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**The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, PSI, and
Global Partnership against Proliferation:**

Progress and Future Challenges¹

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The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT)

GICNT was jointly announced by the U.S. and Russian presidents on July 15, 2006 at G8 St. Petersburg summit and it is known to be a very effective tool. The GICNT, which now unites 85 countries, will be co-chaired by Russia and the U.S until 2015. The purpose of the GICNT is to develop global capacities to prevent, detect, and respond to nuclear terrorism through multilateral activities via strengthening planning, policies, procedures, and interoperability. To date, partner nations have completed more than 50 activities

On March 21, 2012 the Co-Chairs (Russia and the United States) of the GICNT issued a statement on “the valuable contributions the GICNT has made in strengthening global capacity to prevent, detect, and respond to nuclear terrorism”.

On September 27-28, 2012 Russia hosted international exercise “Guardian 2012” The exercise, which involved security officers from more than 50 countries as well as representatives from the European Commission, IAEA, Interpol, was aimed at sharing experience in preventing the illicit trafficking of nuclear materials and radioactive sources. The exercise demonstrated advanced technologies of the Russian Defense Ministry and State Corporation "Rosatom" in the field of detection of nuclear materials and radioactive substances. It also showed the high level of cooperation between the special units of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (FSB) and the technical units of "Rosatom" in countering threats of nuclear terrorism and dealing with its possible consequences.

On 24 May, 2013 GICNT Plenary Meeting was held in Mexico City, where the strategy for the coming years was presented. It emphasized the necessity to increase practical, topically- and regionally-focused activities including more GICNT workshops, training events, and exercises. Partners were encouraged to keep in mind the global nature of the Initiative and to foster participation and observation of all interested partners. Partners will also continue the development of GICNT documents in the three areas – nuclear detection, nuclear forensics, and response and mitigation.

The next scheduled event in this field is Nuclear Security Summit in the Netherlands in 2014. The next Plenary Meeting will take place in 2015 with Finland as a chairman.

Proliferation Security Initiative

PSI was announced by the US President George Bush in May 2003 and nowadays PSI is endorsed by 102 countries. The initiative was created to strengthen international cooperation in prevention/interdicting of the illicit transfers of WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials. The initiative seeks to develop a broad range of legal, diplomatic, economic, military, and other tools to interdict such transfers via air, land, and sea. Additionally, participating states agree to enact measures to ensure that their national facilities are not utilized to transfer illicit weapon cargoes. Starting from 2011, the *concept of CCP (critical capabilities and practices)* for interdicting WMD is being implemented within the frameworks of PSI aiming at enhancing sharing experiences and cooperation (in terms of methodology, technologies and management) to help the countries which do not have their own capabilities to develop them.

Russia joined the initiative in May 2004. Her membership is based on the following principles: compliance of PSI with international law and national laws of the Member States; non-binding, voluntary decision making; non-creation by PSI obstacles to the legitimate economic and technical scientific cooperation. Russia also considers that PSI should not be directed against any country and that interdiction must be conducting only based on the reliable information about the illegal transport of WMD.

On 27 January – 7 February, 2013, a multilateral PSI exercise ***LEADING EDGE 13*** took place (450 individual participants from 29 nations). The goal of the program was to provide an opportunity for nations to focus on critical elements of the WMD-interdiction process including tactics, techniques, and procedures. On 7 – 14 March, 2013, a multilateral maritime exercise ***SAHARAN EXPRESS 13*** was conducted with 10 ships, 4 aircrafts, and 14 nations. The goals of this exercise were to improve communications, boarding tactical capability and cohesion between regional countries.

On May 28, the PSI's tenth anniversary meeting was held in Warsaw where the decision was made to reinvigorate the dialogue between the participants on the political level (since 2005 the only coordinating body was informal Operational Experts Group (OEG)). The participants called for concrete, specific steps to expand the influence and impact of the PSI by deterring proliferators, promoting legally-binding international treaties to criminalize WMD trafficking, sharing expertise and resources, and outreaching to new state.

In Russia, as well as in India, China and some other participating or non-participating countries, PSI is perceived by many experts as a "US-led" initiative which lacks transparency and acts against specific states, i.e. beyond the framework of international law. For these reasons, Russia has been increasingly skeptical if not reluctant over PSI. At this stage, no decision has been made yet to withdraw from the initiative. Russia participated in the international exercises in 2010 - *Leading Edge 2010* for the last time, and since then abstains from any active participation in the PSI.

The Global Partnership

The Global Partnership is a G8 initiative launched at the June 2002 summit in Kananaskis, Canada. Its initial objectives did not include preventing new countries from acquiring WMD – that task was left to the NPT regime and the IAEA. The GP initiative aimed instead at preventing weapons and materials of mass destruction from falling into the hands of non-state actors, i.e. terrorists. The G8 nations and the donor countries are providing financial assistance to those states which have weapons and/or materials of mass destruction, and which don't have enough resources to ensure secure storage or disposal of these weapons and materials.

The GP currently has 24 participants. The donor countries include the G8 nations (Canada, France, Britain, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia and the United States) plus Australia, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, the EU, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the Philippines, Poland, South Korea, Sweden and Switzerland. Among the recipient countries at this moment: Kazakhstan, Russia (which is, uniquely, both a donor and a recipient state), and Ukraine.

The GP has been in operation for just under 11 years, and over that period a colossal amount of work has been done. According to the latest figures, projects in Russia and the countries of the CIS have accounted for the bulk of the more than 21bn U.S. dollars that has been spent 112 fissile material, putting physical protection arrangements in place, nuclear material control and accounting, destroying stocks of chemical weapons, scrapping nuclear submarines, and refocusing nuclear weapons scientists on a range of other areas of work designed to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and WMD terrorism. At the same time, as Alexandre Gorbachev, director of the French Alternative Energies and Atomic Energy Commission's (CEA) Global Partnership program, pointed out, those taking part in these projects have amassed a significant amount of experience that **can be put to good use in other countries** that have either little or no involvement in the program at present.

In 2011 the G8 countries agreed at the summit in Deauville to extend the program for another 10 years until 2022. The overall funding figure was not announced, but some individual countries undertook financial commitments with regard to GP projects. At the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, President Barack Obama announced a U.S. commitment to make 10bn dollars available for the GP program in 2012-2022. At the second Nuclear Security Summit in Seoul in 2012, Canada said it would provide 367m dollars in 2013-2018.

Since WMD terrorism threats had largely been neutralized in the former Soviet countries, the G8 summit in Deauville decided to shift the focus of Global Partnership from the CIS to other regions such as the South Caucasus, Central and Southeast Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America, as well as China, India, Brazil, and South Africa. The plan is to invite all these regions and countries to become GP members.

Assistance will be provided in the following priority areas: improving nuclear and radiation security; improving bio-security; facilitating the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1540; projects focusing on weapons scientists; addressing issues related to chemical weapons destruction.

Russia supported such a shift in the Global Partnership's target countries and priorities. At the same time, Russia was determined to ensure the completion of projects on its own territory after 2012, especially in such areas as the destruction of chemical weapons and nuclear submarines. At the summit in Deauville, Moscow managed to secure commitments to that effect from the donor countries. On the other hand Russia is already ready to provide assistance in realization of GP projects in the third countries as a donor state. During an informal workshop hosted by PIR Center, a Russian MFA representative said that in 2014, when Russia becomes the rotating president of the G8 and the Global Partnership against the spread of weapons and materials of mass destruction, which is a G8 initiative, The Russian leadership plans to provide financial assistance to resolving nuclear problems in third countries, including efforts to strengthen export controls and prevent nuclear technology leaks. The Russian Foreign Ministry is not prepared to specify at this point which particular nuclear projects will be implemented, or in which countries; the issue is still being discussed with the Rosatom state corporation.ⁱ

The future of the GP is, however, far from certain. At the G8 summit in Northern Ireland on 17-18 June 2013, the main problems on the agenda were the civil war in Syria, the development of trade, the international exchange of information on taxation, and transparency in public administration. The summit paid far less attention to problems associated with ensuring nuclear security and the nonproliferation of WMD. As a result, the final documents from the meeting make no mention of any further action to develop the Global Partnership. The only reference to this issue came in the extremely modest point 91 of the communiqué adopted by the G8 leaders, which consisted of a routine sentence stating that preventing the proliferation of WMD is a top priority breakthrough on these issues never materialized. Members of the GP need to establish clear directions for the program's future development.

Officially, there is no general, accepted document in which GP participants have set out either a specific timeframe for future cooperation, or the specific levels of funding assigned to the program. In the meantime, countries such as the United States and Canada have already said they intend to continue funding the GP. As things stand, GP participants have made a commitment to see projects in Russia and in the post-Soviet space through to the end in the next few years. Irrespective of this, however, those

countries that are actively and effectively advocating the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the materials required for their manufacture are clear in their understanding that, given its global nature, modern terrorism must be fought right around the world. In this respect, it can be said that the GP is not only engaged in a constant search for new donors to contribute to the program, but is also examining the prospects for a further investment of effort and funding in other parts of the world that have not attracted the required attention.

PIR Study & Recommendations

The GP will continue to be an active mechanism, and one with international influence. Its already accumulated experience is invaluable. However, it will require a transformation to keep up with the current needs and current and future challenges.

PIR Center's Study "**The Prospects for International Cooperation in WMD Nonproliferation and Nuclear Security**" (published in September 2013) addresses the issue of its potential transformation and proposes the following recommendations regarding the future development of the Global Partnership in the context of preparations for the Russia-chaired G8 Summit in Sochi in June 2014.

Among the conclusions:

- **Russia and US should be leaders of GP** as countries with the largest nuclear programs. Therefore bilateral US-Russian cooperation in WMD nonproliferation and nuclear security should correlate with the development of the GP projects.
- Primary **target regions** for the next five to ten years should be Middle East; Central Asia; & South-East Asia. Experiences could be used in the future to be applied to cooperative projects and efforts in Iran, Pakistan, and, at a certain point, in DPRK.
- Cooperation on **bio-security** will only become possible once Russia joins the Australia Group, which will enable this problem to be addressed via other multilateral formats, such as the Global Partnership. Bio-security threats require global solutions, and the Global Partnership is promising multilateral international mechanism. As a first step towards cooperation on bio-security, the parties must develop a common set of principles in this area. To that end it would make sense to establish an international working group of experts,

which would not only formulate these principles, but also develop a commonly accepted list of biological threats.

- In parallel with measures against bio-threats, the parties should pursue international cooperation in **fighting infections**. This area of cooperation can be relatively free of political and economic differences related to military bio-security. Cooperation in fighting infections will make it possible to strengthen international monitoring and controls over dangerous weapons-usable pathogens. As a result, cooperation in fighting infections, which seemingly has little to do with nonproliferation or politics, could make a tangible contribution to reducing the risks of biological weapons proliferation.
- It is a matter of extreme importance that the cooperating parties should have a **tangible interest** in the areas of cooperation being pursued. Determining such areas of tangible interest is not an easy task. That is why there seems to be a clear need for a new mechanism of coordinating interests, analyzing the problems, and determining possible areas of cooperation. That mechanism could be set up in the form of another specialized working group within the Global Partnership program. The workgroup should be tasked with conducting a detailed analysis of the proposals outlined in this Study, and presenting these proposals to the relevant governments in a more polished and detailed form.
- **Local projects** should aim to make the best possible use of local specialists and local technologists. This recommendation is linked to the previous one concerning nuclear education. The point of training nuclear specialists from third countries is to give these countries the capability to address their nuclear problems using their own specialists and resources.

Middle East

Future projects will most likely take place in the Middle East. Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Iraq, and Libya have already participated in GP projects, and cooperation is expected to continue. The GP could also monitor nuclear activity and implement initiatives in Turkey, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Morocco.

Iran and Syria represent special cases. In Syria, the continuing civil war prevents cooperative international GP-style approaches at this stage. However, the most recent developments with CW destruction process provide a new and unique opportunity.

As far as Iran is concerned, likelihood of developing a cooperative relationship with it in the context of GP is only hypothetical today. Iranian nuclear program has been addressed through a different mechanism. But, if the talks prove to be successful and lead to a stable improvement of relations between Iran and the West, the trust in relations will be built and, consequently, chances for a GP-type programs will appear.

The instability some of the Middle Eastern countries are experiencing combined with the clear threat of terrorist attacks indicates that there is a strong possibility that WMD will be used in the region. Recent history has demonstrated that the threshold beyond which WMD are used in the region is relatively low. As a consequence, there is a high probability that, should such weapons fall into the hands of radical, non-governmental groups, they may be used against supporters of government forces and against the wider civilian population.

To sum up, there are both **promising areas** for the development of the Global Partnership program in the Middle East, but also clear **obstacles**.

Over the last 10 years, a certain amount of experience has been accumulated by implementing GP projects in the region, in areas such as the retraining of scientists specializing in nuclear, chemical and biological weapons; developing the professional skills of staff working for export and border control services and supplying these services with new equipment; and providing technical assistance in order to strengthen nuclear security. At the same time, the majority of measures planned under the GP program have yet to be implemented. To a considerable extent, this stems from the shortage of public funds available to the program's donors (the United States, the EU, Japan). Up to 2013, the majority of projects were financed by diverting the balance of funds remaining from other projects, as Russia and the post-Soviet space were the key areas for the GP. Given the burgeoning threat of WMD proliferation in the region, as well as the fact that many projects in Russia and the CIS are nearing completion, the refocusing of the GP towards the Middle East would seem to be the best direction for the program, although exactly how to approach these

questions is still undecided. At a meeting of the working group on international cooperation on WMD nonproliferation and nuclear security, which took place at PIR Center on June 19, 2013 following the G8 summit, it was noted that since the GP's participating countries involved in the summit confined themselves to general statements, the issue of specific international cooperation projects on matters of nuclear security and WMD nonproliferation as part of the GP remains open.

Central and South Asia

After US/NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan in a year from now, the risks of using this country as a transit point for WMD-related materials will increase, unless energetic measures are taken to improve border guards forces both with equipment and with training. This certainly should be a new mission for GP in the coming years.

The same is true about Afghanistan's Central Asia neighbors such as Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan as well as such states in Afghanistan's proximity as Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan.

Providing better nuclear security also means better transparency. Russia itself is a good example of the positive impact of Global Partnership in terms of greater transparency of its nuclear program and other potentially WMD-related programs. As a condition of receiving assistance under GP and the related Nunn-Lugar program of disposal of nuclear submarines, obsolete ICBMs and fissile materials, Russia gave foreign inspectors access to military facilities which used to be strictly off-limits. Such inspections have increased the transparency of the Russian nuclear arsenal and given foreign countries greater confidence that Russia is not reneging on its disarmament commitments or trying to increase its weapons stockpiles. It can be expected that inspection visits by representatives of the donor countries to military facilities of the new recipient countries the GP program hopes to engage will have a similar benign effect on the transparency of their nuclear programs. That is especially true of the countries that are not covered by other international nonproliferation mechanisms.

For example, **Pakistan** is not a member of the NPT , but discussions are now under way about the country joining the Global Partnership. In such a situation GP could be

the only international mechanism that can help to increase the transparency of the Pakistani nuclear program and alleviate concerns by the international community regarding the danger of Pakistani nuclear weapons and materials falling into the hands of terrorists.

South East Asia

The countries of Southeast Asia have the following problems in the nuclear domain which should be addressed by the GP:

- Lack of experience in the development of nuclear energy and determination to develop it (to build 16 nuclear energy reactors over the next two decades)
- Necessity to better physical protection of the already existent nuclear and other facilities (Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand have different type of reactors)
- Low effectiveness of national export control systems
- The threat of terrorism (in addition to *Al-Qaeda*, the region also has such Islamist terrorist organizations like *Jamaat Islamiyya* and *Abu Sayya*)
- The support systems of Southeast Asia's nuclear facilities must be able to function in emergency situations.

Thus, the objectives of international nuclear cooperation in Southeast Asia are as follows:

1. to assist in the improvement of export-control systems;
2. to improve security in the area of research reactors and radioactive sources and, most importantly, to ensure the appropriate level of nuclear security at the nuclear power reactors;
3. to prevent environmental and proliferation threats associated with spent nuclear fuel;
4. to educate the specialists working in the nuclear industry.

Russia has already been active in providing assistance to states of the region in nuclear area. In **Vietnam**, Russia got 2 contracts to build two reactors in Vietnam. There are currently 314 foreign students, including 168 from Vietnam, being trained in Russia as part of Rosatom's educational programs. The U.S.-aided removal to

Russia of highly enriched uranium (HEU, 36%) from a Vietnamese research reactor and conversion of the reactor to low-enriched uranium (LEU) one was completed in July 2013. In **Indonesia**, in March 2013, Rosatom Overseas organized a technical workshop entitled *Russia's experience in the peaceful use of nuclear energy: technology, security, financing, personnel*. The participants discussed the trends in nuclear energy markets post-Fukushima, and, separately, considered the following key elements of Rosatom's comprehensive offering: training, attracting financing, local manufacturing content in the construction of nuclear power plants, the establishment of a regulatory framework in the field of nuclear energy, etc. In **Myanmar**, the construction of a research reactor is on hold now, although the agreements to build it was signed back in 2007. However, cooperation in the area of nuclear education goes on: since 2001, the National Nuclear Research University (MEPhI), the leading Russian institution of higher education, trains in average 100 students from Myanmar for the Nuclear Research Center still to be built in Myanmar. Roughly half of these specialists trained in specialties related to the use of nuclear technology and related professions.

Russia will be working on improvement of export control and border control systems in the region - collaboration on the installation of the Yantar detectors on the borders and at customs facilities (it was already done in Albania, Armenia, Egypt, Jordan, Qatar, Serbia, Uzbekistan, Ukraine, South Africa, as well as in Vietnam). This possibility of international cooperation in this field could be discussed with the United States, which is already carrying out extensive efforts to improve the export control system in Southeast Asia, implementing U.S. *Megaports initiative*, which seeks to improve customs and border controls in many ports of Indonesia and the Philippines.

Taking into account that both Russia and R.O.C. are current and active GP members, and both have an increasing interest – and presence in South-East Asia, it might be worth exploring the opportunities for a joint Russian-South Korean project within the Global Partnership in South-East Asia.

Nuclear nonproliferation education: a new potential direction of the Global Partnership

Where possible, local technology and the services of local experts should be used on the nuclear energy related projects. Those countries receiving aid for projects to improve the systems of the first and second lines of defense should be involved in their financing as well to ensure an equal partnership and to avoid the problems of unequal relationships between aid and donors. In this light it is utmost important to further develop the cooperation in education and training of the specialists, the area where Russia already has fruitful experience.

During the development of the GP projects an emphasis should be made on **nuclear education**. In providing nuclear security, the human factor is even more important than advanced protection systems or radiation detectors. That is why to address the nuclear challenges facing the Middle Eastern, Central Asian or Southeast Asian countries, it is necessary to train export control and physical protection specialists for these countries. Nuclear education is one of the foremost requirements for the GP successful future.

And it should not be for nuclear engineers, or MPC&A specialists, or border guards practitioners only. The main emphasis should be made on educating a young generation – diplomats, the military officers, among others. For this purpose, a new MA international Program on WMD Nonproliferation & Global Security should be developed. United States and Russia should take the lead in its implementation in their respective leading universities, open for MA students from all over the world, with the emphasis on the nations-newcomers to nuclear energy, from various regions of the world.

All G8 nations as well as other non-G8 GP members would be invited to join as well to contribute to the establishment of such an MA Program, both financially – supporting the education the brightest MA students from developing countries - and in-kind –through sending their own students to the program.

As the preparations for establishment of such an MA Program, through G8 GP, advance, R.O.C. is invited in exploring its own opportunities and interests vis-à-vis

this important initiative going in line with the UN GA resolution supporting nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament education and training in the world.
