts of excess weapon-origin fissile material there is a need for creating reliable and environmentally safe long-term storage facilities.

In Russia, under agreement between the United States and Russia signed in June 1992, a Fissile Material Storage Facility is being built at Ozersk, Chelyabinsk Region. The cost of construction is covered by both sides on the basis of parity: 50% by Russia and 50% by the United States. The US share would amount to \$412,5 million which would include containers for storing plutonium. The first stage of the FMSF is to be completed in February 2002.

#### **Proposals for Regional Management of Spent Fuel and High Level Waste**

Several proposals have surfaced recently for the establishment in Russia of facilities either to store on an interim basis or to dispose of 'permanently' the spent nuclear fuel from nuclear power programs of such countries as Japan, Republic of Korea, Switzerland, and Taiwan. The authors of these proposals advocate that the profits from such a facility could help finance the upgrading of physical protection measures and the disposition of excess plutonium from the Russian nuclear weapons program and civilian nuclear energy program.

Such proposals, however, run counter to the present Russian national legislation, specifically, the 1991 *Law on the Protection of Environment* which bans import into the Russian Federation and storage of radioactive waste. Minatom has been intensively lobbying for the introduction of amendments that would change the existing legislation. Minatom's main interest appears to be in constructing a second reprocessing

facility at Krasnoyarsk-26 and providing storage and reprocessing services to other countries. The last State Duma did not adopt the amendments, and it is not yet clear what might be the attitude of the majority of the new Duma elected last December. Russian environmentalists have been mounting a strong campaign against any change in the legislation.

It is also questionable whether the establishment in Russia of an international waste storage would be acceptable to many officials and legislators in the United States, since much of the spent fuel in Japan, South Korea and Taiwan is of US origin, that is, enriched by the United States.

Russian Minatom and US DOE are now jointly preparing a white paper on the subject of storage of radioactive waste and its management in Russia.

#### **Transparency of Weapon-Origin Material**

In September 1996, the Russian Minister of Minatom, US Secretary of Energy and Director General of the IAEA initiated a discussion of practical measures concerning IAEA verification of weapon-origin fissile material. With this initiative Russia and the United States confirmed their interest in international verification of the irreversible removal of fissile material from their respective weapons programs.

A joint working group established under the trilateral initiative has been investigating technical, legal and financial issues associated with IAEA verification. Special technical provisions are being developed that will allow the states to submit dismantled nuclear weapon components or other classified forms of fissile material, with assurance that Agency inspectors would not gain access to information relating to the design or manufacture of such weapons. Since verification arrangements should be in conformity with the commitments of the two states under Article I of the NPT, a new technology known as 'information barriers' was developed which is designed to allow the inspectors to derive sufficient information for the verification to be credible and independent, while preventing access to classified information.

The two facilities to be covered by the trilateral initiative are the *Mayak* Fissile Material Storage Facility, located at Ozersk, and the K-Area Material Storage Facility, located at the Savannah River Site.

A work program for 2000 is aimed at the adoption of basic technical measures associated with the verification of fissile material covered by the initiative and approval of an appropriate model verification agreement by the IAEA Board of Governors. The model verification agreement being developed may also be used by other NPT nuclear-weapon states for international verification of fissile material in conjunction with future arms control measures.

#### **FMCT**

The actions by the two nuclear-weapon states described above are certainly not sufficient. The most effective and realistic way to mitigate the aftermath of the Cold War build up of nuclear weapon arsenals and to make irreversible the present trend of rolling back the nuclear legacy is to conclude an international treaty to cut-off future production of fissile material for weapons purposes. Another significant reason is the need to stop the arms race among the countries with recently acquired nuclear capabilities (Israel, India and Pakistan).

In 1993, the UN General Assembly endorsed by consensus a request to the Conference on Disarmament (CD) to negotiate a FMCT that was 'non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable,' and in 1998 CD agreed on a negotiating mandate for an FMCT ad hoc committee. However, the committee has not yet met due to many differences among CD members. The last UN General Assembly even failed to adopt a resolution submitted by Canada with a large number of co-sponsors which would back CD negotiations on FMCT. The draft resolution was withdrawn by Canada since it would lose the UN consensus obtained in 1998 on a similar resolution. One of the main reason was China's insistence to include a call for CD negotiations to be part of a comprehensive CD work program, including a subsidiary body on outer space issues.

Under the circumstances, the international community should pull up every effort to start FMCT negotiations as promptly as possible.

### **Commentary**

#### **NEW NONPROLIFERATION CHALLENGES AND THE NUCLEAR SUPPLIERS GROUP**

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**[This article was originally published in Russian in *Yaderny Kontrol*, No. 3, Vol. 6, May-June, 2000]**

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*Abridged version*

The prospects of international cooperation in the area of nuclear export controls are closely connected with the problems of WMD nonproliferation and the nonproliferation of missile delivery systems, which have become the top-priority issues in world politics. The situation in this area will be crucial for the fate of the world and for global security, will affect the process of maintaining international stability and the process of control over the strategic arms and disarmament. In the recent years, new trends and new challenges in this area have emerged.

We do not pretend to offer a comprehensive analysis of the situation but have to emphasize that the nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan meant a fundamentally new situation for nuclear nonproliferation. The reaction of the world community to these events is well known: the P-5 and G-8 foreign minister held meetings concerning these nuclear tests and issued joint communiques; on June 6, 1998, the UN Security Council passed Resolution No. 1172 on the problem.

These documents lay the foundation of the further endeavors aimed at strengthening the nuclear nonproliferation regime, peace and stability in South Asia.

Intensive efforts are being made at the bilateral level, within the P-5 and other multilateral mechanisms, including the Task Force on Indian-Pakistani nuclear tests, to encourage New Delhi and Islamabad to review their attitude towards the nuclear issues, to adhere to the nonproliferation regime, to sign the CTBT without any conditions and to accede to the NPT as non-nuclear weapon states.

The positive shifts in the positions of India and Pakistan, i.e. the statements of their leaders about signing the CTBT and participating in the FMCT negotiations in Geneva, leave some room for optimism. Let's hope that this commitment won't be weakened by the US Senate's refusal to ratify the CTBT. It is important that the aforementioned intentions of the two states in the area of nuclear nonproliferation were complemented with the establishment of strict national export control mechanisms.

The other problem concerns the implementation of the NPT. The problem of fulfilling the resolution on the Middle East passed by the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference was one of the key issues at the 1997-1999 PrepCom meetings. The US reluctance to promote the implementation of this resolution and Washington's willingness to justify the Israeli non-adherence to the NPT may have a negative impact on the prospects on the international nuclear nonproliferation regime on the whole. Besides, it is necessary to take into account the position of the NAM states, above all the Arab countries, which link the implementation of the resolution with the prospects of the NPT.

Another factor to bear in mind, when we speak about the cooperation in the area of export controls, is the complicated interdependence of the export controls, nonproliferation, and disarmament. It is known that the existing multilateral and bilateral agreements form a single international legal basis in this sphere. The NPT, which is the cornerstone of nuclear nonproliferation contributing to international stability and security, has a significant disarmament orientation. The need to keep momentum in the area of strategic offensive arms reduction, which so far involves only Russia and the USA, is an important contribution to strengthening the

nonproliferation regime and is indispensable for the expansion and strengthening of the NPT. In its turn, the disarmament process is based on the US-Russian ABM Treaty. In other words, in the modern interdependent world any arbitrary moves breaching the missile defense agreements may have some serious consequences for the nonproliferation regime, which will negate any cooperation in the area of export controls.

Obviously, the missile proliferation challenges require an appropriate international response. None of the countries, including Russia, would like to have its national security interests infringed. Here in Moscow we are sure that the solution to this problem should be based on the multilateral political-diplomatic efforts and not on any military countermeasures. Russia's initiative on establishing a global system of control over missile and missile technology proliferation offers a new constructive alternative to the unilateral attempts to develop the national missile defense, which are fraught with pernicious consequences for nuclear nonproliferation.

The prevention of the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and missile delivery systems has become one of the most important factors for maintaining international stability and, hence, a priority for the national security policy of many states, including Russia. In recent years, Russia and the USA have taken steps to reduce the global nuclear threat and to ensure control over advanced sensitive technologies. In accordance with the US-Russian bilateral commitments, the two states have deactivated more than 18,000 strategic and tactical nuclear warheads, agreed to withdraw some 50 tons of plutonium each from their nuclear weapons program and to reprocess it in a way that will prevent its further use in the nuclear weapons.

The global process of nuclear arms reduction and the transformation from confrontation to constructive economic cooperation (though these trends are complicated and are still developing) are impeded to a certain extent by the striving of some states to possess WMD, especially nuclear weapons. There is a growing danger of unauthorized transfer of nuclear technologies and knowledge, the menace of WMD development and use by international terrorist groups, which is fraught with security challenges at the global and regional levels.

These threats should be eliminated, and this requires the concerted efforts of all states, above all the suppliers and importers of nuclear products.

There are two intertwined tasks, which are stated in the NPT: firstly, to strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation regime; secondly, to promote international cooperation in the area of peaceful energy uses.

In this context, the Nuclear Suppliers Group has become an essential mechanism of control over nuclear export. We presume that the activities of the group, spanning a quarter of a century, have contributed to strengthening the nuclear nonproliferation regime, which eventually met the interests of global and regional stability.

We believe that the NSG should not be regarded as an elite club of developed states, whose activities are aimed at limiting the access of other states to the advanced technologies. The NSG members maintain their relations on an equal and non-discriminative basis and do not hamper the mutually beneficial cooperation in the area of peaceful nuclear energy uses.

In this connection, it is noteworthy that the NSG enables the world community to control the sensitive export at a national level and to make it comply with the agreed and recognized criteria and rules, although the group is not a prohibitive mechanism. Thus, the NSG enables the state parties to participate actively in laying down the rules and norms of civilized behavior on the world commodity markets.

It is necessary to make sure that this export control regime remains non-discriminatory, so that the activities of the NSG may correspond with its principal objectives and are not aimed against any state. The idea is not to start confrontation, but to initiate dialogue with non-partners.

The transparency of the NSG activities was enhanced by the international seminars on export controls organized by the group. In fact, informal meetings between the nuclear suppliers and the importers began, which contributed to the correct understanding of the group's mission and objectives, to the accumulation of its experience and achievements in the area of export controls.

These seminars should not be regarded as meetings between *teachers* and *students*, *technology haves* and *technology have-nots*. This approach would erect an invisible but tangible barrier between the NSG and non-partners, ensuring the privileged position of the former. This should not be allowed to happen, since this would hamper the accomplishment of the group's primary mission - the enhancement of international cooperation to the benefit of nonproliferation and the safe development of the nuclear energy sector.

The need for such cooperation is increased by the emergence of new challenges and problems, which require the joint efforts of many states.

For instance, there is a problem of *intangible* technology transfer implying that the technology drain takes the form of education, training, scientific exchanges and the transfer via electronic communication means. This issue is quite new and, hence, has only recently entered into the discussions on international export controls. The discussions within the NSG demonstrated how difficult it was to control the *intangible* transfer of sensitive technologies at the national level, even with the means available to the developed states. Russia and other states parties to the NSG are taking steps to enhance the control over the transfer of knowledge, scientific-technical information and services, which can be used to develop the WMD. However, it is obvious that without constructive assistance and cooperation on the part of nuclear importers it will be impossible to impede the unauthorized leakage of sensitive information.

This is only one of the areas for possible and necessary cooperation.

In our opinion, nowadays, taking into account the character of the emerging problems, it is useful to promote extensive and open dialogue on the problems of nuclear export, including the establishment of a diversified structure of cooperation between the exporters and importers of nuclear technologies and material. When we speak about these contacts, we mean two-way channels of communication, so that the NSG may inform the world about its decisions and activities and the importers may formulate their concerns about the nuclear export control issues and somehow influence the NSG decisions.

The expansion of cooperation with the non-partners may be useful from the point of inflow of new ideas and views, which would contribute to the timely and comprehensive solution of all topical problems. It is sensible and informative to know the opinions which the nuclear importers hold of the NSG guidelines and trigger lists, which can be taken into consideration in the process of amending these documents.

Thus, we believe that there is a good chance of increasing the NSG transparency and enhancing its cooperation with the non-partners. The formalization of this process would, in the future, require the establishment of a sort of "NSG Friendship Club", comprising the importers which collaborate with the group and back its guidelines and whose export control system complies with the NSG requirements.

It would be nice if as many non-partners as possible acted in conformity with the NSG principles and requirements. But it would make sense if those states, which officially commit to these guidelines and implement them, were to get their *carrot* in the form of easier and wider access to the peaceful nuclear energy technologies, including dual-use technologies. The cooperation with non-partners may develop at the global, regional and bilateral level. Hence, it would be useful to continue the practice of convening international seminars on export controls and to make them a constantly working forum for maintaining contact with the non-partners. Besides, the regional approach can be applied - seminars may be organized specially for the South Asian nations or the states of the Middle East. Along with the inter-governmental ties it would be important to encourage cooperation in the private sector to assist in the development of intra-firm export control mechanisms.

Thus, the nuclear nonproliferation faces serious tests. If these challenges are to be successfully overcome, it will depend mostly on the political will, realism and responsibility of all states regardless of their participation or non-participation in the NSG. Their interaction will enable the world to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to preserve the opportunity for cooperation in the area of peaceful nuclear energy uses.

## Viewpoint

### THE US-RUSSIAN NONPROLIFERATION DIALOGUE: THE IRANIAN FACTOR AND EXPORT CONTROL COOPERATION

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[This article was originally published in Russian in *Yaderny Kontrol*, No. 3, Vol. 6, May-June, 2000]

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In the last few years, nonproliferation problems have been a significant element of the US-Russian dialogue. Export control issues are especially important. Export controls are defined as the combination of practical national and multilateral measures aimed at efficiently hampering the proliferation of WMD and missile delivery systems. These matters have become one of the most important tracks of the US-Russian negotiations, including the top-level talks. And there is an objective rationale for that.

The Russian Federation and the United States of America are equally interested in strengthening the nonproliferation regime. The emergence of new states possessing nuclear, chemical, biological weapons or ballistic missiles, meets neither Russian nor US national interests. The Russian leadership has reiterated this position many times during meetings between the foreign ministries.

Russia takes every possible effort inside the country and on the international arena to pursue this course, which is demonstrated by the measures to develop the national export control system and by the active interaction with foreign partners in this area.

At the same time, it would be an exaggeration to say that the US-Russian relationship in this sphere is smooth. Particular differences focus on the topic of the alleged Russian missile and nuclear technology *drain* to Iran, which - in the eyes of the USA - contributes to the implementation of Tehran's nuclear weapons program. The polemics and speculations about this drain are accompanied with official steps and specific actions implemented by the Clinton administration, which take the form of trade sanctions against the Russian organizations and enterprises arbitrarily accused of illicit contacts with Iran.

We know the uncompromising attitude towards Iran existing in the US political circles, which is reflected in a number of laws, presidential directives and foreign policy strategy. This approach can be felt at the emotional level in the course of discussions with US officials. This position has a decisive impact on the US policy in the dialogue with Russia concerning Iran. The most vivid example is the adoption of a new sanctions bill by the US Senate in February 2000, concerning nonproliferation and Iran and targeted chiefly at the aforementioned Russian organizations.

Unfortunately, this recent step has demonstrated not only the persistent willingness to extend the effects of internal legislation beyond national borders, but also the explicit reluctance to take into account the objective development of the situation with Iran, including the processes under way in this country.

In July 1998, the US administration imposed so-called trade sanctions on the Russian organizations accused of missile cooperation with Iran.

In January 1999, another three institutes were added to this list. Two them - the Scientific Research and Design Institute of Power Technology and the *Mendeleyev* University of Chemical Technology - were allegedly involved in nuclear cooperation with Iran.

Meanwhile, the USA called into question Russia's participation in a number of US-Russian projects in outer space, e.g. the

development of an International Space Station, and nuclear security programs.

Such actions are surprising and raise Russia's concerns about the US policy. They differ sharply from the recent US positive assessment of consecutive steps taken by the Russian leadership to develop export controls; moreover, these US actions restrict cooperation in the general sphere of nonproliferation.

Regretfully, the USA has preferred to remain deaf to the Russian arguments, including the key one - that Russia has never had any governmental missile cooperation with Iran. The investigations of the alleged drain have demonstrated no violations of the state nonproliferation policy, Russia's commitments under the international export control regimes, or the requirements of the domestic legislation in the area of control over sensitive exports.

Even more vague are the US concerns about the Russian-Iranian cooperation in the area of peaceful nuclear energy uses. Russia has confirmed many times that this cooperation complies with Moscow's international nonproliferation obligations. Iran is a fully-fledged State Party to the NPT, its nuclear activities are under the full-scope IAEA safeguards and the Agency has no grievance against Tehran. Besides, there is no information from independent sources proving that Iran has resumed his nuclear weapons program.

The MFA's statement of January 13, 1999, concerning the US sanctions, maintained that the language of sanctions and pressure was unacceptable for Russia, significantly *clouded* the US-Russian relationship and impeded the joint work at resolving many important problems, whose solution was indispensable for both states.

It is noteworthy that the surge of emotion following the January sanctions hasn't yet affected the US-Russian dialogue on nonproliferation and export controls, reflecting the domination of strategic interests of the two countries over the unjustified moves and considerations of the moment.

In this context, the recent intensification of a number of joint space projects can be regarded as a sign of progress and positive shifts in the US-Russian relationship.

It is worth analyzing briefly the US policy of unilateral economic sanctions as an instrument to affect international affairs.

One remembers the Western Cold War policy of sanctions and strict export controls over the supplies of military-related or dual-use high-tech products to the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc. The main mechanism to pursue this policy for nearly 50 years was the notorious COCOM.

After the demise of the Soviet Union, the establishment of the CIS and the emergence of a new democratic Russia, the situation was favorable for the development of a US-Russian strategic partnership in maintaining international security. Such partnership paved the way for uniting the states willing to put an end to the proliferation of WMD and missile delivery systems within multilateral export control regimes.

Russia and the USA set up a united front with other members of the international community within the UN Security Council to work out the collective enforcement measures, e.g. towards such states as Iraq and Libya.

At the same time, in the 1990s, we witnessed the intensified US endeavors to use unilateral economic sanctions against the states, whose actions or political practice breach, in the opinion of Washington, the significant norms of international behavior - i.e. human rights or nonproliferation principles - or jeopardize the US national interests. This position is not only opposed by Russia, but also lacks the support of even America's close allies.

The concerns are caused not only by attempts, closely connected with the sanctions, to promote the ex-territorial application of US legislation. This practice runs counter to the fundamental principles of international law. It has led some Western nations, including Great Britain, to pass special legislation to protect its economic interests.

The outright policy of double standards raises even more questions, since different states are *punished* differently for the same international or domestic *faults*. This has resulted in the emergence of a group of *pariah* states.

One should also bear in mind the growing influence of internal political struggle and lobbyist activities on the US policy in this area.

The economic effect of the unilateral sanctions is doubtful, especially given the rapid globalization of the world economy. As a rule, the state under sanctions succeeds in finding ways to circumvent them and to obtain access to the required goods and technologies. One should remember that the sanctions are a double-edged tool: they inflict certain damage on the state imposing them and strengthen the position of business rivals from other countries, who do not join the regime of sanctions.

In our opinion, the economic sanctions achieve their goals only if they are imposed on a multilateral basis in accordance with a UN Security Council decision. Obviously, they should be the last resort for the international community wishing to punish a particular state.

Russia is interested in developing a modern export controls system for sensitive goods and technologies; this interest results from a number of political, economic and military factors and from Russia's strategy and role on the international arena as a permanent member of the UN Security Council. Evidently, the export controls become one of the foreign policy priorities of the Russian leadership.

Nowadays, export controls have become the promising area of international cooperation to maintain global and regional peace. Hence, the export control issues play an important part in Russia's relations with the states that have extensive experience in this sphere. The trusting dialogue with the USA in this delicate area (delicate, because key national interests are affected) emerged due to the existence of common approaches to nonproliferation, equal partnership and a mutual respect of rights and interests in the sphere of security.

For Russia, another motive for such cooperation was obviously the practical interest in studying the rich experience, legal basis and everyday activities of the US federal authorities in this area, in order to apply the acquired knowledge

to address the problems of developing the Russian export controls.

At present, Russia's legal and organizational basis in the field of export controls is not ideal. However, any expert will prove that no country has an ideal system of export controls, even the USA. Russia realizes the emerging problems and takes deliberate measures to improve the whole export control system, beginning from the intra-firm control at an enterprise and extending right up to the level of federal executive bodies.

Naturally, we are not merely copying the foreign patterns: this would not be a fruitful course of action, and would lead us to a dead-end. The foreign experience bears fruit only if it is adapted to the realities and capabilities of the state and takes into account its existing positive legacy.

A new Federal Law "On Export Controls" gives a qualitatively new impetus to the improvement of the export control system in Russia. The law entered into force in July 1999 and, according to experts, including Western specialists, it meets all requirements and creates additional significant judicial and organizational prerequisites for the further advancement of all stages of the export control system in Russia.

An important step was the commitment provided for in the *Joint Statement by Presidents of the USA and Russia on Common Security Challenges at the Threshold of the XXI Century* signed on September 2, 1998. The two states pledged to develop cooperation in the area of export controls, which was hailed as the essential element for maintaining the nonproliferation regime.

In fact, to strengthen such cooperation, the presidents agreed to establish joint expert groups on export controls in the nuclear sphere, in the area of missile and space technology, on intra-firm and catch-all controls, on control over conventional arms transfers, on legal issues, licensing and customs.

So far, each group has held two to four meetings in Russia and the USA. The problems under discussion were the legal basis for the activities of the state sensitive export control bodies, the licensing practices and procedures, the operational and information support for the export controls, the functions and practical work

of the law-enforcement agencies, and the principles and organization of the intra-firm control.

The results of this work enable us to access the efficiency of such meetings. The groups were useful for the experts of the two states and their activities encouraged regular practical interaction between the Russian and US agencies engaged in the national export controls and between the companies which produce and export the items to be controlled.

In the foreseeable future, the US-Russian expert groups will presumably focus on studying the relations between the industrial sector and the state authorities, on encouraging the high-tech enterprises to comply with the export control requirements, on examining the *intangible* technology transfers. One of the key topics for discussion may become the establishment of intra-firm export control mechanisms as the basic *internal elements* to ensure nonproliferation.

The recent years have demonstrated that the equal business-like interaction in maintaining the international WMD nonproliferation regime, including the endeavors to enhance the efficiency of international and national export control mechanisms, meets the long-term interests of Russia and the USA. On the other hand, any attempts to substitute economic and political pressure for the constructive and concrete dialogue undermine the atmosphere of trust and strategic partnership, which have been created during the past decade.

We would like to believe that the USA will realize the role of the two states in maintaining global stability and security, and will be more cautious in imposing unilateral economic sanctions, including those provided for in the explicitly anti-Russian bill concerning Iran and nonproliferation passed by the Congress. The practical implementation of this law may result in Russia's need to review the whole spectrum of relations with the USA in maintaining international security. Thus, we may find ourselves in the situation of Sisyphus, who was not able to keep the stone on the mountain peak and had to make the long, hard journey from bottom to top, over and over again, pushing his heavy stone in front of him.

Analysis**RUSSIA AND SYRIA: MILITARY-TECHNICAL BARGAINING**

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[This article was originally published in Russian in *Yaderny Kontrol*, No. 3, Vol. 6, May-June, 2000]

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On the Arab market, one's ability to bargain is highly appreciated. Even rich Arabs find it necessary to push prices down (preferably by 150%). The bargaining process is not humiliating in the Arab world. On the contrary, it demonstrates the ability of the bargainer to do business.

This national Arab passion for bargaining is reflected in the Syrian approach to international affairs, including military-technical cooperation.

The Russian-Syrian military-technical cooperation started in 1956. The Soviet Union and then Russia supplied the Syrian Armed Forces with arms and materiel worth \$26-billion, including 65 launchers for tactical and sub-strategic missile systems, about 5,000 tanks, 1,200 aircraft, 4,200 artillery pieces and mortars, 70 warships and other equipment. Russia has trained nearly 9,500 officers for Syria. Nowadays, more than 90% of the Syrian Army is equipped with Soviet- and Russian-made arms.

Since 1991, the military-technical ties with Syria, as well as with the majority of other states, have been practically frozen. The exception was the contract to supply Syria with T-72A tanks in 1992-1993 (approximately \$270 million).

As a result, in 1996, the amount of arms and spare parts supplies to Syria under the *Rosvooruzheniye* contracts was \$1.3 million; in 1997, it decreased to \$1 million. Such a low level of shipments seemed strange, taking

into account the frequent reciprocal visits of the military delegations. The scale of cooperation was not appropriate to the level of mutual expectations and the scale of projects under discussion.

To expand the arms supplies, the parties established an inter-government commission on military-technical cooperation. In December 1996, the commission even approved the terms of payment for furnishing military equipment and rendering technical assistance. In accordance with the agreement, Russia was to provide Syria with a large consignment of AKS-74U and AK-74M rifles and ammunition, 9M117M guided missiles, 9M113 missiles for Konkurs anti-tank missile systems, PG-7VL rockets for RPG-7 rocket launchers, and RPG-29 grenade launchers with night-vision sights. Moreover, Russian experts were to modernize the Syrian T-72 and T-55 tanks and arm them with guided armament systems and systems of protection from anti-tank defense. The protracted negotiations on the acquisition of S-300PMU1 air defense missile systems, Buk-M1 and Tor-M1 air defense missile systems intensified.

However, the Syrian delegations visited not only Russia but also other CIS states. The representative office of the Syrian Army Acquisition Office in Moscow received business offers to supply various arms from middlemen all over the FSU. The analysis of the situation on the market indicated that the prices of *Rosvooruzheniye* were several times higher. The Arab notion of the market laws prevented Syria from accepting such Russian proposals. Syria purchased arms in Byelorussia, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan. The modernization of T-55 tanks, which had been mentioned in the Russian-Syrian plans, was carried out by *Ukroboronservice* (daughter-company of *Ukrspetsexport*) at the Kiev tank-repairing plant. Kiev hopes that Syria's assurance in the quality of Ukrainian work will make Damask modernize 300 T-72 tanks in Ukraine rather in Russia.

The Syrian military have the closest ties with the arms dealers from China and North Korea. For Syria, China has become a

supplier of cheap arms made to Soviet designs.

The military cooperation between Syria and North Korea is under the veil of secrecy. In 1996, the port authorities in Hong Kong seized a \$1.2-million consignment of North Korean weapons designated for Syria. 18 containers were loaded with 603 tons of various weapons, including large-caliber and self-propelled artillery systems. The correlation of weight and value indicates the low price of these weapons.

The missile component of the military cooperation is more substantial. DPRK provided Syria with SCUD-C missile technology; the missiles can be armed with nuclear warheads and have a range of 500 km. Pyongyang was reportedly ready to sell Syria Taepodong-1 missiles with a range of 2,000 km.

Nonetheless, an analysis of the combat capability of the Syrian Army reveals the low military might of its armed forces. Syria acquired the majority of its then-modern arms from the Soviet Union and they are now mostly out-of-date. Even the advanced military equipment purchased in the post-Soviet era has an expired service life and requires repairs. The newest air defense missile system in Syria is 20 years old. The air defense system is inefficient against a high-tech enemy.

Russian specialists have developed software to assess the air defense capabilities of any state. The demo version is based on the modeling of armed conflict between Israel and Syria. The computer shows that if hostilities were to begin, the Syrian air defense system would cease to exist after the first 40 minutes of war.

In January 2000, the Center for Strategic Studies at Tel-Aviv University prepared an annual report on the balance of military forces. The report emphasized the absence of military threat from Syria and concluded that the combat readiness of the Syrian Army was extremely low.

The Pentagon shares this point of view. According to a US military official, even if Syria buys major weapons, this won't pose an immediate serious threat to Israel. In recent years, Syria's general military capabilities have significantly diminished. The hardest blow has been dealt to the Air Force. According to the US DOD official, the number of sorties in the Syrian Air Force decreased by 30% in comparison with the last year. The Syrian pilots have only two-to-four hours of flight time per month and many aircraft remain in their hangars for the lack of spare parts.

Even more tough was the statement by the Turkish Defense Ministry official, who said that in case of war with Syria, the Turkish Army would defeat the Syrian Armed Forces in one day.

As far as the Israeli Armed Forces are concerned, the picture is different. Israel expends ten times more than Syria on modernization of the army. Israel's annual military purchases amount to \$3 billion. Israel's defense industry produces \$4-billion of arms per year. 75% of these arms are exported. The export earnings and technological assistance from the US enable Israel's military science to keep up with the most advanced technological achievements.

Israel is armed with F-15I fighters, UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters, MLRS rocket launchers and high-precision munitions. Israel has developed and commissioned mobile artillery systems, Merkava-3 tanks, new computer artillery fire-control systems, and upgraded helicopters. Israel was the first foreign state to procure high-precision air bombs from the USA.

Israel has recently signed a contract with the USA on supplying the Israeli Air Force with 50 dual-seat F-16I fighter-bomber aircraft (\$2.46 billion). According to the contract, Israel has the option to order another 60 aircraft of this kind before September 2001.

In 2000, Israel will deploy the Arrow missile defense system, which has been developed in close cooperation with the USA.

Estimating the balance of power in the region, one can state that Israel possesses

overwhelming military superiority. To equalize the balance of power, the Syrian Armed Forces would require repairs, modernization and a large-scale acquisition of arms.

Does Syria have sufficient financial resources? A Pentagon official believes that Syria has obtained limited funding from Iran or Saudi Arabia. According to him, Iran and Syria strive to strengthen their strategic cooperation. Nonetheless, the capabilities of Iran in providing financial assistance are quite limited.

Israeli analysts and military sources have argued that Syria received \$350 million from Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf states as a loan. The money was meant for the acquisition of new military equipment. This funding would be enough to pay for S-300 air defense missile systems and vitally important spare parts for 1,500 T-72 tanks.

Other sources informed that in 1998, Saudi Arabia agreed to pay for the Russian arms supplies to Syria (\$2 billion). At that time, this was accepted as fact and the newspapers spoke about the resumption of Russian-Syrian military cooperation after a 10-year break.

The financial aspects of the problem were the most difficult issues for Moscow. Syria refused to recognize its \$11 billion debt to Russia and proposed to review its amount and to postpone the reimbursement for an indefinite term. Syria's position was quite reasonable - the Soviet arms supplies to the Arab states were carried out at symbolic prices and the USSR didn't demand payment. The parties used to treat the debt as a regular statistics of shipments; the prices were approved without bargaining and all this was called a low-interest credit granted by the Soviet Union to its allies. But the government of new Russia presented a bill.

For a long time, the military-technical cooperation between the two states was the victim of financial differences. As a result, Moscow took a step forward to meet half way: Russia decided to separate the military cooperation issues from the problem of Syria's debt. A *window of opportunity* to start the *tabula rasa* negotiations emerged.

The awaited changes occurred in 1998, when the Instrument-Making Design Bureau (Tula) held talks and signed the contract to

manufacture and deliver to Syria in 1998-1999 Kornet-E and Metis-M anti-tank missile systems (\$65 million and \$73 million respectively). It seemed that flourishing military cooperation between Moscow and Damask was within arm's reach.

In November 1998, *Al Ittihad* newspaper reported that in the course of Marshal Igor Sergeev's visit to Damask the parties had agreed to supply Syria with Su-27 aircraft, T-80 tanks, and S-300-type air defense missile systems. Russian experts planned to modernize MiG-21, MiG-23, MiG-29 aircraft and T-72 tanks belonging to the Syrian Armed Forces. According to the newspaper, the Syrian-Russian agreements in the area of military-technical cooperation were strategically important.

The *Jerusalem Post* reported on May 18, 1998, that Russia and Syria were on the verge of striking the first important arms deal after the demise of the Soviet Union. The newspaper referred to various sources of the Israeli security service and Russian MFA and claimed that the deal provided for the supply of air defense systems worth \$300-400 million.

The MFA spokesman Valery Nesterushkin confirmed that negotiations with Syria were under way, aimed at preparing the schedule of modernization for the Soviet-made Syrian military equipment. 'Syria and Russia maintain contacts to promote further military cooperation,' said Nesterushkin. At the same time, he pointed out that Russia had 'the right to cooperate in the military sphere with any state'.

A representative of *VPK MAPO*, which manufactures MiG-type fighters, said that the enterprise was working on plans to modernize 40 Syrian MiG-29 aircraft.

In 1999, the Israeli leaders overloaded their US counterparts with numerous facts and detailed analysis of intelligence data implying that Syrian-Russian arms trade jeopardized Israel's security. The matter of particular concern was the S-300 air defense missile systems, which Moscow was expected to sell to Damask.

The USA stayed calm and showed no reaction to the Israeli panic but changed its position after the shipment of Kornet-E and Metis-M anti-tank missile systems to Syria. The USA

imposed sanctions on three Russian enterprises participating in the deal. Washington also threatened to cut down the US assistance to Russia by \$50 million if Moscow continued its arms supplies to Syria. The Russian authorities expressed their indignation and declared their commitment to international law rather than to the US legislation.

It is noteworthy that before this scandal, similar measures were taken against the South African government. In 1997, it decided to sell to Syria a modernized fire-control system for the Soviet-made T-72 tanks (\$641 million). South Africa was not interested in politics: the government was hoping for some commercial profit. The supposed supplies included range-finders, telescopes, periscopes, and electronic devices. Specialists admitted that the modernized systems could not dramatically improve the characteristics of the Soviet tanks. At first, the government was even ready to sacrifice the US assistance, which was to amount to \$120 million in 1996-1997. The inter-state rhetoric between South Africa and the USA and Israel contained some strong language. In response to the US warning about suspension of the US assistance, the then Vice President of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, said that South Africa would discuss the situation with Washington but he didn't believe that it would be necessary to tell someone to go 'to hell or to any other place'. After some time the South African government abandoned the project.

In summer 1999, after the exchange of many top-level delegations, Russia and Syria prepared for the Moscow visit of President Hafez Assad. Experts tried to guess what the amount of arms supplies would be and spoke about \$200-400 million per year. Assad's vast plans were discussed in the Russian and Syrian press. 'The coming visit to Russia by Syrian President Hafez Assad should become not only the symbol of resuming strategic partnership between the two states but the harbinger of their reviving military-technical cooperation.'

In the course of the visit, Assad met all prominent Russian leaders: President Yeltsin, Defense Minister Sergeyev, Prime Minister Stepashin, and Foreign Minister Ivanov. But the expected sensation didn't occur.

The bargaining failed. The Syrian president insisted on a long-term payment schedule for a \$2-billion contract. Russia was strongly against

any loans to Syria. The parties parted and left each other some time for reflection.

Moscow is beginning to understand that multi-billion deals with Damask are hardly possible. Syria is not ready to pay for the Russian supplies. The rules of Arab bargaining say that these sums will be enough to buy many weapons in the CIS, China, or North Korea. The Russian prices are US-oriented rather than CIS-oriented, and Moscow has its own vision of trade rules. The positions are firm and there is little room for compromise. Syria, which has to confront one of the best-equipped armies of the world with its limited military budget, cautiously spends the available funds.

Even without these problems, the complicated military commerce between Syria and Russia is exacerbated from time to time by the progress in the Syrian-Israeli negotiations. The most recent example is the March meeting in Geneva, which involved President Clinton and President Assad. On the eve of the meeting, many sources in the USA, Israel and Syria argued that a breakthrough in Syrian-Israeli relations was inevitable. The Syrian *Al Baas* wrote that Assad was ready 'to grant Israel another and, presumably, the last opportunity to open the doors for peace'. According to Clinton's plan, the Israeli troops were to move to the 1967 lines and Syria was to withdraw some of its territorial claims in exchange for the equivalent concessions.

Clinton's peace plan would have helped the Syrian leader to realize his old *peace-for-land* slogan. Besides, the USA promised to render financial assistance to the warring parties to restore the economy. Syria was supposed to obtain \$15 billion. Moreover, Hafez Assad intended to demand some extra military assistance.

After three hours of talks, the parties failed to come to an agreement. The Syrian Foreign Minister stated that Clinton had brought no new proposals to the summit. The bargaining met with no success. A British researcher of Assad's biography maintained that this might be the first step to confrontation between Israel and Syria.

And for Moscow, the gloomy results of the US-Syrian negotiations offer a glimmer of hope: it is high time Russia resumed the bargaining.

## Stories of the Past

### THE 1995 NPT REVIEW AND EXTENSION CONFERENCE: PECULIARITIES, RESULTS AND LESSONS

by Vladimir Orlov,  
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[This article was originally published in  
Russian in *PIR Study Paper*, No. 11, 1999]  
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*Abridged version*

By 1995, when the fate of the NPT was going to be decided at the NPT Review Conference, the international community had achieved a certain level of progress in preventing horizontal and vertical nuclear proliferation. Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Belarus and South Africa became non-nuclear weapon states. The development of nuclear weapons in Iraq was stopped. The nuclear ambitions of North Korea were contained. Other *hotbeds* of proliferation have not yet emerged in the early 1990s. The nuclear arsenals of the USA and the USSR were being reduced in accordance with START I. START II was signed. In Geneva, the world was actively working on the draft of the CTBT. Finally, the number of NPT States Parties amounted to 172 by late March 1995 and on the eve of the Conference this figure continued to increase.

There was no doubt that, in these generally favorable conditions, the Treaty would be preserved. At the same time, some dangerous trends indicated that the extension of the Treaty wouldn't be easy, since the main objective was not only to extend the Treaty but to prolong it as far as possible.

US and Russian diplomats urged for indefinite extension, as provided for in Article X paragraph 2 as one of the variants. This is why the representatives of nuclear weapon states (NWS), or let's say of the *North*, who were the major proponents of the longest extension, had to launch an

impressive preparatory campaign. Its visible part was the statements and sessions in the course of the PrepCom meetings in Geneva. The most significant meetings took place in September 1994 and in January 1995.

At the same time, the most important diplomatic activities were those performed in private.

Western and Russian diplomats began to prepare for the Conference in early 1994 and were eager to achieve maximal results: indefinite extension of the treaty with minimal concessions to the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). The preparation was carried out in Geneva (at the Conference on Disarmament (CD)), in Vienna (in the IAEA Headquarters) and in New York. Firstly, Russia, the USA and Great Britain conducted trilateral negotiations and then, all three parties discussed their plan with the French diplomats. China didn't take part in these consultations and, as one of the participants put it, pretended to be 'a non-nuclear weapon developing state, which has acquired some nuclear weapons by chance.'

The diplomats identified the four key and most probably controversial issues: Article IV (the right of non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS) to harness peaceful nuclear energy without discrimination); Article VI (the NWS commitment to achieve nuclear disarmament at an early date); security assurances to the NNWS; the term of extension.

As far as Article IV was concerned, it was not likely to cause serious complications in the course of the Conference. Examination of the lists of goods which exporters refused to sell to the NNWS, despite their requests, demonstrated that such refusals were isolated instances on the part of Russia and the USA. The informal dialogue included the Indonesian representatives, who agreed that actual reproaches concerning discriminative technological exchange could be confined to minimum; on the contrary, this article was functional thanks to the IAEA endeavors. If there was discrimination in the exchange of technological achievements pertaining to nuclear energy, it resulted from the high price of these technologies. Hence, it was a

matter of financial discrimination; however, it was understood that the NPT didn't provide for the free transfer of nuclear technologies for peaceful use in the developing countries.

As for Article VI, Russian and Western diplomats chose offensive tactics with regard to those states, which were critical of the way the NWS implemented their commitments. All NWS (except China) agreed to prepare national reports on the implementation of Article VI and disseminate them at the Conference. Following the Russian initiative, the parties negotiated a joint statement on disarmament, which was to be disseminated at the Conference<sup>1</sup>.

As far as full-fledged legally binding security assurances were concerned, there was disagreement. In principle, Russia supported the proposal of the NAM to conclude the Convention on Security Assurances. Great Britain didn't oppose the Convention, since this issue had was more a symbolic than a practical one, and therefore, the NWS could afford to make significant concessions. The US diplomats were not enthusiastic about the idea. France strongly objected to the Convention, saying that it ran counter to its national concept of nuclear deterrence. As a compromise, the parties agreed to back the UN Security Council resolution reiterating the commitments on security assurances, above all, the pledge to not use nuclear weapons against the NNWS. The compromise was reached in autumn 1994 but the actual work on the text of the resolution was delayed and was finished only in early April 1995<sup>2</sup>. Doubtless, the UN Security Council resolution tempered the level of criticism at the Conference.

As for the extension issue, the diplomats of the *North* decided at their confidential meetings to push for the indefinite extension of the NPT. Meanwhile, the most heated debate concerned the ways to attain this goal. For instance, Russia proposed initially to discuss the problem of extension and to put it to the vote immediately, on the first day of the Conference, before the actual review of the treaty's implementation (the five-year review is an integral part of the Conference).

Russia believed that the issue of extension should be solved by all participants deliberately, without pressure and fuss; hence, it oughtn't to be put at the bottom of the agenda. However, this position was not endorsed, since the USA and its allies didn't predict that indefinite extension or even long-term extension would be agreed upon easily. They preferred to obtain a clear vision of the positions at the beginning of the Conference and to use this forum to influence the heads of hesitating delegations.

In December 1994, in Geneva, Russia set forth the two-fold initiative. The resolution on the term of the treaty would have been a short document, without preamble (which would have inevitably lead to long debate) and stating only the indefinite extension. Only Great Britain backed this Russian initiative. The USA was concerned that the NAM might issue a collective resolution in response and put it to the vote first. Canada was against the proposal, naming the Russian draft a 'high quality, high risk' idea. Canada stood for cautious and gradual actions before and during the Conference, to increase step by step the number of states supporting indefinite extension. According to Canadian diplomats, it was necessary to convene expanded meetings for that purpose and to invite as many NAM states as possible. Russia strongly opposed this approach. Firstly, it feared a low turnout at such meetings, which might look like the NWS policy was failing. Secondly, Russia believed that there was a split in the ranks of the NAM and, hence, didn't expect a single unified resolution from all the opponents of indefinite extension. Russian diplomats advocated the benefits of lobbying, although they admitted that the USA had more capabilities in this area.

The first attempt of lobbying took place in Budapest in December 1994 in the course of the OSCE session. The two-line initiative was endorsed for the first time. A small working group organized frank discussions in a narrow circle. The group contained representatives of all NWS (except China), Germany, the Netherlands, Canada, and Japan (the latter played the most constructive role). It became clear that 62 states were sure

to back the two-line initiative and 10-12 countries would eventually support the resolution but would adopt a wait-and-see policy. Some problems emerged with the positions of Australia, Canada, and Sweden. They agreed with the indefinite extension but insisted on deleting the words concerning unconditional extension, since it was necessary to seek compromise and to link the indefinite extension to a number of strict conditions binding the NWS to accelerate the process of disarmament. Russia, the USA, France and the UK took a final decision on the two-line initiative only in early April. They believed that it would be logical for Canada to put forward this motion, as the chairman of the informal Geneva working group and as the state most capable of finding common language with the NAM.

Moreover, the diplomats from Russia, the USA and Canada attached importance to the intentions of the South African leadership to set forth its own initiative at the Conference. The participants of the Geneva working group were informed about the South African proposals and encouraged them, taking into account the firm resolution of this country to back indefinite extension. To assure South Africa of their intention, Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev and US Secretary of State Warren Christopher sent letters to South African Foreign Minister Alfred Nzo on the threshold of the Conference.

In January 1995, the most probable candidate to preside over the Conference, Amb. Jayantha Dhanapala (Sri Lanka), visited Moscow. In the course of his meeting with the Russian foreign minister he expressed the opinion that the most favorable outcome of the Conference would be to take the decision without voting. He proposed his wording for the resolution: 'As a majority exists among States party to the Treaty for its indefinite extension, the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely without voting.' Russian diplomats appreciated this formula, calling it *elegant* but doubting at that time that the Conference would be able to avoid voting.

The diplomatic efforts on the threshold of the Conference included persuasion and tough

pressure. Russia had modest pressing capabilities and, as previously agreed, it began propagandistic work covering the FSU states and Iran. In both cases, the result was generally positive. Moreover, in a few developing countries, Russia's position and its wishes were brought to the attention of the leadership by the Russian ambassadors to these states. As for the USA, its activities were impressive and Washington exerted substantial pressure on such states as Mexico and Egypt, sent ambassadors at large to the majority of allied and friendly countries and counted every new vote for the resolution.

As a result of intensive diplomatic endeavors, the NWS managed to overcome the skepticism about the possibility of indefinite extension. At the same time, on the eve of the Conference, very few diplomats were sure that the initiative on indefinite extension would be able to get, straight off, the required support of half the States Parties to the NPT, i.e. 90 votes as of April 1995.

However, the major defect of the diplomatic activities was the relative neglect of the problem of universality. It was chiefly a matter of a group of Arab states, which called into question the long-term extension if Israel was not going to accede to the NPT. The NWS also underestimated the special position of South-East Asian nations - above all, Malaysia - which, unlike Latin American states, turned out to be susceptible to outright pressure from the developed countries.

#### **Major Groups of States and Conflicts of Interests**

An important characteristic of the Conference was the plurality of conflicts about the NPT, which could be combined into two groups: the conflicts of values and the conflicts of interests (with the prevalence of the latter). Nonetheless, the Conference demonstrated numerous conflicts of values and some sharp contradictions between human values and national interests. The former could be found in the declarations of some NAM states (Malaysia, Tanzania, Zimbabwe, Mexico, Venezuela, and Uruguay) and developed countries (Sweden, Switzerland, Ireland, New Zealand, and Austria) concerning the

necessity to achieve a nuclear-weapon-free world and to establish NWFZ in the whole world in the next few decades.

Obviously, these requirements depended on a strict schedule of nuclear arms reduction and elimination by all NWS, the ban on production and elimination of stockpiled weapons-usable fissile material, and the ban on nuclear tests. These demands met the resistance of the NWS diplomats (mainly Russia, France, and the USA), under the pretext that they were unrealistic for financial (the elimination of nuclear arms costs more than their production) and environmental (the technology of elimination should be thought out in tiny detail) reasons<sup>3</sup>.

Thus, value-driven approaches to nuclear nonproliferation play a leading role in the policy of a small number of states (Sweden, Switzerland, and Ireland). On the whole, as is usually the case in diplomacy, the key factor is the national and grouped interests of the states.

The balance of forces at the conference was quite complicated. There were two large conflicting groups - the *North* (Western developed economies, Japan, Australia, Russia, other CIS states, Central and Eastern European nations), supporting the indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT, and the *South* (NAM), opposing unconditional extension and doubting the usefulness of an indefinite treaty. At the same time, these groups didn't have a streamlined structure and their membership changed swiftly in the course of the Conference.

The traditional division of the States Parties to the NPT into groups implies the existence of three equally important groups: Western (comprising the states which, during the Cold War, were referred to as the West, although this group contains Turkey, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand); Eastern (Russia, all FSU states and former-Warsaw Pact parties); and NAM. The groups are established to facilitate the solution of the current problems and for representative purposes (nomination of candidates to the

official posts, forming the working groups, etc.).

In the course of the Conference, the shortcomings of such a division were most evident in the work of the Eastern group. The representatives of some Central and Eastern European delegations were not properly informed about the lobby discussions at the Conference. This informative role should have been played by the delegates appointed to the working and consultative groups of the Conference. Obviously, Russia represented the Eastern group in all these organs and received most of the reproaches. Moreover, the diplomats from Eastern and Central Europe argued that they were more eager to participate in the consultative meetings of the EU delegation (i.e. the Western group), since these states were associated members of the Union. But they were not invited to these meetings.

Meanwhile, the Russian delegation succeeded in coordinating the activities of the FSU states. For instance, until the last days of the Conference, the Ukrainian delegation was not ready to sign the final resolution on extension of the NPT. Kiev demanded that some provisions concerning security assurances be included in the laconic text of the resolution. If these demands were accepted, other states would have immediately begun to propose new amendments. The Russian delegation worked in close contact with the Ukrainian diplomats and finally succeeded. Russia had also to exert some pressure on the Moldavian and Azerbaijani delegations at different stages of the Conference. However, the two states didn't have any particular interests at the Conference and their uncompromising policy didn't last long.

The Western group set up a mechanism of two-level coordination. The first general level was occupied by the US and British delegations with a modest role played by France. At the second level, the EU coordinated the efforts of the states. Nonetheless, this group also had its dissidents. For instance, Sweden, Austria, and Ireland refused to sign the joint EU document drafted for Main Committee I and

laid down their own national documents, dealing a serious blow to the prestige of the Western group, although the contradictions didn't go beyond the lobby argument. Finally, the Western group shaped a joint position on the key issue - the NPT extension - although some states (Switzerland, Sweden) had certain doubts.

On the whole, it is fair to say that the Eastern and Western groups shared similar positions. It therefore makes more sense to study the groups divided in accordance with their attitude to the existing nuclear nonproliferation regime.

As far as the third traditional group is concerned, there was not really any political unity among the NAM at the Conference. In formal terms, the group was extremely active: it nominated candidates for positions of responsibility, held regular consultations (more often than the two other groups), etc. However, these activities had only one clear explanation: the NAM was unable to form a single position and, in the course of the Conference, the leaders of the regional powers (Indonesia, Nigeria) tried in vain to restore this unity. The split exacerbated and the emergence of new leaders (South Africa) paralyzed the organizational capabilities of the NAM, which could have used its numerical strength (110 countries against 35 Western and 23 Eastern states) to impose its will on the Conference.

The NAM split was chiefly caused by the problem of indefinite extension. It included the subgroup of *uncompromising states* (Syria, Libya, Malaysia, Nigeria, North Korea); the *radical* subgroup of states agreeing to concessions (e.g. Indonesia, Iran, Egypt, Mexico, Venezuela, Kenya); the *moderate* subgroup, which was ready for compromise from the very beginning (e.g. Jordan, Philippines, Uruguay, Colombia, Sri Lanka); the *new initiative* subgroup headed by South Africa, which publicly disagreed with the NAM's old policy of opposing indefinite extension and proposed its own set of political tools to improve the international nuclear nonproliferation regime; and the *pro-Western* group, which voted in compliance

with the orders from Washington (the Caribbean island states).

The split in the NAM ranks had evident political reasons, since each regional group pursued its own interests. For instance, the Arab states (Syria, Libya, Egypt, Sudan, Lebanon) were striving for universality and sought ways to make Israel accede to the NPT. The Pacific nations (Papua New Guinea, the Federated States of Micronesia, the Marshall Islands) urged for a test ban at the earliest date (this issue became even more topical in connection with the plans of President Chirac to conduct a series of tests in French Polynesia).

#### **Key Problems Facing the Conference**

The major problem facing the Conference was the extension of the treaty, which was the focus of much clandestine struggle and intrigue at the Conference. If indefinite extension had been rejected this would have meant a serious blow to the proponents of strengthening the international nuclear nonproliferation regime.

Another important problem was the terms of extension: whether it should be adopted without preliminary conditions, or whether the NPT should be conditioned to a number of measures to improve the review of the treaty in the future and to approve the principles and objectives for nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament as a legally binding document or a policy recommendation.

Much attention was paid to Article VI concerning disarmament issues. It is the concession of the NWS to the NNWS, which in exchange commit themselves to refrain from acquiring nuclear weapons. The implementation of Article VI relates to significant nuclear arms reduction of the NWS; conclusion of the CTBT; conclusion of the FMCT; security assurances to the NNWS parties to the NPT, and the character of these assurances, their legal characteristics. These issues became the major source of confrontation at the Conference between the radical members of the NAM and Western groups, on the one hand, and the NWS on the other.

It was important to analyze the implementation of Article I, - a key NPT provision and the fundamental principle of nonproliferation - i.e., to assess how well the NWS carried out their commitment to refrain from transfer of nuclear-related technologies to the NNWS.

Another topic for debate at the Conference was the implementation of Article IV encouraging international cooperation in the area of peaceful nuclear energy uses, including the exchange of technologies. Despite certain difficulties and conflicts (concerning the construction of an Iranian nuclear power plant (NPP) in Bushehr), the continued efforts of the IAEA contributed to considerable progress in this area. As a result, the problem was not particularly acute at the Conference.

Discussions concerned the establishment of NWFZ, as provided for in Article VII. The establishment of the NWFZ in South Pacific (the Rarotonga Treaty) and in Latin America (the Tlatelolco Treaty), and the plans to create such zones in Africa and South-East Asia, enabled the Conference to welcome the progress achieved and to avoid a heated debate on the matter.

Finally, the Conference focused on the problem of universality, i.e. adherence to the NPT mainly on the part of three *unofficial* NWS (Israel, India, and Pakistan). This task was difficult to accomplish in the course of the Conference. However, the Arab states managed to draw the attention of the forum to this issue, which was quite a timely step.

#### **Results of the Conference**

The major results of the Conference were the adoption of the legally binding decision on the NPT extension under Article X (2); the indefinite extension of the treaty; the decision-making without voting, practically by consensus; the approval of the mechanism to improve the review of the NPT implementation in the future; and the adoption of the recommendation to the CD in Geneva to conclude the CTBT no later than late 1996. Another important result was the active participation in the Conference of nearly all State Parties.

The Conference also demonstrated the inability of the NAM group to affect the decision-making (as before, at the UN General Assembly sessions), the emergence of new leaders within the NAM and the redistribution of power in the movement.

The results of the Conference represented success for the diplomatic representatives of the NWS. They (above all, the USA) managed to achieve the maximum: to pass the resolution on indefinite extension and to make no concessions infringing upon their national interests. In fact, the NWS made no additional commitments on any of the topical items of the agenda. The resolution on indefinite extension is a strict legal document, whilst the other three resolutions are political recommendations.

Thus, was the decision on indefinite extension a completely positive contribution to the cause of nuclear nonproliferation and arms control?

On the one hand, it was. According to Roland Timerbaev, 'firstly, the Conference succeeded in achieving consensus without cutting off the critics of the NPT. Secondly, the control over the NPT implementation will be strengthened. Thirdly, the problem of future extension won't be a stumbling block for the States Parties and they will be able to focus on substantive issues of disarmament.'<sup>4</sup>

On the other hand, the specific commitments assumed by the NWS during the Conference were quite modest. Moreover, the Conference failed to answer the following urgent questions: compliance with Article I; the use of fissile material stockpiles, plutonium in particular; the need to enhance the role and capabilities of the IAEA in combating nuclear proliferation; granting legally binding security assurances to the NNWS; and ways to promote universal adherence to the NPT.

One of the positive results of the Conference was the decision-making without voting. This enabled the Conference to avoid the split between the overwhelming majority and the small but persistent minority, which included such large developing countries as Indonesia, Malaysia, Iran, Nigeria, Venezuela, and Egypt. One of the reasons for this consensus, besides objective factors, was the personal role of the President<sup>5</sup>.

It is difficult to discard the argument of a number of developing states opposed to indefinite extension, that this step would hamper the control of the international community over the NWS policy and would enable the unrecognized NNWS (Israel, India, and Pakistan) to stay away from the NPT framework. The first assumption was proved correct after the Conference, when China and France conducted a series of nuclear tests and the Russian State Duma refused to ratify START II. The second thesis is proved with the intensification of the Indian military nuclear activities.

One had to admit that the variant of 25-year rolling periods would have been no less decisive for strengthening the international nuclear nonproliferation regime than the indefinite extension. Presumably, this form of extension (on the one hand, long term and automatic extension; on the other hand, the ability to influence the policy of NWS once every 25 years) would have been the optimal scenario from the point of nonproliferation values.

Naturally, this compromise didn't meet the interests of the NWS. At the same time, it is known that on the eve of the Conference, the leadership of at least two NWS (Russia and China) regarded the 25-year rolling periods as acceptable for their national interests.

The NAM, which on the threshold of the Conference might have shaped a single moderate position on extension and chosen the variant of 25-year rolling periods with a *green light*, lost this chance. The majority of NAM members preferred to take a radical position, provoking the split within the movement, the emergence of the moderate opposition (Mexico, South Africa) and the failure to make a coordinated decision. And only at the end of the Conference did 12 NAM states manage to work out the draft of a moderate resolution, although tactically they were at least two weeks late.

The special positions of a number of states voiced after the adoption of final decisions had no legal force but indicated that in practical terms the indefinite extension did not obtain unanimous support. Hence, if the NWS breach at least one provision of the *co-lateral* resolutions, the opponents of the indefinite extension may explicitly raise their objections.

Finally, the 1995 Review and Extension Conference failed to find a way out of the situation, when a NPT State Party might like to suspend its membership (e.g. North Korea), ignoring the withdrawal procedure provided for in the treaty. Experience proves that in such cases the NPT itself wouldn't be able to play a decisive role, and the further developments would depend on bilateral and multilateral diplomacy, with a vital role played by the USA, bypassing even the UN Security Council.

In other words, one has to admit that the NPT extension was conditional and indefinite.

The general conclusion will be that the international nonproliferation regime was significantly strengthened by the Conference. Nonetheless, the well-thought out decisions on enhancing the review mechanism do not ensure better compliance with the treaty, above all with Articles VI, I and II. The euphoria about the results of the Conference was groundless. According to a definition given at a scientific-practical conference on the results of the NPT extension, 'the operation succeeded, the patient is not dead but in intensive care'<sup>6</sup>.

Some of the 1995 decisions were implemented or taken into account in part or in full in 1996-1999. However, these years were practically lost for the international nonproliferation regime, since the potential originating from the success of the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, to a great extent, was not exploited.

<sup>1</sup> In the course of the Conference, nearly all participants commended the document.

<sup>2</sup> See: G. Bunn, R. Timerbaev, "Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime and Security Assurances to the Non-Nuclear Weapon States". - *PIR Study Paper*, No. 1, 1996.

<sup>3</sup> See: G. Berdennikov. Statement before the First Main Committee, April 21, 1995. - 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference. Final Document, part III. Summary and Verbatim Records, NY, 1996, pp. 228-230.

<sup>4</sup> V. Orlov, "The Treaty Has Been Extended Indefinitely: Who Is the Winner?". - *Yaderny Kontrol*, No.6, 1995, June, pp. 2-3.

<sup>5</sup> S. Kislyak, Interview to the author, 1995, June 25.

<sup>6</sup> Workshop on the results of the NPT Extension conference. Paper on the key points of the speakers. Monterey, 1995, August 15, p. 1.