

From the Editor

SOCHI 2014: G8 MUST SET A NEW BENCHMARK FOR GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP

Sochi 2014 is not just about the Olympics. It is also about the June 2014 summit of the G8. WMD nonproliferation will not be at the very top of the agenda; that place has been reserved for the challenges posed by mass migration. Nevertheless, it will be one of the central topics of the summit.

It is still hard to make any definitive predictions on the Syrian issue, which dominated the G8 summit in Northern Ireland in 2013. But there are clear signs of progress on the destruction of the Syrian chemical weapons arsenals. Tectonic shifts are also under way with regard to Tehran's nuclear program; the G8 has been making regular statements on this issue since the 2003 summit in Evian¹, when the Iranian nuclear problem began to move to the top of the international agenda.

As for the nonproliferation package, let us take a closer look at the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Nuclear Weapons, which has been officially extended until 2022, but which has yet to be fully fleshed out.

To understand the possible scenarios, we need to focus on three individual aspects of international cooperation against the spread of WMD.

The first aspect is bilateral Russian-U.S. cooperation. It has undergone significant transformations over the past few months; nevertheless, it still remains the engine of multi-faceted and multilateral cooperation.

The second aspect is the International Science and Technology Center (ISTC). There has been a lot of skepticism about this multilateral mechanism, whose HQ is now relocating from Moscow to Astana. What is the role the ISTC has played so far? And what is the role it can still play in the future?

The third aspect is the one this article begins with, i.e. the Global Partnership itself.

Further development of Russian-U.S. and multilateral cooperation on WMD nonproliferation and nuclear security requires a constant supply of fresh ideas. The recommendations offered by our experts can facilitate the implementation of the already approved initiatives and the development of new ones. PIR Center experts make a substantial contribution to keeping the decision-makers supplied with new ideas.

In September 2013 PIR Center released a report headlined Prospects for International Cooperation on WMD Nonproliferation and Nuclear Security.² The report was prepared by the Working Group for International Cooperation on WMD Nonproliferation and Nuclear Security, which was set up under the PIR Center Advisory Board in 2012.

Preparation and discussion of the report was held as part of individual research by Working Group members and two WG meetings held in Moscow in March and June

2013. Apart from WG members, the meetings were also attended by other WMD nonproliferation and nuclear security experts, including representatives of Russian government agencies, embassies, corporations, NGOs, and research institutions.

A discussion of the report within the expert community, which also involved government representatives, was held during the report's presentation held in Moscow in October 2013. Key findings and recommendations of the report were also presented at an international nonproliferation conference in Cheju, South Korea, in November 2013; they triggered a lively debate between the participants. That debate involved the sherpa of the 2014 Nuclear Security Summit in The Hague, Piet de Klerk; Italian ambassador Carlo Trezza, coordinator of the Missile Technology Control Regime; and other colleagues directly involved in formulating the nonproliferation agenda for 2014-2015.

RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES: FLESHING OUT THE NEW PARTNERSHIP

We firmly believe that Russia and the United States should recognize the important role played by the Nunn-Lugar Program in strengthening global security over the 20 years of its existence. Most importantly, the program made a great contribution to the elimination of Russian chemical weapons stockpiles; the disposal of nuclear submarines; and measures to improve nuclear material protection, control and accounting.

The NPL expired in June 2013. That is also when a new format of Russian-U.S. nuclear cooperation was proposed, based on a bilateral agreement signed in June 2013.

It is certainly true that the NPL was launched in a different historical period, and has now become obsolete. It is therefore entirely reasonable to dismantle the Global Partnership program, including its legal mechanisms and practical implementation. But the program must be dismantled without suspending the cooperation itself.

It is important to emphasize that both Russia and the United States realized the need for replacing the Nunn-Lugar Program, whose instruments were largely defined by the consequences of the end of the Cold War and of the Soviet Union's break-up³. The present situation is entirely different.

On the whole, problems faced by the nuclear industry in Russia and the former Soviet republics have now been resolved. Meanwhile, new problems and threats have emerged in third countries, including nuclear security problems, the threat of WMD terrorism, cybersecurity risks at nuclear facilities, etc. An effective response to these problems requires international cooperation not only in the bilateral but also multilateral format, as well as the development of new political mechanisms.⁴ It is also safe to say that the signing of the new Russian-U.S. agreement has facilitated the emergence of new multilateral instruments.

In September 2013 Russia and the United States signed another agreement that has opened up great prospects for deeper nuclear science and technology cooperation. Finally, in the autumn of 2013 Moscow and Washington began to cooperate on the

destruction of Syrian chemical weapons, using the experience accumulated as part of the Nunn-Lugar Program and the Global Partnership.

These and other developments demonstrate that Russia and the United States continue to play the leading role in the international arena in the area of WMD nonproliferation and nuclear security; they also show that the two countries are working as equals in this field.

We believe that the Nunn-Lugar Program should be replaced with a new Russian-U.S. program, which would be much more compact in terms of its financing and the number of its projects. We have provisionally dubbed that new program the *New Partnership* (NP).

To all intents and purposes, that partnership was kicked off by the signing of the agreement and the attendant protocol on June 14, 2013. But it has yet to be decided which specific projects the New Partnership will include. The main principle of the NP should be equality; there should be no senior or junior partners, and no designation of countries as donors or recipients. The same should apply to choosing the specific areas of work, financing arrangements, and legal issues.

We believe that as part of the New Partnership, the two countries can identify a maximum of 10 projects that would be in their mutual interest, and that would bring Russia some clear military, foreign-policy (soft power) and commercial benefits. Russia and the United States should not pursue cooperation for the sake of cooperation itself. When they determine areas on which they can pool their efforts, they must be led by their own pragmatic interests.⁵ The two areas that immediately come to mind are countering proliferation and strengthening nuclear security in third countries.

The Russian business community and the Russian industry should act as one of the main engines of the implementation of New Partnership projects, just like American companies such as Raytheon, Parsons, Halliburton, Bechtel, and others did with regard to the Nunn-Lugar Program. U.S. companies are very good at taking the initiative; Russian businesses should follow suit.

Russia therefore needs to develop a new set of principles for public-private partnership. Such partnership can increase the Russian capability to implement projects in third countries. At some point in the future, Russia must be prepared to act as a 50-50 partner with the United States in third countries; that includes the financial contribution as well. Otherwise, the very idea of equal partnership will be compromised. In addition, substantial Russian financing of New Partnership projects would make it easier to engage Russian companies in their implementation.

CONTROVERSY OVER THE ISTC

The ISTC is an international organization founded by the United States, Russia, the EU and Japan in 1992. Its main objective was to engage Soviet scientists formerly involved in WMD projects and left unemployed after the Soviet Union's break-up in civilian research projects in order to prevent them from taking sensitive know-how to

third countries. That goal has been achieved, so in 2010 Russia announced that it would pull out of the ISTC in 2015.

At the same time, the ISTC, which is now relocating its HQ from Moscow to Astana, is ready to give Russia observer status and to continue science and technology cooperation with the country. The ISTC also wants to increase the number of its member states by engaging *problem* countries in the Middle East. These countries also need assistance in training export control specialists; this is where the experience accumulated by the ISTC as a whole and Russia in particular could prove useful.

EXPANDING THE GEOGRAPHY OF THE GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP

In our opinion, New Partnership should expand the geography of its projects, with an emphasis on the following regions:

- Central Asia and Afghanistan
- Middle East
- Southeast Asia
- Sub-Saharan Africa

CENTRAL ASIA

We believe that Central Asia would be the most productive area of multilateral cooperation because there are already some joint projects completed or under way in the region. For example, speaking at the Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul in March 2012, the presidents of the United States, Russia and Kazakhstan made a joint statement on trilateral cooperation at the former nuclear testing range in Semipalatinsk. That statement outlined joint Russian-U.S. efforts aimed at the rehabilitation and clean-up of the former nuclear range territory. Russia and the United States have also cooperated in Uzbekistan on resolving the problems with research reactors; spent fuel from those reactors has been removed to Russia. In addition, Russia and the United States are working to improve radiological controls on the Central Asian countries' borders. European states are also becoming involved in these projects. The subject is covered in great detail in an article by **Dauren Aben** headlined "Nuclear Security in Central Asia: Specifics and Opportunities for Cooperation".

The need for cooperation in the area of WMD nonproliferation in Central Asia is becoming more pressing because NATO troops will be pulled out of Afghanistan in 2014. The risk of nuclear materials trafficking via the territory of Afghanistan and its neighbors is growing. There are also opportunities for cooperation in Afghanistan itself, primarily in equipping and training the country's border and customs services. Global Partnership members could also provide assistance in bolstering the system of radiation monitoring on the Afghan border, and implementing a program of nuclear material theft prevention. The experience gained as part of rolling out Russian-made Yantar radiation detectors could prove very useful here.

THE MIDDLE EAST

There is a great scope for cooperation in this region in dealing with various problems in the nuclear and chemical areas. These problems were brought about by WMD programs led by the region's countries in the past, as well as their current plans to develop a nuclear energy industry.

With the assistance of other countries, Turkey and the UAE have already begun to build their first nuclear energy reactors; Jordan is expected to follow suit. Saudi Arabia has yet to make any practical steps in that direction, but it has demonstrated its intention to do so in the near future. The development of nuclear energy in the region necessitates measures to strengthen nuclear security and counter the threats of terrorism and proliferation.

This is why there is a clear scope for international cooperation in such areas as education and establishing effective nuclear material protection, control and accounting (MPC&A) systems. Ideally, having an effective MPC&A system in place should be a compulsory requirement for signing contracts to build nuclear power plants.

Russia could make a contribution to the re-training of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons scientists from Iraq and Libya (although the United States has already done a lot of work in this area as part of its own programs). Russia also has valuable experience of cooperation with the Arab countries that goes back to Soviet times; many senior Arab military officers were trained in the Soviet Union. There are also opportunities for cooperation in putting in place the first and second lines of defense at the nuclear facilities to be built in the region's countries.

Russia and the United States are already in a position to pursue cooperation in decommissioning nuclear facilities built in Iraq under Saddam Hussein. Iraq has begun to dismantle nuclear facilities on its territory, but so far, due to a shortage of financial resources and specialists it has managed to shut down only a single facility, the nuclear research center in Baghdad. In August 2010 Iraq signed an agreement with the EU under which it has received 2.5bn euros to be spent on the decommissioning of the remaining nuclear facilities.⁶ These include the Karama industrial complex outside Baghdad and the Ibn Firnas complex in the town of Rashidiya, 20km north of Baghdad.⁷

EU assistance notwithstanding, U.S. and Russian help to Iraq in cleaning up the territory of these facilities would also prove useful. Russia in particular has valuable experience in this area; in 1993-1994 there were two operations to remove spent nuclear fuel from Iraq's IRT-5000 research reactor to Russia.⁸ As for Libya, in 2009 Russia also completed the removal of spent nuclear fuel from a research reactor in that country.

The future Middle Eastern dimension of the Global Partnership is the subject of an article by **Artem Blashchanitsa** headlined "The Experience of the Global Partnership for the Middle East".

SOUTHEAST ASIA

In Southeast Asia, the greatest scope for cooperation is in strengthening nuclear security and training the region's nuclear specialists. The problems that will have to be resolved as part of the Global Partnership could emerge because a whole number of countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam, and Thailand) have announced plans to develop a nuclear energy industry, even though they lack the necessary expertise and specialists.

The GP states could jointly provide assistance in the construction of nuclear reactors and in the removal of spent nuclear fuel from these countries. They could also help with putting in place proper storage conditions for (or disposing of) the numerous radiation sources that exist in Indonesia and Vietnam. For more details, please see an article by **Alexander Cheban** headlined "Nuclear security in Southeast Asia: how Russia can help".

Assistance here could be provided by such active GP donors as South Korea, which is showing great interest in the Southeast Asian region. Also, there is certainly room for a joint Russian-South Korean project in Southeast Asia as part of the Global partnership. Representatives of the South Korean Foreign Ministry have already said that the idea deserves a closer study.

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

In this part of the planet, the GP countries could work together on preventing bio-security threats, such as the spread of natural and perhaps also man-made viruses.

The sources of bio-security threats in Africa include governments and terrorist organizations. South Africa still retains a substantial capability for developing biological weapons, even though back in 1993 the country halted its bio-weapons program. Dual-purpose research is under way at a medical research center in Kenya and a virus research center in Uganda. It cannot be ruled out that these facilities are being used to develop weaponized Ebola and anthrax pathogens.⁹ In November 2011 U.S. Senator Richard Lugar and several Pentagon officials visited laboratories in Kenya, Uganda and Burundi, and identified security risks there.¹⁰

In this context it must be taken into account that the terrorist threat has always been clear and present in Africa. Al Qaeda is active in Kenya, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Ethiopia and the Sahel region (Mauritania, Mali, Chad, Niger, Senegal, and Burkina Faso). The radical Islamist group Boko Haram is waging a campaign of terror in Nigeria. Islamist groups have already shown interest in acquiring biological weapons based on the Ebola virus.

According to the U.S. Department of State, there was an attempt to commit an act of biological terrorism in 2011. Brian Patrick Roach, a South African national, tried to trigger an outbreak of disease among livestock in Britain and the United States.¹¹

Russia and the United States could cooperate in offering training programs for African biologists in order to strengthen the WMD nonproliferation culture among them; they could also assist in bolstering security arrangements at research facilities. The United States and the EU have only just begun to finance workshops for African biologists. A Russian-U.S. initiative for Africa as part of the GP could take these

efforts to a whole new level. At some point in the future international partners could also consider the idea of establishing an international organization in the framework of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC).

TRADITIONAL AND POTENTIAL AREAS FOR COOPERATION

The problem of improving nuclear security arrangements at nuclear industry facilities has yet to be fully resolved. The Russian companies that have benefited from GP programs include the Machinery Plant (MSZ) in Elektrostal; the Novosibirsky Chemical Concentrates Plant (NZKhK); the Leypunskiy Institute of Energy Physics (FEI) in Obninsk; the Bochvar High Technology Institute for Inorganic Materials Research (OAO VNIINM); the Nuclear Reactor Research Institute (GNTs NIAR) in Dimitrovgrad; the Luch Research Institute (Luch NII-NPO) in Podolsk; the Beloyarskaya NPP; the Siberian Chemical Combine (SKhK); the Mayak plant; the Mining and Chemical Combine (GKhK); and other Russian nuclear industry facilities that were struggling with nuclear security problems. Apart from the United States, a substantial contribution into improving nuclear security at these facilities has been made by Canada (worth 63.1m dollars), Britain (11.54m pounds); and Germany (63.4m euros).

In other words, Russia has received very broad international assistance in addressing the problems facing its nuclear industry. The country is now in a position to deal with any remaining problems on its own, without foreign help. For more details on this, please see an article by **Dmitry Kovchegin** headlined “Nuclear material protection, control and accounting: new circumstances”. But the programs that are still under way must be allowed to run their course, while the new ones should be re-focused on new geographic areas.

Countering nuclear terrorism, as well as threat assessment and modeling, should also become elements of GP projects. In fact, the modalities of such cooperation have already been outlined. The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) is one of the most effective instruments of cooperation in this area. The GICNT now has 85 member states; Russia and the United States will remain the initiative's co-chairs until 2015. Examples of practical cooperation include joint meetings of the GICNT member states' secret services focusing on the prevention of acts of nuclear terrorism (Khabarovsk, 2007); joint workshops; and the Guardian-2012 international demonstration exercise on the prevention of nuclear and radioactive materials smuggling (Moscow and Dimitrov). Other formats of cooperation in this area could also include *joint assessment of cyberthreats to the security of nuclear facilities* and *suppressing the financing of WMD-terrorism and proliferation*.

As far as *chemical weapons destruction* is concerned, broad opportunities for cooperation are opening up in Syria following the country's decision to destroy its chemical stockpiles. Syrian chemical weapons will have to be destroyed in unprecedented circumstances, amid an ongoing civil war. These circumstances make it impossible to build chemical weapons disposal facilities, as is usually the case when countries (including Russia and the United States) eliminate their chemical arsenals. Nevertheless, Russian, U.S. and other countries' expertise and technologies could be used in the destruction of Syrian chemical weapons. In particular, Russia

and the United States have mobile facilities for chemical weapons disposal. These facilities can be used to destroy Syrian chemical weapons even in extreme circumstances, without building stationary plants, especially since the Syrian stockpiles are not very large.

Conducting the final phases of chemical weapons destruction in Syria in the GP framework would be logical and timely. We have heard a similar sentiment being expressed by representatives of several GP participants that have already accumulated valuable experience in providing assistance to chemical weapons destruction projects in Russia and Albania.

Finally, the GP framework could be used to initiate cooperation in *fighting infectious disease*. At first glance, such programs are part of the remit of the World Health Organization. In actual fact, however, cooperation in fighting infections would strengthen international controls over many dangerous pathogens without unnecessarily politicizing the issue. As a result, international efforts against infectious disease would also help to increase the transparency of military biological research.¹²

Cooperation in fighting infectious disease can also help to neutralize biological threats not just in Africa but all around the world. Besides, there are specific areas for Russian-U.S. cooperation in this field; the Americans could help Russia to strengthen its own system of biological controls on the border.

Finally, it is worth emphasizing the importance of *international cooperation on nuclear education*. That potential GP area is the least controversial or politicized; there is also a great and urgent need for it. The best format of such cooperation would be for the leading research centers and universities of both countries to launch a joint Masters program. Such a program would be especially useful if its objectives were to include the training of specialists from third countries that are now developing a nuclear energy industry.¹³

There is also a clear need for joint training of humanities specialists who will be involved in improving the legal framework of export controls and international cooperation mechanisms in the area of nuclear nonproliferation and nuclear security. A wealth of experience and expertise has been accumulated over the past few years; there is a strong intellectual potential to prepare a new generation of specialists in various areas of GP. That potential must be strengthened even further.¹⁴

REALITY AND EXPECTATIONS

All the aforementioned potential areas for Russian-U.S. cooperation in the New Partnership framework and the multilateral Global Partnership initiatives are tightly intertwined. But the same was true in the 2000s of the Nunn-Lugar Program, which was already mature at the time, and the Global Partnership, which was still in its early stages.

In the multi-polar international system that is now emerging, Russia and the United States cannot possibly deal with every single problem solely on a bilateral basis. But they can and should cooperate as recognized leaders in such influential multilateral

anti-proliferation mechanisms as the Global Partnership, the GICNT, and the nuclear security summits.

Every multilateral mechanism has to deal with the problem of coordinating joint efforts. Effective Russian-U.S.

For more analytics on nuclear security, please, visit the section “The Future of the Global Partnership and Russia-U.S. Cooperation in Nuclear Security” of the PIR Center website:
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coordination would certainly improve the effectiveness of the aforementioned international mechanisms.

Right now, we cannot say for certain whether there is actual demand for the potential of the GP. But there is no doubt that such a potential does exist.

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NOTES

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