

ПОСТОЯННОЕ ПРЕДСТАВИТЕЛЬСТВО
СССР ПРИ ООН

" 31 " марта 1981 года

г. Нью-Йорк

Исх. № ОСВ-63/68 Экз. № 88.

ЗАМЕСТИТЕЛЮ ЗАВЕДУЮЩЕГО ОТДЕЛОМ МЕЖДУНАРОДНЫХ
ОРГАНИЗАЦИЙ МИД СССР

ГОВ. ТИМЕРБАЕВУ Р.М.


При этом направляем характеристики на гг. Тимербаева Р.М.,
Гриневского О.А. и Кишилова Н.С., подготовленные бывшим главой
делегации США на переговорах по ограничению стратегических
вооружений послом Дж. Смитом.

Приложение: упомянутое.

*В депо
Тиммербаева
передаем в.с. Гринев
Смитов, Кишилову
и Кишилову*

ЗАМЕСТИТЕЛЬ ПОСТОЯННОГО ПРЕДСТАВИТЕЛЯ
СССР ПРИ ООН

В. ШУСТОВ



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GERARD SMITH

DOUBLETALK

The Story of the First
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks

DOUBLEDAY & COMPANY, INC., GARDEN CITY, NEW YORK

1980

GERARD SMITH
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headed a fourteen-man Arms Control Section in the Foreign Ministry and is highly regarded by American officials for his expertise on the subject. He was probably the most knowledgeable Soviet delegate on arms control efforts of the 1960s, including the 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty, the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty, and numerous sessions of the eighteen-nation Disarmament Conference in Geneva and other international conferences. Grinevsky had worked in the past with Lawrence Weiler, the counselor of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, keeper of its conscience and one of my closest SALT advisers. Grinevsky communicated easily with Americans. At SALT he helped prepare for compromises and had a large responsibility for drafting, especially in connection with the ABM Treaty. Much of this work was accomplished in informal sessions with his colleague Kishilov and Americans Garthoff and Weiler. Grinevsky is now chief of the Near Eastern Countries Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Roland Timerbayev, another senior Foreign Ministry official with a considerable background in disarmament matters, replaced the ailing Grinevsky as a principal Soviet delegate at the fourth and fifth rounds of the talks in the spring and summer of 1971. He became acting chief of the Soviet delegation during Semenov's absence in Moscow in April 1971. Americans who have known English-speaking Timerbayev since he was first assigned to the United Nations in New York in 1950 consider him a well-rounded, experienced diplomat, who seldom engages in propaganda and is a skilled negotiator. When Grinevsky returned to SALT, Timerbayev resumed his duties at the Foreign Ministry.

Lieutenant General Konstantin Trusov became a principal Soviet delegate at the Vienna session in March 1971, replacing General Ogarkov and General Alekseyev as the representative of the Ministry of Defense. Trusov served on the Soviet General Staff with responsibilities for advanced weapons research and development and early warning aspects of strategic defense. He stated that he had been involved in the Soviet ABM program. He was mild-mannered and skilled at using lengthy explanations to avoid saying anything concrete. General Trusov was an active spokesman for the Soviet military at SALT. In 1976, still at SALT, he was promoted to colonel general.

deploy them in the future except at locations along the periphery of their national territories and oriented outward. I was surprised that they were willing to take such specific commitments. That augured well for the prospect of an ABM treaty.

While central ABM issues and a number of questions of radar limitation remained unresolved, significant progress also had been made in combining some parts of the draft agreements which the two delegations had tabled. Once the sides had proposed texts, the stage had been set for a joint drafting exercise. A Special Working Group was established, headed by Ambassador Jeff Parsons and Roland Timerbaev. Their job was to convert understandings reached informally into agreed provisions in writing in English and Russian, ad referendum to the two delegations. They would also identify in a joint text those provisions still in dispute, so that the agenda for the balance of the negotiation was precisely understood by both delegations as well as by their authorities. An Ad Hoc Committee was also set up to discuss provisions of special difficulty. These groups produced a so-called Joint Draft Text late in September.

In Article II the Soviet delegation wanted to describe obligations, while the United States wanted to define terms, including radar definitions still unacceptable to the Soviet side. The core of the dispute here was over a definition that ABM missiles and radars were all those either constructed or deployed for an ABM role or of a type "indistinguishable from" those tested in an ABM manner. The Soviets continued to state that the "indistinguishable" criterion was not acceptable because it cast doubt on the effectiveness of national means of verification which they felt could "distinguish" systems designed for an ABM role. In Chapter 10 a fuller report is given on this thorny topic. Article III set out three different proposals for ABM levels and areas of deployment: the Soviet capital defense proposal, the Soviet capital defense plus ICBM defense "approach," and the United States "two or one" proposal.

It was not yet settled whether an ABM agreement would be in treaty form, as the Soviets proposed, or an executive agreement as the United States proposed. Some Washington officials urged that this question of the form of the agreement could be used as a bargaining chip. Assuming that the Soviets wanted it to be a treaty, they argued, we should seek some concession before agreeing to

sation for damages? The whole thing was unthinkable. I could only agree. But we had to work on ways to make the risk of it happening as low as possible. The "accidents" negotiation and the resulting agreement received little attention—but the delegations knew that they were engaged here in deadly serious business. Though the risk of accident was small the results could be immeasurable.

The Accidents and Communications Link Agreements were worked out for the most part at the Vienna round in the spring of 1971. This was when the Kissinger-Dobrynin talks were taking place in Washington. Who knows? Maybe the "accidents" work may prove the more significant of the two efforts. The Soviets then proposed that a separate accidents agreement or treaty be signed. They urged that we not postpone agreement or link it to the solution of other questions of curbing the race in strategic armaments.

A Soviet draft went a long way toward accepting our proposals of the previous December. We asked for authority to engage in detailed discussions. This could be done without deflecting SALT from mainstream issues. The question of whether an "accidents" agreement should be separate did not have to be decided yet.

The question of whether or not there should be a separate agreement was caught up in the larger issues of SALT. The United States negative position had been taken after the Soviet proposal of the previous July for a quick SALT agreement limited to an ABM treaty. By opposing a separate accidents agreement we were supporting our position that limitations must be placed on Soviet offensive forces.

Moscow probably calculated that a separate agreement would be hard to resist after most of its terms had been agreed. So they merely repeated the case for a separate agreement—these measures were important and could stand on their own. An early accidents agreement would show that SALT was making progress and that Soviet-American agreements were possible. The Americans should not worry about "bringing forth a mouse." The agreement's effect would be positive, especially if coupled with an agreement to modernize the Hot Line.

A Special Technical Group was established in mid-April which met eleven times. Ambassador Jeff Parsons and Roland Timer-

baev were co-chairmen. All agreed language and working documents were ad referendum and did not bind governments. Parsons stressed that tentative agreement on language must leave open the question of whether or not the agreement would be part of a SALT agreement. Timerbaev continued to urge that there be a separate agreement or treaty, saying that, despite the fact that both would aim at reducing the risk of war, linkage of accidents measures to a SALT agreement was inappropriate. He quoted Brezhnev's statement to the ongoing Twenty-fourth Party Congress: "We consider that it would be expedient to work out measures to reduce the likelihood of the accidental occurrence or premeditated fabrication of military incidents and their development into international crisis and war." To the Soviets' satisfaction and perhaps surprise we agreed to use their draft as the basis for the Group's work. They agreed to extensive substantive and editorial changes. They had proposed a catchall formula for exchange of information which struck us as much too broad:

Each party undertakes to act in all other situations involving nuclear weapons in such a manner as to reduce the possibility of its actions being misinterpreted by the other side. Each Party may inform the other side or request information when, in its view, this is warranted by the interests of averting the risk of outbreak of nuclear war.

What did that mean? Timerbaev said that there were two types of exchange of information: mandatory, as prescribed by specific provisions of the agreement; and voluntary, which each side might exchange at its own discretion. The main purpose of their proposal was to provide for information exchange in case of incidents which had a risk of war significance, as the Americans had proposed.

Ambassador Parsons proposed substitute catchall language providing for exchange of information only at each side's discretion.

In other situations involving the possibility of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons, each Party may provide relevant information to the other side, when, in its view, providing such information is warranted in the interest of fulfilling the purposes of this agreement.

that the agreement appeared to legalize accidents. Suppose an accidental launch destroyed a city, he asked, could one simply say, "But that's all right, we have an agreement covering such contingency"? I rejoined that of course the United States was not looking for excuses for destroying cities, then moved the talk away from this fruitless subject. After their continued protests that the U.S. wording could be interpreted as "legalizing" detonations, we eventually gave in to this Soviet quirk. This was perhaps the most extreme case of "ships passing in the night" of the whole SALT negotiation—though fortunately not on a very significant issue.

At the final plenary session in Vienna, Timerbaev reported on the work of the Group and submitted a "Joint American-Soviet Draft Document on Accident Measures." We were making progress.

At this same Vienna round a Joint Technical Group on improving the Hot Line, headed by Clifford D. May, Jr., and V. P. Minashin, worked out the essentials of a satellite communications agreement. May noted that the existing system had been highly reliable in operation but had certain vulnerabilities. The Memorandum of Understanding of June 1963 had set up two communications links, a wire telegraph circuit running between Washington, London, Copenhagen, Stockholm, Helsinki and Moscow, and a radio telegraph circuit with a single relay station at Tangier. Owing to the vulnerability of these links, the two governments had agreed to investigate means of improving them. The United States wanted to have a link independent of third countries and more survivable in a wartime environment, and also wanted multiple terminals rather than a single terminal at each end. We proposed use of communications satellites.

Minashin discussed satellite communications. He then asked why the United States was concerned about terminals which had operated without a hitch. May said that the primary problem was the single location. Since the President was not always in Washington, terminals were needed at other locations. Only one of the multiple terminals would be in operation at a time. The United States was not proposing to change the character of the terminals.

On completing its work this Technical Group recommended a series of terminals, with switching circuits so that only one terminal location would be connected to the communication circuit at

been to China, I congratulated him on constructive use of his spell "under the weather," the cover story for his China trip being that he was sick in Pakistan. I also stressed the negotiating advantages of early separate Accidents and Hot Line agreements. Recalling his interest in possibly concluding them prior to the limitation agreements, I suggested that they would tend to balance off the U.S. move toward China. Both agreements were probably reachable in a matter of weeks. Communicating a positive decision to the Soviets at an early date would help lubricate Soviet review of other SALT matters. The White House soon authorized us to advise the Soviets that separate agreements were acceptable.

The Accidents Agreement was then concluded. The Special Group had met six times and finished a complete text in August. The White House approved this text for initialing, but without publicity. I was to inform Semenov that we were prepared to sign an executive agreement without waiting for other SALT agreements, but that U.S. signature must await allied and congressional consultations. Shortly thereafter Moscow agreed.

At the last minute the Soviets again brought up the question of third-country accession. Timerbaev informally asked if this might not be handled by joint or individual statements of readiness to conclude similar bilateral agreements with other nuclear powers. We did not agree.

When the agreement was signed, the U.S.S.R. made no appeal to other countries to accede to it. But in 1976 it concluded a similar agreement with France.

Semenov and I initialed the Accidents Agreement at a plenary meeting on August 20. The timing and place of the final signature would be determined by the two governments. I remarked that this success in reaching agreement showed that differing views could be reconciled. It should serve as encouragement in the work ahead. Semenov called the agreement the first major result of the SALT negotiations, undoubtedly a significant international event, a first step which he hoped would be followed by others. In conversation later he said that words were not adequate to express the importance of the agreement. It involved the maintenance of peace for the whole world. He felt the agreement would