

**HEU Elimination:
The Time and Occasion for the EU to
Become Engaged?**

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Background

- Based on a report on the the treat posed by the abundant amounts of HEU in Russia
- Initiated in May 2002, in the context of a Pugwash conference
- Support from the Swedish MFA and SIDA
- Being printed April 2004

”The HEU Elimination Study Group”

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Why bother?

- HEU is dangerous in the hands of for instance terrorists
- HEU exists in large quantities
- HEU is easy to handle
- HEU is hard to detect when smuggled
- HEU is expensive to store

Why the EU or European states

- At risk
- The costs for elimination of Russian HEU are large
- The EU, the "European G-8" and European states need to do more in CTR/GP

Possible limitations on the EU

- Finances
- No "old strategic dialogue" on nuclear disarmament
- Less developed in the field of non-proliferation assistance
- Different views on nuclear power

What can be done?

- **US-Russian HEU-Deal cannot be copied**
- **Initiate a dialogue with RF regarding "excess material"**
- **down-blending of HEU to 19,9 %**
- **Buy *only* services for down-blending - not the material as such**
- **Continued Russian ownership**

What can be done? (2)

- **LEU (from HEU) stored in Russia under multilateral control**
- **Provision: No re-enrichment and no military uses**
- **RF can market the LEU as fuel as it wants to**
- **Use revenue for other security work**
- **Thus: Security before commercial concerns**

Interests?

EU:

- Irreversability of disarmament steps
- reduced nuclear terror threat
- reduced proliferation threat

Russia:

- Economic security and cooperation
- Reduced nuclear terror threat
- Reduced proliferation risk

Report:

”Eliminating Stockpiles of Highly Enriched Uranium:

Options for an Action Agenda in Co-operation with the Russian Federation”

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