

**Confidential**

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# RUSSIA

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Published monthly in Russian and in English  
by Trialogue Company Ltd.

Issue № 1 (205), vol.13. January 2014

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December 10, 2013

Russia Confidential editors report from Moscow:

## 20 YEARS OF TIMELY ANALYSIS AND ACCURATE FORECASTS

### **ANNOTATION**

On December 11, 2013 Trialogue Club International and its members celebrate the Club's 20<sup>th</sup> anniversary. Trialogue began as the Moskovskiye Novosti newspaper's exclusive information project before being taken over by PIR Center and earning itself a reputation as a prestigious international club, with regular meetings held in Moscow and Geneva.

Ever since the Club's foundation, the provision of exclusive information and analysis "for Club members only" was seen as an integral part of the whole endeavor. That was the idea behind Moscow News Confidential; in the early to mid-1990s the bulletin supplied the Russian capital's chattering classes with well-sourced gossip from the Kremlin. Its first subscribers included British Petroleum, the Israeli ambassador, presidential administration chief Aleksandr Voloshyn, and the Moscow mayor's office. In 1996, after the presidential elections in Russia, the bulletin changed its name to Russia Confidential and was further developed by PIR Center at the premises of the MGIMO school of international affairs. The bulletin shifted its focus to foreign policy, and in 1998 it was renamed once again to Voprosy Bezopasnosti (Security Issues). It increasingly began to concentrate on the global and national security agenda, with a particular emphasis on analysis and forecasting rather than straight reporting. In 2010 the bulletin returned to its old name, Russia Confidential.

That is why as we celebrate the 20<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Trialogue Club International, we also mark the anniversary of Russia Confidential. No man is prophet in his own country, as old saying goes. But in honor of the occasion we have decided to conduct an experiment and prove that saying wrong.

In this special anniversary issue of Russia Confidential we look back at various forecasts and predictions made by our contributors over the past two decades; some of them were made exactly 20 years ago. As it turns out, many of the issues that were high on the agenda at the time still remain very topical. What is more, many of our predictions have come true, to a greater or lesser extent; some are proving very accurate right before our eyes. They include the emergence of the BRICS bloc; the political future of Vladimir Putin; the recognition of Kosovo's independence; the situation with missile defense; the Arab Spring; the recent deal on the Iranian nuclear program; and many others.

As before, in 2014 Russia Confidential and its contributors will continue to provide Trialogue Club International members with well-informed analysis and insight into the future of Russian foreign policy and the global political situation. And, just as it was 20 years ago, the bulletin remains "for Club members only".

INSIDER INFORMATION BULLETIN: STAYING AHEAD OF THE GAME

The April 22, 2013 issue of *Russia Confidential* outlined a proposal of three-phase agreement on the Iranian nuclear program developed with PIR Center's participation. After comparing the first phase of that draft, which covers the initial 180-day period, with the actual deal struck in Geneva between the six international mediators and Iran on November 20-24, 2013, it becomes clear that we had in fact accurately predicted the commitments Iran would undertake, with some small reservations on two separate issues. We believe that experts and decision-makers should now take a closer look at the second and third phases of the proposed solution.

<p><b>PHASE 1 OF THE PROPOSED AGREEMENT ON THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM</b></p> <p><u><i>Russia Confidential, No 5 (197), Vol. 12, May 2013. P. 5-6.</i></u></p>	<p>Deal struck between the EU3+3 and Iran in Geneva on <u>November 24, 2013</u></p>
<p><b>a) Iran to join all applicable international nuclear safety agreements.</b></p>	<p>The deal reached in Geneva does not require Iran to join the IAEA conventions on nuclear safety. As far as cooperation with the IAEA is concerned, the terms of the deal resemble the Additional Protocol to the IAEA Safeguards Agreement, the only difference being that the Additional Protocol is subject to ratification by parliament. Statements by senior Iranian officials indicate that the joint plan of action will not be submitted for the Iranian parliament's approval.</p>
<p><b>b) A verifiable freeze (without complete dismantling) of all activity at the Fordow nuclear facility</b></p>	<p>There will be no further increase in enrichment capacity at Fordow.</p>
<p><b>c) The nuclear program to be locked in its current configuration, including the existing level of uranium enrichment and the currently known number of centrifuges and cascades.</b></p>	<p>There will be no further increase in the enrichment capacity in Natanz and Fordow. The centrifuges that have already been installed but have not been used for enrichment will not be launched. No new centrifuges will be installed. The construction of the reactor in Arak will be frozen for six months. No new enrichment facilities will be built.</p>
<p><b>d) Restricting uranium enrichment to currently known locations.</b></p>	<p>Iran undertakes not to enrich uranium to more than 5% for six months. As soon as the facility for converting 5% uranium hexafluoride into uranium oxide is launched, Iran undertakes to convert all uranium enriched to 5% into oxide form within six months. As a result, the stockpiles of uranium enriched to 5% will not grow, either.</p>
<p><b>e) Ceasing enrichment beyond 5% U-235 and capping enrichment at 5% U-235 at a level that meets domestic needs, with the sole exception allowing enrichment to 20% U-235 sufficient for the Tehran research reactor.</b></p>	<p>Iran will completely eliminate its stockpiles of uranium enriched to 20% (19.75%) in the form of UF<sub>6</sub> uranium hexafluoride (i.e. the form suitable for further enrichment that would be required to produce nuclear weapons). Half of the existing stockpiles of uranium enriched to 20% will be converted to uranium oxide for subsequent production of fuel for the Tehran research reactor. The second half will be downblended to 5%.</p>
<p><b>f) Disclosing undeclared nuclear material and activities, and/or acknowledging any past violations of the NPT or of its Safeguards Agreement.</b></p>	<p>Within three months Tehran will give the IAEA detailed information about all aspects of its nuclear program, including any planned activity, as well as a detailed description of every building at</p>

	all sites, plus information about the uranium mines and raw material. Iran will also fill in the IAEA's Design Information Questionnaire regarding the Arak reactor. IAEA inspectors will be given daily access to the Fordow and Natanz facilities to collect footage recorded by video cameras. Inspectors will also be given access to centrifuge manufacturing plants and uranium mines.
<i>g) Sending to Russia Iranian stockpile of low-enriched uranium - uranium enriched to 20% or below - every six months for incorporation into fabricated fuel assemblies for the Bushehr nuclear power plant, the Tehran research reactor, and possibly other light water reactors.</i>	As already mentioned, Iran will completely eliminate its stockpiles of uranium enriched to 20% (19.75%) and stored in the form of UF6 uranium hexafluoride (the form suitable for further enrichment required for building nuclear weapons).
<i>h) Refraining from engaging in research and/or development of any potential militarization of the nuclear program as described in Articles I and II of the NPT.</i>	Iran will continue uranium enrichment research within the IAEA safeguards system, provided that such research does not lead to an increase in the stockpiles of enriched uranium. Iran will not build any spent nuclear fuel reprocessing facilities suitable for producing plutonium, and will not pursue such reprocessing.

BULLETIN OF ACCURATE FORECASTS ON NUCLEAR FORCES DEVELOPMENT AND ARMS CONTROL

**DISCUSSING PROSPECTS FOR STRATEGIC NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS (1998):**

*"Complete elimination of nuclear weapons is unlikely to be put on the table in the foreseeable future. But another START treaty or a similar deal will obviously have to be negotiated. We are fairly confident that the two sides will discuss further reductions to 1,000-1,500 warheads apiece."*

*Voprosy Bezopasnosti, Vol 22, No 2, January 1998, P. 12.*

12 years later:

On April 8, 2010 Russia and the United States signed the New START Treaty, which mandates a reduction of strategic nuclear arsenals to 1,550 warheads apiece by 2018. Signed in Prague, the document entered into force on February 5, 2011.

**PROJECTING THE DEVELOPMENT OF INDIAN AND PAKISTANI NUCLEAR FORCES (1998):**

*"The role of the Indian-Pakistani nuclear factor is primarily being determined by India. [...] It can be assumed that the optimum level for India would be 100-200 nuclear warheads. [...] India will also try to increase its power projection capability with regard to Pakistan and especially China by improving its delivery systems and ramping up their numbers. [...]"*

*Based on the perceptions of nuclear weapons in Pakistan and the key characteristics of that country's nuclear policy, Islamabad will probably follow India in ramping up the size of its nuclear arsenal. By mobilizing its internal resources, Pakistan will acquire 80-100 warheads, which is the upper technological limit for that country."*

*Voprosy Bezopasnosti, Vol 31, No 11, June 1998, P. 4-5*

15 years later:

According to the SIPRI Yearbook, as of 2013 India had 90-110 nuclear warheads, and Pakistan 100-120.

**PUTTING MULTILATERAL NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT ON THE AGENDA (2000):**

*"As part of the strategic offensive reductions negotiations we should encourage Britain and France to join that process. Reducing the British and French arsenals in addition to strategic nuclear reductions by the United States and Russia would help to achieve a more substantial nuclear threat reduction."*

Voprosy Bezopasnosti, Vol.4, No 10(76), May 2000, P. 9-10.

Nine years later:

In 2009 Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov for the first time voiced proposals for all permanent Security Council members to join the Russian and U.S. nuclear disarmament efforts. Since then, Russia has repeatedly voiced the opinion that the next stage of the disarmament process must be multilateral, with a particular emphasis on taking into account the British and French arsenals.

**PREDICTING A LENGTHY DEBATE ON MISSILE DEFENSE (2000):**

*"Russia is not ready to make any compromises on [...] missile defense in the short or medium time frame".*

Voprosy Bezopasnosti, Vol. 4, No 21 (87), November 2000, P. 5.

In the years that followed:

Following Washington's pullout from the ABM Treaty in 2002 the debate on this problem has become one of the most contentious issues in the Russian-U.S. strategic dialogue. For a long time Moscow stuck to what was essentially an uncompromising position, demanding legally binding guarantees that the U.S. missile defense system will not be directed against Russia.

STRATEGIC VISION: PROJECTING DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL TRENDS

**PREDICTING A DEMOCRATIC FUTURE FOR A NEW RUSSIA (1993):**

*"Parliamentary elections will take place within 18 months, although I hope they will be held much sooner than that. The diarchy we have today is, first, extremely unstable, and second, damaging for Russia. Is there a legally impeccable mechanism of calling elections in the very near future? My logic is as follows. First, the elections will certainly be held. This is inevitable. Second, the elections will be held in accordance with some kind of election law (I would like Russia to have a mixed system, a hybrid of majoritarian and proportional representation, because such a system would be the best match for the situation on the ground). Is there any room for maneuver within the existing legislation? Are the elections inevitable? Yes they are. And if so, there must also be a mechanism that enables them to be held. In a democracy, elections are the cornerstone principle; they are the foundation of the legitimacy of all laws, because the people are the source of all laws. Hence, the elections are inevitable. And if the existing means of holding them have been exhausted, then all the other instruments that lead to elections are also, in the great scheme of things, legitimate as they reflect the principle on government by people."*

Moscow News Confidential. August 1993. Author: Yegor Gaidar.

Five months later:

On December 12, 1993, Russia held elections to its new legislative body, the Federal Assembly consisting of the Federation Council and the State Duma. On the same day the government put the draft of the new constitution to a referendum. That was not the only distinctive feature of the elections in December. Just as Yegor Gaidar had predicted, elections to the Duma were held using a hybrid of the majoritarian and proportional representation systems. The vote was held in a very tense climate. The Russian people demonstrated their disillusionment with radical reforms. Not a single pro-presidential party polled more than 15 per cent of the vote. The newly elected parliament did not become any less anti-presidential than its disbanded predecessors, the Supreme Council and the Congress of People's Deputies. But the real political powers of the new legislature had become much more limited under the new constitution. Parliament no longer had any great say in the country's political course, and could not make any radical adjustments to the policies pursued by the President and the Cabinet.

**PREDICTING A RETURN TO STATE MONOPOLY ON ARMS TRADE (1993):**

"The policy of arms trade demonopolization, which many are now singing the praises of, is actually quite dangerous. The emergence of private defense companies two years ago, and their attempts to begin independent exports have demonstrated that at best, they are unfamiliar with the market situation, and are driving the prices down. At worst, they are making attempts at illegal exports to unstable regions (especially the Middle East) via the southern CIS republics, which have lax customs controls.

Of course, we could grant the requests [for weaponry] coming in from Taiwan or Pakistan. But that would mean ruining our relations with such partners as China and India, whose markets are much larger and much more familiar to the Russian exporters. That is why state monopoly on arms trade will most likely be reinstated."

Moscow News Confidential, March 1993. Author: Vladimir Orlov

In the months that followed:

Just as we had predicted, the Russian government reinstated state monopoly on arms trade by setting up the Rosvooruzheniye (Russian Weapons) state-owned company in late 1993 (after the break-up of the Soviet Union the government agencies in charge of arms exports were abolished).

**PREDICTING THE SITUATION WITH NUCLEAR TRAFFICKING AND COUNTERMEASURES**

"So far, there have not been any cases of illegal exports [from Russia] of highly-enriched uranium, plutonium or sensitive nuclear technologies. But the level of security at Russian nuclear facilities varies from high to questionable [...]. Very soon Russia will face extremely serious problems. In order to reduce the risks, we need to think about setting up a special body under the IAEA that would gather information about nuclear arms trafficking."

Moscow News Confidential, August 1993. Author: Gennady Evstafiev

In the years that followed:

In the summer of 1994 Russia faced another wave of international accusations of being unable to provide effective security measures for its nuclear materials and to stop nuclear smuggling. Three batches of weapons-grade material, allegedly of Russian origin, were intercepted in Germany in quick succession (one of them was at the center of the so-called *Munich Affair*). On the whole, the situation in the first half of the 1990s proved a serious test for Russia's reputation in the area of physical protection of nuclear materials. There were cases of theft from facilities in Ozersk, Podolsk, Sarov, and other towns. Eventually, just as Gennady Evstafiev had predicted, in November 2004 the IAEA set up the Nuclear Trade and Technology Analysis Unit (NTTAU). Its mandate was to centralize the analysis of all nuclear trade-related information at the IAEA's disposal. In cooperation with other parts of the IAEA, the NTTAU began to investigate known nuclear trafficking rings.

**IDENTIFYING TOMORROW'S LEADERS (1998):**

"The defense, law-enforcement and security chiefs all meet the criterion of being loyal to the head of state. [...] At the same time we expect a gradual but significant strengthening in the influence of Vladimir Putin, the new chief of the FSB. Mr. Putin has the support of the competing financial-industrial groups, but he is not bound by any strong commitments to any of those groups (contrary to popular belief, that includes the St Petersburg group). He has the opportunity, energy and willingness to concentrate huge information resources in his hands, thereby strengthening his positions by wielding dossiers of compromising information about key political and business figures."

Voprosy Bezopasnosti, Vol. 35, No 15, August 1998, P.3.

15 years later:

In October 2013 Russian president Vladimir Putin, who is holding his third (non-consecutive) term of office, was named by the *Forbes* magazine the world's most powerful man.



**PREDICTING THE PRESIDENT'S RESIGNATION (1999):**

*"The president has found himself in a difficult situation. There are reasons to believe that his health problems have got worse. For the president's team, uncertainty about his health is a serious argument against initiating any radical changes in the political situation. The only form such radical changes could take would be for the president to step down voluntarily."*

*Voprosy Bezopasnosti, Vol. 60, No 16, September 1999, P.3.*

Three months later:

On December 31, 1999 Boris Yeltsin announced that he was voluntarily stepping down as president and appointing the then prime minister, Vladimir Putin, as acting president.

**PREDICTING THE OUTCOME OF THE USE OF FORCE IN KOSOVO (1998):**

*"The military operation in Kosovo will set a profoundly important precedent. First, it will be a precedent of armed force being used without the UN Security Council's authorization. It is quite obvious that a whole number of NATO members, including such key European allies of the United States as Britain, Norway, and (to a somewhat lesser extent) France are already prepared to use military force in circumvention of the UN Security Council. [...]*

*Second, this could set a precedent of using force for humanitarian considerations (regardless of the actual motives). This could mean a de facto recognition of the supremacy of humanitarian law, as interpreted by one of the regional military-political organizations, over the principles of national sovereignty. A NATO operation could set a precedent of using force to protect an unrecognized state, with a clear prospect of subsequent international recognition of that state. That could radically alter the situation on the international arena."*

*Voprosy Bezopasnosti, Vol. 32, No 12, June 1998, P.1.*

In the years that followed:

The 1999 NATO military operation against Yugoslavia did set a precedent of armed force being used without UN Security Council authorization. Also, the use of force for humanitarian considerations received a de facto recognition by a substantial part of the international community. Since then the scenario of a military intervention without UNSC authorization has been considered on several occasions, and actually implemented in Iraq in 2003. Finally, in 2008 Kosovo declared independence, just as we had predicted.

**DISCUSSING THE POTENTIAL OF THE "EURASIAN TRIANGLE" (RUSSIA, INDIA, CHINA) AS THE FORERUNNER OF BRICS (1999):**

*"The point of the triangle is to remove the existing and potential conflicts between the key Eurasian powers, and to create a healthy core that would be capable, through its gigantic geopolitical weight, of attracting other nations to this zone of stability. [...]*

*The point of this triangle is, first and foremost, dialogue and cooperation. It is an instrument that will allow the three countries, if the need arises and if they all agree, to speak with one voice on important issues, thereby influencing the course of events.*

*The Eurasian Trio will mostly have to rely on its own resources; their modernization and growth of their domestic markets could be one of the principal objectives for the triangle. [...] Other countries may well choose to join such a modernization alliance."*

*Voprosy Bezopasnosti, Vol. 63, No 19, November 1999, P. 7-8.*

In the years that followed:

In 2006 Russia initiated the establishment of the BRIC bloc, which became BRICS in 2011 after South Africa became a member. The rise of this alliance of five rapidly

growing economies - Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa - has been one of the most significant geopolitical developments since the turn of the century. Initially BRICS was positioned as an informal club of countries with similar economies. Now, however, it is seen as an important and long-term factor in the development of the global economic and political architecture. The first meeting of the BRICS heads of state took place in 2009 in Yekaterinburg. Since then, such summits have been held on an annual basis. In 2011 the five partners began to develop not only shared economic approaches, but also a coordinated political stance on various international issues.

**IDENTIFYING THE HARBINGERS OF THE ARAB SPRING (1999):**

*"Serious questions remain as to whether the present generation of political leaders can survive in the current situation in the Middle East. Unlike the 1980s and 1990s, when things in the region were relatively stable militarily, the current climate includes much greater risks of the use of force. [...] In most cases the problem centers on the political repercussions of new trends in political Islam. Compared to the young technocrats, the strength of this new Islamism is that it not only feeds off the governments' economic failures, but also offers a radically new self-identification model, and an ideology of renewed and fairly aggressive Islam. [...]"*

*Meanwhile, as the Gulf War of 1991 and regular crises over Iraq have amply demonstrated, the potential for an explosion in most of the Arab countries is very significant, and it usually translates into action on the basis of anti-U.S. slogans. In this new political climate, the Islamists will be all the more likely to come to power if the new technocrats fail to produce quick results."*

*Voprosy Bezopasnosti, Vol. 48, No 4, February 1999, P.2.*

11 years later:

A wave of protests and revolutions in the Arab world that began in December 2010 has swept through the entire Middle East and North Africa. Dubbed the Arab Spring by the media, these revolutions have toppled four heads of state. Governments were overthrown in Tunisia, Egypt and Yemen; a civil war broke out in Libya (toppling the regime there) and in Syria, where fighting still rages.

**ASSESSING THE SCENARIO OF A FOREIGN MILITARY INTERVENTION IN THE SYRIAN CONFLICT (2013)**

*"A military scenario [invasion of Syria in the event of chemical weapons being used on its territory] remains unlikely. [...] The United States would rather much prefer a peaceful resolution of the Syrian crisis [...] and will try to avoid the invasion scenario for as long as it possibly can [...] The United States, Russia and all the other countries want fighting in Syria to end as soon as possible; Russian-U.S. cooperation will be instrumental in achieving that goal."*

*Russia Confidential, No 7 (199), Vol. 12, July 2013. P. 5-6.*

In the months that followed:

On August 21, 2013 Syrian rebels accused government troops of using chemical weapons in a suburb of Damascus. According to unconfirmed reports, more than 1,000 people were killed in the attack. Up until September 10 a U.S. strike against Syria looked imminent. But in the end, despite hawkish statements by the U.S. leadership that strike did not materialize thanks to Russia's proposal to place Syrian chemical weapons under international control. In the following months Russian-U.S. cooperation was instrumental in launching a plan to

destroy Syrian chemical weapons and let the diplomats resolve the problems which everyone assumed would require the use of force. On November 25, 2013 Russian and U.S. diplomats met a special U.N. and Arab League representative for Syria. The parties agreed to hold the Geneva II conference on peaceful settlement in Syria on January 22, 2014.

**WARNING AGAINST AN INFORMATION AND CYBERNETIC ARMS RACE (2000):**

"There are serious worries [...] over the potential for information and cyber technologies being used to achieve a foreign-policy advantage, and as an element of military confrontation and blackmail. This raises the prospect of an arms race in new forms. It cannot be ruled out that in the foreseeable future, punitive operations on the international arena will be pursued against the pariahs using information weapons rather than cruise missiles and bombs, and that conflicts will acquire the form of information wars.

[...] The cost of this new technological experiment could well be paid in the form of a breakdown of the existing military-strategic balance, as well as local and global power balances. That cost may also include greater risks of attack and blackmail. This will be a serious test for the entire system of international arrangements that maintain strategic stability and prevent a new arms race on a global as well as regional level."

Voprosy Bezopasnosti, Vol. 4, No 3(69), February 2000, P. 7-8.

In the years that followed:

The increasing use of information weapons as part of the media coverage of international events; countries abusing their technological advantage; and cyberattacks initiated by governments - all of this has become an inescapable reality of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Experts are increasingly voicing concerns about the possibility of cyberattacks against nuclear infrastructure facilities and strategic forces. The effects of cybersecurity on the military-political balance and strategic stability are becoming one of the key topics of the military-political discourse. Government-sponsored cyber-sabotage and cyber-espionage has become part of our reality, as demonstrated by the *Stuxnet*, *Red October* and *Flame* malware. All these viruses targeted Middle Eastern (primarily Iranian) networks as part of Operation Olympic Games, which was authorized by the U.S. president George W. Bush and implemented during the first Obama administration. That operation is widely believed to have resulted in a panic among the Iranian nuclear scientists; it also inflicted millions of dollars worth of losses on Iran, and substantially slowed down the Iranian nuclear program. For more details, see: Russia Confidential, No 6 (198), Volume 12, June 2013.

**AWARE OF THE RISKS: ON CONTROL OVER TELECOM NETWORKS AND THE PROFOUND ROLE OF THE INTERNET (2000):**

"Building a telecommunications infrastructure is primarily a geopolitical issue, because at some point in the future it will lead to a redistribution of the balance of power between the global political and economic centers. High-bandwidth network access will also determine the distribution of key information resources, the level of countries' economic and technological development, and, potentially, control over the information transmitted via these networks. [...] Control over high-bandwidth networks also opens up the possibility of control over the Internet, including its resources and contents."

Voprosy Bezopasnosti, Vol.4, No 19 (85), October 2000, P. 10-11.

13 years later:

In 2013 scandalous revelations by Edward Snowden about clandestine U.S. and British surveillance and data gathering on the Internet and in other communication networks demonstrated that the Internet infrastructure can be used as a mechanism of meddling in other countries' internal affairs. Using their unique advantage in the form of access to the core Internet infrastructure, the United States and its colleagues installed hardware bugging devices on submarine fiber optic cables, including intercontinental ones. In a related development, the idea of laying a new fiber optic cable between the BRICS countries has been put forward in order to link up the bloc's networks and reduce

their dependence on the existing channels of Internet traffic. For more details, see: Russia Confidential, No 10 (202), Vol. 12, October 2013.



This issue was prepared by A. Baklitsky, D. Evstafiev, A. Zulkharneev, V. Orlov, and J. Fetisova based on reports in past issues of *Moscow News Confidential*, the *Voprosy Bezopasnosti analytical bulletin*, and the *Russia Confidential exclusive analytics bulletin* from 1993 to 2013.

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Moscow-Geneva, January 2014

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**Excerpts from the Membership Terms and Conditions at the Trialogue Club International**

**3. Club members' rights**

[...]

3.1. Individual members of the Club have the right to:

3.1.3. Receive one copy of the *Russia Confidential exclusive analytics bulletin* by email, in their preferred language (Russian or English). Under the rules of the Club, the bulletin may not be made available to third parties.

[...]

3.2. Corporate members of the Club have the right to:

3.2.3. Receive two copies of the *Russia Confidential exclusive analytics bulletin* by email, in their preferred language (Russian or English) or in both languages, and to make the bulletin available to other representatives of the corporate club member. Under the rules of the Club, the bulletin may not be made available to third persons who are not members of the Club.

[...]

**4. Club members' responsibilities**

4.1. All current members of the Club have the following responsibilities:

4.1.6. Not to share materials of the *Russia Confidential bulletin* they have received, as well as passwords to the Club section of the PIR Center website, with individuals and/or entities who are not members of the Club.

[...]

**6. Russia Confidential**

6.1. The *Russia Confidential exclusive analytics bulletin* is issued by the Trialogue Ltd at the commission of PIR Center for personal use by Club members only.

6.2. The bulletin contains concise and exclusive analysis of problems pertaining to international security, as well as foreign and domestic policies of Russia and CIS states, written specially for *Russia Confidential* by PIR Center staff and invited experts.

6.3. Materials published in the bulletin should be treated as confidential for at least 30 days since the date of publication. During that period they may not be quoted or made available to persons or entities who are not Club members.

6.4. After a period of at least 30 days since the date of publication the Trialogue Ltd may choose to lift the exclusivity and confidentiality requirements for some of the materials published in the bulletin, in which case they may be reprinted in other PIR Center publications and quoted by Club members.

6.5. The bulletin is sent to Club members by email on a monthly basis, in English or in Russian, depending on the individual club member's preference.

6.6. Upon request, Club members can also receive a hard copy of the bulletin in their preferred language.



Dear members of Trialogue Club International,

In 2013 the Club marked its **anniversary**. You are now holding a **special anniversary issue** of the *Russia Confidential* bulletin, which is available only to Club members. We will shortly be holding an **anniversary meeting** of *Trialogue Club International* members to honor our very old friends, and welcome those who joined us only recently.

The year 2013 is drawing to a close - but the Club's work continues. The **upcoming 2014 Club season** will bring new meetings, topical analysis, and enticing membership privileges. That is why I would like to invite you today to **renew your Club membership for 2014 or for the next two years**.

As you know, we are always very happy and appreciative when current members of the Club **recommend Club membership** or participation in our events to their friends and colleagues. Such a recommendation means an automatic membership offer. In addition, we are offering rewards for bringing new members to the Club; the details are outlined below. If you have any questions, please feel free to contact my colleagues at: +7 (985) 764-98-96, or email: [trialogue@pircenter.org](mailto:trialogue@pircenter.org).

The Club's doors are always open for you and your colleagues!

Best regards,

**Dmitry Polikanov**  
**Chairman of Trialogue Club International**

**Rewards for bringing a new member to Trialogue Club International**

<b>Option 1 – Membership fee discount for the next period</b>	
<b>5%</b>	for 1 new individual Club member
<b>10%</b>	for 1 new corporate Club member
<b>10%</b>	for 2 new individual Club members
<b>15%</b>	for 3 new individual Club members
<b>20%</b>	for 4 or more new individual Club members
<b>20%</b>	for 2 new corporate Club members
<b>30%</b>	for 3 new corporate Club members
<b>35%</b>	for 4 and more new corporate Club members

<b>Option 2 – Lump-sum compensation in cash</b>	
<b>100 USD</b>	for 1 new corporate Club member
<b>200 USD</b>	for 2 new corporate Club members
<b>300 USD</b>	for 3 new corporate Club members
<b>500 USD</b>	for 4 and more new corporate Club members