

Confidential

RUSSIA

The circulation of this report has been strictly limited to the members of the Trialogue Club International and of the Centre russe d'études politiques.

This issue is for your personal use only.

Published monthly in Russian and in English by Trialogue Company Ltd.

Issue № 8 (212), vol.13. August 2014

August 11, 2014

Evgeny Buzhinsky reports from Moscow:

DOES THE INF TREATY HAVE A FUTURE?

ANNOTATION

The question of whether Russia should withdraw from the 1987 Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) is increasingly being raised by the expert community. What is more, several Russian officials have said that the treaty is detrimental to Russian national security.

The main proponent of a Russian pullout from the treaty is Sergey Ivanov, head of the Russian presidential administration. The first time he raised that issue was in October 2003, when he served as minister of defense, during a meeting with his U.S. counterpart Donald Rumsfeld in Colorado Springs. Rumsfeld, who is known for his opposition to any arms control agreements, responded cautiously to Ivanov's proposal. He said, in effect, that Russia was free to pull out of the INF if it chose to, and that Washington would have no objections. Shortly before that the Americans unilaterally withdrew from the 1972 ABM Treaty, drawing almost unanimous condemnation from the international community. They were clearly not in a good position to initiate the collapse of yet another disarmament treaty, which is an important element of maintaining strategic stability.

Another important consideration is that unlike the ABM Treaty, the INF Treaty does not hamper Washington's defense plans in any way. To understand why, let us look closer at the background and actual contents of that treaty. In this issue of Russia Confidential we offer a view on the document's past, present, and possible future by Lt. Gen. (rtd) Evgeny Buzhinsky, PIR Center Senior Vice President who served as head of the Department for International Agreements at the Russian MoD's Main Directorate for International Military Cooperation in 2002-2009.

BACKGROUND

Nuclear confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States began in the late 1950s and early 1960s, when the Americans deployed their Thor and Jupiter intermediate-range ballistic nuclear missiles in Turkey, Italy, and Britain. The flight time of American missiles targeted at the Soviet Union was thereby reduced from 30 minutes to only 8-10 minutes. In 1962 the Soviet Union delivered a symmetric response by stationing its R-12 intermediate-range ballistic nuclear missiles in Cuba. Moscow rightly believed that deploying such missiles in Europe would not be an adequate response. The flight time of Soviet nuclear missiles stationed in Cuba was exactly the same as the flight time of U.S. missiles stationed in Europe.

Washington refused to accept such parity, and initiated the Cuban missile crisis, which was settled by the pullout of Soviet missiles from Cuba and U.S. missiles from Europe. In the wake of that crisis, the United States abandoned its plans to deploy intermediate-range ballistic nuclear missiles in Europe for almost two decades. In 1979, however, NATO took the decision to station intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Western European countries while at the same time launching negotiations with Moscow on nuclear and conventional arms reductions. The United States hoped that the Soviet Union would not respond by deploying its missiles in Cuba so as to avoid a repetition of the 1962 crisis - and that even if Moscow tried to do so, it would fail because the United States had already established a naval blockade of Cuba by that time.

The plan was to deploy 108 *Pershing-2* intermediate-range ballistic missiles and 464 *BGM-109G* land-based cruise missiles in Europe. The decision was explained by the need to eliminate the imbalance resulting from the Soviet deployment of the new *Pioneer* intermediate-range ballistic missiles with MIRVed warheads, which replaced the obsolete R-12 and R-14 intermediate-range missiles. Back at the time, NATO had almost twice the Russian number of intermediate-range nuclear weapons delivery systems (missiles and bombers, including carrier-based aircraft). To be more precise, NATO had 1,800 such systems, and Russia 1,000.

The situation clearly wasn't in the Soviet Union's favor because its Pioneer missiles posed no direct threat to U.S. territory, whereas Washington's Pershing ballistic missiles and cruise missiles posed a direct threat to vital military facilities on Soviet territory.

During the period from 1980 to 1983 the Soviet Union put forward a number of proposals on reductions of intermediate-range nuclear weapons stationed in Europe. Under the latest of those proposals, the Soviet Union and NATO were to achieve parity in terms of intermediate-range nuclear bombers. The Soviet Union was also prepared to eliminate all but 140 of its *Pioneer* intermediate-range ballistic missiles. In other words, it agreed to keep fewer of such missiles than France and the UK had in their arsenals at the time. The United States, meanwhile, was asked to abandon plans for deploying its intermediate-range ballistic missiles and land-based cruise missiles in Europe.

In 1981 the Americans made their own counterproposal. Under the so-called *zero option*, they agreed not to deploy *Pershing-2* and cruise missiles in Western Europe in return for the elimination of all Soviet intermediate-

range missiles stationed in both the European and the Asian parts of the country. In essence, Washington wanted Moscow to eliminate the 600 intermediate-range ballistic nuclear missiles it had already deployed, in return for the United States undertaking not to deploy in Western Europe its missiles that were still being developed at the time. After that the Americans made several other proposals aimed at achieving a numerical parity between the Soviet Union and NATO in intermediate-range missiles. All of these proposals, however, were rejected by the Soviet leadership because none of them contained an obligation by Washington not to deploy U.S. missiles in Europe. In late 1983 the United States began to deploy its intermediate-range missiles on the European continent.

The Soviet Union considered several possible responses, from increasing the numbers of intermediate-range ballistic missiles stationed in Eastern Europe to deploying Pioneer missiles in Chukotka.

THE INF TREATY: SIGNING AND IMPLEMENTATION

The Soviet approach to the problem of American intermediate-range missiles in Europe changed radically following the arrival in 1985 of the new Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev. To begin with, Moscow unilaterally suspended the deployment of its own missiles and other response measures in Europe. Then in the spring of 1987 Gorbachev proposed the so-called *double global zero* plan. The proposal included the elimination of all U.S. and Soviet intermediate-range (1,000-5,500 km) missiles, as well as all shorter-range (500-1,000 km) missiles. The plan was accepted and formalized in the 1987 INF Treaty, signed for an indefinite term.

Soviet and U.S. intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and launchers eliminated under the INF Treaty

1. Deployed missiles
2. Non-deployed missiles
3. Deployed and non-deployed missiles in total
4. Deployed launchers
5. Non-deployed launchers
6. Deployed and non-deployed launchers in total

1. Soviet Union

	INTERMEDIATE-RANGE MISSILES					SHORTER-RANGE MISSILES		
	RSD-10	R-12	R-14	RK-55	TOTAL	OTR-22	OTR-22	TOTAL
1	405	65	-	-	470	220	167	387
2	245	105	6	84	440	506	33	539
3	650	170	6	84	910	726	200	926
4	405	79	-	-	484	115	82	197
5	118	6		6	130	20	20	40
6	523	85	-	6	614	135	102	237

2. United States

	INTERMEDIATE-RANGE MISSILES			SHORTER-RANGE MISSILES		
	PERSHING-2	BGM-109G	TOTAL	PERSHING-1A	PERSHING-1B	TOTAL
1	120	309	429	-	-	-
2	127	133	260	170	-	170
3	247	442	689	170	-	170
4	105	109	214	-	-	-
5	51	17	68	1	-	1
6	156	126	282	1	-	1

Source: War and peace: terms and definitions. Military-Political Dictionary under the general editorship of Dmitry Rogozin. Moscow, 2011.

TO SUMMARIZE:

To achieve compliance with the INF Treaty, the Soviet Union had to eliminate more than twice as many missiles as the United States (1,836 to 859), and almost three times as many launchers (851 to 283). The Soviet missiles eliminated under the treaty were capable of carrying four times as many nuclear warheads as the American ones (3,154 to 846).

The only type of missile which the United States eliminated more of than the Soviet Union was land-based cruise missiles (443 to 80). That, however, was not a major concession by the United States because Washington also had large numbers of sea-based cruise missiles (Tomahawk) and air-based cruise missiles (ALCM-B). The total number of those missiles was expected to reach 7,000 by the mid-1990s.

The magnitude of unilateral concessions made by the Soviet Union during the INF talks is best demonstrated by the Soviet leadership's decision to destroy all 239 of its latest Oka ballistic missiles, which had a range of 400 km.

FROM PAST TO PRESENT

Speaking at a meeting with leading national security experts in Sarov in February 2012, Vladimir Putin, who was serving as prime minister at the time, made his first remarks about the INF Treaty. He had this to say on the subject:

“ Other countries are energetically improving their intermediate-range missiles, and almost all our neighbors are developing these weapons systems. The Soviet Union and, obviously, the Russian Federation have relinquished intermediate-range missiles by signing a treaty to that effect with the United States. This is not entirely reasonable because the Americans don't have any real need for such systems. There is nowhere they can put them to any real use. On the other hand, for the Soviet Union, and especially for Russia in its current situation, considering that our neighbors are developing these offensive systems, such a decision was controversial, so say the least.”

Vladimir Putin, February 24, 2012, Sarov

Last year Sergey Ivanov spoke once again to the effect that the ban on intermediate-range missiles cannot remain in place indefinitely. He reiterated the idea voiced by Vladimir Putin in Sarov that the United States had never had any real need for such missiles - and on the whole, he was quite right.

To a certain extent, the U.S. position with regard to intermediate-range ballistic missiles and land-based cruise missiles is similar to its position with regard to non-strategic nuclear weapons. Washington requires neither class of weapons to protect its national territory. It can use them only as forward-based weapons. Now that the Cold War is over, the Western European NATO members hardly require such weapons on their territory.

What, then, is the real situation with intermediate-range missiles at this time? The situation has changed very radically since the INF Treaty was signed.

- *Six countries (China, India, Pakistan, Israel, Iran, and North Korea) have land-based intermediate-range ballistic missiles that can carry nuclear warheads.*
- *Several other countries have missiles of this class armed with conventional warheads.*
- *Russia's attempts to make the INF Treaty multilateral, which were undertaken in the mid-2000, have found little support, which was only to be expected.*

Russia has two main options for compensating the loss of the land-based intermediate-range missile capability:

- To improve its strategic nuclear arsenal
- To deploy sea-based and/or air-based intermediate-range missiles

As already mentioned, the option of withdrawal from the INF Treaty is being studied, but for the foreseeable future such a solution appears unlikely. A unilateral Russian pullout would cause political problems, and there is little hope of the United States agreeing to rescind the treaty by mutual consent. In fact, the treaty has moved up Washington's agenda in recent months over allegations that Russia is developing a new land-based cruise missile, the R-500.

In July of this year U.S. President Barack Obama wrote a letter to his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin, where he expressed concern about the GLCM R-500 tested at a range of 400 km, as well as the R-26 ICBM Rubezh, which, according to American data, was run at a distance of less than 5500 km. In fact, the R-26 was tested at a range of 6500 km and, in accordance with the provisions of the START Treaty, is considered an intercontinental ballistic missile.

The emergence of such a letter can only be seen in the context of the general tensions between Russia and the United States against the background of the Ukrainian crisis, because, unlike Russia, the Americans do actually violate the provisions of the INF Treaty, at least in two respects:

- 1) *the use of two stages of ICBMs to be disposed of as targets simulating medium range ballistic missiles to test interceptor missiles;*
- 2) *mass production and use of unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAV) MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9 Reaper.*

In addition, the United States is testing the new generation of UCAV (X-47), which can also be interpreted as a direct violation of the INF Treaty. In fact, all long-range UCAV, strictly speaking, fall under the contractual definition of "cruise missile" (paragraph 2 of Article II of the Treaty), which development is prohibited in accordance with the Treaty.

Remembering these "sins", the U.S. for many years avoided discussions on violations of the INF Treaty.

The Americans realize that resuming the development and manufacture of new land-based intermediate-range ballistic missiles does not make much sense militarily, especially in view of the financial burden such a move would impose on the country's shrinking defense budget. As already explained, such missiles are a forward-based weapon, and there is little confidence that Washington's allies in Europe and Asia (including Japan and South Korea) would allow such weapons to be deployed on their territory now that the Cold War is over, with Russia posing no real threat to their national security.

I am confident that the INF Treaty will remain in force for the foreseeable future, barring some radical shifts in the area of global geopolitical stability. Such shifts appear extremely unlikely at this moment.

Lt. Gen. (rtd) Evgeny Buzhinsky, the author of this paper, is a PIR Center Senior Vice President who served as head of the Department for International Treaties at the Russian MoD's Main Directorate for International Military Cooperation in 2002-2009.

Editor: Julia Fetisova

(c) Trialogue Club International: trialogue@pircenter.org;
(c) Centre russe d'études politiques: crep@pircenter.org
Moscow - Geneva, August 2014

Excerpts from the Membership Terms and Conditions at the Trialogue Club International

3. Club members' rights

[...]

3.1. Individual members of the Club have the right to:

3.1.3. Receive one copy of the Russia Confidential exclusive analytics bulletin by email, in their preferred language (Russian or English). Under the rules of the Club, the bulletin may not be made available to third parties.

[...]

3.2. Corporate members of the Club have the right to:

3.2.3. Receive two copies of the Russia Confidential exclusive analytics bulletin by email, in their preferred language (Russian or English) or in both languages, and to make the bulletin available to other representatives of the corporate club member. Under the rules of the Club, the bulletin may not be made available to third persons who are not members of the Club.

[...]

4. Club members' responsibilities

4.1. All current members of the Club have the following responsibilities:

4.1.6. Not to share materials of the Russia Confidential bulletin they have received, as well as passwords to the Club section of the PIR Center website, with individuals and/or entities who are not members of the Club.

[...]

6. Russia Confidential

6.1. The Russia Confidential exclusive analytics bulletin is issued by the Trialogue Ltd at the commission of PIR Center for personal use by Club members only.

6.2. The bulletin contains concise and exclusive analysis of problems pertaining to international security, as well as foreign and domestic policies of Russia and CIS states, written specially for Russia Confidential by PIR Center staff and invited experts.

6.3. Materials published in the bulletin should be treated as confidential for at least 30 days since the date of publication. During that period they may not be quoted or made available to persons or entities who are not Club members.

6.4. After a period of at least 30 days since the date of publication the Trialogue Ltd may choose to lift the exclusivity and confidentiality requirements for some of the materials published in the bulletin, in which case they may be reprinted in other PIR Center publications and quoted by Club members.

6.5. The bulletin is sent to Club members by email on a monthly basis, in English or in Russian, depending on the individual club member's preference.

6.6. Upon request, Club members can also receive a hard copy of the bulletin in their preferred language.



Dear members of Trialogue Club International,

We continue our **2014 Club season**. It will bring new meetings, topical analysis, and enticing membership privileges. Having marked its **20th anniversary** in 2013, the *Trialogue* Club continues its important mission – playing a role of a unique community of leading diplomats, experts, and businessmen.

As you know, we are always very happy and appreciative when current members of the Club **recommend Club membership** or participation in our events to their friends and colleagues. Such a recommendation means an automatic membership offer. In addition, we are offering rewards for bringing new members to the Club; the details are outlined below. If you have any questions, please feel free to contact my colleagues at: +7 (985) 764-98-96, or email: trialogue@pircenter.org.

The Club's doors are always open for you and your colleagues!

Best regards

Dmitry Polikanov
Chairman
Trialogue Club International

Rewards for bringing a new member to *Trialogue* Club International

Option 1 – Membership fee discount for the next period	
5%	for 1 new individual Club member
10%	for 1 new corporate Club member
10%	for 2 new individual Club members
15%	for 3 new individual Club members
20%	for 4 or more new individual Club members
20%	for 2 new corporate Club members
30%	for 3 new corporate Club members
35%	for 4 and more new corporate Club members

Option 2 – Lump-sum compensation in cash	
100 USD	for 1 new corporate Club member
200 USD	for 2 new corporate Club members
300 USD	for 3 new corporate Club members
500 USD	for 4 and more new corporate Club members