

Confidential

RUSSIA

The circulation of this report has been strictly limited to the members of the
Trialogue Club International
and of the Centre russe d'études politiques.

This issue is for your personal use only.

Published monthly in Russian and in English
by Trialogue Company Ltd.

Issue № 5 (233), vol.15. 2016

July 22, 2016

Evgeny Buzhinskiy reports from Moscow:

THE FUTURE OF DIALOGUE ON BMD, INF FORCES AND CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE
IN THE LIGHT OF WARSAW NATO SUMMIT RESULTS

SUMMARY

Evgeny Buzhinskiy, Chairman of the PIR Center's Executive Board and former head of the International Treaty Directorate at the Russian Ministry of Defense, believes that the Warsaw NATO Summit has become an important landmark capturing a new military and political reality: Russia has become the main military adversary of the Alliance, more dangerous than international terrorism, and will remain such in the mid and even long term.

In this issue of Russia Confidential, one of the key Russian experts shares his view on a number of thorniest issues of military security and arms control, which were reflected in the final communiqué of the Warsaw Summit. Evgeny Buzhinskiy particularly explains why Russia should toughen its position on the US global missile defense system, why it would be expedient for Moscow to come up with an initiative regarding a new treaty on intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, and assesses the prospects of improvements in the treaty framework and the entire system of European security in the evolving military-political environment.

The North Atlantic Alliance's latest summit that ended in Warsaw on July 9 this year was characterized by some NATO representatives as historical. Indeed, it may be characterized as such, as for the first time since the end of the Cold War the NATO allies clearly voiced their sharply negative attitude towards Russia (the language of the final communiqué of the NATO 2014 Wales Summit was yet less bellicose). Henceforth, NATO perceives Russia as a country that "has... broken the trust at the core of our cooperation, and challenged the fundamental principles of the global and Euro-Atlantic security architecture" (communiqué, paragraph 9).

➤ *Translated from the diplomatic language into the language of practical realities, this wording means that NATO has recognized the emergence of a real enemy that has to be intimidated and deterred, and against whom military capacity should be built up, preferably closer to its borders.*

This process was launched in Wales and concretized in Warsaw through a decision to deploy four battalion-sized battlegroups of the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany and Canada in Poland and the Baltic states, as well as a multinational brigade in Romania; and to reinforce the presence of NATO naval forces in the Black Sea and in the Baltic Sea. I am sure this process will not stop here. A decision to deploy a U.S. armored brigade, most likely in Poland, will follow. And taking into account the decision, already taken, to set up the headquarters of a multinational corps in Poland, the Alliance will continue building up its forces in close vicinity to the Russian borders.

Although no less than 15% of the summit's final document is dedicated to condemning Russia's policy and actions, it repeatedly declares NATO's readiness to maintain a dialogue with our country. Of course, a dialogue itself is a positive thing, but it is not quite clear how it can be combined with a policy of deterrence and intimidation.

Let me share several considerations on a number of military security and arms control issues, which were covered in the communiqué and which, at least in the mid-term, will have a considerable impact on the Russia-NATO relations.

MISSILE DEFENSE: RUSSIA'S POSITION SHOULD BE TOUGHENED

The final communiqué has seven paragraphs dedicated to missile defense. There is hardly any sense in analyzing them, as they contain no new revelations. However, unlike previous documents, this one has the Iranian threat substituted for potential threats coming from the outside of the Euro-Atlantic region and the proliferation of ballistic missiles in general. Again, Russia is offered to discuss missile defense with the Alliance, when it is ready to do so, and which is subject to Alliance agreement.

I believe that in the new geopolitical environment the Russian leaders should take a clearer stance on the US global missile defense system, including its European segment. The situation with Russia's military security has changed. Russia's modest proposals for concluding a legally binding agreement with the United States on non-direction of the European segment of the U.S. global missile defense system against Russia's containment forces, with a number of restrictive provisions regarding the speed of interceptors, the number of antimissiles and their deployment locations, can no longer address all Russian concerns.

The thing is that recently, the U.S. administration, including their President Barack Obama, has voiced more and more often the idea that it would be desirable

to continue strategic offensive reductions. There are several reasons why the United States are so interested in intensifying nuclear arms reduction, and one of these reasons is purely military: their superiority in traditional weapons and precision-guided munitions, which they expect to retain both in the mid and long term. At the same time, they stress that Russia, unfortunately, demonstrates no interest towards further steps to a nuclear-weapons-free world, but, vice versa, more and more relies on nuclear weapons.

I am sure that the accusations against Russia of being unwilling to continue the nuclear arms reduction process will only intensify.

Here it is worth making a short reference to history.

Late in the 1960-s, the United States tightly linked the possibility of signing the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT 1) with signing the ABM Treaty, which was done in 1972. The argumentation of the U.S. administration in support of their position was as follows. No missile defense system can provide a reliable protection from the first nuclear strike with thousands of warheads. A missile defense system is designed to give the attacking party a relative protection from a retaliatory strike, i.e. mitigate damage. Therefore, as the Americans insisted, a missile defense system is a destabilizing factor and an indispensable part of strategic nuclear equilibrium, as it increases the threat of hostilities with the use of strategic nuclear forces.

When ten years ago I drew the attention of Pentagon's senior representatives to those arguments of the United States, I heard almost indignation in response: how can one compare the Cold War times with the current period of strategic partnership? It turns out that such comparison is really possible nowadays.

Although a cold war between Russia and NATO has not broken out yet, the Alliance with its actions and bellicose rhetoric has considerably approached the probability of its outbreak. So I believe it's high time to make Russia's readiness to further reduce strategic offensive arms conditional upon the drafting and conclusion of a new comprehensive ABM treaty, adapted to the existing realities.

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE AND SHORTER-RANGE MISSILES: A POSSIBILITY FOR A NEW APPROACH

In the final communiqué, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty is characterized as crucial to Euro-Atlantic security. And "the Allies therefore continue to call on Russia to preserve the viability of the INF Treaty through ensuring full and verifiable compliance." Two aspects of this passage are of interest.

First, Russia's official position is exactly to preserve the viability of the Treaty, not to destroy it.

Second, on the back of the campaign, recently launched by Washington, of accusing Russia (providing no concrete evidence, but only references to intelligence sources, allegedly not subject to disclosure) of testing a new ground launched cruise missile, which obviously violates the INF Treaty, the summit's final document does *not* call Russia *not* to violate the Treaty.

I think an explanation for this lies on the surface. Russia's previous claims against the United States regarding strict compliance with the letter and spirit

of the Treaty (in particular, against the U.S. use of target missiles imitating intermediate-range missiles, as well as of combat drones) could be opposed by the United States, given that target missiles are not officially prohibited by the Treaty and that no combat drones existed at the time of the Treaty conclusion. However, it's more difficult to dispute the deployment of Mk-41 universal launching systems in Romania and, in the near future, also in Poland, as an obvious violation of the Treaty. The thing is that these systems can launch both sea based and land based cruise missiles. There is little difference between the sea based cruise missile *Tomahawk* and its ground based analogue destroyed in pursuance of the Treaty provisions. To be fair, during the United States congressional hearings a representative of Barack Obama's administration argued that the launching systems to be deployed in Romania were different from Mk-41, however no relevant evidence of that was provided.

Indeed, there is a group of influential policymakers in Russia who from time to time raise the question of expediency of further existence of the INF Treaty, as Russia finds itself in a clearly disadvantageous position compared to a whole range of neighboring countries that, unlike Moscow, have intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles. The United States, by contrast, do not need such missiles in their possession to protect their national territory.

Let us recall that early in the 2000-s Russia and the United States came up with a joint initiative to make the INF Treaty multilateral, calling the countries having intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles to join the Treaty. It was clear from the beginning that the initiative had little chances to succeed. It was difficult to imagine that such countries as China, India, Pakistan, Iran and Israel would abandon the possession of such missiles.

In this connection, it would be expedient for Russia to come up with an initiative regarding a new treaty on intermediate-range and shorter-ranger missiles, since continued reciprocal accusations objectively only discredit the existing Treaty. A new approach to intermediate- and shorter-range missiles could be in drafting and concluding a multilateral treaty based not on the destruction of missiles of this class, but on the limitation of their number, similarly to the U.S.-Russia Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty. As the proposed treaty will be multilateral, the element of discrimination towards both Russia and the United States will disappear, and a considerable contribution will be made to missile non-proliferation.

TREATY FRAMEWORK OF THE EUROPEAN SECURITY SYSTEM IN THE EVOLVING ENVIRONMENT

A large paragraph in the final document of the summit is dedicated to this issue. It contains a ritual accusation of Moscow's non-implementation of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty (although Russia suspended its participation in CFE Treaty in 2005 due to NATO member states' refusal to ratify the 1999 Agreement on Adaptation of it) and, for some unclear reason, of Moscow's selective implementation of the Open Skies Treaty and the Vienna Document. This paragraph of the final communiqué ends with a phrase that the allies "underscore the importance of modernizing the Vienna Document to ensure its continued relevance in the evolving security environment, including through its substantive update in 2016".

It should be noted here that the development of measures for building confidence and security in Europe has a rather long history. The Document of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe (1986) became the first CSCE document in this field. In 1990, the document was named the Vienna Document of the Negotiations on Confidence- and Security

Building Measures. From then onwards, it underwent several adaptations to the evolving security environment, with the most recent one, adopted in 1994 in Budapest, still being effective. Two later revisions of the Vienna Document, of 1999 and of 2011, were just *cosmetic revisions* of the 1994 document.

In 1997-2005, Russia undertook considerable efforts to convince our Western partners that the Vienna Document no longer fitted into the current realities on a whole range of parameters (thresholds for observation and notification of exercises, quotas for visits, inspection team members, and some other). In addition, Russia has repeatedly raised the question of developing confidence- and security-building measures in the naval field, given the role of the naval forces and naval aviation in all most recent armed conflicts, from Yugoslavia to Libya. All Russian initiatives regarding the improvement of confidence- and security-building measures were categorically rejected by the United States and their European allies. The reason behind such position of NATO, in my opinion, is obvious. In the 1990-s and the first half of the 2000-s, Russia was relatively weak in military terms and conducted few exercises. Furthermore, the control mechanisms of the CFE Treaty worked, and they fully satisfied NATO's needs for monitoring the state of Russia's military forces.

Starting from 2010, the situation changed dramatically: the Russian leaders launched a comprehensive military reform and sharply increased the number of operational and military training exercises. In addition, Russia suspended its participation in the CFE Treaty implementation in 2007 due to NATO member states' refusal to ratify the Agreement on Adaptation signed in 1999. As a result, the Alliance suddenly recognized that it lacked mechanisms to monitor the activities of Russia's military forces.

I should frankly say that the current state of affairs objectively satisfies the Russian military. NATO's military activity is monitored by the national technical means (which is largely facilitated by the restoration of the orbital group of satellites and radiotechnical means of the missile approach warning system) with the help of the mechanisms of the Open Skies Treaty and the Vienna Document.

Of course, it does not exclude the possibility of improving the measures of confidence- and security-building in Europe. However, in the existing environment, when Russia transformed from NATO's strategic partner into its main enemy subject to deterrence and intimidation, the modernization of the Vienna Document alone is unlikely to be sufficient for the Russian leaders.

I think that the entire European security system, including its military dimension, should be modernized. Here it may be reasonable to come back to Russia's proposal to draft a comprehensive Treaty on European Security, once put forward by the Russian President Dmitry Medvedev. This document could embrace all security dimensions, including the military one, restore the system of control, which is in fact lost now, over conventional armed forces, and dramatically improve the system of confidence- and security-building measures.

Finally, one may conclude that the Warsaw NATO Summit indeed has become a landmark by capturing a new military and political reality: Russia has become the main military adversary of the Alliance, even more dangerous than international terrorism, and will remain such (consistent with the conditions of return to "business as usual", as laid down in the final communiqué) in the mid and even long term.

The author of this article is Evgeny Buzhinskiy, Chairman of the PIR Center's Executive Board, Lt.Gen (Rtd), 2002-2009 - Head of the International Treaty Directorate, Deputy Head of the Main Directorate for International Military Cooperation of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense

Editor: Julia Fetisova

(c) Trialogue Club International: trialogue@pircenter.org;

(c) Centre russe d'études politiques: crep@pircenter.org

Moscow - Geneva, May 2016

Excerpts from the Membership Terms and Conditions at the Trialogue Club International

[...]

3. The rights of the Club members

3.1. Individual club members are entitled to:

3.1.3. Receive a copy of the Russia Confidential exclusive analytical newsletter by e-mail in chosen language (English or Russian). According to the Club Terms and Conditions, the transfer of the bulletin to third parties is not allowed.

[...]

3.2. Corporate Club members are entitled to:

3.2.3. Receive two copies of the Russia Confidential exclusive analytical newsletter by e-mail in chosen language (English or Russian) or in both languages simultaneously. Share the bulletin with the other representatives of the corporate member. According to the Club Terms and Conditions, the transfer of the bulletin to third parties is not allowed.

[...]

4. The duties of the Club members

4.1. All members of the Club must:

4.1.6. Not to share the Russia Confidential analytical newsletter, as well as the Password to the Club section of the PIR Center web-site with individuals and legal entities who are not members of the Club.

[...]

6. Russia Confidential

6.1. The Russia Confidential exclusive analytical newsletter is issued by the Trialogue Ltd for the Club members' private use only.

6.2. The newsletter contains exclusive analytical materials on international security, foreign and domestic policy of Russia and the CIS, prepared by the leading experts specially for Russia Confidential.

6.3. The newsletter materials are confidential and must not be quoted and transfer to the non-members for at least 30 days since the day of issue.

6.4. 30 days after the day of issue the Trialogue Ltd can remove the exclusive and confidential status of the material, after which in such cases it can be published in other editions and can be used by the Club members for quoting.

6.5. The newsletter is disseminated via e-mail between the Club members once a month in Russian or in English, depending on the choice of the Club member.

6.6. The Club member can also receive a paper copy of the newsletter in chosen language.

Dear members of the Trialogue Club International,

The 2016 Club season continues, and we are glad to **invite you to prolong your membership for 2016 or 2016-2017**, if you have not done so yet.

In 2016, the *Triologue Club* members will continue to receive our exclusive information on the foreign policy priorities of the Russian Federation, and on current threats and challenges to global security. **Five meetings of the *Triologue Club International*** are planned for 2016 (four in Moscow and one abroad); Club members will receive 4 issues of the Security Index quarterly journal in electronic form and 2 issues in print (in 2016 only in Russian), **12 issues of the *Russia Confidential* exclusive analytics bulletin**, our informational and analytical newsletters.

As before, experts of the *Triologue Club International* and of its partner organization PIR Center are open to an exchange of views on key international problems.

Fees for the *Triologue Club* membership since 2016 are as follows:

Period	Individual membership	Corporate membership
01.01.16. – 31.12.16. (1 year)	50 000 rub.	80 000 rub.
01.01.16. – 31.12.17. (2 years)	90 000 rub.	140 000 rub.

We would like to remind you that the corporate membership is based on “**1+1**” **scheme** when **two representatives** of the organization participate in the work of the Club.

On all questions concerning the *Triologue Club International* membership, please contact us by the e-mail secretary@trialogue-club.ru or by phone: +7 (985) 764-98-96.

Sincerely,

**Chairman,
Triologue Club
International**

Dmitry Polikanov