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Nonproliferation
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(NUCLEAR CONTROL)

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**FOUNDER: PIR CENTER FOR POLICY STUDIES
IN RUSSIA**

Moscow, 2005

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The PIR Center has published a public opinion survey (IN ENGLISH)

**"ATTITUDES IN THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION TOWARDS WMD
PROLIFERATION AND TERRORISM"**

This survey continues the good tradition of studying Russian public opinion in the PIR Center, started by the analytical report "Russians on nuclear weapons and nuclear threats" in 2000.


At the same time the present report, compared to the year 2000 study, features analysis on a broader range of issues, connected with the Russians' perception of WMD threats as well as the problems of Russia's international cooperation, especially with other states - members of the G8.

Does the appearance of nuclear weapons in Iran threaten Russia's national interests? Should Russia join the process of international cooperation in fighting infectious diseases more actively? Which countries pose WMD threats to Russia? These and other questions were answered by Russians throughout the country. In total, 1600 respondents were questioned on the basis of representative sampling and asked to answer 18 questions.

All questions of this survey were split into three groups:

- The role of nuclear weapons in ensuring Russia's security
- The probability of war and terrorist acts with the use of WMD
- International cooperation and the problems of WMD nonproliferation.

**If Iran Acquires Nuclear Weapons,
Will This Comprise a Threat to Russia?**



The description of each of the poll's questions includes the distribution of the answers depending on the respondents' political sentiment and their basic socio-demographic features (sex, age, education level, income, social status, type of place of residence, federal district of residence).

The author of analytical comments to the results of the sociological poll is the member of PIR Center Advisory Board, associate professor at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO) Ildar A. Akhtamzyan.

For more details on the survey, please contact PIR Center Deputy Director Anton Khlopkov by phone +7 (495) 234-0525 or e-mail: khlopkov@pircenter.org

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Editorial

FULL SPEED AHEAD, UNDER THE BANNER OF THE G8!

2006 is the year of the Russian Federation's presidency of the G8. Russia was handed the torch by Great Britain on January 1 of this year.

As early as last year, we launched a number of activities, linked to Russia's presidency of the G8.

Winter and spring this year were filled with intense discussion with colleagues from the other member states of the G8, on the entire range of issues on the agenda for the G8 summit:

1. Energy security;
2. Nonproliferation of nuclear weapons (including those involving Iran and North Korea, the Global Partnership Against WMD Proliferation, and potential strategies to develop nuclear power);
3. The "economy of education" as a key component of development and global competition in the 21st century;
4. International biosecurity cooperation and the fight against the spread of infectious diseases;
5. Work to frustrate international terrorists in their attempts to acquire new, high-technology means of terror...

In London, Brussels, Washington, Paris, Geneva and, of course, Moscow, we have begun meeting with experts from the countries of the G8, with participants of the Global Partnership, and with the Russian and international media. We have set our own convictions aside, in order to compare points of view and listen carefully to one another's positions; we hope to find those areas of common interest that will guarantee a constructive dialog in the run-up to the 2006 summit and beyond.

Certain topics, currently earmarked as central to the summit and the Russian presidency, frankly, create the preconditions for differing interpretations by G8 members. Take, for example, **energy security** – a phrase on everyone's lips. But this simple phrase means very different things to different people. This was neatly summed up by Konstantin Kosachev, head of the State Duma Committee on International Affairs,

in a session of the Trialogue Club at the PIR Center, "What would be a national catastrophe for Russia? If oil prices were to fall under 15 dollars per barrel. But for the majority of Russia's partners in the G8, that would be a national holiday!"

Is it even possible to find common ground to begin cooperation in energy security between the G8 countries (without simply narrowing the topic to the protection of pipelines from terrorists), or are all these discussions no more than a fig leaf, hiding a bitter struggle to gain global control over current—and especially future—energy sources, a struggle in which Russia, however the cards fall, is destined to play a key role? The PIR Center is engaging in practical research to commence discussion of these ideas, as yet in a relatively narrow circle, including discussion at sessions of the Trialogue Club (for example, the session in December was wholly dedicated to energy security).

In other fields of research a number of PIR Center papers, including some on the strategic problems of the Caspian and Central Asian regions, are published in 2006 in the journal *Yaderny Kontrol* – a journal which, as friends of the PIR Center will already be aware, is set to undergo a major transformation this year, as it assumes a solid and enduring reputation as **Russia's journal of international security**. For the journal, too, this year will be remembered as the year of the G8, in all senses; but in addition to covering topics related to the G8 summit, the journal has printed its 80th issue since it was founded in November of 1994! This was an unusual issue of the journal, and in its wake further issues will still be recognizable, but with new numbers and a new title.

April saw the major **international conference "G8 Global Security Agenda: Challenges & Interests. Towards the St. Petersburg Summit"**. The PIR Center organized this conference independently, but coordinating preparatory work with the Administration of the Russian President, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other ministries and agencies, Russia's community of experts, and leading research

centers in other G8 countries, foremost the Center for Strategic and International Studies (USA).

The closer we are to the summit, the more important it is to enter into a dialogue with the Russian public at large – and we are assisted in this objective by the **Russian Internet Forum on Global Security**, located at the site: <http://www.securityforum.ru>. This site was created by the PIR Center at the beginning of 2006, and provides a virtual forum for debate on the G8 and the significance of Russia's presidency for our country's national interests, opening the "ivory tower" of a narrow circle of experts to include the polyphony of the street, encouraging frank discussions over a cup of coffee or even something stronger; we are listening to Russian public opinion in this chat forum, to voices from cybercafés and home computers across the country. We respond to questions, but our main prerogative is to listen with all ears.

By drawing on the views of national governments and the international community of experts, articulated at our conference in April, and giving voice to Russian public opinion, expressed in discussions in our internet forum, we have developed a set of specific recommendations on the eve of the 2006 summit.

July is the month of the **St. Petersburg Summit**. The basic composition of the summit may now appear to be simple: three presidents plus four prime ministers plus one chancellor plus the chairman of the European Commission; but politics are notorious for last-minute changes, and we cannot know exactly which guests President Putin will greet in his native city. We do, however, know for certain that the PIR Center will continue its tradition of participating in parallel and side events to the summit. We were fortunate enough to participate in such events during the G8 summit at Evian in France in 2003, as well as during the summits at Sea Island, USA, in 2004, and Gleneagles, Great Britain, in 2005.

The G8 summits are known to have plenty of traditions, but there is one that we strongly dislike. This is the "tradition" of simply forgetting many important summit resolutions. For this reason, the PIR Center, as a non-government organization with a broad network of international connections, will start **tracking the effective-**

ness of G8 activities: which of the documents signed at the summits actually comes into force? Which documents are discarded, and why?

However, such an ambitious goal is beyond the resources of the PIR Center alone. So, as Russia was accepting its first presidency of the G8, the PIR Center proposed a new initiative: to create an international mechanism that would allow leading experts to assess the effectiveness of the G8, and to develop recommendations for forthcoming summits. What sort of mechanism will this be? Let's not jump ahead too quickly: we are working on the details in partnership with our colleagues on the PIR Center Executive Board and the Advisory Board, with the expanded Editorial Board of the journal *Yaderny Kontrol* and the Board on Sustainable Partnership for Russia (SUPR). We can already say, however, that this mechanism will have the structure of a 'club', which is to say:

- A small number of permanent members with an informal style of communication at meetings;
- Meetings will take place far from the commotion of the city, allowing the members to fully concentrate on the issues at hand;
- Meetings will be relatively infrequent: one or two sessions each year will be enough;
- In forming such a club, it would be unacceptable to restrict membership to the G8 countries themselves. This will be the "**G8+**" – apart from members from Russia, the USA, Great Britain, France, Italy, Germany, Japan and Canada, experts will also be invited from China, India, Brazil, Norway and, I expect, from a number of other states (which could include Malaysia, Egypt, South Africa and Iran) and international organizations.

The preparatory meeting of the organizational committee, charged with the task of creating this club, is scheduled for August of 2006, and the first meeting will take place in 2007, in Russia.

Such impressive headway would have been impossible without the **goodwill and strong support of our friends and partners**, whose ranks multiplied so prodigiously in 2005. We look forward to working with you all on projects linked to Russia's presidency of the G8, and the numerous other projects!

Interview

**Nikolay Spassky:
“LONG-LASTING, PROFOUND
CHANGES IN THE GLOBAL
BALANCE OF POWER
ARE THE MOST SERIOUS
CHALLENGE TO NATIONAL
SECURITY TODAY”**

[This article was originally published in Russian in *Yaderny Kontrol*, No.1, Volume 12, Spring 2006]

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An interview with of Deputy Secretary of the Russian Federation National Security Council Nikolay Spassky with Yaderny Kontrol correspondent Ekaterina Rykovanova

YADERNY KONTROL: Ambassador Spassky, how would you define the main trends in today's foreign policy? Would you say that we are still going through the transition period that Russia and the world had entered after the collapse of the Soviet Union?

SPASSKY: To answer this question, I will have to use one basic platitude: we are living through a period of drastic change. Having been in the diplomatic service for more than twenty years, I remember our perceptions and expectations in the early nineties, when the hope was in the air that yes, we are living through a transition period, but we'd get over it. Things get settled sooner or later. It turns out that the transition period from the bi-polar world after the conclusion of the Cold War, technically speaking, is probably over.

Broadly speaking, however, the transition period in the world politics, motivated and determined by the radical fundamental changes across the whole gamut of the factors determining and influencing not only the world situation, but the life of the humanity of today – in this sense, this broad transition period is only beginning.

It's a reality with which not only our political generation, but with all probability the forthcoming political generations as well will have to live, co-exist and deal.

“MISSION IMPOSSIBLE”?

It's very curious, but it's a fact: for the first time in a very long while the professional foreign policy community is once again living through a period when different scenarios of rewriting borders, reconfiguring states, re-allying the world compositions are being floated and discussed, because – and it's unavoidable – the magnitude of the changes in the world balance of power is so challenging and so impressive that even psychologically it's practically “mission impossible” to get the depth and to try to find not the right solution, but the right approach to the national security of one's country.

If we have to sum up in a nutshell what this fundamental shift in the balance power in the world is all about, we can define it with just three words: “Ascent of Asia”. Basically that is about it.

All of us remember that famous prognosis of the American National Intelligence Council, according to which somewhere between 2040 and 2045 the Chinese GDP will surpass that of the USA. It's just the tip of the iceberg: the actual changes implied by this phenomenon of the ascent of Asia are much more profound. It's a long-term trend.

YADERNY KONTROL: What, in your opinion, are the options for the world development in the next several decades? How do you see the role of the United States in this development in the years to come?

SPASSKY: A number of scenarios are possible. One of them is that for a certain period the United States retains its privileged position in the world affairs.

The second scenario might be that while in the political and military sphere the evident predominance of the USA still exists, in the economic field we see the creation of potent economic groupings struggling vehemently among each other.

There is a possibility – let's hope that a distant one – of a Bismarchian future, that is, the creation of not only economic groupings, but also of political ones – groupings that will be hustling and struggling with each other. In this case large scale wars are not to be excluded.

And of course, it would be unfair and professionally dishonest not to mention the fourth possibility – that of chaos as a full-fledged option for the world development.

This possibility exists, and to preclude its materializing we have to be aware of it.

These are serious things to be reckoned with. If we speak in substantive terms, the most serious challenge to the national security of whatever state (and the state of the Russia's magnitude is no exception) , the "Master Challenge", if you wish, is not terrorism, not proliferation (these are all specific manifestations of different trends); but the long-term and the most profound underway shift of the balance of power in the world. I'm not saying it's a threat, I'm not saying it's a danger; it's a new reality to adapt to.

ANOTHER COUNTRY, OTHER PRIORITIES

YADERNY KONTROL: Over the past fifteen years, Russia has gone through some very difficult times and through a considerable transformation. Yet, for many, the image of today's Russia is to a large extent still that of a smaller Soviet Union. Does such view of Russia have solid grounds in your country? Do you believe that on a foreign policy level, Russia has been able to dissociate herself from its Soviet past?

SPASSKY: Russia has indeed undergone a transition period of an unparallel magnitude. Today, the transition from the URSS is more or less over. I'm saying "more or less" because we still have some residual legacy. Yes, it's a new country, thanks God. But the bulk of the nineties, even though we were proudly proclaiming the uniqueness of Russia and its distinctions and differences from the URSS, were basically the years of nurture. Speaking of Russia, we were actually dealing with the Soviet Union on a smaller scale. Now at least we can acknowledge it. That is no longer the case, thanks God. It is probably the basic result of the first term of Putin's presidency that we are finally dealing not with a Soviet Union on a smaller scale, but with Russia standing on its own, even though certain things of a nurtial character going back to the practices and traditions of the USSR are still there.

YADERNY KONTROL: Under such circumstances, it seems essential to find the optimal mode of positioning Russia on the world political scene vis-a-vis its foreign

partners. What are the options being considered?

SPASSKY: Several options are currently considered and analyzed as the probable recipes for the practical policy of my country. For simplicity, I call them the "Asian", "European" and "Eurasian" options.

YADERNY KONTROL: You seem to attribute a large importance to the role of Asia in today's world politics, and in Russia's foreign policy in particular. Do you see Russia creating tighter links with this part of the world, especially China and India, at a detriment to its relations with Europe?

SPASSKY: The "Asian" option for Russia's foreign policy is indeed one of those being considered as a potential solution for my country's practical policy. It's quite popular with the political analysts and political scientists. Sometimes it's applied for the purposes of Russia's bashing, and sometimes it's used to portray the danger of Russia teaming together with China against the "free world". I can say with all responsibility that it's a political fantasy – no less and no more, because seriously speaking, this option does not exist.

It is not being considered for different reasons: first of all, it would be dead against our long-term political tradition, our political culture, and so on. Besides, it would be absolutely unrealistic technically, because to be able to seriously consider this option we have to first and foremost revive Siberia. And that's an entirely different conversation.

Realistically speaking, with the current (unfortunately, quite deplorable) situation of the economy and the social sphere in the vast regions of Siberia, to seriously consider this possibility of realigning Russia's strategy to the East would be wishful thinking.

YADERNY KONTROL: Another option you mention is the "European" option. What level of cooperation between Russia and Europe would such option imply? Could it one day lead to an accession to the EU? Is this currently a preferred option?

SPASSKY: When we are speaking about the European option for the national security strategy and the foreign policy of my country, we imply getting closer to the European Union and building our political and economic future together. This is a very serious and quite popular option, but I should acknowledge that in recent years

it has been losing steam in the most drastic and obvious way. In fact, I would be at a loss to name any influential political party currently presented in the parliament supporting it. Why? To answer this question, I have to identify several perceptions: not *my* perceptions, but perceptions of people who currently represent the majority of the political establishment of my country.

The first perception is one of the most profound crisis of Europe, i.e. of the European Union as a center of power. Some of us probably remember that about ten years ago Mr. Chernomyrdin [Prime Minister of the Russian Federation, 1992-1998] proudly proclaimed the dream of Russia to one day join the European Union. I'm not saying whether it was realistic or absolutely unrealistic. I'm just saying that this approach was being formulated by the top-level representatives of my country as recently as the mid-nineties. I would challenge you to name any single high-level representative of *today's Russian government who recently would have made a statement along the same lines.*

The times have changed, but first and foremost has changed the perception of the European Union. Ten years ago the perception was that the EU was riding the wave into the future. Nowadays the opinion of the Russian political elite is that the EU in all probability will not become a full-fledged center of power in the foreseeable future.

Another perception: the perception of the crisis of the EU policy on the matters that matter, both for us and for the world community as a whole. Nowadays, on the global agenda of the European Union it is best to be more or less in tune with the policy of the United States. On the regional issues that matter for my country it happens quite often that the EU policy more or less mirrors the perceptions of certain new members of the European Union, and Poland in particular. I'm not saying whether this is bad or good. I'm just saying that the European Union, which ten years ago aspired to construct a coherent policy of its own vis-a-vis the whole range of regional issues, nowadays – of course I'm exaggerating a bit, but the perception is basically the following – the EU follows the lead of the USA on global issues and the lead of its new members on the regional issues.

In that case the validity of the European Union as a negotiating power for my coun-

try, frankly speaking, is not that of a great interest.

I want to emphasize that the relative decline of this European option for the foreign policy of my country is connected with the perception of decline of the perspective of an independent, strong Europe, strong independent European Center of power which would be tempting and enticing for my country to work together with and to realize our own political ambitions following the routes of this collaboration.

BRIDGE AMONG CIVILISATIONS

YADERNY KONTROL: The last of the three options you have mentioned is the Eurasian option. Do you mean that by selecting this option, Russia would aspire to a much larger role on the world political scene than it currently has? Are there grounds for talking about hopes for a "recreation of empire"?

SPASSKY: First of all, we are not talking about the recreation of Empire here – that would be rubbish. The majority of the political establishment is fully aware that it's impossible, and there is not even a desire to make a try. So the Eurasian option is not about a recreation of an empire or a full-fledged lobby power. However, it does imply that Russia cannot be contained within the borders of a single region, be it Europe or Asia. For us that would be a self-defeating choice. To be able to realize our potential, our dreams, our ambitions, we have to aspire to this larger role and to try to carry it out. And first and foremost – and this is absolutely central to the perception of this Eurasian option – it's the perception of Russia's role as a sort of a civilization bridge between East and West, which is a very popular concept in my country nowadays. This concept has a very serious bearing for the practical implementation of foreign policy of Russia.

Of course, since we are speaking of a very challenging, very ambitious goal, the basic question is: can we do it? I don't know. I do hope we can. Speaking realistically, of course, there is only one piece of evidence that will demonstrate that we can – *time*. If in the course of time we manage it, it will prove the validity of this strategic option.

I should mention, however, that this option is not just wishful thinking or political theorizing – it's already a well elaborated strategy. And we do think that if we build upon the intrinsic national advantages of Russia, such as its great culture, importance of orthodoxy, high quality human potential, fantastic natural resources, our key role in the world energy and the geographic position per se – there is a very solid chance that we can actually do it.

YADERNY KONTROL: Going back to the subject of Russia and the EU, how would you define their current relationship? Are there any grounds to be speaking about a “crisis” in the relations between the two? What is the current Russian policy vis-a-vis the European Union?

SPASSKY: The first thing I should say with all sincerity and all responsibility in order to avoid any misunderstanding is that there ain't no crisis in our relations.

It is a difficult relationship, but it is a relationship of mutual interest and of mutual respect, and on the balance, it is a positive one.

Yet, having said this, I have to admit that in a way our policy vis-a-vis the European Union is at the crossroads. What are the possibilities? The simplest and the most obvious one is of course the inertia that will take us along the current tracks. In that case, everything would be fine and smooth, and on the whole everything would be more or less positive. However, this sort of relationship will be lacking the dynamism, the impetus and the strategic perspective. Frankly speaking, this is not the choice that the current leadership of my country would favor. Neither it is my personal choice.

Another possible approach is defining an algorithm which, without going as far as the membership, which at present is out both for us and for the EU, would provide the framework for really intensive, really profound cooperation that would somehow manage to not only drag into its orbit the political elites of the populations, and, most importantly, Russian population, but also to develop a stake in the cooperation with the European Union. This is actually the master challenge.

YADERNY KONTROL: In 2007, the current agreement on partnership and cooperation between Russia and the

European Union expires. What are Russia's plans with respect to collaboration with Europe after the expiration of this agreement? Will she use roadmaps elaborated last year to draft a successive agreement or is an entirely new document being planned?

SPASSKY: In any case we will have to create something new, since the current legal base will no longer be there. And with all due respect to roadmaps developed last year, these remain just roadmaps. Yes, they are another piece of evidence to the positive character of the relationship between Russia and the EU. Yet, they are basically political documents that cannot fulfill the function of a legal foundation of a relationship as huge as a relationship between my country and the EU. So, what do we do in this situation? The ambitious approach would be to shoot high and elaborate something new, something deeper and broader. But unfortunately there is the underlined skepticism, and probably even fear that under current political conditions if we rewrite this document we won't be able to arrive even at the current level.

YADERNY KONTROL: Are you saying that Russia is still uncertain about the relationship it would like to establish with the EU after 2007?

SPASSKY: We have indeed not yet made our mind on how to proceed. And when I say that, I am not trying to conceal a decision already taken, with which we are expecting at a proper moment to spring upon our European colleagues. We have actually, and it's a fact, not made up our minds. There are different options, different opinions, the brainstorming is going on, and the jury is still out.

What might help? I'll give a few hints of my own. Once again, the arrangement of these recipes is absolutely random. It would definitely help if the Baltic States and my country settled our differences, bilateral in their nature. I have to note though that the European Union as a body gets involved in our dispute with the Balts, and once again, unavoidably in this situation, the overall body of relationship gets aimed at.

Another point – European Union is a huge body doing lots of fantastic things within its borders, transforming the European landscapes. However, when we say this, we are referring to the domestic matters of the

European Union – European Union tends first and foremost to its internal events.. If the European Union is interested in developing and nurturing relationships with other outside partners, like Russia, it should make itself an interested partner for cooperation on the *world* scene, because there should be stimulus to work together. Globally speaking, excuse my bluntness, the European Union is not much of a partner.

Besides, when speaking about the relations between Russia and the European Union, there is a tendency, a trend to somehow focus on the relations on the axis between Moscow and Brussels, but that's an oversimplification. The relations develop on different levels – there is a macro level between Moscow and Brussels, but there are also bilateral relations which contribute in a fantastic way to the overall situation and overall body of relations. For instance, our bilateral relations with France, Italy, Germany, Spain, among other countries – those are the relations that can be considered in many respects model. And what we would like to achieve is to upgrade the relations with the European Union as a body having as a model the bilateral relations we enjoy with the bulk of European Union member countries.

INVITATION TO SIBERIA

Another point: for a relationship, and it applies to the relations between states and groupings of states in the same way as it applies to human relations, you've got to have a project to pursue, and if the project is not there, then what is the motivation to stay together and work together? And unfortunately, speaking bluntly, *currently we do not have large scale joint projects with the European Union*. I insist on that: unless one has a project, one won't be able to nurture and construct a large scale, future-oriented relationship. It would be a mission impossible.

YADERNY KONTROL: Even if there are no specific projects on such a scale currently being developed between Russia and the EU, could you provide an example of a project that could act as a launching pad for a revived partnership between Russia and the European Union?

SPASSKY: Well, to give you an idea, just an idea, since I'm in no position to make an offer of this kind, we should be speak-

ing about something really big and really promising. For instance: the project of a joint development of Siberia. In terms of magnitude, it would be exactly the thing that would give the motivation, the stimulus, the perspective, the substance to qualitatively step up the cooperation between Russia and the European Union. In this case I am deliberately speaking about the *development* of Siberia, not about draining out its natural resources. I'm speaking about a comprehensive project, implying actually turning this vast zone, fantastically rich in natural and human recourses, into a model zone of a balanced sustainable development of the XXI century. This would be done first and foremost for the benefit of my country, but also for that of Europe and of our other neighbors. And in this case, my impression is the following: if a project of this kind gets underway, Europe as a partner would have some very serious advantages in comparison to the United States or certain other partners, China and India for instance.

Some smaller potential joint projects might be mentioned, like the joint collaboration on the potential of the hydrogen power, or actually stepping up the bilateral trend within the multilateral cooperation in the field of nuclear fusion. The ideas are there, and they should not to be postponed into a long-term future. It's a job for the current political agenda, because otherwise – once again, I don't want to frighten anybody – we won't be heading for a crisis, nothing dramatic would be happening, we'll be just having a protracted sliding down in neglect in a relationship which actually might become one of the driving forces of the XXI century if handled the right way.

YADERNY KONTROL: You have mentioned various elements, various pillars on which you built your thinking in terms of Russia's role in the world. Apart from Russia's culture you've also mentioned the energy factor and the role of Russia as an energy player. Is this a way of insisting on the role that energy can play in foreign policy? Also, if we turn to the Russian-Ukrainian relations and the recent gas dispute: even if gas prices needed to be reviewed, the critical context behind the dispute and its timing were all questioned in the world press. The element that turned out to be of concern was predictability of Russian foreign policy. Could

you comment on that and deliberate a bit further on the Russian-Ukrainian relations?

SPASSKY: This issue has recently been addressed by my president, as well as by the foreign minister Lavrov in his annual press conference, so there is not that much to add. We've had a very tough nut to crack with our Ukrainian friends with respect to this gas issue and energy prices. It was probably one of the most intransigent issues going back to the former Soviet Union. We dealt with this issue, and it required a huge lot of political effort on both parts. I am absolutely sure that this problem, even though, frankly speaking, it was ill-timed the way it transpired, will be solved and settled in the immediate future.

I would also like to draw you attention to the fact that for ten years the over-pressing task of getting down to the business of revising the system of price setting and the overall energy system of the former USSR was completely neglected by the people who guided Russia in the nineties. It is a fact that if one is trying to push something under the carpet, sooner or later it is going to burst you right in the face. So we finally arrived to the point where we could not – with all the political will in the world – proceed with these prices, because they amounted to subsidize the Ukrainian economy and the economies of other neighboring states. We are not blaming these states, on the contrary: we are most appreciative of the way president Yushchenko handled this situation; and of the reason, wisdom and political courage he manifested.

The issue is now over. It cost quite a lot of nerve-racking experience. The timing on the eve on the New Year was bad, but let me remind everybody that this experience repeated itself almost every single December. It was less publicized, less scandalous, less nerve-racking, but almost every year there was this situation of balancing on the brink. We do hope that now we put this situation on the right track, which will enable us to settle it to the benefit and satisfaction of Ukraine, Russia and our other partners.

Now let me address the point on predictability. A pipeline is like marriage: it's a two-way street. It's a mutual dependence: the pipeline cannot stay empty for long, it has got to supply gas, otherwise it degrades and malfunctions.

And that is why – and here is a very serious issue for our discussion with the

European Union – why we emphasize the validity of long-term contracts as far as the gas market is concerned. Yes, everyone understands that times change, that now we are approaching the era of LNG (liquefied natural gas), that to LNG spot contracts are applicable. It's all correct, but nevertheless: speaking about the bulk of gas supplies which are supplied via these so-called central gas pipelines, the only way to operate them is on the basis of long term contracts, which would provide for the predictability.

And my final point. The central issue at this year's G8, presided by Russia, would be the issue of energy security. This issue is very complicated as some basic facts have to be reckoned with. For instance, there is this huge leap in the growth in energy demand, first and foremost on the part of the new economies of China and India. Currently the situation is more or less balanced, there is a sort of equilibrium between supply and demand, not withstanding this huge growth in demand on the part of China and India that I have just mentioned. But it's not going to stay forever. I'm not trying to sound alarmist, but we all know that readily reachable and extricable resources are being depleted. It's a long term trend, and we have to do something about it in order to avoid a crisis of huge dimensions in some thirty or forty years.

Let me give you another example: everybody likes to address certain topics, such as terrorism. It is a very challenging issue indeed, but this sort of issues can be addressed and defined only in specific ways. To speak of terrorism generically doesn't lead anywhere. But to speak of the counter-terrorist protection of the global energy infrastructure, of pipelines, of terminals, of routes of supply – this is an issue that cannot be settled on the level of a single country, he is as large and potent as the United States. It's an issue, a challenge that requires a global response.

I can go on: the same applies to new sources of energy, to energy conservation, where my country is unfortunately in a tragic situation due to the fact that with our climate and temperatures there is a gross abuse of power. But the issue is there. So, once again: it's very difficult, but the world community has to finally learn to work together, because energy, excuse me for this platitude, is like a gland that enables body of the world community to function.

Interview

**SERGEI KISLYAK:
 “THE RUSSIAN SIDE HAS
 TAKEN A DECISION
 IN PRINCIPLE TO EXTEND
 THE CTR AGREEMENT
 OF 17 JUNE 1992 FOR THE
 NEXT 7 YEARS (UNTIL 2013)”.**

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An interview of the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Sergey Kislyak with Yaderny Kontrol Journal correspondent Daniil Kobaykov

YADERNY KONTROL: Sergei Ivanovich, what role will Russia give the Global Partnership (GP) at the upcoming summit in St. Petersburg and over the course of this year as G8 President?

KISLYAK: The G8 Global Partnership Against the Proliferation of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (WMD) as established in 2002 in Kananaskis, is one of many themes under the Russian G8 Presidency in 2006, and, as you understand, not the least important.

YADERNY KONTROL: How do you view the interaction between Russia's declared priorities – questions of energy security and the fight against infectious diseases – and the Global Partnership or broader G8 policies in the nonproliferation field?

KISLYAK: Neither of the priorities have a relationship to the Global Partnership or nonproliferation. The problem of the fight against infectious diseases will be discussed during special meetings (at the level of G8 ministers of health). The question of energy security will be reviewed in the framework of the appropriate forums.

The goals of the Global Partnership were fixed at Kananaskis. They were focused on solutions to the questions of nonproliferation, disarmament, the fight against terrorism, and ensuring nuclear safety. The first project priorities were set as the destruction of chemical weapons, the dismantlement of

decommissioned nuclear submarines as well as the disposition of fissile material and the employment of former weapon scientists.

YADERNY KONTROL: The Global Partnership has almost passed its halfway mark. How would you evaluate progress since the decision at Kananaskis? Has it met your expectations? In what way, in your view, should the dynamic of the Global Partnership be supported, and how can its practical realization be accelerated in a number of directions?

KISLYAK: We have established cooperation with all the donors of the GP. We have especially good cooperation with Germany, UK, USA, Canada, and Norway. At the same time, it is not less important that there are many other countries that contribute, even with modest means, to our GP priorities—chemical weapons destruction and the decommissioning of nuclear submarines.

We have practically completed the establishment of legal frameworks for the GP. In 2003, Russia signed and ratified the Multilateral Nuclear Environmental Program in Russia (MNEPR) agreement. On this foundation, we concluded agreements in 2003–2004 with the UK, Germany, Italy, Switzerland, and Canada. In February 2006, two agreements were signed with France. Agreements with Japan and the U.S. had been signed earlier. From 2002–2005, Russia received more than \$540 million for its priorities (\$287 million for submarine decommissioning, \$261 million for chemical weapons destruction). With the partners' help, the chemical weapons destruction facility at Gorny, Saratov region, was constructed and began work. Construction was begun at the facility at Kambarka, Udmurtia Republic. The Schuchy'e facility in the Kurgan region is actively being built (to open by the end of December 2007). Since 2002 17 nuclear-powered submarines have been decommissioned (altogether 61 have been destroyed) with international assistance. It is necessary to also note Russia's role. Since 2002, the Russian federal budget has spent \$997 million on chemical disarmament and \$206 million on decommissioning of nuclear-powered submarines (with that amount 44 subs were decommissioned). Overall, we can say that the GP continues to develop, and the cooperation is useful. At the same time, it is far from simple. The most important problem, from our point of view, is that declarations of assistance are slow to

become reality. As is well known, at Kananaskis the GP members pledged \$20 billion over ten years. Based on this, after Kananaskis we could calculate that from 2002 to 2005, Russia would have received a sum of more than 5 billion dollars for cooperative work. In reality a lot less has been allocated. In other words, the Kananaskis promises of resources for Russia have not at all come about. Therefore during our Presidency we still see our main goal to be translating the political agreements to practical cooperation. The Russian theme for the Global Partnership this year is - "from promises to realization".

YADERNY KONTROL: At the G8 Kananaskis Summit, the decision was taken to begin Global Partnership work in Russia. Now Ukraine has become a recipient country. How do you see the prospective geographic widening of the Global Partnership, and will Russia use its experience to cooperate with other countries? For example, do you see a possibility for Russian participation in this work in the DPRK for the halt of its nuclear program through the Global Partnership framework?

KISLYAK: In principle, we support the addition of the CIS countries to the Global Partnership—this adheres to the letter and the spirit of Kananaskis. We propose that the candidate countries must have prepared project proposals that match GP objectives. In addition, they must participate in international nonproliferation regimes. Russia is ready to assist them in preparing needed projects and sharing our experience in cooperating with other G8 participants. Regarding the DPRK, they have not yet raised the question of participation in the GP.

YADERNY KONTROL: How would you evaluate the present level of Russian-American cooperative threat reduction activities? How do you evaluate progress and success in solving long-term problems such as nuclear liability and access to sensitive nuclear facilities? Is there now more understanding between the two countries on these questions? How do you evaluate the future of bilateral cooperation?

KISLYAK: The relationship with the American side is developing.

YADERNY KONTROL: At the Bratislava Summit, Presidents Putin and Bush agreed to develop a partnership and cooperative work in the nuclear security area, the pre-

vention of nuclear terrorism, the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1540, and the conversion of research reactors from highly enriched to low enriched uranium fuel. What progress has been made in this sphere since the two Presidents met in Slovakia?

KISLYAK: Recently, we have made a bilateral Senior Interagency Working group to address issues of cooperation on nuclear security (including the disposition of fissile material no longer needed for defense purposes) was established and is chaired by the heads of Rosatom and the U.S. Department of Energy (currently Sergei Kirienko and Samuel Bodman). In 2005, a five-year plan was agreed upon to return all highly enriched fuel from Russian and U.S. origin research reactors in third countries. Russian-origin fuel is in 17 countries, 14 of which have agreed to return the fuel, except Egypt, DPRK and China. At present, fresh fuel has been returned from 7 countries. Countries that have nuclear reactors operating with highly enriched uranium are asking for help with conversion to low-enriched fuel. Russia and the United States have conducted an active dialogue about the question of implementing UNSC Resolution 1540, including in the Security Council committee meetings, in the G8, and in the framework on nonproliferation and export control forums. One of the central questions in this dialogue at the moment is the extension of the mandate of the 1540 committee for another two years (until April 28, 2008). 1540 is an important instrument of cooperation and needs to be fulfilled by all states.

YADERNY KONTROL: Do you see a possibility for the UN member states, as they fulfill their 1540 obligations, to gain assistance from the Global Partnership (for example, funding for this work in addition to the pledged \$20 billion)?

KISLYAK: In principle, we are ready to examine what can be done using the potential of the Global Partnership in order to help states fulfill their obligations under UNSC Resolution 1540 (for example, as regards the physical security of nuclear and other WMD-related materials). At the same time, to give a general answer to a general question is an unthankful task. Everything depends on whether the concrete needs and requests by potential recipients match the goals and principles of the Global Partnership.

Interview

**VIKTOR ZAVARZIN:
"RUSSIA'S MILITARY
PRESENCE IN CENTRAL ASIA
WILL HELP STABILIZE
THE REGION".**

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State Duma Defense Committee Chairman Viktor Zavarzin was interviewed by PIR Center Consultant correspondent Sergei Mursankov.

YADERNY KONTROL: Not long ago the State Duma adopted a law on non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that garnered a lot of attention both in Russia and abroad. Some even tried to use this fact to cast doubt on the very possibility that Russia could hold the G8 presidency. What is your relationship to this bill? In your opinion, what role should NGOs play in the formulation of Russian defense policy?

ZAVARZIN: Yes, you are right; this law attracted a great deal of attention, and not just in Russia. For example, on January 25, 2006, it was considered at a session of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, which decided by a small majority of votes that the law does not meet the criteria of the Council of Europe. I think that this shows that the European parliamentarians do not fully understand the aims and objectives of this document. As President Putin noted during his recent meeting with German Chancellor Angela Merkel, "One of the primary objectives of the law on NGOs is to exclude opaque forms of funding domestic political activity in Russia."

In answer to your question, I would first like to note that NGOs have played and continue to play an important role in the establishment of a civil society in Russia. However, we have to separate the wheat from the chaff. NGOs should be differentiated according to their activities, aims,

and objectives as set down in their founding charters. If these aims do not violate Russian laws and the organization's activities and funding are transparent and directed at, for example, the development of science, culture, education, or other issues important to society, then we can only welcome the activities of such organizations. As for the role of NGOs in defense policy, there are a number of organizations that undertake fairly detailed analyses of current global security threats and challenges. Their conclusions are taken into consideration when formulating Russian defense policy. The cooperation of government agencies with these types of NGOs can help improve understanding of the substance and mechanics of threats, and help in the search for effective means to counter them. As they say, two heads are better than one. Thus taking into account NGO opinions and the results of their work in this area can contribute to the formulation of Russian defense policy.

YADERNY KONTROL: The PIR Center, in our opinion, offers a good example of a constructive approach towards NGO participation in the events leading up to Russia's G8 chairmanship. In coordination with the Russian presidential administration and the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, we are preparing to hold an international conference - "Global Security and the G8: Challenges and Interests. On the Way to the St. Petersburg Summit" - in Moscow from April 20-22, 2006. The aim of the conference, held two months prior to the beginning of the summit, is to discuss the questions that the G8 leaders will face in St. Petersburg, to have an exchange of opinions between representatives of government agencies and leaders from the international expert community and business community, and to concentrate on practical recommendations. We hope that you will not only be our guest there, but also an active participant in this conference.

ZAVARZIN: I accept your invitation with pleasure. I think that holding this sort of conference will only help to solve the problems Russia is facing as G8 chairman this year.

YADERNY KONTROL: We would like to propose that your conference participation include giving a report in the breakout session on "Security Challenges in Central Asia." You have dedicated several

years of your life to the problem of stabilizing this region. Of course, we will learn about your views of the situation in more detail at the session. For the moment, however, if you could briefly tell us: What is the significance of Central Asia for Russia today and what do you consider to be the fundamental challenges to security in the region?

ZAVARZIN: At the present time, Central Asia is one of the most problematic regions in the post-Soviet space. The authorities in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan are facing growing socioeconomic, interethnic, and interclan contradictions ever more frequently. The challenge to the governments of Central Asian states from local Islamic circles remains as well. The region is also faced by threats from its southern neighbors in the form of the growth of the forces of international terrorism and drug trafficking. The tensions between neighbors in the region created by unilateral actions to "strengthen borders," mutual territorial claims, and interethnic conflicts are also well known.

There is either no system of mutually complementary economic ties, particularly in the joint use of energy, water, and other resources, or it constantly breaks down. Pragmatic, commercial interests have come to the fore. Hence the periodic use of the tactic of gas, transport, customs, energy, and even food blockades (for example, in the "gas war" between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan). The speed and aims of the economic reforms being undertaken in the Central Asian states differ substantially. Economic policy continues to be based on a desire to modernize and become integrated in the global economy through the development of raw materials.

Unfortunately, the mutual relations between heads of state in the region are not always rational. The variety of their regional and international foreign policy philosophies plays a significant role in this regard.

The issue of security continues to be a difficult one for countries in the region, since they all feel vulnerable not only to external action, but also to internal cataclysms. This is clearly demonstrated, for example, by the harsh, forceful suppression of the armed rebellion in Uzbekistan in 2005, as well as by the fact that the Islamic proj-

ect in Kyrgyzstan was ignored by the country's new elite after the forceful elimination of the Akayev regime.

Given this situation, of the political tasks facing Russia in Central Asia, I would emphasize, first of all, the development of a realizable, integrated strategy of interaction with the states in the region and the goal of long-term stabilization. I believe that it is necessary to retain our political presence and increase our economic presence in the region (following the example of the agreement between Gazprom and the Tajik government of 2003 on the right to Turkmen gas for 25 years, as well as the long-term agreement between Russia and Uzbekistan on Russian development of gas fields for 35 years). It makes sense to increase participation in new infrastructure and energy projects in the region, as well as in the development of promising oil and uranium deposits.

The development of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which can make a real claim to the role of a collective deterrent force in Eurasia, would make a great contribution to regional stability. After all, this intergovernmental organization, which was formed on June 15, 2001, in Shanghai at the initiative of China, Russia, and the four Central Asian states, unites countries with a combined territory of more than 30 million square kilometers (three fifths of the total area of the Eurasian continent). Its population is nearly 1.5 billion, or approximately one fourth of the population of the entire world. If the political and military leaders of SCO member states were to coordinate their policy in the security sphere, and adhere to the principles they signed onto in the Shanghai Convention on Combating Terrorism, Separatism, and Extremism, which forms the legal basis for collective action by all of the region's countries against the threats and challenges they face, then they would be able to achieve impressive results.

The capabilities of SCO member nations are truly great but, as our president noted at the last SCO summit, "they must be converted into real returns." And it is critically important to remain faithful to the so-called "spirit of Shanghai," which includes mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality, respect for each other's interests and opinions, mutual consultation, obtaining mutual understanding through consen-

sus, and voluntarily carrying out the agreements that have been reached.

Russia's military presence in the region and its growth, particularly within the framework of the Collective Security Treaty Organizations (CSTO), would also contribute to the stabilization of Central Asia, and could be aimed at neutralizing the American strategic advantage and having a restraining influence on American forces in the Persian Gulf and Afghanistan should U.S.-Iranian or U.S.-Chinese relations become aggravated. Russia needs to strengthen and expand its unified defense with its CSTO allies in order to maintain its territorial integrity, protect itself from terrorist and other external threats, retain its sovereign rights in the area of natural resources, and control vitally important transportation infrastructure.

There are other, no less important tasks that must also be undertaken. This includes combating drug trafficking, maintaining strict control over the problem of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction from the region, and a number of other problems. In order to succeed in these areas, as I already noted, we must develop all-embracing cooperation with the countries of the region.

YADERNY KONTROL: Another topic, to which you have devoted part of your life in practical work, is Russia-NATO relations. What do you envision as possible avenues for future cooperation, and what obstacles are there to such cooperation?

ZAVARZIN: The quality of Russia-NATO relations is improving. This is primarily happening thanks to the creation of the Russia-NATO Council (RNC). Today there are no great political problems that could prevent the further growth of political dialogue and the development of purely practical measures to facilitate an increase in Euro-Atlantic security.

The Council's format makes it possible for us to speak frankly about remaining problems, including some very sensitive questions. We are able to reach joint solutions that take into account the interests of all parties.

A whole series of studies and evaluations on how Russia and NATO can cooperate in practice have been prepared. Some of these proposals have been evaluated during

the course of joint exercises. The results have been positive and are encouraging.

I would like to mention military cooperation with particular satisfaction. The number of joint measures and training exercises is increasing. It is constructive that we have begun to evaluate in practice a lot of the theoretical work on cooperation. Beginning this year, for the first time since the withdrawal of the Russian contingent from the Balkans, our servicemen have been participating together in counterterrorist operations in the Mediterranean.

However, at the present time, in my opinion, there are some difficult areas in our relations with the alliance that require additional momentum in order for us jointly to move forward and find effective mechanisms to push forward in these realms, or we will have to conclude work in these areas and concentrate our main efforts in more promising ones. That is to say, we need a sort of fresh start. We need some revision in particular areas of cooperation. This state of affairs has largely arisen for good reasons: the aims and objectives of the Rome Declaration were fairly cautious, given the newness of the measure, and by now have been basically realized. Now the question of moving to the next, more advanced phase of cooperation is on the agenda: to operational cooperation between Russia and NATO in response to new threats and challenges.

Here the tasks of further strengthening mutual confidence and transparency, taking all facets of each others' interests into account, along with the inadmissibility of applying double standards are undoubtedly critically important for strengthening the stability and predictability of our relations.

Both in the Russian leadership and in the State Duma the constructive response of the NATO General Secretary to our concerns related to the modernization of military infrastructure in the Baltic countries was greatly appreciated. We took note of the confirmation of the obligations of the Founding Act not to position nuclear weapons on the territories of new NATO members, not to deploy substantial military forces there, and also not to create infrastructure for these purposes.

I have a positive view of the Alliance's readiness to be transparent regarding issues related to the modernization of military infrastructure in the Baltic states. The

work that has begun in the Baltic states to develop and modernize airfields, naval bases, and test ranges was naturally viewed in our country with caution. After all, we are talking about a region where, it would seem, there are no real military security threats today, and no crises or major conflicts are foreseen.

Since NATO has now reached our borders (in principle one cannot exclude the possibility of incidents in the air or at sea, even for purely technical reasons such as adverse weather conditions and the like), it makes sense for us to work together to develop additional measures to avert possible incidents arising from the operation of contingents of Russian and NATO armed forces so near each other.

The launch of such measures to increase confidence and transparency, and to avert incidents, would allow us to ensure the precise coordination of flights by our civil and military aircraft, to work out an effective defense system should ships make unsanctioned deviations from their routes or be seized by terrorists, as well as for acute emergencies.

The creation of a common system to monitor the air situation and air traffic control in the Baltic region would be a significant first step towards building confidence.

We also need to keep working in such promising areas as the compatibility of theater missile defense systems. We are prepared for greater cooperation in a number of areas of military and related technical activities, and on issues related to the operational compatibility of the Russian Armed Forces and NATO.

It must be noted, though, that there are still issues in our relations about which we hold divergent positions. First of all, this concerns the Adapted Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty). It seems to me that NATO is artificially tying the ratification of this agreement to Russian fulfillment of the unrelated, so-called "Istanbul Commitments" to Georgia and Moldova. Moreover, Russia has already ratified the Treaty. This Treaty is not more important to us than it is to NATO, and its collapse will not be an irreplaceable loss for Russia.

We are still concerned over NATO expansion. This process affects Russia's political, military, and to a certain extent economic

interests. And this is tied to the fact that the Baltic countries are not members of the CFE Treaty, while the situation in Latvia and Estonia with regards to discrimination faced by the Russian-speaking population remains acute.

NATO accepted new members with all of their delicate domestic problems and unresolved questions, and thus took responsibility for their solution.

This factor puts a certain stamp on the development of the Russian-NATO partnership as well. It is time for NATO to be converted from a purely military organization into a political one.

And now our primary task is to convert the "Russia-NATO" mechanism from a political force, which is already playing an important role in forming the spirit of the current system of international relations, into a force that will determine the practical actions of the Alliance and Russia in the military sphere.

Cooperation between the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and NATO could make a noticeable contribution to increasing the effectiveness of work in the areas of anti-terrorism and rebuilding Afghanistan. The CSTO has some positive experience in solving these problems. At the end of May 2005, consultations at the level of deputy foreign and defense ministers and national security council secretaries of the CSTO countries took place, at which the question of coordinating joint activity in the post-conflict development of Afghanistan was discussed, among others. It goes without saying that both organizations would benefit from cooperation in this area and it could demonstrate their unity in solving security issues in the Central Asian region. We are also in favor of a variety of types of mechanisms for this sort of cooperation.

YADERNY KONTROL: Could you briefly sum up the work of the Committee in 2005 and indicate what the Defense Committee is working on today?

ZAVARZIN: The Committee examined more than 200 bills in 2005. I will not subject you to an enumeration of these bills, but will instead draw your attention to the areas that are, in our opinion, extremely important.

One area of the Defense Committee's work during the fall session was in the area of

legislation to improve the quality of officer training.

Creating conditions for the scientific and pedagogical growth of the professorial and teaching staff of military educational establishments was critical to the solution of this problem.

For many years this problem has not been dealt with. However, this year the Committee succeeded in getting the government to agree that in 2006, scientific and pedagogical staff of military schools who have scientific degrees could obtain military ranks one level above their current positions up to and including the rank of colonel, and monthly payments for scientific degrees will be 3,000 rubles for Candidates of Science and 7,000 for Doctorates of Science. Furthermore, servicemen who work as docents and professors will obtain salary increases of 40% and 60 %, respectively.

The Committee has worked actively and continues to work to adjust servicemen's pensions to the cost of living. In fact, the Committee has now drawn fire for its position on this question. We have to maintain a constant, forthright dialogue with the government, the Supreme Court, and the General Prosecutor's office.

This is a very difficult question. It is worth about 60 billion rubles. There is no simple solution. However, this issue cannot be left quiet and must be solved.

The State Duma succeeded in persuading the Russian Government to index servicemen's service pay (and military pensions) as follows:

- beginning January 1, 2006 - by 15%,
- beginning January 1, 2007 - by 10%,
- beginning January 1, 2007 - by 15%, and
- beginning January 1, 2008 - by 15%.

The State Duma has provided funding for the service pay increase in 2006.

Another acute problem that the Committee worked on during the fall session was the issue of the application of correctional custody to servicemen, i.e., military confinement.

At the current time, questions of criminality and discipline in the Russian Armed Forces have become particularly serious. Therefore, we view the adoption of the bill

On Procedures for Applying Correctional Custody to Servicemen in the first reading as extremely important. The point of the bill is that it requires that disciplinary action in the form of correctional custody be applied to servicemen and citizens called up for military duty on the basis of a court decision.

Yet one more critical problem that the Committee is constantly working on is military housing.

Today, about 160,500 military families need housing. Of this number, 80,600 families need permanent housing, about 50,000 need service housing and 31,000 families need better housing.

This problem will be solved in the following ways:

First. The establishment of a fund for service housing for authorized personnel. In 2006 the fund will increase by 19,000 apartments and will reach the level of over 200,000. In total, prospective troops (forces) will need approximately 480,000 service apartments.

Second. The receipt of housing by servicemen through a savings/mortgage system. All of the legislation necessary for the realization of this method of housing provision has been developed.

Over the course of two years, servicemen participating in the program will each receive 77,600 rubles in individual savings accounts: 37,000 rubles this year and 40,600 rubles next year. One billion rubles were allocated for this program in 2005 and 3.3 billion rubles in 2006.

Third. The provision of permanent housing to servicemen by the usual means, i.e., the assignment of housing as property through its purchase and construction by the Ministry of Defense or through the State Housing Certificate program.

Unfortunately, funding levels do not provide for the amount of housing that is demanded.

10.4 billion rubles have been provided for housing in 2006, making it possible to obtain about 7,900 apartments. This is only slightly above 2005 levels. Basically, the reduction in the effectiveness of direct investment in housing is related to the fact that real estate has overtaken the rate of growth of investments in fixed capital. While investments grew 1.7 times between

2001 and 2006, the mean cost of a serviceman's apartment grew 2.55 times during this period.

6.2 billion rubles are planned for the acquisition of housing through the State Housing Certificate program. This is equivalent to about 7,800 certificates [a type of promissory note - trans.], which is not enough to meet the needs of all of those discharged in 2006. The additional needs equal approximately 3.2 billion rubles, or 4,000 certificates.

This problem can be partially solved through to the release in the fourth quarter of 2006 of an additional amount of certificates that will amortize in 2007. A similar method was used in 2004.

As is well known, the mean market value of a square meter of housing varies, and often differs from the amount in the certificates. While this difference may not be large in smaller regions, in the center this difference poses insurmountable problems in the acquisition of housing. In order to bring the value of the certificates closer to the real cost of housing the president has set the objective of allocating an additional 15 billion rubles in 2006.

However, insufficient funding is only one of the problems. We believe that even with current funding levels a more rational use of funds would make it possible to get better results.

At the present time a substantial portion of the funds allocated by the Ministry of Defense is expended on the upkeep of

housing used by citizens who have lost all ties to the military. We believe that we need a program, with the appropriate funding, for the accelerated transfer of such housing stock to local municipal governments.

What bothers us? First, that the initiation of the savings/mortgage system is being superimposed on existing housing problems. Without the means to provide housing to those who by law have a right to it today, the government has begun to set aside quite substantial sums for those who will only obtain a right to housing in a minimum of 10 years, and the majority - in 20 years.

In the second place, there is no guarantee that market prices for housing will allow servicemen to acquire dignified housing with the funds they have accumulated in the foreseeable future.

I will not go on. I will only say that the problem of military housing is complicated and it will take a fairly long time to solve it. Alas, we should not expect easy victories and quick results. But we will work. Walk and ye shall reach your destination.

At the current time the Committee is considering over 30 bills. They concern all of the main areas of legislation related to military activity. We are also convinced that we need to pay special attention to issues related to the provision of servicemen's social welfare, the housing problem, the funding of the armed forces, and others.

Interview

**Valentin Sobolev:
“WE MUST COMBAT
THE SOURCES OF TERROR-
ISM, NOT ITS CONSE-
QUENCES”**

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Deputy Secretary of the Russian Federation Security Council Valentin Sobolev answered the questions of PIR Center Director, Yaderny Kontrol editor-in-chief Vladimir Orlov.

YADERNY KONTROL: For Russia, terrorism is not a new phenomenon. At the same time, not so very long ago – during the Cold War – this concept was in no way associated with our country. Now Russia is in the top portion of the list of countries most affected by the terrorist threat. What do you see as the basic reasons for this change?

SOBOLEV: For Russia, the word “terrorism” has been well known for a long time. To take a historical view, one can point to individuals like Karakozov, who shot the tsar; or Alexander Ulianov, Lenin’s brother, who planned the assassination; left socialist revolutionaries; Savinkov; or the White and Red terror. These are more than just names. The people who lived at that time suffered a great deal of tragedy; there were a great many victims, and a lot of blood flowed.

During the Cold War period Soviet territory was relatively peaceful; where terrorist acts were concerned, it was far more peaceful than anywhere else in the world. There was just one atrocious act. In January 1977, Armenian nationalists (the “Zatikian Group”) set off explosives in the Moscow subway, in which children were returning from New Year’s celebrations. Approximately two dozen people were killed.

In general, at a time when bombs were exploding in the Bologna railway station,

the Red Brigades were plotting acts in Germany, Irish terrorists were active in the United Kingdom, and Basques were carrying out terrorist acts in Spain, Moscow viewed terrorism as a very far-away and insubstantial threat.

The Soviets’ lack of concern regarding terrorism was due to a number of reasons. Primarily, the “iron curtain” that then existed prevented the free exchange of ideas between countries. And, of course, the fairly strong authoritarian regime and powerful security services and law enforcement responded to every sign of such an event in time and did not let society feel threatened.

However, the situation changed with the advent of perestroika, when the Soviet Union ceased to exist in the form that it had taken up to that time. The conflicts that then erupted were chiefly based on ethnic grounds: there was the conflict in the Ferghana Valley (Uzbekistan) where Meskhetian Turks were beaten up, the conflict in Sumgait (Azerbaijan) between the Azeri and Armenian populations, and a virtual civil war in Tajikistan. All of this changed the Russian government’s view of terrorism and the perception of the problem within Russia.

The conflicts then shifted to the Northern and Southern Caucasus. Moreover, they occurred both on the territory of the Russian Federation (the Ingush-Ossetian conflict) and outside of Russian borders, on the territory of South Ossetia, Abkhazia, and Nagorny Karabakh. It is precisely at this time that the nationalists first made political demands and more radical religious groups appeared.

In addition to the separatist demands to which we were already accustomed, for partitioning a region from Russia, we then confronted a new demand for the first time: the creation of a so-called “global Islamic Caliphate.” As you know, that is the formula we hear from Al Qaeda to this day.

We should recognize that in Russia, which has a significant Muslim community, particularly in the border regions near the Caucasus and Central Asia as well as along the Volga, this idea has gained some support, in the absence of political will and economic stability. The forces that are driving this issue, and drawing the maps of the area to be covered by the Caliphate

(the North Caucasus and Volga region), have been concentrated in the Chechen Republic.

YADERNY KONTROL: Valentin Aleksevich, when did it become clear that we need to act against well-organized, trained, funded, and motivated international terrorists, and not just individual bandit formations?

SOBOLEV: Already in 1994, when the decision was made to conduct an operation to restore constitutional order in the Chechen republic, it became abundantly clear that those driving and organizing the attempts to create a Caliphate were not just Chechen extremists, but included a multinational group of international terrorists. We received information at the time that representatives of more than 50 countries were then fighting alongside the Chechens. The majority came from the Middle East and Central Asia, but there were also representatives of non-Muslim countries. A significant portion of them had been trained in combat skills and received political indoctrination in camps in Afghanistan. Their Taliban instructors taught them military combat skills, sabotage, and radical Islamism. We later received proof of the validity of this information from prisoners of war and deserters.

Thus, already in the first half of the 1990s Russia recognized the real threat posed by the aggregation of terrorist organizations. In 1995, at the G7 plus 1 summit in Halifax (Canada), Russia made a statement regarding the real threat posed by the consolidation of terrorist groups in the Northern Caucasus, not just to Russia itself, but also to the entire world. Unfortunately, the appeal was not fully appreciated by the politicians, many of whom would not see the threat as real for some time to come.

It took the events of September 11 in New York and Washington for politicians to realize the scale of the threat. After these terrorist acts an international counterterrorist coalition was formed in which Russia participates to this day.

In September 2001, the United Nations passed Resolution 1336, setting forth the principles that U.N. member countries should apply when dealing with terrorism. This was quite a challenge, as the international community, since the time of the

League of Nations, has not even been able to agree on a definition of the word "terrorism." However, step by step a system was formed that allows us to counter terrorism fairly effectively today.

Further, in September 2005 the United Nations passed another resolution that can be summarized as "judge or extradite." Its point is that terrorism cannot go unpunished. This principle was confirmed in the Gleneagles (United Kingdom) G8 statement emphasizing the fact that no country has the right to use any terrorist contacts for political aims.

The threat of terrorism today is also multiplying because, despite global progress and improving international relations, our world remains very vulnerable.

YADERNY KONTROL: What, in your opinion, are the particular features that characterize contemporary terrorism?

SOBOLEV: First, there is its increasing geographical reach and the internationalization of terrorism. Further, there is its brutality and focus. Terrorists of the late 19th and early 20th centuries were loners who primarily shot at political leaders. Today's terrorist targets are completely different. They include civilians, children, cultural and religious sites, and places where a lot of people gather. The goal is new: to scare people.

The number of suicide bombers is growing. Furthermore, in the past three years the number of "shahids" (martyrs) has grown nearly 20-fold. Suicide bombers cause the most damage. Just look at the fact that only 5% of all terrorist acts involve the use of shahids with explosives, yet they account for 70% of all victims. Moreover, it is very difficult to counter terrorist acts committed by a kamikaze or shahid.

Another distinguishing feature of contemporary terrorism that must be noted is the attempts to obtain and, of course, use either WMD or its components. Unfortunately, it's not just that intelligence services have this sort of information; there have been actual incidents involving the use of chemicals. Today we probably cannot say that terrorists are in possession of nuclear weapons. However, the possibility that a terrorist might build or purchase a "dirty bomb" is very real.

Yet another distinguishing feature of modern terrorism is "cyberterrorism." Many experts believe that the consequences of an attack on telecommunications or electronic management systems could be comparable to the results of a WMD attack.

The terrorists are in tune with global developments, and exotic new terms such as ecoterrorism and agroterrorism have come into being. Here terrorists are both making use of and playing with the real problems the global community is facing (such as environmental problems), blackmailing people by threatening to explode oil refineries, oil and gas pipelines, and other facilities posing toxic threats.

These threats are global. Consequently, there is a need to unite global efforts to combat the contemporary "Terrorist Internationale." Russia's leaders fully realize this and are working in this direction together with other countries.

YADERNY KONTROL: What are the basic areas of Russian endeavors in the area of combating terrorism?

SOBOLEV: As I already noted, Russia is an active participant in the counterterrorist coalition. We believe that the United Nations should take the leading role in fighting terrorism. At the same time, Russia is also active in regional counterterrorist groups such as the CIS Antiterrorist Center, Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).

Russia maintains bilateral relations with practically every country in the world that has experienced what terrorism really is. Primarily, these are the states on the territory of the former Soviet Union. In addition, there is the United States, Israel, Germany, France, and the United Kingdom. It is no accident that Russia has already hosted four major international conferences on this issue for intelligence and law enforcement agencies from various countries. In 2006 Kazan, the capital of Tatarstan, will host the fifth such conference, with representatives of over 80 countries expected to attend.

Terrorism knows no mercy. And governments should respond to terrorists in kind. Terrorists demands concessions and political compromises that we must in no way entertain, something the Russian Federation has learned through bitter expe-

rience. Negotiating with terrorists is possible and necessary only for one purpose: to ease the plight of hostages and to rescue them. Any other concessions only encourage the further growth of terrorism and result in even more brutal and audacious demands.

As an example I'd like to recall Russia's experience in Chechnya. In 1996, the Khasavyurt Agreement was signed by the then leadership of the so-called Chechen Republic of Ichkeria and Russia. They agreed that over the course of five years: Ichkeria committed to disarming, remaining under the legal jurisdiction of Russia, and holding a general referendum to decide whether the population wanted to stay within the Russian Federation or leave Russia.

What actually happened after the Khasavyurt Agreement? We saw that the Chechen leaders used this time for the further arming and training of its fighters. Instead of the promised legal jurisdiction of the Russian Federation, sharia courts started operating in the Chechen republic together with public executions. We saw that mercenaries from all over the world were coming back to Chechnya for training and, apparently, were being prepared to undertake terrorist attacks.

All of this led up to the events of August 1999, when a group of well-trained, well-equipped bandits and mercenaries from all over the world infiltrated not Chechnya, but Dagestan, to try to implement their ideology in practice and create an Islamic Caliphate by force. The Russian Federation responded by initiating counterterrorist operations in Chechnya in the fall of 1999.

Or we can take another example: the bloody terrorist attacks on the Spanish subway stations and trains. Two weeks after the attacks, which took place on March 11, 2004, Spain held elections and the ruling party lost. The terrorists quickly claimed credit for these changes. A few months later, terrorists seized Spanish hostages in Iraq and demanded that the Spanish government withdraw its nearly 1,000 troops participating in the antiterrorist operation. The Spanish government made such a decision, after which the number of hostages taken in Iraq multiplied dramatically.

YADERNY KONTROL: One more problem related to terrorism is the issue of ter-

rorist funding. In your opinion, how can we combat this phenomenon?

SOBOLEV: There are various estimates of the volume of terrorist funding. Some experts say that about \$20 billion are expended on these aims. The IMF has stated that the sum is about \$50 billion. From our experience in Chechnya, we know that when the terrorists run out of money half of the bandits come down from the mountains and go home. After receiving large sums the number of bandit groups mushrooms.

After the terrorist acts of September 11, 2001 U.S. law enforcement agencies identified \$32 billion that their information indicated could be intended for use by terrorists, and froze these funds. However, about \$150 million of this amount remains the subject of legal proceedings to this day. And as a rule, the government does not win these legal cases. As one U.S. congressman joked, "Trying to starve the terrorists of money is like trying to catch one kind of fish by draining the ocean."

Today the most radical Muslim extremists use the informal "havala" funds transfer system, in which money does not physically cross any borders. To expose, and particularly to document and assess penalties for such operations is extremely complex.

However, the problem needs to be addressed, and in principle it is clear how this must be done. This primarily means improving legislation to allow the government to intervene constructively and create barriers to terrorist funding. It is also important that these efforts not be undertaken by one country alone, but by the global community in concert.

Where does the money that is used to fund international terrorism come from? First, there are several foundations and international organizations, mostly of a radical Muslim nature. Another portion comes from the sponsorship that, unfortunately, quite a number of rich people from a variety of nations provide for personal or political reasons. In addition, there is the money that terrorists traditionally receive from transnational organized crime.

If we look at a map we can identify an "arc of instability" from the Philippines and Thailand through the Indian subcontinent, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia, and then the Caucasus, the Middle

East, and Kosovo. This is the arc along which the largest number of terrorist attacks is concentrated. If we look at the routes used by drug traffickers, leading from the main drug producing locations, we can identify the Golden Triangle, as it used to be called (where the borders of Myanmar, Thailand, Laos, and China meet), and the Golden Crescent (Pakistan and Afghanistan). The drug routes continue further through Central Asia and either through the Balkans or in a more northerly direction. And we see that this geography is the same as the arc of political instability. Drug trafficking involves huge sums of money; there is hard data indicating that a significant proportion ends up in the pockets of terrorists.

We can also consider a number of other types of crimes here as well, such as illegal arms sales, human trafficking, kidnapping, and racketeering. Terrorists fairly often make use of these types of criminal enterprises as well.

YADERNY KONTROL: Combating terrorism and human rights. What do you see as the relationship between these two concepts?

SOBOLEV: Given the increase in international terrorism on the one hand, and the need for state security services to act in a preemptive, preventive fashion on the other, there is a clear need to toughen some of the norms, related to human rights, to which democratic countries have become accustomed. There is some conflict here: the government must put limits on society and individual rights in order to preserve the most basic right: the right to life.

YADERNY KONTROL: Then could we examine another such conflict: between the fight against terrorism and freedom of the press?

SOBOLEV: Mrs. Thatcher once said that publicity is the oxygen of terrorism. When terrorists take hostages, often their first demand is not financial or political, but to give them a microphone.

There is an old, but illustrative example of this. In 1975, the West German radical leftist Baader-Meinhoff group took a politician hostage and demanded that the government release some of its comrades in arms from prison. The political decision was made to release the prisoners. The terror-

ists then came up with an additional demand: television coverage of the entire release process, from the escort to the aircraft to the walk up the ramp. Each of the freed prisoners was given the right to make a political statement on the ramp, and made use of this opportunity. Later the directors of the German television companies admitted that for 72 hours they lost control of their own media.

There are additional examples like this that can be cited. For instance, the live coverage of the events at the Nord Ost Theater in Moscow should also be seen as extremely negative. Television did a lot to popularize the terrorists, helped them spread their propaganda, and allowed them to play with the feelings of the hostages' relatives.

On the other hand, the media coverage of the terrorist acts in London in 2005 is one of the best examples of the media acting in a very thoughtful and humane manner to protect the rights of those who deserved protection, and not the terrorists.

Of course the press does not simply relay information. Journalism operates according to its own laws. Professionalism and civic responsibility should be the main criteria a journalist uses to determine the fine line between the right to obtain and disseminate information and the unwitting sponsoring of terrorism.

International terrorism is not a petrified relic. It constantly evolves, and seeks out new forms. Therefore the system of countering terrorism must also be constantly evolving. This is precisely why in recent years many countries have restructured their intelligence services, improving their coordination and amending the laws that underpin them.

We are trying to do the same thing here in Russia. In February 2006 legislators adopted a new law on counterterrorism. A presidential decree set up a new chain of command responsible for the coordination of counterterrorism activities. It is led by a national counterterrorism committee headed by the director of the FSB. The committee includes 19 ministers and agency heads – heads of the so-called “power ministries” as well as ministries such as health, finance, and economics. Counterterrorism commissions have been established in Russia's regions and provinces; they are headed by governors and regional chief executives. Under the national counterter-

rorism committee a federal operations center has been set up with the job of developing and carrying out specific counterterrorism operations in case of terrorist acts.

I'd like to stress once again that terrorists have no nationality and no religion. Therefore we need to establish a system to bring together states, intelligence services, civil society, and the business community that could be called upon to provide a reliable defense against terrorism. Russia, which stands between the East and the West, is ready to play a role in this process in order to prevent a clash of civilizations.

YADERNY KONTROL: Today it is accepted to speak of “international terrorism.” When this all started, Russia did not like the word “international.” We believed that terrorism was “local” or “Chechen.” Then it turned out that this was far from the truth and that the term “international” better reflects the actual situation. This leads me to ask about the role of Al-Qaeda, much discussed within the expert community and among journalists who deal with the problem of terrorism. Some assert that Al-Qaeda exists, while others say that Al-Qaeda is just a “brand name” used by many other terrorist organizations. What is your opinion in this regard?

YADERNY KONTROL: Without a doubt, Al Qaeda is a combat organization that was created at a particular moment in history and was needed by particular political forces in order to combat Soviet troops in Afghanistan. Of course, at that time it was funded by certain states that had a stake in the process. In addition there were the funds of a well-known person who was already wealthy then and accumulated a great fortune later. At the time it was a combat organization with particular objectives and a clear and direct chain of command.

Today the structure of Al Qaeda is clearly quite different. A question of special interest to experts, politicians, and political scientists is the character of organizational ties within the Al Qaeda organization at the current time.

At present nearly any terrorist attack, especially if it is tied to radical Islamism, is automatically attributed to Al Qaeda. However, Spanish intelligence agencies investigating the terrible terrorist attacks in the subway have yet to identify any links

between the events in question and Al Qaeda.

In my view the European part of Al Qaeda today is a dispersed system of self-organizing and self-radicalizing cells. However, thanks to their ethnic and religious characteristics these cells are capable of setting up vertical and horizontal links among themselves at any time, including access to Al Qaeda.

According to U.S. experts, since 2002 Al Qaeda itself has been directly responsible for carrying out several dozen terrorist attacks that caused over 700 deaths. Sixty-seven suicide bombers were used in these attacks.

Today Al Qaeda has a new precept that has been added to its ideology and is being successfully spread among its cells. Along with the idea of creating a global Islamic Caliphate there is a new "tactical" goal that has been announced: to push the United States, its armed forces, and its allies out of the territories of Muslim nations, primarily in the Middle East, and also in Central Asia.

Today Al Qaeda is quite successful in acting as the main ideologist and main sponsor of international terrorism. It is still the largest and richest of the terrorist organizations. But I would not say that all Islamist terrorist organizations are directly coordinated from Al Qaeda headquarters.

YADERNY KONTROL: It is well known that about 20 million Muslims live in the Russian Federation. Are you aware of any Islamist movements in this huge group of people?

SOBOLEV: Yes, without a doubt. Intelligence and law enforcement agencies are well aware that this environment attracts international terrorist organizations and that they are working in this milieu.

Furthermore, the intelligence agencies have uncovered specific instances where religion, particularly Wahhabism, has been used not only to spread ideology but also to recruit people for terrorist organizations. Indeed, it is well known that in Germany the Federal Intelligence Service (BND), Federal Agency for the Protection of the Constitution (BFF), and the German police are working in this area and coming to similar conclusions.

YADERNY KONTROL: One often hears experts argue that along with the measures Russia has already taken to combat terrorism it would be useful and effective to redistribute the functions of relevant agencies. Primarily between the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) and the FSB, since they say the MVD has many divisions responsible for these issues but that they do not work effectively enough. At the same time, the FSB's wealth of experience in this area would naturally increase the effectiveness of counterterrorist measures...

SOBOLEV: This is a proper and reasonable question that has always existed. No matter how hard we try, we cannot clearly separate the responsibilities of one agency from another, since the situation itself is so complex and interwoven.

As far as a redistribution of authority is concerned, I think that the FSB has enough of its own powers at this point. However, coordination among agencies, the clarity of the chain of command, and the exchange of information in real time – all of these aspects should be discussed.

YADERNY KONTROL: Until recently, counterterrorism efforts have been focused on the use of force. However, experience has shown that terrorism cannot be defeated through force alone. Is there any plan to propose to the international community, for instance at the upcoming G8 summit in St. Petersburg, that work start on the ideological front in order to debunk international terrorism, to try to neutralize the effect it has on many thousands or even millions of people in those countries that are the sources of the terrorist threat? Of course, this is a topic for a long discussion, but at the moment could you just answer "yes" or "no"?

SOBOLEV: The short answer to your question is yes. Of course, we need to fight against the root causes of terrorism, and not just its consequences. This is why the new law on combating terrorism has a different name than the previous law. Its main emphasis is on forecasting and possible preventive actions, and not interdiction and consequence management.

YADERNY KONTROL: You mentioned Russia's cooperation with European countries, and you also mentioned Central Asia. But to what extent is Russia cooperating with the countries of the Middle East, and in what areas is this interaction growing?

SOBOLEV: We have very good relations with Israeli intelligence. Of course intelligence agencies are never completely transparent with one another. But there are areas where they can cooperate. And the more closely they cooperate in combating terrorism, for instance, by exchanging information in real time, the greater their chances for success. But we are not only working with Israel. We also have a pretty good relationship with Saudi Arabia despite our divergent approaches to a number of issues, particularly where religion is concerned. We are also improving our ties with Egypt, Jordan, and Algeria. And there is no reason to hide that we are also cooperating with Palestine.

YADERNY KONTROL: You headed the Russian delegation to Iran in January 2006. Your trip was likely quite difficult – it came at a particularly difficult time in Russia's relationship with Iran, when Russia had made its proposal and our Iranian colleagues did not evince much interest in it. What is your view of the current situation and Russian-Iranian relations, now that you have been to Tehran?

SOBOLEV: First of all, we understand perfectly well that the Iranian possession of nuclear weapons would constitute a real threat to Russia, since Iran already today has delivery vehicles capable of reaching Russian territory. At the same time we absolutely recognize Iran's right, like any other NPT member state, to have its own nuclear fuel cycle. Russia is one of the depositaries of this treaty and will insist upon the strictest adherence to the treaty's provisions.

Hence our position: first, Iran's actions must be in conformity with the treaty, to which (as they aver) they are in adherence. Iran must convince the global community that it is not getting ready to produce nuclear weapons, but only nuclear energy, and after that it can undertake the establishment of the full nuclear fuel cycle.

The proposal on the creation of a joint venture outside of Iranian territory to supply the nuclear fuel needed by Iran's peaceful nuclear energy sector was based on this reasoning. Besides, at the present time Iran has just one nuclear reactor that is not yet in operation; it does not need that much fuel, and will not need it in the coming decade.

Today we are trying to convince Iran to cooperate closely with the IAEA. We are trying to keep the process within the IAEA's purview because we believe that the agency is the only organization both capable of and obliged to monitor the development of nuclear activities in Iran.

Unfortunately, Iran does not always listen to recommendations, although they have nearly always enacted them eventually. The Iranians know that we do not want anything negative. We have asked them on multiple occasions to stop the work related to centrifuges. Furthermore, their recent political announcements have been far from helpful in solving the problem. However, the fact that 164 centrifuges are in operation does not mean that they are producing or are trying to produce nuclear weapons. They reached just 5% enrichment, and it is far more difficult to enrich uranium to higher levels.

We hope that this problem will be resolved at the IAEA and by the EU-3, with the cooperation of Russia, China, and the United States. And it should be resolved in a practical and objective manner, without the imposition of sanctions that would only serve to exacerbate a regional situation that is already severe.

*This interview is based on Russian Federation Security Council Deputy Secretary Valentin Sobolev's address at a meeting of the Trialogue Club on April 13, 2006.

Analysis

**SOME THOUGHTS
ON THE EVOLUTION
OF U.S. APPROACHES
TO REGIONAL SECURITY
ISSUES IN CENTRAL ASIA**

**By Gennady Evstafiev,
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The Central Asian region is attracting the heightened attention of diplomats, political scientists, economists, and the military. During the Soviet era this region was referred to as "Soviet Central Asia and Kazakhstan," and thus was not completely considered to be a unified whole. The disintegration of the Soviet Union, which came fairly unexpectedly to both the ruling elite and the people of Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan, and the new Russian democratic leaders' neglect of these five states' vital interests in the areas of security, politics, economics and some other realms during the first years of independence, caused them to band together in order to survive under fundamentally new conditions. One consequence of this was the joint decision to call the region Central Asia. (In Russian, Soviet Central Asia was previously referred to as "Srednyaya" Asia, a name which Uzbek president Islam Karimov reportedly was willing to retain, but Kazakhstani president Nursultan Nazerbayev insisted that it be changed to "Tsentralnaya" Asia—tsentralnaya clearly implies centrality, while srednyaya also has the connotation of "middling.")

The Pentagon, with a view to the future, sees Afghanistan and the five Central Asian states as a unified whole, therefore creating a new geographic concept. It has already received an official name in Western political circles: Greater Central Asia (GCA), and the idea of creating a new Greater Central Asia Partnership (GCAP) is already developing around it.

However, some in the U.S. military are already going further than this. Here we are talking about the idea that Central Asia and the Caucasus together make up the Transcaspian region, which, in the current understanding of Pentagon strategists, is critical for the "projection of military power" in a whole series of theaters viewed as vital to the United States.

**THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION'S
VIEWS OF CENTRAL ASIAN SECURITY
IN THE 1990 AS A STARTING POINT
IN THE HISTORY OF U.S. RELATIONS
WITH THE REGION'S NEWLY
INDEPENDENT STATES**

Nearly all Western authors view Central Asia in terms of some sort of *Great Game*, a vivid expression coined in the 19th century by Rudyard Kipling to describe the situation in the region, which in many ways corresponds to present-day Central Asia, where the imperialist battles of the great powers of the day were played out. At the time the United States was not yet mature enough to participate in them. As the director of the U.S. Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute, Colonel Richard Witherspoon, wrote as early as 1996, "the paramount American stake lies in helping to ensure that Central Asia does not become a 'game gone bad'." A game gone bad is seen as one in which an interregional conflict arises that may draw in both states in the region and those outside it. What were the threats to the region in the view of American analysts in the mid-1990s?

In her work "Central Asia: A New Great Game?" Lieutenant Colonel Dianne Smith of the Strategic Studies Institute, mentioned above, writes: "The greatest threats to Central Asia are internal. The painstaking process of nation building, the legitimacy crisis, rapid social and economic transformation, environmental degradation, decolonization, ethnic diversity, and border disputes are among the sources of instability. [...] Democracy has been sacrificed at the altar of stability in all five republics. The continuing civil war in Tajikistan remains the most crucial inter-regional security threat, while the civil war in Afghanistan remains the most immediate extra-regional threat."

Smith comes to one other fairly persuasive conclusion as well. Although, in her opin-

ion, there was some instability, apparent to the whole region at the time, that provided opportunities for countries such as Iran and China to increase their influence, they understood that attempts to make use of them actively could “ricochet” back on them and therefore they, along with Russia, India, and even Pakistan, each in its own way and without rejecting the expansion of its own influence, made its own contribution to the strengthening of regional stability and security. The most convincing example of these efforts is clearly the end of the civil war in Tajikistan through the patient and balanced achievement of national reconciliation between healthy forces and the neutralization of extremist groupings. Russia, in our opinion, made a decisive contribution to the achievement of this historic compromise, something that Americans prefer not to remember.

In the 1990s, the United States viewed a strong, growing economy as a condition and prerequisite for political stability and the gradual strengthening of democracy in the Central Asian states, a fact that undoubtedly brought American and Russian views on the region’s problems somewhat closer together.

Today, ten years later, it has become clear that it was somewhat premature to conclude that “America has no vital interests in Central Asia, nor will it assume responsibility for Central Asia’s security. [...] The primary focus of the United States will be damage control—to prevent existing problems from escalating into crises.” This view was shared by many at the time.

American analysts recognized at the time that territorial integrity and political security were fairly reliably ensured by the CIS collective security agreement. But Russian assertions, though well substantiated, that Moscow believes it has special interests in Central Asia, were already being met with deaf ears and the open dissatisfaction of the American political and military establishment at the time.

At the end of the Clinton administration there were distinct signs that American policy towards Central Asia was beginning to change. In particular, there was Congress’ adoption of the so-called *Silk Road Strategy Act* in March 1999. The new legislation was aimed at “supporting the economic and political independence of

Central Asia and the South Caucasus.” An antiterrorist component to these efforts appeared only after the armed intrusion of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) into Kyrgyzstan in July-August 1999. Judging by the statements of the present U.S. ambassador to Bishkek, the Americans continue to exploit this fact to this day, declaring that IMU presents the greatest threat to U.S. interests in Central Asia.

**THE GEORGE W. BUSH
ADMINISTRATION: RETHINKING
FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITIES
AND STRATEGIC METHODS**

The majority of political analysts initially underappreciated the Republicans’ rise to power in 2001. Factoring in the presence of many influential members from the first Bush administration in the second Bush administration, they believed that there would essentially be a continuity of foreign and defense policy, and a return to the assumptions and concepts that predominated under the first President Bush. However, this belief ignored some crucial facts. In the eight years during which they were not in power, the ruling group of Republicans had conducted a comprehensive analysis of the global situation after the collapse of the Soviet Union and concluded that the era of the nearly complete domination of the United States had arrived. The well-known American journalist James Mann writes that hopes for continuity of policy were not realized. “From its first months in office the new Bush foreign policy team made clear that it would deal with the world in new ways. Its style was, from the outset, at variance with that of the first Bush administration... It displayed a pronounced skepticism about the value of international agreements and treaties that it believed were not in the American interest.”

Making use of the broad solidarity with the American people that arose after the unprecedented terrorist acts of September 2001, the Bush administration initiated the “global war on terrorism.” The terrorist acts proved to be very timely, since they proved the basic assumptions underlying Washington’s approach to the solution of the world’s most acute problems. It was precisely at this moment and under these circumstances that the administration,

apparently with the quiet agreement of Moscow, was able to make a temporary geostrategic breakthrough into the Central Asian region, which in principle had been planned even before the events of September 2001.

As Douglas Lovelace, Director of the U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, notes, "The U.S. military has deployed forces to hitherto undreamt of destinations in Central Asia and the Caucasus. [...] The Transcaspian area has now become an area of strategic importance to the United States for many reasons, and not just energy."

Speaking on December 13, 2001, in the newly created subcommittee, Assistant Secretary of State Beth Jones (daughter of U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney) formulated the long-term interests of Washington in Central Asia as follows: "*First*, preventing the spread of terrorism; *second*, helping the Central Asian states to conduct economic and political reforms; *third*, guaranteeing the secure and transparent development of Caspian energy resources." These priorities clearly already differed significantly from the toothless ones of the Clinton administration. The country where the main U.S. efforts would be concentrated was quickly determined: Uzbekistan.

THE IDEA OF A "REVOLUTION IN MILITARY AFFAIRS" AND ITS INFLUENCE ON U.S. POLICY IN CENTRAL ASIA

The basic principles underlying U.S. security interests in the Central Asian region are "preventing the hostile domination of key areas and maintaining a stable balance of power; maintaining access to key markets and strategic resources; addressing threats from territories of weak (!) states; sustaining coalitions; and preparing to intervene in unexpected crises."

It set out the goal of preparing "forward deployed forces" for a variety of contingencies worldwide, of expanding basing options beyond Western Europe and Northeast Asia, and of securing *temporary access to facilities in areas where the United States lacks bases*. As is well known, two fashionable ideas began to determine the military and political thinking of the present administration. The first was the *revolution in military affairs*,

according to which the U.S. Armed Forces can be *employed anywhere in the world and can be optimized as needed for global force projection*. Thus new theaters such as Central Asia acquire significant strategic importance for America. In parallel, through the revolution in strategic affairs, the ideas of the military have found political support, since Central Asia has been designated as a possible theater of strategic operations. This constitutes a claim to the long-term and one-sided domination of this region.

As a result, U.S. military involvement in Central Asia and the Caucasus increased sharply, and it obtained temporary forward basing in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, access to airspace and the limited use of bases in Kazakhstan and even in Turkmenistan, and the opportunity to begin creating coalitions through high-ranking missions to Central Asia.

It seems that the president did not pay attention to several factors. First, in contrast to, for example, Germany, the United States has refused to include HT in its list of forbidden terrorist organizations. (It is thought that this was done to counterbalance the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.) Second, even the leader of the Islamic Party of Tajikistan, current deputy prime minister Hadji Akbar Turajonzoda, asserts that Hizb ut-Tahrir is viewed in the United States and the majority of western countries, the United Kingdom first and foremost, as a tool to initiate the process of a "democratic transition" in Central Asia, since there are currently no other forces capable of organizing mass demonstrations against the region's ruling elite. This became clear when, during the conduct of joint research under the auspices of the Russia-NATO Council on terrorist threats to Central Asia, the U.K. representatives persistently removed Hizb ut-Tahrir from consideration. But, apparently, the leaders of other Central Asian states have proven to be somewhat shrewder than Akayev and have forced changes to the potential goals of American strategy in the region. In the final analysis, almost all of them came from the Soviet-era elite, and cannot count on Washington's faith in them in the context of the "revolution in strategic affairs" that is being implemented.

Kazakhstan does not just attract the attention of American politicians and the mili-

tary because by 2010, according to President Nazarbayev, the country will produce 1.5 million barrels of oil per day. Instead it is the Caspian region that is critical. This is where the United States volunteered to refurbish the Atyrau naval base "in order to improve national security." (Even more work on the possible equipping of U.S. mobile forces is occurring in Azerbaijan. It is remarkable that U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Laura Kennedy stated fairly openly, entirely in the spirit of the concept of a "revolution in strategic affairs," that "the United States is not interested in permanent bases in Azerbaijan to station their forces. However, within the framework of the *reconfiguration of our military presence abroad there is a question for the United States about access to appropriate facilities in crisis situations.*" And such facilities on Azerbaijani territory have already been determined.)

It appears that the Pentagon, in separate talks with Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, came up with the idea for the unadvertised "Caspian Guard" project, the main aim of which is to establish a maritime control regime in the Caspian Sea, through the efforts of the three countries, to intercept "suspicious cargo," primarily cargo of importance for WMD proliferation. In principle one cannot deny that this formal goal is noble and urgent. However, it is unclear why this is being done behind Russia's back, since its role and influence in the Caspian cannot be overestimated, and why instead of through multilateral cooperation in which of all of the states in the Caspian littoral participate, a task of this importance is being taken on privately, by a power that is not a member of the region. And if a real crisis involving another state that does not participate in "Caspian Guard," Iran, were to arise, it would lead to even more serious questions. One can only guess by whom and why the realization of the Russian idea of the creation of CASFOR is being prevented, an idea which, it should be noted, takes American concerns into account.

But this is one of the increasing problems of political interaction in the region – the manifestation of narrow, selfish national views of the solutions to important common regional problems and a failure to seek joint answers to emerging challenges. But in fact Russia joined the *Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)*, proclaimed by the

United States in 2003, and has indicated its interest in interacting in this "process."

For its part, Tajikistan has also allowed the Pentagon (and later the French military) to use Dushanbe airport in emergencies and to refuel aircraft. Furthermore, the Americans have been given the right to fly through the nation's airspace. And since March 2003 the Americans have involved Tajikistan in training soldiers of the new Afghan army.

In Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's annual report to the U.S. Congress, the National Security Strategy for 2002, it says: "It is not possible to defend against every threat, in every place, at every conceivable time. The only defense is to take the war to the enemy. The best defense is a good offense." An official conclusion is being made regarding the acceptability of a preventive, *preemptive strategy*. And it was asserted that the "the density of US basing and en route infrastructure in Asia is lower than in other critical regions." Thus it was concluded that access to additional bases, the signing of agreements for infrastructure creation, and the development of new forms of security cooperation in the region should be U.S. priorities.

In many respects the agreements mentioned above and the arrangements with Central Asian countries reflect these approaches. The U.S. military recognizes that its military resources, due to the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, are very stressed, but U.S. Army Chief of Staff General Schoomaker has emphasized that under these conditions "strategic mobility" is a critical task. U.S. access to bases and temporary points of deployment in Central Asia make it possible for U.S. forces to react rapidly if there are terrorist threats or *other crises in the region*. The experience of operations in Afghanistan and Iraq were a lesson indicating that everything must be done quickly. Donald Rumsfeld already had concluded this in his 2003 report to congress.

The above statements by U.S. officials contain many aspects that are unclear, and it would seem that as the United States' strategic partner in combating terrorism, Russia has every right to insist on an explanation, at the very least, of what is meant by "other crises in the region." But there is yet one more thing that is troublesome. Does rapid action mean that the

Central Asian countries and Russia might not be given any time to think and get dragged into yet another American “battle against evil”? A statement by Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith is significant in this regard: “Military conflicts in the post-Cold War period require rapidly deployable capabilities, since our forward-deployed forces are unlikely to fight where they are based.”

In addition to full-scale cooperation with the governments and armed forces on both sides of the Caspian Sea, it has become clear that Washington has decided that it must obtain *Forward Operating Locations* (FOL) at any cost. The U.S. strategists’ quest, thus far, has resulted in the idea voiced by President Bush in August 2004 during the introduction of the *Global Posture Review*: a kind of declaration of global strategic intentions, whereby instead of obtaining permanent bases, including in the Transcaspian region, the United States will seek “permanent access” to the facilities they need in the region. First, this is an important change from the above-mentioned “temporary access in case of emergencies,” and second, the meaning of “permanent access” is riddled with uncertainties.

THE REVOLUTION IN STRATEGIC AFFAIRS

The U.S. military intervention in Iraq seriously complicated acceptance of the reasons Washington had officially declared for the expansion of its presence in Central Asia, especially among urban populations and ruling elites in all of the region’s countries, with the exception of Uzbekistan. The governments of the countries in the region were worried that their military cooperation with the United States could draw them into a confrontation with Islamists and kindle domestic tensions at an inopportune time. On the other hand, the majority of Central Asian governments used the U.S. war in Iraq to further crush political opposition and the activities of Islamist forces. That is to say, what occurred was the direct opposite to the goals the Americans had announced for their Central Asian policy. Given the fact that when calculated per capita, the level of U.S. economic assistance was just \$.53 per individual Central Asian resident, it becomes clear that Washington’s goals have

little chance of success. In public opinion polls, 83.5% of respondents in Kazakhstan oppose the war in Iraq, while 66% in Kyrgyzstan chose the neutral answer to this question. An even more interesting result was obtained when people were asked if the war in Iraq would help to strengthen stability in Central Asia. Of those polled, 46% in Kazakhstan, 42% in Kyrgyzstan, and 31% in Tajikistan stated that the war in Iraq would not lead to an improvement in regional stability in Central Asia. In Kazakhstan, 77% of those questioned were against sending their troops to Iraq. At that time, sympathies for the American intervention proved to be most durable in Uzbekistan, the state that later was the first to shut down an American base (K-2), formerly the first window into the new American “revolution in military affairs.”

A central lesson of the *Revolution in Strategic Affairs*, one discovers in the conclusions of American political scientists, is the fact that “there are no intrinsically nonstrategic regions from which U.S. vital interests cannot be threatened.” In their opinion, Washington’s strategic approach to Central Asia is narrow and fairly selfish in nature, and does not have much regard for the realities of the interrelations between the region’s countries, or their relationship with their neighbors or with adjacent regions such as the Caucasus, South Asia, Iran, Turkey, etc. At the same time, the majority of these analysts carefully avoid any reference to Russia and existing cooperative structures in the Central Asian region—in all issue areas, including the provision of security.

Here we are not at all trying to suggest that a prominent political scientist like Frederick Starr does not understand how detrimental his assertions about the United States’ great achievements in Afghanistan are. Our goal here is quite different. U.S. political circles have recently begun to sharply feel the loss of strategic momentum in Central Asia, caused by errors and an inconsistent strategy based on unilateral actions in the region together with a lack of readiness to interact with other important players in the area, or to act together within the framework of the intergovernmental organizations and structures that already exist in the region. A new, strong strategy is needed, but it can only be launched on territory that is under the

relatively stable control of the United States and its allies. In the strategic area around Central Asia only Afghanistan fits this description. For this very reason Afghanistan must be urgently brought into the geostrategic environment, joining (or being joined by) Central Asia to create a regional Greater Central Asia Partnership for Cooperation and Development (GCAP) forum. Its task will be the planning, coordination, and implementation of an array of U.S. programs. The headquarters of the proposed new forum, naturally, should initially be located in Kabul.

AND WHAT ABOUT RUSSIA?

It is interesting that the palette of opinions in Russia about Central Asia is more diverse than in democratic America. It is not the aim of this paper to describe all of the views that exist. But one must recognize that Russia has maintained the principle of a multilateral foreign policy, and this has positively affected relations with Central Asia. In addition to the importance of the decisions made at the CIS summit in Kazan, responsible analysts widely agree that the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) is becoming a real "integrating nucleus" in the sphere of regional security.

This raises a legal question: shouldn't our American and Western European partners begin cooperating with the regional structures that already exist, such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and CSTO, instead of making plans to build new, parallel security structures in the region? The SCO is already making a contribution to regional stability. Indeed, in a region as complex and fragile as Central Asia, regional security is *indivisible*. He

who tries to break through an open door without knowing the situation inside is unlikely to understand fully the possible consequences. For this very reason it is extremely dangerous to attempt to artificially transfer problems and instability, or methods to overcome them, from Afghanistan to Central Asia.

The Central Asian countries, by all humanitarian indices as well as by the organization of civil society, stand a head above this country. Furthermore, Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov presented, in our opinion, an exceptionally flexible and constructive formulation for possible cooperation when he said "we approached the evaluation of the role of our European and other partners in the CIS space from the position of an interest in the real stabilization of the region. We are ready to recognize their interests here to the degree in which they consider our interests. In any case, the CIS space must not be a ground for destructive rivalry, any activity here by extra-regional forces must be transparent and clear. For us any 'concealed agendas' are unacceptable, in particular any actions directed at the destabilization of this area that borders us."

Certainly, countries differ in their estimation of the situation, and even within Central Asia itself there will be diverging and even contradictory views, but at present an ongoing dialogue is very necessary. Real cooperation can only be based on common threat assessments and joint decisionmaking, particularly where practical actions are concerned. Only then can a real step in the direction of an effective partnership in the area of security be made, something those in the West love to talk about, but about which they do so little.

Analysis**INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR
FUEL SERVICE CENTERS:
RUSSIAN PROPOSAL**

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During its G8 presidency in 2006, Russia presented an initiative to develop a network of international fuel cycle centers, including one on its own territory. Ekaterina Rykovanova, PIR Center consultant and staff member of the Geneva Center for Security Policy (GCSP) provides an overview of the initiative based on media sources and personal interviews.

The Proposal:

- 25.01.2006: At a meeting of the Intergovernmental Council of the Eurasian Economic Community (EURASEC) Vladimir Putin presented a proposal to establish international centers that would provide nuclear fuel cycle services, including uranium enrichment, reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel¹ and training and certifying nuclear experts². He announced that Russia was ready to host such center on its territory, but no specific date was suggested³.
- Vladimir Putin: "Such centers could be created in other states of the nuclear club along with ensuring the provision of non-discriminatory access to all those who want to use them."⁴
- Sergei Kirienko, the head of the Russia's Federal Atomic Energy Agency (Rosatom): "It will be enough for Russia to have only one uranium enrichment center, and four or five similar centers internationally, for the main regions."⁵
- The proposal states that these centers would
 - function on a non-discriminatory basis (be equally accessible to all countries wanting to participate in developing atomic energy)
 - function under the IAEA control

- comply with the norms of non-proliferation⁶.
- Some hypotheses lead to think that such centers would provide nuclear services to countries who either
 - have no nuclear program of their own, or
 - are suspected by the international community from using their nuclear industries (e.g. Iran)⁷.
- Sergey Kirienko: "Today this offer is addressed to Iran, but it can go to any interested country that does not have its own nuclear fuel and who wants to develop its nuclear energy... In practice, Russia is proposing to form international centers that under IAEA's control would guarantee the non-proliferation regime and provide access to cheap energy. Such centers have to be fully open"⁸.
- Under this plan the participating states would be able to obtain a full nuclear-fuel cycle while being constrained from developing their own uranium enrichment programs (which could be potentially used for military purposes). Thus, their nuclear programs would remain within the scope of the Non-Proliferation Treaty⁹.

**Proposed Location for One Such Center -
Angarsk, Russia:**

- 27.03.2006: Rosatom announced that Angarsk was picked as the site for its international nuclear fuel service center. Rosatom will seek approval from the IAEA to have the existing Angarsk Electrolysis Chemical Complex certified as an international service center¹⁰.
- The Angarsk plant already offers conversion and enrichment facilities¹¹, exporting about half of its production to the US, Europe, China and Japan¹².
- Sergey Novikov, Rosatom spokesman: "Angarsk would not accommodate all the elements of the international program, but it could deal with [uranium] enrichment among other processing functions. The training of personnel and the setting up of waste storage facilities would be located elsewhere."¹²
- It is anticipated that the center will function according to the *Eurodif* model¹⁴, i.e.:

- all members will invest in the center;
- the center's management will be carried out jointly by all members;
- Russia will preserve its control over the center's technologies and operations.

THE BENEFITS OF AND CONCERNS ABOUT JOINING THE INITIATIVE FOR PARTICIPANT COUNTRIES

The majority of countries that are likely to participate in the initiative are countries that do not have any fundamental problems with accessing the enrichment services market.¹⁵ For them, joining the initiative will mean:

- a guaranteed access to enriched fuel¹⁶
- increase in their energy security¹⁷
- likely economic advantages (saving resources by not developing enrichment activities domestically)¹⁸
- diversification of enrichment services¹⁹

Some experts believe that in order for the initiative to be successfully implemented, Russia should not put forth any formal requests on cessation of all development of enrichment technologies in participating countries, as, even if all possible advantages of the initiative are taken into account, one cannot exclude a possibility where the potential benefits of participation in the new centers do not outweigh the negative effect of such moratorium. Yet, if the initiative (even without a formal mention of moratorium) succeeds, it could reinforce non-proliferation regime considerably by providing an additional incentive for member states not to develop enrichment technologies domestically.²⁰

WHAT'S IN IT FOR RUSSIA - THE BENEFITS OF OPENING A NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE CENTER²¹

- A practical step towards the implementation of global energy security strategy.
- Important input into the G8 policy and IAEA concept on multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle.
- Inflow of foreign investments into domestic economy.
- Possibility of increasing exports of Russian high-tech production.

NOT AN ENTIRELY NEW PROPOSAL

The idea of multilateral approach to the nuclear fuel cycle is far from being new. Among the key proposals and initiatives in this field, the following should be mentioned:

- As early as in 1946 the United States presented the UN with a proposal of a multinational control of the nuclear fuel cycle (the Baruch Plan). The proposal called for states to transfer ownership and control over civil nuclear activities and materials to an international development agency²².
- In 1975–1977 the IAEA undertook a study to look at the potential of the creation of the Regional Nuclear Fuel Cycle Centres (RFCC). The study considered economic aspects, issues of physical security and the fulfillment of the IAEA safeguards towards any potential multilateral approaches for the final stages of the nuclear fuel cycle²³.
- September 2003: Addressing the IAEA members at the General Conference, IAEA Director-General, Mohamed ElBaradei suggested that multilateral nuclear approaches could serve to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime while not impeding the development of nuclear energy for states wishing to choose that option. Further on, he made a three-part proposal:
 - *«It is time to limit the processing of weapon-usable material (separated plutonium and high-enriched uranium) in civilian nuclear programs, as well as the production of new material through reprocessing and enrichment, by agreeing to restrict these operations exclusively to facilities under multinational control».*
 - *«These limitations would need to be accompanied by proper rules of transparency and, above all, by an assurance that legitimate would-be users could get their supplies»²⁴.*
- Summer of 2004: Following up on his proposal, ElBaradei set up an independent international Expert Group on Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle (MNA) that included participants from 26 countries. MNA participants examined the nuclear fuel cycle and multinational approaches at four

meetings and released a report in February 2005.²⁵

- November 2005: The issue of establishing an international uranium enrichment center has been raised by Russia in response to the reaction of international community to Iranian nuclear ambitions. At that time, Iran rejected Russia's proposal²⁶.
- 16 January 2006: This proposal was repeated during Vladimir Putin's meeting with Angela Merkel²⁷ before being stated in a much broader form at the EURASEC meeting on 25.01.2006.
- Besides the proposals stated by Mohammed el-Baradei²⁸, similar ideas have been also raised previously by George W. Bush²⁹.
- The latest proposal has some features in common with its predecessors, such as³⁰:
 - It responds strictly to a perceived need for improving and expanding mechanisms to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons;
 - It does not take into account other concerns of the international community, such as the promotion of concrete measures of nuclear disarmament;
 - It combines the ideas of non-discriminatory access to all countries and of restriction of the number of States permitted to perform enrichment/reprocessing operations;
 - It envisages international control of the system.
- The proposal also includes some novel concepts, e.g.³¹:
 - It indicates that services would be provided to States that "have no program of their own" or "are suspected by the international community from using their nuclear industries to pursue weapons programs";
 - It envisages "four or five centers", distributed by region;
 - Besides Russia, such centers would be created "in other States of the nuclear club".
 - The centers would also "handle spent nuclear fuel" and "train and certify nuclear experts".

Potential Role of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan in the Initiative:

- Vladimir Orlov: "We shouldn't think of this [initiative] as being about only Russia and Iran. This will also involve at least two countries that Putin himself has mentioned – Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan – and could turn into a genuinely international project."³²
- At the Eurasian Economic Community (EURASEC) meeting in January 2006 (where Uzbekistan officially joined the EURASEC) the heads of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan did not rule out participating in Russian initiative.³³
- Vladimir Putin: "Concrete plans are being drawn up for expanding cooperation between the nuclear energy sector enterprises in Russia and Kazakhstan.»³⁴ Such projects will be discussed with Uzbekistan, too.³⁵
- Putin's plan calls for pulling together the technological potential of Russia and Ukraine and the extensive uranium ore reserves in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to set up in Russia a global centre for nuclear fuel cycle services to other countries.³⁶

Uzbekistan:

- Vladimir Putin: Known to have extensive uranium-ore reserves, Uzbekistan will give Russia "additional long-term possibilities for the building of a stable nuclear fuel energy base.»³⁷
- Uzbekistan's uranium reserves stand at 109,000 tonnes³⁸ and are ranked 7th in the world (4th in terms of extraction).³⁹
- Gennadiy Pshakin, head of a nonproliferation analytical center in Obninsk: "Uzbekistan was a major base of uranium ore in the Soviet Union. Bringing it on board is a weighty contribution» to Russia's ability to rebuild its nuclear energy capabilities.⁴⁰

Kazakhstan :

- According to IAEA, Kazakhstan's uranium reserves are estimated at one million tonnes, or 20% of total world resources⁴¹. By 2010 Kazakhstan is projected to become world's largest uranium producer⁴².

- Currently known uranium reserves in Russia reach approximately 600 thousand tones, only 28% of which are cost-effective and only 9% of which can be sold at a present optimal price of \$40 per kilogram or less. To provide Russian nuclear industry with fuel and maintain its export potential in the nuclear fuel market, Russia will have to increase its uranium output 1.4 times by 2010 and 3.4 times by 2020. Close cooperation with a significant uranium producer is thus necessary. Out of the three major uranium producers in the world (Canada, Australia and Kazakhstan), Kazakhstan is the closest one to Russia, and close cooperation with it in the nuclear field is seen by Russia as crucial for its security.⁴³
- Example of existing collaboration between Kazakhstan and Russia in the nuclear field: Russian «Techsnabexport» and Kazakh «KazAtomProm» each hold 49% of shares of a joint venture for uranium mining.⁴⁴

POTENTIAL PARTICIPANTS OF THE INITIATIVE

The countries that are most likely to take advantage of the new centers are countries that already use atomic energy but do not have access to enrichment technologies, as well as countries that are planning to develop atomic energy domestically in the near future (among them Turkey, Vietnam and Indonesia). In addition, potential clients of such centers include China, Japan, India and Brazil.⁴⁵ For more detailed information and statistics please refer to Nadezhda Logutova's presentation cited above.

Several countries have already stated interest in the Russian proposal (examples of Canada and Japan have been cited in press).⁴⁶ According to «Techsnabexport», Russia's state-controlled uranium supplier and provider of uranium enrichment services, «...more than one country, including Asian nations, said they were interested». Yet, «proposals to set up bilateral joint ventures are progressing faster than plans to open multilateral international centers under the control of the IAEA».⁴⁷ It is partly due to the fact that «Techsnabexport» started working on bilateral projects well before the President's ini-

tiative has been announced. One of such bilateral projects is the joint venture with Iran.⁴⁸

COUNTRIES' AND FOREIGN EXPERTS' REACTIONS TO RUSSIA'S PROPOSAL:

Russian proposal has been perceived by many as a response to the Iranian impasse rather than a broader international initiative that it is. A large number of reactions cited in press and on the official sites reflect this perception.

• USA:

- George W. Bush spoke out in favor of the idea, and suggested that the U.S. should be another venue for such a center.⁴⁹
- George W. Bush: «The Russians came up with the idea and I support it... because I do believe people ought to be allowed to have civilian nuclear power.»⁵⁰
- Nicholas Burns (U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Political Affairs): «We find the Russian proposal to be interesting, and it might be a good way to proceed with negotiations. But we've never said that we accept every detail in that proposal.»⁵¹

- **UK:** Jack Straw (U.K. Foreign Minister): Britain welcomed a proposal by Russia's government to process uranium for Iran's nuclear program on Russian soil. «We welcome the Russian initiative to enable Iran to receive fuel and for it to be processed outside the country»⁵².

• IAEA:

- The IAEA Press Office declined to comment directly on the proposal, but pointed out that it was in line with recommendations that the agency's director general, Mohammed El-Baradei, had made in the past⁵³. Over all, El-Baradei supports the idea of using a multilateral approach to protect the security of sensitive aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle like enrichment and reprocessing⁵⁴.
- Tariq Rauf (Head, Verification and Security Policy Coordination, IAEA): «IAEA finds Russian proposal useful and supports the idea of such international centers providing nuclear services. It believes that Russian proposal is

in line with what the IAEA Director General was calling for in his initiative. The IAEA approves of the fact that under Russian proposal the fuel cycle will be available to all countries under the auspices of the IAEA. However, several important points need to be taken into consideration. First, in order to implement this initiative, support of commercial nuclear industry will be needed. It particularly concerns international commercial enterprises. Second, international fuel cycle centers proposed under Russian initiative must not disrupt the existing market in nuclear fuel. Also, this initiative should be developed in a way that does not harm the near-term prospects of growth in nuclear power.»⁵⁵

- **CHINA:** China favored Russian proposal⁵⁶

- 17.03.2006: Sun Qin, chairman of the China Atomic Energy Authority (CAEA) said China supports a Russian proposal to set up international nuclear fuel centers under the control of the IAEA: “Every country has the right to develop nuclear energy. We consider the initiative to establish international centers to provide nuclear fuel cycle services to be very significant.”⁵⁷

- **IRAN:**

- Ali Larijani (head of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council): “The Russian proposal is not sufficient for Iran’s nuclear energy needs, but one can not say that it is a negative proposal.”⁵⁸
- Ali Hosseinitash (head of Iranian delegation at the Moscow negotiations): “We view this proposal positively. But we agreed that the plan should be widened in the framework of a broader formula [...]”⁵⁹
- Manucher Mottaki (Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran): Teheran did not reject Russian proposal for enriching uranium on Russian territory and will continue to consider it.

“As I have already said, we need to add some elements to the Russian proposal, and after that both parties may consider it complete. This includes the issue of where uranium is to be enriched, the time frame,

as well as who will be participating. These are some of the elements that need to be considered. That is why our negotiations are not done yet, but they will be continued.”⁶⁰

STATEMENTS BY RUSSIAN EXPERTS AND OFFICIALS:

- **Alexey Arbatov:** “The definite strong point of Russian initiative, if it gets implemented, is that a system of international nuclear fuel cycle centers providing uranium enrichment services under IAEA’s monitoring rules out a possibility of whatever speculations on the part of countries that produce enriched uranium as well as those that consume it.”⁶¹
- **V. N. Govorukhin** (Deputy General Director on Marketing and Information Policy of Techsnabexport): “The project of establishing an International Center for uranium enrichment is not a political stance, but a practical proposition that has all chances to be implemented”⁶².
- **Dr. Vladimir Orlov:** The initiative “is practical, emphasizes technological and scientific strengths that Russia already has, serves the economic interests of a number of players, and may solve urgent non-proliferation problems.”⁶³
- **Vladimir Putin** (at a meeting with G8 energy ministers in the Kremlin on 16.03.2006): “This initiative on setting up an international network of uranium-enrichment centers has good prospects for the future.” It “would not only help make progress in solving the problem of ‘energy poverty’ but it would also consolidate the nuclear nonproliferation regime”⁶⁴.
- **Rosatom:** “Implementation of Putin’s proposal, if it gets the support of international community, will permit to solve a number of important issues. First of all, it will allow for development of atomic energy in the world while strictly following the NPT norms. Second, it will solidify Russia’s positions: Russia will be practically controlling nuclear industries in countries starting to develop nuclear energy at home. Finally, implementation of this initiative will have a significant economic effect, creating a large number of jobs in the Russian nuclear sector”⁶⁵.

- **Sergei Ruchkin**, Deputy Director of the Department of Strategic Analysis, Technsabexport: "I personally think that this initiative has a future if we manage to find its place in the previous (IAEA Multilateral Nuclear Approaches (MNA), US-promoted IAEA Mechanism for reliable access to nuclear fuel) and more recent initiatives (GNEP) aimed at guaranteed access to services and production of the nuclear fuel cycle based on enforcement of the non-proliferation regime".⁶⁶

This proposal will be presented by Russia at the July G8 summit in St. Petersburg⁶⁷. Being the only country providing the full fuel cycle services, Russia is in a unique position of leadership on this matter. Besides looking deeper into this initiative, the forthcoming G8 Summit offers an important opportunity for the G8 members to further discuss other proposed initiatives (such as the US GNEP) and possible multilateral nuclear approaches. It would also be the occasion to raise the following points:⁶⁸

- G8 members could provide nuclear material or associated support where appropriate, in connection with the first step of an assurance of supply system, i.e. a reserve of enriched uranium to be placed under IAEA disposal.⁶⁹
- G8 members could commit to reassessing restrictions on nuclear power in existing international arrangements unrelated to proliferation and physical protection.⁷⁰
- The G8 could express political support for the continuing study of systems of assurances of supply of nuclear technology for energy security.⁷¹

ISSUES THAT NEED TO BE RAISED AND WORKED ON BEFORE THE G8 SUMMIT:

A number of points have to be clarified:

- The proposal states that services of the centers would be provided to States "having no program of their own". What kinds of programs are contemplated? Would it only be enrichment programs? What would be the criteria to determine the existence of such programs in a

country potentially qualifying as a recipient of the services?⁷²

- The proposal states further that States "suspected by the international community" of using their programs to pursue weapons programs" would also qualify for receiving enrichment/reprocessing services. How would a State become "suspect"? Does the term "international community" in this context mean a specific international organization? Could it mean any group of States? What would the acceptable objective grounds for eventual "suspicions"? How could "suspicions" become "certainties"?⁷³
- What would be the "main" regions where the proposed enrichment/reprocessing centers will be located? How would they be chosen? How would inevitable regional rivalries be avoided or resolved?⁷⁴
- Does the "handling" of spent fuel include its safe storage, besides eventual reprocessing?
- Would experts from all participant States be eligible for training?⁷⁵
- Would the establishment and maintenance of the centers be funded exclusively by national means? How would each center charge for its services?⁷⁶
- The requirement that the provision of services would be made on a non-discriminatory basis is obviously of extreme importance for the success of the plan. How could possible political constraints or pressure, either on individual States where the centers would be located, or on the IAEA, be avoided and eliminated?⁷⁷
- What would be the status of States which choose not to participate in the system, either as providers or recipients of the services?⁷⁸
- What does Russia mean when she says that the centers will operate under the control of IAEA? Do they mean the IAEA will carry out verification, or would it assume ownership or management of this initiative?⁷⁹
- What kind of technology would the new fuel cycle centers use? Would it be current technology, new technology, or the mix of the two?⁸⁰
- What services would the centers provide? Is plutonium fuel included? What about

spent fuel? Would it be sent back to the countries it came from or would the waste stay in Russia?⁸¹

- For uranium enrichment: would only the uranium of Russian origin be used, or not only?⁸²
- What countries does Russia plan to partner up with in order to implement the initiative?⁸³

A number of formulations have to be defined:

- States of the nuclear club⁸⁴
- “International” (when speaking of “international fuel cycle centers”) – does it mean international in the sense of international company, like Toshiba or Coca Cola, in the sense of international enterprise, i.e. involvement of extraterritorial status for such centers, or that they will be governed by an international regime?⁸⁵
- “Non-discriminatory” (as in “non-discriminatory access to the centers”) – does it mean that every country will be eligible for fuel cycle from the centers? What about the states reported by the IAEA for their non-compliance the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, such as North Korea and Iran?⁸⁶

The initiative is still being worked on

**CONCRETE PROPOSALS BY
TECHSNABEXPORT AND ROSATOM:**

In June 2006, Rosatom and “Techsnabeksport” are expected to present a project of establishing an international center for uranium enrichment using one of existing Russian fission plants. Currently, work on conceptualizing such center is at a very early stage.

Representatives of “Techsnabexport” shared their views and ideas on this subject at the PIR Center conference “G8 Global Security Agenda: Challenges & Interests. Towards the St.-Petersburg Summit” (Section 8: Multilateral Approaches to Nuclear Fuel Cycle) that took place in Moscow on April 22, 2006.⁸⁷ In the report presented by “Techsnabexport”, it was noted that the basic principles of establishing an international uranium-enrichment center include:

- Equal, non-discriminative conditions (criteria) for membership for all interested countries (have to be defined);
- benefits (political, economic, scientific and technical) from joining the international enrichment center have to outweigh the “losses” from giving up development of nuclear fuel cycle services domestically;
- participation of executive organizations in management of the Center (international control);
- transparency of the Center’s commercial activities (according to international practice);
- commercial viability and investment appeal;
- majority of production run on raw materials supplied by the client;
- foreign participants do not gain access to Russian uranium enrichment technology.

Sergei Kirienko: Rosatom is prepared to host four types of international nuclear fuel cycle service centers:

- Uranium enrichment centre (one of four or five worldwide).
- Center for reprocessing and storage of used nuclear fuel.
- Center for training and certification of personnel, especially for emerging nuclear states. In this context, harmonized international standards, uniform safeguards and joint international centers would be needed.
- Center for R&D and integration of new scientific achievements.⁸⁸

Such international centers should be public companies, so that the countries participating in its operation could hold stakes and contribute to the decision making. However, this does not imply that participant countries will obtain the right to disseminate the technology. Neither the partners will be granted access to Russian technologies.⁸⁹

There will be no combined production – military and civilian at the same time – at the facility in question, which is the case for the majority of Russian nuclear fuel cycle facilities.⁹⁰

Rosatom and Tekhsnabexport plan to submit detailed proposals on the establishment of an international uranium enrichment

center in Russia to the government in June 2006.⁹¹

For more information on the initiative and on Multilateral Approaches to Nuclear Fuel Cycle, please visit the site of the international conference "G8 Global Security Agenda: Challenges & Interests. Towards the St.-Petersburg Summit", organized by PIR Center on April 20-22, 2006 at <http://www.pircenter.org/g8conference/eng>

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Analysis**THE KOREAN NUCLEAR
CRISIS AND RUSSIA**

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The Korean nuclear crisis belongs to one of the most dangerous trends in nuclear proliferation at the beginning of the 21st century. However, the prospects for a solution have hardly been examined to date.² The issue affects key Russian interests, and Moscow has laid claim on a significant role in resolving this crisis. However, the course of events over the past three years has put two questions into increasingly sharp focus:

- What are the real options Russia has to influence the results of the negotiations and other efforts to resolve the Korean nuclear crisis, taking into account Moscow's dwindling economic, political, and military posture in northeast Asia?
- To what extent is the Russian diplomatic position with regards to this crisis well-substantiated and consistent?

**THE SECOND KOREAN NUCLEAR:
 RESULTS OF THE FIRST THREE YEARS**

By now the states affected by the Korean nuclear crisis have settled on their approaches for handling the crisis. The fundamental problems that must be solved lest it reach new levels of escalation have also been made clear.

**The Main Phases of the Second Korean Nuclear
 Crisis**

Pyongyang initiated the crisis in the fall of 2002. At a meeting in Pyongyang in October 2002, a U.S. delegation headed by Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly raised a question about Korea having a "uranium program." This was a reference

to work on the enrichment of uranium for the creation of nuclear weapons, conducted in breach of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the 1994 Agreed Framework. The North Korean representatives admitted the existence of this program. Subsequently, North Korea's leadership contended that what they had meant was simply that they had a right to enrich uranium, but that no work in this sphere was being conducted. It has retained this latter interpretation of those events to this day. Later, the DPRK rejected all of its obligations and began a new phase of work on the creation of nuclear weapons.

From the Kelly meeting through the end of 2005, the nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula has been escalating incrementally. One can identify four basic phases in this process; moreover, decisions made in the DPRK itself led to the shift from one phase to another. One important "critical point" occurred in the spring of 2003, when Pyongyang agreed to participate in the multilateral negotiations on the crisis. Another happened in the summer of 2004. Soon after the third round of the Six Party Talks, North Korea refused to participate in the negotiations further, hardened its position on a number of the problems related to the crisis, declared that it possessed nuclear weapons and, possibly, began to prepare for nuclear testing. Finally, in the summer of 2005, Pyongyang stopped the escalation of the crisis – temporarily forgoing testing, if, of course, testing was actually intended – and agreed to renew negotiations.

DPRK Nuclear Capabilities

To date it is unclear whether the DPRK has nuclear weapons, and if so, how great an arsenal.³ This is largely due to a scarcity of reliable information. Electronic and space reconnaissance and deserters' statements are practically the sole sources of information about the DPRK nuclear program. Space and electronic reconnaissance, despite all of its capabilities, cannot provide a precise estimate of the level of scientific and technical progress. The overwhelming majority of deserters does not have significant information about nuclear research, and could be voluntary or involuntary channels of disinformation.

The Main Phases of the Second Korean Nuclear Crisis

PHASES		PERIOD	SCOPE
		First	October 2002 – summer 2003
Second	Summer 2003 – August 2004	"Crisis Stabilization." All sides refrained from actions that could aggravate the crisis. In April 2003 trilateral talks between the U.S., China and DPRK were held. From August 2003 to June 2004 three rounds of Six Party Talks took place. No results were achieved, but during the third round the U.S. presented a plan to resolve the crisis that took some of the DPRK's principle positions into account.	
Third	August 2004 – June 2005	Second round of crisis escalation. The DPRK refused to participate in Six Party Talks; the subject of negotiation was changed – instead of discussing conditions for giving up nuclear programs, the DPRK demanded discussions on nuclear arms control in the region; it officially declared itself a nuclear weapons state; and it unloaded the reactor in order to obtain a new round of weapons plutonium. The U.S. declared that the DPRK was preparing for nuclear tests. The U.S. and Japan threatened to refer the DPRK to the U.N. Security Council if it did not return to negotiations.	
Fourth	June 2005	"Crisis Stabilization" at a higher level of escalation. The DPRK agreed to renewed Six Party Talks; from August-September 2005 the fourth round was held. A Joint Statement was adopted that contained several general principles for resolving the crisis. There were sharp differences of opinion with regards to the DPRK's peaceful use of nuclear energy. No overall approach for solving the crisis was found.	

There are no doubts, however, that North Korea can produce weapons plutonium from the spent nuclear fuel of the 25-30 MW reactor.⁴ By the fall of 2005, North Korea could have had as much as 45-50 kg of weapons plutonium.⁵ Theoretically, 5-10 nuclear explosive devices with a power of about 20 kilotons could be produced from this material. The well-known U.S. nuclear physicist Sig Hecker believes that the DPRK has renewed construction of its 50 MW nuclear reactor. In his opinion, this

reactor could commence operations "in a few years" and produce enough weapons plutonium to build 10 nuclear weapons per year.⁶

The statement by the DPRK Ministry of Foreign Affairs on February 10, 2005, that North Korea has nuclear weapons did not remove all doubts.⁷ The only real proof of North Korean possession of nuclear weapons is their testing.⁸ Russian experts have various explanations for why the

DPRK has not conducted nuclear weapons tests. Some believe that North Korean scientists are not confident that the tests will be successful. Others hold that testing is being postponed for fear of international sanctions.⁹ Finally, some assert that North Korea cannot construct nuclear weapons given its economic and technological backwardness.¹⁰

These are all feasible explanations. However, it is most likely that Pyongyang has simply not needed any testing thus far. Although there is no conclusive proof, it is very risky to ignore the possibility that the DPRK has nuclear weapons. At the same time, if it does not carry out tests, North Korea is not crossing the line that could lead to international sanctions, while a change in the posi-

tions of China, South Korea and Russia would be unfavorable for Pyongyang.

This uncertainty makes it possible for North Korea's leaders to blackmail the international community, even if it does not have a real ability to design nuclear weapons. But an eventual practical resolution of the crisis would require the DPRK to provide concrete information on the state of its nuclear programs. Without this, any verification of the fulfillment of an agreement that might be concluded would be impossible. And if it turns out that Pyongyang was simply bluffing, it will face serious consequences. North Korea would not be compensated for giving up nuclear weapons and would be subject to strong pressure.

Table 2

Approaches towards Determining the Content of an Agreement to Prevent the DPRK from Obtaining Nuclear Weapons

APPROACH	APPROXIMATE CONTENT OF THE AGREEMENT
Minimalist	Nuclear weapons and/or nuclear explosive devices, facilities and equipment for uranium enrichment and the separation of plutonium from spent nuclear fuel, and nuclear weapons materials that have been produced are destroyed or removed from the country. North Korea's 25 MW reactor is "frozen." An agreement in principle is concluded regarding the provision of a light-water reactor to the DPRK after its nuclear weapons have been dismantled on the condition that all spent nuclear fuel is exported.
Intermediate	In addition to the measures envisioned in the "minimalist approach," the plutonium production reactor is eliminated, the construction of new nuclear reactors - including light-water reactors - and uranium mining is banned, uranium mines are destroyed, and the uranium that currently exists is taken out of the country. States that are party to the agreement take upon themselves the obligation to provide energy resources to the DPRK to compensate both for the uranium that has been removed and for the hypothetical losses caused as a result of renouncing nuclear energy.
Complete denuclearization of the DPRK	All nuclear activities are banned in the DPRK, with the exception of the use of radioisotopes in medicine, agriculture, and several branches of industry. Research and development aimed at the creation of key non-nuclear components of nuclear weapons is prohibited. All facilities and equipment related to these activities is eliminated, and specialists are retrained. North Korean scientific research centers are subject to intrusive monitoring.

Key Problems to Be Resolved in the Second Korean Nuclear Crisis

By the fall of 2005, Pyongyang had in principle agreed “to dismantle” its military nuclear programs and nuclear weapons in exchange for the satisfaction of certain political and economic conditions, the list of which periodically changed.¹¹ An understanding was reached that the crisis would be resolved in stages, and that North Korea should be given appropriate security assurances and economic aid if it renounces nuclear weapons. In addition, the whole universe of problems that would have to be solved was duly noted.

SEQUENCE OF STEPS

The question of what order the DPRK and U.S. should take various steps is extremely complicated. It is critical that North Korea be prevented from rapidly reviving its nuclear capability should Pyongyang once again refuse to come to an agreement. But the DPRK is demanding that a substantial part of its requirements, which first of all relate to the provision of a light-water nuclear reactor, are fulfilled before it begins to “dismantle” its military nuclear programs.¹² The United States is only prepared to “reward” North Korea for renouncing nuclear weapons after it completes key steps in the elimination of its nuclear capabilities.¹³ Pyongyang’s position is not likely to be acceptable. The DPRK’s numerous violations of its NPT obligations and the 1994 Agreed Framework have destroyed any confidence in North Korea. Therefore, Pyongyang itself will have to prove that it is prepared to forego nuclear weapons by undertaking steps that indicate irreversible movement towards this goal.

The Content of a Possible Agreement on the “Dismantlement” of the DPRK Nuclear Programs

The concrete facilities, equipment, and materials that must be eliminated or dismantled, and what activity forbidden, in order to prevent the DPRK from obtaining nuclear weapons is a very complex question. Theoretically, one can designate three options: “minimalist,” “intermediate,” and the complete denuclearization of North Korea.

Any future understanding must, as far as possible, slow down the DPRK’s capacity to undertake military nuclear projects were

it to leave the agreement. Therefore, it is important to forbid not just the production of weapons materials, but also the creation of other nuclear weapons components, in particular those necessary for the realization of an implosion-type plutonium device. If North Korea does not yet have nuclear weapons, then the reason is precisely the inability to create an implosion-type device.

North Korea’s Uranium Program

As was noted above, Pyongyang has denied that it is working on uranium enrichment – for either military or civilian purposes.¹⁴ The United States, for its part, insists that the DPRK is conducting this type of activity and, therefore, that the facilities and equipment intended for this purpose must be uncovered and eliminated. The statements of the North Korean leadership are not credible. In open source documents there are four basic facts that confirm that the DPRK is active in this sphere:

- the presence of “suspicious” facilities on North Korean territory;¹⁵
- the sale to Libya of a significant quantity of uranium hexafluoride, which is used in the enrichment process;
- the purchase of special materials for the production of centrifuges, which are needed for enrichment; and
- the receipt of centrifuges for uranium enrichment and their blueprints from Pakistan.¹⁶

At the same time, it is difficult to estimate the degree of progress North Korea has achieved in the field of uranium enrichment and its prospects for creating weapons on that basis from open sources.

The Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy

Through the end of the fourth round of the Six Party Talks, the United States demanded the dismantling of all nuclear programs in the DPRK. This meant denying North Korea the right to use nuclear energy not just for military, but also for peaceful purposes. China, Russia, and South Korea supported North Korea’s claims of a right to peaceful nuclear activity. During the course of the fourth round, the U.S. position changed slightly: the Joint Statement spoke of “respecting the right” of the DPRK to the peaceful use of nuclear energy, as provided for in the NPT. Denying North Korea the right to peaceful nuclear activity could aggravate

the situation around this treaty still further. But many nuclear technologies are dual-use. The Iranian experience indicates that the acknowledgement of a right to nuclear power can soon lead to a demand for the right to enrich uranium. However, the technologies used in the production of low-enriched uranium for power reactors are practically the same as the technologies used in the production of highly-enriched uranium for nuclear weapons. Of course, the acknowledgement of the DPRK's right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy does not entail any obligations to render it assistance in the nuclear sphere.

Construction of a Light-Water Nuclear Reactor in the DPRK

Pyongyang was not satisfied by the theoretical acknowledgement of a right to peaceful nuclear activity, and presented the United States with an ultimatum that it provide the DPRK a light-water nuclear reactor for the production of electricity. The United States is not prepared to do this. Disagreement on this question has become one of the greatest obstacles facing the Six Party Talks.

It is generally believed that the isotopic composition of plutonium in the spent fuel of light-water reactors makes it impossible to use it to construct nuclear weapons.¹⁷ This view is not shared by all.¹⁸ From an engineering point of view, a munition using "reactor plutonium" is substantially more complex than a munition made from weapons plutonium; more plutonium is required to build it, and it will have less explosive force.

Thus, the construction of a light-water reactor in North Korea gives it the capacity to produce plutonium and, more importantly, to claim that it has the right to enrich uranium. Furthermore, it would be difficult for the country to use the electric power produced by an NPP. Its electric power lines, distribution networks, and substations are extremely worn and are already working at capacity. They can not sustain a considerable increase in the production of electric power.

Verification

The reliable verification of the DPRK's fulfillment of an eventual agreement is of critical importance. It must prove that:

- The DPRK has disclosed all of the facilities, nuclear weapons, equipment, and materials of the types that must be elim-

inated or removed from the country under the terms of the agreement;

- All of the facilities, weapons, equipment, and materials indicated are being destroyed, dismantled, or removed from the DPRK;
- The DPRK has no nuclear weapons materials, explosive devices, or nuclear munitions hidden from international inspections.

Fulfilling these tasks will require considerably larger scale and more intrusive verification procedures than those that exist under current arms control agreements. After all, none of the latter provide for the destruction of nuclear weapons. Since North Korea has declared itself a nuclear weapons state, Pyongyang must

- reveal all of the nuclear explosive devices or munitions that have been built;
- demonstrate how much plutonium and uranium is contained therein;
- prove that other nuclear weapons materials were not produced, a task that requires detailed and verifiable information on its nuclear activities in the last 15–20 years.

Since the DPRK could overstate the losses of weapons materials and thus hide them from international inspectors, it will be necessary to certify that the DPRK does not have any concealed nuclear materials or munitions at its disposal. This requires the inspection of practically any facility on the territory of the DPRK. Most likely, this will be perceived in Pyongyang as an unacceptable "loss of face," even if it takes the political decision to forego nuclear weapons.

In addition to these future difficulties, differences regarding verification mechanisms have already arisen today. The DPRK has demanded the creation of a special monitoring mechanism that is unrelated to the IAEA. Agreement to this would weaken the status of the IAEA and create a negative precedent for the solution of other nuclear nonproliferation problems. In addition, even if this demand is met, an agreement on the details of the functioning of this mechanism could take several years.

Security Assurances

The provision of security assurances to North Korea if it agrees to give up nuclear

North Korean and U.S. Views of Security Assurances (as of September 2005)

DPRK DEMANDS	U.S.A.
<p>Withdrawal of U.S. nuclear weapons from South Korea and ensuring that they will never be based there again;</p> <p>Termination of all exercises "presuming that there will be a nuclear war against the DPRK";</p> <p>Elimination of all "instruments with which a party could threaten other countries with nuclear weapons";</p> <p>Establishment of "good faith relations between the neighboring countries, including between the DPRK and the United States";</p> <p>Provision of assurances that nuclear weapons will not be used against the DPRK;</p> <p>South Korean rejection of the U.S. "nuclear umbrella" for the defense of South Korea against third power aggression;</p> <p>Rejection of attempts to change the DPRK regime by force.</p>	<p>Multilateral document taking the place of the 1953 armistice.</p>

weapons is one of the key elements to resolving the crisis. A general agreement that North Korea should be given appropriate security assurances has been achieved. However, there is no unified understanding of the content or mechanisms of such assurances.

North Korea's demands are not acceptable to the United States, since they mean the rejection of the alliance with South Korea. The United States (like other participants in the negotiations) will not give up exercises in the Far East region that include the use of nuclear weapons. It is unclear what assurances of the non-use of nuclear weapons against North Korea that the United States can provide. Strictly speaking, this requires the complete destruction of U.S. nuclear weapons.

THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE SECOND KOREAN NUCLEAR CRISIS

As long as it continues, the nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula will destabilize the strategic situation in the region and the world at large. Concretely:

- "Nuclear dominoes" will begin to fall in the region. Japan is likely to build nuclear weapons: the country has about 5.6 tons of plutonium, which could be used to build several thousand nuclear weapons.²⁰ From the time Tokyo makes the corresponding decision to the production of the first nuclear weapons would only take a few months. This would most likely be followed by the development of high technology C⁴RI systems, as well as missiles capable of delivering "surgical" strikes on North Korea.
- This would cause South Korea and Taiwan to favor the construction of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea would accelerate the creation of an antimissile defense system together with the United States. Washington would increase its military presence in Northeast Asia. In response, China would increase its activities in the area of nuclear missiles, further stimulating a regional arms race.
- The stability of the crisis on the Korean peninsula would decrease. The United

States and Japan cannot ignore the possibility of North Korea's use of nuclear weapons and if the crisis is aggravated may engage in a preemptive strike. Pyongyang, in turn, may be guided by a similar logic.

- "Nuclear dominoes" in the Far East would lead to the collapse of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Many NPT states parties would be convinced that abandonment of the treaty would go unpunished, while leading states would not be able to stop a state that challenges the global community.
- It is impossible to exclude the possibility that the DPRK might transfer nuclear

materials to state supporters of terrorism or terrorist groups. Pyongyang could try to use an act of nuclear terrorism outside of Northeast Asia in order to distract attention from the situation on the Korean peninsula. The threat of nuclear proliferation emanating from the DPRK could lead to international sanctions against it. This would cause the crisis to escalate, including the possible clashing of warships near the North Korean coast.

JOINT STATEMENT

On September 19, 2005, on the last day of the fourth round of Six Party Talks, the

Table 4

Main Contents of the Joint Statement²¹

PROVISIONS IN THE JOINT STATEMENT	COMMENTARY
The goal of the Six Party Talks is the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner.	Agreement on this goal was expressed earlier. Indirectly, it is clear that "denuclearization" just means the rejection of nuclear weapons since South Korea, located on the same peninsula, has a developed nuclear energy program and does not plan to give it up.
The DPRK committed to abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs and returning at an early date to the NPT and to IAEA safeguards. ²²	The reference to "existing" nuclear programs means that the DPRK maintained the right to "new" nuclear programs. The reference to the IAEA testifies to a change in the DPRK position regarding verification mechanisms.
The DPRK stated that it has the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The other parties expressed their respect and agreed to discuss at an appropriate time the subject of the provision of light-water reactor to the DPRK.	This compromise has no real content, since the meaning of "expressed their respect" for the peaceful use of nuclear energy is not defined. The question of the provision of a light-water reactor is postponed to an indeterminate future time.
China, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Russia and the U.S. stated their willingness to provide energy assistance to the DPRK.	This agreement was expressed earlier as well.
The United States affirmed that it has no nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula. South Korea reaffirmed its commitment not to receive or deploy nuclear weapons ... while affirming that there exist no nuclear weapons within its territory.	The only thing new here appears to be the U.S. declaration that there are no nuclear weapons in South Korea.
The United States undertook to respect the DPRK's sovereignty, and affirmed that it has no intention to attack or invade the DPRK with nuclear or conventional weapons.	This declaration was first made during the preparations for the fourth round of talks.

PROVISIONS IN THE JOINT STATEMENT	COMMENTARY
The six parties agreed to explore ways and means for promoting security cooperation in Northeast Asia, while the directly related parties will negotiate a permanent peace regime on the Korean peninsula at an appropriate separate forum.	The question of security assurances was replaced by the issue of a "permanent peace regime," which is not defined. Such a regime presupposes that the DPRK will take on an obligation to limit its armaments and military activity. The mention of "directly related parties" means that Russia and, possibly, Japan will not participate in the future negotiations.
The six parties agreed to take coordinated steps to implement the aforementioned consensus in a phased manner in line with the principle of "commitment for commitment, action for action."	This formula was used previously.

participants adopted a Joint Statement. It established some principles for resolving the crisis, although solution of the basic problems was postponed. In addition to empty references to the United Nations and declarations of mutual respect and equality, the statement contained the following main provisions.

After the adoption of the Joint Statement there were very optimistic assessments of its significance, in Russia as well as elsewhere.²³ These assessments were exaggerated. The formulations related to questions about security assurances and the delivery of a nuclear reactor merely meant that these problems would be discussed some time in the future at an "appropriate forum" or at an "appropriate time." The only new aspect is the U.S. recognition of the DPRK's right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The "package approach" to negotiating the crisis was not mentioned. The question of how the actions of the DPRK are related to the actions of the other countries remained open. As a result, there are no concrete outlines for the negotiation of the nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula.

THE KOREAN NUCLEAR CRISIS AND THE STRATEGIC INTERESTS OF STATES IN THE REGION

The nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula is part of a larger web of security problems in Northeast Asia. The prospects for its solution are in many respects deter-

mined by the conjunction or divergence of various regional states' approaches to the totality of current and imminent strategic problems. Among them, concern over the growing strength of China plays a special role. The states in the Far East are also anxious about the possible collapse of the regime in Pyongyang. Were this to happen, there would likely be an acute power struggle between top military commanders, a disintegration of the administrative system, social chaos, and the like.

North Korea

Many observers are convinced that the DPRK's actions are in answer to the threat posed by the United States. They believe that including it as one of the states in the "axis of evil" and the U.S. failure to fulfill its obligations under the Agreed Framework forced Pyongyang to turn to the creation of a nuclear deterrent. This theory defends the DPRK leadership. Others surmise that the DPRK nuclear program is a "means of exchange" to be used to bargain for maximum aid for its decaying economy and assurances of non-intervention in its internal affairs. Both of these things are important for the survival of the regime, especially given the upcoming transfer of authority to Kim Jong-Il's as-yet-unnamed successor. It is also desirable for the DPRK leadership to expand its circle of partners in the global arena, to rid itself of its economic and, as a result, political dependence on China. Finally,

Pyongyang may need nuclear weapons to prevent U.S. interference in a possible military action against the South.

The supposition that the DPRK needs nuclear weapons to neutralize the American threat is not well-founded. There are about 8,000 North Korean artillery and missile systems deployed in underground structures near the demilitarized zone, able to completely destroy Seoul in the first hours of a war. This is a strong deterrent to any action by the United States and South Korea. Further, although President George Bush did indeed name North Korea as a member of the "axis of evil," about one third of the approximately \$1 billion allocated by the United States for aid to North Korea since 1996 (for food-stuffs, medicines, fuel oil, etc.) was provided in 2001-02, after the present administration took control of the White House.²⁴ Furthermore, the DPRK did not initiate the nuclear crisis immediately after the statement by President Bush, but nine months later. That was when the United States was preparing for the operation in Iraq and could not react to the North Korean actions as it should have. This reduced the military threat to North Korea emanating from the United States nearly to zero.

If North Korea really has nuclear weapons, then it had to have been working in the military nuclear sphere throughout the 1990s, in violation of its obligations under the NPT and the Agreed Framework. A.Q. Khan and other Pakistani individuals confirmed that the DPRK obtained equipment and know-how for uranium enrichment in the second half of the 1990s. In other words, its uranium program was begun long before the statements by President Bush cited above.

Pyongyang, most likely, is striving to obtain the maximum benefit from giving up its nuclear program. With this goal in mind, the DPRK is playing a risky game, balancing on the line beyond which the conflict may become insoluble, but without going over this line. The North Korean leadership is not prepared to scuttle the negotiations, fearing undesirable changes in the Chinese, Russian, and South Korean positions. At the same time, Pyongyang is trying to draw the talks out as long as possible, deliberately advancing unacceptable demands and provoking prolonged interruptions in the negotiating process.

There is a correlation between North Korean actions and the course of events in Iraq. Clearly, the DPRK stopped escalating the crisis in the spring of 2003 due to the rapid and crushing defeat of Iraqi army. But by the summer of 2004, Iraq had reached a military and political dead end and Pyongyang began a new phase of escalation.

It is possible, however, that Pyongyang is using the negotiating process to try to win time and build the needed number of nuclear weapons without facing severe international repercussions. Finally, one cannot exclude the possibility that the North Korean leadership simply does not know how to get out of the difficult situation which it got itself into, particularly if it greatly exaggerated the DPRK's nuclear capabilities.

United States

The emergence of nuclear weapons in the DPRK is seen as a serious security threat to the United States. They are particularly anxious over the possibility that North Korea might transfer nuclear weapons, materials, or technologies to terrorist groups or to regimes hostile to the United States. The aggravation of the situation in Northeast Asia does not correspond to U.S. interests, given the value of the region to the global economy and its Alliance obligations towards Japan and South Korea. Washington is not willing to breach these obligations. However, getting drawn into an armed conflict to protect its allies from aggression is extremely undesirable. Furthermore, the U.S. use of military force to eliminate the North Korean nuclear capability with the aid of massive "surgical" strikes is also highly unlikely:

- reconnaissance cannot reveal all depots of nuclear weapons, missiles launchers, and the missiles themselves ahead of time;
- given their location in underground shelters, some nuclear weapons and missiles may survive a strike, even if it is carried out by deep penetration nuclear weapons;
- North Korean troops concentrated near the demilitarized zone are too numerous to be destroyed in the course of just a few hours.

This is the reason for the U.S. interest in sanctions against North Korea, up to the

introduction of a full naval and air blockade, and in finding a political solution. The preconditions for such a solution include the elimination of North Korean nuclear weapons, enterprises used to develop and construct these weapons, as well as the minimization of the risk that the nuclear weapons program will be renewed if the DPRK withdraws from an agreement to give up nuclear weapons. These preconditions are shared by practically all American political groups. And indeed, there is no sense in concluding an agreement that would allow North Korea to retain the ability to rapidly renew its production of nuclear weapons. However, there are serious divergences of opinion in the United States with regard to the means to achieve these goals. Some believe that one can make a deal with the DPRK that includes reliable security assurances for the regime in Pyongyang and a non-nuclear Korean peninsula. Others think that the only solution to the crisis is to maintain relentless pressure on Pyongyang and, in the final analysis, regime change.²⁵

Pyongyang's blocking of an acceptable agreement on giving up nuclear weapons confirms the arguments of those supporting a hard line. But involvement in Iraq, the Iranian nuclear problem, and the situation in the Middle East as a whole is diverting U.S. resources from the Far East. Effective sanctions against North Korea are impossible without the support of China and South Korea. But they are not ready to participate in such sanctions. Consequently, the nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula is not likely to be solved soon. Furthermore, the United States may have concluded that the DPRK already has nuclear weapons but nothing catastrophic has happened thus far. And finally, if Japan obtains nuclear weapons this would not threaten U.S. strategic interests. It is even possible that the transformation of Japan into a nuclear power would meet American interests, since it would create a counterweight to the growing power of China, which is considered a rival, and perhaps an enemy, of the United States in the Asia-Pacific region.

Given these circumstances, the United States is more likely to concentrate on preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and materials from North Korea than on finding a solution to the crisis as a whole. Furthermore, Washington is interested in

preventing the situation from being aggravated further, for example by a North Korean nuclear test, which would require a large-scale military intervention.²⁶ The other areas of U.S. policy in the region include enhancing the combat efficiency of U.S. troops stationed in the region, improving U.S.-Japanese military cooperation, and developing antimissile defenses.²⁷

U.S. military action against North Korea is likely only in an extreme case, for example, in response to a threat by Pyongyang to use nuclear weapons or its initiation of a new war on the Korean peninsula that cannot be stopped by political means. But a more probable scenario is a clash of North Korean and U.S. armed forces after an interception of a DPRK ship or aircraft suspected of transporting a nuclear weapon, materials or equipment. It is also impossible to exclude the possibility of an American military intervention in North Korea if the regime falls and chaos ensues, as the nuclear weapons could fall into the hands of adventurist parties.²⁸

China

China is interested in a peaceful settlement of the Korean nuclear crisis.²⁹ This solution, in the opinion of Beijing, must include: assurance of nonaggression against the DPRK on the part of the United States; the DPRK's re-entry into the NPT and the return of IAEA inspectors; and an acknowledgement of North Korea's right to peaceful nuclear activity. If the crisis is not resolved, it could have unpleasant consequences for China: "nuclear dominoes," increasing military confrontation on the Korean peninsula, reduced stability of the crisis, and contradictions with the United States and South Korea, if the confrontation on the peninsula exceeds acceptable levels. The tension on the Korean peninsula is diverting Chinese resources from Beijing's main goal: ensuring international circumstances that are favorable for the realization of its plans for the economy and Taiwan. China is trying to prevent an increase of the U.S. military presence in the region and the deployment of theater missile defenses; it is not interested in the growth of Japan's military and, particularly, its acquisition of nuclear capabilities. All of this could complicate Beijing's long-term plans; therefore, Beijing is trying to prevent the aggravation of the Korean nuclear cri-

sis and destabilization of the regional military situation, including as a result of the implementation of severe measures against the DPRK, including sanctions with or without a United Nations resolution. The Six Party Talks are helping to increase China's international authority substantially, strengthening its position vis-a-vis Taiwan.

Furthermore, it is important to Beijing to maintain North Korea as a "buffer" between its territory and locations where U.S. ground troops are deployed – Beijing views a strengthening of U.S. political and military influence in the region as unacceptable, particularly near its boundaries.³⁰ China's leaders, who plan to act if the situation across the Taiwan Strait deteriorates further, want to limit the freedom of maneuver of U.S. troops deployed on the Korean peninsula. Furthermore, the DPRK is only likely to agree to truly forego nuclear weapons if the United States, Japan, and South Korea make multibillion-dollar capital investments in the country, which would lead in turn to a reorientation of North Korean foreign policy that China would view as undesirable.

China is North Korea's only political ally, its main commercial partner and source of economic aid.³¹ Trade with China and its economic assistance is believed to provide for 80% of the basic necessities required by the DPRK population and a large portion of the consumer goods.³² Nevertheless, Beijing has only limited influence on the North Korean ruling clique. Pyongyang's leaders understand that if there were a military conflict on the peninsula, China is unlikely to enter it on the side of the DPRK; they are irritated that Beijing has not supported North Korea's nuclear ambitions; and they are dissatisfied by their long-standing economic dependence on China.

Essentially, China only has one "tangible" instrument of leverage over the DPRK: the curtailment of aid and curbing of economic relations. However, this could lead to regime collapse, with unpredictable consequences. A chaotic course of events in the DPRK would most likely entail an armed intervention by the South and the United States that would in no way correspond to Chinese interests. Given these circumstances, Beijing's line is most likely directed at preventing the aggravation of the Korean nuclear crisis and avoiding a possible strengthening of the U.S. and

Japanese positions in the region. The result of these stances is support for the status quo.

Japan

Japan can exert economic pressure on North Korea. Koreans residing in Japan transfer \$30-150 million to the DPRK each year.³³ Japan is North Korea's third most important economic partner in terms of commodity turnover. Its share of North Korean exports is 13% and share of North Korean imports about 5%.³⁴ In 2004, the Japanese parliament adopted a law banning North Korean ships from Japanese ports and stopping all cash transfers to the DPRK.

Japanese policy on the Korean nuclear crisis is in many respects determined by its geographical proximity to North Korea; by the presence of U.S. troops on Japanese territory; and also by the painful problem of Japanese citizens abducted by North Korean intelligence many years ago. Japan is particularly concerned about the possibility of a North Korean nuclear missile attack on U.S. bases in Japan, as well as an attack on Japan's own facilities. This is the reason for Tokyo's interest in preventing the DPRK from acquiring nuclear weapons before it can deploy ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads capable of reaching Japan.

And it is why Japan supports the possibility of referring the Korean nuclear problem to the UN Security Council, and could support decisive measures against the DPRK. The Japanese view of a solution to the Korean crisis includes the question of the North Korean missile program as well as the issue of the "abductees."³⁵ This approach is not supported by the other participants in the Six Party Talks, although the North Korean missile arsenal is a destabilizing factor in the region. Apparently, future negotiations may include an item on the agenda which is reflected in the Joint Statement as negotiation of "a permanent peace regime on the Korean peninsula." Meanwhile, the Japanese government is not inclined to support, at least publicly, the idea of regime change in the DPRK, believing that this could provoke a strong reaction on the part of Pyongyang, which would make it even harder to find a solution to the "abductees" problem.

As far as achieving a political solution to the Korean nuclear crisis is unlikely, Japan will probably increase its military capabilities – including, over the long term, nuclear capabilities – and will deploy an antimissile defense system together with the United States. There may be a revision of the articles in the Japanese Constitution that regulate the use of the military. The leadership of the Japanese Liberal Democratic Party came out with a draft of such a change in the fall of 2005.³⁶

South Korea

South Korea's approach to the Korean nuclear crisis is based on the following factors:

- Pushing for “regime correction” and economic difficulties in the DPRK would be counterproductive for South Korea, since it could lead to an uncontrollable course of events in the North and a need for armed intervention by South Korea and the United States;
- The belief that Pyongyang would not initiate unprovoked aggression against the South, whether or not the North has nuclear weapons;
- Confidence that a new major war on the Korean peninsula would result, in the end, in a victory by South Korea and the United States, but would have catastrophic consequences for the economy and populations of both Korean states.

Due to these beliefs, South Korea has tried as far as possible not to irritate Pyongyang or “to force it into a corner.” Seoul is trying to “freeze the situation” and has continued its “sunshine policy,” hoping to thus prevent a war while contributing to the gradual, peaceful metamorphosis of the Pyongyang regime.³⁷ Seoul is in favor of providing the DPRK with security assurances, is against the exertion of too much military pressure on it, and is ready to grant North Korea significant economic aid if it gives up nuclear weapons.

RUSSIAN POLICY REGARDING THE KOREAN NUCLEAR CRISIS: LIMITS AND POSSIBILITIES

The continuation of the Korean nuclear crisis in its present state contradicts Russian interests in the region to an ever

greater degree. Russia, like Japan, though for different reasons, is not as interested in freezing the crisis as in solving it before gives rise to undesirable consequences.

The Korean Nuclear Crisis and Russia's Strategic Interests in the Far East

An arms race in the northern Pacific region, particularly the transformation of Japan into a modern military power and the consequent growth of Chinese and then U.S. military power in the Far East, would lead to a change in the ratio of the military forces in Northeast Asia that does not favor Russia. Its military and political role in the region, where the strategic situation would be complicated appreciably, would be reduced. Under these circumstances, Russia would be forced either to noticeably increase its military forces in the Far East, which would require large, unproductive expenditures of resources, or its capacity to defend its interests militarily would be noticeably reduced.

Russia's strategic position in the Far East is already a cause of concern. According to data from the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the ground forces in the Siberian and Far Eastern military districts total about 125,000 personnel.³⁸ This is less than one third the number of Chinese ground forces deployed in the military districts adjacent to Russia – the Beijing and Shenyang districts.³⁹ The Russian Pacific Fleet, Russia's most important tool for the protection of national security, has eight large warships, including one guided missile cruiser, five guided missile destroyers, and two guided missile frigates.⁴⁰ The Japanese fleet, for its part, has 53 large warships, including 39 guided missile destroyers.⁴¹ The only reliable way for Russia to provide for its own military security in this region is nuclear weapons. But an arms race and “nuclear dominoes” could cancel out their significance.

A military conflict on the Korean peninsula would have severe consequences for the economic and sociopolitical situation in the Russian Far East. For instance, it would result in a flow of refugees from North Korea. It would put a definitive end to the prospects for the realization of certain economic projects that promise large benefits to Russia. And finally, the aggravation of the military and political situation on the Korean peninsula would block

foreign investment in the development of oil and gas deposits in eastern Siberia.

If the three permanent members of the UN Security Council prove unable to resolve the Korean nuclear crisis, the weakening of the nuclear nonproliferation regime would be painful for Russia. This failure would indicate to all states and groups attempting to acquire nuclear weapons that such action will go unpunished if the proliferator selects the right time and successfully blackmails the international community. The North Korean leadership might even agree secretly to supply nuclear weapons, materials, and technologies to Islamist terrorist groups.

Given these circumstances, Russia needs to push actively to resolve the Korean nuclear crisis as soon as possible. The longer it remains unresolved, the higher the probability of consequences that will rebound negatively on Russian national interests. For Russia, a waiting strategy aimed at averting further aggravation of the crisis in the hope that over the course of time the North Korean regime will be transformed and more constructive actors will come to power in Pyongyang is not very acceptable.

Russian Instruments of Influence over the Situation on the Korean Peninsula

Russia does not have very many instruments with which to influence the Korean nuclear crisis. The probability of Russian military intervention in an armed conflict on the Korean peninsula is minimal. This could only happen if military action extended onto Russian territory, which is highly unlikely. Russia's ability to render North Korea economic aid is also minimal. The major international projects mentioned above are largely not moving forward due to a lack of Russian funding. Russia cannot manipulate its trade with North Korea to exert political influence over it, since by the mid-1990s the volume of trade between Russia and the DPRK had fallen by about ten times, in comparison to the 1980s. However, North Korean imports from Russia, which mainly consist of oil, coal, and ferrous metals, exceed exports from North Korea to Russia by 20-30 times. Despite a noticeable increase in North Korea-Russia trade this decade, an increase of approximately four-five times, it still only comprises an insignificant portion – of about 4-6% – of North Korea's total

foreign trade. The question of North Korean debts remains unsolved as well, preventing the further growth of bilateral economic ties. Supplies from Russia to North Korea of the items they most want to obtain – weapons and spare parts for Pyongyang military equipment of Soviet origin – have been minimal this decade.⁴² All of this makes it impossible for Russia to use economic ties as a means to influence Pyongyang, if Moscow were to take such a decision. Since Russia has neither military nor economic leverage over policy in Pyongyang, political influence has acquired particular significance. The latter, in turn, is in many respects dependent on the diplomatic skill of those responsible for realizing foreign policy.

Russian Policy Regarding the Korean Nuclear Crisis: the Main Elements

North Korea's initiation of the second nuclear crisis in the fall of 2002 was, one must assume, a complete and unpleasant surprise for Russian diplomats, who did not foresee this course of events. In fact, it destroyed the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs' strategy of strengthening Russia's strategic position in Northeast Asia through the development of constructive relations with the DPRK, which materialized in 1999-2000. This approach, *inter alia*, allowed Russia to act as an influential mediator in fine-tuning relations between Pyongyang, on the one hand, and Seoul and Washington, on the other, prior to the beginning of the second nuclear crisis.⁴³

At first the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs needed about three months in order to – in addition to simply repeating all of the well-known arguments about the need for the DPRK to strictly observe all conditions and obligations under the “fundamental Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which is the guarantee not only of global strategic stability, but also of peace and security on the Korean peninsula,” as well as the obligations of other parties to the 1994 Agreed Framework – work out its own formula for the resolution of the crisis. In January 2003 the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs came out with an initiative for a “package approach” to the crisis. This proposal envisaged:

- Guaranteeing the non-nuclear status of the Korean peninsula;

- Strict observance of the NPT;
- Fulfillment by all parties of the obligations under other international agreements, including the 1994 Agreed Framework;
- A constructive bilateral and multilateral dialog among all of the interested parties, one of the results of which should be the provision of security assurances to the DPRK;
- The renewal of humanitarian and economic programs on the Korean peninsula.⁴⁴

Essentially, a “package approach” presupposed a return to the status quo ante, augmented by security assurances for the DPRK. This approach could, theoretically, lead to useful results if Pyongyang were prepared to forego its policy, begun in the fall of 2002, of seeking to procure nuclear weapons and to legalize its nuclear status or, at least, to create an impression in the world that the DPRK has nuclear weapons. In that case the idea of returning to the “pre-crisis” situation could be realized, and the provision of security assurances to the DPRK could help Pyongyang to save face. However, the Russian “package approach” fell flat in both the DPRK and the United States. Pyongyang, to all appearances, did not plan to reject its policy, adopted in the second half of 2002, of escalating the crisis. As for the United States, the main shortcoming in the Russian plan was that a return to the pre-crisis situation together with some sort of security assurances did not prevent the DPRK from leaving the NPT once again, or from continuing its concealed nuclear weapons activities. Despite these obvious lacunas, the Russian Foreign Ministry continues to view the “package approach,” with “certain modifications,” as a possible way to resolve the Korean nuclear crisis.⁴⁵

Since advancing their proposal of a “package approach,” Russian diplomats have not come out – at least, openly – with any concrete ideas for resolving the nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula in general or for solving any of the individual issues related to the crisis. Nevertheless, one can assume that Russia’s diplomatic course as regards the nuclear crisis in the Korean peninsula basically consists of playing the role of a mediator between North Korea and the United States.

In substance, the position of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs includes three basic components:

- Emphasizing that there is no convincing proof that the DPRK has built nuclear weapons.⁴⁶ If this is true, then Pyongyang’s demands are nothing more than an attempt to blackmail the international community that is not based on the country’s actual capabilities. But if that is true, then Russia’s position that DPRK interests be considered is unfounded: if the DPRK does not have nuclear weapons, then there is no reason to meet its demands, and supporting the DPRK position means, in essence, nothing more than contributing to open blackmail.
- Russia supports the principles for a resolution to the Korean nuclear crisis that are shared, one way or another, by all of the participants in the talks with the DPRK. To a certain extent they were reflected in the Joint Statement and can be summarized as the need to ensure the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula through peaceful, verified, means and the provision of some sort of as-yet-undefined security assurances and economic aid to the DPRK after it takes concrete steps to dismantle its nuclear program.
- At the same time, Russia’s diplomats emphasize their support for several of North Korea’s main positions. The Russian Foreign Ministry has spoken out against the application of severe sanctions against the DPRK and the idea of reporting it to the UN Security Council for consideration of the Korean nuclear problem; it calls for allowing the DPRK to maintain the right to the peaceful use of atomic energy on the condition that it returns to the NPT; it insists on a careful consideration of the DPRK’s concerns; and it attaches particular significance to the provision of security assurances to Pyongyang.⁴⁷

The only public demarche aimed at Pyongyang in recent times was the statement by Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov, who decisively rejected the DPRK demand that it be given a light-water nuclear reactor before it begins to dismantle its nuclear weapons.⁴⁸

On the whole, the Russian Foreign Ministry’s position is far from in complete

agreement with the country's real interests. First of all, the principled refusal to examine the Korean nuclear problem in the UN Security Council because this might cause a strong reaction in Pyongyang undermines Russia's policy of strengthening the role of the United Nations and its Security Council as a key component of international security. Moreover, the more influential the role of the Security Council in global politics, the stronger the influence of Russia, a permanent council member. Furthermore, the expediency of providing political support for Pyongyang's obstructionist policy is doubtful.

Second, supporting North Korea's demand for a right to the peaceful use of atomic energy, in the form that it is interpreted today, could be seen as indicating support for a right to enrich uranium for allegedly peaceful use. This is very dangerous, since, as already mentioned, uranium enrichment technologies for peaceful purposes are in practice no different from military enrichment technologies.

Third, the negative attitude towards the application of severe sanctions against the DPRK could have a dangerous effect on DPRK policy. Of course, sanctions should be targeted in such a way as to minimize the degree to which they worsen the already tragic situation in which the North Korean population finds itself, and to affect the interests of the North Korean leadership to the maximum degree.

Fourth, the effectiveness of mediation is reduced to the degree to which North Korean and U.S. representatives establish direct contacts.

The fruitlessness of the Russian approach to the Korean nuclear crisis is connected, it seems, to Russia's general diplomatic strategy in the Northeast Asian region. This strategy, to all appearances, includes not just the strengthening of security, stability, and the avoidance of conflicts in the region, but also:

- The high priority and necessity of concluding a workable, long-term, constructive partnership with China in the security sphere;
- The limitation of U.S. influence and its military and political posture in the Far East.

As a result, one can assume, Russia, like China, wishes to resolve the Korean

nuclear crisis in a manner that will not strengthen U.S. influence on the Korean peninsula. It is noteworthy that Russian experts have concluded that Russia, like China and South Korea, is striving not to resolve the Korean nuclear problem so much as to prevent a U.S. military operation against Pyongyang.⁴⁹ This distribution of priorities encourages the obstructionism of the North Korean leadership and does not contribute to the establishment of a non-nuclear Korean peninsula.

And, finally, given the severely limited availability of resources to influence the Korean nuclear crisis and the Korean peninsula as a whole, Russia's role in the Six Party process (and in the wider context) will be determined by its ability to carry out a thorough and impartial analysis of the situation, to devise and propose concrete, practical proposals to its partners in the negotiations for resolving the key issues. These issues, first of all, include the form and the mechanism of security assurances; the procedure and mechanisms for verification; the list of technologies and facilities that will be banned in North Korea; and the enumeration of the steps that North Korea must take before it will be provided with energy and other aid.

Russia could also raise the question of the conditions for the return to the NPT of a state that was a party to the treaty, but violated its main provisions and left the treaty without the required reasons. It would seem that such a return should not be automatic, and should be accompanied by serious limits to nuclear activity. Therefore, the statement by former Rosatom head Aleksandr Rumyantsev that "Russia will make a decision on how to build a reactor in North Korea when the DPRK returns to the negotiating table" is, first of all, premature and, in second place, does not correspond to Russia's NPT obligations. Russia, among other things thanks to its own domestic legislation, cannot cooperate in the nuclear sphere with states that are not IAEA members.⁵⁰ Returning to the negotiating table does not indicate a return to IAEA safeguards.

No less important would be the development of an "escalating hierarchy of sanctions" that should be applied to the DPRK if the constructive approach to negotiations fails and the present obstructionist policy continues. Such sanctions must be directed against the interests of the North Korean

leadership first and foremost. At the initial level they could include freezing the foreign bank accounts of top members of the DPRK leadership and their relatives, strict constraints on exports to the DPRK that only permit the delivery of basic commodities, and decisive actions against illegal North Korean trade, including DPRK exports of narcotics, weapons, and so forth. A more advanced level of sanctions could include limiting or curtailing the activity of North Korean trade representatives, freezing North Korean assets, and so forth.

Finally, effective coordination of the positions of the states negotiating with the DPRK is of particular importance. For this purpose Russia could introduce an initiative to conduct regular meetings of the "group of five" at which concrete, unified positions could be developed on those issues where it is possible to agree. The very fact that such meetings are being held would assert a salubrious disciplinary impact on Pyongyang, and limit its ability to play on divergences in the positions of the five states.

Notes

¹ This report was prepared with the support of the Korea Foundation. The opinions and arguments expressed here reflect the views of the author alone and may not reflect the position of the Korea Foundation or the Russian Foreign Ministry's Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO).

² The term "denuclearization," which is used in documents and official statements related to the Korean nuclear crisis, does not have precise legal interpretation. It could indicate a rejection of all activity in the nuclear sphere and its prohibition together with the elimination of the relevant facilities, or the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons alone or, in addition to nuclear weapons, of enterprises and equipment for their production. On the one hand, the absence of a legal definition makes it possible, for a time, to avoid disagreements when preparing diplomatic documents. On the other hand, the effectiveness of these documents is decreased.

³ Estimates of the number of nuclear weapons or explosive devices that the DPRK may possess are based on the quantity of plutonium produced by the operational nuclear reactor. However, the quantity of plutonium needed to produce one nuclear explosive device depends on the planned output level of this device, the level of the technological development of the country's nuclear complex, losses of plutonium during the manufacture and fabrication of the nuclear device, and other factors.

⁴ A reactor of this type produces about 0.9 grams of plutonium per megawatt of thermal power. See David Albright, "Overview of North Korea's Fuel Cycle in the Early 1990s," in David Albright and Kevin O'Neil, eds, *Solving the North Korean Nuclear Puzzle* (Washington, D.C., 2000), pp. 146-65.

⁵ This was discussed, for example, by Sig Hecker when he spoke at the PIR Center on September 20, 2005.

⁶ "U.S. Scientist: N. Korea Pursuing Nukes," http://yahoo.com/s/ap/20051109/ap_on_go_ot/ us_nkorea_nuclear_2.

⁷ In this declaration it states: "We had already taken the resolute action of pulling out of the NPT and have manufactured nukes for self-defense to cope with the Bush administration's evermore undisguised policy to isolate and stifle the DPRK. Its nuclear weapons will remain nuclear deterrent for self-defense under any circumstances." "DPRK Foreign Ministry on Its Stand to Suspend Its Participation in Six-party Talks for Indefinite Period," February 11, 2005, <http://www.kcna.co.jp/e-index.htm>.

⁸ Theoretically, one can fabricate a serviceable uranium-based nuclear munition without testing. For a plutonium weapon field tests are critically important.

⁹ A.G. Arbatov and V.V. Mikheev, eds., *Nuclear Proliferation in Northeast Asia* (Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Center, 2005), p. 10.

¹⁰ Thus, former head of the Russian Federal Atomic Energy Agency Aleksandr Rumyantsev stated at the end of 2004 that the probability that North Korea can develop nuclear weapons is very small, since the level of development of the DPRK "does not make it possible to suppose that they are conducting serious developments [in the nuclear sphere - author] there." <http://www.rambler.ru/db/news/print.html?mid=5044834>

¹¹ The term "dismantlement" does not have a clear definition in international law. It can indicate the complete elimination and physical destruction of armaments, technological and scientific research equipment, enterprises, etc., used to create and produce nuclear weapons. Or it could just mean the partial destruction of related facilities or their dismantlement. The determination of the concrete meaning of this term, apparently, will be one of the complex questions to be considered during the negotiations.

¹² On September 20, 2005, the DPRK Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that: "The United States should not even dream that the DPRK will dismantle its nuclear deterrent capability before they supply a nuclear reactor, which is a material guarantee of trust. This is a fair and logical position, firm as a rock buried deep in the ground." "Spokesman for DPRK Foreign Ministry on Six-Party Talks," September 20, 2005, <http://www.kcna.co.jp/index-e.htm>.

¹³ Thus, before the beginning of the fifth round of the Six Party Talks, chief U.S. negotiator Christopher Hill said, "First they [the DPRK - author] have got to disarm, create a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula, and once they are back in the NPT with IAEA safeguards, at an appropriate time we'll have a discussion about the subject" of providing a nuclear reactor. "North Korea Nuke Talks Open in Beijing," http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20051109/ap_on_re_as/koreas_nuclear_10.

¹⁴ Thus, in August 2005 the North Korean representatives in Beijing once again categorically rejected speculation about developments in the sphere of uranium enrichment. <http://www.rambler.ru/db/news/print.html?mid=6310839>.

¹⁵ Suspicions are particularly aroused by an underground structure in T'aech'on region, which is surrounded by high-voltage electrical power lines, while soil samples from the region have a uranium content tens of times that found in nature. http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/NK/45_547.html.

¹⁶ In August 2005, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf admitted that A.Q. Khan sold centrifuges for uranium enrichment and their blueprints to the DPRK, but he could not remember exactly how many centrifuges had been sold. <http://www.rambler.ru/db/news/print?mid=6456457>.

¹⁷ Weapons-grade plutonium is considered to be plutonium consisting of no less than 93% Plutonium-239 and no more than 7% Plutonium-240. The higher the degree of the

"burnup" of nuclear fuel, the more plutonium-240 is created, hampering the creation of nuclear weapons.

¹⁸ Richard L. Garwin, *Reactor-Grade Plutonium Can be Used to Make Powerful and Reliable Nuclear Weapons* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1998), <http://www.fas.org/rlg/980826-pu.htm>. In a document prepared by the Committee on International Security and Arms Control of the National Academy of Sciences (CISAC) it states: "A potential proliferator could prepare a nuclear explosive device of a simple design from reactor plutonium with a power of from one to several kilotons. More powerful explosive devices would require more complex construction." *The Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium* (Washington D.C.: CISAC, National Academy Press, 1994), <http://www.nap.edu/read-ingroom/enter2.cgi?0309050421.html>.

¹⁹ "DPRK Foreign Ministry Spokesman on Denuclearization of Korea," March 31, 2005, <http://kcpa.co.jp/index-e/htm>; "Declaration by Kim Kye-gwan, head of the DPRK delegation to the Six Party Talks," <http://www.rambler.ru/db/news/print.html?mid=6315930>; Paul Kerr, "U.S. Unveils Offer at North Korea Talks," *Arms Control Today*. July/August 2004, p. 37.

²⁰ George Perkovich, Jessica T. Mathews, Joseph Cirincione, Rose Gottemoeller, and Jon B. Wolfsthal, *Universal Compliance: A Strategy for Nuclear Security* (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), p. 106.

²¹ "Text of Joint Statement from Nuclear Talks," <http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/international/AP-Koreas-Nuclear-Text.html?pagewanted=print>.

²² In the translation of this document by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for some reason it says in this section that the DPRK obligations are of a political character. The English text does not have any mention of political obligations.

²³ Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov stated: "The agreement that has been achieved solves the main problems that were a stumbling block: ensuring the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and realizing the legal needs of the DPRK in the area of security and in the humanitarian sphere." http://www.rian.ru/world/foreign_russia/20050919/41441994.html.

²⁴ Nicholas Eberstadt, "The Persistence of North Korea," *Policy Review*, October 2004, <http://www.policyreview.org/oct04/eberstadt.html>.

²⁵ Thus, in an analytical survey prepared by the International Crisis Group, it notes: "Washington has struggled to develop a consistent policy towards North Korea. Most policy-makers agree that preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons by North Korea is among the most urgent goals. However, a wide rift has been evident between those who believe it possible to make a deal with North Korea and verify compliance, and those who feel North Korea is beyond the pale. The latter group has held sway over U.S. policy during the Bush administration, leading to a wholesale abandonment of many of the advances under the Clinton administration." "North Korea: Where Next for the Nuclear Talks," *Asia Report*. № 87, November 15, 2004, p. 13.

²⁶ In the mid-1990s, U.S. Army Command in South Korea calculated that a new Korean war would result in \$1 trillion in economic losses and losses of 1 million people, including 52,000 American servicemen. See Victor Cha and David Kang, "Think Again: The Korea Crisis," *Foreign Policy*, May/June 2003, p. 24. According to the estimates of the South Korean Ministry of Defense, the DPRK's use of chemical weapons could cause the death and injury of 2.19 million South Korean citizens, including 1.2 million people in the Seoul region. See: "North Korea: Where Next for the Nuclear Talks," *Asia Report*. № 87, November 15, 2004, p. 25-26.

²⁷ On the basis of an agreement with South Korea, the number of U.S. troops based there is being reduced and the 2nd Infantry Division is being relocated to the south of the Han River, in order to be out of the range of North Korean artillery. An agreement has been concluded with Japan on the considerable strengthening of cooperation between the U.S. and Japanese military, the basing of a U.S. aircraft carrier in Yokosuka on a permanent basis, the beginning of the deployment of an American antimissile defense system in Japan in 2007, and so on. Artur Blinov, "Tokyo: pacifism is over," *Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye* № 42, November 2-10, 2005, p. 2.

²⁸ In April 2005 Vice Admiral Jonathan Greenert, commander of the U.S. 7th Fleet, stated that "if the regime [the DPRK - author] were to fail, we would have quite a mess on our hands. We would be the naval component for any subsequent operations, we would go in and help restore order in North Korea if there were an instability or a regime failure." "Transcript of Vice Adm. Jonathan Greenert's interview with Stars and Stripes," *Stars and Stripes*, April 17, 2005, <http://www.stripes.com/article.asp?section=104&article=27686&archive=true>.

Several days later, the South Korean Ministry of Defense said that it no longer had any plans for joint military action with the U.S. if there were an emergency situation in the DPRK. The plan that Washington had proposed earlier anticipated military operations under U.S. command. The South Korean military announced that if the situation in North Korea becomes unstable, and even if the leadership is overthrown, the South Korean government would play a leading role in the resolution of this conflict. http://rian.ru/defense_safety/20050420/39671765.html.

²⁹ Incidentally, the Chinese leadership has not rejected military demarches against the DPRK. Thus, in 2003 an additional five divisions, numbering about 150,000 soldiers, were deployed on the Chinese border with North Korea.

³⁰ The prominent Russian expert V.V. Mikheev drew interesting conclusions as early as 2003, when he wrote: "It is hard to say that China is protecting North Korea now. China is very aggravated by the fact that Kim Jong-Il cannot manage the country's economy, and that this is causing an enormous quantity of refugees, estimated at 200,000-300,000 people. [...] At the same time, China also has another, more traditional approach to the problem. Beijing is afraid that events on the peninsula may result in a military clash, military action in North Korea, or a strengthening of the U.S. military and political position. These fears exist, and they are determining China's position." "The DPRK Crisis," *Yadernoye Rasprostraneniye* (Nuclear Proliferation), vol. 16 (January-March 2003), pp. 42-3.

³¹ China accounts for about 30% of North Korean exports and about 33% of imports. See <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/kn.html#Econ>.

³² "North Korea: Can the Iron Fist Accept the Invisible Hand? *Asia Report* N°96, International Crisis Group, April 25, 2005, p. 10.

³³ "North Korea: Where Next for the Nuclear Talks," *Asia Report*, № 87, November 15, 2004, p. 21.

³⁴ <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/kn.html#Econ>.

³⁵ On August 2, 2005, Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs Nobutaka Machimura stated: "For Japan it is particularly important how the issues of the "abductees" and missiles will be reflected in the concluding document [this refers to the statement by participants in the fourth round of the Six Party Talks which was then being prepared - author]. See: http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/fm_press/2005/80802.html.

³⁶ See Artur Blinov, "Tokyo: pacifism is over," *Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye* № 42, November 2-10, 2005, p. 2.

³⁷ In mid-April 2005 South Korean President Roh Moo-Hyun said, "I don't think sanctions would make North Korea give up its nuclear program and it's my belief that mounting pressure will only aggravate the situation... Restrictions could be available only in case no hope is in sight. I believe, however, there is still hope. ... The real problem is the distrust between North Korea and the United States. But actually it's a matter of fact that Pyongyang has never said that it would not give up its nuclear ambitions, and the United States never said it would not recognize North Korea. ...the North Korean threat has decreased far more than ever before. This is because neither does North Korea have modern high-tech weapons nor does it have economic capability to stage a war." http://www.korea.net/news/news/newsView.asp?serial_no=20050415024&part=1037Searchday=

³⁸ The Military Balance, 2005-2006, The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2005, p. 165.

³⁹ Ibid., p. 272.

⁴⁰ Ibid, pp. 163-164, 167.

⁴¹ Ibid, p. 280.

⁴² In 2001 in an interview with the Kyodo Shinbun news agency, former Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Losyukov said: "If we are talking about military technical collaboration with the DPRK, then I must say that this cooperation today, and in the future, must be of a balanced nature, based on the principle of a reasonable defense. In South Korea, as you know, there is a particular military capacity, including the presence of foreign troops. Naturally, the DPRK must be confident that it can protect itself if extraordinary circumstances arise. I think that it is generally in the interests of all countries of the region that the DPRK not feel endangered. When this feeling exists, it can lead to problems." See "Interview with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Losyukov by the Kyodo Shinbun news agency, June 28, 2001, <http://www.mid.ru>.

⁴³ Former Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Losyukov noted, for instance that Russia "contributed to the renewal of the inter-Korean dialogue and talks between the DPRK, U.S., and Japan. Dialogue between the DPRK and the U.S. is gradually being restored. There was a meeting between U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell and DPRK Minister of Foreign Affairs Paek Nam Sun in Brunei. I believe that Igor Ivanov, who spoke about the possibility of such contacts in Pyongyang, played a mediating role that allowed the meeting took place." Transcript of an interview with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Losyukov by Japan's Kyodo Tsushin news agency, August 12, 2002, <http://www/mid/ru>.

⁴⁴ See A. Panin and V. Altov, North Korea: the Sunset of the Kim Jong-Il Era (Moscow, 2004), pp. 285-86.

⁴⁵ Thus, on the eve of the fourth round of Six Party Talks the official Russian Foreign Ministry representative stated: "The so-called "package approach" that was proposed by Russia earlier and a synchronized solution to the problem has, in our opinion, not lost its relevance, many of its many elements coincide with the proposals of other participants in the negotiations and with certain modifications it could be useful in working out a common agreement." See: Answers by official Russian Foreign Ministry representative Aleksandr Yakovenko to media questions in connection with

the upcoming Six Party Talks in Beijing on the nuclear problem on the Korean peninsula. July 20, 2005, <http://www.mid.ru>.

⁴⁶ In March 2004, former Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Losyukov stated that Russian Foreign Ministry knowledge of the DPRK nuclear program had become obsolete, since Russian cooperation with it in the nuclear sphere ended many years ago, while "intelligence sources had provided no convincing evidence." However, he added that "in general our experts assess North Korea's capabilities of in this sphere as not very high. The Americans take a more alarmist position. It could be that they have more information. But in any event U.S. concerns are greater than those of Russia or China" "North Korea could explode," *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, March 5, 2004. Former head of the Russian Federal Atomic Energy Agency Aleksandr Rumyantsev said at the end of 2004 that the probability that North Korea can develop nuclear weapons is very small, since the level of development of the DPRK "does not make it possible to suppose that they are conducting serious developments [in the nuclear sphere - author] there." <http://www.rambler.ru/db/news/print.html?mid=5044834>.

⁴⁷ Characterizing the main features of the Russian approach to the Korean nuclear crisis, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Losyukov, for example, declared expressly: "We share the point of view of the United States regarding the danger of the spread of nuclear weapons. At the same time, Russia is more inclined to understand North Korea's concerns. One can have a variety of opinions about the regime there. But besides this regime there is also the civilian population. One cannot say that the North Korean people do not deserve trust. One should view the situation in which the people of the DPRK find themselves with understanding. To only make threats and put forward demands that lead to the further aggravation of the life of this people is inhumane." See: Transcript of an interview with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Losyukov by Japan's Kyodo Tsushin news agency, April 17, 2003, <http://www/mid/ru>.

⁴⁸ In the end of September 2005 Sergey Lavrov, after talks with U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, stated: "The sequence of steps that was fixed in the Beijing agreement must be observed: first the dismantling of the nuclear program, and only then - the resolution of the question about the delivery of reactors." <http://www.rian.ru/world/relations/20050921/41458391.html>

⁴⁹ In the analysis prepared under the leadership of A.G. Arbatov and V.V. Mikheev, it says, for example, "As far as South Korea, China, and Russia are concerned, they consider negotiations primarily as a way to avoid U.S. military action against the DPRK, which is fraught with unpredictable military, social, ecological and political consequences and could draw the three nuclear powers involved into a crisis. In other words, their first priority is not as focused on resolving the North Korean nuclear problem, however seriously they take it, as on preventing the U.S. from applying the 'Iraqi model.'" See: A.G. Arbatov and V.V. Mikheev, eds., Nuclear Proliferation in Northeast Asia (Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Center, 2005), p. 13.

⁵⁰ <http://www.minatom.ru/News/Main/viewPrintVersion?id=20092&idChannel=579>

Analysis**THE EVOLUTION OF ARMS CONTROL: CURRENT TRENDS**

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The concept of “arms control” was formulated approximately half a century ago.¹ It is based on the idea of putting restraints on and limiting armaments, up to and including the prohibition and elimination of some weapons types, on the basis of legally binding multilateral or bilateral verified agreements or other arrangements. This notion also encompasses the unilateral limitation or elimination of certain weapons types with subsequent international verification or even without it, where there is an acceptable level of transparency. Arms control also can be enforced on the basis of decisions made by the UN Security Council in accordance with the UN Charter.

As was rightly noted by the prominent US analyst John Steinbruner, director of the Center for International and Security Studies at the University of Maryland: “Arms control is a necessary component of the general rule of law and, as such, is a vital interest of all countries of the world, the United States included (*and Russia as well, I would add – R.T.*). Most of those countries recognize that their security depends on legal regulation far more than on their own military capability and will predictably defend the central provisions of international restraint with the tenacity that their dependence requires.”²

Arms control has never been and by definition cannot be a static concept. Its form and substance are constantly evolving in accordance with the existing political and strategic environment, changing balance of power, and disappearance of old centers of military power and emergence of new ones in a never-ending process. For some reason arms control is sometimes thought to refer only to the US-Soviet treaties limiting

strategic nuclear weapons concluded in the 1970s–90s, an association that leads some people to the premature conclusion that the arms control era is over and arms control itself allegedly “dead.” In fact, arms control is still needed and will be needed as long as weapons exist and as long as new, ever more dangerous military technologies continue to emerge and be perfected. Indeed, the main goal of arms control is to ensure the security of individual nations of blocs of states. This is its basic mission, and this purpose will endure

The coordinated actions of the international community to find ways to make further progress in the area of arms control will always be necessary, but that may be accompanied by a need for various and even *sui generis* interpretations of the term “arms control” itself and to develop the most acceptable framework, methods and degree of arms control for the new international environment.³ Therefore it is important to abandon obsolete views about the nature of arms control in time, and be innovative in searching for new ways and methods to achieve the goals of such control.

ON THE HISTORY OF ARMS CONTROL

The first attempt to conceptualize and discuss disarmament problems was made almost immediately after the end of WWII, soon after the emergence of nuclear weapons. In 1946–49 the UN Atomic Energy Commission considered the well-known “Baruch Plan,” a US proposal to establish international control over atomic energy, along with Soviet proposals aimed at banning nuclear weapons and monitoring this ban. These proposals, of course, were based on security interests and on achieving the strategic goals of the states that had put them forward. And their main purpose, first and foremost, was to provide political and propagandistic support for the nuclear arms race, which was beginning at that time. Given the circumstances of the time, the work of the UN Commission was naturally destined to fail.

During the 1950s, a time characterized by an uncontrolled nuclear arms race and the emergence of other Western nuclear powers (the United Kingdom and France), the Soviet Union and the Western states made similarly unrealistic proposals regarding general and complete disarmament, as well as partial disarmament, at the United

Nations and other international bodies. In 1961 the Soviet Union and the United States even reached an agreement (albeit with certain reservations) on a joint statement about the principles of achieving general and complete disarmament (known as the Zorin-McCloy statement).

The first agreement that is generally considered to provide for realistically achievable arms control is the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water of 1963. This treaty was signed by the Soviet Union, the United States, and the United Kingdom during negotiations in Moscow, and then opened for signature by other states. Since underground explosions, which are difficult to verify, were not banned, the treaty did not require and did not provide for international verification, but it was presumed that state parties would use "national means of control," based chiefly on satellites, but also on aircraft. It was assumed that these means would be sufficient to ensure the verification of treaty compliance.

What were the prerequisites for the conclusion of this treaty? Several main reasons are usually named, which we list here in no particular order: the desire of both superpowers to ensure a political detente after the Cuban missile crisis, which brought the world to the brink of war; the completion of development work on nuclear warheads, especially the most powerful ones; the accumulation of large amount of data on the consequences of nuclear explosions in the atmosphere, space, and undersea; the desire of both parties not to disclose information about the design and other features of their nuclear munitions, because at that time methods to monitor atmospheric explosions remotely by taking radioactive samples and analyzing them were already in use; as well as the radioactive contamination in the atmosphere that had caused public protests everywhere.

The next major arms control treaty was the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) of 1968. The NPT was drafted by the Soviet Union and the United States as co-chairs of the Geneva Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament and then finalized by the committee. Aimed at preventing the emergence of new nuclear-weapon states, the treaty primarily serves the interests of nuclear powers, but it is important for

many other countries as well, since it limits the number of states that possess nuclear weapons and therefore the danger of the possible use of such weapons. It is no coincidence that almost 190 states have joined the treaty. In the 1960s it was supposed that in the near future there would be around 20 nuclear-weapon states; today it is believed that at least 40 countries have the scientific, technical and industrial capabilities to produce nuclear weapons. In reality, there are only 8 states that have nuclear weapons in their arsenals today. However, there are suspicions that an additional two or three countries have plans to master the technology of producing such weapons and may even be implementing such plans.

The NPT plays an enormous role in the efforts of the international community to eliminate the nuclear threat. The treaty created an international legal basis that undergirded the formation of a comprehensive and intricate nuclear nonproliferation regime. Despite the many difficulties facing full implementation of the NPT provisions, due to the discriminatory nature of the treaty itself (which legally divided the world into two categories of state: nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear-weapon states), and despite the difficulty in drawing a clear and straight line between military and peaceful uses of atomic energy and the presence of nuclear ambitions in some states, the treaty was and remains the most important starting point for collective action aimed at diminishing the nuclear threat and ensuring the use of atomic energy for exclusively peaceful purposes.

The NPT and the nonproliferation mechanisms that support it (the IAEA safeguards system and the 1997 Additional Protocol procedures in particular) are aimed at realizing another important arms control function: early warning about possible dangerous developments in the WMD sphere.

In the late 1960s and early 1970s a new stage in the development of arms control was ushered in that was based upon the *bipolar* world order that had been formed by that time. Bipolarity resulted from the fact that the Soviet Union was about to close the gap with the United States in terms of nuclear weapons, establishing a more or less acceptable balance of strategic capabilities.

According to the Russian experts General Nikolai Detinov and Aleksandr Saveliev, by the end of the 1960s, 200-250 ICBM silos and 7-8 nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines were being built each year.⁴ The Soviet Union, while still behind in terms of numbers and, especially, in terms of the quality of its strategic delivery systems, was nearing a strategic balance with the United States.

A similar point of view has been expressed by senior US officials. Henry Kissinger, Richard Nixon's national security adviser, wrote in his memoirs that if the USSR had 250 deployed ICBMs in mid-1966, 570 deployed ICBMs in mid-1967, and 900 in September 1968, then by September 1969 the USSR had surpassed the United States in the number of ICBMs, with 1,060 missiles deployed.⁵

Another prominent US specialist, Richard Garthoff gave the following assessment of the geostrategic situation that was being formed at the time:

"By the end of the 1960s, the Soviet Union had acquired strategic intercontinental military forces approaching those of the United States in numbers, if not yet in capability. Moreover, the United States had proposed strategic arms limitation talks and appeared to be prepared to accept a general parity in strategic military power. From the standpoint of the United States, this initiative did reflect a readiness and desire to constrain the arms race, at least quantitatively. From the standpoint of the Soviet Union, the prospective attainment of strategic parity, and acceptance of it by the American leaders, marked an unprecedented advance over the Soviet Union's military inferiority since the revolution. Moreover, in addition to enhancing Soviet security, it also could represent an important step toward attaining political parity as a superpower."⁶

The fundamental change in the strategic situation made it possible for bilateral strategic arms limitation talks (SALT-I) to begin in 1969 on an equitable basis. The talks were held from 1969 to 1972. During these negotiations, treaties on the limitation of defensive and offensive strategic arms were worked out. However, at the outset, in 1971, the Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War Between The United States and the USSR was signed. In this agreement, which was seemingly technical in nature,

the balance of strategic capabilities (or the so-called principle of "equal security") between the USSR and the United States was legally formalized *for the first time*.

As a result of the SALT-I negotiations, Leonid Brezhnev and Richard Nixon signed an Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty in May 1972. According to the interim agreement, the numbers of ICBM and SLBM launchers were frozen, while the ABM Treaty prohibited both powers from deploying national missile defenses, allowing each of them just two missile defense systems: around the capital and one missile base. The ABM Treaty Protocol, signed in 1974, limited this number to one zone for each of the parties.

The logic of both SALT-I agreements, as well as of later Cold War strategic arms agreements (SALT-II, START-1 and 2) assumed that in order to prevent a nuclear war each party had to retain a retaliatory capability, which implied a sort of "openness" to retaliatory strikes by the other party. This made it possible to create a system of mutual deterrence and gradually to start the process of nuclear arms reduction.

In 1979 the SALT-II Treaty was signed. It set equal levels of strategic delivery systems – not just ICBMs and SLBMs, but also heavy bombers – and at the same time it provided for some reduction in the number of strategic delivery systems. The treaty took into account the appearance of MIRVed ICBMs in the United States and then the Soviet Union. However, this treaty did not enter into force (President Carter withdrew the treaty from the Senate ratification process in protest against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan), but in practice its main parameters were implemented as a result of the implementation of subsequent agreements.

The next important agreement was the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START-1), signed in 1991, which remains in force today. The treaty limits the number of nuclear warheads to 6,000 and the number of strategic delivery systems to 1,600. Counting rules were adopted to determine the number of warheads, in accordance with which each delivery vehicle in a particular category was counted as having a missile of a certain type, and each missile type counted as having a

particular number of warheads. A completely new component in START-1 was its powerful verification system, which included the comprehensive exchange of data and various types of inspections, including inspections at missile production plants.

Despite the fact that a predictable and fairly stable system of mutual nuclear deterrence between the two powers had emerged at that time, there were still problems from time to time that had to be solved. For instance, in the early 1980s President Ronald Reagan introduced the so-called "Strategic Defense Initiative" (SDI) that envisaged the creation of a multilayer defense system for the United States with space-based elements, which would have contradicted the basic principles of deterrence enshrined in the ABM Treaty. After much complicated diplomatic maneuvering, the United States abandoned the creation of a missile defense system at that time.

Another crisis started when the Soviet Union began deploying the Pioneer (SS-20) intermediate-range missile with three warheads, replacing older missile types. This action caused concern, both in the United States and among its European allies. In response, the United States planned to deploy new intermediate-range missiles in Europe: Pershing-2 ballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles. Following complicated negotiations, a "zero option" was adopted: the parties gave up their respective capabilities and signed the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty) in 1987. This was the first (and so far, in the nuclear sphere, the only) treaty between the two powers providing for the elimination of an entire class of weapons. The treaty provided for a strict verification system, including information exchange and on-site inspections. The treaty has been fully implemented.⁷

The arms control system, which had arisen and was gradually being consolidated at that time, made it possible for both powers to implement *unilateral, informal and unverified* nuclear arms limitation measures: this time in the area of **tactical nuclear weapons**. It was impossible to prepare a comprehensive treaty with appropriate verification measures in this area; however, the agreement, in which both parties were quite interested, made it pos-

sible to achieve important results in a relatively short period of time.

In September 1991, President George Bush unilaterally announced his intention to cut non-strategic nuclear weapons. Several days later Mikhail Gorbachev responded with a statement announcing similar measures, which were confirmed in January 1992 by Boris Yeltsin on behalf of the Russian Federation. The measures provided for removing from operational use and eliminating nuclear artillery shells, nuclear mines and nuclear warheads on tactical missiles; the same measures were adopted for tactical nuclear warheads on sea-based delivery systems; some of the nuclear warheads on non-strategic aviation systems were eliminated or put into storage; non-strategic nuclear weapons only remained on aircraft; while nuclear warheads were also removed from sea-launched cruise missiles, although the latter were long-range weapons.

The bipolar world order also made it possible to conclude a number of multilateral arms control agreements, including such important ones as the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty) of 1967, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (BWC) of 1972, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (CWC) of 1993, and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) of 1996, although the latter treaty, which has not entered into force because the United States refused to ratify it, has already experienced the winds of change in the arms control sphere.

In 1991, the compulsory elimination of ***Iraqi weapons of mass destruction and their components*** took place, in accordance with a decision of the UN Security Council supported by all of its permanent members. Iraq was caught engaging in covert activities aimed at the creation of nuclear weapons in violation of its obligations under the NPT and its IAEA safeguards agreement.

This brief, somewhat schematic description of the main Cold War arms control agreements indicates that during the bipolar era

of 1960-1990, which is often called the period of "traditional" arms control, various ways to reach agreement on monitoring mechanisms and formats were used. Nevertheless, the agreements were inevitably based upon the fact of bilateral, mutual nuclear deterrence.

THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE GEOPOLITICAL AND GEOSTRATEGIC SITUATION AND ITS INFLUENCE ON THE ARMS CONTROL PROCESS

The break-up of the USSR in the early 1990s led, after a transitional period, to a change in the global strategic situation, and, correspondingly, has resulted in significant corrections in the process of arms control, which has gradually started acquiring new dimensions. It appears that this process is still going on. The following developments of global importance are the main factors that characterize the emerging geopolitical and geostrategic situation:

- The disintegration of the Soviet Union, emergence of several independent states on its territory, and significant weakening of Russia's economic and military power, albeit with the retention of a significant nuclear deterrent capability. These events have complicated the problem of ensuring Russian national security;
- The emergence of new threats to international stability and new challenges to the regime of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction;
- The Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests of 1998, and nuclear programs and ambitions of several other states (Iran and the DPRK);
- The steady rise of China as a potential new center of industrial, economic, and, in the long run, military power;
- The rolling wave of international terrorism, which is in fact a response of poorer, weaker and oppressed peoples, but a response employing methods that the civilized world cannot accept; it is a response to the continuing and strengthening supremacy of the rich nations of the North over the countries of the South. The most dramatic manifestation of this phenomenon was the tragic events of September 11, 2001 in New

York, as well as the terrorist acts in Russia and in Europe.⁸

- The gradual depletion of oil reserves in the intensifying struggle for dominance in the Middle East, which is the main source of global oil reserves;
- The increasing importance of the "economic component" of leading countries' foreign economic policies, which increase demand for military power to secure state economic interests;
- Escalating conflicts between different peoples on the basis of race and religion, and the danger of split between civilizations that has been denounced by some political scientists.

All of these changes in the global situation, when taken together, suggest that the world has become more threatened than it was during the relatively stable times of bipolarity, and as a result is less predictable, making it more difficult to maintain general stability and the security of individual states. While the spectrum of threats is broadening and these threats are manifesting themselves in new forms, the role of the uncertainty factor is increasing, and imposing new demands on state security.

It was against this backdrop that the so-called neoconservatives became especially influential after the Republican administration of George W. Bush came to power in the United States in early 2001. They started pushing for more aggressive unilateral action, including the use of force, to support and promote American interests. The most vivid manifestation of this shift in US policy from the policy of previous administrations was the military intervention in Iraq in 2003, which was not sanctioned by the UN Security Council, and made under the false pretext that Iraq had WMDs and their components.

It was precisely at this moment that the departure of the United States from the Cold War policy of "traditional" arm control started. And the first display of this process was the story of the START-2 Treaty, which had been signed by both countries back in the beginning of January 1993. The treaty provided for nuclear arms reductions, limiting the number of warheads to 3,000-3,500 and eliminating all MIRVed ICBMs. The key deficiency of the treaty from Russia's point of view was not the elimination of MIRVed ICBMs per se, but

the fact that this ran counter to Russia's economic capabilities at the time, and that the timeline for reductions was too short.

Throughout the 1990s, there was a tense diplomatic struggle over the conditions of these reductions. Consequently, a Protocol prolonging the treaty's duration until 2007 was signed in 1997. An agreement also was reached to start work on the START-3 treaty, which would envisage a level of 2,000-2,005 warheads by the end of 2007, and to start negotiations on the new treaty right after the ratification of START-2. In 1997 some other agreements, which took into account Russia's concerns regarding US missile defense plans, were reached. However, while the US Senate ratified the START-2 Treaty in 1996 in its initial form, Russia only ratified the treaty in 2000 and in a new variant, which took into account these additional accords. The US Senate did not agree to ratify the treaty with the subsequent amendments. As a result, the START-2 Treaty has not entered into force.

Another step the United States took that reflected its new approach towards the entire arms control regime was its **withdrawal from the ABM Treaty** in June 2002, and the initiation of intensive R&D work on its own, purportedly "limited," ballistic missile defense system, which was supposedly needed for protection from North Korean missiles. But in fact, according to some observers, it had China's missile and nuclear capability and, possibly, the Russian capability in mind. The US Administration, supported by the Congress, provides generous funding for missile defense, although the tests conducted to date have not yielded satisfactory results. Approximately \$10.4 billion have been appropriated for the next financial year, while future expenditures on missile defense are projected to reach \$19 billion annually. By the end of 2005, 8 interceptors had been deployed near Fort Greely in Alaska and two at California's Vandenberg Air Force base. By the end of 2009, up to 40 interceptors will have been deployed on the US west coast between Fort Greely and Vandenberg.⁹

The Russian Federation reacted quite calmly to the US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, calling the US decision a "mistake," while relying on Russian missile systems capable of penetrating US missile defenses. But the very fact of withdrawal from a treaty that for decades had con-

tributed to ensuring global strategic stability cannot but undermine faith in the international legal process of nuclear arms limitation and reduction, a process that has been facing so many difficulties.

But let's go back to the CTBT Treaty, which was signed by Bill Clinton's democratic administration in 1996 and which, as was mentioned above, has not yet entered into force because the US Senate refused to ratify it, and is not likely to enter into force in the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, it is encouraging that the moratorium on nuclear explosions continues to be observed by all nuclear powers. China's behavior is particularly interesting: for many years it has regularly announced that the All-China Assembly of People's Representatives was considering the treaty for ratification. However, it does not seem that China will ratify the treaty before the United States does, if it ratifies it at all.

For some time the United States has worked on the development of low-yield nuclear devices designed to penetrate deep underground to destroy bunkers and other underground targets (Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator). However, it appears that further research efforts have been abandoned; in any case, no funding has been allocated for this work in next year's budget.¹⁰ No funding will be allocated to develop new low-yield nuclear weapons concepts either. Instead, the Reliable Replacement Warhead Program, for which \$27.7 million have been allocated, will be implemented. In addition, funding to improve the test-readiness posture of the Nevada Test Site from 24 to 18 months has been allocated in the new budget (\$14.8 dollars), as it was last year.

It is noteworthy that in recent years the United States has been unilaterally cutting its contributions to the Provisional Technical Secretariat of the Preparatory Commission for the creation of the CTBT International Monitoring System and for the development of inspection procedures. For FY2006 these contributions have been again cut by almost \$5 million.¹¹ In contrast, Russia has actively supported the activities of the Provisional Technical Secretariat and has signed an agreement on the realization of the Russian segment of the monitoring system.

The Russian Federation, like the United Kingdom and France, has ratified the CTBT. At the same time, Russian nuclear

weapon designers are clearly interested in new low-yield nuclear warheads deployed both on tactical and strategic delivery vehicles. They substantiate this view as follows: "One of the most important tasks in the development of low-yield nuclear weapons consists in a radical decrease in the level of nuclear confrontation between the United States and Russia in the military and technical sphere. On the one hand, equipping nuclear forces with low-yield devices will radically decrease the level of global threat associated with them, and on the other, give them the property of real "battlefield" weapons, usable in any region of the world." The use of such weapons, which "do not lead to total annihilation of the adversary, but significantly exceed the power of traditional weapons, [...] in response to a significant use of conventional arms or terrorist acts causing the loss of important infrastructure facilities and deaths of dozens and hundreds of people, could be quite justified on moral grounds." According to the authors of this concept, activities aimed at adapting existing warheads to the above-mentioned tasks "initially could be implemented in the framework of existing types of nuclear weapons."¹² Thus, one might conclude that proponents of such a scenario do not rule out the conduct of nuclear tests at some time in the future.

The signing of the **Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT Treaty)** by the United States and Russia in May 2002 was characteristic of the new approach to arms control. The treaty appears to commit each party to its unilateral statements in a legally binding form, while providing them with great freedom of action within the framework of commonly agreed obligations. The main article of the treaty (Article 1) deserves to be cited in full:

"Each Party shall reduce and limit strategic nuclear warheads, as stated by the President of the United States of America on November 13, 2001 and as stated by the President of the Russian Federation on November 13, 2001 and December 13, 2001 respectively, so that by December 31, 2012 the aggregate number of such warheads does not exceed 1700-2200 for each Party. Each Party *shall determine for itself the composition and structure* (italics added – R.T.) of its strategic offensive arms, based on the established aggregate limit for the number of such warheads."

Thus, this new treaty is quite unusual, indeed novel, in that the treaty text itself emphasizes the freedom of action of the parties to the treaty with regards to everything related to the composition and structure of strategic offensive arms within agreed numerical limits. This makes the treaty completely different from, for instance, the START-2 Treaty, which stipulated, in particular, a ban on MIRVed ICBMs for both parties. The treaty fully takes Russia's interests into account.

The SORT Treaty does not contain provisions on information exchange, or on verification and inspections, but it confirms the START-1 Treaty with all of its provisions, now referred to as the START Treaty. This treaty will be effective through the end of 2009. According to the new treaty a bilateral implementation commission is to be created; in addition, the Joint Declaration which was signed by the two presidents in the interim provided for the creation of a consultative commission on strategic security issues to be headed by foreign and defense ministers, through which the parties would strengthen mutual confidence, increase transparency, exchange information and plans, and discuss strategic issues. The commission, however, as is well known, has not been noticeably active to date, although the expiration of the START treaty and then of the SORT treaty itself is steadily approaching.

Treaty implementation, according to available reports, is proceeding in due course. In July 2005, Russia announced the withdrawal of 200 warheads from 20 SSBNs and of 26 ICBMs with 150 warheads. The last rail-mobile missile launchers, known in the West as *SS-24s*, have also been eliminated. In total, as of January 1, 2006, Russia had 4,300 deployed warheads on 927 launchers in accordance with START Treaty counting rules.¹³

Meanwhile Russia, in full compliance with the SORT Treaty, is qualitatively upgrading its arsenal of strategic offensive delivery systems. According to a February 5, 2006 statement by Russian Defense Minister Sergey Ivanov made at a conference in Munich, "we continue to improve our strategic deterrent forces. But our efforts are aimed only at their qualitative modernization." Older *Voevoda (SS-18)* missiles, of which there are currently 80, are being withdrawn from duty, a process that will

continue until 2016. They are being replaced by stationary and road-mobile *Topol-M* missiles. According to Strategic Rocket Forces Commander General Nikolai Solovtsov, in several years *Topol-M* missiles in some divisions will be equipped with multiple re-entry vehicles, similar to the ones being designed for the *Bulava* sea-based missile system.¹⁴ Russia's current military policy is based on "abandoning the 'symmetry' principle," e.g. the desire to maintain quantitative parity with a potential adversary, and on transitioning to an armed forces, and entire national military organization, based on "asymmetry" and prioritizing to ensure real deterrence."¹⁵

US implementation of the SORT Treaty is proceeding more slowly than in Russia. It was recently announced that 50 of 500 Minuteman-3 missiles had been withdrawn from duty. Furthermore, these missiles are periodically modernized, and the number of warheads deployed on them has been decreased from three to one. In total, as of January 2006, the United States had 5,235 warheads on strategic delivery vehicles. Like Russia, the United States continues qualitative modernization of its ICBMs: it plans to put a new missile of this type into service by 2018.¹⁶

Where multilateral arms control agreements are concerned, the state of affairs is less positive, with the exception of the Chemical Weapons Convention, although its implementation by the main possessors of such arms – Russia and the United States – is lagging behind the timeline established in the convention. But in this case the delay can be explained by inadequate funding and technical problems faced by the parties to the convention; when it was written not all such factors could be calculated, even in theory.¹⁷

The Geneva Conference on Disarmament, which is tasked with preparing multilateral arms limitation and disarmament treaties, has done nothing in a decade (since the signing of the CTBT). It has sunk into discussions on its agenda and on determining priorities for negotiating particular disarmament issues.

One of the most vital issues – the preparation of a **Fissile Material Cut-off treaty (FMCT)** – is being hampered by a number of states, including China, that are linking the start of negotiations on this problem to progress in the prevention of

the militarization of outer space. The process is also hampered by several countries that plan to continue accumulating stocks of weapon-grade fissile materials. Russia and the United States, like the United Kingdom and France, have stopped producing such materials and are ready to start negotiations on an FMCT. However, fairly recently – in July 2004 – a new difficulty emerged: the United States, after confirming its readiness to start negotiations on the treaty, announced that its research had "indicated grave concern about the impossibility of achieving a realistic and effectively verified FMCT."

Efforts to strengthen and to increase the effectiveness of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), which contained no verification provisions when it was signed in 1972, are in no better shape. A multi-year effort to develop a verification protocol to this convention that had nearly been finished was halted in 2001 by the refusal of the United States to continue further work on the protocol. As American experts noted, the United States was worried that the inspections envisaged by the protocol might allow "bad actors to learn the microbiological details of specific medicines that the United States was developing and thus circumvent US biodefenses."¹⁸

As for **tactical nuclear weapons (TNW)**, the two countries – Russia and the United States – continue to rely on the unilateral statements they made in 1991, and are fulfilling these pledges. According to a May 3, 2005 statement by the head of the Russian delegation to the NPT Review Conference, Sergey Kislyak, "by today Russia has cut its non-strategic nuclear arms fourfold." In his May 2, 2005 statement at the same conference, head of the US delegation Stephen Rademaker said: "We have reduced our non-strategic nuclear weapons by 90% since the end of the Cold War, dismantling over 3,000 such weapons." In numerical terms, according to various estimates, the Russian TNW arsenal includes as many as 3,000-4,000 devices.¹⁹ According to the US experts Robert Norris and Hans Christensen, the United States possesses approximately 1,300 non-strategic nuclear weapons, with 500 weapons operationally deployed, including B61 free fall bombs designated for use by US and NATO country air forces that are still located outside US territory – at eight bases in six European countries.²⁰

However, it seems unlikely that in the foreseeable future any tangible progress in drawing up bilateral or multilateral agreements on the limitation or reduction of such arms can be achieved. Suffice it to mention the fact that there are significant monitoring difficulties, since the majority of TNWs have dual use, i.e. a single type of delivery aircraft can have both nuclear and conventional equipment, while counting rules for nuclear weapons are based on the number of delivery systems.

ARMS CONTROL: THE POSITIONS, ACTIVITIES AND PLANS OF OTHER NUCLEAR POWERS

We now turn to the reaction of other nuclear powers to the changing geopolitical and geostrategic situation with a view to the future prospects for arms control, and examine their existing plans and activities related to the further development of their nuclear arsenals.

As is well known, the United Kingdom, France and China have never agreed to conduct negotiations on the limitation or reduction of their nuclear arsenals, a formal violation of NPT Article VI. Nonetheless, some of the above-mentioned countries have made unilateral cuts to their nuclear forces.

For instance, in recent years the **United Kingdom** has implemented small unilateral cuts to its nuclear forces (which is not in accordance with its NPT obligations), and, according to SIPRI data, now possesses a little less than 200 deployed warheads on four *Vanguard* submarines, which are equipped with US-made *Trident* missiles, each capable of delivering up to three warheads. However, according to statements by the UK leadership, since the service life of these SSBNs will come to an end in the not too distant future (approximately by the year 2025), it will be necessary to decide on a replacement for these nuclear missile systems by the year 2010. The new vessels will provide for the nation's security for the period up to the middle of the present century (to 2055, to be more precise). According to media reports, debates in the House of Commons will soon be held on the issue of whether this replacement should occur during the tenure of the current Labor government. But in practice, according to Member of Parliament and former Secretary of State for International

Development Clare Short, Prime Minister Tony Blair and current Defence Secretary John Reid have already decided to hold such debates.²¹ In justification, the minister referred to the nuclear programs of India and Pakistan and to the Iranian nuclear problem as evidence of the unpredictability of the global situation; interestingly, he did not mention China in this context.²²

And, although no official decisions have been made yet, the Ministry of Defense has already started the large-scale modernization of relevant systems at Aldermaston and Burgfield nuclear weapon centers, and will spend ?1 billion on that modernization over the next three years.²³

France, according to official statements, has also made some changes and reductions in its nuclear arsenal. Land-based ballistic missiles have been eliminated, the number of SSBNs has been reduced, the total number of missile launchers has also been reduced, the test site in the Pacific has been closed, and weapons-grade fissile material production facilities in Marcoule and Pierrelatte have been dismantled.²⁴

According to SIPRI, France has approximately 350 warheads deployed on SSBNs, carrier strike aircraft and land-based bombers. France continues to modernize its nuclear forces, including the construction and commissioning of the third and fourth *Triomphant* SSBNs, *M-51* SLBM with a new nuclear warhead, air-to-surface *ASMPA* cruise missile, and *Rafale* strike aircraft capable of carrying nuclear weapons. The *M-51* long-range missile (with a range of over 6000 km, and possibly up to 8000 km) will allow French SSBNs to significantly expand their patrol zone and missions. As French President Jacques Chirac noted recently, "in this fast-changing world the *M-51* ballistic missile and enhanced air-to-surface medium range system (ASMPA) will provide us with a capability to counter threats, wherever they arise and whatever nature they have."²⁵

Chirac provided quite a candid account of France's plans given the changing geostrategic situation in his statement of January 19, 2006, where he in essence proclaimed a new nuclear doctrine. Due to the importance of this statement, we will quote several parts of it here. Chirac started by emphasizing the existence of a "constantly changing environment," characterized at present by "no direct threat from a

major power.” But the end of the Cold War, Chirac continued, “has not removed threats to peace. In many countries radical ideas are being spread which advocate confrontation between civilizations, cultures, and religions.[...] Combating terrorism is one of our priorities. Our world is constantly changing and searching for new political, economic, demographic and military equilibria. It is characterized by the swift emergence of new poles of power.”

“And we are not safe from the unexpected reversal of the international system, nor from a strategic surprise,” Chirac continued. Chirac paid special attention to the fact that “our world is marked also by emerging assertions of power based on the possession of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons.” Given this situation, “believing that prevention alone is enough to protect us would however be naively optimistic. To make ourselves heard, we must also be capable of using force when necessary.[...] Nuclear deterrence remains the fundamental guarantee of our security.” “Nuclear deterrence is not intended to deter fanatical terrorists. Yet, the leaders of states who would use terrorist means against us, as well as those who would consider using, in one way or another, weapons of mass destruction, must understand that they would lay themselves open to a firm and adapted response on our part. And this response could be a conventional one. *It could also be of a different kind* (Italics added – R.T.)”

The main point of the new (if it is really new?) French nuclear doctrine is obvious and hardly needs comment. What should France do in the current situation? Chirac formulates the task very clearly in this regard: “The modernization and adaptation of (our) capabilities are absolutely necessary for our deterrent to retain its indispensable credibility in an evolving geostrategic environment.”

The nuclear arsenal of *China* is exerting an increasing influence on the geopolitical and strategic environment not only of Eurasia but of the entire world, and is based on the country’s rapidly developing economy. The Chinese arsenal is estimated at 400–450 warheads, which are deployed on land-based, air-based, and sea-based delivery systems. Land-based nuclear forces provide the foundation of the nuclear triad. The *DF-5A* intercontinental ballistic missiles have a range of 1,300 km, i.e. are capable of reaching US territory, and are

liquid-fueled missiles that are equipped with 4-5 megaton warheads. In addition, there over 100 intermediate-range missiles deployed so that they are capable of striking targets on the territory of India, Japan, Russia and other Eurasian states.

China possesses one Xia nuclear-powered submarine, armed with 12 solid-fueled two-stage Julang-1 SLBMs with a range of 1,700 km. However, the submarine’s patrol area is limited to coastal waters. The aerial part of the nuclear triad consists of 120 H-6 bombers and 30 Q-5 medium- and short-range bombers, capable of carrying nuclear weapons. The range of H-6 bombers is 3,000 km. China is buying Sukhoi-30 and Sukhoi-27 multipurpose aircraft from Russia, and will likely re-equip these aircraft for nuclear missions. China possesses satellite missile guidance systems.²⁶

Since China has a limited retaliatory strike capability, it is especially concerned about the prospect of the creation of an anti-ballistic missile system. A missile defense system protecting US territory, if added to a modern theater missile defense system that the United States might sell to Japan and Taiwan, would significantly complicate Chinese military planning. The Americans would have the theoretical capability to destroy Chinese deterrent forces. If China’s concern about its ability to provide for its own security grows significantly, Beijing will most probably be compelled to increase the number of deployed launchers and warheads, increase the scheduled production of weapons systems and start creating and deploying countermeasures against missile defense systems.²⁷ China is quite concerned about the 2003 Japanese decision to invest its first \$1 billion in the sea- and land-based ballistic missile defense system being developed by the United States. Plans call for the expenditure of several more billions of dollars on this system before it is fully deployed, probably no earlier than in 2011. This system, ostensibly aimed at countering a missile attack by North Korea, could be used for protection from a Chinese missile threat, and its sea-based component could be deployed to protect Taiwan.²⁸ According to past US Defense Department calculations, China had approximately 20 ICBMs capable of hitting targets on the territory of the United States, and it was supposed that this number would grow to approximately 30 missiles by the year 2005, and possibly

to 60 missiles by 2010. According to CIA forecasts, in the next 15 years the overall size of the Chinese strategic nuclear arsenal will grow to 75–100 warheads deployed “mainly against the United States.” But Chinese expert Hui Zhang wrote: “Absent U.S. missile defense plans, China might be expected to build no more than 50 ICBMs by 2015.” However, China might need 100–300 ICBMs to defeat the current U.S. missile defense system if that system were to employ 100–250 interceptors.²⁹

Since the mid-1980s China has been developing three new ballistic missiles: the mobile three-stage solid-fueled *DF-31* (*CSS-X-10*) ICBM, a new version of the *DF-31* with extended range, and the *Julang-II* (“Big wave”) SLBM. Another ICBM, the *DF-41*, with a range of 12,000 km, is under development. It will be deployed in the near future and will be capable of hitting targets throughout US territory. The creation of the *Project 094* nuclear submarine is also continuing. The submarine will be equipped with 16 *Julang-II* missiles.

If China, as expected, tries to master multiple re-entry vehicle (MRV) technology in the near future then, according to CIA estimates, one of the options could be using the *DF-31* missile for the development of simple MRV systems, or MIRV systems on already existing *DF-5* ICBMs.³⁰ According to experts, the “key sphere of modernization and growth is increasing the number and accuracy of shorter-and medium range missiles.”³¹ Some experts wonder whether the reason for China’s continual failure to ratify the CTBT can be explained by a desire to retain the option to conduct nuclear tests in order to develop warheads for MIRVs, in case the treaty does not enter into force.

According to a *Washington Post* article published on April 12, 2005, “in the past several weeks, President Bush and his senior aides, including Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Director of Central Intelligence Porter J. Goss, have expressed concern over the recent pace of China’s military progress and its effect on the regional balance of power.” This gives rise to the question: while the US leadership frequently speaks about the unpredictability and uncertainty of the global environment to justify its new course, isn’t it Washington itself that is pushing certain

countries to take the actions causing such changes in the international arena?

CONCLUSION

It seems obvious that in recent years the arms control system has been evolving in a complicated manner, with changes of both substance and form. But it is also certain that as before, this system continues to play a major role as a deterrent preventing the use of weapons of mass destruction and as a factor contributing to some limitations and reductions of such weapons. For many decades this system has been an important component of the international legal field, a fact that no one is likely to call into question. From time to time some elements of the arms control system are taken on, but, as a rule, the system as a whole withstands these attempts to make holes in it, though not without some difficulty.

The current steps aimed at shaping the arms control regime, in particular the SORT Treaty, which gives the parties greater freedom of maneuver within a framework of set quantitative limits, adequately meet the demands of the current geopolitical and geostrategic environment, which is characterized by less predictability and certainty than the period of bipolarity. At the same time, the fact that the process of replenishing the arms control regime with new collective actions in the area of arms limitation, both on a bilateral and multilateral level, has slowed, cannot but cause concern.

The expiration date of the START Treaty – the year 2009 – is approaching. It is time to decide what is to be done. Thus, one must ask whether the treaty should be extended for some period of time, perhaps with an agreement (without amending the text of the treaty prepared with such great difficulty) to suspend some of the more burdensome, but not currently very necessary, methods of its verification, and possibly, some other amendments. Not too much time is left (given that strategic arms treaties take years to conclude) until the expiration of the SORT Treaty in 2012. In the past Russia has repeatedly called for setting lower ceilings – 1,500 or even 1,000 warheads. The current US administration is not inclined to reciprocate. So far it is not clear what actions should be taken given these circumstances, but it is also obvious that suspen-

sion, let alone termination of the arms control process does not meet the vital interests of either country. It would be a signal to other nuclear (and also non-nuclear) states that they are totally free to build and accumulate such weapons. As for multilateral arms control, it is difficult at present to offer suggestions on how to achieve any shift in resolving the FMCT problem, given the positions of such countries as China, India, Pakistan and some others. However, attempts to do something regarding the BWC could be made. If a verification protocol to the convention cannot be agreed upon at this time, then maybe it would make sense to develop at least a system of some confidence-building and transparency measures aimed at strengthening this international instrument. It seems that Russia's foreign policy, given present international circumstances and its growing capabilities, could play a more proactive role in searching for ways to maintain and develop the international arms control regime.

Notes

- ¹ This term appeared in US documents and literature for the first time in the 1950s-1960s. It was included also in the name of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), created in 1961. Initially the term was ignored in the USSR, which preferred "disarmament" instead, but gradually "arms control" started being used more in Russian as well.
- ² John Steinbruner, "Can Arms Control Be Revived?" *Arms Control Today*. Vol. 35, No. 2 (March 2005), p. 45.
- ³ Some US analysts express similar thoughts. See: Michael A. Levi & Michael E. O'Hanlon, *The Future of Arms Control*, (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2005), p. 1.
- ⁴ Aleksandr G. Savelyev and Nikolay N. Detinov, *The Big Five. Arms Control Decision Making in the Soviet Union* (Westport, CT, and London: Praeger, 1995), p. 2.
- ⁵ Henry Kissinger, *White House Years* (Boston, Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 1979), p. 537.
- ⁶ Raymond L. Garthoff, *Detente and Confrontation. American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan*. (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1985), p. 16.
- ⁷ However, sometimes even high-ranking Russian military officials views denounce the ICBM Treaty. It is unlikely that they have Western Europe in mind. Does this mean their focus is, perhaps, South or East Asia? (*Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, March 1, 2006).
- ⁸ As stated in Michael A. Levi & Michael E. O'Hanlon, cited above, "today's strategic environment is characterized more by the problem of weak states and dangerous non-state actors than by competition among the great powers".
- ⁹ General Robert Gard and John Isaacs, Council for a Livable World, February 2006; Head of the US Missile Defense Agency General Henry Obering (Fairbanks Daily News Miner, February 5, 2006).
- ¹⁰ At the same time, there are plans to allocate a large amount of funds for re-equipping nuclear-armed SSBNs with conventional warheads.
- ¹¹ *Arms Control Today*, Vol. 35, No. 10 (December 2005), p. 25.
- ¹² Igor Andryushin, Viktor Mikhaylov, Yuri Trutnev, and Aleksandr Chernyshev, "Low-yield nuclear weapons - the possible foundation of a new age nuclear arsenal," *Yaderny Kontrol*. 2005, № 2(76), pp. 27-37.
- ¹³ Statement by V.V. Loschinin, the representative of the Russian Federation at the Conference on Disarmament, February 28, 2006. RIA Novosti. February 28, 2006.
- ¹⁴ *Krasnaya Zvezda*, January 31, 2006. If the Topol-M is declared to be an upgraded variant of the Topol ICBM, then, since we already put the latter missile in the category of missiles with one warhead when we signed the START Treaty, we will only be able to equip Topol-M with MIRVs after the treaty's expiration in 2009, or earlier, if an additional agreement is reached.
- ¹⁵ Yuri Baluyevsky, "The General Staff and the Tasks of Developing Military Capability," *Krasnaya Zvezda*, January 25, 2006.
- ¹⁶ *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, January/February 2006, pp. 68-71.
- ¹⁷ N. I. Kalinina, "The Chemical Weapons Convention: problems and prospects," *PIR Study Papers*, 2003, № 3(24), p. 113.
- ¹⁸ Michael A. Levi & Michael E. O'Hanlon, p. 78.
- ¹⁹ A.S. Dyakov, E.V. Myasnikov, and T. G. Kadyshch, *Nonstrategic nuclear weapons. Problems of control and reduction*. (Dolgoprudny: 2004), p.11.
- ²⁰ *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, January/February 2006, pp. 68-71.
- ²¹ Independent, November 1, 2005, as cited in *Disarmament Diplomacy* № 81 (Winter 2005), p. 71.
- ²² *Arms Control Today*, Vol. 35, No. 10 (December 2005), p. 38.
- ²³ *Disarmament Diplomacy*, № 81 (Winter 2005), p. 68.
- ²⁴ Statement by Francois Rivasseau, the representative of France at the Conference on Disarmament,, February 7, 2006.
- ²⁵ A well-known French analyst Bruno Tertrais from the *Fondation pour la Recherche Strategique* in his comment dated 23 January 2006 interpreted Chirac's statement in such a way that the president meant "possible emergence of new hostile powers, especially in the Middle East, South or East Asia".
- ²⁶ Zhang Ming. *China's Changing Nuclear Posture. Reactions to the South Asian Nuclear Tests*. Wash., D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999. P. V and 2-3; *SIPRI Yearbook - 2003*. P. 742.
- China launched a satellite constellation of three satellites for space navigation known as Beidou, which is capable of providing enough accuracy for using MIRVs. (Geoffrey Forden. *Military capabilities and importance of Chinese local satellite navigation system*. *Nauka I Vseobshchaya Bezopasnost*. 2005, Vol. 12, № 3. P. 35-46).
- ²⁷ *Deadly Arsenals*. Wash., D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002. P. 143-144.
- ²⁸ Bates Gill. *China's new security multilateralism and its implications for the Asia-Pacific region*. *SIPRI Yearbook - 2004* (Russian Edition). Moscow, 2005. P. 270.
- ²⁹ *Arms Control Today*. 2005, Vol. 35, No. 10, December. P. 9.
- ³⁰ *SIPRI Yearbook - 2003*. P. 741.
- ³¹ Zhang Ming. P. 3.

Viewpoint**WILL THE THREAT OF WMD
TERRORISM EMANATING
FROM THE NORTH CAUCASUS
RECEDE?!**

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For the past few years it has been difficult to get shake the feeling that the leaders of industrialized states are trying to “persuade” their citizens of the fact that terrorist acts using weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are inevitable.² This is the case in Russia too. Note, for instance, the following statements by high-ranking Russian officials. Deputy Secretary of the Russian Security Council Nikolay Spassky said in September 2005, “The most horrifying threat is a terrorist attack employing some sort of weapon of mass destruction. Unfortunately, it is not a question of “whether,” but a question of “when.”³ In May 2004, Federal Security Service (FSB) Director Nikolay Patrushev noted that the danger of terrorism approaching the “Rubicon” separating it from the possession of weapons of mass destruction is growing.⁴ Further, in September 2003 Mikhail Lysenko, director of the Department of Security and Disarmament Affairs of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, announced: “Terrorists continue to be able to acquire weapons of mass destruction or components thereof, and this could lead to a terrible tragedy. The threat remains, and it is high.”⁵

Russia’s citizens are completely convinced of this danger as well. In an opinion poll carried out by the All-Russia Center for the Study of Public Opinions at the behest of the PIR Center in January 2006, it turned out that 83% of Russians fear that terrorists will use WMD against Russia. Furthermore, terrorist organizations are the entities that pose the greatest threat of the

use of WMD, in the opinion of Russian citizens. In answer to a question asking what country or organization presents the greatest threat of the use of WMD against Russia, the majority answered “Chechen terrorists” (55%), while Al Qa’eda got 38%. For comparison, 33% of Russians answered that the United States posed a similar threat.

In any discussion of terrorism, particularly megaterrorism,⁶ it is necessary to recognize that the greatest such threat faced by Russia today is related to the instability in the North Caucasus region. The threat of terrorist acts increased noticeably during the course of the second Chechen campaign, when foreign terrorist organizations began to offer the terrorists in the Caucasus stronger support. Note, for instance, the fact that during the counter-terrorist operation in the Chechen republic the scale of acts of terror and quantity of victims increased substantially (in 1999 apartment houses in Moscow and Volgograd were blown up, while in 2002 approximately 1,000 people in Moscow were taken hostage, and in 2004 over 1,000 people in Beslan (Northern Ossetia) were taken hostage).

The ties between the terrorist groups based in the North Caucasus and Al Qa’eda are dangerous not only because of a potential increase in the funding of these organizations’ activities, but also the possibility that technological assistance will be provided. It is well known that Osama bin Laden has proclaimed the acquisition of nuclear or chemical weapons to be his followers’ religious duty.⁷

POSSIBLE WMD TERRORISM SCENARIOS

An act of megaterrorism implies the use of so-called “means of mass destruction.” All facilities where these weapons and their components are produced as a final product or are used as an initial or intermediate product in the manufacture of other substances, as well as their storage depots, products pipelines, and means of transportation could be used to create mass destruction.⁸

Another problem causing anxiety is the question of whether terrorists in the North Caucasus are capable of independently constructing a nuclear explosive device, using stolen or otherwise acquired fissile materials, or stealing an “operational”

nuclear warhead and making it work. In the 1990s there were frequent media reports concerning losses of nuclear materials, and at times entire nuclear warheads, from Russian nuclear industrial facilities or military storage depots.

Moreover, on December 1, 2005, Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces Yuri Baluyevsky announced that documents had been discovered in Chechnya that described technologies for creating "dirty" radiological, chemical, and biological weapons.⁹

In addition to the threat of the leakage of nuclear technologies and materials, there is the danger that terrorists may acquire chemical or biological weapons or technologies for their production, which is considerably simpler and more accessible than the production of nuclear weapons, since many of the components can be acquired completely legally. It is also necessary to remember the possibility that terrorists will build "dirty" bombs, including "dirty" biological bombs.

THE THREAT TO RUSSIAN NUCLEAR FACILITIES

The apparent "No. 1 goal" for likely terrorists is the nuclear facilities (both civil and military) located throughout the country. Furthermore, the physical protection systems at nuclear facilities, nearly 100% of which were created in Soviet times, were oriented towards external threats, not an internal enemy.

On October 30, 2002, soon after the seizure of the audience at the "Nord-Ost" musical, Chechen separatist leader Akhmed Zakayev told the media that "we cannot exclude the possibility that the next such group will take over a nuclear facility." The seriousness of Zakayev's words soon obtained indirect confirmation from the Tver region FSB, where the captain of Kalinin NPP guard forces was detained. When the detainee was searched, a diagram of the plant was discovered that included the secret facilities there. In addition, the search turned up encoded telephone numbers that, it later turned out, belonged to individuals from Chechnya.¹⁰

There were serious reasons for examining the threat of WMD terrorism even earlier. For instance, in 1999 the Defense Ministry press service stated that one of the leaders

of the Chechen fighters, Salman Raduyev, had trained a group of saboteurs. One of their missions was to attack Russian nuclear facilities, including NPPs. According to the information provided by the press service, the group was to have consisted of 15 people of Slavic appearance. On October 13, 1999 this information was confirmed by the FSB.¹¹

Earlier, on March 13, 1996, the RIA Novosti news agency reported that at a meeting of field commanders in an alpine village not far from Bamut, which was under the control of Ruslan Gelayev, the decision was made "to organize a series of terrorist acts against nuclear facilities on Russian territory."¹²

There are also reports that before the seizure of the Moscow theater, Movsar Barayev's group had been looking for ways to get into the Kurchatov Institute. However, the institute's security system proved to be enough to cause him to drop his plan to seize one of the institute's research reactors.

Security at Ministry of Defense Facilities

Personnel at nuclear facilities subordinate to the Defense Ministry felt the impact of the early 1990s economic crisis on nuclear security more sharply than others. As Chief of the Russian Ministry of Defense 12th Main Directorate Colonel General Yevgeny Maslin put it, "there were not enough of the protective devices used in the transport of nuclear weapons, security equipment, etc. And new threats appeared, with which we were not familiar, such as the possible unauthorized access of terrorist groups to nuclear weapons located in storage depots or being transported. We felt this threat particularly seriously in 1991-1992 when the conflict in Chechnya began to heat up."¹³

The interest extremists showed in Defense Ministry facilities was noted repeatedly. In October 2001, Chief of the Russian Ministry of Defense 12th Main Directorate Colonel General Igor Valynkin stated that representatives of terrorist organizations had already conducted reconnaissance in the vicinity of nuclear weapon storage depots on two occasions.¹⁴

In 2002 the representatives of two Chechen terrorist groups tried to get into nuclear weapon storage depots in Saratov oblast. However, the terrorists were stopped by the FSB.¹⁵ Other countries' intelligence

agencies have also noted that Chechen terrorist groups have evinced an interest in the transportation of nuclear munitions in Russia. In particular, they were discovered at several large main railway stations in the Moscow area attempting to obtain information about the special trains used to transport nuclear warheads.¹⁶

In March 2002, media stories appeared reporting the detention of three armed Chechens in Sverdlovsk oblast who were attempting to sell weapons illegally. In addition to an imposing weapons arsenal, it was discovered that the criminals had a valid permit for the Lesnoy closed city, where the serial production and dismantlement of nuclear warheads for the Russian Defense Ministry takes place.¹⁷

Yet one more "alarm bell" was the April 2002 discovery of a detailed plan for the seizure of a nuclear-powered submarine, prepared by Islam Khasukhanov, one of the Chechen fighters' military leaders, who was apprehended during the course of a special operation. According to the plan, seven fighters of Slavic appearance were supposed to seize a submarine at a naval base near Vladivostok, mine the nuclear reactor and one of the nuclear missiles on board, and then demand the withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya.¹⁸

The announcement by Boris Berezovsky, published in the foreign media, that in 2002 he helped British intelligence foil the plans of Chechen terrorists who allegedly wanted to sell a nuclear explosive device for \$3 million, is not very credible.¹⁹ It is noteworthy that this "acknowledgement" by the well-known Russian oligarch only came after two years had passed, at a time when the foreign press was once again focusing on the issue of the security of nuclear arsenals and radioactive materials on the territory of the post-Soviet states, thanks to a notorious series of terrorist acts in Russia in late August-early September 2004. Given his situation, the oligarch's statement could be interpreted as an attempt to draw attention to himself and put political pressure on the Russian government.

The majority of the new tasks facing the Defense Ministry were managed successfully (a portion of them are still being dealt with) within the framework of the Cooperative Threat Reduction program with financial, and sometimes also techno-

logical, assistance from foreign states, the United States first and foremost. Furthermore, in the opinion of Colonel General Maslin, "the measures undertaken through the Cooperative Threat Reduction program not only increased the security of nuclear weapons at the present time, but also, to a certain degree, made it possible to anticipate and prepare for future challenges, the threat of nuclear terrorism in particular."

In addition to measures directed at strengthening physical protection at Russian nuclear weapon storage facilities, work is continuing on ways to perfect the cooperation between different ministries and agencies during the transport of nuclear weapons, in order to increase security further. Here we should mention the large-scale military maneuvers entitled "Avaria-2004" (Emergency 2004) that took place in August 2004 (for more details, see *Yaderny Kontrol* № 1, 2005). The main goal for exercise participants related to the provision of reliable protection for nuclear weapons both at storage sites and along nuclear weapon transport routes.²⁰

According to former 12th Main Directorate chief Valynkin, "During the entire history of Russia terrorists have never succeeded in a single effective attack on a nuclear facility. Two sole attempts have been undertaken, but both of them were immediately put down by facility guard forces. This indicates that we have good mobile units to guard and defend nuclear facilities. Throughout the half century of the existence of nuclear weapons in Russia, there has not been a single case of loss. This proves that the physical protection system at our nuclear facilities is good, and works reliably."²¹

This does not mean, however, that there isn't a need to continue to improve physical protection systems at nuclear facilities. Since the February 2005 Bratislava summit, where the Russian and U.S. presidents adopted a joint statement "on enhanced nuclear security cooperation," there has been noticeably more cooperation between the two countries on further improvements to physical protection systems at Russian nuclear weapon storage facilities, as well as transport security enhancements.²² In October 2003, Germany joined in the process of increasing Defense Ministry facility security as well.

Generally speaking, Russian specialists agree that the system of physical protection at nuclear facilities, including nuclear weapon depots, is at a qualitatively different level today than it was 10-15 years ago. At that time, immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union, they really were vulnerable to unauthorized access. Today, we can exclude unsanctioned access by terrorist organizations to nuclear arsenals from the list of probable scenarios.²³

Security of Federal Atomic Energy Agency Facilities

In the late 1980s a training exercise was held that simulated the seizure of a nuclear facility. Soldiers from the Soviet KGB's intelligence and sabotage "Vympel" division were able to overcome all of the NPP's security systems and even plant a dummy explosive on the reactor.²⁴

It is clear that the level of security at nuclear facilities has grown since the mid-1980s. In December 2000, the Russian government adopted the federal special-purpose program entitled "Russia's Nuclear and Radiation Safety" for the period up to 2006, the purpose of which was to develop a comprehensive approach to nuclear and radiation safety. Under the auspices of the Global Partnership program, there are a whole series of joint international projects to increase physical protection at scientific research institutes with nuclear installations. Every year NPPs and research institutes hold "Atom" training exercises, through which the FSB and Interior Ministry (MVD) jointly check the effectiveness of the system that protects these facilities from terrorists.

The groups that participate in these exercises include: troops from the FSB's Center for Special Operations (TsSN), "Vympel" and "Alfa" units, the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of the General Staff, and the MVD. According to the scenario for "Atom-2002" at Kalinin NPP, two months before it was to begin troops from the Center for Special Operations, who were to play the role of the hypothetical terrorists, went to Tver oblast's Udomelsky region to conduct reconnaissance. In other words, a group of 15 saboteurs was dropped off in Tver oblast and had to reach Udomli on their own, by any method they could, using any form of transportation and approaching the site from any direction they liked. To conduct

the operation, they had to be *based* in the region near the NPP, at the post nearest to the nuclear plant. Furthermore, in playing the role of terrorists they studied the traffic routes to Kalinin NPP, visited the personnel division under the pretext of applying for jobs, and established contacts with employees, all with the ultimate goal of seizing hostages and the facility, and making some demands.²⁵

In October 2002, the "Metel-2002" (Snowstorm-2002) command and staff exercises focusing on a nuclear terrorism scenario were conducted at the Tomsk Polytechnic University Scientific Research Institute of Nuclear Physics research reactor. This was an indication of the increased attention that Russia's leadership was paying to the protection of nuclear facilities.

However, there is no such thing as 100% security, as was revealed by the evaluations carried out by the Russian General Procuracy in 2004. Deficiencies were discovered in security measures at the Kola, Novovoronezh, and Smolensk NPPs, as well as at several other nuclear and petrochemical production facilities.²⁶ One of the most vulnerable components in the physical protection system at nuclear facilities remains the personnel. Thus, additional attention and preventive measures must be undertaken by facility directors. This aspect of security provision demands increased attention, particularly since terrorist organizations have been attempting to use people who appear Slavic to undertake their criminal activities.

Given the circumstances, the creation of a so-called "dirty bomb" is the most attractive and practically attainable action for the separatists (if certain parts of such an attempt can be realized).

THE PROSPECTS FOR THE CREATION OF A "DIRTY BOMB"

It is well known that to create a "dirty bomb" all one needs is an insignificant quantity of radioactive materials and common explosives. According to IAEA data, most of the countries in the world possess the types of radioactive materials suitable for the production of a "dirty bomb" to one degree or another.²⁷ Millions of radiation sources were produced in the last 50 years; hundreds of thousands are used now in medicine, metallurgy, agriculture, mining, and mechanical engineering; 12,000 industrial radiography sources are produced

each year; more than 10,000 radiation sources are used in medicine for radiotherapy. The number of cases of illegal trafficking involving radiation sources officially registered and confirmed by the IAEA total 470.²⁸

As for Russia, in Moscow alone there are about 200 enterprises that use radiation sources and isotopic sensors, to say nothing of the 11 nuclear reactors and 33 nuclear research installations located there.

As for the North Caucasus, the Radon radioactive waste disposal facility 30 km north of Grozny, Chechnya, one of 16 regional radioactive waste disposal facilities, was for all practical purposes outside of the control of federal authorities in the early 1990s. Radon Grozny had two underground depositories for solid radioactive waste (mostly the low- and medium-level isotopes Ir-192, Co-60, Tm-170, and Cs-137), which were 57% full.²⁹ Other Radon storage installations, including those for liquid and biological wastes, were not being used. During the so-called first Chechen campaign, Radon's security system and relevant facilities were actually destroyed, as a result of which two containers of radioactive materials were lost. Thanks to the efforts of the Emergency Situations Ministry these containers were found and rendered harmless. However, for a fairly long period, all the way up to 1999, security and environmental protection measures were not conducted at the site.³⁰ After federal troops established control over the facility, a plan for the restoration of physical protection there was devised as a top priority, in order to reduce the threat of sabotage or terrorist acts making use of radioactive materials on Chechen territory. This plan was approved by the Russian Construction Committee (GosStroy), and sanctioned by the FSB, MVD, and the Civil Defense and Emergency Situations Ministry.³¹

In addition to Radon, there are 26 other facilities in Chechnya where some 120 radioactive items can be found, including factories, petroleum and construction industry enterprises, hospitals, and universities.³² Unfortunately, it is not known whether proper control is being maintained over all these sources. There is reason to believe that at least some of this material has fallen into the hands of the separatists. For instance, one of the containers that had disappeared from the Radon site

was later discovered in Izmailovsky Park in Moscow.

At a press conference in Shali in October 1995, Shamil Basayev displayed several containers of radioactive materials that would allegedly make it possible for him to create a "small Chernobyl" in Moscow. Based on the geometric form and sizes of the containers, specialists believe that they contained radioactive sources used in medicine and agriculture, such as Co-60 or Sr-90.

On November 23, 1995 a radioactive container containing Cs-137 was discovered in Moscow's Izmailovsky Park. Journalists from the Russian television network NTV were informed of the container's location ahead of time, and were therefore able to videotape its removal from a snowdrift and to transmit this material over the airwaves before cameras were prohibited at the site of the incident.³³

In 1998, officials disarmed a booby trap mine in Chechnya that was attached to a container of radioactive materials.³⁴

It is impossible to completely dismiss the possibility that the necessary materials could have been obtained either from the CIS countries themselves or in transit from other countries. The most probable timeframe for this sort of operation was the mid-1990s. Looking at Russia's borders, it is clear that Georgia is the main potential "transit point." In 2002 alone some 13 "orphaned" radiation sources were discovered in this country.³⁵ In the early 1990s, the well-known Sukhumi Institute of Physics and Technology was divided: some researchers remained in Abkhazia (a break-away region of Georgia), while the remainder established the Andronikashvili Institute of Physics in Tbilisi. Subsequently, media reports began to appear about mass thefts and losses of radioactive materials from the Sukhumi Institute's storage areas. Furthermore, Director Valter Kashiya believes that these radioactive materials could be used to create "dirty bombs."

Radiation sources from Abkhazia had already started "glowing" in Chechen hands in the mid-1990s. In 1996 a group of four Chechens stopped in the village of Lidzava, on the outskirts of Pitsunda, and after a short period of time drove on in the direction of Sukhumi. The next day they returned with a metal box, but two of the Chechens felt quite ill, and in 24

hours they passed away. Their partners then threw the box away. Russian experts believe that the group had tried to open up the radioactive waste storage depot, and the two "diggers" received 800 rem, a lethal dose of radiation.³⁶

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, many military and industrial facilities where radiation sources were stored remained in Georgian territory. According to available information, in 1992-93 five mobile chemical repair shops (PRKhM) were officially transferred to the Georgian republic together with instruction manuals. During the same period, in 1992, Georgia affected the unauthorized seizure of three mobile chemical repair shops and 48 SO-6 complexes with radiation sources from previously decommissioned mobile chemical repair shops that were being stored in military depots. It is known that a large portion of the equipment and materials enumerated above was simply plundered by metals thieves and spread out into various regions; these items were later pointed out by Georgia during the search for "orphaned" radiation sources.³⁷

Nevertheless, it would appear that the problem of possible terrorist acts using radiation sources is exaggerated by the media in many respects. For instance, many of them refer to a Main Intelligence Directorate of the Russian Armed Forces General Staff document describing attempts by insurgents tied to killed Chechen resistance leader Khattab to obtain Os-187 to construct a "dirty bomb." Given that this material is not radioactive, and that one gram costs \$50,000-100,000, the usefulness of such an acquisition appears doubtful.

Nor should one forget that most of the isotopes used in civilian enterprises (theoretically the most accessible materials) have a relatively short half-life (Co-60 - 5 years, Cs-137 - 30 years, Ir-192 - 74 days, Sr-90 - 29 years).

It is worth noting that the "newest" sources likely to be in the possession of Chechen fighters date back to 1990-91; they may well be even older. Thus, the only real danger is posed by Cs-137. However, it recedes with each passing year, even if the separatists really do have the material at their disposal. Long-lived isotopes can be excluded from the list of potential threats, since the Chechens have

made no statements about the possession of such materials, and access to them is severely limited and hard to obtain.

Furthermore, during the second Chechen campaign getting hold of such materials in Russia's large cities became considerably more difficult. This is because the number of sentry posts equipped with the Yantar system for the detection of radiation on rail, air, and road transport has increased year by year.

THE THREAT OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL TERRORISM IN THE NORTH CAUCASUS

According to official data, there are no facilities on Chechen territory where life-threatening chemical and bacteriological materials are stored. Moreover, in 2001 Russian officials declared that the possibility terrorists might obtain access to chemical weapons storage depots was "vanishingly small."³⁸

Nevertheless, insurgent interest in using toxins against federal forces is clear. In the course of a special operation in Chechnya's Gudermes region in January 2003, instructions for the primitive production of toxic substances, including ricin, an extremely deadly toxin, were discovered.³⁹

There is also no evidence that the terrorists acting in Chechen territory possess the equipment needed to produce or transport chemical weaponry. Given the fact that the population centers in the Chechen republic are increasingly under the control of federal forces, the likelihood of home-made production of chemical (and biological) weapons is considerably reduced.

Given these circumstances, the Chechen fighters can only make declarations and undertake "targeted" actions using accessible materials. There are reports indicating that ampoules containing botulism toxin (a dangerous bacteriological substance) have been repeatedly seized from the terrorists.⁴⁰ And some sources indicate that "Chechen fighters have both stocks of anthrax and smallpox viruses in their arsenal today."⁴¹ There have been no official comments on these statements. Nevertheless, there have been no recorded cases of the use of any of the above substances or bacteria either against either Russian troops or civilians to date, although the danger is real.

Reported Statements by Chechen Fighters on Possession or Access to Sources of Ionizing Radiation and Attempts to Acquire Nuclear Devices

Date	Event	Remarks
Autumn 1995	Report that a "suitcase nuke" had fallen into Chechen hands.	The information appeared in the Russian media.
October 14, 1995	Display of a container of radioactive materials. Announcement that four such containers had been positioned in Russian territory.	At Shamil Basayev press conference.
November 23, 1995	Discovery of a container of Cs-137 in Moscow.	Discovered by Russian media. Presumably put in position by Shamil Basayev two weeks earlier.
December 22, 1995	Display of a container of some radioactive substance.	At Shamil Basayev press conference. Threat to use the substance in a terrorist attack.
March 1996	Announcement that the Chechen fighters possess an atomic bomb and other weapons.	Announced by Shamil Basayev.
Summer 1996	Chechen attempt to access radioactive waste storage site in Sukhumi.	Two of four perpetrators died. Information from Russian media.
September 1997	Announcement that the Chechens have a "suitcase nuke."	Made by Alexander Lebed.
2002	Two attempts by Chechen fighters to gain access to nuclear weapons depots in Saratov oblast.	Announcement by Igor Valynkin, June 2005; Russian Defense Ministry source.
2002	Attempt by Chechen fighters to obtain a nuclear device with the aid of Boris Berezovsky.	Disclosed by Boris Berezovsky in October 2004.

In December 1999, there were several cisterns with ammonia and chlorine that exploded. The resulting fumes spread over an extensive territory; some innocent civilians were victims. Although neither chlorine nor ammonia are WMD components, the damage they cause can be quite significant. Moreover, there is a danger that these substances could infect the water and soil, leading to far more serious consequences.⁴²

In summer 2001, Chechen insurgent leader Rizvan Chigitov announced that they planned to poison Russian servicemen's food and water supplies. It was later discovered that one of his closest associates had a notated map of the regional water sources.⁴³

On April 6, 2002, according to media reports, one of Islam Chalayev's field commanders, who was killed, was discovered to have mercury bichloride and arsenic, both

strong poisons, in his possession. A large quantity of these poisons and instructions for their use were discovered in one of Aslan Maskhadov's hideouts, discovered near the settlement of Bachi Yurt in Chechnya's Kurchaloy region.⁴⁴

It is impossible to ignore the fact that at the present time it would be quite difficult to produce chemical or biological weapons on the territory of the North Caucasus and Chechnya, since intelligence services would quickly notice a workshop of this type in populated areas, while it is practically impossible to undertake this sort of production outside of these areas. Given this fact, it would seem logical to "transfer" these sorts of activities to other states bordering the North Caucasus. This proposition received unexpected confirmation from the French Foreign Ministry. In March 2005, then French Minister of Internal Affairs Dominique de Villepin stated that Al-Qaeda terrorist groups in Georgia's Pankisi Gorge were developing biological weapons and means of their delivery after such work had been interrupted in Afghanistan by the fall of the Taliban regime.⁴⁵

CONCLUSION

The terrorist attacks in New York, Madrid, Moscow, London, and other cities throughout the world have proven that terrorism cannot be considered an individual country's local problem. The ties between the insurgents in the North Caucasus and Al-Qaeda terrorists are no longer subject to doubt. Western experts note that "if the Chechens acquire a nuclear bomb their number one aim will undoubtedly be Moscow, while if they obtain several nuclear bombs, their brothers in Al-Qaeda would be potential purchasers."⁴⁶

Several measures have already been taken within the framework of the fight against terrorism in Russia; the next logical steps should be taken to continue this work. While this article cannot provide comprehensive recommendations to the Russian leadership on reducing the threat of WMD terrorism in the North Caucasus, the authors would nevertheless like to draw attention to the following possible steps.

Deeper interaction between the countries in the anti-terrorist coalition against the threat of WMD terrorism

On April 28, 2004 the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1540 on the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction in the context of combating terrorism. This document was developed on the basis of a Russian draft and approved unanimously. The purpose of the resolution is the creation of effective barriers to prevent WMD, WMD components, and means of their delivery from falling into the hands of terrorists. The resolution lays down important principles and mechanisms for coordinated action against "black markets" of WMD and related materials.

Moving forward, Russia initiated work on the development of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, which was adopted by the U.N. General Assembly on April 13, 2005. The articles of the convention call for the prevention of the terrorist acquisition of nuclear materials from both civil and military nuclear facilities. The convention also provides for the return of stolen radioactive materials, nuclear devices, or materials to the state-party to which they belong. It seems that the adoption of this document, open for signature until December 31, 2006, could greatly decrease the probability of acts of megaterrorism that make use of fissile materials, and complicate the acquisition of these materials by extremist forces in the North Caucasus to an even greater degree.

Measures to stabilize the North Caucasus region

The social instability in the Chechen republic, along with the activity of criminal and extremist groups there, generates new terrorists. Combating terrorism on Russian Federation territory as such is one of the major steps in the fight against the threat of megaterrorism. "Terrorism flourishes where there is desperation, humiliation, misery, political oppression, extremism, and human rights violations; it also flourishes where there are regional conflicts and foreign occupation; it preys on a lack of state capacity to maintain law and order," as the eruption of terrorism at the end of the 20th century is explained in the Report on "A Safer World: Our Common Responsibility." Thus, the problem of reconstructing the Chechen republic must become one of the basic elements of Russian security policy.

Further modernization of physical protection measures at nuclear industry facilities

This article cited several cases that attest to terrorist groups' real interest in nuclear facilities. In all cases, these attempts were thwarted by the intelligence services and law-enforcement agencies, a testimony to the government's control of the situation. However, we should also strengthen intelligence work to eradicate criminal ideas in the early planning stages, and further strengthen physical protection measures to avert attacks making use of advanced equipment.

Equipping borders and customs posts

Customs control takes on particular importance where combating terrorism is concerned. Federal Customs Service statistics indicate that the number of radioactive and radiation-hazardous materials that individuals try import into Russia considerably exceeds the quantity of materials in illegal export attempts. Therefore, equipping border crossings with the Yantar radiation detection system is critical. A more complex problem that also requires a solution is monitoring the transport of chemical and biological materials suitable for the creation of WMD.

Notes

- ¹ The authors would like to thank Gennady Evstafiev, Yevgeny Maslin, Daniil Kobayakov, and Anton Khlopkov for their assistance in the preparation of this article.
- ² Thus, according to the U.S. State Department Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism Henry Crampton, "the probability of an attack involving is very high. It is only question of time." *Gazeta.ru*, January 17, 2006. "Terrorist groups throughout the world are attempting to acquire WMD by a variety of means, we constantly obtain information and signals to this effect," stated then-U.S. Under Secretary of State, (now U.S. ambassador to the United Nations) John Bolton in May 2004. *Gazeta.ru*, May 20, 2004.
- ³ <http://www.pircenter.org/cgi-bin/pirnews/getinfo.cgi?ID=2015&L=0>.
- ⁴ Patrushev notes the danger of WMD falling into terrorist hands. *RIA Novosti*, May 18, 2004.
- ⁵ Kseniya Baygarova, "Russian diplomat believes that there is a significant threat that terrorists may acquire weapons of mass destruction," *Interfax*, September 19, 2003.
- ⁶ The term "meagterrorism" denotes the "use (or threat of use) for terrorist aims of the most modern weapons or technologies of mass destruction or of weapons that cause perceptible (at the state level) economic or ecological damage." A.V. Fedorov, editor, *Super-Terrorism: The New Challenge of the New Century* (Moscow: Human Rights, 2002), p. 59.
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<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A32285-2004Dec28.html> or http://more.abcnews.go.com/sections/world/DailyNews/transcript_binladen1_990110.html.

- ⁸ *Terrorism in a Metropolis: Assessment of Threats and Security* (Moscow: PIR Study Papers №3, 2002), p. 43.
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- ¹² *RIA Novosti*, March 13, 1996.
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- ¹⁵ Vladimir Ivanov, Andrei Terekhov and Anton Trofimov, "The Generals Frighten Foreign Investors," *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, June 23, 2005.
- ¹⁶ *Ibid.*
- ¹⁷ <http://main.izvestia.ru/community/article159#>.
- ¹⁸ <http://fsb.ru/ru/smi/ufsb/2002/020426-2.html>; *ITAR-TASS*, October 31, 2002.
- ¹⁹ <http://timesonline.co.uk/01-523-1325302-523,00.html>.
- ²⁰ Vladimir Verkhovtsev, "Nuclear Weapons Security - Russia's Priority for the Long Term," *Voprosy Bezopasnosti* №2, April 2004.
- ²¹ <http://www.pircenter.org/cgi-bin/pirnews/getinfo.cgi?ID=1694&L=0>.
- ²² In 2006 the U.S. Congress plans to allocate \$74 million to fund physical protection systems at Russian nuclear weapons depots and \$30 million to improve the security of nuclear weapons transport, *Global Partnership Bulletin* №10 (Winter 2005).
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- ²⁸ Andrei Vaganov, "Dirty bomb' explodes in people's minds," *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, March 26, 2003.
- ²⁹ Yevgeny Antonov, "The threat of a terrorist attack using weapons of mass destruction from Chechnya," *Yaderny Kontrol*, 2001, №2, p. 61.
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- ³¹ On the status of radiation safety at Radon Groznyy, see: <http://www.gan.ru/news/info/100/info-118-2004.htm>.
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- ³³ Nezavisimaya Gazeta, November 25, 1995.
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- ³⁵ NIS Export Control Observer, July 2004.
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- ⁴⁰ Maria Zolotaikina, "Ampoule of plague," Nezavisimaya Gazeta, December 23, 2002.
- ⁴¹ Ibid.
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- ⁴⁴ Ibid.
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Letters to the Editor**HANDOUTS FOR A COUPLE
OF WARHEADS**

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There is no missile defense system capable of protecting the territory of the United States of America from a Russian missile strike, and there never will be. Just as there will never be any such missile strike. This is recognized by each and every U.S. and Russian expert in the field.

Nevertheless, after each routine test of an intercontinental missile, Russia's commander-in-chief comes forward with a declaration about a "new, miraculous warhead capable of overcoming any missile defense." That is, he literally breaks through the open American door with this warhead.

Yes, Russia and the United States can destroy each other. This is simply a fact, just as it is a fact that England and France can erase Paris and London from the face of the earth. But for some reason the British prime minister and the French president do not remind each other of this every single day.

The idea that the United States is trying to deprive Russia of its nuclear missile capabilities has become part of our paranoid public foreign policy consciousness. Its infinite repetition has apparently even caused those who consciously interjected the idea into the public space for propagandistic purposes to believe in it.

We would like once again to remind everyone who is still capable of logical thought that the United States cannot be attempting to deprive Russia of its deterrent capabilities. First of all, this is because it is technically impossible. Second, such a goal would contradict the United States' own security interests. (For more details, see: A. Piontkovsky and V. Tsigichko, "Challenges

to Russian National Security at the Threshold of the 21st Century," *Voyennaya Mysl*, 2000, No. 1, p. 6.)

Paradoxically, the Americans themselves are helping to strengthen the "nuclear castration" paranoia felt by the average Russian through their now-senseless program of financial assistance to Russia to enhance the security of nuclear facilities (radioactive material storage depots, transport routes, etc.)

The Cooperative Threat Reduction program made sense in the mid-1990s, when Russia was in a state of permanent financial crisis, the Defense Ministry was not fully funded, and there really was a serious threat that nuclear materials might be stolen by a variety of terrorists, from those in the North Caucasus to Arabs.

But today, when the country's best financial minds are trying to figure out how to spend the tens of billions of dollars in the Stabilization Fund, "cooperation in the area of nuclear security" has become a Kafkaesque absurdity for both countries.

From time to time the Russian president, assuming a haughty pose, announces to his brothers and sisters and all of his friends that a unique new missile, capable of once and for all destroying America, has been created by our remarkable scientists and weapons designers (who have apparently spent very large sums on the effort). Subsequently, he shyly stretches out his hand to the same Americans for yet another contribution to the maintenance of the Russian nuclear missile complex.

The Americans' behavior is no less absurd. What goals do they hope to realize from the expenditure of the significant sums promised Russia (if the commitments made at the G8 summit in Canada are realized we are talking about \$10 billion)?

That terrorists not steal nuclear weapons components from Russian facilities? Russia is no less interested in this than the United States. Today, thankfully, it has the financial and intellectual wherewithal to prevent this without any U.S. assistance, if its scientists manage to put together any such remarkable missiles.

To prevent the sanctioned transfer of any dual-use technologies to any combatants "fighting against the unipolar world"? Moscow will always be able to do this if

it wishes, whether the Americans gives it money or not.

The situation is being aggravated by top Russian officials' systematic theft of the funds that have been allocated. Former Minister of Atomic Energy Yevgeny Adamov, now a prisoner languishing in Butyrka prison, evinced great enthusiasm and devotion when he was handed over to Russian prosecutors, after having suggested that he might not be able to withstand torture and could give the Americans his native land's nuclear secrets. But the last such secrets were transmitted to the Soviet Union by the unhappy Rosenberg couple, a crime for which they were executed on the electrical chair more than a half century ago. Adamov is only capable of giving out the account numbers of his high-ranking accomplices.

The Americans' timid attempts to verify how Russia's Adamovs have spent their taxpayers' money caused a wave of nation-

al patriotic anger – supposedly American marines would take over our entire nuclear complex tomorrow. For some reason one simple thought does not occur to our dejected patriotic citizens: let's stop accepting these wretched hand-outs from the Americans so that they quit bothering us with their inspections.

Besides, I would like to report some information for the special benefit of these miserable citizens that may really shock them: according to the START Treaty currently in force, the United States and Russia are required to exchange much more "secret" data than information about the security of radioactive waste storage depots. For example, all telemetric data on tests of miraculous missiles were transmitted to the Americans in accordance with this agreement.

Only the two presidents can save us from this utterly absurd situation.

Summary

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EDITORIAL

The St. Petersburg G8 Summit: Where the Power Is, Where the Glory Is – Russia's ruling elite has already deemed the G8 summit that will take place July 15–17, 2006 in St. Petersburg one of year's top events.

The Kremlin's reflections on their priorities – and about the priorities of the 2006 summit – have evolved in a fairly interesting way.

Firstly, there has been a noticeable shift from hard security problems (the classic, familiar subjects about which entire statements can be written far in advance) towards soft security issues; the appearance of education among the summit and chairmanship priorities is the best example of this.

Secondly, Russia is gradually outgrowing the euphoria initially felt about joining the G8 as a near-equal, and is starting to have a calmer, more nuanced view of this arrangement. At the same time, under examination is the possibility of forming other “elite clubs” where Moscow would feel equal to other members. Thus, the architects of Russia's new foreign policy are looking ever more seriously at the feasibility of developing a strategy for the creation of a “Eurasian component” of the international system, one not limited to the regional giants, China and India, but which would include such obvious partners as South Korea, Brazil, Malaysia or South Africa. It has already become clear to many that the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) will perhaps be modified towards this end.

Thirdly, the Kremlin realizes that the St. Petersburg summit will not be all pleasant “choral singing” – on many key issues the group's interests vary too widely. One can see this from the issue of nonproliferation alone: the ritual pronouncements of a unified position vis-a-vis Iran completely hide the variety interests with regards to this country. As for education, the European Union has adopted a policy of “absorbing”

the best minds from other countries, including Russia; this directly contradicts Russian interests. Similarly, a possible, future Russian policy aimed at luring back the high-class specialists/Russian nationals who received their education in the West will hardly please Germany, the United States or Canada.

This global discord is even truer in the energy field. Russia now sometimes even taunts its G8 partners by saying that the line for Russian oil and gas no longer starts in the West but in the East and South, suggesting that they will have to take their place in line after China and perhaps after India. Noticeable tension is growing on the threshold of a serious battle for “nuclear exports” between Russia, France and the United States. When the “price question” is addressed, one can hear Russia frankly ask, “Why do we always have to consider the concept of a ‘national catastrophe’ in American or G8 terms? For us a national catastrophe would be a drop in oil prices below fifteen dollars per barrel.” Needless to say, for the majority of President Putin's guests in St. Petersburg this coming summer, such a turn of events would lead to new national holidays.

Today, however, Russian strategists are not as bothered by the existence of some conflicts of interest between Russia and its G8 partners as they would have been several years ago. Today, they simply diagnose the conflicts, coolly, like medical doctors. Furthermore, despite the sickly start of the chairmanship, it would seem that Russia is looking forward to July without fear: not hoping to accomplish something “good,” but fully counting on achieving “glory,” inasmuch as she has begun to regain a sense of her former, partially-lost grandeur. The feeling of power is sometimes more important than power itself.

INTERVIEW

Sam Nunn: “Energy Security Requires Security in the Nuclear Sphere” – In an interview with the journal's editor-in-chief, Sam Nunn, one of the founders of the Cooperative Threat Reduction program, discusses Russia's priorities as president of the G8, ways to increase the effectiveness of the Global Partnership, and the role of the “Iran factor” in U.S.-Russian relations. In the opinion of the senator, the U.S. administration should recognize the change in Russia's approach to Iran and consider

it as a possible model for cooperation with other countries that also want to develop their own nuclear programs, particularly where questions of spent fuel reprocessing are concerned.

Michele Alliot-Marie: "The Search for an Adequate Response To the Threat of Terrorism May Require the Restriction of Personal Freedoms" - France's defense minister presented her views on the new challenges and threats to international security and stability, and touched on the reasons for their emergence. In her opinion, countering terrorism may require the restriction of citizens' personal freedoms; however, citizens themselves must decide if they are prepared to take this step. The French minister of defense views monitoring the Internet, which has a lot of information connected to biological agents, as an important measure in the fight against bioterrorism.

ANALYSIS

Taiwan's Nuclear Missile Capabilities in the Context of the "Reunification Problem" - Sergei Ponamarev - One of the primary challenges to security and stability in the Asia-Pacific region is the proliferation of nuclear weapons and means of their delivery. An expert of Novosibirsk State University, in an examination of the political and technical prerequisites for Taiwan to undertake a military nuclear program, comes to the conclusion that Taipei is interested in strengthening its own defense capabilities and reducing its direct dependence on U.S. geopolitical interests in the region to maintain its sovereignty. At the same time, the island has the capability to construct nuclear weapons in a limited period of time.

The Korean Nuclear Crisis and Russia - Yury Fedorov - The nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula is one of the most dangerous manifestations of nuclear proliferation in the beginning of the 21st century, and affects Russian national interests. Professor of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations of the Russian Foreign Ministry, in considering Russia's endeavor to play an important role in resolving the crisis, examines its various facets and possible solutions, and also provides answers to the questions of whether Russia has any real possibility of influencing the course of the six-party talks, and

how coherent Russian diplomacy has been with regards to this crisis.

ROUND TABLE

Biosafety, Biosecurity and Controlling the Spread of Biological Materials: Prospects for International Cooperation - Is there, from the Russian point of view, any potential for bilateral cooperation or for joint, primarily commercial, projects in the area of biosecurity and biosafety? What steps need to be taken for the practical realization of international projects in this sphere? In answer to these questions, Russia's leading biosecurity and biosafety experts propose possible areas of international cooperation that might, in their opinion, be of interest to both Russia and its foreign partners.

COMMENTARY

India and the United States' "Nuclear Rapprochement": Pro et Contra - Robert Einhorn - In July 2005 U.S. President George Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh adopted a joint statement on the development of bilateral cooperation in several areas, including nuclear energy. How can the negative impact of such cooperation on the nuclear nonproliferation regime be minimized? What conditions should the United States put forward in its negotiations with India on the elaboration of a bilateral agreement on cooperation in the nuclear sphere? Should other countries that are not parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty receive similar right to cooperate in the area of nuclear energy? A Senior Adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) answers these and other questions.

SURVEY

On China's Nuclear Capabilities and Nuclear Policy - Roland Timerbaev - The article analyzes China's current nuclear posture and many aspects of its nuclear policy. The Chairman of the PIR Center Executive Board draws attention to the country's unusually active participation in the 2005 NPT Review Conference, as well as to the number of recent Chinese initiatives in the sphere of nonproliferation. He particularly focuses on China's working paper on the creation of a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.

On New Initiatives in the Area of Nuclear Materials and Technologies Control – Nadezhda Logutova – The emergence in the beginning of the 21st century of new challenges to the nonproliferation regime has served as a catalyst for the appearance of many new initiatives to strengthen controls over fissile materials and a proposal to introduce a ban on the export of sensitive nuclear fuel cycle technologies (those related to uranium enrichment and spent nuclear fuel reprocessing). A PIR Center's Research Fellow examines the prospects for the practical realization of these proposals, in particular with regards to finding a solution to the current crisis revolving around the Iranian nuclear program.

HISTORICAL PAGES

A Green “Needle” (Igla) with White Thread, or How the Cooperation of the World’s Largest Intelligence Agencies Helped to Expose an International Terrorist – Vadim Kozyulin and Anastasia Laguta – In September 2005 Hemant Lakhani, the organizer of the illegal “acquisition” of Igla anti-aircraft missile complex in Russia and its transport to the United States, was sentenced. The media presented the operation as a great success and a shining example of a joint operation between the U.K., Russian, and U.S. intelligence agencies. However, not all experts agree with this assessment. The article's authors, who lead PIR Center's Program on Conventional Arms, provide a chronology of events and conclude that the operation truly showed that cooperation between the three nations' intelligence services are being perfected, while Lakhani himself was a run-of-the-mill smuggler.

On the 1971 U.S.-Soviet Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War – Roland Timerbaev – One of the key participants in the events recalls the course of U.S.-Soviet negotiations over an agreement that had great political importance to the Soviet Union, since it was the first agreement to legally set the balance of strategic power between Moscow and Washington. In the opinion of Ambassador Timerbaev, the Chairman of the PIR Center Executive Board, the 1971 signing by the Soviet Union and the United States of the Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War opened the way to further

agreements on the limitation and reduction of the armaments of the two superpowers.

LIBRARY

America to Lose Its “Vulcans” – Gennady Yevstafiev – This review draws the reader's attention to James Mann's book on the formation of America's ruling elite and how they developed the principles underlying their approach to determining the U.S. role in today's world (*Rise of the Vulcans. The History of Bush's War Cabinet*). In his analysis of the material in the book, a PIR Center Senior Adviser concludes that the group of politicians that is now active will inevitably withdraw in the next 2-3 years, and that this will leave a large gap in the ranks of the Republican Party that will be quite difficult to fill. This, in his opinion, presages a serious struggle over the foreign policy of this key country.

OPINION PIECE

Handouts for a Couple of Warheads – Andrei Piontkovsky – The Director of the Moscow-based Center for Strategic Studies raises sharp questions about the advisability of accepting Western funding for the destruction of excess weapons in Russia given the country's multibillion-ruble Stabilization Fund, as well as about the reasons why the United States is providing significant amounts of money for this purpose. In his opinion, today's Russia has the financial and intellectual capacity to prevent the leakage of sensitive materials and technologies abroad without any external assistance.

The Article on Withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Should Be Abolished – Jozef Goldblat – In an opinion piece that takes issue with the authors of “The Right to Withdraw from the NPT: The opinion of two participants in negotiations over the agreement,” which was published in the latest issue of *Yaderny Kontrol*, Vice-President of the Geneva International Peace Research Institute (GIPRI) proposes that the provision for withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty has to be completely eliminated. The corresponding amendment to the agreement, in his opinion, could be adopted through an Additional Protocol to the NPT.

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EDITORIAL

Russia's G8 Chairmanship and New Rules for Nuclear Power – The general discussions are over, and Russia has begun concrete preparations for the St. Petersburg G8 summit. Whatever foreign and home-grown critics have said about the summit agenda Russia has proposed, it was accepted by the other summit participants.

Russia's summit agenda is especially relevant: for perhaps for first time since 1973, the energy market is being completely restructured and new rules of the game are being devised, particularly where nuclear power is concerned. These new rules have several features. First, a new relationship between the role of petroleum products and the peaceful atom is being established. Second, new approaches toward the goals and challenges of nuclear nonproliferation are coming into being, needed due to the crisis that is facing traditional means for balancing the interests of the states parties to the relevant international treaties. Third, there is a practical need for new approaches in the commercial sphere, particularly where nuclear power is concerned, so that all of the countries following the rules of the game will be guaranteed equal access to the advantages of advanced technologies.

The choice of energy security as one of the central topics at the G8 summit has already led to some very promising and significant proposals for overcoming global difficulties in providing for energy security, and thereby revitalizing international relations.

In addition to Russia's own proposals, others have advanced important ideas, another indication of the relevance of Moscow's G8 summit agenda. The United States has proposed a serious international initiative to contribute to the spread of nuclear energy throughout the world via the concentration of the full nuclear fuel cycle in a limited number of countries (the so-called Global Nuclear Energy Partnership Consortium). In addition to this U.S. initiative, there have also been interesting proposals put forward by the Italians and the Canadians.

Moreover, the validity of the Russian agenda for the St. Petersburg G8 meeting is not limited to questions of energy security. The topics traditionally discussed at such high-level meetings are also being considered here: countering international terrorism, including nuclear terrorism, and preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction. The Russian State Duma's recent adoption of a new law on combating terrorism and the creation of clear lines of responsibility for this issue among Russian state bodies for the first time is a concrete domestic political result of Russia's current G8 chairmanship. Specialists in the sphere of nonproliferation are already expecting a lot from the tack Russia's experts take during discussions of the G8 statement on WMD nonproliferation. It is no secret that since the failure of the 6th NPT Review Conference in New York in May 2005, productive and nondiscriminatory international cooperation on nonproliferation requires a fresh, unifying stimulus, and Russia is just the country to propose new ideas.

Thus, in many respects Russia's G8 chairmanship allows us to formulate clearly our approaches to key international problems and explain them to our partners, establishing a number of priorities for Russian foreign policy in later years. One of these will clearly be the development of international cooperation in the field of nuclear power.

INTERVIEW

Nikolai Spassky: "Long-lasting, Profound Changes In the Global Balance of Power Are the Most Serious Challenge To National Security Today" – In an interview with correspondent Ekaterina Rykovanova, Deputy Secretary of the Russian Federation National Security Council Nikolai Spassky shares his view of possible global political developments in the next decade and speaks about Russian foreign policy priorities, paying particular attention to Russia's complex relationship with the European Union. In Ambassador Spassky's opinion, Russia's E.U. policy is at a crossroads—there are various paths for its future development, but the final choice of which path to take has not yet been made.

Viktor Zavarzin: "Russia's Military Presence in Central Asia Will Help Maintain Regional Stability" – At present, the Central Asian region is one of the most problematic in the post-Soviet space.

There continue to be challenges to the governments of the Central Asian states from local Islamic circles. There is a threat of the growth of the forces of international terrorism and drug trafficking that is emanating from the territory of the region's southern neighbors. In an interview with correspondent Sergei Mursankov, Chairman of the Russian State Duma Defense Committee Viktor Zavarzin voices the opinion that "Russia's military presence in the region and its growth, particularly within the framework of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), would contribute to stability in Central Asia."

ANALYSIS

The Evolution of Arms Control: Current Trends - Roland Timerbaev - Arms control has never been, and by nature can never be, a fixed concept. Its nature and subject matter are constantly evolving to conform to the changing political and strategic situation, as former great powers disappear and new ones arise. However, we currently see a delay in the process of forming a new arms control regime through new collective action both at the bilateral and multilateral level. The PIR Center's Executive Board Chairman, examining current trends in the area of arms control, comes to the conclusion that Russian foreign policy, given its growing capabilities, could take more initiative in searching for ways to maintain and develop the international arms control regime.

Some Thoughts on the Evolution of U.S. Approaches to Regional Security Issues in Central Asia - Gennady Yevstafiev - Several countries, the United States in particular, have yet to develop a uniform understanding of Central Asia's borders. Therefore many new geographic concepts are emerging, such as that of Greater Central Asia and the Transcaspian region, that are underpinned by various ideas about the development of a security system for the region. In his analysis of U.S. initiatives in the region, PIR Center's Senior Advisor asks whether American and Western European strategists shouldn't enter into cooperation with regional organizations that already exist, such as the SCO and CSTO, instead of making plans for the creation of parallel security arrangements in Central Asia?

The Prospects for a Central Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty - Nuria Kutnaeva - For ten years Central Asian leaders have stood on the lofty rostrum of the U.N. General Assembly and declared their determination to create a nuclear weapon free zone (NWFZ). However, despite the support of all of the states in the region for the initiative and the existence of an agreed text, the treaty on the creation of the zone has yet to be signed. What is behind the initiative taken by the states of the region, what are the specifics of the Central Asian NWFZ, what is preventing the practical realization of this initiative, and, most importantly, what are the prospects for a treaty on the creation of a NWFZ in this region - these and other questions are answered by the expert from the Kyrgyzstan Ministry of Foreign Affairs Diplomatic Academy.

Russia and Pakistan Have Common Interests - Andrei Alekseev - In an examination of our relations with Islamabad in the areas of commercial trade and military technology that takes into account Russian companies' uncertain prospects on the Indian market, the Russian expert on security in South Asia concludes that Russian-Pakistani cooperation in these spheres needs to be restored. In his opinion, the development of practical contacts between Russia and Pakistan in the areas of military technology and commercial trade, as well as under certain conditions in the nuclear sphere, can play an important role in diminishing anti-Russian feelings inside Pakistan while it is not likely to spoil relations with Delhi.

The Prospects for the Realization of Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle - Nadezhda Logutova - To what extent can the multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle that are being considered as a promising way to control the spread of sensitive nuclear technologies be realized? The PIR Center Information Program Director analyzes and evaluates the practical possibilities for realizing various multilateral proposals in the nuclear sphere, paying particular attention to issues related to the establishment of an international nuclear fuel bank and the possibilities for creating a multilateral consortium in the area of enrichment. On the basis of this analysis she makes practical recommendations with regards to the positions the Russian Federation may take on this

and other multilateral proposals in the nuclear sphere, with a view to promoting nonproliferation.

VIEWPOINT

Is There a Threat of WMD Terrorism Emanating from the North Caucasus? - Elena Arbekova and Andrei Frolov -

In recent years it has been difficult to get rid of the feeling that the developed countries are trying to "convince" their populations that terrorist acts involving WMD are inevitable. This assertion is valid in Russia too - just look at the recent statements of high-ranking officials from the Russian Security Council, FSB, or Ministry of Foreign Affairs. How real is the threat of WMD terrorism emanating from the North Caucasus, the most "problematic" territory in the Russian Federation, and what are the authorities doing to reduce the likelihood of such an act of super-terrorism in Russia? The authors, independent Russian experts on security issues, offer their answers to these and other questions related to the threat of WMD terrorism.

Taiwan's Special Status in the Nonproliferation Regime: An Example of a "Gray Zone"? - Sergei Ponomarev -

The current transformation of the global security system has given rise to more and more so-called "gray zones," that is, quasi-state entities clamoring for independence, sovereignty, and de jure international recognition. Thus it is natural to seek existing models for "involving" such hazardous "gray zones" in the international system. The Novosibirsk State University expert discusses the question of whether Taiwan, which is a member in one form or another of several international organizations and regimes, including APEC, the WTO, and the IAEA, can be viewed as a "model" of this sort of "involvement."

COMMENTARY

Russia and Energy Flows on the Eurasian Continent - Azer Mursaliev -

It would seem that such disparate events as the failure of the most recent OSCE Foreign Ministers' meeting, Russia's delivery of the TOR anti-aircraft missile system to Iran, and the rapid growth of gold prices on the global market are unrelated. However, they are all the result of the struggle for control over energy flows on the Eurasian

continent, of which the Islamic Republic of Iran is a key component. In the opinion of the well-known Russian energy security expert, the critical developments in this struggle will take place within the U.S.-SCO-Iran triangle, with Iran holding the critical cards that will determine who wins in this contest.

SURVEY

Technical Aspects of the North Korean Nuclear Program - Yuri Yudin -

In the absence of information sources inside North Korea, intelligence services evaluating the country's capacity to create nuclear weapons must basically depend on national technical means of reconnaissance and on information obtained from deserters. However, such technical reconnaissance measures require the correct interpretation, and cannot always provide a full picture of the situation. Deserters frequently distort information, either on purpose or involuntarily. While intelligence evaluations themselves often change over the course of time or depending on the country that is making them. The Director of the Analytical Center for Nonproliferation, analyzing of open-source information, provides his quantitative evaluation of North Korea's capabilities vis-a-vis the construction of nuclear weapons.

The Soviet-Origin Research Reactor Fuel Return Program: Time To "Gather Stones" - Daniil Kobayakov and Sergei Panov -

Russia and the United States are making joint efforts to reduce the global stockpiles of nuclear materials suitable for the production of nuclear weapons. For instance, the program for the removal of highly enriched uranium (HEU) from research reactors built by the Soviet Union has already resulted in the repatriation to Russia of over 120 kg of HEU from seven countries. This amount, according to experts, is enough to create as many as 10 nuclear charges. The authors, Coordinator of the PIR Center's Program on the Global Partnership and a Moscow Engineering Physics Institute expert, examine the future steps countries will take under the program, and analyze the problems that Russia and the United States are facing in its realization.

Russia and the Uncontrolled Spread of Small Arms and Light Weapons - Vadim Kozyulin and Anastasia Laguta -

According to official data, in mid-2005

there were 140,000 illegal weapons brought by Russian authorities; in total, estimates of illegal weapons in circulation run 2-3 times this number. In addition, in 2003 there were also about 20,000 tear gas pistols converted for use as firearms. What are the "origins" of Russia's illegal weapons? What measures is the government taking to prevent these weapons from being transferred from Russian hot spots and Russian Federation Ministry of Defense depots to Russian cities? What steps are being taken to reduce the number of small arms in illegal circulation? These and other questions are raised in this article by its authors, the Director and Coordinator of the PIR Center Program on Conventional Arms.

HISTORICAL PAGES

The "Illegal Networks" of Tehran: Historical Lessons - Anton Khlopkov and Ekaterina Soroka - Swedish anti-aircraft missile complexes, French weaponry, Belgian detonators, spare parts for tanks from England, and "civilian" aircraft from Switzerland are only some of the arms deliveries Iran received from European countries during the Iran-Iraq war, in contravention of national legislation in the companies' home countries. The PIR Center Deputy Director and a PIR Center Intern recall the events of the mid-1980s and scrutinize the many "schemes" for the supply of military equipment from Sweden, which involved companies and individuals from Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, and Kenya.

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EDITORIAL

From 8 to ∞ - The current calendar year - 2006 - does not have a single "eight" in it. Nevertheless, for the PIR Center the year will be ruled by the number "eight" in more than one way.

To begin with, this is the year of Russia's G8 presidency and the year of the G8 summit, which will take place in Strelna (near St. Petersburg), where, among other things, there will be discussions about issues such as energy security; the development of promising international projects in the field of nuclear energy; biosafety, biosecurity, and the prevention of epidemics of infectious diseases; and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons... The PIR Center is taking an active part in the events preceding the summit, and also plans to make a contribution this coming autumn through an assessment of the results of Russia's presidency.

But we have already elaborated on PIR Center's activities related to the G8 in detail, both on the pages of *Yaderny Kontrol* and in other PIR Center publications. Therefore we will not focus on these activities here, but instead turn to other "eights."

The periodical that you hold in your hands is the eightieth issue of *Yaderny Kontrol*.

In order to celebrate an anniversary, one typically invites guests. Thus, the PIR Center invited its regular contributors, members of our Advisory Board, and the journal's friends and partners to a presentation of issue No. 80 in Moscow on April 20, 2006.

But we also decided to "invite" articles themselves to this anniversary - articles from the previous seventy-nine issues, published during the journal's nearly twelve-year history. There was a great temptation to take out some scissors and begin to "cut up" some of the older articles so that they would appear to be "fresher." We tried to keep this under control. In certain cases, we must admit, we

made some cuts in order to free up a bit more space and present the widest possible variety of points of view, and allow the largest possible number of authors to "express themselves" in this polyphonous issue. But we "played" honorably: every reduction is properly noted. Now we invite you on a journey - over the years, the themes, and the pages of *Yaderny Kontrol*, 1994-2006.

INTERVIEW

Several Questions About Nuclear Nonproliferation - Gennady Yevstafiev -

After its publication in 1993, the "White Book" on WMD nonproliferation by Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) caused a surge of interest in this issue both in Russia and abroad. There are reports that several countries "offended" by the publication even sent notes of protest to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Today it is particularly remarkable that Iran was not one of those countries, although the country was described in the report as "a country (that) has a program of applied military research in the nuclear sphere". One-and-a-half years after the work was published, *Yaderny Kontrol* editor-in-chief Vladimir Orlov interviewed one of the chief authors of the White Book, SVR directorate head Gennady Yevstafiev, who slightly lifted the curtain of secrecy surrounding the aims and tasks that the authors of this work pursued.

Yevgeny Maslin: "Not One Nuclear Munition in Russia Has Been Lost or Stolen to Date" -

It was hard to imagine in the early 1990s that there was a hotter topic in the foreign media than the security of the Soviet nuclear arsenal. Just recall the Israeli media's fake story about the sale of nuclear warheads from Kazakhstan to Iran. However, one could not fail to recognize the deficiencies at that time in the physical protection of Russian Ministry of Defense facilities to which the strategic nuclear arsenal was being repatriated from the newly independent states. A similar state of affairs caused obvious apprehension among Russian servicemen too. In an interview for *Yaderny Kontrol*, the chief of the 12th Main Directorate of the Russian Ministry of Defense, Yevgeny Maslin, talked about the difficulties his subordinates encountered in carrying out the tasks that had been assigned to them.

Sergey Kislyak: "Russia Came Out Against Dividing the Conference Into a Camp of Conquerors and a Handful of Those Conquered" – The indefinite extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), together with headway in attaining the universality of this agreement, created euphoria in the first half of the 1990s over the future of the nonproliferation regime, particularly in the nuclear weapon states. Now, more than ten years since that historic decision was taken in New York, it is obvious that this joy was premature. This only serves to make the diplomatic work undertaken in preparation for and during the conference by the delegations of the nuclear weapon states, Russia and United States first and foremost, of even greater interest. In an interview with Yaderny Kontrol's editor-in-chief done immediately after the end of the session at which the decision on the indefinite extension of the agreement was made, the deputy head of the Russian delegation at the NPT Review and Extension Conference (and current deputy foreign minister), Sergey Kislyak, described how the success of the conference was obtained.

Jayantha Dhanapala: "Now We Should Make the Entire World a Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone" – The chief architect of the indefinite extension of the NPT answered questions posed by the editor-in-chief of Yaderny Kontrol right after the end of the final session of the NPT Review and Extension Conference. One of the conclusions conference chair Jayantha Dhanapala drew about the conference results was: "When multilateral diplomacy and the international community encounter a challenge that affects global interests, the international community can rise to meet this challenge together." Read about the surprises during the conference, Russia's role in the indefinite extension of the NPT, and the prospects for the nonproliferation regime as they were viewed several minutes after the indefinite extension agreement, in the interview of the Sri Lankan diplomat who is now a contender for the post of U.N. Secretary-General.

Nikolai Kravchenko: "Only 25% of the Border Crossing Points Have Special Equipment to Prevent Nuclear Smuggling" – What was the state of controls over the transit of nuclear and radioactive materials across Russia's borders in the first half of the 1990s, and what

were the priority issues that had to be tackled by the division created in 1995 under the Russian State Customs Agency to exercise customs control over nuclear and radioactive materials? These questions are answered by its director, Nikolai Kravchenko, in an interview with Yaderny Kontrol's editor-in-chief. In the director's opinion, the controls that existed at the time made it possible to take advantage of legal shipments of nuclear and radioactive materials, substituting for or increasing the quantity of the nuclear and radioactive material specified in the license and declared in the declaration, and undertake illegal shipments of such materials.

Mikhail Kirillin: "Several American Firms That Design Missiles Have Links to the Iranians" – In the mid-1990s, Iran's intelligence agencies made conspicuous efforts to obtain missile and other sensitive technologies in Russia. In 1997 alone the FSB prevented several such attempts. At the same time, the European countries and the United States were also the focus of Iranian scientific and technical intelligence efforts. In November 1997, during a visit to Moscow by high-ranking CIA officials, FSB director Nikolai Kovalev gave the U.S. officials information his agency had obtained about the Iranian ties of several American firms involved in designing missiles. Yaderny Kontrol's editorial staff made an official request at the U.S. embassy for comment; however, this comment was not granted. In a Yaderny Kontrol interview, FSB official Mikhail Kirillin talks about the measures undertaken in the mid-1990s to avert the leakage of missile technologies to Iran.

Valentin Yevstigneev: "Ebola Strains Were Brought to Russia by Intelligence Officers" – The dispersal of anthrax in the United States in the mail and the difficulty in controlling the global spread of bird flu brings increased urgency to questions about individual states' preparedness for biological threats. Despite the different nature of the threat, this problem was no less acute during the Cold War years. In an interview with Yaderny Kontrol correspondent Dmitry Litovkin, the deputy head of the Russian Ministry of Defense Radiological, Chemical, and Biological Defense Directorate Valentin Yevstigneev talks about his directorate's duties, and where samples of U.S. biological weapons were obtained – samples that were later

used in field tests at the Aral Sea test range. The issue of how Russia is preparing for new threats in the biological sphere, including acts of bioterrorism, is discussed as well.

Dmitry Rogozin: "World History is not Written in Diplomatic Notes" – This caustic interview with then-chairman of the Russian State Duma Committee on International Affairs Dmitry Rogozin caused numerous disputes on the journal's editorial board over both form and content. The positions presented in the interview are of a sort with which one might not agree, but which are nevertheless worthy of note. Particularly since it has proven partially prophetic. This is quite unfortunate, since the reference was to terrorist attacks in Great Britain. In this interview with Yaderny Kontrol, the State Duma deputy also discusses Russian interests in Iran and North Korea, and the prospects for bilateral cooperation with these countries and a united Europe, as well as the most promising, from his point of view, ways to reform the United Nations.

Mohamed ElBaradei: "The Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime is Going Through Tough Times" – From the moment of the foundation of Yaderny Kontrol to this day, its editorial board has maintained a dialogue between its experts and those of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). This dialogue is useful for both parties and mutually enriching. At various times the journal's pages have featured the words of directors-general Hans Blix and Mohamed ElBaradei; meanwhile, editorial board members and Yaderny Kontrol authors have spoken repeatedly at the Agency, providing their expert opinions on contemporary trends in the area of non-proliferation and development of nuclear energy. In an interview with PIR Center Executive Board chairman Roland Timerbaev, IAEA Director-General ElBaradei talks about the critical tasks that must be accomplished in order to strengthen the nonproliferation regime.

ANALYSIS

Several Nuclear Material Storage Problems in the Northern Fleet – Mikhail Kulik – This journal was designed to be a platform – a platform not only for expert evaluations and opinions of various aspects of security problems, but also as a platform from which to pose the problems that

demand solutions. One of the articles that opened our eyes to the huge problems associated with the secure storage of Russian nuclear materials in the early 1990s was an article by Mikhail Kulik, a Northern Fleet Military Procuracy critical affairs investigator who had investigated a criminal case involving the theft of radioactive materials. A defective alarm system, rusted padlock, and old ladies serving as paramilitary security guards were the only barriers that sailors who might want to steal Northern Fleet nuclear materials then faced.

Tactical Nuclear Weapons: A New Geopolitical Reality or Old Mistakes? – Nikolai Sokov – An examination of possible future reductions of Russian and U.S. nuclear weapons cannot avoid the question of the future of tactical nuclear weapons (TNW). Some experts believe that Russia can compensate for the weakness of its conventional weapons through this class of weapons; others have gone even further, proposing that additional TNW be deployed along Russia's borders. In this article, the senior research associate from the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies explores the view, popular in Russia in the early 1990s, that the country should rely on TNW to ensure its defense, and examines the initiatives – which have still not lost their urgency – for Russian withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range and Short-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and the deployment of nuclear weapons on the territory of Belarus.

A Survey of the Current U.S. Military Biological Program and Russian Interests – Aleksandr Kudakaev – The U.S. withdrawal of its support for the principle of outlawing biological weapons (BW) through a BW Convention with strict monitoring mechanisms is no longer a secret. One can only guess the reasons for such a transformation. Let us just mention that as early as August 1986, deputy assistant secretary of Defense for Negotiations Policy Douglas Feith, speaking in front of the House of Representatives Intelligence Committee, stated that the Pentagon had changed its opinion regarding the value of BW from the military point of view, and that the treaty banning these weapons must be recognized as critically deficient and unfixable. This article, by a Russian expert on biosecurity issues, examines the

various avenues of biological research at U.S. defense research institutes.

Politics, New Technologies, and the 21st Century - Alexander Yakovenko - The information revolution at the turn of the century accelerated global polarization. Given the appearance of new high-tech production based on the application of information technologies, the significance of those countries whose welfare and world importance has been based for many years on their role as providers of raw materials and traditional energy sources is falling, while those countries that export high-tech products are gaining additional advantages. The qualitative jump in technological development, however, has negative, as well as positive aspects. In this article, Alexander Yakovenko, currently a Russian deputy foreign minister, examines the possible negative consequences of the breakthrough in information technology and comes to the conclusion that "misbegotten experimentation in the field of genetic and molecular engineering could cause the explosive multiplication of a pathogenic virus before the creation of compounds to neutralize its impact."

Osama Bin Laden and Weapons of Mass Destruction - Adam Dolnik - This article by a young expert from the Czech Republic (who is currently studying counter-terrorism issues in a leading research institute in Singapore) was originally published just days before the events of September 11, 2001. The editorial board, when commissioning this work from the beginning author, could not possibly have imagined how timely the text would prove to be; on the other hand, the editorial board members recognized the very low level of attention that was being given to the phenomena of the Taliban and al Qa'ida at the time. The article examines the personality of terrorist No. 1, Osama Bin Laden, and his motivations, including in particular attempts to acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD), as well as al Qa'ida capabilities with regards to the construction of WMD.

Nuclear Deterrence and Strategic Offensive Reductions - Yury Baluyevsky - In the past decade a new form of nuclear deterrence has emerged: deterrence by threatening not the use of, but merely the acquisition of nuclear weapons. And not only direct military action is being deterred, but also political and economic pressure. North

Korea has already started down this path. One cannot exclude the possibility that Tehran is seriously considering analogous steps. In his examination of this phenomenon, the chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces concludes that the world will not give up nuclear weapons in the near future. At the same time, in his opinion, the important transformation of nuclear deterrence policy is a departure from the concept of the "quantitative parity" of nuclear forces and the view of nuclear weapons as the only guarantee of national security.

VIEWPOINT

Why I Support the Russian-Iranian Contract. A Reply to Professor Yablokov - David Fischer - Whether the editorial staff likes it or not, the journal's history is inextricably linked to the history of Iran's nuclear program. While our focus in *Yaderny Kontrol*'s early days was on Russian-Iranian cooperation in the field of nuclear power engineering, for well-known reasons the beginning of the 21st Century has shifted our attention to Iran's capabilities in the area of nuclear weapons construction. In the article presented here, the former assistant to the IAEA Director-General presents his view of the Iranian nuclear power program and Russian-Iranian cooperation in this sphere. Some of the article's theses - such as, for example, the need for the repatriation of spent nuclear fuel from Bushehr to Russia - did not escape the notice of Russian experts and influenced the formulation of Russia's conditions for cooperation with Iran in the nuclear sphere.

The Nuclear Suitcase with a Triple Bottom - Anton Surikov - In August 1994 a Columbian who had flown in from Moscow was detained in the Munich airport. More than 350 grams of plutonium were discovered in his suitcase. The foreign media presented this as nothing less than proof of the existence of a Russian black market in nuclear materials (NM), and the success of German intelligence agencies in preventing illegal trafficking in NM. The author of this article (who was at the Institute of the United States and Canada at the time when he wrote the article) presents a step-by-step picture of these events, with citizens of Spain, Germany, and Columbia appearing as extras. The skillful directors of this operation, in the author's opinion, are the representatives of

Germany's intelligence agencies who, again in the author's view, switched out the Columbian's baggage with another suitcase, which contained plutonium produced in a German reactor.

On the Feasibility of and Ways to Realize the Russian President's Initiative - Nikolai Ponomarev-Stepnoi - At the U.N. Millennium Summit in New York, President Putin proposed an initiative to launch an international project to ensure the supply of energy for the sustainable development of mankind, furnish critical solutions to the problems of nuclear weapons proliferation, and provide for the environmental recovery of the planet. One-and-a-half years later, Academician Nikolai Ponomarev-Stepnoi of the Russian Academy of Sciences published this article in *Yaderny Kontrol* on possible ways to realize the initiative in practice, proposing that the project be discussed by the G8. Today we know that energy security has been designated as one of the G8 priorities in 2006, while WMD nonproliferation will be one of the priority issues for the heads of state gathering at the St. Petersburg summit in July 2006. This makes this article of particular interest to readers today.

The Crisis of International Security Institutions in Light of the Iraq Conflict - Andrei Piontkovsky - The crisis of international institutions was apparent long before the U.S. invasion of Iraq without the sanction of the U.N. Security Council. However, this event was a catalyst for yet another wave of proposals and alternatives for the reform of the United Nations and its institutions. The well-known Russian political scientist proposes in this article that the G8 take on the role of an effective global government. In the opinion of the author, director of the Center for Strategic Research, the traditionally informal and trust-based nature of G8 consultations is most suitable for working out joint solutions to key world policy issues. However, transforming the G8 into the leading international security institution is impossible without Russian participation.

ROUND TABLE

International Terrorism: Preconditions, Ideology and Counterterrorism Methods - The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, unprecedented in their mercilessness and scope, and the subsequent operation in

Afghanistan posed numerous questions to scholars, politicians, and government agencies. Are these events the first manifestations of a new global conflict? If this hypothesis is correct, then what is the social and ideological nature of this conflict? Where is the front in this impending "World War Three"? What are the means and methods to be used to fight against international terrorist organizations and movements? These and other questions related to the globalization of terrorism were touched upon during a round table organized by *Yaderny Kontrol* that brought a lively response from our readers.

COMMENTARY

The Moscow Nuclear Summit: Taking Stock - Vladimir Orlov - In April 1996 the leaders of the seven leading industrialized developed states (the United States, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom) and Russia met in Moscow to discuss questions of nuclear safety and security. For the first time in its history, the G7 held a session in Russia. And for the first time the agenda focused on one specific question, which directly affects the interests of the population of these countries, as well as the rest of the world - the future of nuclear power, and ensuring its reliability. For the first time Russia participated in the negotiations as an equal, as a result of which the attendees were dubbed the "G8" in diplomatic circles. It is obvious that this first experiment proved to be successful, and ten years later these countries will gather in Russia again, this time in an official Group of Eight (G8) format. The PIR Center has assumed the role of a consultant in the preparation of documents for the summit. This article offers a review of the previous summit's goals and results, as related by the editor-in-chief of *Yaderny Kontrol*, who participated in summit events.

U.S.-China Relations: A New Front for Global Contradictions - Yuri Fedorov - U.S. China policy has become more rigid. This can be seen both from Colin Powell's 2001 appearance at a hearing of the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and from the 2006 U.S. National Security Strategy. The director of the Center for War and Peace Studies at the Moscow State University for International Relations (MGIMO) compares contemporary Sino-American relations with US-Russian relations in the early postwar years, when a

severe, not always logical turn was made from the Rooseveltian post WWII concept of a united world, within which the Soviet Union was seen as peculiar, but nevertheless still part of what was then considered to be the civilized world, to Truman's idea of deterring communism.

REVIEW

The Current Status and Prospects for the Development of Missiles in Third World Countries through 2015 - Vladimir Dvorkin - One can judge changes in national policies on the creation of weapons of mass destruction by looking at levels and changes in the rates of a state's development of missile technologies, since many missile types do not make military sense when equipped with a conventional warhead. There are currently over 20 countries in the Middle East, Asia, Africa, and the Asia-Pacific region that have tactical or semi-strategic missiles. The PIR Center consultant examines missile capabilities and prospects for their development in third world countries through the year 2015. He concludes that during this period of time we may see the development of 45-70 ballistic missile launchers in regions from which Russian military facilities and critical infrastructure can be targeted.

HISTORICAL PAGES

Counterproliferation: The Forgotten Past - Ilya Fabrichnikov and Andrei Frolov - Given the escalating conflict over the Iranian nuclear program, influential American neoconservatives' intent to carry out a military operation in Iran regardless of the outcomes at the negotiating table is becoming ever clearer. And we should not expect that the United States will try to obtain international approval for its actions. In addition to the question of whether the United States will decide on the unilateral application of force, there is a second question - will American or Israeli "hands" take on this operation, if such a decision is made. The authors of this article, independent Russian experts, look for the answers to today's questions through historical analysis, examining the preparations for and the course of the June 1981 operation by Israeli special services to destroy Iraq's Tammuz nuclear research center.

How the USSR Helped China Create an Atomic Bomb - Roland Timerbaev - "In times when we had good relations, we

signed an agreement on cooperation in the sphere of nuclear energy that included the transfer of secret technology for the production of nuclear weapons to China. We basically gave China everything. We had no secrets from it," wrote Nikita Khrushchev in his memoirs about the Soviet Union's transfer of nuclear weapons secrets to China. In accordance with six agreements, signed by the USSR and PRC between 1955 and 1958, the Soviet Union gave Chinese specialists detailed information about the construction of a nuclear warhead, assisted in the creation of a test site in China, and also consulted on the question of cooperation between enterprises and the Chinese version of Minsredmash (the Soviet Ministry, responsible for the nuclear sector). A regular contributor to *Yaderny Kontrol's* historical pages, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Roland Timerbaev talks about the various stages in the development of bilateral cooperation in the nuclear sphere, and the reasons for its collapse.

OPINION PIECE

Strengthening the Nonproliferation Regime - Remaining Issues - Hans Blix - In his letter to the editor, the chairman of the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission and former IAEA director-general presents his views on the most critical problems facing the nonproliferation regime, those demanding immediate solutions. In the opinion of Hans Blix, these threats include the fact that the technologies used to produce nuclear reactor fuel and weapons-grade nuclear materials are identical. He also discusses the necessity of strengthening IAEA inspections and the physical protection of stockpiles of weapons-grade nuclear materials.

Sergei Prikhodko, Alexander Rumyantsev, Andrei Granovsky, Vitaly Korabelnikov, and Boris Labusov on Yaderny Kontrol - Among those readers of the journal that have sent us numerous letters in response to our publications throughout the years, there are government experts and those far from the government, political scientists, engineers, journalists, and students... But we will not hide the fact that we are always interested in what our most well-informed readers - those who work in government agencies - think about our publications. In our 80th issue we offer excerpts from several such letters.

**In 2006 the PIR Center has published the English edition
of its Global Partnership Guidebook**

**"GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP AGAINST THE SPREAD
OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION"**

In 2006 Russia holds the G8 presidency. In the context of this presidency, the Global Partnership inevitably is an important issue on the G8 agenda. As more than four years have passed since the G8 launched its Global Partnership initiative at the Kananaskis summit in Canada, it is now possible to examine its preliminary results. The PIR Center Global Partnership Guidebook, in both Russian and English editions, provides a "balance sheet" to assist in just such an examination. The books focus on the achievements, problems, and prospects for cooperation within the framework of the Global Partnership and provide a great deal of practical information on how the machinery of the Global Partnership functions on the political, business, and technical levels. The information is presented in user-friendly form with many figures, graphs, images, and tables, making both the achievements and the problems of the Global Partnership clear.

The Russian edition of the Global Partnership Guidebook, published in early 2005, was a very successful project for the PIR Center. It was widely read by Russian-speaking decision-makers and practitioners involved in the G8 Global Partnership. In Russia, the Presidential Administration of the Russian Federation, the Security Council of the Russian Federation, the Office of Prime Minister, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, the Ministry of Defense and the Federal Agency of Atomic Energy all showed great interest in the Guidebook. The PIR Center received many complimentary comments from our readers. For example, Deputy Head of the Russian Federal Agency of Atomic Energy Sergey **Antipov** told the media on March 24, 2005: "I am convinced that the PIR Guidebook 'Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction' should become the book to have for all people involved in the Global Partnership."

The English edition of the Guidebook is up-to-date as of September 2005. It has five chapters:

- **Chapter 1:** History of the Cooperative Programs to Eliminate the Legacy of the Cold War
- **Chapter 2:** Spheres of Cooperation
- **Chapter 3:** Cooperation Problems
- **Chapter 4:** Global Partnership Member Countries
- **Chapter 5:** Prospects for Future Cooperation

This book also provides a Russian perspective on the Global Partnership, which is especially valuable in the context of Russia's G8 Presidency in 2006.

*To order a copy of the Guidebook please contact **Triologue** company
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