

SECURITY INDEX


Occasional Paper Series **№ 5 | 2019**

PIR CENTER | TRIALOGUE

Oleg Shakirov

The Future of the Vienna Document

Prospects for the Further Development
of Confidence- and Security-Building
Measures in Europe





The relations between Russia and the West are steadily deteriorating. The Vienna Document adopted in 2011 within the framework of the OSCE still remains a significant link between the parties. It contains specific procedures for interaction between the military of the participating States, which allow an acceptable level of mutual trust and control to be maintained. The author of the report, Oleg Shakirov, not only analyses the discussions surrounding the updating of the Vienna Document, describing the fundamental difference in the approaches of Russia and Western countries, but also proposes practical steps aimed at creating conditions for its modernization. Specific recommendations on strengthening confidence-building measures, which are outlined in the document, take into account Russia's national interests and the commitment of all interested OSCE participants to regional security, and can be used in the negotiations on updating the Vienna Document.



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Highlights

■ **THE VIENNA DOCUMENT 2011 (VD 2011) IS ONE OF THE FEW EXISTING MECHANISMS OF CO-OPERATION IN THE POLITICO-MILITARY SPHERE IN EUROPE.** The confidence- and security-building measures (CSBMs) agreed in the document facilitate the dialogue among the participating States and represent a genuinely operational format for professional interaction between the military.

■ **RUSSIA AND WESTERN COUNTRIES HAVE DIFFERENT VIEWS ON VD 2011 MODERNIZATION.** Russia proceeds from the need for a comprehensive solution to security problems in Europe, which should include the normalization of relations with NATO in the politico-military sphere and the launch of negotiations on conventional arms control. In this context, separate modernization of VD 2011 is inappropriate. According to NATO's position, VD modernization is possible without linking it to pan-European security issues. NATO needs modernization to make more transparent the military activity of Russia, whose actions "represent a fundamental challenge to the Alliance."

■ **THE POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT IS NOT CONDUCTIVE TO THE MODERNIZATION OF THE DOCUMENT.** Future normalization of the situation in Europe is likely to include another update of the list of confidence- and security-building measures. This requires elaboration of approaches to their development based on the tasks of ensuring Russia's national security and understanding the opportunities and limitations of the negotiation process.

■ **FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF THE VIENNA DOCUMENT SHOULD TAKE INTO ACCOUNT RUSSIA'S SECURITY INTERESTS.** Russia is able to make specific proposals to this end. (a) To ensure the provision of information on rotational forces in the territory of participating States. (b) To propose the inclusion in the list of CSBMs of measures relating to naval forces, including provisions on information exchange and visits to naval bases. (c) To agree on the format of inspections of the U.S. missile defence bases in Europe as a basic transparency mechanism.

■ **RUSSIA CAN ADDRESS SOME OF THE WESTERN CONCERNS ABOUT ITS MILITARY ACTIVITIES WITHOUT MODERNIZING THE VIENNA DOCUMENT.** To this end, it can increase the transparency of the conduct of unannounced combat readiness checks and perform major exercises with full observation in accordance with the Vienna Document 2011.

■ **RUSSIA MAY INITIATE A DISCUSSION ON THE POSSIBLE ADAPTATION OF THE VIENNA DOCUMENT TO TECHNOLOGY CHALLENGES.** (a) Invite participating States to establish a new format for discussion – a workshop on military technologies and technology-related aspects of CSBMs. (b) Regulate the use of additional mobile and GPS equipment during inspections and evaluation visits. (c) Initiate discussion on the possibility of using UAVs as an alternative to manned aerial surveys when observing exercises.

Discussion on the need to modernize the Vienna Document

IN RECENT YEARS, Western countries have stepped up calls to modernize the Vienna Document 2011 on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures. This was preceded by more than two decades of negotiations on the instrument within the framework of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), during which the interests of various parties in the development of CSBMs were changing.

Initial confidence-building measures were agreed in the Helsinki Final Act of 1975. Eleven years later, the Stockholm Document containing an expanded set of confidence- and security-building measures was adopted. In 1990, consultations held in parallel with negotiations on conventional forces in Europe led to the adoption of the Vienna Document, which combined the measures of the 1986 Stockholm Document with the new CSBMs.


In the 1990s, the VD was regularly updated and reissued in 1992, 1994 and 1999. Russia took an active part in the development of CSBMs. This activity peaked in the run-up to the 1999 OSCE Istanbul Summit, during which negotiations were under way to modernize the 1994 document, and proposals were made by Russia, inter alia, for the inclusion of naval CSBMs in the document.

Negotiations on the Vienna Document were not a priority for Western participating States in the 2000s and in fact reached an impasse. The document was not reissued for a decade. The relatively stable situation in Europe also contributed to the shift in attention from CSBMs.

Following Russia's suspension of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty in 2007, the situation around it turned out to be linked to the VD negotiations. According to Pierre von Arx, "Some participating States were no longer willing to negotiate proposals related to the VD due to the unilateral suspension of CFE Treaty implementation by the Russian Federation, while the Russian Federation relaunched a number of proposals linked to provisions of the adapted CFE Treaty!"


Consultations on the CFE Treaty did not resolve the crisis of the conventional arms control in Europe regime (CACE), and the Western position began to move towards strengthening the Vienna Document. According to Steven Pifer, certain CFE Treaty controls could be included in the VD².

The process of VD modernization received an impetus in 2010 after the adoption of the first decision in the format of the Vienna Document Plus (VD Plus)³ at the initiative of Russia. From a substantive point of view, this decision was of a procedural nature, but it shifted the negotiation process from the dead point⁴. The idea of updating CSBMs was supported by the leaders of the OSCE participating States in the Astana Declaration. This made it possible to reissue the Vienna Document in 2011. It included changes agreed upon at that time, including a mechanism to allow for regular updating of the document through VD Plus decisions, as well as the possibility of holding special



A team from Russia and Belarus is briefed during an inspection to the United Kingdom, April 2018

Source: Ministry of Defence of the United Kingdom



meetings of the Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC) every five years or more frequently to reissue the document. In 2012-2013, four VD Plus decisions were adopted, including two at the initiative of Russia: on prior notification of major military activities held below the threshold levels (2012) and on the duration of visits to air bases (2013).

Against the backdrop of deteriorating European security situation, the gradual updating of the Vienna Document stopped. In 2014, the VD 2011 measures were extensively used in the context of the Ukrainian crisis. In accordance with an OSCE fact sheet⁵, as of the end of October 2014, 27 states conducted 19 verification activities

in Ukraine; 11 states (including Ukraine) conducted 5 verification activities in Russia. The procedure for consultations and co-operation as regards unusual military activities (paragraph 16 of Chapter III) was also applied, with the requests addressed to Russia and Ukraine.

At the same time, attempts by Ukraine to use the VD 2011 measures in the territories not controlled by the government proved ineffective. In early March 2014, prior to the referendum on the status of Crimea, a group of military representatives of OSCE participating States, including an official of the OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre, visited Ukraine at the invitation of Kiev (in accordance with Chapter III, paragraph 18, of VD 2011, which was applied for the first time). The group made several attempts to enter Crimea but was prevented from entering the peninsula by unidentified armed men⁶.

According to Johan Engvall, the application of the Vienna document in Ukraine in 2014 (and in Georgia in 2008) shows that “it is essentially a fair-weather conflict- and security-building tool; built on trust rather than suspicion or control, it is too weak a tool in a severe crisis situation?” The idea of increasing the effectiveness of CSBMs as a crisis response tool took a prominent place in the discussion on the VD modernization.

Another common justification for the need to update the document today is the growing tension between NATO and Russia. As a result of the Alliance’s increased military activity, the number of encounters between NATO and Russian ships and aircrafts in the Baltic and Black Sea regions has increased since 2014. The West started promoting VD 2011 as an additional tool to prevent incidents whose risk had increased, along with bilateral agreements on incident prevention and agreements on the prevention of dangerous military activities. It was proposed, inter alia, to elaborate and strengthen paragraph 17 of the VD-2011 on co-operation with respect to hazardous incidents of a military nature.

In the Warsaw Summit Communiqué issued in July 2016, the leaders of the Alliance members underscored “the importance of modernising

CONTEXT: THE VIENNA DOCUMENT

The Vienna Document 2011 on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures is a politically binding instrument adopted by 57 OSCE participating States. The zone of application for VD 2011 covers “the whole of Europe, as well as the adjoining sea area and air space” (for Russia - the European part of the country up to the Urals), as well as Central Asian states.

In accordance with VD 2011, the participating States exchange annually information on their military forces concerning the military organisation, manpower and major weapon and equipment systems (Chapter I) and information concerning their defence planning (Chapter II). Chapter III defines the procedure for consultations and co-operation with respect to unusual military activities, as well as co-operation measures with respect to hazardous incidents of a military nature; it also provides for voluntary hosting of visits to dispel concerns about military activities. Participating States arrange visits to air bases (at least once in a five-year period) and may promote and facilitate contacts and co-operation between the members of the armed forces on a voluntary basis (Chapter IV).


Chapter V stipulates that the participating States will give notification to all other participating States 42 days or more in advance of the start of certain military activities (including those where forces of other participating States are participants). Notification shall be necessary, if military activity is at or above the defined levels. Military activity with the engagement of land forces will be subject to notification whenever it involves at least 9,000 troops, 250 battle tanks, 500 armoured combat vehicles (ACVs), or 250 artillery pieces. It is stipulated that notification of military activities above the agreed thresholds carried out without advance notice to the troops involved will be given at the time the troops involved commence such activities.

Participating States carrying out military activities involving at least 13,000 troops, 300 battle tanks, 500 ACVs or 250 artillery pieces, and, in the case of an amphibious landing, heliborne landing or parachute assault – 3,500 troops, will invite observers from other participating States. If such military activities are carried out without advance notice to the troops involved and have a duration of less than 72 hours, participating States shall not be obliged to invite observers (Chapter VI).

In accordance with Chapter VII, participating States will exchange with each other annual calendars of their military activities subject to prior notification. Chapter VIII imposes restrictions on certain types of military activity in terms of their quantity and levels.

Chapter IX is dedicated to compliance and verification of confidence- and security-building measures. In accordance with it, each participating State has the right to conduct inspections in the territory of any other participating State. Each participating State will be obliged to accept at least three inspections per year. Participating States will be obliged to accept from one to fifteen (depending on the number of units in the military forces) visits to evaluate the information provided in accordance with Chapter I.

In Chapter X, the participating States are encouraged to undertake measures complementing those stipulated by VD 2011, at the regional level. Chapter XI provides for holding annual meetings to evaluate the implementation of VD 2011. The final Chapter XII sets the procedure for updating the document and stipulates the use of the OSCE Communications Network (a special computer communication network) for the transmission of messages between the participating States in addition to diplomatic channels. ■



International observers
at NATO's Trident
Juncture 2018 military
exercise in Norway,
October 2018

Source: NATO

the Vienna Document [...] including through its substantive update in 2016⁸.” Prior to the start of the special FSC meeting in November 2016, at which the document was planned to be reissued in accordance with the procedure stipulated by the version revised in 2011, Western participating States were promoting specific proposals for its modernization. The general idea was that the document needed to be strengthened as an instrument for increasing predictability during the period of growing political-military confrontation.


Special FSC meeting was held on 9 November 2016, but the decision to reissue the Vienna Document was not adopted by consensus. Russia called on the Forum “to concentrate on the implementation of the Vienna Document 2011 and the subsequent Vienna Document Plus decisions [...] and on the creation of the necessary conditions for resuming constructive discussions on strengthening the politico-military foundations of European security⁹.”


Western countries continued their efforts aimed at modernizing VD 2011. At the OSCE Ministerial Council in December 2018 a draft decision was proposed, which, according to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland Mr. Jacek Czaputowicz, “included the vital reference to the modernization of the Vienna Document¹⁰,” and was viewed by Assistant Secretary of State A. Wess Mitchell as an initial step “to update the OSCE Vienna Document¹¹.” Russia’s opinion of VD 2011 modernization being ill-timed remained unchanged¹².

Despite differing views of the participating States on the modernization of CSBMs, the Vienna Document 2011 continues to be successfully implemented. It may be in a better position than other

conventional arms control agreements in Europe. Inspection activities under the VD 2011 were not interrupted for a year, as was the case in 2018 with the Treaty on Open Skies¹³. None of the participants to the document suspended its implementation, unlike what happened with the CFE Treaty after its adaptation failed. The participating States have recently been demonstrating their commitment to the Vienna Document 2011. In its public communication, NATO emphasizes the implementation of CSBMs by the Alliance members¹⁴, while Russia has underscored its interest in maintaining the Vienna Document out of public view – in its proposal to the United States at the Russia-U.S. summit in Helsinki in July 2018¹⁵. The resilience of the Vienna Document 2011 in the changing politico-military situation, the predictability in its implementation and the continued support of participating States will be important conditions for the further evolution of the document. ■

SINCE 1975, CONFIDENCE- AND SECURITY-BUILDING MEASURES IN EUROPE WERE EVOLVING STEADILY, HAVING TRANSFORMED INTO THE VIENNA DOCUMENT BY 1990. ITS MOST RECENT SIGNIFICANT CHANGES GO BACK TO 2011. EVEN THE UKRAINIAN CRISIS HAS NOT IMPEDED THE PRESERVATION OF THE DOCUMENT. IT CONTAINS WORKING PROCEDURES FOR INFORMATION EXCHANGE AND INTERACTION BETWEEN THE ARMED FORCES OF OSCE COUNTRIES, INCLUDING RUSSIA AND NATO STATES.





Different approaches to the modernization of the Vienna Document and possible ways of its evolution

RUSSIA AND WESTERN COUNTRIES HAVE DIFFERENT VIEWS on VD 2011 modernization. Russia proceeds from the need for a comprehensive solution to security problems in Europe, which should include NATO's abandonment of its policy of politico-military deterrence and normalization of relations with Russia, as well as modernization of the CACE. In this context, separate modernization of VD 2011 is inappropriate, since it is not capable of solving fundamental problems by itself. Amid the worsening situation in the field of European security, the reissue of the VD 2011 would send the wrong political signal that co-operation between Russia and the West continues.

Supporters of the VD 2011 immediate modernization believe that the relevance of materially updating the document has increased precisely because of the growing confrontation between Russia and the West. The Vienna Document is seen as a tool that could address a wider range of tasks than the current version. It could perform part of the functions of the dormant CFE Treaty, in which Russia's participation has been completely suspended, and of co-operation within the framework of the NATO-Russia Council that was frozen by the West.

According to NATO's position, the VD modernization is necessary to make more transparent the military activities of Russia, whose actions "fundamentally challenge the Alliance¹⁶." Due to these reasons, the modernization of the VD 2011, according to its supporters, has value in and of itself and is perceived as a mechanism for limiting damage in a more confrontational environment as compared to previous years.

Comparing different approaches to the VD modernization, it is necessary to take into account the history of the European security system development. Two circumstances may be noted in this regard. Firstly, the CSBMs were most actively developing during the period of co-operation rather than confrontation between the participants of the pan-European process. Initial CSBMs were agreed in the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, and subsequently reviewed in the Stockholm Document of 1986. However, their most active development took place from the late 1980s to the 1990s. Secondly, the VD was evolving not separately, but rather in combination with the conventional arms control regime and other agreements related to European security.

In view of these circumstances, the opinion that favourable conditions and discussion of the entire range of problems in the politico-military sphere are necessary for the modernization of the VD 2011 seems justified. This does not necessarily mean that all these topics should be linked up, and the Russian and Western approaches should be mutually exclusive. The strategy of negotiations on the VD 2011 modernization should be flexible and use the opportunities for dialogue and co-operation in this area to contribute to the formation of more favorable conditions for reaching an understanding on a wider range of European security issues.


The Structured Dialogue on current and future challenges and threats to security in the OSCE area can be considered an attempt to reconcile the different approaches of Russia and the West. It was launched at the end of 2016 in accordance with the joint ministerial declaration of the OSCE participating States “From Lisbon to Hamburg: Declaration on the Twentieth Anniversary of the OSCE Framework for Arms Control”. At the moment, the Structured Dialogue is an open-ended and informal process, in which comprehensive discussion of politico-military issues is possible. The Informal Working Group on Structured Dialogue and related events brings together diplomatic and military representatives of all key States of the OSCE region, including Russia (the level of representatives remains uneven).

Taking into account the current state of the discussion on the VD 2011 modernization, as well as different approaches of Russia and the West, the most probable way of the VD 2011 evolution is coupled with the resolution of other European security issues. This process is likely to assume a protracted nature. The alternative – a separate modernization of the VD 2011 – may be blocked by Russia, and therefore is unrealistic. It is also possible that the VD 2011 will follow a negative scenario of degradation, under which the document will be losing its relevance as the military activities in Europe that do not formally violate the provisions of the VD 2011 build up.


SEPARATE MODERNIZATION OF THE VIENNA DOCUMENT IS NOT CAPABLE OF SOLVING THE FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES OF EUROPEAN SECURITY. RUSSIA INSISTS THAT THE DOCUMENT BE UPDATED IN A COMPREHENSIVE MANNER, BEING LINKED TO CONVENTIONAL ARMS CONTROL ISSUES AND THE NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS WITH NATO.

Such degradation of the VD 2011 would not be in Russia’s interests: in the conditions of the crisis of the conventional arms control regime and NATO’s deterrence policy, a set of confidence- and security-building measures makes it possible to ensure transparency of the Alliance’s actions and has a deterring effect. In the future, when the relations with Europe will be normalized, Russia will be able to use the Vienna Document 2011 as a tool to address concerns of the border states about possible threats in the region of common neighborhood.

In addition to these subjective factors (i.e. the positions of different parties), the future of the VD is also associated with objective changes in the nature of warfare in modern conditions, which will increasingly require bringing CSBMs in line with the new realities. ■



Moving forward: using the Structured Dialogue and symbolic steps



ACCORDING TO THE OFFICIAL RUSSIAN POSITION¹⁷, the prospects for VD 2011 modernization are linked to changes in NATO's policy towards Russia, the prospects for the CACE and the overall state of European security. Other OSCE participating States continue to discuss the modernization of the VD 2011, making specific proposals. In this context, it would be advisable for Russia to participate in the discussion on the modernization of CSBMs in a manner that does not contradict the principled stance on linking the CSBMs to a wider range of European security issues. This can be achieved through the Structured Dialogue.

In accordance with the Declaration on the Twentieth Anniversary of the OSCE Framework for Arms Control, the participating States note “the interrelation between CSBMs and conventional arms control, and the wider politico-military context¹⁸.” Thus, the Structured Dialogue has a broad scope in terms of topics, and the discussion of CSBMs within the framework of this process will emphasize the link between the VD 2011 modernization and the changes in the overall European security situation. Proposing ideas on CSBMs as part of the Informal Working Group on Structured Dialogue (rather than the official OSCE working bodies) will allow Russia to ensure the flexibility of the negotiation strategy on this issue. Discussion of the Vienna Document's future could go hand in hand with the threat assessment and the process of comparative analysis (“mapping”) of military capabilities in Europe launched in late 2017, which would also identify objective gaps in the existing CSBMs. Such an approach would demonstrate Russia's interest in the long-term CSBMs development, and at the same time emphasize the need for a comprehensive update of agreements in the politico-military sphere, rather than a separate modernization of the VD 2011.

Russia could specify what exactly, from Russia's point of view, constitutes the upgrade of the VD 2011. For instance, it could define modernization as reissuance of the document with material changes. Certain spot changes to the VD 2011 – the adoption of mutually acceptable VD Plus decisions – can be taken out of the modernization framework. Such decisions can be made both to clarify technical issues and as symbolic gestures that send a signal of interest in future VD development.

Symbolic gestures may include the steps not related to VD 2011 modernization, but rather concerning military activities in general. Russia could take into account Western concerns about unannounced combat readiness checks and exercises with troop numbers close to the threshold, but without grounds for observation.



In both cases, Russian military activities are carried out in accordance with the formal commitments under the VD 2011. In accordance with the paragraph 41 of the document, if military activities are carried out without advance notice to the troops, notification to the participating States will be given not in advance, but rather at the time the exercise commences. According to Western representatives, a large number of unannounced checks contradict the spirit, if not the letter of the VD 2011¹⁹. In this regard, Russia could consider conducting such exercises in a more transparent manner.


As far as the exercises below the threshold of 13,000 troops are concerned²⁰, in the West, NATO officials are promoting the point that Russia is purposefully conducting military activities at a level slightly below the threshold to avoid observation, and has not conducted a single exercise above the threshold since 1991²¹. In this case, a symbolic gesture could be the demonstration of a fully observed exercise in accordance with the VD 2011. Such symbolic steps could be taken without modernizing the VD, ideally in parallel with reciprocal steps from the other side²².

A round of the Structured Dialogue on current and future security challenges in the OSCE region, June 2017

Source: OSCE

NATO'S CONCERNS ARE CAUSED BY UNANNOUNCED CHECKS OF COMBAT READINESS OF THE RUSSIAN ARMED FORCES AND MAJOR EXERCISES THAT DO NOT REACH A LEVEL AT WHICH THE WESTERN MILITARY EXPERTS COULD OBSERVE THEM. RUSSIA CAN ADDRESS PART OF THESE ISSUES WITHOUT MODERNIZING THE VIENNA DOCUMENT. RECIPROCAL STEPS TAKEN BY THE WEST COULD HELP TO RESTORE TRUST.

The possible areas of VD 2011 development analyzed below are given in view of the fact that it is expedient to consider the issues of CACE and CSBMs in a comprehensive manner. ■



Overview of the main proposals for the modernization of the VD 2011

OVER THE PAST FEW YEARS, and in particular in the run-up to the special FSC meeting on the reissuance of the Vienna Document in 2016, participating States have put forward a significant number of proposals for modernizing the document in different parts:

■ France's proposal to lower the thresholds for prior notification of certain military activities, co-sponsored by all EU member states; proposals to lower the thresholds for observation; and proposals to expand the range of military activities subject to prior notification;

■ numerous proposals from various participating States (EU member states, in particular Poland and Ukraine) on risk reduction (Chapter III), aimed at strengthening the capacity of the VD 2011 to prevent incidents and increase the efficiency of the document as a crisis response tool; proposals for additional inspection voiced by the United States and Russia; and a proposal by Germany on the possible use of independent fact-finding missions;

■ proposals to strengthen inspection activities, to create new opportunities for verification activities and to change the composition of inspection teams; proposals to increase annual passive inspection and evaluation quotas;

■ proposals to change the parameters of the annual exchange of military information (Chapter I), the German proposals to hold mandatory briefings at FSC meetings by the participating State deploying new types of major weapon and military equipment systems, and the establishment of a centralized OSCE database on the major weapon and equipment systems of the participating States.

Russia could adopt a diversified approach to these and other proposals for the VD 2011 modernization. A fundamental distinction should be made between proposals to develop existing CSBMs and proposals aimed at making the Vienna Document a more intrusive instrument. In the first case, Russia could signal its readiness to support proposals on strengthening military contacts or exchanging of military information in the future. As for more intrusive measures, Russia should signal that it is fundamentally against their inclusion in the Vienna Document, since the VD 2011 modernization cannot substitute for modernization of the CACE. This category includes proposals for the possibility of sending independent missions that cannot be blocked by the participating States concerned or for imposing substantial restrictions on military activities. ■

Russia's concerns in the politico-military sphere and possible ways for the evolution of CSBMs

ACCORDING TO THE RUSSIAN MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, NATO's military activities in Europe have intensified in the past few years. Based on the Defence Minister's speeches at annual enlarged board meetings of the Ministry of Defence, as well as speeches by other senior officials of the ministry, the following activities by NATO in the conventional sphere cause Russia's security concern:

- increase in NATO's and U.S. contingents in the member states bordering on Russia and close to Russia's state borders:
 - deployment of four multinational battalion task forces in the Baltic states and Poland (deployment was completed in 2017; overall strength as of February 2018 – around 4,700 personnel with arms and equipment) on a rotational basis;
 - deployment of an armoured brigade of the U.S. Army to Eastern Europe;
- further NATO enlargement (accession of Montenegro to NATO in 2017, possible future accession of North Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina), as well as co-operation with non-member states, including Finland, Sweden, Serbia, Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine;
- growing military budgets of NATO member states;
- intensification of NATO member states' intelligence activities along Russia's borders:
 - increased overall number of intelligence collection flights near Russia's borders in the Baltic and Black Seas and the Arctic;
 - increased naval surveillance near Russia's territorial waters;



■ with regard to military exercises:

■ growing intensity of military exercises (from 2014 to 2017, the number of exercises almost doubled to 548; as of 2017, 30 are conducted annually near Russia's western borders)²³;

■ large-scale exercises conducted near Russia's borders;

■ anti-Russia nature of exercises (use of Soviet- and Russian-made military equipment, Russian uniforms, and Russian-speaking personnel to designate enemies);

■ deployment in Romania and planned deployment in Poland of the Aegis Ashore missile defence systems, which include unified Mk 41 launching systems designed to launch both antimissiles and cruise missiles;

■ increase in the strength of NATO's response forces to 40,000 personnel amid reduction in their ready time from 45 to 30 days²⁴;

■ improvement of infrastructure and stockpiling of weapons, military equipment, ammunition, and foodstuffs within Europe with a view to reducing troop shift time to the NATO member states sharing a border with Russia;

■ curtailed military-to-military contacts.

In response to many of these steps, corresponding military measures are being put in place. It is in Russia's interest to guide further development of the Vienna Document 2011 towards addressing its own concerns. Given that the Vienna Document 2011 is not a universal instrument and that the agreed CSBMs also apply to the Russian armed forces, the following proposals for upgrading the document can be put forward:

■ provision of information on the rotation of forces in the territory of the participating states;

■ inclusion in the list of CSBMs of arrangements relating to the naval forces, including provisions on the exchange of information and on visits to naval bases by analogy with the section of the Vienna Document 2011 concerning visits to air bases;


■ approval, possibly in the format of additional CSBMs (under Chapter X on regional measures), of a format for inspections of the U.S. missile defence bases in Europe as a basic transparency mechanism.

With regard to the implementation of the existing CSBMs, Russia could use the mechanism of consultation and co-operation with regard to unusual military activities in order to request clarification with respect to aspects of military activities that cause concern, such as the anti-Russian focus of exercises, as well as the improvement of infrastructure with a view to creating opportunities for faster troop shift towards Russia. The mechanisms of the Vienna Document 2011 can be used to account for military incidents near Russia's borders, such as the accidental launch of a missile by a Spanish fighter in Estonia in August 2018²⁵. ■



Russian specialists conduct an evaluation visit of Rose Barracks, a U.S. military base in Germany, January 2016

Source: 2nd Cavalry Regiment of the U.S. Army



Outlook for regional CSBMs



A German inspection team visits the Russian 201st military base in Tajikistan, October 2017


Source: Department of Media Affairs and Information of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation

ONE OF THE FOCUSES OF EXPERT DISCUSSIONS on the future of conventional arms control regime in Europe and CSBMs is special regimes for certain regions within Europe tailored to the specific features of the security situation. The participating states of the Vienna Document 2011, according to Chapter X, are encouraged to develop bilateral and multilateral regional CSBMs in addition to the measures approved for the entire OSCE region. Russia is involved in a number of such mechanisms: with the Black Sea member states of the Document on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures in the Naval Field in the Black Sea, and with Finland. Previously, bilateral agreements were in effect between Russia and the Baltic states. Russia's closest ally,

Belarus, is also involved in regional CSBMs, primarily with Latvia under a bilateral agreement on additional confidence- and security-building measures.

The Baltic Sea region is a promising area for the approval and application of additional CSBMs. At the moment, conditions are not ripe for this: the Baltic states and Poland emphasize their status as the eastern flank of NATO in deterring the alleged Russian aggression and seek to ensure their own security primarily through military means enlisting the support of the United States and other allies. Attempts to build up co-operation with the countries of the region with respect to the use of transponders by military aviation in flights over the Baltic Sea have shown that they are not ready for bilateral dialogue on security issues and prefer acting on behalf of NATO. In the long term, additional CSBMs may become a necessary element for a sustainable security system in the region. Russia can give a political signal that it is ready to discuss such measures in the future as part of a renewed European security system.

Another proposal to consider is to develop regional measures to ensure transparency and visits by Russian inspectors to U.S. ballistic missile defence sites in Romania and Poland. Previously, representatives of the United States suggested that Russian military personnel should be admitted to missile defence facilities in Europe. In Poland, there also was willingness to foster confidence-building measures to allow Russian inspections of the Redzikowo complex²⁶. Such measures can be agreed upon with the inclusion of Russia, the host country, and the United States. ■



Adapting to technology challenges


THE DEVELOPMENT OF MILITARY technology and the accelerating technological development in a broader sense are becoming an increasingly prominent factor in relationships between states in the politico-military sphere, which will also need to be reckoned with in the possible upgrade of confidence- and security-building measures. In any case, the Vienna Document will not have to embrace all aspects of technology change. International information security is covered by an individual list of confidence-building measures within the OSCE to reduce the risks of conflict stemming from the use of information and communication technologies, whereas consultations on lethal autonomous weapon systems are carried out at the global level within the framework of the United Nations. It is advisable to initiate a discussion under the auspices of the Vienna Document on its possible adaptation to technology challenges.

Such a discussion can be arranged (as a provision of the Vienna Document) in the format of a workshop on military technologies and technology-related aspects of CSBMs, similar to the OSCE Seminar on Military Doctrines referred to in paragraph 15.7. One of the long-range topics for discussion during such a workshop on military technologies could be transparency concerning new types of weapons that are not explicitly identified in the Vienna Document 2011, such as reconnaissance and combat unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).

THE VIENNA DOCUMENT, JUST AS REGIONAL SECURITY IN GENERAL, ENCOUNTERS NEW TECHNOLOGY CHALLENGES. ONE POSSIBLE DIRECTION FOR ITS UPGRADE IS ITS ADAPTATION TO THEM: THE LAUNCH OF A WORKSHOP ON MILITARY TECHNOLOGIES, INTRODUCTION OF UNIFORM RULES FOR THE USE OF MOBILE AND GPS DEVICES DURING INSPECTIONS, OBSERVATION OF EXERCISES WITH THE HELP OF UAVS, USE OF AUTOMATED DATA PROCESSING SYSTEMS FOR THE ANALYSIS OF OPEN MILITARY BUDGETS.

The use of additional equipment in the course of inspections and evaluation visits requires harmonization. An inspecting or evaluating state can use a certain set of equipment (paragraphs 95 and 131 of the Vienna Document 2011) and, prior to the visit, shall specify in the relevant request additional equipment for which the consent of the receiving state is required. In recent years, mobile phones and GPS devices, for which no uniform rules have been established, have been identified as additional requested equipment. In some cases, the receiving party allowed the use of such devices, and in some cases, inspectors met with a refusal²⁷. The use of these types of equipment can be regulated. If there is common consent, the list of equipment allowed to be used by default can be extended.

When it comes to the observation of certain military activities (Chapter VI), one possible area for development is the organisation




of aerial surveillance with the use of unmanned aerial vehicles. According to paragraph 57.4, the host state is encouraged to “provide an aerial survey, preferably by helicopter, of the area of the military activity.” Aerial survey using a UAV can be viewed as a less costly and safer aerial survey option. The UAV option can be specified as an alternative to manned survey in a corresponding paragraph, and it will be up to the host state to provide this type of aerial survey. Given the experience of the Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine in using UAVs leased by the OSCE, the possibility for the OSCE representatives to use UAVs may also be envisaged for the

High-Level Military
Doctrine Seminar,
February 2016

Source: OSCE

observation of military activities under the Vienna Document if the host state has no capabilities of its own.

New technology solutions can be applied to information exchange-related measures, specifically as far as the military budget is concerned. In a number of the Vienna Document 2011 participating states, including Russia, information about the budget is available in the open data format, which ensures automatic processing. Information about the military budgets of the participating states provided in the open data format can be integrated into a platform with a single database and interface accessible by authorized users of the OSCE Communications Network. The participating states can therefore benefit from a more convenient and functional tool to exchange information, while maintaining the volume of information subject to exchange unchanged (pursuant to paragraph 15.4). ■




Practical recommendations for reforming the Vienna Document 2011

BASED ON THE CURRENT SITUATION in European security and positions of the states in the OSCE region, three possible options for the evolution of the Vienna Document 2011 on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures can be outlined: (a) an individual upgrade of the Vienna Document 2011 with an increase in its intrusiveness regardless of the situation with other CACE elements; (b) upgrade of the Vienna Document 2011 in conjunction with the development of CACE and normalization of the relationship between Russia and the West in the military and political sphere; and (c) gradual degradation of the Vienna Document 2011 and reduced role of CSBMs in Europe.

The alignment of the upgrade of the Vienna Document 2011 with the improvement of the situation in European security and modernization of the CACE regime meets Russia's interests and is adequately supported by the track record of negotiations over military and political issues in Europe. This position does not rule out the possibility of CSBMs-focused dialogue and co-operation.

The following suggestions are put forward in the report:

- Russia should work out an approach enabling it to participate in the discussion on the upgrade of the Vienna Document 2011, which would not contradict the principled position on its alignment with other issues;
- in order to emphasize the link between the modernization of the Vienna Document 2011 and the future of CACE, it would be reasonable to discuss proposals for amending CSBMs within the framework of the Structured Dialogue in parallel with a comparative analysis ("mapping") of military potentials in Europe;
- to specify what exactly, from Russia's point of view, constitutes the upgrade of the Vienna Document 2011 and to ensure possibilities for making spot changes to the document in the format of Vienna Document Plus decisions;
- to consider increasing the transparency of unannounced checks of combat readiness and conducting a demonstrative exercise in full compliance with the Vienna Document 2011 – symbolically important gestures, ideally accompanied by reciprocal measures taken by the West;



■ with regard to the proposals put forward for the upgrade of the Vienna Document 2011, to draw a fundamental distinction between proposals concerning the upgrade of CSBMs already in place and those aimed at making the Vienna Document a more intrusive instrument; to signal that in the former case Russia could eventually support constructive ideas, whereas in the latter case, it is opposed in principle, since the Vienna Document 2011 cannot replace the modernization of conventional arms control;

■ in view of Russia's concerns over NATO's military activity, to work out proposals for upgrading the Vienna Document 2011 in the following dimensions:

■ provision of information on the rotation of forces in the territory of the member states;

■ inclusion in the list of CSBMs of arrangements relating to the naval forces, including provisions on the exchange of information and on visits to naval bases;

■ approval, possibly in the format of additional CSBMs (under Chapter X on regional measures), of a format for inspections of the U.S. missile defence bases in Europe as a basic transparency mechanism;

■ to actively apply the mechanism of consultation and co-operation with respect to NATO's unusual military activities;

■ Russia can give a political signal of its willingness to discuss additional CSBMs in the Baltic Sea region in the future as a component of a renewed European security system;

■ to initiate a discussion under the auspices of the Vienna Document about its possible adaptation to technology challenges in the form of a workshop on military technologies and technology-related aspects of CSBMs, similar to the OSCE Seminar on Military Doctrines;

■ to invite participating states to regulate the use of additional equipment during inspections and evaluation visits;

■ to explore the possibility of using unmanned aerial vehicles as an alternative to manned aerial surveys when observing certain military activities under the Vienna Document 2011;

■ to consider updating information exchange methods under the Vienna Document 2011 with regard to the military budget, envisaging the creation of an electronic platform with a single database and interface accessible by authorized users of the OSCE Communications Network, while keeping unchanged the volume of information subject to exchange.

NOTES

¹ Pierre von Arx, Recent Developments in the Field of Arms Control and Confidence- and Security-Building Measures, 2011, p. 206, <https://ifsh.de/file-CORE/documents/yearbook/english/11/Arx-en.pdf>

² Steven Pifer, The Russian Arms Control Agenda After New START, in Stephen J. Blank (ed.), Russia and the Current State of Arms Control, September 2012, pp. 86-87, <https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/download.cfm?q=1119>

³ The decision concerned taking into account national holidays when planning verification activities.

⁴ See Pierre von Arx, op. cit.

⁵ OSCE Responds to Crisis in & Around Ukraine, 30 октября 2014, <https://www.osce.org/home/126167?download=true>

⁶ According to an ITAR-TASS report dated 5 March 2014, Lithuanian Foreign Minister Linas Linkevičius told reporters that the admission of military observers to Crimea is not guaranteed, since the peninsula “has a specific leadership”, which “does not [go] too far in contact with other organisations.” Source: <http://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/1023628>

⁷ Johan Engvall, OSCE and Military Confidence-Building in Crisis, FOI, March 2019, p. 50, <https://www.foi.se/rest-api/report/FOI-R--4750--SE>

⁸ Warsaw Summit Communiqué, NATO, 9 July 2016, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm

⁹ Special meeting of the Forum for Security Co-operation (834th Plenary Meeting), Statement by the Delegation of the Russian Federation, 9 November 2016, <https://www.osce.org/fsc/281341?download=true>

¹⁰ Address by H.E. Mr. Jacek Czaputowicz, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland 25th OSCE Ministerial Council Milan, December 6th 2018, <https://www.osce.org/whoweare/405539?download=true>

¹¹ Remarks at the First Plenary Session As delivered by Assistant Secretary of State A. Wess Mitchell At the 2018 meeting of the OSCE Ministerial Council Milan, Italy, December 6, 2018, <https://www.osce.org/whoweare/405530?download=true>

¹² See Oleg Shakirov, Vienna Document Update Awaiting Better Days, Security and Human Rights Monitor, 20 February 2019, <https://www.shrmonitor.org/vienna-document-2011-update/>

¹³ See Elena Chernenko, Russian and Georgia Collide in the Open Skies, 19 October 2018, <https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3773340>


¹⁴ See, for instance, NATO Allies host Russian arms control inspectors, 18 March 2018, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_152782.htm; International observers visit exercise Trident Juncture 2018, 1 November 2018, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_160033.htm

¹⁵ Elena Chernenko, Measures to Control the Agreements, 26 July 2018, <https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3696084>

¹⁶ Warsaw Summit Communiqué, NATO, 9 July 2016, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm

¹⁷ Special meeting of the Forum for Security Co-operation (834th Plenary Meeting), Statement by the Delegation of the Russian Federation, 9 November 2016, <https://www.osce.org/fsc/281341?download=true>

¹⁸ “From Lisbon to Hamburg: Declaration on the Twentieth Anniversary of the OSCE Framework for Arms Control”, 9 December 2016, <https://www.osce.org/chairmanship/289496?download=true>



¹⁹ See, for instance, Michael Carpenter, Conventional Arms Control and CSBMs: Problems and Prospects | Statement at the 2016 ASRC, 29 June 2016, <https://osce.usmission.gov/conventional-arms-control-confidence%2%AD-security%2%AD-building-measures-problems-prospects-statement-2016-asrc/>; Peter van Ham, Modernizing conventional arms control in the Euro-Atlantic region, Clingendael, September 2018, p. 3, https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2018-10/Modernizing_CAC.pdf

²⁰ According to the VD 2011, when such a level is reached or exceeded, the State should invite foreign observers to the exercise.

²¹ See Teri Schultz, NATO voices skepticism over size of Russia's Zapad military exercise, Deutsche Welle, September 14, 2017, <http://www.dw.com/en/nato-voices-skepticism-over-size-of-russias-zapad-military-exercise/a-39682346>; Lee Litzenberger, Beyond Zapad 2017: Russia's Destabilizing Approach to Military Exercises, War on the Rocks, 28 November 2017, <https://warontherocks.com/2017/11/beyond-zapad-2017-russias-destabilizing-approach-military-exercises/>

²² According to the report of the Russian Ministry of Defence of 3 March 2017, during a telephone conversation between General Valery Gerasimov, Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, and General Petr Pavel, Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, "the parties confirmed the need for mutual steps aimed at reducing tension and stabilizing the situation in Europe". Source: https://function.mil.ru/news_page/person/more.htm?id=12113548@egNews

²³ Commander-in-chief of the Russian Armed Forces Vladimir Putin participates in an enlarged board session of the Ministry of Defence, 22 December 2017, https://function.mil.ru/news_page/country/more.htm?id=12155960@egNews

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Estonia cites pilot's error as it accounts for accidental missile launch, 21 February 2019, <https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/6143716>

²⁶ Łukasz Kulesa, Poland and Ballistic Missile Defense: The Limits of Atlanticism, 2014, p. 33, <https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/pp48kulesa.pdf>

²⁷ Consolidated Summary of the 2016 Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting, p. 14, 18 March 2016, <https://www.osce.org/fsc/231831?download=true>

ACRONYMS USED IN THE TEXT

ACV – armoured combat vehicle

UAV – unmanned aerial vehicle

VD 2011 – Vienna Document on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures of 2011; previous VD versions adopted in 1990, 1992, 1994, and 1999

VD Plus – Vienna Document Plus

CFE Treaty – Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe of 1990

CACE – Conventional Arms Control in Europe

CSBMs – confidence- and security-building measures

NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

OSCE – Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

FSC – OSCE Forum for Security Co-operation





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SECURITY INDEX

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