

INTERNATIONAL EDITION

SECURITY

INDEX

A Russian Journal on International Security

No. 2 (84), Summer 2008

Publisher: PIR Center — Center for Policy Studies (Russia)

SECURITY INDEX No. 2 (84), SUMMER 2008

The Journal of PIR Center

We support the establishment of open systems of collective security, above all, the creation of the single security space in the Euro-Atlantic region. We stand for continuity in disarmament and arms control, for their further development through treaties and legal norms, including multilateral and universal agreements in the spirit of strategic transparency. We are ready for joint constructive work with all concerned parties.

Sergey Lavrov

President Putin's speech in Munich in February 2007 was believed by many to be the start of a cold war. Far from that. He just voiced some important things to unburden the mind, to raise our concerns. What he said in Munich was an invitation to a dialogue, to discuss issues that there are today between us.

Alexander Yakovenko

Russia and the EU have one more common interest – without each other they cannot become independent centers of power in international affairs. Russia and the EU can play the role of global economic center only when they are together and in the future they may transform into a joint center of politico-military power. Such pole will not confront the United States or other poles, but it may pursue independent policy, prevent international arbitrary actions, and have its own homemade project of rational world order.

Nadezhda Arbatova

The involvement of Russian private capital, establishment of joint ventures should not be hampered by European bureaucrats. Russian manufacturers of equipment and engineering companies, unlike their Western colleagues, continued to build nuclear plants in India, Iran, or China during the nuclear *break*, and we have a lot to offer to our partners. Such industrial and financial alliance would be useful both for energy sector of Eastern Europe and Russia, and for joint conquering of the third markets.

Alexey Ubeev

In the last 25 years Europe is left without system that regulates military-political relations on the continent and even without appropriate negotiations on such matter. And this happens at the moment when the United States decides to deploy missile defense units in some European countries and, thus, returns Europe the status of the theater of war for the first time since the fall of the Berlin Wall. It would be advisable at least to launch the negotiation process, or ideally start detailed dialogue on European security and stability.

Dmitry Evstafiev

Sergey Lavrov

ON RUSSIAN CIVIL SOCIETY AND DISARMAMENT

Alexander Yakovenko

ON MULTILATERAL DIPLOMACY, HUMANITARIAN COOPERATION AND EUROPE

Andrey Makarychev

THE CRITICAL DEBATES IN EUROPE

Nadezhda Arbatova

RUSSIA, EU AND COMMON SECURITY SPACE

Sergey Markedonov
Sergey Romanenko

KOSOVO: A PRECEDENT OR AN EXCEPTION?




2,982
January 1, 2008

2,937
February 1, 2008


2,930
March 1, 2008

2,926
April 1, 2008

2,920
May 1, 2008



IN HIGH PLACES



Men in great place are thrice servants: servants of the sovereign or state; servants of fame; and servants of business. So as they have no freedom; neither in their persons, nor in their actions, nor in their times. It is a strange desire, to seek power and to lose liberty: or to seek power over others, and to lose power over a man's self. The rising unto place is laborious; and by pains, men come to greater pains; and it is sometimes base; and by indignities, men come to dignities. The standing is slippery, and the regress is either a downfall, or at least an eclipse, which is a melancholy thing. Cum non sis qui fueris, non esse cur velis vivere. Nay, retire men cannot when they would, neither will they, when it were reason; but are impatient of privateness, even in age and sickness, which require the shadow; like old townsmen, that will be still sitting at their street door, though thereby they offer age to scorn.

***Francis Bacon
The essayes or covnsels civill and morall***



**A Russian Journal
on International
Security**

Published since November 1994
(1994–2006 under the title
Yaderny Kontrol)

International Edition

INDEX

**No. 2 (84), Volume 14
Summer 2008**

The academic and policy
journal of the PIR Center –
Center for Policy Studies (Russia)
published quarterly
in cooperation with Centre
russe d'études politiques, Genève

Center for Policy Studies in Russia



centre russe
d'études politiques

ISSN 1993-4270

Non multa, sed multum

SECURITY

INDEX

Editorial Board

Vladimir A. Orlov, Editor-in-Chief

Sergey B. Brilev
Vladimir Z. Dvorkin
Konstantin P. Eggert
Dmitry G. Evstafiev
Yury Y. Fedorov
Anton V. Khlopkov
Vasily F. Lata
Yevgeny P. Maslin
Azer A. Mursaliev
Sergey E. Prikhodko
Nikolay N. Spassky
Yekaterina A. Stepanova
Mikhail V. Yakushev

Moscow • Geneva • Monterey

SECURITY INDEX

Published since November 1994. From November 1994 through 2006 published under the title *Yaderny Kontrol*. Published quarterly in Russian (February, May, August, and November) and quarterly in English (March, June, September, and December). Registered with the Russian Federal Service for Monitoring the Observance of Legislation in the Sphere of Mass Communication and Protection of Cultural Heritage. Registration certificate PI № FS 77-026 089 of November 9, 2006

Publisher

PIR Center – Center for Policy Studies (Russia)

Ildar A. Akhtamzyan, Dr., Consultant
Elena A. Cherepnina, Intern
Dmitry B. Dashevsky, PIR Center Executive Board Member
Yana I. Dulghieri, Assistant to the President
Gennady M. Evstafiev, Lieutenant General, Senior Advisor
Yury Y. Fedorov, Dr., PIR Center Executive Board Member
Yulia G. Ivanova, Secretary
Natalia N. Kalinina, Dr., PIR Center Executive Board Member
Konstantin G. Khachatryan, Website Design and Maintenance Specialist
Anton V. Khlopkov, PIR Center Executive Director
Vadim B. Kozyulin, Special Projects Director
Vasily F. Lata, Lieutenant General, Consultant
Yevgeny P. Maslin, Colonel General, PIR Center Executive Board Member
Vladimir A. Mau, Dr., PIR Center Executive Board Member
Vladimir A. Orlov, Dr., PIR Center President and Executive Board Member
Nikita V. Perilyev, *Security Index* Assistant Editor; Editor, *Yaderny Kontrol*, electronic newsletter
Yevgeny N. Petelin, Intern
Alexander V. Plugarev, Intern
Dmitry V. Polikanov, Dr., Editor of the International Edition of *Security Index*
Yevgeny A. Popov, IT Specialist
Galina D. Rasskazova, Accountant
Yury A. Ryzhov, Ambassador, PIR Center Executive Board Member
Konstantin A. Sirikov, Distribution Manager
Yekaterina A. Stepanova, PIR Center Executive Board Member
Roland M. Timerbaev, Ambassador, PIR Center Executive Board Chairman
Mikhail V. Yakushev, PIR Center Executive Board Member
Dmitri Yakushkin, PIR Center Executive Board Member
Andrey V. Zagorsky, Dr., PIR Center Executive Board Member
Vyacheslav A. Zaytsev, Chief Accountant
Albert F. Zulkharneev, Education Projects Coordinator

No. 2 (84), Volume 14 Summer 2008

Translators

Michael Cordy
Michael Gillen
Konstantin Golota
Rosa Kavenoki
Danil Kobayakov

Editors

Vladimir A. Orlov, Editor-in-Chief (orlov@pircenter.org)
Dmitry V. Polikanov, Editor of the International Edition
Nikita V. Perilyev, Assistant Editor (perilyev@pircenter.org)
Yuliya Yu. Taranova, Technical Editor
Galina D. Rasskazova, Accountant
Konstantin A. Sirikov, Distribution Manager

Journal Regional Representatives:

Algiers: Sergei G. Mursankov
Almaty: Dauren Aben
Atlanta: Inna V. Baranova
Baku: Jahangir Arasli
Bamako: Andrey V. Grebenshchikov
Bishkek: Nuria A. Kutnaeva
Kyiv: Sergei P. Galaka
London: Yury Y. Fedorov
Monterey: Cristina Hansell
Nizhny Novgorod: Mikhail I. Rykhlik
Stockholm: Yekaterina A. Stepanova
Tokyo: Taisuke Abiru
Tomsk: Larisa V. Deriglazova
Tyumen: Sergey V. Kondratyev
Vienna: Nadezhda B. Teller
Vladivostok: Vadim S. Gaponenko
Wellington: Mikhail N. Lysenko (ex officio)

Legal Support:

CAF Russia (Moscow)
Littlefield Financial Services (Monterey)
Secretan Troyanov Avocats (Geneva)

Contact Information:

Mailing Address:
Security Index Editorial Board
Trekhpudny per., No. 11/13, Building 1, Office 025
Moscow 123001, Russia
Telephone:
+7-495-234-0525 (Moscow)
+41-79-736-9034 (Geneva)
FAX: +7-495-234-9558

Website: <http://si.pircenter.org/eng>

The International Edition is distributed from Geneva by
Centre russe d'études politiques

Website: <http://www.crep.ch>

Subscription:

- For Russia/CIS residents, visit <http://pircenter.org/club>
- For residents outside Russia/CIS, visit <http://www.crep.ch/fr/application.html>

Editorial policy

- No part of *Security Index* may be reproduced in print, electronically, or in any other form without prior written permission in writing from the PIR Center
- The published materials, assessments, and conclusions may not necessarily coincide with the opinion of the editors and are the opinions of the authors alone
- This publication has been made possible thanks to support from the MacArthur Foundation, the Carnegie Corporation of New York, Ford Foundation, NTI, Ploughshares Fund, and others.
- The editorial work on this issue was finished and it was approved for printing on May 25, 2008.

Circulation: 4,400 (Russian and International Editions)

© PIR Center, 2008

© Centre russe d'études politiques, Genève, 2008

CONTENTS

F R O M T H E E D I T O R

- 7 **Mapping a Route.** In his Editorial, **Vladimir Orlov** shares the plans of the PIR Center, deliberates on the expansion of its international activities, educational programs, new research projects and publications.

I N T E R V I E W S

- 11 **Sergey Lavrov: «We are ready for joint constructive work with all concerned parties.»** In his interview with *Security Index*, Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation Sergey Lavrov comments on the current state of cooperation between the MFA and the civil society and presents his views on the future of arms control and disarmament in the world.
- 15 **Alexander Yakovenko: «When a country grows stronger, its language becomes more popular.»** In an interview with *Security Index* Editor-in-Chief Vladimir Orlov, Russian First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Alexander Yakovenko speaks about humanitarian cooperation and multilateralism in international affairs and speculates on the most urgent topics in Russia's relations with Europe and the Commonwealth of Independent States.

A N A L Y S E S

- 21 **Andrey Makarychev, «Security and the Return of the Political: The Critical Debates in Europe.»** In his thorough analysis of the theoretical paradigm of security, Andrey Makarychev tries to find the place for Russia-Europe relationship, which is somehow *lost in translation* and is troubled with securitization of all aspects of cooperation.
- 35 **Nadezhda Arbatova, «Russia, EU, and Common Security Space: Pros and Cons.»** One of the renowned Russian experts on European affairs, Nadezhda Arbatova analyzes the stimuli, impediments and prospects for Russia-EU cooperation on external security matters. The partners lack common notion of security space, institutions and even political will to promote the dialogue and implement the signed roadmaps. However, there is a window of opportunities that should not



be missed and the author suggests a few realistic remedies to improve the situation.

- 45 **Anastasia Angelova, «Druzhba Nuclear Power Plant: Russia in the Market of Central and Eastern Europe.»** Nowadays that the world is facing a new *nuclear renaissance*, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe present a unique opportunity for international cooperation in this area. How to transform global rivalry into opportunities? What would the place of Russia be? The authors mentions a number of specific projects where Russia's involvement would be beneficial for Europe.

V I E W P O I N T S

- 63 **Sergey Markedonov and Sergey Romanenko, «Kosovo: A Precedent or an Exception?»** The problem of the future of Kosovo has remained in the headlines and is an important topic of discussion at the highest political levels, a fact that is not surprising, since this unresolved issue has become one of the chronic factors influencing Russia-West relations. In their discussion on potential dangers posed by the Kosovo precedent, the two experts speak about both short- and long-term effects of the problem.

C O M M E N T A R Y

- 73 **Andrey Gagarinsky and Stanislav Subbotin, «Small Nuclear Reactors: Forgotten in the Past, Indispensable in the Future.»** Floating nuclear power plants is one of the ways to promote Russia's innovations and ensure peaceful nuclear energy uses. Despite potential impediments related to safety, security and nonproliferation risks, the authors maintain that further advancement of the technology will allow to mitigate all negative implications and give new impetus to global development.
- 81 **Yury Morozov and Soren Bo Bojesen, «Prospects for Expanding Cooperation between Russia and NATO in the Area of Joint Peacekeeping.»** The authors, who were directly involved in peace-keeping operations, one from Russia and the other from NATO, call for increased cooperation in the area of conflict settlement. The two experts believe that with enough political will and by looking for points of common interest, Russia and NATO can realize their significant capacity for joint peacekeeping.
- 93 **Alexey Ubeev, «Russia and CEE: The Nuclear Chance that Should not Be Missed.»** Being practically involved in development of economic ties of the Russian nuclear industry, the author speculates on the prospects for cooperation in the area of peaceful nuclear energy uses in CEE. The current relationship is contradictory, but opening of the CEE and Russian markets may give a new chance for joint mutually beneficial programs, e.g. in the area of decommissioning of nuclear power plants.
- 97 **Dmitry Evstafiev, «Life without CFE and not Only CFE.»** Europe finds itself in the peculiar situation – it is left without any significant arms control agreements, while being transformed by the United States into the theater of potential military operations. The author argues that the negotiations on the new regime should be launched, otherwise Russia may rely on its tactical nuclear arsenal to deter the aggression from the west and from the east.

REVIEWS OF RECENT WORLD EVENTS :
JANUARY – MAY 2008

- 99 **The *iSi* index – a comprehensive index of international security.** The spring of 2008 was a time of growing tensions and the emergence of new negative factors. All this resulted in the decrease of the index. Members of the PIR Center International Expert Group Marian **Abisheva**, Fulvio **Attina**, Dayan **Jayatilleka**, Konstantin **Eggert**, William **Potter**, Abdulaziz **Sager**, and Yevgeny **Satanovsky** provide their assessments and forecasts.
- 102 **Yury Fedorov, A View by a Russian Liberal: «Nuclear Middle Ages.»** «The dynamics of international events in the beginning of 2008 once again poses rather annoying questions concerning the extent to which the world powers are able to adjust their foreign and military policy to the changes taking place in the international arena, to which extent they are ready to counter the challenges and threats of the new nuclear Middle Ages. As of now, there is no basis for a positive response to these questions.»
- 113 **Dmitry Evstafiev, A View by a Russian Conservative: «Consensus of the Past and Dilemmas of the Future.»** «The events in the sphere of energy supply have become the main theme of the past quarter. They not only confirm the growing importance of energy supply for international politics, but demonstrate the beginning of the reorganization of the global hydrocarbon and energy supply in the overall market, which started to determine global military and political processes. All other events and statements in the recent period are not more than the background for this global process.»



H I S T O R I C A L P A G E S

- 129 **Vladimir Shustov, «The CFE Treaty: Death or Revival?»** The direct participant in the negotiations to elaborate the CFE Treaty presents his views on the future of the agreement and on the prospects for overcoming the current deadlock. The author believes that only if the Western states take Russian interests into account, one can speak of a resuscitation of the European security system.

B O O K R E V I E W S

- 137 **«Policy in Slam Dunk Style,» Gennady Evstafiev.** The book by George Tenet, ex-Director of the CIA, is analyzed by his counterpart Lt. Gen. Gennady Evstafiev, who devoted many years of his life to Russian intelligence. With a high degree of skepticism, Evstafiev devotes his review to three stories mentioned by Tenet – 9/11 and war on terrorism, nonproliferation issues, and Iraq.
- 142 **«Asian Dimension of Energy Security,» Tatiana Mitrova.** New book published by the Moscow Institute of International Relations (MGIMO) deals with energy security aspects in East Asia and its impact on international affairs in the region. The first and probably major advantage of the book is that its contributors openly and clearly declare *energy causes* behind today's policies of most countries, as they underlie many current political processes, international conflicts, whether ongoing or potential, included.

- 145 **«Troubled Waters of the Black Sea,» Anatoly Ushkov.** The book *Black Sea Knot* by renowned Russian experts is one of a few editions giving profound analysis of the situation in the region. The Black Sea area quickly becomes a new geopolitical priority for Russia and the West and the authors try to give a comprehensive view of regional issues, including oil reserves, transportation routes, and frozen conflicts.

L E T T E R S T O T H E E D I T O R

- 149 **Yury Volodin, «PIR Center's Activities Are Visible in Russia and Abroad»**

150 A B O U T T H E
A U T H O R S

154 P I R C E N T E R
A D V I S O R Y B O A R D

Cov. III F I N A L Q U O T E S

In high places

SECURITY INDEX

Published since November 1994. From November 1994 through 2006 published under the title *Yaderny Kontrol*. Published quarterly in Russian (February, May, August, and November) and quarterly in English (March, June, September, and December). Registered with the Russian Federal Service for Monitoring the Observance of Legislation in the Sphere of Mass Communication and Protection of Cultural Heritage. Registration certificate PI № FS 77-026 089 of November 9, 2006

Publisher

PIR Center – Center for Policy Studies (Russia)

Ildar A. Akhtamzyan, Dr., Consultant
Elena A. Cherepnina, Intern
Dmitry B. Dashevsky, PIR Center Executive Board Member
Yana I. Dulghieri, Assistant to the President
Gennady M. Evstafiev, Lieutenant General, Senior Advisor
Yury Y. Fedorov, Dr., PIR Center Executive Board Member
Yulia G. Ivanova, Secretary
Natalia N. Kalinina, Dr., PIR Center Executive Board Member
Konstantin G. Khachatryan, Website Design and Maintenance Specialist
Anton V. Khlopkov, PIR Center Executive Director
Vadim B. Kozyulin, Special Projects Director
Vasily F. Lata, Lieutenant General, Consultant
Yevgeny P. Maslin, Colonel General, PIR Center Executive Board Member
Vladimir A. Mau, Dr., PIR Center Executive Board Member
Vladimir A. Orlov, Dr., PIR Center President and Executive Board Member
Nikita V. Perilyev, *Security Index* Assistant Editor; Editor, *Yaderny Kontrol*, electronic newsletter
Yevgeny N. Petelin, Intern
Alexander V. Plugarev, Intern
Dmitry V. Polikanov, Dr., Editor of the International Edition of *Security Index*
Yevgeny A. Popov, IT Specialist
Galina D. Rasskazova, Accountant
Yury A. Ryzhov, Ambassador, PIR Center Executive Board Member
Konstantin A. Sirikov, Distribution Manager
Yekaterina A. Stepanova, Dr., PIR Center Executive Board Member
Roland M. Timerbaev, Ambassador, PIR Center Executive Board Chairman
Mikhail V. Yakushev, Dr., PIR Center Executive Board Member
Dmitri Yakushkin, Dr., PIR Center Executive Board Member
Andrey V. Zagorsky, Dr., PIR Center Executive Board Member
Vyacheslav A. Zaytsev, Chief Accountant
Albert F. Zulkharneev, Education Projects Coordinator

No. 2 (84), Volume 14 Summer 2008

Translators

Michael Cordy
Michael Gillen
Konstantin Golota
Rosa Kavenoki
Danil Kobayakov

Editors

Vladimir A. Orlov, Editor-in-Chief (orlov@pircenter.org)
Dmitry V. Polikanov, Editor of the International Edition
Nikita V. Perilyev, Assistant Editor (perilyev@pircenter.org)
Yuliya Yu. Taranova, Technical Editor
Galina D. Rasskazova, Accountant
Konstantin A. Sirikov, Distribution Manager

Journal Regional Representatives:

Algiers: Sergei G. Mursankov
Almaty: Dauren Aben
Atlanta: Inna V. Baranova
Baku: Jahangir Arasli
Bamako: Andrey V. Grebenshchikov
Bishkek: Nuria A. Kutnaeva
Kyiv: Sergei P. Galaka
London: Yury Y. Fedorov
Monterey: Cristina Hansell
Nizhny Novgorod: Mikhail I. Rykhlik
Stockholm: Yekaterina A. Stepanova
Tokyo: Taisuke Abiru
Tomsk: Larisa V. Deriglazova
Tyumen: Sergey V. Kondratyev
Vienna: Nadezhda B. Teller
Vladivostok: Vadim S. Gaponenko
Wellington: Mikhail N. Lysenko (ex officio)

Legal Support:

CAF Russia (Moscow)
Littlefield Financial Services (Monterey)
Secretan Troyanov Avocats (Geneva)

Contact Information:

Mailing Address:
Security Index Editorial Board
Trehprudny per., No. 11/13, Building 1, Office 025
Moscow 123001, Russia
Telephone:
+7-495-234-0525 (Moscow)
+41-79-736-9034 (Geneva)
FAX: +7-495-234-9558

Website: <http://si.pircenter.org/eng>

The International Edition is distributed from Geneva by
Centre russe d'études politiques

Website: <http://www.crep.ch>

Subscription:

- For Russia/CIS residents, visit <http://pircenter.org/club>
- For residents outside Russia/CIS, visit <http://www.crep.ch/fr/application.html>

Editorial policy

- No part of *Security Index* may be reproduced in print, electronically, or in any other form without prior written permission in writing from the PIR Center
- The published materials, assessments, and conclusions may not necessarily coincide with the opinion of the editors and are the opinions of the authors alone
- This publication has been made possible thanks to support from the MacArthur Foundation, the Carnegie Corporation of New York, Ford Foundation, NTI, Ploughshares Fund, and others.
- The editorial work on this issue was finished and it was approved for printing on May 25, 2008.

Circulation: 4,400 (Russian and International Editions)

© PIR Center, 2008

© Centre russe d'études politiques, Genève, 2008



MAPPING A ROUTE

I am writing these lines soon after the annual meeting of the PIR Center Executive Board – our supreme body approving all key decisions related to organizational development. I am pleased to say that this time the meeting has passed in high spirits – the PIR Center is rich with exciting plans for the next two years and my colleagues have supported them with enthusiasm.

Now it's time to share these plans with the readers of the journal.

First of all, the PIR Center becomes an **international organization**.

Let me note (albeit for those who know well PIR's activities, it is obvious) that our headquarters will continue to be in Moscow. The PIR Center will remain to be the Russian-based organization. However, our work becomes more and more international by nature.

We have opened the European branch of the PIR Center in Geneva. It is branded as Centre russe d'études politiques (CREP) and is boosting with activities. It would be enough to say that the international edition of the *Security Index* journal is promoted and disseminated via Geneva – the journal has readers in 92 cities in Europe and all over the world. Having independent legal status, Centre russe d'études politiques comprises individual and corporate members from Switzerland, Russia and 14 other countries and international organizations – from Latvia to Australia, from Jordan to Canada. Evidently, the activities of our European branch are intertwined with the projects of the Moscow-based PIR Center. I assume such approach will stay.

PIR's representative office has been operating in the United States for over 10 years now. Members of the Advisory Board and the International Expert Group (INTEG) cooperate with us in 11 countries – from Italy to China, from Germany to Sri Lanka. Representatives of *Security Index* help us in maintaining dialogue with the audience in 12 cities outside Russia – from Algiers to Wellington, from Vienna to New Delhi. The *Trialogue* international club affiliated with the PIR Center unites diplomats, businessmen and media from 28 states – from Poland to Turkey, from Israel to Japan. We have numerous alumni of summer schools and internships – these are young specialists representing 14 nations – from Armenia to the U.K., from Azerbaijan to the U.S.A. Finally, for several years now our projects have been beyond the domestic framework, while conferences and roundtables held by the PIR Center (independently or in cooperation with our academic partners) took place in Almaty and Havana, Gstaad and Bishkek.

We will continue to expand our international activities, strengthen cooperation ties with our foreign academic partners, resort to the experience of internationally-recognized experts and widely use the capabilities of the European branch in Geneva.

Secondly, the PIR Center extends the **range of applied research projects** and consultancy. Step by step we approach thorough analysis of such complex issues, as global energy secu-



rity or strategic challenges in Central Asia. We start with publications in the *Security Index* journal and continue with the series of roundtables and seminars. We keep an eye on the prospects of Sino-Russia security relationship. Another important matter is the control of small arms and light weapons, especially in potential conflict zones.

There is always a risk of *dispersion*, if too many *juicy topics* are dealt with. So we have to show restraint and think twice before adding new projects to PIR's portfolio. The criterion for setting priorities is simple – how crucial this or that issue is from the point of Russia's national interests, its national security agenda.

PIR's traditional focus on nuclear nonproliferation and arms control does not evade. The evidence of it is a thought-provoking discussions that we had in Geneva this May during the session of the Preparatory Committee of the NPT Review Conference. We follow the evolution of challenges to the international nuclear nonproliferation regime, especially in the countries and regions adjacent to Russia. Hence, no wonder that the first priority is and will be the analysis of the situation around nuclear and missile programs of Iran.

We develop research and consulting related to multilateral approaches towards nuclear fuel cycle, discussing this issue with our colleagues from the United States, Japan, Kazakhstan, Europe, and the Gulf region. Among other meetings I remember fruitful *Rosatom*-sponsored debate that we had on this matter during the extended meeting of the *Security Index* editorial board in the premises of this federal agency.

We would like to ensure more systemic approach to the future of nuclear weapons in the world, to their role in the arsenals of leading nuclear weapon states – we will try to concentrate our vision not even on years, but on decades ahead.

Thirdly, *Security Index* successfully passed its first year under the new title and in new format and now occupies well-deserved niche – **a Russian journal on international security**. Now that the work on quarterly issues of the Russian and international edition goes on smoothly and in accordance with the plans, we have to accomplish three consecutive tasks.

The first goal seems easy – we have to learn more about our target audiences. This does not mean that we don't know them at all. Our readership contains civil servants and experts, professors and students, businessmen and journalists. They are interested in getting information on international security developments and for 12 months we have been forming this audience ourselves providing them with copies of the journal. I am glad that most of them remain our devoted readers and their number is growing thanks to new subscribers, e.g. through our *Trialogue* and CREP membership systems. Now it is important to hear the voice of the readers who are well aware of the journal – to get their feedback, criticism, comments, requests, response to the articles. We plan to use our interactive Website – pircenter.org – for that purpose, but we also realize that nothing can be better than live communication. Therefore, we intend to conduct a series of readers' conferences in Russia and abroad, in the organization of which we are assisted by regional representatives of the journal.

The next task is to keep the format of the journal, but adapt the topics of the articles, so that we may fully take into account the requirements of our readers and their comments.

Finally, another mission is to increase further the number of contributions by young authors.

Fourthly, we will ensure the progress of our **educational projects**, above all the Summer School on Global Security and internships.

The Summer School, along with the *Security Index* journal, has become one of the most successful, most remarkable projects of the PIR Center in the last few years. During the first two weeks of July, young experts from Russia and the former Soviet Union get together in the Moscow region and plunge into details of the most urgent international security issues – from nuclear nonproliferation to cyberterrorism. The student-lecturer ratio is normally one to one. We get about 10 applications per seat. And this statistics is eloquent – there is a growing interest in the participation in the summer school on the part of young civil servants and postgraduates from Moscow and the regions, and even greatly – from the ex-U.S.S.R.

Shall we increase the number of participants of the summer school? I would say, no. Otherwise we may affect the quality. Shall the program be extended? Yes, but only in the future. It is an open secret that such training programs are quite expensive. And I am happy that in 2008 substantial part of support comes from the Russian state – it is a grant provided under the presidential order of June 30, 2007. If and when such trend becomes stable, we will be able to make our training programs longer. Thus, in 2008–2009 we intend to raise the quality of our course and launch the process of establishment of the Russian Training Center on Global Security on the basis of current PIR’s educational programs.

Finally, we plan to engage more actively the impressive resource of the **alumni community**. Obviously, we mostly speak about alumni of our educational programs, but there are also many ex-PIR Center’s staff members. As far as emotions are concerned, we naturally feel sorry when an employee decides to leave the organization and go on with his own career. However, I am often glad to see the names of our former colleagues among the staff of large international organizations, or business entities... Many are scattered around the world. And many come back to the PIR Center again – they take part in the work of the *Dialogue Club*, or represent *Security Index* abroad... Or simply attend our New Year parties. It would be a good idea to have such virtual and real meetings in a more frequent mode.

I started this article with the recollections of the recent PIR’s Executive Board meeting. At the end of it, one of the Board members, Col. Gen. Yevgeny Maslin inspired us with a few songs. And not surprisingly, we finished the session with the choir of distinguished experts singing a famous travelers’ song – about mapping new routes and conquering new heights. 🐘🗺️

Vladimir Orlov



F
R
O
M
T
H
E
E
D
I
T
O
R

THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY

SPRING 2008 VOLUME 31 NUMBER 2 \$13.00



Iraq's Strategic Legacy

ENERGY PARTNERSHIP

Zha Daojiang and Hu Weixing

CAN THE UNITED STATES SHED ITS OIL ADDICTION?

Josef Braml

CAN THE UNITED STATES SHED ITS OIL ADDICTION?

Josef Braml

EU ENERGY SECURITY: TIME TO END RUSSIAN LEVERAGE

Zeyno Baran

Putin and Beyond

IMPROVING RUSSIAN HEALTH AND BILATERAL RELATIONS

William H. Frist

THE DAY AFTER A NUCLEAR ATTACK

Ashton B. Carter, Michael M. May, and William J. Perry

CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

“TWQ has the right people writing on the right issues . . .”

Joseph S. Nye, Harvard University

“TWQ regularly provides some of the most provocative and comprehensive writing on policy today.”

Daniel Byman, Georgetown University

“TWQ is a gold mine of readable, cutting-edge articles that clarify a complex and uncertain world.”

Jeffrey W. Legro, University of Virginia

coming in the summer 2008 issue: Beijing 2008

MIT Press Journals | <http://mitpressjournals.org/twq>

238 Main Street, Cambridge, MA 02142 USA | tel: 617-253-2889 | fax: 617-577-1545 | US/Canada: 800-207-8354

Alexander T. J. Lennon, Editor-in-Chief | CSIS | 1800 K St., NW | Washington DC 20006 | twq@csis.org



Sergey Lavrov

«WE ARE READY FOR JOINT CONSTRUCTIVE WORK WITH ALL CONCERNED PARTIES»

In March 2008, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Sergey Lavrov commented to the Security Index journal on some topical issues of national foreign and security policy.¹

SECURITY INDEX: In your opinion, what is the role of Russian nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in strengthening our positions on the international arena?

LAVROV: It is impossible to imagine politics in the country without active participation of NGOs. The authorities are open for dialogue and cooperation with the civil society institutions. The state support of NGOs is increasing. Their number is growing. Today various organizations of the Russian *third sector* comprise over eight million people.

Obviously, the MFA cannot stay apart from this trend. Such developments are typical of the current stage of international relations – NGOs generate many ideas that later become the subject of interstate cooperation. So it is the matter of being present at all level of global processes, otherwise it would be quite difficult to ensure our national competitiveness in foreign policy. Hence, we are interested in equal involvement of Russian NGOs together with their partners abroad into international cooperation – they should undertake zealous efforts to strengthen mutual understanding among the nations, should complement intergovernmental and interstate links of Russia.

We have signed appropriate agreements and have dynamic cooperation with Russian NGOs that deal with economic issues – the Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs, *Business Russia*, *OPORA*, the Union of Oil and Gas Industry, the Association of Russian Banks, and the Moscow International Business Association. Political experts, academic community, professional media associations also have significant foreign policy potential. We tighten our relationship with NGOs acting under the auspices of the Russian Orthodox Church, notably with the World Russian People's Council and the Imperial Orthodox Palestine Society. The basis for such joint activities is the broad consensus on major issues of foreign and domestic policy proved at the recent parliamentary and presidential elections in Russia.

SECURITY INDEX: How would you assess the existing level of interaction between the Russian Foreign Ministry and the NGO sector?

LAVROV: I regularly meet the representatives of the Russian NGO sector. At one of the recent meetings in February this year the participants noted that lately our cooperation had intensified and became systemic.

Key coordinator of our interaction with civil society is the appropriate interdepartmental working group. The Russian Center for International Scientific and Cultural Cooperation at the MFA has also gained positive experience of using various specialized loci for dialogue. We hold sectional meetings of NGOs with the MFA departments. The ministry maintains good working ties with the Presidential Council for Facilitating the Development of Civil Society Institutions and



Human Rights, with the Public Chamber, and so on. Another evidence of our close contact with the civil society is the MFA Website, which contains a special section on such issues.

To a large extent, thanks to our support, over 40 NGOs got consultative status with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations (ECOSOC) and the Council of Europe. Such status encourages them to get engaged in numerous intergovernmental programs. Our civil society is represented in Russian delegations at international forums held by the UN agencies, including UNESCO, as well as by the Council of Europe and the OSCE. Last year our NGOs had a chance to take part in the work of the UN General Assembly for the first time.

During Russia's presidency in the G-8, the *Civil G8–2006* forum was organized. This project helped to raise the level of dialogue and interaction between the G-8 and civil society institutions.

SECURITY INDEX: Does Russia plan to involve NGOs more actively in the process of promoting national interests in the former Soviet Union?

LAVROV: We welcome the growing interest of our NGOs in working in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). This is extremely important bearing in mind the expansion of humanitarian cooperation in this region. The legal basis for this is the initiative of the CIS Council of Heads of States aimed at developing relationships within the common humanitarian space, establishing the Humanitarian Cooperation Fund and the appropriate Council. Many new ideas emerge and get tested at the Forum of Artistic and Scientific Intelligentsia of the CIS countries.

As we elaborate the proposals set forth by President Putin in October 2007 at the Russia-EU summit in Mafra, the Institute of Democracy and Cooperation was established. The branches of this fund are opened in Paris and New York. The concept behind it is clear – to intensify the debate of the general public, NGOs and experts about the ways of organizing the electoral process, electoral monitoring, to discuss the situation with national minorities and migrants, rights of children and youth, and freedom of speech. At the same time, Russia stands for the elaboration of the European Convention on Election Standards and has submitted the draft of this document. Work at this document also opens a window of opportunities for Russian NGOs.

The *Russian World* Foundation has been set up in accordance with the presidential decree. This new structure is now operational and it provides grants to NGOs. The MFA is one of its founders. I am sure that the establishment of the foundation will assist in strengthening our ties with the Russian communities abroad, will broaden the opportunities for engagement of national NGOs in accomplishing such crucial tasks as protection of rights and interests of compatriots, consolidation of positions of the Russian language and culture abroad and, in general, maintenance of our common asset – Russian-language area.

SECURITY INDEX: Our journal traditionally draws attention to disarmament issues. So we can't help asking about the MFA's vision of efficiency of multilateral approaches to disarmament. What are the ways to enhance the effectiveness of such mechanisms?

LAVROV: We are concerned about the state of affairs in the process of disarmament. I mentioned this on February 12 in Geneva at the Conference on Disarmament.

We believe that multilateral approaches to practical disarmament should be approved and institutionalized. This would be in conformity with the multilateral approach to nonproliferation issues – we have to bear in mind that both matters are interconnected. The logic of development of the present-day international relations proves that any unilateral or bloc schemes, especially if they rely on force, fail – they are inadequate. Attempts to bring them to life undermine stability and raise the danger of external interference in domestic affairs of sovereign states, sometimes even under the pretext of nonproliferation missions.

President Putin has recently stated that Russia would not let anyone drag Moscow into costly confrontation, including new arms race, which would be fatal for internal development of our country. Among our priorities is the promotion of constructive disarmament agenda. We try to focus it on the following issues – to prevent the washing out of legal basis of disarmament and to impede the expansion of arms race in new spheres, such as outer space.

SECURITY INDEX: Would you comment on the fate of such pillars of the disarmament and nonproliferation regime as the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), or new strategic arms reduction agreements?

LAVROV: The core element of the contemporary system of international security is the NPT. We are interested in maximum constructive and fruitful work of the 2nd PrepCom session, which should create conditions for success of the 2010 NPT Review Conference. It is important to ensure further effectiveness of the treaty, taking into account three components – nonproliferation, peaceful nuclear energy uses, and disarmament.

We are concerned about the process of strategic offensive arms reduction and limitation. It is known that in 2009 the restrictions of the START Treaty will expire and, meanwhile, the United States intensifies its efforts to deploy the global missile defense system. Under such circumstances, strategic stability cannot continue to be the exclusive area of U.S.-Russian relations. The remaining bipolarity should be overcome, this sphere should open to all concerned parties, which are ready for active cooperation in strengthening common security. In our opinion, to become productive, such interaction should be based on equal rights, joint analysis of the problems and consideration of interests of all parties.


Nowadays it would be important to streamline the structure and activities of the existing disarmament triad – the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, the UN Commission on Disarmament, and the UN Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. The First Committee, which represents all member states of the United Nations, should be entitled with the functions of a basic political institution charged with elaboration of strategic directions for multilateral disarmament efforts. The commission should play the role of integrator of specific ideas and concepts, be the forum for approving practical recommendations. We highly praise the work of the UN Council of Wisemen on disarmament and assume that it may serve as a platform for provisional testing of ideas and expertise on specific issues.

SECURITY INDEX: The Conference on Disarmament has been blocked for several years now. How do you assess the prospects of this mechanism? Will it be revived?

LAVROV: As far as the Conference on Disarmament is concerned, it is a unique and indispensable negotiation forum, which has serious intellectual and professional potential. Russia, as the overwhelming majority of other states, is not content with the fact that substantive activities of the conference remain blocked. This is another evidence of stagnation in the area of disarmament and arms control.

The situation may change, if there is political will. The important prerequisite for this is the creation of favorable international conditions for further progress in disarmament on the basis of reciprocity, equal security for all and international law.


As we adhere to such approach, on February 12 Russia and China jointly presented to the conference the draft treaty on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space, the threat or use of force against outer space objects. We are sure that the conference is the most appropriate forum for multilateral work on the draft treaty with research mandate. Later when the conditions are in place, these activities may be transformed into negotiations and the special committee of the conference may be set up.

In conclusion, let me emphasize once again that Russia is firmly committed towards collective approach and strengthening of legal mechanisms of regional and global politics on the basis of the UN Charter and principles of indivisibility of security and development. We support the establishment of open systems of collective security, above all, the creation of the single security space in the Euro-Atlantic region. We stand for continuity in disarmament and arms control, for their further development through treaties and legal norms, including multilateral and universal agreements in the spirit of strategic transparency. This is the key to our common success. We are ready for joint constructive work with all concerned parties. 


Note

¹ The interview with the minister was taken on March 27, 2008.







TOKYO




SHANGHAI




NEW YORK




MEXICO CITY




LONDON



TEHRAN



MOSCOW



TEL AVIV



EVERYWHERE

The Doomsday Clock reads five minutes to midnight as the world stands on the brink of a second nuclear age. Climate change now poses threats nearly as withering as those posed by nuclear weapons. Stay informed and receive the *Bulletin*, the leading authority on science and global security, for only \$48* a year (six issues). Subscribe today online.

**Bulletin
of the
Atomic
Scientists**

IT IS 5 MINUTES TO MIDNIGHT

www.thebulletin.org

*Please allow 6–8 weeks for delivery of your first issue. Outside of North America, one year is \$52.00, two years is \$93.50 (U.S. dollars only). For institutional rates please call 1-866-584-0009.



Alexander Yakovenko

«WHEN A COUNTRY GROWS STRONGER, ITS LANGUAGE
BECOMES MORE POPULAR»

Vladimir Orlov, Security Index Editor-in-Chief, interviews Alexander Yakovenko, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia.¹

SECURITY INDEX: Even though bilateral relations between states are important, in the world of today, due to increasing interdependence, multilateral participation is becoming more relevant. What role does Russia see for multilateral diplomacy in general and the United Nations in particular?

YAKOVENKO: Be it multilateral or bilateral diplomacy, we see it as our main task to establish most favorable conditions for the development of our country: economic, socioeconomic, etc. For the country to develop more dynamically, good relations with other countries are required. Our citizens are supposed to feel secure in the outside world. In this respect, naturally, we should let multilateral tools play their role, the United Nations being one of them.

Today there seems to be two trends in international practices. The first one, to which we adhere, aims at strengthening by all means of international mechanisms, particularly multilateral diplomacy. Here we mean the United Nations. We support strengthening such mechanisms because the UN framework allows tackling a wide range of issues multilaterally, by broad coalitions, and, most importantly, based on international law. Hence, it has been a constant major line of Russian foreign policy we consistently follow.

Regretfully, not all countries like the approach. In this case, let's say, the United States takes an ambivalent approach towards the United Nations. On the one hand, it understands that it is impossible to tackle successfully issues of world politics without involvement of the Security Council. On the other hand, its work in the United Nations always shows something that if not undermines efficiency of the United Nations then at least impedes its activities. A vivid example here is the fact that the United States has the largest arrears in payment to the UN budget.

Life experience shows that it is very hard to deal with international affairs without the United Nations and its Security Council. This very idea is demonstrated by the outcome of the U.S. venture in Iraq, when in fact military activities were launched without endorsement of the Security Council. The result is well-known. After some time Americans had to go back to the Council for such an endorsement.

It indicates that the Security Council is equally needed today as a single working tool of decisionmaking in international politics that can invoke the use of force clause under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. We feel it important to strengthen the role of the United Nations as the latter has always relied on international law.

By the way, I should say that this line if followed by all CIS countries because they clearly understand it: for a country to be heard, it should have an equal opportunity to speak. Only the UN framework offers that.



I
N
T
E
R
V
I
E
W
S

SECURITY INDEX: What role does Russia play in international development programs?

YAKOVENKO: Today, after the difficult times for Russia during the 1990s, we are developing a new approach to international involvement. Our participation in activities of this or that organization used to be active, but no more than that, while today we render significant support to them, funding included.

A new component of our policy towards multilateral diplomacy is represented by International Development Assistance Concept endorsed by the President of the Russian Federation. It means that we are intent to join other countries of the G8 to meet the level of financial support rendered to international projects with volunteer participation. Today we contribute about \$200 million to various projects. Hopefully, by 2009 we will reach the level of \$0.5 billion. It is real money allocated from the budget that we are going to expend. For instance, it implies increased contributions to the World Food Program, too. Nowadays our share is \$11 million, but we are going to raise it. Same can be said about our input for the Economic Commission for Europe: a few million today to become more in the future. The United Nations Industrial Development Organization will see the difference as well as many others. On the whole, it can be said that Russia is becoming one of the growing donor countries.

We are starting to render significant support under international law and UN programs to those countries that are close by, those are CIS countries. They are our priority. We feel it important that our closest neighbors should actively develop. And we are planning to assist them via various UN programs that have no politics behind them. This new trend, which you see starting today, I believe, is going to develop gradually to produce some tangible results in five or six years' time. We do so because relations with those states, with our closest neighbors, ensure stability and economic well-being in our own country.

SECURITY INDEX: Russia is more and more focused on establishing its positive image, also by promoting the Russian language abroad. Do you have any plans to open branches of Russian think tanks abroad so that they could deliver more competent information on Russia's foreign and security policies?

YAKOVENKO: The 1990s saw a colossal decline of interest in the Russian language. The country's economy was on its last legs. The Soviet Union had just collapsed. Many even thought Russia was heading for the cutting room floor together with CIS countries. Today the situation is different. The economy is growing at an exhilarating pace. Naturally, it adds to an increasing interest to the Russian language. Hence, there is interest in it, which was clearly shown during 2007, which had been declared Year of the Russian Language.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs arranged many events throughout that year – contests, quizzes, festivals. However, there are some things to do first. Firstly, more effort will be spent to expand the possibility to learn Russian in many countries of the world. We recently adopted the *Russian World* program, which means significant funds allocated to that end. More opportunities to study Russian will be created around the world, more books published in Russian. When a country grows stronger, looks more attractive, its language becomes more popular.

Look, Russian is the language of communication in space. An astronaut entering the International Space Station should know Russian, it's a must. Hopefully, the Russian language will regain its place. We are working on that through our embassies, and will do everything to help, also financially.

However, there are problems in promoting Russian, as well as the country's image. First thing, practically all of the media have been monopolized by large English-language companies. It includes TV, newspapers, and the rest of the media world: major newspapers and all Internet news sites, in fact, target a specific group and have a very specific owner. However saturated the media space is, everyone tracks literally just a dozen of largest news agencies. Historically, those are Reuters, Associated Press, *CNN*. It is extremely hard to join in as it requires money and influence. *CNN* was started as a large U.S. public-private project to increase influence in the media.

We now have *Russia Today* TV channel. A very interesting one, I think. During the past year it has improved significantly. But it isn't let to be heard. It's very hard to promote it as an alterna-

tive outlook. I think, as we regain weight, economically and politically, those largest news sources will more actively present viewpoints from our country.

And one last thing: the media component is no less important here than smart ideas. One may have plenty of clever ideas that no one will ever hear about. Here's exactly where multilateral diplomacy demonstrates its importance, that's why many countries stick to the United Nations and bodies within its system. It's a place for their voices to be heard. It's a possibility to deliver a certain position to a significant number of states without any extra financial investments.

SECURITY INDEX: How can you comment on the climate change issues?

YAKOVENKO: Frankly speaking, the U.S. approach looks more appealing to me, which can be summarized as follows: national legislation should incorporate very serious commitments, though deliberate ones, as to how certain industries would be developed, including energy-saving and environmentally-friendly technologies, that would tangibly cut down emissions.

When my EU colleagues and I have a debate on that issue, I tell them: you want limited emissions, but do you know the efficiency of those technologies that you consign to developing countries? Just how efficient are they, what is the outcome, how much of the emissions have they helped to cut? I should say, no answer so far.

I have an ambivalent feeling towards the issue of climate change. On the one hand, no one understands the processes caused by our industrial activities. Obviously, there is an impact. Obviously, I agree, new technologies need to be there. However, issues related to climate change have a false bottom behind them. Let me remind you of the situation around combating those ozone holes by abolishing Freon gases used in fridges. Back during the Soviet period the country had to switch to new types of cooling agents. No one ever proved it later that the holes had been caused by Freon gases. It was a world-wide venture, when a company supplying those other types of technology used the international framework to expand into all countries.

I believe, a similar thing may occur with climate change. In this case large companies might want to use it to promote their technologies. They will be transferred to developing countries, maybe even imposed. It is a large commercial undertaking. We wish to see as little as possible of a commercial undertaking, but rather a real discussion of problems we are facing.

Any benefit for us? I believe, there is and there isn't. On the one hand, there is an understanding that good agreements, reached sooner or later, will mean cutting down on carbon dioxide emissions. I think our country needs that. I believe that in this respect international commitments will bring a positive effect. On the other hand, it may slow down economic growth. Look, Russian economy is growing and I think the growth will be even greater. We need a very close analysis. And I believe it's wrong if some countries decide to stay away from that effort.

SECURITY INDEX: When describing relations between NATO members and Russia we now more and more often hear the word *new cold war*..

YAKOVENKO: To begin with, there is no *new cold war*. I would call that striving to promote own interests. Not everyone is ready to have good respect for our interests because the 1990s added significantly to Russia losing its influence over world affairs. Today it is a little bit different. The Russian society would have its interests protected. If we don't like something, today we say that out loud. And opinion polls in countries of Western Europe indicate that 60 percent agree with what we say. President Putin's speech in Munich in February 2007 was believed by many to be the start of a cold war. Far from that. He just voiced some important things to unburden the mind, to raise our concerns. What he said in Munich was an invitation to a dialogue, to discuss issues that there are today between us.

If we take the Russia-U.S. agenda, there are two major issues, of which only one affects stability of the bilateral relations: it's GMD deployment in Poland and the Czech Republic. The other issue is Kosovo, which is broader in its nature. But its tension is no less than that over the missile defense.



There are a few things that spoil our relations. But they are caused by the increasing competition. I think it is going to increase even further. However, today our countries have so many common tasks that a new stage of the cold war is hardly possible.

SECURITY INDEX: You mentioned GMD in Europe and the status of Kosovo as major controversies between Russia and the United States. Do you mean to say that the issue of Iran is no longer among the rocks on which we split?

YAKOVENKO: We don't have any major controversy with the United States over Iran. We are on the same track. The only thing that we view differently is how to move along that track. Americans proceed from a very simplistic idea that right now we all should press on Iran, squeeze it with sanctions. For an unknown reason no one proposes sanctions against the country's oil industry, which would be the most tangible blow for Iran. It's beating about the bush. No one says a word about oil, keeping dead silence.

That's the philosophy behind the U.S. approach. With us it's different. We think we should negotiate with Iran. There's no military solution. And we should build up pressure. We shouldn't feel that desperate about the nuclear program of Iran. It's very hard to develop a bomb that could be used as a weapon in just a few years. And even if a nuclear device is created, it would not necessarily mean it is a warhead: testing is needed for that. Hence, we do have some time.

I think, our approach is important because on the one hand, it increases pressure against Iran so that it complies with our demands, and on the other hand, we don't make any sort of crisis in the region, with all the consequences that could follow. America is far away, while we aren't. Hence, any military venture, causing extra problems, would further destabilize the situation.

Americans are now in Iraq. Look what has happened. The country is torn apart by internal conflicts. It has become more radical. They used to have no terrorists, and now they do. If Iran is now made into a similar loophole, then we'll see history repeating itself.

We fully share the concerns Americans have expressed. We too don't want Iran to take hold of nuclear weapons. The question is how to ensure it. Hence, Europeans and we try to prevent Americans from taking such inconsiderate steps. And, doing justice to them, they do listen. The fact that the six nations are working at that track, generally, demonstrates that our line in these issues is quite popular.

SECURITY INDEX: Today the European Union is developing a new strategy towards Central Asia. How does Russia see it?

YAKOVENKO: Naturally, we think that all countries can cooperate with anyone they like. I heard something about that strategy. It has two elements. One is strengthening political influence. Today EU countries have a very weak influence over Central Asia mainly because until a few years ago there was strong criticism of human rights violations followed by certain sanctions. It particularly concerns Uzbekistan, where there was a bandit coup attempt they tried to present as a human rights-related affair. That indeed estranged Central Asian countries from Western European states. However, the latter take interest in the former.


Look, for one thing, they want to strengthen their political influence, which is, generally, fine, and, again show economic interest in the capacity of those countries. Everyone clearly understands that they are very rich in mineral and other primary resources. Obviously, the EU has a strong incentive to promote its economic interests in the region. And to do this, it needs to develop a certain policy line.

SECURITY INDEX: If we speak about Russia's closest neighbors, it's common knowledge now that within the post-Soviet space there are many frozen conflicts. In this respect, how does Russia view the issue of Transnistria today? Does Russia want to keep the *status quo*?

YAKOVENKO: By no means would we want to keep the *status quo*. We look at it in a very simple way. It's Chisinau and Tiraspol which are to come to an agreement. And we are constantly pushing them towards it. For us, there is only one problem with Transnistria: we have to evacuate an immense arsenal remaining from the Soviet troops. Now it is guarded by 150 people. The Transnistrian side does not let us evacuate it. And we are often accused of keeping our

troops in the area. How can we possibly leave the arsenal there? If we just leave it there, it is not going to stay there, it will stream into our country and to other neighbors, Ukraine to name one, and Western Europe. That's why we are sitting there and guard these weapons – and cannot even withdraw them.

There is no agreement between Chisinau and Tiraspol. Frankly speaking, it doesn't matter to us what terms they decide to agree upon. The main thing is that they do agree at all. As soon as such an accord is in place, it will be there for a long haul. Hence, our main effort today is to get them at the table so that they could agree. That's, basically, it.

We don't have any special interests in that area. We are ready to develop purely economic relations with Moldova, naturally, on an equal basis. This is a typical policy towards all CIS countries. Our main aim is to minimize the potential for a conflict. And have no lop-sided agreements. 

Note

¹ The interview is based on a public lecture that Alexander Yakovenko delivered at the International Summer School on Global Security held on July 9, 2007 by the PIR Center.



I
N
T
E
R
V
I
E
W
S

SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATION

Security Index is a quarterly publication available via paid subscription. Subscribing to either the international (English-language) or Russian-language editions can be undertaken as follows:

OPTION A.

For those residing outside Russia/CIS – by becoming a member of the *Centre russe d'études politiques, Genève*.

Members of our organization based in Geneva will receive either the international or the Russian edition as they wish. To become a member of the *Centre russe d'études politiques, Genève*, please complete the online form available at: <http://crep.ch/fr/application.html>. Upon payment of the annual membership fee (corporate, individual, or student), you become a member of the Center, and together with subscription to the journal receive discounts on other services provided by the *Centre russe d'études politiques, Genève*. For additional information, please contact us by telephone in Geneva at: +41-79-736-9034 or via email at: info@crep.ch, or visit <http://www.crep.ch>



OPTION B.


For those residing in Russia/CIS – by becoming a member of the *Dialogue Club International (Moscow)*.



Both individuals and organizations belonging to the *Dialogue Club* will automatically receive both the Russian and international editions of *Security Index*, along with the PIR Center's other information and analytical publications and invitations to the Club meetings and other events. Either individual or corporate Club memberships are possible. There are discounts for journalists! Detailed information on the *Dialogue Club* can be obtained from by telephone: +7-985-764-9896, by e-mail: dialogue@pircenter.org, or on the PIR Center

website: <http://pircenter.org/club>.

And finally don't wait long! You can now pay your membership and subscription fees online. Simply visit <http://pircenter.org/index.php?id=1779> and pay with your credit card by submitting a form on the Web.



Andrey Makarychev

SECURITY AND THE RETURN OF THE POLITICAL: THE CRITICAL DEBATES IN EUROPE

Few terms in international political discourse have undergone as much evolution over the past several years as “security” and, as a result, this term has become one among many that are easily *lost in translation*.

This article is an attempt to gain a deeper understanding of and work up an analysis for application to modern international life of the concepts which are now forming in Europe and which make up the core of what is known as “critical research” in security. Having begun forming in the mid-1980s as *dissident* views, they segregate themselves from *traditional* research in two ways. The first of these is the expansion of the field of security-related problems. In this sense, the “critical school” continues the tradition of those researchers who hold that the trunk line of discussion about security consists in the “emancipation” of this concept; in other words, bringing into its orbit the broadest possible continuum of social groups whose positions could previously be disregarded as unsubstantial. As a result, the set of issues that can be publicly presented through the prism of security is expanding. The problem with this approach, as the “critical researchers” rightly noted, is that if “security” encompasses virtually everything around us, from terrorism to food prices, then this implies an expansion of the regulatory sphere (a reflection of this tendency are such terms as, for example, “risk management”). Politicians in many countries picked up on this rather quickly, using the expansion of this term for the purely pragmatic end of increasing state (and in many cases, police) presence in various areas of life and, consequently, growth in the mechanisms of state power. This is precisely why the question about how and by whom certain problems are “securitized” and the methods by which this is done are of key importance for the “critical school.”

The other important distinguishing parameter of this school is the use of non-traditional approaches to research, which are found at the juncture of post-structuralism and social constructivism. This is what explains the most important methodological thesis of the “critical school,” which states that research on the phenomenon of security outside of a values context and outside of the question of a normative choice is impossible. Thus, the critical school calls for “thinking politically” about emerging security issues and returning to a discussion about “first-order political questions”¹ that inevitably arise in this sphere.

The questions raised in this article are part of a broader discussion about this “lexicon,” which is used to describe security threats in the 21st century. Essentially, the debates about security are, in the broader sense, debates about the nature of (post-) contemporary political power.² An overview of these debates forces us to place the problem of the correlation of the concepts of politics and security at the forefront of our analysis.



A
N
A
L
Y
S
E
S

THE “CRITICAL SCHOOL” AND THE CONCEPT OF SECURITIZATION

One of the core concepts of the “critical school” is that of “securitization”. This term, which was coined by the “Copenhagen School,” provides us with an opportunity to look at the phenomenon of the security dynamic: any conflict can develop as a clash of “technical” positions, resolved within the framework of an ordinary, routine negotiation process, but as soon one of the components of the situation becomes one of opposition by a culture or civilization and leads to the mobilization of public opinion and the evocation of a sense of identity, the stage of politicization begins, at which point the conflict acquires the nature of a security problem. For example, the Kaliningrad problem, which started as a technical dispute over border-crossing procedures and the associated administrative issues, was first been politicized (as a result of it being transformed into a key issue in relations between the Russian Federation and the European Union), and then securitized (i.e., framed as a security issue). Similarly, one can follow the trajectory of the debates about energy issues: technical problems (oil and gas prices, transport routes, and so forth) acquire political overtones (inasmuch as they are included in the system of demarcating states according to the principle of “ours/yours”), thereby opening the road to further securitization (in the form of the concept of “energy security”).

Securitization in international affairs cannot be avoided because the “manufacturing of danger” is always included in the formation of socio-political identity. As Dutch researchers note, any community defines itself “as the good life, thereby reifying figures of societal difference and danger, such as the criminal, the terrorist, the invading enemy, the migrant, and so forth.”³ Here the basic problem, it would seem, is that any *distinction* can be presented as a threatening *deviation*. Hence, the articulation of such “personages” as the “deviant Other,” or “stranger,” neither organic or natural for the space in question.

Against this background, the work of one of Europe’s most radical political philosophers, Slavoj Žižek, appears to be of interest. He sets forth three types of security threat to modern Western societies: terrorism, Rightist Populist violence, and suburban juvenile “irrational” outbursts.⁴ In all three cases, a process of sociocultural construction of danger occurs: “The status of victim fully legitimizes any position taken by the victim... The only sign of the justness of your position is in your positioning yourself as a victim... But as soon as these victims begin to organize, they immediately become fundamentalists and terrorists, hence becoming extremely dangerous.”⁵ With this, Žižek shows the contrived nature of relations in the sphere of security. Moreover, it is impossible to delineate clear lines of identification in the modern world. In the United States, September 11, 2001, just like riots that took place later among Arab youths in France, showed that security threats are not external in nature. This radically confuses the search for an image of an enemy.

Žižek essentially develops an argument about the possibility of a movement towards “*de-securitization*,” i.e. a return to harmonizing positions among conflicting parties and seeking overlapping interests. Incidentally, no one can guarantee that the next step will not be “*re-securitization*,” i.e. the new articulation of security threats.

The theory of securitization can be regarded as a foundation of critical reflection in the security domain. It is referenced by the authors of one of the most interesting texts on this topic, known as the *Networking Manifesto* and entitled *Critical Approaches to Security in Europe*.⁶ However, in our view, it would be an oversimplification to view it, in contemporary critical research – in the form in which it exists at the beginning of the 21st century – as a simple continuation of the ideas of the “Copenhagen School.”

Their critical re-evaluation is linked to a very significant contradiction embedded in the concept of securitization: on the one hand, it presupposes an act (or process) of shifting one or another previously ignored issue into the political agenda; on the other, securitization leads to a further withdrawal of this question from the political arena per se into one of “pure security.”⁷ Politics, in other words, cancels itself out, repudiates itself. It is this last circumstance that is rejected by “post-Copenhagen” thinkers, inasmuch as the thesis that “security” begins where “politics” leaves off has led, if not to the opposition of these two concepts, then to the appearance of watersheds between them. Defined through the category of survival, security becomes its own kind of semantic “marker,” which signifies the prospect of undertaking

exceptional measures that are not necessarily “encoded” in the normal course of events. Security signifies the suspension of certain rules and presupposes something extraordinary, special, exceptional, falling outside of standard procedures, and directly connecting the concepts of security and sovereignty. Securitization thus places security questions outside the political framework, in effect de-politicizing them.⁸ It is this line of critical reflection, which touches upon the relationship between the concepts of security and politics, that forms new, critical approaches.

SECURITY AND POLITICS

As we indicated above, “critical thinkers” see the main problem as being that security, perceived outside the political context, is being carried beyond the boundaries of the public arena of power. The phrase that “security is the horizon of politics” should, obviously, be understood as an indication that securitization depoliticizes approaches to security by turning either to military power and coercion, or to biopolitical methods of control, monitoring, and surveillance that are presented as “normalizing” a society, “obviously necessary,” and not requiring political discussions.⁹

The nature of de-politicization in the sphere of security can be explained by several factors. First, de-politicization is a direct consequence of the fact that many ways of resolving security problems are presented as being based on universal norms and the consensus that surrounds them, which provides the authorities with an opportunity to take a comfortable and morally attractive position as embodying the interests of “all civilized people.”¹⁰ The war of “civilization” against “barbarism” (“Good” versus “Evil”) does not require political connotations, since one side is presented as the manifestation of “the universalist regime of truth,”¹¹ while the opposing side is characterized as “monstrous,” “inhuman,” “savage,” “barbaric,” and so forth.¹² Instead of managing the diversity that is inherent in any form of politics, we have before us a depoliticized project for establishing “common truth,” for which within the space of the legitimate there is nothing external (competition, alternatives, and anything unorthodox). The choice of “all humanity” as a point of departure for the war on terror thus leads to a point where any definition of an enemy becomes possible not within the framework of this “humanity,” but only outside its limits. In other words, the enemy inevitably takes on non-human, if not inhuman features, which automatically justifies taking the most ruthless actions against him.

“Critical researchers” fault the liberal-idealistic paradigm in that its constant references to “universalism” do not leave room for politics as such. Their counterweight to this is their insistence on the principle meaning of “singularities” in global politics.¹³ Having “a capacity to exceptionalize” is precisely what the “critical researchers” of security call upon us to do.

Second, the very act of foregrounding the concept of “war” (along with poverty, corruption, terrorism, and so forth) not only simplifies the problems of security and technologizes their solutions, it also undermines political discourse, depriving it of time as well as space for analysis and dialogue, as well as crudely marking the boundaries of what is possible from the standpoint of discussion.¹⁴ This is precisely how the thesis of contemporary anti-terrorist strategies “de-politicizes politics by always locating it outside of the realm of power.”¹⁵ In other words, they present a line of behavior for their state as “natural,” “obvious,” and “indisputable.” However, any norm, according to “critical research,” is the result of making decisions about the exclusion of certain specific practices or social groups from one or another community, and putting them “outside.” This is why a norm is not something self-evident, “natural,” and given once and for all; it is an object of political struggle. Accordingly, the “utter necessity” and “emergency” that governments refer to are, for “critical thinkers,” not “existential conditions,” but political requirements, built into certain discussions and requiring legitimization, elaboration, and argumentation.

Third, the establishment of de-politicized approaches is largely facilitated by the fact that general public opinion is inclined to perceive many threats (especially terrorist) as the manifestation of “senseless,” “irrational,” “dysfunctional,” and “baseless” violence that is not justified by any utilitarian or ideological rationales.¹⁶ This state of affairs, in the opinion of many European authors, is brought about by an absence of explanations for acts of terror and a lack of under-



standing of who is behind them, the result of which the terrorist figure is torn out of the “conditions of discourse.” Consequently, hypotheses about a “psychotic,” “inarticulate monster,”¹⁷ and so forth arise in the public consciousness. Following this logic, the sources and bearers of these threats remove themselves from the framework of the political arena, issuing it a challenge and refusing to seek a place within it. The functions of the state in this case are reduced to a *technical* means of law enforcement that do not require additional legitimization in the public political sphere.

Žižek called this model of power “ultrapolitics”: it calls for militarization (and, I would add, securitization) of politics by means of its radicalization, i.e. using the concept of war between “us” and “them,” “ours” and “theirs.” He also indicated that de-politicization does not eliminate violence, but, on the contrary, leads to increased violence: “the rejected political celebrates its triumphant return of pure, undiluted racist hatred in its most primeval form.” These considerations are important because they concern the establishment of a logical connection between de-politicization and the growth of right-wing nationalistic, xenophobic, and neofascist mindsets. Jacques Ranciere adheres to an analogous position: “When a conflict ceases to exist, its place is taken by undisguised, overt forms of hatred towards Others...”¹⁸

Thus, the sphere of security relationships itself (which presuppose something exclusive and extraordinary) became, thanks to the “Copenhagen School,” defined in opposition to “normal politics,” and, therefore, began to turn into a space walled off from public debate. Accordingly, politics ended up at roughly the same distance from security as a norm would be from an exception. This is precisely what does not sit well with the authors of the *Network Manifesto*, whose general thrust consists in defining the critical approach through the destruction of *depoliticized* practices and discourses in the area of security and the return of discussions to *political* channels. “The political is returning” – this could be the motto of the “critical school,” meaning a call for the legitimization of a certain problematic sphere, the components of which could be perceived as political units. This framing of the issue is highlighted within the context of terrorism and has several different aspects.

First, some experts express a paradoxical, at first glance, thought that terrorism does not have a substantive nature, i.e. it cannot be divorced from a certain “root cause,” be it poverty, social injustice, or the inability to resolve a specific conflict. This makes terrorism a *political* phenomenon in at least one important sense: if virtually *any* issue can be politicized (i.e. become the subject of political relations), so can then *any* demand, action, or challenge become “terrorized.” In other words, virtually anything can serve to motivate acts of terror, from the desire for power and money to religious and ethnic sensibilities.¹⁹

Second, the return of the security problem set to political channels raises the question of what can be said about terrorism and how it can be said. Against this backdrop, Žižek question about whether the Western mass-media would be ready to give airtime to an “uncensored” and “radical Other” – for example, a criminal or fundamentalist²⁰ – sounded provocative. Here, in fact, exists a logical conundrum: it’s understood that providing a platform to these people will contribute to the propagation of their views, yet total silence will lead to a situation where society never understands the logic behind socially dangerous behavior. It seems that we are dealing with a situation, the configuration of which depends upon our point of view. If we equate terrorism with irrational fanaticism, then the rejection of the very possibility of communication seems plausible. But if we acknowledge the existence of some logical connection between terrorism and mass poverty or the formulation of an identity, then the answer to this question becomes much more complex. Understandably, nations will remain categorically opposed to any communication with the enemy, but a significant part of civil society, it would seem, is ready to make such a sacrifice in order to save (possibly, illusorily), hundreds or thousands of lives.

By way of example, I refer to a November 2007 installment of *The Doha Debate* talk show on BBC TV, whose guests focused on several possible arguments for why a dialogue with terrorists is possible in principle. There is a rather widespread point of view that *Al-Qaeda* cells were formed by the United States during the height of the Cold War in order to fight the U.S.S.R and that, consequently, the United States (and, in the broader sense, the West), bears the responsibility for the emergence of this terrorist network. Here, the rough logic is: if these are your off-

spring, then you cannot “keep silent.” Furthermore, the dialogue with radicals and extremists could be conducted in religious terms that would reconcile the “executioners” and their victims. Finally, dialogue could be useful for purely practical reasons: large numbers of those who were recruited relatively recently and therefore have not had time to absorb misanthropic ideologies hang around the fringes of the organized “machines of death.” Whether we want it or not, these are the arguments that will, evidently, be marshaled by those who advocate communicating with terrorists.

Third, the most basic aspect of the political is the problem of the relationship between freedom and security,²¹ which is actively debated in European countries. The question boils down to which individual liberties citizens are prepared to sacrifice in order to succeed on the counter-terrorism front, and whether this sacrifice would lead to qualitative changes in the functioning of democratic institutions.

The intent to return the discussion of security issues to political channels reveals two essential problems: first, what understanding of politics is being discussed, and, second, whether it is even possible to logically separate the spheres of politics and security. In other words, is there, in fact, a *purely* political space to which “critical thinkers” propose returning the problem set of security?

If politics is perceived as a sphere of “normal” administrative rules and procedures, then there is actually a discontinuity in meaning between politics and security relations. But if politics are interpreted as a sphere of Schmitt’s “constitutive exceptions,” as a way of indicating to society who its friends and enemies are (for social constructivists, politics is a creation of “us” through a definition of “they”), or as a radical negation of the “rules of the game,” and the departure of the subject from everyday reality and the invention of a new reality (on which neo-Marxists and the “new leftists” insist), then the boundary between this kind of politics and security becomes less obvious. Many “critical thinkers” acknowledge this, supposing that “the political always relates to security.” It is important that “politics, being a creature of order and the preservation of that which matters most, cannot live without evil.”²² Consequently, it is sufficient to reevaluate our understanding of politics in order to doubt the necessity of returning the phenomenon of security to political channels: security will have already been written into politics through categories such as conflict, risk, breaking away, violence, and trauma.

The aforementioned thus requires us to recalibrate the sense in which we will be talking about the possibility of according (or restoring) political characteristics to the phenomenon of security. We see several potential directions linked to the discussion of the problem set of security through the prism of such categories as borders and identity.

SECURITY AND BORDERS

The rehabilitation by “critical researchers” of the political context, which is necessary for discussions about security, concomitantly brings up the category of borders: “the political moment is always connected with changes to borders.”²³ It is borders that define “what I keep, and what I give up”²⁴ Here, the key question is where, how, by whom these borders are drawn.

Here it would be appropriate to adduce the opinion of Rob Walker that the key problems of modern international relations hinge upon a category of borders that is regulative by nature: “We are here, you are there; they are somewhere else. We can let you in, and they will be turned away. Everyone must know his place, not only within the hierarchy of status, class, and social order, but also within the territorial space.” It is from here that the inevitable (re-) politicization of the security discourse takes its beginning, inasmuch as the political logic is that which insists on the existence of a border that marks out (defines, in the strict sense of the word) the concepts of “normal,” “lawful,” “acceptable,” “permissible,” and so forth. Political power is thus manifested through an ability to evaluate Others (to name them) and, on this basis, to authorize any form of discrimination or exclusion (including boycotts, sanctions, special operations, restrictions on the rights of certain groups, etc.).

All forms of order (including the “new world order”) are inevitably accompanied by the creation of borders separating “ours” from “theirs,” “developed” from “undeveloped,” “included” from



“excluded.” Indirectly debating with the different variants of the theory of transnationalism, “critical researchers” start from the premise that a world without borders is a world without political entities. The liberal-idealistic (or cosmopolitan) model, which could be simplified as “security through integration,” is not an authoritative model for “critical research.” What is more interesting is that, as a result, the boundaries between *left* and *right* types of security discourse are erased. An example could be the critique of multiculturalism by contemporary “new leftists” and neo-Marxists, in which the main role is played by the call to return to the regulatory role of borders as the most important element of peaceful coexistence between potential enemies (for instance, between different racial, ethnic, or religious communities). This argument was often used by the “new right” in Europe, but today it has made its way into the arsenal of the “new left,” whose political program is, in many ways, being built around the thesis of the “right to be different,” i.e., to preserve the cultural identities of various groups that do not wish to assimilate with others even if these others are their immediate neighbors. In other words, communication should presuppose an obligatory distance that would provide this “right to be different.” The thesis that “the lower the frequency of interaction, the more peaceful the relations between two social entities would be,”²⁵ should be regarded as a continuation of polemics with liberal theories that present integration as a key element to securing the peace.

In this regard, it is possible to again come back to Žižek’s thesis that terrorism is based not on the terrorists’ belief in their superiority and not on their wish to wall off their cultural-religious identity from the onslaught of global consumer civilization: “the problem that fundamentalists have is not that we consider them inferior, but rather that they themselves secretly think so ... The problem is not in the cultural difference, but quite the opposite: the fundamentalists are already similar to us because they have secretly been using our standards to evaluate themselves. Paradoxically, the fundamentalists do not have a sufficiently “truly racist” belief in their own superiority.”²⁶ With this pronouncement, Žižek comes to the understanding that, in one form or another, the distance between various socio-cultural groups should be woven into the fabric of social relations.

Within this context, it would be useful to refer to that *lexicon* which helps to formulate the concept of border within the security discourse. A good example of this would be the frequently used term “extremism,” the political sound of which is expressed with duality. First, it is impossible not to see the possibilities for its broad interpretation: many European experts suggest that “extremism” should include such diverse phenomena as anti-Semitism, Islamophobia, discrimination towards sexual minorities, and so forth. The inevitable politicization of the term “extremism” represents the other side of its conceptual “void”: only the form hides behind this word, but not the substance. But it is here where it is important to see the second aspect of politicization: anything that has its own *borders* could be considered extreme. Accordingly, the concept of extremism is important as one of the most precise indicators of where the borders of our “symbolic order” exist, beyond which begins something that threatens its foundations. Extremism is a type of social indicator: without it, we would not be able to tell where this border is located, however imaginary and mobile it might be. But this very same thought could be dialectically reversed: the definition of extremism often depends on our understanding of the meaning of this imaginary boundary between chaos and order, stability and instability, the permitted and the forbidden.

Political connotations can be heard as well in discussions about “multiculturalism,” which can describe various models of social interactions – “melting pot,” automatically “ingesting” and unifying groups of quite different origins and profiles, or a “kaleidoscope,” which, regardless of the setting, preserves the individuality of each fragment of the changing picture, as well as the definition *in* and irreducibility of each detail relative to one another. Upon careful examination, we see that here the same question arises – should the socio-anthropological boundaries between cultural groups, not all of which by any means wish to assimilate with each other, be clearly drawn (even if using a dotted line)? Actually, violence often emerges as a consequence of the collision between differing norms as a result of communication that is too intensive. If we look more closely at the direction in which many Western societies are moving, we will see a tendency towards the segmentation of social spaces. For example, in some U.S. cities, there exists the practice of providing different social groups with *their* police officers, who come from a particular social background. That same segregationist logic can be seen in the existence of

so-called “gated communities,” where affluent families live, walling themselves off from the outside world and preferring to live in relative isolation.

The most complex problems arise in situations of tight proximity between various social groups that adhere to incompatible cultural and ideological positions. Globalization is a problem precisely because it creates an illusion of closeness, mutual dependence, and interconnectedness. Consequently, the right to ignore the Other (one’s neighbor) should be restored and, therefore, the putting up of new *fences* (or drawing new boundaries) could be fully justified, and a certain degree of alienation is necessary for peaceful coexistence among various identities and lifestyles.

This is precisely how “critical thinkers” frame the question of boundaries, which allow us to maintain a certain distance and not approach too closely to those whose life experiences radically differ from our own. The fundamental problem, however, is that politicization of the security discourse by means of emphasizing the category of borders essentially reconstitutes the very same logic that leads to that aforementioned de-politicization, referencing the American vision of the “war on terror” as the fight between the self-evident Good and the obvious Evil. This is precisely why the political aspects are most vividly articulated when the boundary between “us” and “them,” which often coincides with the boundary between “security” and “danger,” is being analyzed as a flexible and unfinished construct that is potentially open to reexamination and all sorts of modifications.

If we are talking about geographical borders, the “critical school” makes it possible to see their various functions. Actually, borders can be: a) restrictive, demarcating territorial “security spaces” (boundaries); b) lines for crossing over into adjacent territories (borders); c) peripheral lines running along outside edges (margins); d) lines of contiguity between neighbors (frontiers)²⁷; territories with their own specific characteristics formed as a result of close interaction with neighbors and multiculturalism (borderlands).²⁸ In any case, boundaries are determined not so much by geographical categories, as by a “sense of belonging,” a set of voluntarily shared norms and values, adherence to certain ways of doing things. On the one hand, boundaries are “identity markers;²⁹ on the other, they are “agents of national security and sovereignty.”³⁰ Since any social entity assesses threats to its own security in light of one or another system of values, the concept of borders can vary depending upon the cultural context. Even if the border does not change, what can change are the views regarding what these borders represent: whether they are a mechanism of cooperation and expansion, or a barrier that provides protection from unwanted outside influences.

Extrapolating this line of reasoning to Europe, one can see that it becomes a discussion about what meanings could be imputed to the borders of the European Union. Three of these variants seem to present the greatest interest. First, the EU theoretically can take the path of forming consolidated borders as a fixed “line” that physically “delineates” Europe as a “gated community.” Second, borders can presume the presence (or formation) of a “buffer zone,” the functional purpose of which is explained by the presence of a threat on the other side of the border. Third, and finally, it is possible to discuss a model of a border that would be analogous to a colonial frontier that is constantly moving to the East and to the South. These latter two, more mobile models of a border, seem to have the greatest chance of being realized by means of the *Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (Barcelona Process)*, the *Northern Dimension*, and the peacekeeping “pact” for the Balkans, as well as the initiative developed by the EU for the Black Sea region.

SECURITY, IDENTITY, AND OTHERS

Utilization of the concept of identity is built into the political context as a referential object of security.

The link between security and identity conceptually manifests itself in several ways. For example, *security culture* – is a totality of the symbols, images, ideas, and conceptualizations of what lies at the basis of what sets a given social group apart from “others,” or “outsiders.” The “culture of security” forms its own “codes” that mark “security spaces” and separates them



from each other. *Security border* is a border that delineates various “security spaces” (either complementing or competing with one another).

These terms indicate to us the different facets of the “security-identity” node. First, it is often presumed that the “fundamental task of security – is maintaining an identity basis.”³¹ Second, identities mediate the creation of images of danger and can be used as a tool directed against the so-called “outsider.”³² Identity belongs to the category of fundamental social values (e.g., sovereignty), and therefore in different contexts can be perceived as being under threat.³³ Third, using identity as an analytical concept helps to realize why a society is inclined to accord central importance to a particular threat and secondary importance to others. To a significant degree, this depends on social factors: the stronger the intra-group identity, the higher the probability that the particular group will perceive external groups of actors as “outsiders.”³⁴

An equally important problem is that, using, by way of example, discussions about identity, we see essentially the same, contradictory situation that was noted in the previous section: an attempt to (re-) politicize our perceptions of security contain within them the possibility of a return to depoliticized approaches to the Other as a figure taken out of the limits of the “normal” space of power relationships and possessing imminent characteristics of intractable enmity. This is why, as we see it, within the context of implementing the “critical project,” not only are references to identify important, but, first and foremost, indications that identify is always fluid, its boundaries are difficult to pin down. Any identity is of a relative and fluid nature, hard to define, requires being provided with meaning, presumes an ability to be rearticulated and reconfigured under the influence of changing perceptions, formed in the public policy arena.

PROJECTIONS ONTO EUROPE

Since “critical research” grew out of European political philosophy, it would be logical to pose the question regarding how it might affect the positioning of Europe in the international security picture. In the most general sense, it can be averred that the argument advocating the return of the security problem set to the political realm fully comports with the nature of those challenges which the EU encounters in its capacity a “peace project.” It would seem that “critical research” opens different avenues of discussion on this subject.

First, these challenges touch upon EU expansion. The problem of accepting or not accepting into the EU countries such as Turkey or Serbia is of a deeply political (rather than economic or legal) nature. It especially touches upon the prospect of accepting Turkey: the main difficulties for Europe have to do with the unavoidable adjustments in the understanding of what constitutes European identity and, accordingly, statehood.

Using the terminology of Bahar Rumelili, one can see two different models, within the framework of which the image of the Other is formed. The first model of the relationship of the EU towards its neighbors is described by the formula “the other as less self,” according to which, figuratively speaking, the Other emerges as a “younger brother,” a less perfect resemblance of Europe itself. This Other tries to become indistinguishable from the EU and to conform to its standards, but needs help to do so. Proceeding from such logic, the Other can be pressured to attain “normalization,” i.e. to exhibit those behaviors that would fall within the framework of existing standards. This is the type of Other that Žižek wrote about: we are more often tolerant of the Other which does not challenge, even symbolically, i.e. of the Other which lacks his own essence, his own cultural roots and individual features. This is an artificial, assimilated *sterile* Other, adapted to our life, i.e. one who has adopted our culture, traditions, rituals, faith, and “rules of the game.”³⁵

The second model is based on another formula – “the other as non-self,” according to which the Other is acknowledged by Europe as fundamentally different from itself and, correspondingly, not susceptible to external influences and not subject to substantive changes,³⁶ or presenting a certain problem for the EU (for instance, Belarus). It’s not difficult to see, for example, that, in this sense, Ukraine and Russia are in different categories: if the former is among those nations amenable to Europeanization and ready to utilize EU prescriptions, then the lat-

ter in the eyes of the European Union is approaching the acquisition of all the characteristics of insurmountable otherness.

However, there is a supposition that for Brussels it is politically disadvantageous to sharply differentiate between these categories: as the research of the Brussels CEPS center states, “any final frontiers position taken by the EU would reinforce the worst neo-Soviet, hegemonic inclinations inhabiting Moscow.”³⁷ Evidently this state refers to countries such as Belarus or Georgia: placing them in the category of *non-self* will signify an indirect recognition of their future status in Russia’s sphere of influence.

Second, Brussels encounters the necessity of making an essentially political choice between one role (mission) or another, and, essentially, the *brand* with which a united Europe will enter the global world. This *brand* should highlight the unique aspects of the EU within the framework of the so-called West, which means to form a European identity, among other things, and in contrast to the United States. The vision of Europe as a “normative power” has every chance of becoming a key marker of European identity. A normative foreign policy adheres to *principles, values* (justice, democracy, human rights, the rule of law, the attainment of peace, assistance for developing nations, and fighting crime), and a non-normative one – adheres to strategic *interests*. In the words of Arnold Wolfers, normative politics follow so-called *milieu goals* (in contrast to *possession goals*), i.e. are directed towards changing the institutional environment by means of improving rules and procedures. Normative means include non-military (economic, diplomatic, social, and cultural) tools, including persuasion, promises of gain, humanitarian initiatives, technical assistance, and financial incentives. For instance, the main criterion for whether Croatia is ready to enter the EU is full-scale cooperation by its leadership with the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.³⁸ In other words, if the United States relies primarily on *coercion* (predominantly through the use of military forces), the EU relies primarily on *persuasion* (through the force of example). Europe tries to counter the American strategy of advancing its national interests from a position of strength with a concept of foreign policy based on the ability to influence by means of soft power. Europe counters the American strategy of exclusivity by elevating the attention paid to the general rules of the game, i.e. institutions and procedures. The EU, however, does not always act normatively, at times either resembling a modern version of the *imperial state* (say, with respect to Kosovo) or playing “*real politics*” with a clear geopolitical subtext (as it happens, with respect to the EU’s relationship to the Russian Federation) or by adhering to the logic of the *status quo* (for example, with respect to North Africa).

One group of skeptics devotes attention to the fact that this brand – “Europe as a normative power” – can be advanced by this group only against the background of the United States assuming the overwhelming volume of functions pertaining to a military response to threats to the general security (regardless of how successful they are in doing this). The other group of critical voices indicates that not only the EU, but virtually all leading countries build their foreign policies on the basis of normative arguments, simply formulated differently than in Europe. This involves China, India, the United States, Russia, and other nations that clearly have their own “normative agendas.” Many countries speak the normative language, which transports the key issue to a sphere where different norms collide.

The European Union, for understandable reasons, wants the world to associate it with a normative foreign policy; however, at the same time, it is important to see that this adherence to such a policy can itself assume different forms. There is a *de-politicized* version of normativity, in which the norm is perceived as something sustainable, immovable, and self-evident, not requiring any political discussions (for example “human rights” or “democracy”). Given this understanding, references to the norm signify a claim to action in the name of an indisputable principle, deviations from which are perceived as pathological, a kind of disease. Extrapolation of the norm to other countries in this case takes the form of a technological expansion of its sphere of application – this is how things stood with nations adapting to EU norms in preparation for joining the EU.

But there is another, *politicized* version of normativity, in which the norm is recognized as a social construct that defines identity and is conceived during the process of communication – including during conflictive communication – between equal constituencies of international



relations. Accordingly, the process of norm formation is always in inter-constituent interaction with the Other, a discussion with it, discourse; it is always a filling of “empty signifiers” with meanings. Here, the “Other” is not so much a carrier of a pathological deviation as a “conversational partner” or companion.

One of the problems with this is that the concept of “normative power” is realized in the absence of full-scale system of political constituencies within the European Union that can emerge only when the mission of Europe as a “normative power” is combined with its mission as a “security actor”. The importance of decisions which are *political* in nature in cases with *semi-protectorates* like Kosovo is emphasized, for instance, by the French expert Jacques Rupnik: “either you recognize that some people are criminals and terrorists and, accordingly, send them to God, or you acknowledge their legitimacy and do not object to their participation in elections.” Thus, the European Union pretends not only to be a “normative power,” but is compelled to try itself out in a different capacity, carrying out, among other things, a policing mission in support of security in Kosovo. Europe, in other words, must, perforce, learn the language of strategic goals, and not just the language of values and norms. Within this context, the decision by Brussels to send a mission to Kosovo is illustrative from the standpoint of how the EU gradually acquires the characteristics of a full-scale international constituency and the risks and unknowns encountered in this process.

Third, “critical research” helps us to look in another way at the sphere associated with regionalism, where a significant re-evaluation of the legacy of the “Copenhagen School” is also beginning to be noticed, especially that part which is connected with the concept of “regional security complexes.” Within its framework, borders are described as “zones of weak interaction,” where two types of states are possible – the so-called “insulators” that are geographically located at the juncture of different security dynamics and the “buffer states” that are themselves a source of securitization for rival blocs.³⁹ Other researchers, however, attempt to take a different look at the so-called “non-central” “outlying” regions and countries to which are affixed predominantly negative connotations and that have migrated to the “Copenhagen school.” A good illustration of this is the concept of *marginality* that comes from the work of the British scholar Noel Parker. The value of this concept lies in its description of the imminent duality of marginal positioning and its simultaneous orientation to various external centers of power. Here’s a convincing example: in Finland in the 1990s, the question of which geographical connotations for that country were the most effective was actively discussed; in other words, should it associate itself with the Baltic region (which was risky because of unclear prospects for the Baltic identity, which had strong links to the images of the European east), Nordic Europe, or Europe as a whole. Thus, the concept of marginality has to be perceived as an invitation to discuss various alternatives in the positioning of geographically outlying countries and regions. Marginality is a spatial category of identity that presumes resistance to the established order from the direction of peripheral elements of the structure. This is not a category that has been established once and for all; it is forming in the process of the so-called “games of recognition.” The actor can recognize or not recognize the marginal status that is assigned to it by others or it can call itself marginal on its own.

Different countries build the concept of marginality (even if they call it something else) into their political strategies differently. For instance, in the 1990s, it was extremely important for Croatia that the EU recognize its status as a European nation; for Russia, the same recognition seems to be less important – it regards itself as a European power in view of its history, not because someone invited it to join the *club of Europeans*. Thus, marginality is a position voluntarily assumed with respect to an inevitable center that, in and of itself, provides structure to one or another system of relations. If some territory does not consider itself tied to a particular center, and, moreover, confronts it, it cannot be marginal, inasmuch as it belongs to the alternative spatial order.

Using the category of marginality provides an opportunity to look at the space as a social construct. Spatial markers can change; the space can be *played with* and be filled with different meanings. There is an abundance of examples of how one or another marginal territory begins to feel crowded within the framework of an *official* spatial matrix; they start to tear away from it, distancing itself from certain geographical signifiers and moving closer to others. The for-

mer socialist countries which once formed Eastern Europe prefer to call themselves “Central Europe,” while Estonia, wishing to separate itself from the so-called Baltic States, more and more frequently associates itself with Nordic Europe. Throughout the 1990s, Slovenia and Croatia followed a strategy of “exiting the Balkans” and acquiring the characteristics that directly linked them to the “real Europe.” In this sense, one can confirm that marginal territories have their own secret weapon that can be used under certain circumstances. For instance, this was successfully done by Finland, thanks to whose efforts at least some type of policy towards transborder cooperation with Russia emerged within the EU. A contrasting example is Poland, which not only did not manage to implement its *Eastern Dimension* program, but within a short period of time damaged its relations with both Russia and *old Europe* as well.

At the same time, centrality and marginality do not so much stand in opposition to each other as they presuppose and are mutually dependent upon one another. For instance, it is thanks to its centrality in the key area of economics (the financial sector in Switzerland and oil in Norway), these two countries can allow themselves the luxury of remaining marginal with respect to the EU – not to join the union organizationally, but to utilize all its advantages of its structures, to include entering into the Schengen zone.

CONSEQUENCES FOR RUSSIA

For Russia, the situation thus described is important in view of several considerations.

First, Russia has more than once encountered situations in which security issues that it considered political were seen by other negotiating partners as having nothing to do with politics (for example, the Kaliningrad conflict at the beginning of this decade). At the same time, we know that Russia blames Western nations for a tendency to politicize issues that have to do, in Russia's opinion, either with rights (the Litvinenko-Lugovoy case), energy (the construction of *Nord Stream* or discussions about energy prices), or economics (the ban on imports into Russia of certain goods from Georgia, Moldova, and Poland). The crux of the problem is that Russia and the West speak with each other in different languages, which leads to a constant *struggle for interpretation*. Problems in communication arise when different approaches are mixed, whether consciously or unconsciously. For example, if one party explains its actions with references to economic or financial motives, and the other sees a hidden political or securitized agenda, then the dialogue begins to break down. Russia wants to be an active participant in communication, and is trying to learn how to explain itself in language that can be adequately understood by the Western political and academic community, but it does not always do so convincingly.


Second, for effective communications with European colleagues, it is important to understand into which contexts the concept of security is built. For example, what concept of security is offered to Russia within the framework of the four common spaces? Is it possible to break security down into “internal” and “external” parameters, as is the case with the “roadmaps”? Some of the questions relating to security are referenced in the economic realm, and the migration of people is divided into a “humanitarian and cultural” realm and the realm of freedom, security, and the rule of law. Terrorism, as well as the protection of minorities, is mentioned in two spaces. In the common space on external security, there are certain elements connected with the migration of people, although they are just as closely related to the space of research, education, and culture. Finally, how can one interpret the triad of “freedom – security – the rule of law”? As an attempt to depict a model of “legal security,” i.e. based on laws and thereby reinforcing freedom or as presenting security in the capacity of a *mediator* between freedom and the rule of law, as a compromise between them (the values of freedom require the *encouragement* of transborder flows, and legal norms require *control* of illegal traffic)?

These questions are even more urgent in that, within the EU itself, there is no unity in regard to all-European security. At the 2007 Lisbon Summit, Great Britain is known to have won itself special considerations relating to the legislation on cooperation in the area of securing the rule of law and internal security, including issues regarding migration and visa rules and procedures.



Even more important it would seem is the question about how Russia and the EU countries will try to overcome existing conflicts with respect to security. For instance, Alexander Vondra, the Czech deputy prime minister, called for equating “the manipulation or interruption of energy supplies” to a military threat.⁴⁰ Estonia forbade the Russian-German consortium from doing work related to the laying of *Nord Stream* within its territorial waters. Another step taken by Tallinn was to characterize the recent attacks by hackers against Estonian governmental and corporate Internet sites as an attack by “Russian cyber-terrorists,” that threatened the system of computer service provision in this Baltic nation, which requested official assistance in this regard from the European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA).

From the Russian side, the points of emphasis are placed just as confrontationally. In 2007, Vladimir Putin publicly interpreted the delay in the start of negotiations on the new agreement between the Russian Federation and the EU in such a way as to place the responsibility for the current lull on the European Union. Following from Moscow’s logic, it is ready to discuss the format of the strategic partnership, but our European colleagues need some additional time in order to come to an agreement among themselves and come out with a united position. Moreover, Russian authorities regularly bring up the lack of preparation of some countries (the U.K., Sweden, and Denmark) to cooperate with the Prosecutor General Office of the Russian Federation with respect to the extradition of fugitives hiding out within their respective territories. Again, bringing up this fact should be considered from the standpoint of the thesis that the root of the problem in bilateral relations should be looked for not in Russia, but in Europe.

In this regard, it is evident that discussion about security in the Russian-European format will inevitably bear a politically conflictive nature. The predominance of security issues in the overall format of Russian-European relations show that within basic perceptions of politics lie the reactions of a nation to security challenges. In other words, securitization itself forms a new political context within which the way in which the majority of power institutions function changes – be it in Russia or the nations of Europe. 

Notes

¹ Andrew Hurrell, “There are no Rules” (George W. Bush): International Order after September 11,” *International Relations*, Vol. 16 (2), 2002, p. 195.

² Jef Huysmans, “International Politics of Exception”. Paper prepared for presentation at SGIR Fifth Pan-European Conference, The Hague, September 9-11, 2004, p.5.

³ Henk van Houtum, Roos Pijpers, “The European Union as a Gated Community: Two-Faced Border and Immigration Regime of the EU”. *Antipode. A Radical Journal of Geography*, Vol.39, No. 2, March 2007, p. 296.

⁴ Slavoj Žižek. “Some Politically Incorrect Reflections on Violence in France and Related Matters,” <http://www.lacan.com/zizfrance.htm> (last accessed on March 17, 2008).

⁵ Slavoj Žižek. “The left should rediscover the genuine heroic conservative approach”. *Russky Zhurnal*, June 4, 2003.

⁶ “Critical Approaches to Security in Europe. A Networking Manifesto”, *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 37, No. 4, December 2006.

⁷ Olav F. Knudsen, “Post-Copenhagen Security Studies: Desecuritizing Securitization”, *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 32 (3), September 2001, p. 361.

⁸ Stefano Guzzini, “The Concept of Power: a Constructivist Analysis”, *Millenium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 33, No. 3, 2005, p.513.

⁹ Colleen Bell, “Biopolitical Governance in Canada’s National Security Policy”, *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 37, No. 2, June 2006, p.162.


¹⁰ Matthew Specter, “Perpetual War or Perpetual Peace? Schmitt, Habermas and Theories of American Empire”, *Political Theory Daily Review*, <http://www.politicaltheory.info/essays/specter.htm> (last accessed on April 4, 2008).

¹¹ Andreas Behnke, “Terrorising the Political: 9/11 Within the Context of the Globalisation of Violence”, *Millenium: Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 33, No. 2, 2004, p. 286.

- ¹² Brett Bowden, "Civilization and Savagery in the Crucible of War", *Global Change, Peace and Security*, Vol. 19, No. 1, February 2007, p. 4.
- ¹³ Nick Vaughan-Williams, "Beyond a Cosmopolitan Ideal: the Politics of Singularity", *International Politics*, No. 44, 2007, p. 112.
- ¹⁴ Lori Hartmann-Mahmud, "War as Metaphor", *Peace Review*, No. 14 (4), 2002, p.431.
- ¹⁵ Henry A.Giroux, "Democracy and the Politics of Terrorism: Community, Fear, and the Suppression of Dissent", *Cultural Studies and Critical Methodologies*, Vol. 2, No. 3, 2002, p.337.
- ¹⁶ Slavoj Žižek, *The Universal Exception* (London – New York: Continuum, 2006), pp. 194-196.
- ¹⁷ Alain Brossat, "Unspeakable". In *World in war: September 11, 2001 in the eyes of French intellectuals* (Moscow: Pragmatika kultura, 2003), p. 63.
- ¹⁸ Jacques Rancier, Jean-Francois Chevrier, Sophie Wahnich, "Democracy as a Political Form". *Zhurnal Ne 1. Politica. Filosofiya. Isskusstvo*, Winter 2003, p. 129.
- ¹⁹ A very similar thought was expressed in the language of cinematographic imagery: in the anti-utopian "V is for Vendetta," the face of the terrorist protagonist is replaced by a mask, which he never removes until the very end of the film. In the cinematographic collage "9/11", one of the segment plots is based how teenagers see a resemblance between the features of a passerby and those of Osama bin Laden. Both films underscore the other side of *faceless* terrorism – its depersonification, inability to establish one's own identity, and *getting lost* in the crowd.
- ²⁰ Slavoj Žižek. "Let's Do Without Sex; After All, We are Post-People!" http://www.ruthenia.ru/logos/kofr/2002/2002_12.htm (last visited on March 7, 2008).
- ²¹ Joanna Apap and Sergio Carrera, "Maintaining Security within Borders: Towards a Permanent State of Emergency in the EU?". *CEPS Policy Brief*, No. 41, November 2003.
- ²² Alain Brossat, "Unspeakable"..., p.74.
- ²³ Jacques Ranciere, *Hatred of Democracy* (London and New York: Verso, 2006), p.84.
- ²⁴ Mikhail Ryklin, *Deconstruction and Destruction. Conversations with Philosophers* (Moscow: Logos, 2002), 216 pp.
- ²⁵ Morten Boas, "Security Communities. Whose Security?" *Cooperation and Conflict*, Vol. 35(3), 2000, p.311.
- ²⁶ Slavoj Žižek, "Some politically incorrect speculations on the violence in France and not only there". *Logos*, No. 2 (53), 2006, p. 9.
- ²⁷ Christopher S.Browning & Pertti Joenniemi, «The Identity of Kaliningrad: Russian, European or a Third Space?» Paper presented at the CEEISA/RISA/NISA Convention, Moscow, Russia, June 22, 2002, pp. 3-4.
- ²⁸ Julian V.Minghi, «From conflict to harmony in border landscapes». In: Dennis Rumley and Julian V.Minghi, eds., *The Geography of Border Landscapes* (London & New York: Routledge, 1991), p. 15.
- ²⁹ Birte Holst Jorgensen, *Building European Cross-border Co-operation Structures*, Institute of Political Science, University of Copenhagen, November 1998, p. 19.
- ³⁰ Kari Laitinen, «Reflecting the Security Border in the Post-Cold War Context». *International Journal of Peace Studies*, Vol. 6, No. 2, Autumn-Winter 2001, p. 75.
- ³¹ Jevgenia Viktorova, «Borders, regions, and security: on an intersection». In: Pertti Joenniemi & Jevgenia Viktorova, eds., *Regional Dimensions of Security in Border Areas of Northern and Eastern Europe* (Tartu: Peipsi CTC, 2001), p. 29.
- ³² Richard Devetak, «Postmodernism». In: *Theories of International Relations* (New York: Palgrave, 1996), p. 195.
- ³³ Stephen M.Saideman and Beth K.Dougherty, «Secessionist Foreign Policy and the Strategic Use of Identity», at <http://www.ciaonet.org/isa/sas02/> (last accessed on March 21, 2008).
- ³⁴ Johan Eriksson, Erik Noreen, «Setting the Agenda of Threats: An Explanatory Model». Paper presented at the Waxholm Conference, August 16-17, 2002, pp. 9-10.
- ³⁵ Slavoj Žižek, *13 experiments about Lenin* (Moscow: AdMarginem, 2003), p.83.



- ³⁶ Bahar Rumelili, "Constructing identity and relating to difference: understanding the EU's mode of differentiation". *Review of International Studies*, No. 30, 2004, p.37.
- ³⁷ Michael Emerson, Senem Aydin, Julia de Clerck-Sachsse, Georgana Noutcheva, "Just what is this 'absorption capacity' of the European Union?" *CEPS Policy Brief*, No. 113, September 2006, p.20.
- ³⁸ Dick Leonard, "Croatia jumps at EU opportunity". *European Voice*, October 18-24, 2007, p.14.
- ³⁹ Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, *Regions and Powers. The Structure of International Security* (Cambridge University Press, 2003), p.41.
- ⁴⁰ Simon Taylor, "Can the EU unite over energy?", *European Voice*, October 18-24, 2007, p. 21.



Nadezhda Arbatova

RUSSIA, EU, AND COMMON SECURITY SPACE: *PROS AND CONS*¹

Despite numerous decisions of the European Union summits, the integration in the area of common defense, security and foreign policy has traditionally been and remains one of the most complicated issues in the life of united Europe. Security, by its nature, is such a sphere that affects vital interests of nations and citizens. Any international cooperation there requires maximum conformity of national interests, common threat perception and high level of confidence between the partners. Therefore, there are at least two prerequisites for successful Russia-EU security cooperation – the existence of EU's own security space and a level of relationship that would be adequate to the tasks set by the parties.

The idea of common space on external security (along with other common spaces – in economy, domestic security, research and education) took shape at the Russia-EU summit in St. Petersburg in May 2003. The establishment of such common space implied partnership in five major areas: strengthening dialogue and cooperation on the international scene; fight against terrorism; nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery systems, tightening export controls and disarmament; crisis management; and civil protection.

Being a breakthrough concept in essence, with a good strategic potential for the Russia-EU relations, the St. Petersburg initiative immediately caused substantial skepticism, as far as its implementation was concerned. Besides, many experts called into question even the seriousness of intentions of the parties. The common spaces should have been set up on the basis of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), which was a narrow, technical document, quite outdated by that time. The PCA could hardly serve as a sufficient and reliable legal framework for such a large-scale initiative. The St. Petersburg concept was underpinned, foremost on the EU side, with the desire to ensure new quality of relationship on the eve of the largest expansion in the history of the EU – its enlargement towards Central and Eastern Europe. The very logic of enlargement pushed the EU towards searching new forms of cooperation with Russia, which was left beyond the integration framework.

Being a merely symbolic document by nature, when embodied in the official document, the St. Petersburg initiative began to live its own life and encouraged the politicians to undertake further steps. For instance, it was deepened at the Moscow and London summits in 2005, where four roadmaps were approved. And the concept of four common spaces is accepted by Brussels and Moscow as a basis for new agreement that should replace the PCA.

There are three issues that should be dealt while analyzing the prospects of common space on external security – a) stimuli for security partnership; b) impediments; c) possible areas of realistic and specific interaction.



A
N
A
L
Y
S
E
S

STIMULI FOR EXTERNAL SECURITY COOPERATION

One of the most widespread points of view today is that economic and energy interdependence of Russia and the EU may serve as an imperative for interaction. According to *Eurostat*, EU's export to Russia has tripled in 2000–2006 – from 22.7 to 72.4 billion euro. The import doubled – from 63.8 to 140 billion euro. Russia-EU mutual dependence is even more evident in the energy sector. Moscow accounts for 44 percent of imported gas or in other words, for 24 percent of the gas consumed in the European Union. Russia's oil exports have also been growing since 2000 – in absolute numbers and as a percentage in the total balance. According to the European estimates, EU's dependence on external gas supplies will increase to reach 81 percent by 2030; as for oil, the figure will amount to 93 percent of total consumption. And Russia's role in these supplies will be quite significant.²

Even though this impetus seems obvious, one has to note that during the Cold War the Soviet Union had commercial ties with the West and even managed to maintain the dialogue in arms control sphere. But such limited cooperation did not change the substance of the relationship between the blocs. So economic interests create only some general grounds for cooperation between Russia and the EU, but they do not predetermine partnership in good faith, especially in the security area. The lack of trust with respect to Russia, which is partly the historical legacy and is partly accounted for by current Russian developments, forces the EU to keep a distance and regard Moscow primarily as «oil, gas, and nuclear weapons.» The EU realizes the importance of Russian supplies of hydrocarbons, but attempts to diversify the energy sources – this process sometimes takes the form of tough rivalry, a sort of *race* for gas and oil pipelines. Thus, energy interdependence accompanied with the lack of strategic partnership goals may become the reason for differences.

It is more probable that the stimuli for Russia-EU security cooperation should be rooted in objective coincidence of their national interests in the security sphere.

For instance, Russia and the EU have common vision of challenges that jeopardize European and international security. Both parties agree that such new threats are international terrorism, proliferation of WMD, and protracted ethnic and religious conflicts. At the same time, it is clear that there is nothing particular in such coincidence – any member of the so called civilized international community shares similar concerns. This is why common threat perception in the post-bipolar world is again only a general framework for interaction – it provides for distinction between *the wheat* and the *chaff*. It is important that Russia, unlike the U.S.S.R, takes the same side as the West and in case of crises (e.g. Iraq) the dividing line does not separate east and west of Europe, but rather opponents and supporters of the U.S. military intervention.

Another reason for interaction is the common willingness of Russia and the EU to ensure stability in Grand Europe, notably in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The latter today is an apple of discord between Russia and the West. The EU is interested in having stability in the east, Russia needs stability in the west and in the south. Moscow's policy in the post-Soviet space is a major factor that will affect relations with Western countries. Meanwhile, Western policy towards the CIS is a certain *acid test* for the Russian political elite, as the latter tries to understand the genuine goals of post-Communist strategies of the EU and NATO. Such stability can hardly be achieved without Russia-EU cooperation, including military-political integration. The history knows other examples, e.g. when security of Western Europe was impossible without integration of France and Germany.

The EU nations (most of which are NATO members and have foreign troops, bases, nuclear weapons stationed on their territory; two countries are even nuclear weapon states) and Russia have excessive military potential with significant offensive forces, so they can hardly be merely *neighbors* and avoid suspicions and mutual apprehensions. This problem is partly solved by the disarmament treaties (such as the CFE Treaty, the INF Treaty, confidence-building and transparency measures within the OSCE framework). Nonetheless, they regulate mostly strategic relationship between the rivals and, thus, only cement the confrontation. They are always selective by scope, prone to erosion due to political differences and can be circumvented or denounced (e.g. as the fate of the CFE and the INF Treaty shows now). Deep and

irreversible transformation of military relations between the nations and alliances may happen only through persistent military integration based on equal and mutual desire of all parties.

Finally, Russia and the EU have one more common interest – without each other they cannot become independent centers of power in international affairs compared to the United States, China, or other possible new superpowers, coalitions and transnational actors of the 21st century. Only after removing mutual military apprehensions, they can fully focus on other urgent threats and security challenges. Moreover, military-industrial and research potential, geostrategic positions, traditional strong points and practical experience of the armed forces of Russia and the EU may complement each other. Russia and the EU can play the role of global economic center, only when they are together, and, thus, in the future they may transform into a joint center of military-political power. Such pole will not confront the United States or other poles, but it may pursue independent policy, prevent international arbitrary actions, and have its own homemade project of rational world order.

COMMON SECURITY SPACE: KEY IMPEDIMENTS

There are three major groups of impediments that hamper the establishment of the common space on external security. Some of them are conceptual, others are just practical.

The first group of problems relates to internal development of the EU and the prospects of European integration. The European project is unique, but as far as its military-political dimension is concerned, skepticism dominates the minds, despite substantial success of United Europe in this area. Under the circumstances when the threats are amorphous and unpredictable and do not have clear military features, it is quite difficult to create an adequate military component. Unlike NATO, which was set up in different time and exists mostly by inertia, the EU deliberately follows this path of common security and defense policy. At the same time, the EU finds it hard to define the security space and this is a serious obstacle for cooperation with Russia, even from institutional point of view – interaction should have the object. So much depends on EU's ability to set forth the reasonable and sustainable strategy of further European integration.

After the most impressive wave of enlargement and failures in approving the Constitution in France and the Netherlands, the EU faced the need to seek a new strategy aimed at enhancing efficiency of the unique integration institutions. The prospects of EU's viability are crucial for Russia, since it remains Moscow's major partner in Europe and in solving urgent international security issues. Despite the adoption of the Treaty of Lisbon, the EU is still uncertain about the integration strategy.

«Architects of the integration process cannot decide whether foreign policy and security should be subject to integration. From the point of integration theory, foreign policy and security are dubious spheres for integration efforts. Even outright federalists assume that integration in these areas is possible only after successful economic integration; and economic prospects of *Europe of 27* are not shiny.»³

Today it is clear that the former strategy based on simultaneous and painless enlargement and deepening of European integration has failed.

The development of common foreign, security and defense policy in *Europe of 27* requires modernization of the structure and functions of the institutions, as well as changes in decisionmaking. The Treaty of Lisbon is a compromise between supporters of interstate coordination and integrationists. The pressure of some countries resulted in the removal of important provisions related to the European security and defense policy (ESDP). Ex-British Prime Minister Tony Blair suggested in June 2007 in Brussels that the post of the EU Foreign Minister should not be established – the union decided to keep the post of High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy with expanded functions. Poland succeeded in struggling against the cancellation of the unanimity principle as far as ESDP was concerned. Now this principle will be valid until 2014, despite the changes in the EU voting system. In other words,

«The results of the summits in Brussels (June 2007) and in Lisbon (December 2007) demonstrated modesty and complexity of integration perspectives of the EU in the foreign policy sphere. The area of ESDP did get legislative regulation. National security remains a full responsibility of the member states. However, after approval of the High Representative for Foreign Policy the institu-



tionalization in the area of foreign policy continues. The member states have managed to solve more or less clearly the issue of appointment and recall, as well as the status of the High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy. But his functions are formulated in a very general way.»⁴

According to the Treaty of Lisbon, the European Council, acting by a qualified majority, with the agreement of the President of the Commission, shall appoint the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (Article 9e). This person conducts the union's common foreign and security policy by making proposals and implementing the existing agreements. The major innovation here is that the High Representative will preside over the Foreign Affairs Council. He is also one of the Vice Presidents of the Commission charged with maintaining external relations of the EU with the world.⁵

The enlargement process makes urgent both the problems of governance and identity, i.e. future borders and reconsideration of the old slogan «unity in variety.» How much variety can the EU afford, if it wants to preserve the unique European project and the unique political system? Nowadays the EU seems to realize that the expansion should be limited to save the union. After admission of Romania and Bulgaria, the EU takes the pause, which can be used to shape a strategy towards other nations that are left beyond the enlargement framework. While Russia does not strive for membership, there are a number of countries in the CIS – Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, and Azerbaijan, – which have already declared their European choice. The *Neighborhood Policy* is an interim solution, it is a sort of break for the union; but the issue of their prospects for joining the EU is yet to be resolved.

The vision of further enlargement affects Russia's interests. Shortly before the EU expansion in the Baltics, the Russian leadership raised its concerns about the possible influence of these states (with their post-Soviet syndrome) on the elaboration of EU's general strategy. These countries became the biggest problem in the Russia-EU relations. Deepening crisis over Russian sanctions against low-quality Polish meat (2005), conflict with Lithuania about the accident at the 3-km section of the *Druzhba* oil pipeline (2006), clashes with Estonia over the removal of the Soviet war monument (2007) – all this had negative impact on Russia-EU dialogue on the whole. Russian-Baltic differences changed the initially favorable attitude of Moscow towards broadening and deepening of European integration. Russia used to emphasize the need for strong EU speaking with one voice – now it is concerned about the tone of this voice and the *soloists*.

The dichotomy between the goals of European integration (including military-political component) and traditional Atlanticism is a serious stumbling block for cooperation with Russia. The expansion of the EU and NATO eastwards has always been described by Brussels as a mutually complementing process. Even though NATO membership is not mentioned in the Copenhagen criteria as a mandatory prerequisite for joining the EU, the recent waves of enlargement indicate that for Central and Eastern Europe *de facto* it is. These countries first accede to the Western security system and only then may expect the EU membership. As far as the CIS is concerned, such practice will cause significant problems in relations with Russia and change its generally positive view on the EU enlargement.

Besides, the lack of convincing division of labor between the military component of the union and NATO, notably the very fact of NATO membership by most of the EU nations and investment of their primary resources in the alliance, may also hamper the interaction with Russia in establishing the common space on external security. At present, the EU has common security space only with NATO, exclusive of Russia. For instance, armed forces of the EU countries amount to 1.8 million people. 200,000 of them (slightly more than 10 percent) should have been initially assigned to the rapid deployment corps, so that 60,000 should be quickly deployed in the field (i.e. 3 percent of all armed forces). This is a low-efficiency use of the military resource and even such modest requirements make a problem for the member states. In accordance with the 2004 decision, Brussels have focused on the establishment of mobile units (1,500 men each), which are called battlegroups. They can be set up by a single country, or by several states and in cooperation with the NATO Response Force (NRF). Thus, such strong linkage with NATO and allocation of lion's share of resources on it impedes interaction

with Moscow, even from the institutional point of view (since again the cooperation needs the subject).

The back side of the EU ambivalence is connected with the negative attitude of the current U.S. administration towards military-political integration of the union. Some American politicians and experts consider it to be the threat to the U.S. interests. According to Sally McNamara,

«With warmer relations with Paris and Berlin, Washington might be forgiven for thinking that its strategic interests are now protected in continental Europe. However, this discounts the threat posed by the European Reform Treaty, signed by all 27 European Union (EU) member states on December 13 (...) The new treaty will shift power from nation states to Brussels in critical areas of policymaking – such as defense, security, and energy – where the United States finds more traction on a bilateral basis. It will restrict the sovereign right of EU member states to determine foreign policy and poses a unique threat to the Anglo-American Special Relationship. Above all, it is a treaty that underscores the EU's ambition to become a global power and challenge American leadership on the world stage.»⁶

This quotation is the best illustration of the attitude of some part of U.S. establishment to any, even modest, attempts of Brussels to gain some weight in the area of defense and security. At the same time, the reduction of U.S. presence and commitments in Europe, search for new missions and the exploit the allies for the sake of American interests, as it happens now in Iraq, potentially undermine the transatlantic link, the future of which depends on the U.S. policy.

Another group of problems is related to Russia's internal development. Bearing in mind that security integration requires a substantial degree of trust between the partners, one may presume that uncertainty of the prospects of domestic and foreign policy developments in Russia is still a serious obstacle for such integration.

Russia's *multivector* approach is different from Charles de Gaulle's *tous azimuth* policy, since for Moscow it is not a deliberate foreign policy strategy. *Multivector* approach indicates the lack of clear priorities, long-term plans and coordination of activities of all actors involved in the process. It proves that Russia's *European choice* has not become irreversible, final and acceptable to the new political elite and general public. Beside administrative chaos, such course is a result of tough ideological struggle of different policy grouping – each of them wants to promote its own model of domestic development, which naturally affects foreign policy priorities and the selection of partners and adversaries. In fact, *multivector* approach is a reflection of *sovereign democracy*⁷ and self-sufficiency, which are now in harmony with the concept of *Eurasianism* and *liberal empire*.⁸

Such *polyphony* also has a European dimension. At the level of declarations, Russia-EU relations occupy the honorable second place after the CIS in the list of foreign policy priorities. This happens primarily thanks to the current stance of Russia's top leadership, which is still more and more criticized by Brussels and accused of authoritarian rule. Such criticism is often justified, but it does not always take into account realistic alternatives inside the country, nor the effect of Europe's own sometimes erroneous activities on internal political struggle in Russia. Russia's *multivector* approach as a new version of *special path* is closely connected with the Western policy, since external isolation and totalitarian regimes are two sides of the same coin.

The dominance of raw material export in Russia's economy impedes not only economic modernization of the country, but also its integration with the EU. Such model is a model of authoritarian political system. It implies growing stratification of the society and the regions, extensive corruption, insufficient employment, loss of intellectual potential and skilled labor, and tough limits on budget revenues (due to the size of the country). Such approach feeds the policy of domination in the post-Soviet space for the sake of security and cheapness of transit pipelines and the desire to gain control over energy reserves in other CIS countries. Such model eventually leads to reorientation towards Asia as the most promising market for energy exports in the long run, it leads to favorable attitude towards authoritarian regimes and all aspects of nationalism, it brings new opportunities to play on contradictions of different partners. Selective cooperation between authoritarian and democratic states, including security issues, is possible, but integration and drift towards long-term alliances can happen only between the partners that have similar political regimes.

«Rapprochement and establishment of strategic political and economic alliance are beneficial for both Russia and the EU, but such turn of developments is not likely to occur in the next five-seven



years. The chances for such evolution may grow, if Russia adheres to the path of intense economic modernization and political democratization.»⁹

In other words, modernization and development of the knowledge-based economy is not only advantageous for nominal GDP growth. Such process implies changes in political system, formulation of certain foreign policy priorities and choice of specific allies.

«Today, at the edge of the 21st century, again in its long-suffering history Russia stands as a fairy-tale knight at the crossroads of national security strategies. Each of the roads is difficult and hides many sufferings and dangers – one is worse than another. But the choice should be made, eternal standing at the crossroads or jumps from one road to another are not good either ... Russia's security in the next century by all means depends on the correct choice of the path and persistent following of the selected road.»¹⁰

Just like the EU, but for different reasons, Russia is not an acceptable partner for security integration, at least, as far as its military component is concerned. The parties do not have an evident and specific common enemy. For modern Russia the reasons are clear – stagnation of the military reform due to the absence of effective political and democratic control over the armed forces, legacy of old militaristic traditions in the political elite and society, huge shortage of funding for the military in the last 15 years, the inability of the military-industrial complex to get accustomed to the market economy (except the sharp increase in arms sales), and destructive role of NATO enlargement, U.S. anti-legal course (elimination of the disarmament treaties, such as the ABM Treaty, START II, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, Chemical and Biological Weapons Conventions) and unilateral use of force beyond national borders (Yugoslavia in 1999, Iraq in 2003).

As a result, neither armed forces, no defense industry has managed to adapt to new security challenges and military demands, which could serve as a basis for military integration with the EU and partly with NATO. On the contrary, being left on their own, the military and defense industry inevitably reproduce traditional military tasks (which help to preserve their structure), military policy course and military construction patterns. Therefore, the large part of the armed forces, their structure and numerical strength, deployment areas, materiel and equipment programs, combat training and principles of recruitment are still designated for a large-scale or regional war with the United States, NATO, and Japan (up to 80 percent of nuclear weapons and 70 percent of conventional forces). It is clear that such approach cannot underlie effective military interaction, let alone integration with NATO and the EU. The units that may be involved in such cooperation (local conflicts, peacekeeping, rapid deployment forces) hardly account for two-three percent of the Russian Army and the Navy.

The third group of issues is connected with the Russia-EU relations and Russia's ties with the Western countries. This is a fundamental problem – the model of Russia-West relationship that was formed in the 1990s is now being broken, since Russia's positions have strengthened. Moscow does not want to follow the old rules, while its partners are not ready to accept the new ones. Nowadays the Russian leadership claims for recognition on four principal matters:

- ❑ Recognition of Russia as a fully-fledged partner on the international arena and not as an obedient executor of someone's decisions. In the 1990s Russia was following the course of the United States *volens nolens*, its interests were ignored – now such paradigm is unacceptable to any political party or state agency in Russia.¹¹
- ❑ Recognition of the right to have and defend national interests, even if they differ from the interests of the EU, NATO, and the United States (be it the Kosovo issue, the Polish meat, or the construction of U.S. missile defense facilities in Europe).
- ❑ Recognition of the post-Soviet space as a zone of special, vital economic, military, humanitarian and security interests of Russia in the broad sense of the word (this is not equal to the recognition of exclusive sphere of influence, domination, or dictate).
- ❑ Recognition of the right to conduct domestic reforms that take into account internal political situation and the public sentiments (i.e. the *post-Versailles* (humiliation of the 1990s) and the *post-Weimar* (fear to return to poverty and crises) syndromes).

The question is whether the *EU at 27* will be able to assess the current Russian situation and elaborate comprehensible and realistic integration strategy with respect to Russia. This is a principle matter for further development of relations between the two partners.

Another problem is the lack of legal basis for the relations – current framework is not adequate to the goals to be achieved, i.e. the establishment of the common space on external security. The PCA has expired. Its extension by default does not affect the St. Petersburg initiative. The negotiations on the new post-PCA agreement are under permanent threat of being blocked (like Poland did in the recent past). Approved roadmaps are not legally-binding. They could become some working documents under the umbrella of the Russia-EU general agreement (which would have clear definition of four common spaces). From substantive point of view, the roadmaps can hardly be called the roadmaps, since they contain only the open list of directions of cooperation without naming any specific programs or implementation deadlines. Therefore, there is an urgent need for a new treaty, which would not set forth unrealistic tasks for the foreseeable future (e.g. Russia's membership in the EU), but would move the relations from the lowest level, i.e. cooperation, to the next stage, i.e. integration.

Besides, neither Russia nor the EU has sharp vision of the final goal and framework of the common security space. There is a detailed list of areas of cooperation, but it does not answer the fundamental question – what does the very term «common space on external security» mean?

Cooperation on specific international security issues goes on without establishment of any common space. For instance, NATO-Russia Council (NRC) discusses a number of matters – from missile defense to oil spills on the shelf. However, this is a modest level of interaction, while the concept of common space implied something more solid. On the other hand, there is a military-political alliance – the supreme form of integration.

It seems that the common space is something in between. It is more than selective partnership, but less than an alliance, which implies the common perception of the enemy and threats, common strategy, operational planning, principles of combat training, coordination of military-technical policy, and compatibility of weapons and materiel. Unlike the common economic space, the common space on external security does not have criteria that could indicate its design.

Presumably, such criteria should include:

- Understanding of the common space on external security in geographical and functional terms;
- More than mere cooperation in solving international problems – the parties should determine joint course of action with significant military component (training and use of the armed forces);
- Common perception of key external threats and specific adversaries;
- Establishment of the administrative structures for military interaction;
- Compatibility of the armed forces of Russia and the EU at the level required to conduct joint peacekeeping and other operations.

Is there a common understanding about external security for Russia and the EU? This seemingly simple question immediately confronts serious problems, since external security space (unlike three other spaces) does not have specific geographical limits. Is the CIS included in such external security space and should Russia and the EU cooperate in the eastern part of the former Soviet Union and in Central Asia? How should the countries of the region be involved? There is no clarity and the issue has not been tackled yet. Russia tends to regard the CIS as its area of vitally important interests and the Western nations, including the EU, deny Moscow of recognition of such approach.

What shall be done with other security spaces that Russia is engaged in? Among them is the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which become more and more influential in Central Asia and adjacent regions. These two bodies have no link to the Russia-EU common space. Moreover, they are the source of contradictions, since Moscow claims for special role in these regions, while the West does its best to hamper the development of the aforementioned structures.



The same relates to the European Union, where most of the nations are NATO members. So Russia-EU common space *a priori* comprises a large part of NATO security space and, hence, Russia-U.S. security space. Today this area is full of confrontation and the term «space» can hardly be applied to Russian-American relations. A good proof for that is the Russian position on the CFE Treaty, the INF Treaty, and the debate on potential deployment of U.S. missile defense in Europe. It is quite difficult to separate these contradictions from the Russia-EU relations and it is impossible to put a dividing line in the security space of NATO and the EU.

What about energy security? How much is it integrated in the common space on external security? At the NATO summit in Riga in 2006, the issue of energy security was in the focus of attention and Russia was mentioned as a potential common threat and even the object for application of Article V of the Washington Treaty. Russia's recent doctrine of transformation into the *energy superpower* reminds of the energy export blackmail – just as the oil embargo was used as a foreign policy tool in 1973. Russia and the EU have little mutual understanding on how external security covers energy security. There is only some reciprocal irritation, suspicions, and increasing rivalry. Unfortunately, one has to admit that common interests do not prevail over competition here.

Is there a common perception of threats and enemies? As we have mentioned above, there is an agreement between Russia and the EU/NATO on the list of external threats. Most of them were formulated in 2003 in the European Security Strategy (*A Secure Europe in a Better World*). But as soon as the partners start discussions on definition of international terrorism, failed states or *rogue states* supporting international terrorism, there is no unity among them.

For Russia, terrorism is the radical Wahhabism of the North Caucasus and Central Asia (Chechen Islamic combat groupings, *Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan*). The countries that unofficially sponsor terrorism are Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Jordan, and Turkey, i.e. the U.S. partners and allies. The United States has never regarded them as sponsors of terrorism. Washington is quite skeptical about the Russian definition of terrorist movements, notably in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and in the North Caucasus. The United States believes that Iran is the primary supporter of terrorism, while *Hamas* and *Hezbollah* are terrorist organizations – and Russia does not agree. The European Union is obsessed with the Palestinian issue and assumes that Palestine is the key source of terrorism, including in Europe. Again Russia does not share this viewpoint.

There is no agreement inside the EU and NATO on the character of threats and the ways to resist them. The problems of Iraq, Iran, missile defense in Europe have eloquently demonstrated this. Within Russia there is no agreement either. Some military and politicians regard as threats the Islamic fundamentalism, conflicts in the south and potentially in the east (e.g. with China). But the majority of Russian elite considers the U.S. and NATO policies to be the primary security challenge. This is openly proclaimed in official documents, including the military doctrines and the security strategies.

There is no administrative structure that would maintain cooperation between Russia and the EU in the military sphere on a permanent basis. Theoretically such mechanism could be set up within the framework of the new treaty between Russia and the EU. Nowadays there is a permanent representative of Russia to the EU, who regularly meets the Political and Security Committee; there is a representative of the Defense Ministry at the Russian Permanent Mission to the EU – he has occasional contacts with the EU Military Committee. However, there is no standing working interaction, like the one that the EU has with NATO. Since 2005 the EU and NATO have agreed to have a permanent presence of the EU liaison officers at the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Powers in Europe (SHAPE) and NATO officers at the EU Military Staff.

All aforementioned issues are not taken into account nor analyzed at the expert or state level when the problems of common security space are discussed.

LANES OF COOPERATION IN EXTERNAL SECURITY

Even though the stimuli for Russia-EU partnership are important, the graveness of the problems and obstacles leaves little room for optimism. It is obvious that the establishment of the

common space on external security between Russia and the EU is still a distant perspective and the chances are slim. At present, one may speak only about the program of joint actions in the area of foreign policy and security, which may create prerequisites for the future common space. There are three major areas of potential interaction.

First of all, it is cooperation via NATO. Since there is no clear distinction between the military components of NATO and the EU, and EU's military organization is just emerging, Russia and the EU cannot circumvent the option of interaction via NATO. Besides, any Moscow's attempts to cooperate with the EU in military sphere without NATO would be regarded as a wish to split the Euro-Atlantic partnership and would be rejected by European countries. Hence, NATO format is quite acceptable for Russia-EU ties. If the threat of new division of Europe in the post-Soviet space is avoided, all means and resources of NATO in Europe will eventually be transformed into a military pillar of the European Union.

One of the key objectives should be the moratorium (*de facto*, if not *de jure*) on NATO enlargement within the CIS, as well as reiteration of NATO-Russia commitments to the principle of territorial integrity of all post-Communist states, including Russia's pledges to assist in the settlement of *frozen conflicts* in Georgia and Moldova. The issue of NATO enlargement is resolved easily – Russia should get an offer to consider the possibility of joining the alliance. NATO's leadership missed this opportunity in 2001, when President Putin stated in Brussels Russia's willingness to reconsider its attitude to the enlargement, if the process covered Russia as well.¹² In any case, unless Russia and NATO decide on the format of their relationship, neutrality of Georgia and Ukraine remains the crucial factor of stability in the CIS and in Europe as such. Such agreement would be extremely important.

- It would prevent further tensions between Russia and NATO, i.e. between Russia and the EU member states;
- It would help to avoid the dangerous conflict between Russia and the West due to the possible NATO enlargement that may include Georgia and Ukraine;
- It would remove the key obstacle for the development of military-political cooperation with NATO and the EU;
- It would restore the basis for new agreements on arms control and reduction in Europe;
- It would pave the way to shaping common space on external security.

Russia-NATO format may also encourage the following activities:

- Joint development of the unified system of air and missile defense and early warning on the basis of Russia's proposals set forth in summer 2007;
- Russia's involvement in the peacekeeping operations and interaction with the NRF and EU battlegroups, in order to implement the UN Security Council resolutions;
- Prevention of terrorism with the full use of lessons learned during the antiterrorist operation in Afghanistan. Russia can be engaged to NATO operation in Afghanistan together with the CSTO and the SCO, in order to stabilize the situation and prevent the revenge of *Taliban* (especially after inevitable U.S. withdrawal from Iraq).

As far as the Russia-EU direct ties are concerned, taking into account the experience of NRC, the parties should avoid the emergence of the *Matryoshka doll* of forums for eternal discussions. On the contrary, Russia and the EU should narrow down the agenda, but develop specific tasks and plans and provide for administrative and financial support (up to appointment of responsible state agencies and officials), and supervision of implementation.

The roadmap on external security approved at the 2005 Moscow summit contains the detailed list of cooperation spheres. Russia and the EU should select the priorities, the most urgent tasks and monitor their implementation. Among the areas to be cut off is civil protection (as it relates to domestic security), which should be replaced by military-technical cooperation. The resources and efforts should be concentrated in the following spheres:



- ❑ Combating terrorism and illegal transit of sensitive technologies and materials, enhanced practice of joint land, sea and air exercises;
- ❑ Cooperation between Russia and the EU on nonproliferation and export controls, in order to ensure better coordination within the existing international structures (NPT, IAEA, Nuclear Suppliers Group, Missile Technology Control Regime, and Wassenaar Arrangement);
- ❑ Joint long-term space projects of the Russian Aerospace Agency and the European Space Agency, including the systems of space monitoring of activities related to the MTCR and NPT;
- ❑ Cooperation in the area of crisis management;
- ❑ Establishment of the Permanent Military Mission at the EU Military Staff, regular participation of the Russian Chief of the General Staff in the work of the EU Military Committee; establishment in the future of the permanent Council on Planning and Coordination of Russia-EU cooperation in the common space on external security.

At the level of bilateral contacts between Russia and the EU member states the following activities are advisable:

- ❑ Military-technical cooperation, including supplies and joint production of heavy long-haul cargo aircraft, rocket launchers and armored vehicles, missile defense systems, small battleships and diesel submarines, fifth generation fighters, etc.;
- ❑ Space cooperation, including further satellite launches, use of spacecraft ranges, joint production of dual-use satellites for communication, navigation and meteorology.

Obviously the time will show what specific time limits, forms and ways of equal and mutually beneficial integration of Russia and the EU, including external security, may emerge. If Moscow pursues constructive and persistent line, the EU will sooner or later accept the new rules of the game, since they suit EU's long-term interests. In the long run, Russia's evolution from raw material exports to hi-tech knowledge-based economy accompanied with the strengthening of democratic institutions and norms could naturally eliminate all domestic contradictions and support the integration policy vector for the largest country and potentially the strongest economy in Europe. 🐼

Notes

¹ The article is written on the basis of the Concept of Common Space on External Security between Russia and the EU (by Nadezhda Arbatova and Alexey Arbatov) presented at the annual meeting of the Committee «Russia in United Europe» on October 5–7, 2007 in Stockholm.

² Vladimir Chizhov, «Moscow needs the strong European Union», *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, October 22, 2007, p. 23.

³ Ilya Tarasov, «Prospects of foreign policy unity in the EU», *Mezhdunarodnye processy*, Vol. 5, No. 3 (15), September-October 2007.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ http://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/Лиссабонский_договор (last accessed on April 20, 2008).

⁶ http://states2008.russ.ru/ssha_v_global_noj_igre/dogovor_es_o_reformah (last accessed on April 20, 2008).

⁷ The concept devised by Deputy Head of the President's Office Vladislav Surkov. See «Nationalization of the future», *Expert*, No. 43 (537), November 20, 2006.

⁸ Anatoly Chubais, «Russia's mission in the 21st century», *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, October 1, 2003.

⁹ Sergey Karaganov (ed.), *The world around Russia: 2017. Outline of the near future*, (Moscow: 2007), p. 121.

¹⁰ Alexey Arbatov, *Security: Russia's choice*, (Moscow: EPIcentr, 1999), p. 11.

¹¹ Alexey Arbatov, «Moscow-Munich: new contours of Russian domestic and foreign policy». *Working Paper of the Carnegie Moscow Center*, No. 3, 2007, pp. 13–14.

¹² Gareth Jones, «Putin Softens on NATO», *Moscow Times*, October 4, 2001, p. 1.



Anastasia Angelova

DRUZHBA NUCLEAR POWER PLANT: RUSSIA IN THE MARKET OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE¹

In recent years several countries have announced their plans to develop nuclear energy. Today nuclear power plants (NPPs) produce approximately 16 percent of world electricity, and the share of nuclear energy in the world energy mix is growing.² Most of production growth is coming from Asia. However many countries in Europe are also planning to build new nuclear power plants. NPPs are being built today in France, Finland and Bulgaria. There are plans to build new nuclear power plants or additional reactors at the existing ones in Romania, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Lithuania, Slovenia, Ukraine, and Belarus.

For Russia, as an active developer of national atomic industry and one of the major global exporters of nuclear fuel and nuclear technologies, this *nuclear renaissance* in Europe, especially in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), provides an excellent opportunity for export of nuclear technologies. For a long time the Soviet Union was the key player in the countries of the *socialist camp*.³ However during the last 20 years Russian companies in Central and Eastern Europe have been facing serious competition from Western companies, dealing with atomic energy, such as German *Siemens*, French *Areva*, as well as U.S.-Japanese *Westinghouse*. The European Union is also influencing the nuclear technologies market in Europe by providing the legal framework for atomic energy industry of EU member states, controlling the safety of nuclear facilities and regulating the nuclear fuel supply. Combined, these developments, undoubtedly, affect the position of Russian companies on the EU nuclear market, especially in Central and Eastern Europe.

EU INFLUENCE ON THE ENERGY POLICY OF CEE

In order to understand the opportunities for Russia on the nuclear technologies market of Central and Eastern Europe it is necessary to consider the EU influence on the atomic energy industry of this region. Most of CEE countries are already EU members or are planning to become EU members, what *de facto* places them under the influence of European institutions, in particular in the nuclear energy sphere.

Historically, the nuclear industry in Europe developed on a national level with significant differences from country to country. A treaty signed in 1957 established the European Atomic Energy Community (*Euratom*). *Euratom's* main goal was to regulate and to develop the European nuclear industry. This treaty in its current reading provides the European Commission with authority to protect the population from radiation and ensure supply of nuclear fuel for all the EU member states. *Euratom* also coordinated research in the sphere of



A
N
A
L
Y
S
E
S


nuclear energy and dealt with nuclear nonproliferation issues. However, the *Euratom* Treaty did not establish any clear European safety standards for the nuclear energy industry. Safety control was delegated to the national entities of member states. The European Commission was not able to regulate directly the national nuclear industries of EU member states.

For a number of years attempts were made to include specific safety standards into the treaty, most of them related to radiation safety of nuclear facilities⁴. However, no single legal base prescribing pan-European safety norms for nuclear facilities has ever been created.

Despite numerous efforts and multiple declarations of intent no common European energy policy has been created so far. In recent years, especially after the stand-off between Russia and Ukraine over the export of natural gas, the issues of common European energy policy and energy security are high on the agenda. A number of documents, aimed to formulate the general principles of the European energy policy, have been developed in the EU. The most recent and important one is the *Green Paper on a European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy*⁵ calling for development of a common energy policy for Europe and offering specific proposals on the substance of this policy. However, despite many documents containing recommendations and declarations, as well as several proposals by individual member states (for example, the so-called *Polish Proposals* to create an equivalent to NATO in the energy sphere⁶), no significant steps have been made to create a common European energy policy.

The approaches of EU member states to nuclear energy issues also differ. Countries like France, that covers 78 percent of domestic electricity needs with nuclear energy, stand for further development of the nuclear industry in the EU. At the same time, several countries, like Germany, are planning to stop producing electricity at nuclear power plants on their territory. And countries like Austria and Ireland are against using nuclear energy in the entire European Union. Nevertheless, the EU enlargement has led to a more favorable treatment of nuclear energy in the EU. With current internal differences on nuclear energy inside the EU and EU's rather limited ability to influence its member states' nuclear technology markets, the creation of a common nuclear energy policy in the EU seems unlikely in the near future.

Chart 1. The share of nuclear energy in the EU energy mix⁷



The best illustration of EU's real influence on the national nuclear industries of the CEE states can be provided by the EU membership negotiations. For the first time in its history the EU interfered directly into the nuclear industry of its future members and requested to shut down several nuclear reactors for their alleged non-conformity to safety standards. Keeping in mind the absence of a Europe-wide legal base defining safety parameters for atomic energy facilities, as well as the general fuzziness of the "EU safety standards" term, the abovementioned requirement is more likely to be interpreted as political pressure from the EU side. Issues related to shutting down or upgrading nuclear reactors became a subject of negotiations and a part of membership requirements put forward by the EU. It has also become a standard practice for Western companies to upgrade the Soviet-style nuclear reactors in order to bring them in conformity with Western safety requirements.

An important aspect of EU regulatory influence on the nuclear technologies market in CEE is the unofficial quota on uranium imports from Russia and CIS member states which equals 20 percent for natural uranium and 25 percent for enriched uranium. This quota was unofficially set in the beginning of the 1990s and it was formally specified in the so-called *Corfu Declaration*, which, however, has never been officially published. Today, when most nuclear reactors in CEE are of Russian design using fuel supplied by Russian company *TVEL*, such import restrictions can be treated as a serious barrier for the Russian company. According to Russian media, that Declaration expired on December 1, 2007, but it is still unclear whether it has been prolonged or not.⁸

BULGARIA

Bulgaria is one of the countries attaching strategic importance to atomic energy as a source of national energy supply. At present, there is only one working nuclear power plant in Bulgaria, Kozloduy, and another one, Belene, is under construction. Bulgaria is one of the major partners for Russia in atomic energy sphere. Both nuclear power plants use reactors designed in Russia. All of Kozloduy NPP fuel comes from Russia and all the spent nuclear fuel is being sent back to Russia.

Since 2001 Bulgaria has been creating a legal base for atomic energy industry development in accordance with new realities.⁹ The national long-term program on energy efficiency was adopted in 2005, including Bulgaria's energy strategy until the year 2015. It was aimed at attraction of investments into the energy sector and reduction of energy losses. According to the strategy, nuclear energy development is the key element of the national energy policy.¹⁰

In late October 2006, Bulgaria's *National Electricity Company (NEC)* officially declared Russian company *Atomstroyexport* a winner of the tender for construction of Belene nuclear power plant, the second nuclear power plant in Bulgaria equipped with two *VVER-1000* reactors with the capacity of 1,000 MW each.¹¹ *Atomstroyexport* in partnership with French *AREVA* and German *Siemens* competed in that tender against Czech *Škoda Alliance* allied with Japanese-American *Westinghouse*.

The value of Belene NPP construction contract is estimated at 4 billion euros (although, according to experts, the Russian bid was initially estimated at 2.6 billion euros) or 16 percent of Bulgarian GDP. That makes Belene the most expensive national project in the post-communist history of Bulgaria. The power plant construction began in 1980s, but it was frozen in 1990 due to financing shortages. That happened before the equipment was installed but after \$1 billion of national money had been spent. In 2003 the Government of Bulgaria has decided to restart the project. The main reason behind this decision was the need to compensate for the shutdown of the third and the fourth reactors at Kozloduy NPP as part of Bulgaria's EU membership agreement.

NEC will get the controlling stake (51 percent) in the new power plant. The remaining stake (49 percent) is targeted by five European companies: Czech *CEZ*, German *E.ON* and *RWE*, Belgian *Electrabel*, and Italian *Enel*. There were six contenders before, including *Electricite de France*



(EdF) which signed out in the end of 2007 due to “regional instability”¹², however saying that it intends to purchase electricity from that plant.

The Belene project is based on AES-92 design (two VVER-1000 units, each carrying a third generation reactor B-466). This design is the most suitable for the EU in terms of safety. Belene will be the first power plant in the EU built by a Russian company and it is undoubtedly a serious breakthrough for Russian companies to the European nuclear technologies market.

With regard to Kozloduy power plant, it currently works on two reactors out of six. Reactors No.3 and No.4 were shut down on December 31, 2006, according to the EU requirements, despite a positive safety evaluation made by the IAEA in its 2002 report.¹³ Reactors No.5 and No.6, which are operational today, were finally constructed in 1988 and 1993. These are VVER-1000 type, B-320 model reactors. In 1993 when all six Kozloduy NPP reactors were working, Bulgaria increased its export of electricity. As a result, it became one of the leading exporters in the Balkans, covering up to 60–80 percent of electricity deficit in the region.¹⁴

During the 1990s right until 2002, when reactors No.1 and No.2 were shut down, Kozloduy NPP had six reactors with total capacity of 3,760 MW. It was covering 40–47 percent of average annual electricity generation needs of the country.¹⁵ The EU membership agreement required Bulgaria to shut down reactors No.3 and No.4. This would lead to electricity shortages in Serbia, Kosovo and Macedonia. On April 11, 2007, at the meeting between Rumen Ovcharov (Bulgaria’s Minister of Energy at that time) and Bulgarian members of the European Parliament, initiated by Geoffery Van Orden (U.K. Member of Parliament since 1999 and reporter on Bulgaria’s progress towards EU membership), a declaration was adopted on “more flexible approach to” regional problems of energy use.¹⁶ According to Geoffrey Van Orden, the shutdown of the abovementioned two reactors “creates conditions for increased economic and political instability”¹⁷ in the region and also means that Bulgaria is not an electricity exporter anymore.¹⁸ Prior to reactors’ shutdown, supplies from Bulgaria covered more than 50 percent of electricity needs in neighboring countries, including Greece, Romania, Serbia, Macedonia, Albania, and Turkey. And at present, it will be able to meet only 20 percent of those needs. According to some estimates, the electricity deficit in Southeastern Europe will range from 15 to 20 percent if “no new nuclear power plants are built in the immediate future”.¹⁹ In this context the construction of Belene will mark Bulgaria’s return to the energy markets of its neighbors.

It is necessary to note a very negative attitude of government officials and the media, as well as the population of the country, to the shutdown of reactors No.3 and No.4 at Kozloduy NPP. Already in his first speech at the European Parliament immediately after Bulgaria joined the EU (January 1, 2007) President of Bulgaria Georgy Pyrvanov proposed doing additional safety checks of the two reactors. According to the Bulgarian side, reactors No.3 and No.4 at Kozloduy NPP corresponded to EU safety standards when they were shut down, what was confirmed by numerous IAEA inspections, and their shutdown was groundless.²⁰ The opinion of the Bulgarian President was supported by independent nuclear energy experts who believed that those two reactors corresponded to the EU security standards, because they had been upgraded using EU financing (PHARE Program)^{21,22}. European Commission was planning to modernize these reactors for temporary operation but the modernization that had been carried out actually put these reactors up to a standard which allowed for their further operation.

In practice the requirement to shut down reactors No.3 and No.4 at Kozloduy is a part of Accession Agreement and it is quite difficult to amend, because it requires getting approvals from all 27 EU member states.²³ For this purpose one would need to prove that Bulgaria was going to experience a serious energy crisis in case if the two reactors were closed. However, according to Andris Piebalgs, the European Commissioner for Energy, the need for electricity in the region so far is not a sufficient argument for reviewing the agreement.²⁴ However, serious negative effects are expected not only for Bulgarian economy but also for neighboring countries, and for the environment as a result of increased coal burning.

Regarding the compensations for electricity losses, the EU has paid 550 million euros for the shutdown of the two reactors in order to compensate for the losses until 2009. At the meeting between Bulgarian Minister of Energy Peter Dimitrov and Andris Piebalgs in November 2007, Bulgaria demanded a higher compensation for a longer period up to 2013 (following the example of other CEE states who also had to shut down their reactors according to EU demands).²⁵

Despite European Commission's negative stance on re-launching of the third and fourth reactors at Kozloduy, efforts to start revising the agreement have never stopped ever since Bulgaria joined the EU. For example, in January 2008 the Bulgarian Prime Minister together with other ministers and parliamentarians obliged *NEC* to consider a possibility of re-launching the reactors at Kozloduy NPP.

At the same time, many Kozloduy NPP supporters oppose Belene NPP. The choice of a Russian company for finalizing the construction of Belene has provoked a lot of disputes and discussions in Bulgaria as well as in the EU. The main argument of the anti-Russian opposition on this issue is Bulgaria's excessive energy dependence on Russia. According to the project opponents, Belene construction with Russian assistance will only increase this dependence. But according to the ex-Minister of Energy Rumen Ovcharov, Bulgaria's energy dependency on Russia was much higher, for instance, in 1999 when *Lukoil-Petrol* bought 58 percent of Bulgaria's *Neftokhim* petrochemical plant²⁶.

However, keeping in mind the forecasted growth of demand for electricity and the legally binding provisions of the Kyoto Protocol, the development of nuclear energy seems like a natural choice for Bulgaria. And in general, it seems incorrect to draw a direct linkage between choosing a contractor for Belene construction and increased dependence on Russian gas, oil, and coal.

Bulgaria's energy consumption pattern differs a lot from the Western countries' model. The main difference is in gas consumption. In Bulgaria the majority of gas is used in industrial sector and in electricity production. Only a very small portion is utilized by households and by the services sector, because there is no extensive gas distribution network in Bulgaria.²⁷ This leads to unreasonably high electricity consumption by households. From this perspective the project will lead to decreasing Bulgaria's energy dependence on Russia, rather than increase it, because electricity from nuclear plants is cheaper than from hydrocarbon power plants.

Meanwhile, the European Union strongly recommends diversifying the sources of supply of energy resources in order to decrease the dependence on Russia. According to Rumen Ovcharov, first of all Bulgaria should ensure the supply of necessary energy resources, and only then start looking for alternative sources. As an EU member state, Bulgaria will follow EU directives, but EU policy aimed at diversification of energy supply sources cannot hamper Russian-Bulgarian bilateral relationship.²⁸

Several European environmental organizations, including *Greenpeace*, a German environmental organization *Urgewald* and Bulgarian environmental activists vigorously oppose the Belene project and insist that the European Commission should not approve it. Their concerns and argumentation includes the following points: environmental risks and safety risks, lack of operational knowledge on the new type of reactors, lack of specialists and effective control systems, low nuclear safety culture of Bulgarians, high earthquake probability in the region and lack of demand for additional electricity in Bulgaria.²⁹ Moreover, according to a nuclear energy expert Georgy Kaschiev, this project plays into the hands of Bulgarian *energy mafia* and "will turn into a major corruption source in the country".³⁰

In terms of seismic security, IAEA research shows that this region meets the IAEA requirements on seismic safety for nuclear power plants construction. The Institute of Geography of the Bulgarian Academy of Science processed the seismic data of the region and also concluded that the Belene NPP location is stable and carries no seismic risk.³¹

In November 2007 the European Commission confirmed the conformity of the Belene project to European requirements and approved the contract with Russia (the *NEC – Atomstroyexport* agreement was signed on November 29, 2006) as a non-EU state. However, the project's



investment plan was officially approved by the Commission only in December 2007.³² Then it became clear that *NEC* will receive a loan (with government guarantees) of 600 million euros from *Euratom* and the European Investment Bank for Belene construction.³³ According to Bulgarian Minister of Economy and Energy Peter Dimitrov the reason for delaying the approval is the pressure by environmental groups.³⁴ It is important to note here that the decision of the European Commission has a nonbinding nature and it is primarily important for attracting investments into the project.³⁵ On January 18, 2008, *NEC* and *Atomstroyexport* signed a contract on the nuclear power plant construction.³⁶

It seems reasonable to discuss the future possibilities of constructing the third and the fourth reactors of the Belene power plant. Bulgarian Ministry of Energy is considering this option (according to Aisekhel Ruffi, political advisor to the Minister of Energy).³⁷ However, at present it would be too early to discuss its feasibility and the possibility of constructing two more reactors at Belene. In general, the project is a strategically important step for Russia on her way to the European market of nuclear technologies. The future of Russian nuclear technologies in the EU largely depends on the success of this project.

CZECH REPUBLIC

The Czech Republic is one of the most important partners for Russia in the nuclear technologies market. The nuclear industry of the Czech Republic (then Czechoslovakia) was born in the 1970s with the construction of the Dukovany nuclear power plant based on the Soviet second generation *VVER* reactors of *B-213* model.³⁸ Four blocks of the power plant were launched in 1979. Dukovany NPP uses fuel produced from uranium extracted in the Czech Republic. It is further enriched by Russian company *TVEL*. After Czechoslovakia's disintegration and Slovakia's refusal to take the spent fuel from the Czech Republic (initially spent fuel from Dukovany was shipped to Bohunice storage facility now located on the Slovakian territory) this spent fuel is stored in the Czech Republic. There are plans to build additional storage facilities in the country.³⁹

The construction of the second nuclear power plant, Temelin, was interrupted in 1989 due to financing shortages as a result of break-up of the socialist bloc. The construction was restarted in the 1990s with participation of Western companies. In the mid-1990s the Czech Republic signed an agreement with U.S. company *Westinghouse* to complete construction and upgrade the safety systems at the power plant. In 2000 and in 2003 two out of four initially planned reactors of *B-230* design were finally completed after more than a decade-long saga marked by multiple protests and lawsuits from Austria (Temelin NPP is located close to the Austrian border), numerous IAEA and *Euratom* inspections, and the NPP became operational.

Aiming to join the EU and following the West's requirements on upgrading the safety systems, the Czech Republic signed an agreement on completing the construction of reactors with *Westinghouse* (the contract was marked by a corruption scandal).⁴⁰ It was also agreed that the American company will supply fuel for the Russia-designed reactors at Temelin. Cooperation with *Westinghouse* ended in 2007 when *CEZ*, the company operating the power plant and Russian *TVEL* signed an agreement on fuel supplies from Russia starting from 2009. The termination of contract with *Westinghouse* was accompanied by unloading of the reactor fuel, what, according to *TVEL* Vice President Pyotr Lavrenyuk, was "an unprecedented event in international practice".⁴¹

According to many press reports, the reason behind the termination of the contract, which resulted in the paying penalties to *Westinghouse*, was the mismatch of American fuel and Russian reactors. Frequent incidents, leading to power plant shutdowns, provoked regular protests from Austrian activists and eventually resulted in this quite radical move by *CEZ*. The same situation occurred in Finland where *TVEL* also replaced *Westinghouse* as the fuel supplier to the Loviisa nuclear power plant built on the basis of *VVER* reactors but with the use of western technologies.⁴²

Table 1. Nuclear reactors in CEE states⁴³

	Operational reactors		Reactors under construction		Planned reactors		Proposed reactors	
	quantity	Megawatts	quantity	Megawatts	quantity	Megawatts	quantity	Megawatts
Belarus	0	0	0	0	2	2,000	0	0
Bulgaria	2	1,906	0	0	2	1,900	0	0
Hungary	4	1,826	0	0	0	0	2	2,000
Lithuania	1	1,185	0	0	0	0	2	3,200
Russia	31	21,743	7	4,920	8	9,600	20	18,200
Romania	2	1,310	0	0	2	1310	1	655
Slovakia	5	2,064	2	840	0	0	0	0
Slovenia	1	696	0	0	0	0	1	1,000
Ukraine	15	13,168	0	0	2	1,900	20	27,000
Czech Republic	6	4,884	2	2,600	0	0	0	0
Total	67	48,782	11	8,360	16	16,710	46	52,055

In 2007 TVEL finally regained the nuclear fuel market for Russia-designed reactors. Therefore, it would be fair to say that *Westinghouse*, as the only alternative supplier for VVER-type reactors is not a competitor to TVEL at the moment. Yuzhno-Ukrainskaya nuclear power plant is the only project left in Eastern Europe with *Westinghouse* fuel for Russian reactors but its success is still to be confirmed.

Considering other possible aspects of nuclear cooperation between Russia and the Czech Republic, the energy strategy of the Czech Republic includes building several additional nuclear reactors. This may become a good opportunity for Russian companies, such as *Atomstroyexport*. The chance for Russian companies to be a part of these projects will highly depend on the success of *Atomstroyexport* in completing the Belene NPP in Bulgaria and on the EU nuclear energy policy. There are also opportunities for Russian companies in developing Czech uranium deposits, which are becoming increasingly attractive as uranium prices rise.

SLOVAKIA

Today Slovakia has two nuclear power plants: Bohunice and Mohovce. Two reactors based on Soviet prototype B-230 of the Bohunice Block 1 were launched in 1979 and 1981, and two reactors based on B-213 type of Block 2 were launched in 1985 and 1986. For several years since the 1990s Slovakia, aiming to join the EU, was pressured by the EU and had to shutdown Block 1 at Bohunice because it did not correspond to the EU safety standards. Finally, as part of Slovakia's EU membership deal, it was agreed to shut down two reactors of Block 1. The first reactor was shut down in 2006. Slovakia promised to shut down the second reactor by the end of 2008.

The construction of Mohovce power plant based on Soviet B-213 type reactors started in 1982 and was interrupted in 1990 due to the shortage of funding. In the early 1990s the Slovakian company-operator SE joined forces with *Électricité de France* and started a joined project on



completion of the first and second reactor in Mohovce. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) has offered a loan for the completion of Mohovce NPP reactors in exchange for the shutdown of first and second reactors at Bohunice nuclear power plant by 2000, even if the Mohovce reactors still would not be completed by that time. The EBRD loan also required modernization of other reactors up to level of the western safety standards and increase of domestic electricity prices by 29 percent.⁴⁴ Slovakia has eventually declined the EBRD offers and after lengthy negotiations agreed with joined proposals from Russia, the Czech Republic and several Western companies (like *Siemens* and *EdF*) to complete the construction of No.1 and No.2 reactors at Mohovce. Russia became one of the largest investors in the project concluding a deal, which also included an agreement on fuel supplies to the NPP. The No.1 and No.2 reactors at Mohovce were launched in 1999 and in 2000.⁴⁵

Russia also enjoys a monopoly position in fuel supplies for both power plants: Slovakia has been fully relying on Russian supplies for decades. Russia also takes part of the spent fuel back for reprocessing.

This kind of cooperation provides grounds for good prospects for Russia on Slovakia's nuclear energy market. According to recent announcements, Slovakia is planning to build No.3 and No.4 reactors at Mohovce. Italian concern *Enel*, owning a controlling stake in *SE*, has expressed its readiness to start the construction. In November 2006 President of Slovakia Ivan Gasparovic stated that Slovakia would give preferences to Russia in selecting the partner for the project based on previous positive experience in dealing with Russian companies.⁴⁶ The final decision on the main contractor will be made by *Enel* with the EU approval, and Russia has good chances to win the tender. In the tender on completion of construction of the Mohovce NPP, *Atomstroyexport* is competing with *Škoda JS*, although the outcome of the recent competition between these companies in the Belene⁴⁷ NPP tender is well-known.

HUNGARY

Hungary has only one nuclear power plant – Paks – equipped with four *VVER-440* reactors (*B-213*) built in the mid-1980s. It was upgraded in the 1990s by adding western parts in order to improve safety. 100 percent of fuel for the power plant comes from Russia and spent fuel is shipped to Russia for reprocessing and disposal. Hungary also stores spent fuel in its own dry storage facility.

In 2003 there was an incident at the Paks NPP during the works related to fuel handling (using the technology and equipment of *Framatome ANP*, today *Areva*⁴⁸). Russian company *TVEL* was invited to do repair works, which is a proof of high confidence in professionalism of Russian nuclear experts. Repairs were completed and Block 2 was launched in 2007. According to the Russian Ministry of Industry and Energy, “Russian and local specialists were engaged in restoration works. They were using unique Russian equipment and technologies exclusively designed to complete this project.”⁴⁹

It is worth noting that, despite the Paks accident, Hungarians are quite positive to nuclear energy. According to the European polling service *Eurobarometer*, in 2005, 65 percent of Hungarians had a positive attitude to nuclear energy, which is the highest level among the EU member states.⁵⁰

At present *Atomstroyexport* performs service and modernization activities at the Paks NPP. In 2003 the company won a tender for production and replacement of 24 high-pressure pre-heaters at four reactors and, according to the signed contract, provides equipment supplies to the plant.⁵¹ Moreover, “the Russian company will modernize the four blocks with *VVER-440* reactors in order to increase the unit capacity, extend their working life and incorporate new technologies, tested and certified at Russian nuclear power plants.”⁵²

Russia is planning to participate in a possible tender on the construction of the second nuclear power plant, possibly, based on the Paks NPP site. Taking into account the enormous accumulated positive experience of bilateral cooperation, Russia has good chances to win the tender. *Atomstroyexport* believes that its chances to receive orders for construction of new reactors in Hungary are “realistic.”⁵³

ROMANIA

Romania's nuclear energy industry is based on the Cernavoda power plant operating two *CANDU* reactors launched in 1996 and 2007. Both reactors were built by consortium of Canadian *EACL* and Italian *Ansaldo*. Cernavoda produces 18 percent of all the electricity in Romania.⁵⁴

With a view to maintain its energy security, Romania is planning to build the second power plant after the completion of the third and fourth power-generating units at Cernavoda.⁵⁵ It is planned to install *CANDU-6* type 720MW reactors on the No.3 and No.4 power-generating units. Their launch is scheduled for 2014.⁵⁶ According to Romanian President Traian Basescu, "the participants of construction of the No.3 and No.4 reactors will become strategic partners for Romania."⁵⁷

On the eve of Romania's membership in the EU, there were several public statements by the President of Romania and other politicians expressing concern about Romania's excessive dependence on Russian energy imports. At the same time, Romania actively supports forming of EU common energy policy towards Russia. Regarding Russian-Romanian relations, Minister of Foreign of Romania Affairs Mihai Razvan Ungureanu says, "Romania's eastern policy cannot lie in two separate drawers: as an EU and NATO member state in one and as a bilateral partner of Russia – in the other."⁵⁸ This means that serious nuclear cooperation between Russia and Romania is unlikely in the near future.

LITHUANIA

The nuclear industry is the key element of Lithuania's electricity supply. The 1980 Ignalina NPP (Block 1 launched in 1983, Block 2 – in 1987) equipped with the most powerful reactor in the world, *RBMK-1500*, provided 75–85 percent of Lithuania's domestic electricity needs, prior to the shutdown of Block 1 in December 2004.⁵⁹ However, according to the EU membership agreement Lithuania was obliged to shut down Ignalina NPP. This EU requirement was based on an assumption that this power plant would not meet EU safety standards due to the fact that its reactors were close in design to Chernobyl's reactors. The shutdown decision was firmly approved despite numerous modifications and upgrades of its safety system made in the 1990s. Block 2 is scheduled to be shut down in 2009–2010. Ignalina NPP dismantlement is largely financed by the EU.⁶⁰ EU has also decided to finance the construction of a mixed-fuel (gas/steam) power plant in Lithuania in order to compensate for the electricity shortages which would arise following the shutdown of Block 2.⁶¹

Lithuania has no uranium deposits. It receives uranium fuel from the Russian company *TVEL*. Fuel supplies will continue until Block 2 is shut down (approximately in 2010), but there is a likelihood that its operation will be extended.⁶² Lithuania stores the spent fuel in temporary or permanent storage facilities on its territory.⁶³

At present Lithuania plans to build a new nuclear power plant in place of Ignalina NPP. This decision was announced by the President of Lithuania for the first time in 2005 as part of the national strategy.⁶⁴ In 2006 it was also announced that Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia will participate in the project on the parity principles.⁶⁵ Later Poland will enter the project. According to initial assessment, the new plant will be built using one or two reactors (800 MW or 1,600 MW) by 2015. However, several experts believe that the new power plant may have a combined power of 3,200–3,400 MW and it could be launched by 2017–2020.⁶⁶

Extensive and difficult negotiations took place prior to this collective decision. In Lithuania itself the selection of the so-called *national investor* (which should represent Lithuania in the negotiations) was accompanied by a corruption scandal.⁶⁷ Finally, on February 2, 2008 the Lithuanian parliament adopted amendments to the *national investor* bill and brought together three Lithuanian companies *Lietuvos Energija*, *Rytu Skirstomieji Tinklai (RST)* and *Vakaru Skirstomieji Tinklai (VST)* to establish a new concern *Leo NT* to participate on behalf of Lithuania in the Ignalina NPP project. 61.7 percent in *Leo NT* will belong to the state and the remaining 38.3 percent – to the Lithuanian company *NDX Energija*.⁶⁸



In 2007 the Lithuanian parliament adopted a law awarding the state with a 34 percent share in the new power plant project and leaving 22 percent for each of the three partners.⁶⁹

With regard to the selection of subcontractor for the construction of the new power plant's reactors, it is still unclear what companies will take part in the tender. According to Reuters, American company *General Electric* has expressed its readiness to take part in the project. Lithuanian representatives are also considering *Areva* and *EdF* as possible reactor suppliers for the new power plant.⁷⁰

Today the political situation in Lithuania is unfavorable for Russian business. According to the Estonian media, Anisetas Ignatas, a representative of the Lithuanian Ministry of Economy, said on February 25, 2008, that *Atomstroyexport* would most likely not participate in the tender for the construction of reactors at the new power plant, because Lithuania, aiming to integrate its national networks with the European continental system *UCTE*, was planning to use Western-type reactors, "which would comply with the trans-Atlantic integration criteria."⁷¹ Keeping in mind the corruption scandal which accompanied the selection of *the national investor* and the play of *Russian card*,⁷² as well as frequent statements by the Lithuanian politicians stressing the need to decrease Lithuania's energy dependency on Russia, this message on behalf of the Lithuanian government official sounds more like a political justification of unwillingness to build the new power plant based on Russian reactor design, rather than a technical one. For example, Bulgaria's electricity networks are connected to the *UCTE* system, and Bulgaria does not see any technical problems in constructing the new power plant based on Russian reactors.

Therefore, possible barriers for the Russian nuclear business in Lithuania are entirely of political character, reflecting the current political climate in Russia's relations with the Baltic states.

BELARUS

The idea to build a nuclear power plant in Belarus is already approximately 15 years old. The concept of the Draft Nuclear Energy Development Program in Belarus developed in 1993,⁷³ included the plans to build nuclear power plants in Belarus. In 1998 the Parliament of Belarus adopted a 10-year moratorium on nuclear power plants construction, but the idea to develop atomic energy industry remained.

During the last several years Belarus was sending mixed signals on its plans to construct nuclear power plants. On May 2, 2002, President Alexander Lukashenko spoke against the development of nuclear power plants in Belarus on TV.⁷⁴ However, in January 2005, against the backdrop of Belarus confrontation with the Gazprom on gas supply terms, the President of Belarus told at the National Security Council meeting that construction of nuclear power plants in Belarus is just "a matter of time."⁷⁵ According to the Concept of Energy Security of Belarus adopted on August 25, 2005, the construction of nuclear power plants is seen as a necessary step towards a stronger national energy security and diversification of energy supply sources. Therefore, the development of Belarusian nuclear energy industry is targeted at decreasing the dependency of Belarus on Russian gas imports. The Concept also declares, that "the optimal way to develop the Belarusian nuclear energy industry is to launch several nuclear power-generating units with total capacity of 2,000 MW in 2015–2020."⁷⁶

In June 2006 the Government of Belarus approved an action plan, which provides for making an feasibility study of nuclear power plant construction, identification of suitable location, evaluation of project costs and other actions targeted at investigation of economic viability of the nuclear power plant's construction. On November 12, 2007 Alexander Lukashenko signed a decree *On certain measures related to the construction of a nuclear power plant*, outlining a set of preliminary organizational activities, needed to begin the plant construction, such as creation of "a dedicated organization, that will place orders for technical and economic assessments of nuclear power plant construction,"⁷⁷ selection of the "research organization to support the preparation and construction of the nuclear power plant."⁷⁸ The latter is the state unitary enterprise *Joined Institute of Energy and Nuclear Research–Sosny* of the National Academy of Sciences. Addressing the National Security Council on January 15, 2008, President Lukashenko announced his final decision to build a nuclear power plant. According

to the press service of Belarus Embassy in Moscow, “a schedule of nuclear power plant construction works has been developed, including parallel construction of two units – one to be launched in 2018 and another unit – one-two years later. This will allow launching the power plant into full operation by 2020.”⁷⁹ Location options include Kukshinovskaya or Krasnopolyanskaya lots in the Mogilev region.⁸⁰

Atomstroyexport's chances to get the reactor construction contracts are quite high. Russia and Belarus enjoy a long history of close political and economic cooperation. Bilateral scientific and academic research ties in the sphere of nuclear energy are also very strong. Russia seems to be the most probable partner for Belarus in training the qualified personnel for power plant operation. Therefore, it is very likely that *Atomstroyexport*, maybe in partnership with French *Areva*, will be selected for the construction of the power plant.

At the same time, despite the apparent final decision to build a nuclear power plant in Belarus, the project itself is in the early stage of development. At present, work is underway to adopt the legal framework, select the location and create the project management structure. Moreover, the cost of construction remains unclear as well as the mode of financing. According to a rough estimate by *Atomstroyexport* Vice President Alexander Glukhov, this project will cost Belarus \$8–12 billion rather than \$4 billion mentioned by the Belarusian side, because a nuclear power plant construction implies replacement of national electricity networks, construction of necessary infrastructure, including an entire satellite city close to the nuclear power plant.⁸¹ Therefore, at the current stage it seems unrealistic to make specific forecasts about the future of construction of an NPP in Belarus.

UKRAINE

Ukraine is the largest and strategically important partner for Russia in the nuclear industry. During the Soviet Union time Ukraine's nuclear energy industry was an integral part of the U.S.S.R nuclear energy complex. Ukraine's nuclear energy industry started its development with the construction of the Chernobyl power plant, which was launched in 1977. Many U.S.S.R research institutes and nuclear energy machine-building enterprises were located in Ukraine. Uranium was extracted here as well.

At the time of the break-up of the Soviet Union, Ukraine possessed 15 operational nuclear reactors, covering around 50 percent of national electricity needs.⁸² The Chernobyl catastrophe resulted in the moratorium on construction of new nuclear power plants in Ukraine; however, in 1993 the moratorium was lifted.

At present, the nuclear energy industry is the key industry of Ukraine's fuel and energy sector. Around 50 percent of electricity in Ukraine is produced by 15 active nuclear reactors at four nuclear power plants: Khmel'nitskaya (two B-320-type reactors), Rovnenskaya (two B-213 reactors and two B-320-type reactors), Yuzhno-Ukrainskaya (three B-302-, B-338-, B-320-type reactors), Zaporozhskaya (six B-320-type reactors).⁸³ The last working reactor (No.3) at Chernobyl'skaya nuclear power plant was shut down in 2000.⁸⁴

Ukraine plans to actively develop its nuclear industrial sector to reduce its dependence on gas supplies. Ukraine's Energy Industry Development Strategy until 2030, adopted by the Cabinet in March 2007, provides for the construction of up to 20 new reactors.

Ukraine also has one of the largest uranium deposits in Europe but it does not have the technology of full nuclear cycle and currently it receives almost all the fuel from Russia. Besides, Ukraine covers only 30 percent of its uranium needs.⁸⁵ Ukraine stores spent fuel on its territory and ships it to Russia.⁸⁶ Ukraine is also planning to develop a centralized spent fuel storage facility and has long-term plans to stop shipping spent fuel to Russia.

Ukraine develops relations with the European Union on nuclear energy. For example the EU was actively involved in financing the decommissioning of reactors at the Chernobyl power plant. Today, however, the EU's influence in Ukraine's nuclear energy industry is rather small.



In 2006 the government issued a regulation creating the state concern *Ukratomprom*, incorporating the national nuclear energy generating company *Energoatom*, mining companies and several research institutes. The aim was to integrate the nuclear fuel cycle and Ukraine's energy machine-building industry. At present the future of the concern is unclear due to the lingering conflict between President Victor Yushchenko, who is trying to break up the concern, and the heads of the main enterprises constituting *Ukratomprom*, who are questioning in court the presidential right to break up the concern by force of presidential decree.

The official reason for the presidential decree on *Ukratomprom's* elimination is a threat that the government may lose the ownership of its nuclear assets that may end up in foreign hands, which would jeopardize Ukraine's national security.⁸⁷ Most recently the Interagency Committee on Energy Security of Ukraine has made a decision to change the status of *Ukratomprom*. It recommended the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine to disband *Ukratomprom* in its current form and to separate *Energoatom* from the concern.⁸⁸

The fears of Ukraine's president originate in particular from the proclaimed plans to privatize Ukraine's nuclear power sector. These plans were outlined in *Energoatom's* draft strategy of the nuclear energy complex development until 2030 together with alarming proposals to actively attract foreign investments into Ukraine's nuclear energy industry.⁸⁹

In June 2007 *Rosatom* and *Ukratomprom* signed a protocol of intent to cooperate in the nuclear energy industry. Apart from general statements calling for closer cooperation the two sides expressed readiness to create joint ventures in uranium production and enrichment. As stipulated in the protocol, one of such joint ventures will coordinate interaction between *Ukratomprom* and *Rosatom*.

Head of *Rosatom* Sergey Kiriyenko also expressed readiness on behalf of Russia to transfer the technology of fuel rod bundles production to Ukraine. "We are planning to integrate completely the fuel assembly production technology chain. The final product will be made jointly, with Ukraine producing a minimum of 50 percent of added value," he said.⁹⁰ The head of *Rosatom* also proposed to "produce a joint Russian-Ukrainian fuel and ... trade it jointly in the third countries' markets."⁹¹

Moreover, the protocol indicates Russia's possible participation in the development of the Novokonstantinovskoye uranium deposit, zirconium and zirconium alloys production and production of nuclear fuel components in Ukraine. Russia also plans to participate in the completion of No.3 and No.4 reactors of the Khmel'nitskaya power plant based on Russian third generation reactors *VVER-1000*. In addition the two sides discuss possible cooperation in the Angarsk International Uranium Enrichment Center and in machine-building for production of fuel assemblies for *VVER* reactors in Novosibirsk. It was also officially stated that Ukraine and Russia have good grounds to jointly produce nuclear fuel for western *PWR*-type reactors.⁹²

Overall, despite the negative reaction from the press to *Ukratomprom* plans and regularly voiced concerns about Ukraine's excessive economic dependence on Russia, the future of bilateral Russian-Ukrainian cooperation in nuclear energy looks very promising. There is a lengthy experience of cooperation, a set of historical prerequisites (Ukraine's and Russia's nuclear energy industries were parts of a single system for a long time), and a clear mutual benefit from cooperation. Russia needs Ukrainian nuclear industry equipment (for example, Russia plans to buy turbines produced by Ukrainian JSC *Turboatom* for its nuclear power plants⁹³). Ukraine, on its part, is almost 100-percent dependent on Russian nuclear fuel supplies and needs Russian investments into uranium production.

Despite Ukraine's plans to diversify the supply sources of fuel and technologies for its nuclear industry, mentioned in Ukraine's Energy Development Strategy until 2030, according to experts, Russia will remain the main supplier of energy and technologies in the foreseeable future. As of today, Ukraine has a signed agreement with *Westinghouse* for the supply of 42 fuel assemblies in 2009.⁹⁴ It is planned that *Westinghouse* will supply fuel for Russia-designed reactors. The Ukrainian strategy says that there should be at least three suppliers of fuel for nuclear reactors. Ukraine has also proposed *Areva* to participate in fuel supplies for reactors in Ukraine, but the French company declined the offer. Moreover, keeping in mind the *Westinghouse's* negative experience of supplies to the Russia-type reactors in Finland and the

Czech Republic, there are no guarantees that the project to supply Yuzhno-Ukrainskaya NPP with U.S. fuel will be a success.

Summing up, in the near future Russian nuclear fuel supplier *TVEL* will retain its dominant position on the Ukrainian market. With regard to Ukraine's plans to create a full nuclear cycle, including spent fuel reprocessing, it is unlikely that these projects will be implemented in the near future and, most probably, Russia will continue enriching Ukrainian uranium and import Ukrainian spent fuel. Russia and Ukraine share great potential in developing nuclear cooperation. The realization of this potential primarily depends on mutual political will.

CONCLUSION


Russia has good chances to strengthen its positions on the European market of nuclear technologies. Most CEE states enjoy a long history of constructive cooperation with Russia in the nuclear energy industry, which provides good grounds for further strengthening of cooperation between Russia and CEE states in this area. Besides, the competitive position of Russian nuclear technologies on the CEE market is very strong.

Russian company *TVEL* is firmly placed in CEE as the supplier of nuclear fuel for Russian-type reactors, and in the near future there are no threats to *TVEL*'s monopoly as the supplier of fuel for *VVER* reactors. In the 1990s, the U.S. company *Westinghouse* tried to compete with *TVEL* supplying fuel for Russian reactors in Finland and the Czech Republic, but failed. Since 2007 both states returned to Russian supplies. At present, only Ukraine plans to use *Westinghouse* fuel for *VVER* reactors at Yuzhno-Ukrainskaya nuclear power plant.

Atomstroyexport's victory in the Belene tender is a historical breakthrough for Russia on the nuclear technology market of Europe. Success of this project will increase probability of more contracts of this kind with other CEE states planning the construction of nuclear power plants.

The nuclear industry of CEE states is characterized by a trend of merging Russian and Western nuclear technologies. Largely as a result of EU pressure most of the U.S.S.R.-built nuclear power plants in the CEE states are equipped with additional Western machinery, installed by Western companies in order to enhance safety. At the same time, Russian companies often participate in joint projects with Western partners at nuclear facilities in the CEE states.

It is fair to say that Russian nuclear technologies are treated ambiguously in the EU. Due to the Chernobyl catastrophe and contradictory political climate inside the EU, Russia's first and second generation reactors are assessed quite negatively. However, modern Russian nuclear technologies, and the Belene NPP example illustrates it perfectly well, are very welcomed. There is only one negative aspect of EU's influence on the position of Russian companies on the European nuclear technologies market, which is the remaining limitation on Russian uranium imports.

Therefore, despite the existence of certain problems, mostly of political character, it can be concluded that in the era of *nuclear renaissance*, Russia is not just in the lead, but also in a good position to strengthen its leadership in the CEE market of nuclear technologies and continue developing constructive cooperation with CEE countries in the atomic energy sphere. 

Notes

¹ For the purposes of this article the CEE countries are: Albania, Belarus, Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldavia, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Ukraine, Croatia, Montenegro, Czech Republic, and Estonia.

² "Nuclear Power in the World Today". *World Nuclear Association Information Papers*. June 2007. <http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf01.html> (last accessed on April 3, 2008).

³ Lynne Myers, "Nuclear Power in Eastern and Central Europe. Science and Technology Division". November 1993. <http://dsp-psd.pwgsc.gc.ca/Collection-R/LoPBdP/BP/bp357-e.htm> (last accessed on November 30, 2007).



S
E
S
Y
L
A
A
N
A

⁴ Council Directive 96/29/EURATOM of May 13, 1996 laying down basic safety standards for the protection of the health of workers and the general public against the dangers arising from ionizing radiation. European Nuclear Society. <http://www.euronuclear.org/info/encyclopedia/pdf/euratombasicsafetystandards1996.pdf> (last accessed on February 29, 2008).

⁵ *Green Paper. A European Strategy for Sustainable, Competitive and Secure Energy*. European Commission (Brussels: 2006). http://ec.europa.eu/energy/green-paper-energy/doc/2006_03_08_gp_document_en.pdf (last accessed on February 28, 2008).

⁶ Judy Dempsey, "EU urges an energy pact with Russians. But Poland objects and offers plan that excludes Moscow." *International Herald Tribune*. http://www.ihf.com/articles/2006/03/08/news/energy.php#end_main (last accessed on November 30, 2007).

⁷ *World Nuclear Association Information Papers (2006–2008)*. <http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/info.html#nuclearpower> (last accessed on April 3, 2008).

⁸ "Senators believe it unacceptable to extend the Corfu Declaration," IA REGNUM, October 30, 2007. <http://www.regnum.ru/news/907316.html> (last accessed on March 4, 2008).

⁹ *Country Nuclear Power Profiles: Bulgaria* (Vienna: IAEA publications, 2004). http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/cnpp2004/CNPP_Webpage/countryprofiles/Bulgaria/Bulgaria2004.htm (last accessed on March 21, 2008).

¹⁰ Agencija po energijna efektivnost. *Natsionalna dolgosrochna programa po energijna efektivnost do 2015 god* (Sofia: 2005). http://www.seea.government.bg/documents/NATIONAL_EE_PROGRAMME-last17.06.doc (last accessed on March 21, 2008).

¹¹ AES "Belene" (Bulgaria). *Atomstroyexport*. <http://www.atomstroyexport.ru/projects/current/project15/> (last accessed on March 21, 2008).

¹² "Giganti ukhazhvat nash ministr za "Belene", *Standart*, November 20, 2007. <http://www.standart-news.com/bg/article.php?d=2007-11-20&article=211814> (last accessed on February 28, 2008).

¹³ Blgarski atomen forum (Bulatom), http://bulatom-bg.org/Industry_statement.html (last accessed on March 21, 2008).

¹⁴ Marinella Jonkova, "2007-ma: Turbulentsii na energijniya pazar." *Energiyen nablyudatel*, December 2007. http://energy-observer.com/UsersFiles/Files/5_energien_pazar.pdf?PHPSESSID=4a4790dcb45f0067211eb268cbd7399b (last accessed on March 5, 2008).

¹⁵ *Country Nuclear Power Profiles...*

¹⁶ "EK neotcupchiva za AETs "Kozloduy"", *Portal Evropa*, April 12, 2007. http://www.europe.bg/htmls/print_page.php?id=7856&category=7&print=yes (last accessed on February 28, 2008).

¹⁷ "Rumen Ovcharov: Energiynata nezavisimost na Bulgaria sche se uvelichava." *Bulgarian Post*, April 17, 2007. <http://www.bpost.bg/story-read-11764.php> (last accessed on March 21, 2008).

¹⁸ It is worth noting, than on November 23, 2006 the Foreign Affairs Committee of the European Parliament did not adopt the amendment, proposed in Geoffrey Van Orden's report on Bulgaria, about additional checks of the third and the fourth power-generating units of Kozloduy NPP and an eight-month extension of operation of the two power-generating units. (The chronology of negotiations with the EU on the closure of first four Kozloduy NPP reactors can be tracked at the following website: [http://infocenter.bnt.bg/index.php/content/view/full/1022/\(offset\)/5](http://infocenter.bnt.bg/index.php/content/view/full/1022/(offset)/5) (last accessed on March 5, 2008).

¹⁹ "Nedostig na tok sled zatvoryanego na blokovete na AETs "Kozloduy", November 26, 2007. http://bulgaria.actualno.com/news_135844.html (last accessed on March 21, 2008).

²⁰ Slovo na prezidenta Georgy Pyrvanov pred Evropeyskiya parlament, February 1, 2007. <http://www.president.bg/news.php?id=2779&st=20> (last accessed on March 21, 2008).

²¹ PHARE Program is one of the three EU programs aimed at providing support to CEE countries on their way to EU accession. Initially the program was created in 1989 under the title *Poland and Hungary: Assistance for Restructuring their Economies (PHARE)*.

²² "Energiynata zavisimost void do politicheska slabost, smyata britanskiyat lobist Dzhon Koniam," Intervyu Ogniana Boyadzheva, February 8, 2007. <http://www.europe.bg/htmls/page.php?category=290&id=7259> (last accessed on March 21, 2008).

²³ "Bulgaria iska povtorno otvaryane na 3-ti i 4-ti blok na AETs Kozloduy" <http://infocenter.bnt.bg/content/view/full/1255> (last accessed on April 3, 2008).

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Ivaylo Velkov, "Vdigame osche dva reaktora v "Belene". Nastoyavame Bryuksel da uvelichi kompensatsiite za AETs "Kozloduy", *Standart*, November 14, 2007. <http://www.standartnews.com/bg/article.php?d=2007-11-14&article=211128> (last accessed on March 21, 2008).

²⁶ Iva Nikolova, "Rumen Ovcharov, ministr na ikonomikata n energetikata: Ubedikhme *Gazprom* da ni dade morkova, a ne toyagata," *Politika*, February 16, 2007. <http://www.mi.government.bg/pr/memo/mdoc.html?id=201514> (last accessed on March 21, 2008).

²⁷ *Country Nuclear Power Profiles...* (last accessed on March 21, 2008).

²⁸ Dimitr Sbev, «Bulgaria i *Gazprom* sklyuchvat sdelka do kraya na godinata,» November 3, 2007. http://money.ibox.bg/news/id_83647773 (last accessed on March 21, 2008).

²⁹ «Ekolozi nastoyavat EK da ne dava sglasiye za stroitelstvoto na AETs "Belene"». November 23, 2007. http://eu.actualno.com/news_135600.html (last accessed on March 21, 2008).

³⁰ "Proekt "Belene" obyaven za osnoven iztochnik na koruptsiya v Bulgaria. NEK izvadi nov doklad za seizmichnata bezopasnost na terena za bdeschata tsentrala," November 23, 2007. <http://mediapool.bg/show/?storyid=134018> (last accessed on March 21, 2008).

³¹ "Ploschadkata na AETs "Belene" e na nai-spokoynot myasto v Bulgaria," November 23, 2007. http://bulgaria.actualno.com/news_135522.html (last accessed on March 21, 2008).

³² "NEK i *Atomstroyexport* podpisakha dogovora za AETs "Belene", *Dnevnik*, January 18, 2008. <http://www.dnevnik.bg/show/?storyid=449449> (last accessed on February 28, 2008).

³³ "NEK sche poluchi zaem ot 600 mln evro za AETs Belene", December 20, 2007. <http://news.expert.bg/n139958/> (last accessed on February 28, 2008).

³⁴ Ivaylo Velkov, "'Zeleni" ni slagat prt za "Belene". Bryuksel bavi odobreniyeto za AETs zaradi natsk na lobita", *Standart*, November 27, 2007. <http://www.standartnews.com/bg/article.php?d=2007-11-27&article=210986> (last accessed on February 28, 2008).

³⁵ Ivaylo Velkov, "Bryuksel osche sveti cherveno za "Belene". Bez resheniye na Evrokomisiyata trudno sche namerim pari za tsentralata," *Standart*, November 27, 2007. <http://www.standartnews.com/bg/article.php?d=2007-11-27&article=210417> (last accessed on February 28, 2008).

³⁶ "NEK i *Atomstroyexport*..."

³⁷ Ivaylo Velkov, "Vdigame osche dva reaktora..."

³⁸ Lynne Myers, "Nuclear Power...."

³⁹ *Soviet-Designed Nuclear Power Plants in Russia, Ukraine, Lithuania, Armenia, the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, Hungary and Bulgaria* (Nuclear Energy Institute, 1997). <http://www.insc.anl.gov/neisb/neisb5/neisb5.pdf> (last accessed on March 21, 2008).

⁴⁰ "Westinghouse is sorry for the corruption affair," April 30, 1996. English translations of articles discussing the *Westinghouse* scandal. http://www.ecn.cz/temelin/articles.htm#WESTINGHOUSE_IS_SORRY_FOR_THE_CORRUPTION_AFFAIR (last accessed on March 21, 2008).

⁴¹ Alena Kornysheva, "The Czech Republic will change *Westinghouse* for *TVEL*. The Czech NPP disrupts the contract for fuel supplies with Americans," *Kommersant*. No. 95(3671), June 4, 2007. <http://www.kommersant.ru/doc.aspx?DocID=771168&NodesID=4> (last accessed on March 21, 2008).

⁴² Dr. Jiří Beránek, "Power supply strategy in the Czech Republic". http://manhaz.cyf.gov.pl/manhaz/strona_konferencja_2003/EPS2003_03en.pdf (last accessed on March 21, 2008).

⁴³ *World Nuclear Power Reactors 2006-08 and Uranium Requirements*. World Nuclear Association. <http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/reactors.html> (last accessed on April 3, 2008) Operational reactors: connected to the grid. Reactors under construction: real construction takes place. Planned reactors: the project has been approved, financed or firm commitments have been made; it is expected that they will be put into operation within eight years, or the construction is in advanced stage but has been suspended. Proposed reactors: there is a clear intention or proposal on their construction, but without firm commitments. The data is as of March 20, 2008.



⁴⁴ *Soviet-Designed Nuclear Power Plants...*

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ “Enel is ready to complete Mohovce NPP, Slovaks promise preferences to Russian companies,” *AtomInfo.ru*, February 26, 2007. <http://www.atominfo.ru/news/air1013.htm> (last accessed on March 21, 2008).

⁴⁷ “The Czech engineering for the Russian atom. Interview with Director General of Škoda JS Miroslav Fiala,” *AtomInfo.ru*, January 27, 2008. <http://atominfo.ru/news/air3184.htm> (last accessed on March 4, 2008).

⁴⁸ “Russian specialists eliminated 95 percent of damaged fuel in the course of restoration at the Paks NPP,” *Minpromenergo Rossii*, December 14, 2006. <http://www.minprom.gov.ru/lenta/tvel/5> (last accessed on March 21, 2008).

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ *Radioactive waste*, Special Eurobarometer 227/Wave 63.2, June 2005. http://ec.europa.eu/energy/nuclear/waste/doc/2005_06_nuclear_waste_resume_en.pdf (last accessed on April 03, 2008)

⁵¹ “Atomstroyexport modernizes the Hungarian Paks NPP,” RIA Novosti, May 15, 2007. <http://www.rian.ru/economy/branches/20070515/65512979.html> (last accessed on March 21, 2008).

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Potential projects. *Atomstroyexport*. <http://www.atomstroyexport.ru/projects/planned/> (last accessed on March 21, 2008).

⁵⁴ “Romania regards the issue of construction of a new nuclear power plant,” October 11, 2007. <http://www.minatom.ru/News/Main/view?id=49335&idChannel=682> (last accessed on March 1, 2008).

⁵⁵ “Rumyniya iska da postroi vtora atomna tsentraladata,” October 5, 2007. http://business.actualno.com/news_127110.html (last accessed on November 30, 2007).

⁵⁶ “Romania regards...”.

⁵⁷ Stiliyan Deyanov, “Namalyavane na energiynata zavisimost do 0,” December 18, 2006. <http://evropa.dnevnik.bg/show/?storyid=300905> (last accessed on November 30, 2007).

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ *Country Nuclear Power Profiles: Lithuania* (Vienna: IAEA publications, 2003). http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/cnpp2003/CNPP_Webpage/countryprofiles/Lithuania/Lithuania2003.htm (last accessed on March 1, 2008).

⁶⁰ “Ignalina NPP and the Prospects of Nuclear Energy in Lithuania” <http://www.euro.lt/en/lithuanias-membership-in-the-eu/ignalina-npp/> (last accessed on February 28, 2008).

⁶¹ Eugene Eteris, “EU Funds for the Baltic energy development,” *Baltic Course*, February 20, 2008. http://www.baltic-course.com/eng/eu_baltics/?doc=278 (last accessed on February 28, 2008).

⁶² “Lithuanian president warns parliament not to revise decisions on N-plant,” <http://www.euro.lt/en/news/lithuanias-membership-in-the-eu/news/323/> (last accessed on February 28, 2008).

⁶³ *Lithuania Profile: Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant*. The Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), updated December 2007. http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Lithuania/Nuclear/5007_5184.html (last accessed on February 28, 2008).

⁶⁴ “Lithuania should build new nuclear power plant: president,” October 5, 2005. http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200510/05/eng20051005_212619.html (last accessed on February 28, 2008).

⁶⁵ Laura Sheeter, “Baltic states agree nuclear plant,” *BBC News*, February 27, 2006. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4757304.stm> (last accessed on February 28, 2008).

⁶⁶ “Lithuania, Poland sign power deal, spurring nuclear plan,” AFX News Limited, February 12, 2008. <http://www.forbes.com/markets/feeds/afx/2008/02/12/afx4646091.html> (last accessed on February 28, 2008).

⁶⁷ “Russian card in the struggle for the Lithuanian NPP,” *AtomInfo.ru*, November 24, 2007. <http://www.atominfo.ru/news/air2712.htm> (last accessed on February 28, 2008).

- ⁶⁸ “Seimas passes nuclear bill,” *Baltic Times*, February 4, 2008 <http://www.baltictimes.com/news/articles/19765/> (last accessed on February 28, 2008).
- ⁶⁹ “Baltic nuclear plant hits snags,” January 2008. http://pepei.pennnet.com/Articles/Article_Display.cfm?Section=ONART&PUBLICATION_ID=6&ARTICLE_ID=317926&C=INDUS/ (last accessed on February 28, 2008).
- ⁷⁰ “GE to participate in Baltic nuclear project,” Reuters, February 5, 2007. <http://www.reuters.com/article/companyNewsAndPR/idUSL0584520520070205> (last accessed on February 28, 2008).
- ⁷¹ Linas Kmieliauskas, “Russians unwelcome in nuclear power plant project: Lithuanian official,” February 25, 2008. <http://www.balticbusinessnews.com/Default2.aspx?ArticleID=ac467e0c-aaa7-48ef-a263-98eeef1c8dee> (last accessed on February 28, 2008).
- ⁷² “Russian card...”.
- ⁷³ “Lukashenko grasps the peaceful atom.” *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, January 27, 2005. http://www.ng.ru/cis/2005-01-27/1_lukashenko.html (last accessed on March 3, 2008).
- ⁷⁴ *Belarus Profile: Nuclear Chronology 2001–2007*. The Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), updated December 2007. http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/Belarus/Nuclear/5460_5462.html (last accessed on February 28, 2008).
- ⁷⁵ *Ibid.*
- ⁷⁶ Aleksandr Zaborovskiy, Leonid Padalko, “Prospects of nuclear energy in Belarus”. <http://www.brcinfo.ru/bms/print.php?id=8> (last accessed on February 28, 2008).
- ⁷⁷ “Lukashenko signed a decree on construction of the NPP,” Finmarket, November 13, 2007. <http://www.finmarket.ru/z/nws/hotnews.asp?id=709954&rid=3> (last accessed on February 28, 2008).
- ⁷⁸ *Ibid.*
- ⁷⁹ <http://www.embassybel.ru/press/soft/2008/01/16/15847/> (last on accessed March 3, 2008).
- ⁸⁰ *Ibid.*
- ⁸¹ “Atomstroyexport: the construction of the NPP will cost Belarus more than planned,” *Telegraf*, February 22, 2008. <http://telegraf.by/belarus/2008/02/22/belaes/> (last accessed on March 3, 2008).
- ⁸² Here and below the IAEA data is used. *Country Nuclear Power Profiles* (Vienna: IAEA, October 2000). http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/cnpp2004/CNPP_Webpage/countryprofiles/Ukraine/Ukraine2003.htm (last accessed on February 29, 2008).
- ⁸³ *Nuclear Energy Profile. Ukraine. An Overview of Reactor and Uranium Production Facilities – 2008*. December 12, 2007. http://ukraine.suite101.com/article.cfm/nuclear_energy_profile_ukraine (last accessed on March 5, 2008).
- ⁸⁴ *Country Nuclear Power Profiles: Ukraine* (Vienna: IAEA publications, 2003). http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/cnpp2003/CNPP_Webpage/countryprofiles/Ukraine/Ukraine2003.htm (last accessed on February 29, 2008).
- ⁸⁵ Elena Beregovaya, “Problems of raw material supplies for nuclear energy sector”, November 13, 2007. http://uaenergy.org/2007/11/13/problemy_obespechenija_atomnoj_jenergetiki_syrem.html (last accessed on March 21, 2008).
- ⁸⁶ *Nuclear Power in Ukraine*. Uranium Information Centre, October 2007. <http://www.uic.com.au/nip63.htm> (last accessed on March 21, 2008).
- ⁸⁷ “Yushchenko: the establishment of *Ukratomprom* is an attempt to take the enterprise away from the state,” *Kievskiyi Vedomosti*, November 30, 2007. <http://www.kv.com.ua/archive/10148/political/10170.html> (last accessed on March 21, 2008).
- ⁸⁸ Oleg Gavrish, Aleksandr Sviridenko, “The concert is over. The Commission on Energy Security proposes to eliminate *Ukratomprom*,” *Kommersant* (Ukraina), No.194, November 2, 2007. <http://www.kommersant.ua/doc.html?DocID=821620&Issued=41428> (last accessed on March 21, 2008).
- ⁸⁹ “Privatization of the nuclear core, Enterprises of the nuclear energy sector in Ukraine may be privatized in the future,” *Gazeta*, August 20, 2007. <http://www.gzt.ru/world/2007/08/20/184906.html> (last accessed on March 21, 2008).



⁹⁰ “Ukratomprom and Rosatom will exchange the assets in compliance with the parity principle,” June 6, 2007. http://www.energoatom.kiev.ua/ru/media/nnegc.html?_m=pubs&_t=rec&id=16764&fp=517 (last accessed on March 21, 2008).

⁹¹ Sergey Shvets, “Association of two atoms,” June 16, 2007. <http://www.zn.ua/2000/2229/59617/> (last accessed on March 21, 2008).

⁹² “Ukraine and Russia have objective prerequisites for joint access to the world nuclear energy market,” September 27, 2007. http://www.energoatom.kiev.ua/ru/news/nngc?_m=pubs&_t=rec&id=17651&fp=73 (last accessed on March 21, 2008).

⁹³ Yu. Ovseenko, “Prospective directions of industrial cooperation of Russia and Ukraine: nuclear energy,” June 10, 2007. <http://misc.cnmmp.ru/newswithfilter/text.aspx? fileName=CONTENTID.71913.HTML> (last accessed on March 21, 2008).

⁹⁴ *Nuclear Power in Ukraine...*



Sergei Markedonov, Sergei Romanenko

KOSOVO: A PRECEDENT OR AN EXCEPTION?¹

From: Sergey Romanenko
To: Sergey Markedonov
Subject: A role model?

Dear Sergey!

Thank you for your agreement to participate in our discussion. It is not a secret for both of us that there two key issues to be resolved in the course of academic discussions and political negotiations on the possible status of Kosovo. Answers to these questions are crucial for, at least, mitigation, if not resolution of the conflict. The first question is whether the Kosovo case is a precedent, i.e. a principle and a model to be used in settlement of other similar situations related to national self-determination. The second question is to what extent it may catalyze the development of similar processes in other European (and non-European) countries.

Positions of the parties actually clash around these issues. On the one hand we have the official position of Serbia supported by Russia. On the other hand, the United States and most of the EU nations back their viewpoint. The answer is the key to determine further logic of the argument.

In my opinion, the Kosovo case is an example of self-determination aggravated with ethnic violence on both sides. However, it is the national self-determination of two ethnic communities that lived together for a long while, shared the same territory and regarded it as their Motherland.

I also assume that the importance of the Kosovo issue is artificially exaggerated – each party does it to pursue its own political goals.

Yours,

Sergey Romanenko

From: Sergey Markedonov
To: Sergey Romanenko
Subject: Balkanization

Dear Sergey!

Thank you for your comment. It raises a number of fundamental issues of practical and methodological character. First of all, the issue of “precedent” in Kosovo.

To my mind, the answer is not as complicated, as it may seem at first sight. Those who want to see the precedent in Kosovo will see it anyway. And they will interpret its self-determination



V
I
E
W
P
O
I
N
T
S

in the appropriate manner. It has nothing to do with formal law. It is useless to resort to logic or historical (sociological, ethnological) facts in this case. Those who use this case for their own political ends will not be persuaded by analysts, will not share their conclusions. It happens simply because analysts and politicians have different tasks in this situation.

I have the temptation to say – to avoid the Kosovo case, one should not have unilaterally and actively supported self-determination in the former Serbian autonomy. One should have thought out the implications of such step, ramifications for the Balkans or for the South Caucasus. Now it is too late to provide rational (and mainly reasonable) arguments that such ethno-political bread is not baked in one oven and cannot serve as a global solution.

However, I would like to note the potential “one size fits all” character of the Kosovo case. Self-determination in this situation is ethnic by nature (the struggle for it and political dividends from success are the prerogative of the Kosovars, i.e. Albanians, and not a benefit for all ethnic groups). And such approach allows other secessionist leaders to regard the Kosovo case as some sort of a precedent.

Such scenarios exist in political ideology and practice of *de facto* states in Eurasia (Abkhazia, Transnistria, South Ossetia, and Nagorno-Karabakh). Their leaders and unrecognized foreign ministers try to convince external observers that their republics have more grounds for gaining independence than Kosovo. As a matter of fact, we can speak about Balkanization of the post-Soviet space. Under the term “Balkanization” I mean the use of the Kosovo precedent as a tool in struggle for ethno-political self-determination. One has to note that despite negative attitude of the United States and the EU to such logic, the leaders of the “CIS-2” will hardly abandon this precedent.

By the way, the Kosovo precedent can also be noticed in the rhetoric of European ethnic movements (Basques, Catalonians, or Corsicans). The *Times* was right to make a bold forecast – by 2020 we might have 11 new states on the territory of the today’s European Union.

Yours,

Sergey Markedonov

From: Sergey Romanenko
To: Sergey Markedonov
Subject: Re: Balkanization

Sergey,

You wonder if Kosovization (which must be a modern synonym of Balkanization, or its special case) jeopardizes the world, or whether we simply try to customize this model to all other existing ethno-political conflicts. By the way this is a dangerous thing – it is impossible from academic point of view and counter-productive from practical point of view to confine the variety of ethno-political conflicts in Europe and in the world to the situation that emerged on a small territory in Southeastern Europe. All talks about the Kosovo precedent, as well as its uniqueness are abstract to a great extent and proceed from simplified understanding of present-day ethno-political processes.

Proponents of both approaches absolutize (in their own way) this specific case limited in time and space and having particular historical roots. It would be completely wrong to demonize the Balkans and to assume that this region is an exceptional core of all global contradictions and negative example for the entire Europe.

You fairly noted that “under the term “Balkanization” I mean the use of the Kosovo precedent as a tool in struggle for ethno-political self-determination.” However, I would add to this the conflict of geopolitical interests of the so-called Great Powers. If one speaks about external factors, unambiguous support from outside of the idea of independence (*de facto* of mono-ethnic statehood), especially self-proclaimed independence, means support to nationalist radical movements on both sides. Meanwhile, there is a need to back moderate, compromise-prone groupings – this was the goal of establishment of the troika (Russia, the EU and the

United States). By the way unequivocal foreign support of Serbian territorial integrity also gives impetus to national radicalism on both sides.

Figure 1. Explosive effect of Kosovo



Kosovo: what is next? Sri Lanka, Republika Srpska, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Transnistria, Chechnya, Palestine, Karabakh, Crimea, the Basque Country, Northern Ireland, Kurdistan, Xinjiang, Tibet, Quebec, Darfur, Pamir, Chiapas...

Source: Oleg Khromov, www.caricatura.ru, published on January 20, 2008

And one more thing. Why has Kosovo been chosen among the variety of ethno-political conflicts of the last twenty years as an exemplary model and nearly the engine of all other crisis situations? If one wants to have a precedent, he may remember the velvet divorce of the Czech Republic and Slovakia, the recent agreement in Northern Ireland, peaceful disintegration of the Soviet Union, etc.

I may repeat myself, but all ethno-political conflicts have the same nature, but different causes. Hence, I don't think it is reasonable to speak about fatal impact of Kosovo on other regions. It would be wrong to assume that everything that happens in one country should necessarily reoccur in other states.

Yours,

SR

From: Sergey Markedonov
To: Sergey Romanenko
Subject: Pavlov's dog or *sine ira et studio*

In your first letter, Sergey, you mentioned the exaggerated significance of the Kosovo issue due to political goals of the parties. It is true. But I would dwell on your assumption further. The importance of self-proclaimed independence of Kosovo (as well as of unilateral recognition) is exaggerated as well.

Let us put emotions aside. Isn't it clear today that Kosovo is an ethnic property of Albanians and Serbia has no real resources to Serbize the region? I think that Russian diplomats could be more balanced and rational in their statements. Their position could be – unless the UN Security Council recognizes Kosovo, one cannot speak about recognition of state independence of this territory.

After all, today 24 states recognizing Taiwan do not recognize China. And Beijing survives and doesn't bother about these trifles. And obviously, the recognition of Kosovo by Washington or Europe should not transform us into *the Pavlov dog*, whose reflex is to recognize *de facto* states in the CIS.

It is not in our interests to see Tbilisi using force to restore its jurisdiction over Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Moreover, in such case Russia could apply symmetric response (since any escalation of conflicts in the South Caucasus affects the Russian North Caucasus, Northern Ossetia and four Adyg-speaking entities in the western part of the region). But recognition of *de facto* states would immediately mean confrontation with the United States and the EU and creates potentially hazardous precedents.



I am not going to reiterate conclusions about possible secession of Tatarstan or Chechnya – there are no realistic grounds for that today. It would be enough for someone to visit the notorious *Kavkaz Center* website, which has recently informed about elimination of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria and its transformation into one of the provinces of the Caucasian Emirate. So this is not the case.

But the situation in the world changes very quickly and once created the precedent may work out in the future and not always to our benefit. I may remind you of the right to secession guaranteed by the Soviet Constitution. In the 1960s and 1970s the very appeal to this right seemed a fantasy. But in the late 1980s this clause became the factor of *Realpolitik*. Therefore, Russia should be more flexible, should not tie its policy to Kosovo or to Abkhazia, should keep its hands free and have multiple choices. Otherwise we may become a *Kosovo-dependent Great Power*.

Yours,

Sergey M.

From: Sergey Romanenko
To: Sergey Markedonov
Subject: Aliens and violence

Let us analyze the particularities of the situation in Kosovo (regardless of its influence or non-influence on other states). First of all, Kosovo is a result of internal crisis of the already non-existing countries – ethno-territorial Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia (the late 1980s) and its successor – the Union of Serbia and Montenegro (collapsed in 2006). Beside, one has to remember the crisis of the Serbian state after two world wars and under the Milosevic regime in the late 1980s. All these crises are still far from being resolved.

The Kosovo status is a problem of integrity of a poliethnic state, i.e. Serbia. Belgrade faces a tough issue, typical of any poliethnic or multinational state – how to defend the integrity. It can be achieved with centralization, unification and enforcement or with the provision of maximum freedom, including national freedom.

The same problem emerges (but vice versa) for the Albanian movement in Kosovo – how to achieve self-determination and national statehood, including full independence and sovereignty. This can be done by keeping the territory within the poliethnic state (autonomy, federation or confederation) or through secession, even with the use of armed struggle.

Albanians living outside independent sovereign Albania make a national minority in Serbia (they are an absolute majority on the territory of Kosovo), Macedonia, Montenegro, and Greece. Just like many other nations in the Balkans, they pass through the process of national self-determination. Therefore, the crisis has an evident regional dimension.

The paradox of the Kosovo situation is that the inter-ethnic conflict is caused by primarily internal reasons, mostly by the history of national self-determination. However, the resolution of the crisis has a huge external dimension, external factor is decisive, and any new borders would mean new conflicts in the future. It seems that the mechanics of settlement has not changed much since the 1878 Berlin Congress.

One has to note also two characteristic features of the political mentality in the Balkans. First of all, politics is regarded through the prism of ethnic identity as a series of interactions between ethnic communities, which are the only subject of law. Secondly, each national movement (and the state established by such movement) strives for complete coincidence of borders of the ethnic group (sometimes such borders are exaggerated without any specific grounds for this) and its state. This is considered to be a restoration of historical, social and national (as well as confessional) justice.

Both parties consider Kosovo to be their ethnic territory without *strangers* (other ethnic groups). Due to national psychology and ideology of Serbia, the secession of Kosovo is a

national tragedy. For Albanians non-secession would be the similar tragedy. None of the parties regard Kosovo as a poliethnic territory or entity.

Under these circumstances, ethnic violence applied by both parties and reminiscences of such violence further deteriorate the situation. Such memories of violence and crime (both at individual and mass level, mainly uninvestigated and unpunished) are components of national mentality and historical memory and, hence, make part of politics. Both parties, due to their historical development, lack the culture of democracy and consensus. This is why procedures democratic by form (elections, referenda, etc.) and political negotiations are not democratic by substance and remain a tool to continue the conflict instead of seeking compromises.

To a large extent, this is a ramification of state terror on the part of Serbia against the Albanian national movement, as well as of anti-state terror on the part of Albanian national movement in Kosovo and proto-state structures.

S. Romanenko

From: Sergey Markedonov
To: Sergey Romanenko
Subject: Brothers in arms

Dear Sergey,

In your latest message you consider a few matters. They include the external perception of Kosovo (among politicians and in the expert community), the ratio of the general and the particular, and the issue of ethnic violence in conflicts in the Balkans (or it would be better to speak about absolutization of violence by all parties of the Yugoslav tragedy). As for the general and the particular, I would only say that supernormal perception of the ex-Serbian autonomous region as some pattern occurs due to simple Eurocentric approach. In late 2007, for example, an Indian tribe in five American states proclaimed the need for secession from the United States, but this news had no effect (even on the websites of devoted opponents of America).

I assume that the secession of Quebec would not cause such harsh reaction as all intrigues around Kosovo. This is the reason for numerous *de facto* mistakes. Kosovo is portrayed (even by experts) as the first case of breaching the inviolability of borders after the 1975 Helsinki Agreements (as if there was no Eritrea, Bangladesh or East Timor). And it seems that Europe still shapes the primary agenda in the world – here I have to agree with you that not much has changed since the Berlin Congress.

I would like to focus on the problem of ethnic violence, which you analyzed in detail. I agree that internal problems (internal domestic dynamics as such) is more important for the latest crisis in the Balkans than any geopolitical games around the region. Without internal prerequisites for crisis, it would be ridiculous to speak about destructive role of external forces. Nonetheless, one has to note that such mediocre indulging in stunts by Great Powers in the Balkans in the past and today (and Lord forbid, in the future) only encouraged ethnic violence.

Now and then political games, transitory interests of Great Powers (which use ethno-political movements for their ends) strengthen the theory and practice of ethnic cleanliness. And here we touch upon an important issue mentioned by Antoine de Saint-Exupéry “You become responsible, forever, for what you have tamed.”

Germany and Austria should bear responsibility for Croatian democrats, the United States should take care of the Kosovar freedom fighters, and Russia should think of its Serbian Orthodox brothers. Lack of adequate understanding of the Balkans by the Great Powers, their inability to forecast the future (wasn't it clear what swift recognition of Croatia in 1991 or Kosovo in 2008 would mean?) enroot ethnic violence. Their support of this or that movement has created (creates and will create) wrong interpretations and high expectations in the Balkans. If Washington, Brussels, or Moscow stands for us, we can do whatever we want and all our sins (including ethnic cleansing) will be pardoned.

SM



From: Sergey Romanenko
To: Sergey Markedonov
Subject: One size fits all?

Dear Sergey,

Let us get back to the issue of extrapolation of the Kosovo experience, as it may directly affect Russia. Hence, we have to decide for ourselves, which parameters make the post-Soviet space similar or comparable to the post-Yugoslavian one.

The existing comparisons in our mass media (notably matching the patterns of post-Soviet and post-Yugoslavian problems) are hardly flawless or correct. The same relates to any parallels made between Kosovo and other similar regions.

Kosovo is compared to any part of the world! The shortlist would include Bosnia and Herzegovina (even though both regions belong to former Yugoslavia, just like Macedonia, I would be very cautious in making direct parallels without substantial reservations), South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Transnistria (I assume, all three conflicts differ much from each other), Cyprus, The Basque Country, Scotland, Belgium, Corsica, and so on. A Serbian delegation once even suggested to troika to use the Hong Kong experience.

If one takes a purely legal, i.e. abstract, stance, we can compare all those cases only if we speak about autonomy and self-determination in general. And thus, any of them can be exemplary for others. However, thorough analysis of historical, ethnological, and political reality denies such approach. Each conflict has its own reasons, form, logic, pace of development, and external factors. So any settlement of such historically-rooted conflicts would be unique. Even if all countries vote unanimously in the United Nations and agree that this corn should be measured by some universal bushel.

I believe that this is the logic of history. Formal legal recognition of the situation as a precedent would not help in resolution of other conflicts, will not allow us to apply a simplified universal scheme to a variety of historical, ethnic and political conditions.

S. Romanenko

From: Sergey Markedonov
To: Sergey Romanenko
Subject: It's the end

In this case it becomes clear that regardless of Kosovo's future, alleged final decision will not be the end of history for the Kosovo crisis. The latter will simply shift into another phase. First of all, there is neither consensus among leading global actors (the U.S.A, China, the EU, and Russia), nor among the neighbors of the autonomous region. Any *final* solution, on the contrary, would result in numerous interpretations and really unpredictable consequences. Who has analyzed the would-be reaction of the Albanians in Macedonia and Montenegro, Serbs in Republika Srpska in Bosnia, population of the CIS-2, or European ethnic secessionists? Who can give 100 percent prediction of such reaction?

Hence, Kosovo may be regarded as a test for the international community. To say *a priori*, without significant evidence that Kosovo has the right to recognition for political reasons, while Nagorno-Karabakh or Abkhazia have not, means to practice "Tastes differ" approach at the global level. It would be advisable (in connection with Kosovo and not only Kosovo) for the members of the world elite to elaborate criteria of recognition of the breakaway state entities.

The primary criterion would be the ability of the entity to operate as a state. The second factor would be the ability of the parent state to control the rebellious territory by any means other to deportations or ethnic cleansing. In other words, reintegration should be called impossible, if it inevitably causes an armed conflict. The third feature would be the existence and depth of democratic procedures in the separatist entities.

It seems that Kosovo or CIS-2 republics are far away from the fulfillment of the abovementioned criteria, even though they demonstrate some positive progress. In any case, adequate and safe (in its implications) solution on Kosovo should be based on some general and jointly agreed rules of the game. They should be shared by the majority, if not all states in the world. Otherwise Kosovization would become one of the leading international political trends.

S. Markedonov

From: Sergey Romanenko
To: Sergey Markedonov
Subject: Two-edged sword

I fully agree with you, Sergey, that taking into account dramatic experience of the 19th and 20th centuries, reintegration should be called impossible if it may result in an armed conflict. The tragedy and paradox of Kosovo is that any solution – be it conservation inside Serbia, or self-proclaimed independence – would be an act of ethnic violence, be it terrorist attacks, clashes, cleansing, sanctions, or whatever. Does not it mean that national oppression is possible, justified and legalized, if it is authorized by the international community? Can the state that suppresses some part of its population be considered democratic?

We think it is right to claim for democratization of the breakaway territories that strive for independence. But what about the level of democracy in the existing parent countries, what about democratization of their authorities? Why did not we make claims for democracy to Slobodan Milosevic, but make such claims to Hashim Thaci?

I share the opinion that some general rules of peaceful transformation of borders should be elaborated, since such border changes will occur anyway. However, as soon as one starts to formulate such rules, many questions emerge. First: what is the ability to operate as a state, what is sustainable statehood? Second: who will decide the maturity of such statehood? We hear every day the statements by some Russian experts who argue that Ukraine and Georgia are allegedly not sustainable states and imply that they can be divided. This is an example of “Tastes differ” that you mention above.

The existence of democratic procedures... I would say “yes”, but how can we make compatible, for instance, the present-day pan-European concept of democratic values with Russia’s sovereign democracy?

S. Romanenko

From: Sergey Markedonov
To: Sergey Romanenko
Subject: Follow the guidelines

Sergey,

Let’s go step by step. First of all, about the sustainability of a state, its maturity and the role of experts in this process. It will not be experts who will take the decision on recognition of a state! This should be done by the international community (mechanisms, forms, etc. make a topic for a different discussion) and political scientists can only influence such decision-making.

One may suggest certain specific criteria to distinguish between a failed and sustainable state (control over the territory, institutionalization of power, transfer of power from one leader to another without coups d’etat or revolutions). And in this case Georgia and Ukraine make totally different examples. Kyiv enjoys jurisdiction over Donbass and over Crimea. Several heads of state changed in Kyiv on the basis of democratic procedures. In Georgia, on the contrary, until recently supreme powers have never been transferred through elections.



By the way putting labels of “failed state” does not always mean appeals to division or annexation. Sometimes it is necessary to provide responsible and qualified assistance. The major issue is to ensure that responsible approach becomes a cornerstone of peacemaking activities.

As far as democracy is concerned, it should be demanded for from both parties (secessionists and fighters for territorial integrity). At the same time, one has to admit that such democracy will hardly resemble the modern European or U.S. system. It is more important to keep the vector, to encourage the trend. There is no need in acceleration of the process. Hence, it would be correct at the initial stage to ask the conflicting parties to ensure predictability and law and order.

Yours,

SM

From: Sergey Romanenko
To: Sergey Markedonov
Subject: Let's be honest

Sergey,

You are partly right, but such deliberations are mostly theoretical. In reality we should be honest – today's act of the Kosovo drama is over. And one of the major concerns now is how to avoid new escalation of violence. I don't mean official Belgrade or Pristina here – I would remind you of a danger originating from the crowd, in the street. All sorts of semi-legal extremist paramilitary organizations exist on both sides – among the Serbs and the Albanians. The resoluteness in desire to protect “our Kosovo” is beyond any reason and such activities may cause new bloodshed. The scale of such violence would depend on the decisiveness of the authorities and the international contingent.

The will of the Serbian and Kosovar politicians to preserve territorial integrity or to achieve independence does not depend on their personal views or traits of character. Nowadays the public opinion does not let them abandon their bargaining positions – the price is too high.

What can Serbia really do to oppose the independence of Kosovo? The variety of measures has been voiced by numerous Serbian politicians and contains the whole range of responses – from hard line to moderate, from economic blockade to disruption of relations with the countries that recognize Kosovo.

However, all this does not go beyond rhetoric and unrealistic character of such steps is obvious even to Serbia. The nation would find itself in isolation, would lose political contacts required to defend its interests (which are not confined to Kosovo, by the way). The country would be engaged in a new armed conflict, in which the chances to gain victory are slim. Such conflict would split the Serbian society, the major part of which does not want to fight. Serbia would get a reputation of an unreliable economic partner, would exclude itself from world trade and exchange. Belgrade will apparently try to reestablish contacts with Pristina, even though the declaration of independence and its recognition by Europe and the United States make this process extremely difficult.

Yours,

S. Romanenko

From: Sergey Markedonov
To: Sergey Romanenko
Subject: Responsibility and new barbarians

It seems to me that you have raised an important issue of responsibility. The latter has not become a key thing neither for the Balkans, nor for the Caucasus. The Great Powers, instead

of demonstrating solidarity in containing new Barbarianism, use this Barbarianism to defeat each other.

The West shares the illusion that integration of Serbia into the European family would be a good prize for the loss of Kosovo and would lead Belgrade to the highway of civilization. However, absolute neglect towards the interests of Serbia would rather result in the increase of nationalism and justification of ethnic violence, as the only ways to solve the problem. Such scenario would be lethal for Serbia and would be a serious challenge for the U.S.A and the EU. However, such scenarios should be analyzed and calculated!

What do we get instead? Comforting statements that as soon as Brussels welcomes Serbian bureaucrats, all problems will allegedly be solved. Let me say it again – Serbia has no real resources to incorporate ex-autonomy. Its elite has no real understanding of how to live with the Albanians in one country, how to shape a poliethnic community. The Kosovars have no willingness for compromises either, they would like to pursue their line to the end. One destructive position is condemned, the other alike is supported. Does not it strengthen the perception of ethnic violence as the only efficient measure? We have a position, it is ignored at the negotiations, we are treated as a troublesome fly – may be it is high time we used force? I assume that many in Belgrade ask themselves such questions.

And Kosove, therefore, raises a significant issue connected with any peacekeeping strategy. In my opinion, negotiations can hardly be successful, if the parties do not bargain, do not exchange vital things that they value. The Kosovo situation did not show much bargaining. One can hardly see such bargaining in case of Abkhazia or South Ossetia. Everything is predetermined, the status makes the major point at the negotiation table and the conflicting parties are dragged to this talking point (not always in a correct and accurate way).

SM

From: Sergey Romanenko
To: Sergey Markedonov
Subject: Lesson for Russia

All this is true, but you would agree that Belgrade would hardly provide official recognition of Kosovo in the near future. Even if the majority of Serbs support such step, it will not be accepted by many, notably in the armed and security forces, where there are still many fans of Slobodan Milosevic and Vojislav Seselj. Any party in power in Belgrade will have to balance between two realities – political and psychological climate of the population and external conditions, including country's objective interest in drifting towards Europe. By the way Kosovo is not the only impediment for such move – one can mention the notorious issue of poor cooperation with the Hague Tribunal.

Russia's veto in the UN Security Council would hardly save the situation. It will not help in returning Kosovo under the Serbian jurisdiction, nor will it change the ethnic composition of the region. Such veto would only deteriorate relations with the United States and the EU and not only as far as Kosovo is concerned. It could be another stone thrown into the UN building and would give impetus to the intense search for solutions beyond the UN framework.

The Kosovo drama is far from being finished. It is important to avoid its transformation into a tragedy. The Great Powers should break the 19th-century tradition and stop playing on contradictions of the politicians in the Balkans, backing the most maximalist trends. Joint support of moderate practical-minded forces that seek compromises should promote the system of long-term security in the interests of all – small and large nations.

The state borders will continue to change. Today the strategic goal of the international community – whatever romantic it may sound – should be to encourage peaceful character of this process in any particular case.

And another aspect of the Kosovo precedent. To my mind, Russia should take into account the Kosovo experience, especially the tragedy of the Milosevic Serbia (a multinational state), and




should not repeat its mistakes. The Kosovo issue should not also become the core and the tool for rhetoric of political speculations in Russia – when the ideology and psychology of inter-ethnic strife is disguised under the pretext of raising awareness of foreign policy matters. Such ideology, regardless of the wishes of its fathers and carriers, jeopardizes Russia's existence as a state.

Sergey Romanenko

From: Sergey Markedonov
To: Sergey Romanenko
Subject: Both are worse

Sergey, you mention tragic experience of Slobodan Milosevic. I don't want to advocate for him – he has too many defenders in Russia and in Serbia. But it would be biased to put on his shoulders all responsibility for the developments of the early 1990s in the Balkans.

Among those to blame for the tragedy of Yugoslavia are Franjo Tudjman, Alija Izetbegovic, Agim Ceku, or even Hashim Thaci, the winner of the parliamentary elections in Kosovo. It is not a matter of personalities after all, one has to blame ethnic nationalism, ethnocracy and intellectual racism which were political principles in the region. Yugoslavia collapsed not because of the personalities, but because of the principles, principles of blood.

Studying the lessons of the Balkans, Russia should not criticize the xenophobia of the Russians or the xenophobia of the migrant communities, but xenophobia and racism as principles. One has to stop choosing between the Serbian and Albanian ethnic nationalism, xenophobia of the Russian majority or ethnic minorities. As a famous ideologist of national issues said, "both are worse". 

S. Markedonov

Note

¹ The polemics took place shortly before the self-proclaimed independence of Kosovo and finished about one week before the event. Further development of the discussion on the Kosovo issue in the Russian expert community can be found in the reviews of recent world events prepared by Yury Fedorov and Dmitry Evstafiev.



Andrey Gagarinsky, Stanislav Subbotin

SMALL NUCLEAR REACTORS: FORGOTTEN IN THE PAST, INDISPENSABLE IN THE FUTURE

First small nuclear power reactors in modern understanding of this term (meaning just a few dozens of kW) were designed for military use, where they revolutionized submersible vessels into true submarines. Nearly unlimited time of underwater operations allowed tackling new strategic objectives and provided a long-term perspective to nuclear power at sea.

Since 1959 only the Soviet/Russian Navy received over 500 reactors (installed in atomic submarines as well as surface vessels), which have worked for a combined 6,000 reactor-years.¹

It should be noted that most of those reactors use high-pressure water as the coolant. However, Russia has expertise in designing and operating lead-bismuth submarine reactors yet unparalleled in other countries (the total of eight have been built).

When serious consideration was given to civilian applications of nuclear energy, navy reactors *crawled onto land*, as Academician Khlopkin very nicely put it. That's when small-scale nuclear power industry began, but its fate was all but an easy road.

THE STORY SHORT

The era of active search for applications of nuclear energy in the specific geographical and weather conditions (that was in the 1950-1960s) meant not only research and designing projects, but also their practical implementation in working units.

That technical search phase lasting until 1960 saw about two dozens of small nuclear plant designs: mounted on railroad flatcars, vessels, caterpillar platforms, or stationary transportable blocks.²

Interestingly, when in the mid-1990s the Nuclear Society of Russia held a tender of small nuclear power plant projects, it received over 20 bids with heat capacity from just a few kW to hundreds of MW. The competition demonstrated that some of the designs were really well-developed and ready for implementation.

Getting back to the 1960s, let's note that four projects were actually built as working prototypes, and there was also laid an industrial nuclear heat and electricity line in permafrost.

In 1961 the first full-scale working prototype of a transportable nuclear power plant was launched into service while mounted on four mobile caterpillar platforms (with electricity capacity of 1.5 MW, and heat capacity of 11 MW).

In early 1960s there was designed a power unit planned to be used in Antarctica and Extreme North with electricity capacity of 750 kW and high-boiling organic fluid as the reactor's coolant and moderating agent. ARBUS (Nuclear Reactor Block Unit) was first launched in 1963 in Melekes (renamed Dimitrovgrad in 1972). It possessed many promising features, but was not



Y
R
A
T
N
E
M
M
C
O

developed further as the organic coolant technology was not in line with reliability requirements for the local power unit in a distant area.

Bilibinskaya Heat and Power plant was built using the design of a stationary nuclear cogeneration plant. It had 4 blocks, 12 MWe each, the first one launched in 1973. The layout of Beloyarskaya Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) was simplified to fit the Bilibinskaya project, which allowed to ensure reliability for an isolated energy network. We should note that despite huge remoteness of the plant there is no problem with fuel delivery (40-50 t per year).

In 1981 Kurchatov Institute of Atomic Energy launched *Gamma*, a pilot generating reactor cooled with water and offering 220 kW of capacity converting thermal energy into electricity. The device has not a single moving part and can work for decades thus proving it possible to build even non-supervised nuclear plants.

In 1985 a nuclear power unit with several hundreds kW of delivered electricity power progressed to a full-power test. For both the reactor coolant and the turbine working body it used a dissociating substance based on nitrogen tetroxide.

However, even many other designs of small nuclear reactors still failed to promote nuclear power sources into the civilian sector.

Professionals as well as enthusiasts of this business understood that the cause was not about fundamental scientific and technical solutions, but rather about arrangements, maintenance and operation infrastructure, as well as responsibility of running nuclear devices that demand high qualification and special HSE requirements.

It would be wrong to say that only small plants of nuclear nature are prone to organizational and infrastructure issues. Experts on renewable energy sources are united that mini- and micro-hydro plants on small rivers are an important source of energy for a number of regions. Countries leading in small hydro plants count thousands of them: 90,000 in China, 10,500 in the United States, 5,300 in Japan. In the middle of the previous century the number of such plants in Russia reached 7,000, but has been declining ever since to the current level of about 200.

It should be noted that in other kinds of renewable energy sources, i.e. wind, sun and geothermal plants, and maybe with the exception of tidal plants, Russia is far behind world leaders of small-scale generation.

REQUIREMENTS FOR NUCLEAR ADVANCEMENT

The economic development of Russia inevitably requires solutions for two issues in the electric energy industry: substitution for overage fossil fuel plants and distribution of energy to distant areas.

Geopolitical changes made Russia a more northern country than the Soviet Union used to be, while its currently cost-effective resource base has shrunk. Evolution of the country's economy provides for more intensive development of frontier areas: European North, Northeastern Siberia, and the Far East, which jointly hold 80 percent of natural resources, while economic activities there are subject to huge investments, much labor, intellectual efforts, and a reliable energy supply.

According to the Ministry of Industry and Energy, up to 70 percent of the country's territory has no centralized energy supply (areas of the Extreme North, the Far East, Siberia, Kamchatka, part of Central Russia). Energy can only be rendered to those regions by means of delivering organic fuel. Areas of the Extreme North and the Far East alone employ over 12,000 diesel power plants and 5,000 boiler plants. Average per capita electricity consumption in some areas never exceeds 1,200 kWh per year, which is 15-20 times lower than the figure in Canada, Sweden, Norway, and other developed countries of the North.

Areas in the North and Northeast of Russia annually consume average 100 million tons of equivalent fuel. A radical solution of delivering energy to distant areas is related to small nuclear power plants. Even if we consider it in terms of diversifying energy supplies (coal, oil, gas, nuclear fuel, renewable sources), it would be reasonable to say that nuclear energy could account for a quarter and up to a half of all energy produced in those areas (25-50 million tons of equivalent fuel).

With all the peculiar conditions of those areas of Russia, they need parallel supplies of electricity and heat. Reliable sources of high-quality energy and heat, like small nuclear power plants, could play a uniting role for autonomous units encompassing not only enterprises involved in mining and processing, but also hi-tech and highly efficient technologies for goods and services in demand on the international market. Moreover, producers in those areas would not be doomed to depend on fluctuating world fuel prices, while the territories and all their natural wealth would efficiently become a subject of global economic relations.

Thus, ensuring reliable energy supplies in isolated areas becomes a most important long-term political task related to energy security and sustainable development of Russia, which could be accomplished with the help of small nuclear blocks mounted on a barge or installed on the coast or river bank.

Russia's enormous experience in shipbuilding technologies could be effectively put to use to design mass-produced medium-capacity blocks that would fit into grid and capacity requirements for regional electricity supplies.

If those blocks could have a short installation time allowing to cut significantly the time and costs of the nuclear power plant construction, they might prove to be even more cost-effective in many of the areas than even high-capacity reactors.

Remoteness and isolation of frontier areas require an independent fuel base and allow certain freedom in placing the plants.

No need for a hard link to the regional fuel base allows the freedom also with block nuclear power plants standard in technologies and capacities.

An overwhelming majority of organic fuel plants within *RAO United Energy Systems (UES)* built in the 1960s have block capacity below 300 MW, hence if medium-capacity block nuclear plants take their place, the fuel mix of the energy network will be significantly improved without a major change of the infrastructure.

Russia has unique experience in the especially relevant mass production of nuclear reactors, as well as a strong scientific, design, and industry infrastructure for atomic shipbuilding, which can focus on civil nuclear energy construction.

It should be noted here that in March 2007 the Baltic Shipyard in Saint Petersburg launched a new flagship of Russian icebreaking fleet named *50th Anniversary of the Victory* [in World War II]. It was a significant event in new Russian history of the 21st century. It demonstrated that our country has been and remains the only power in the world to build civil icebreakers. *50th Anniversary of the Victory* is the largest one in the world. Its deadweight is 25,200 t, it is 160 m long, has 30 m at beam, and a draft of 11 m. The icebreaker is powered by two nuclear reactors rendering the total of 75,000 h.p. to its three propelling screws. Without stopping it can proceed through solid ice 3 m thick at the speed of 1.5-2 knots.

The ship's reactors employ a number of advanced design features for the equipment and improved security as well as better operational parameters. Recent developments in automation and control are widely implemented. The icebreaker is equipped with a new comprehensive control system never used before with ship nuclear reactors, with the priority of automated control significantly increased.

Having arrived at the home port of Murmansk, the atomic icebreaker *50th Anniversary of the Victory* opened its first navigation in the Russian North. It is important as the Northern Sea Route together with all rivers flowing from Siberia into the North Atlantic Ocean services a vast area of northern territories. Russia spent much resources and efforts of many generations to explore and settle the area. For some regions in the North (like Chukchi Peninsula, islands in arctic seas, the coast of Krasnoyarsk krai and Tyumen oblast) sea transportation is the only means to receive bulk cargo. The North Sea Route is an important element of Eurasian infrastructure allowing to halve sea voyage between economic *world centers* in Europe and Northeastern Asia. The distance between Murmansk and Vladivostok is 5,800 and 12,800 miles along the North and South Sea Routes respectively.



SEA-BASED NUCLEAR PLANTS: AN AREA OF BREAKTHROUGH

In early 1990s a decision of principle was made: to illustrate in practice the positive sides of nuclear power sources in distant and isolated regions it was decided to focus on making a nuclear plant on a barge, which would be fully completed within the shipyard premises, then delivered to the site for a relatively long period of time to be later returned to the yard for maintenance and fuel reload following the technological cycle. Those units were to be owned and maintained by a dedicated operating company selling the energy to end users under its conditions.

Choice was made in favour of the *KLT-40* reactor used on atomic icebreakers to be used as such reactor on a barge, as there was much operating expertise available as well as high reliability and security.

The project was suspended (for a decade) due to failed economy and extended transition period, which even forced to change the working site for the pilot reactor (from Pevek Port to near Severodvinsk, Arkhangelsk oblast). Only in 2007 *PO Sevmash* in Severodvinsk began to build the first sea-based nuclear heat and power plant (PATES) *Academician Lomonosov* (equipped with *KLT-40* reactor), which is scheduled for completion in 2010. PATES *Academician Lomonosov* is expected to become a pilot project in a large series of sea-based nuclear power plants.

The plant is equipped with two reactors originally designed to be used on icebreakers. It is in fact a nonpowered (towed) vessel with installed reactors, turbines and electric power generators, as well as premises for long-term stay of service personnel. On the coast where the plant will be based it is only required to have feeders and a distribution grid.³

Here are some figures to describe the first PATES:

Table 1

Length, m	140
Beam, m	30
Draft, m	5.6
Displacement, t	21,000
Installed electricity capacity, MW	76/38
Electricity generation, million kWh per year	455
Heat production, thousand Gcal per year	900

The whole unit takes less than a hectare of land and a few more on water.

A little bit behind there is another PATES project in design phase, with nuclear reactors of lower capacity (*ABV-6* type). Here are its figures:

Table 2

Length, m	97.3
Beam, m	24
Draft, m	2.8
Installed electricity capacity, MW	2 x 8.6 (17)
Electric power, MW	2 x 6 (12)
Heat, Gcal/h	2 x 12 (24)

The higher-capacity PATES has seven potential operation sites (in Yamal, Chukchi, and Kamchatka Peninsulas) to be launched in 2012-2016. The lower-capacity PATES (with *ABV-6*

reactors) has 14 sites analyzed (including Novaya Zemlya archipelago) for possible launch in 2013-2019.

Obviously, building and launching the first PATES will influence decisions of city administrations in other locations (also in other countries) to purchase such sea-based power plants. It will also attract potential Russian and foreign investors to contribute to building the series. Implementation of the pilot project as BOO (*Build-Own-Operate*) will make it possible to penetrate the international market of energy suppliers.

Main design and layout solutions implemented in those projects could be used in sea-based nuclear units for sea water conversion if turbines and generators are replaced with freshwater units. A nuclear unit of this kind equipped with the twin reactor from an icebreaker is capable of converting sea water into 160,000 cubic meters of freshwater per day, which makes it attractive for many countries.

SAFETY: PRIORITY NO. 1

Nuclear power opens new and vast opportunities for people, but like any other technology, means that higher efficiency is linked with new risks and danger.

Looking at risks and benefits of a particular design in different geographical, climatic, economic, and political conditions may lead to totally different conclusions as to whether or not nuclear reactors are acceptable.

From the technological perspective it is easier to ensure safety with smaller nuclear reactors than with high-capacity power plants. It is explained by the fact that lower capacity of the unit proportionally decreases the danger of each factor: stored reactor energy, radionuclides, and fission count, which increases safety significantly.

Issues of nonproliferation, as well as safety and security of the reactor remain in the focus of opponents to small nuclear engineering. Its founders should pursue the goal of demonstrating the benefits of small nuclear plants so that politicians and business people would want to employ the new source, complementing technical mechanisms with institutional, legal, and economic tools to ensure no unauthorized use or proliferation.

Technologically, a lot of has been done to ensure safety. Today scientists and engineers have mastered construction features and physical techniques to ensure the required characteristics (safety by design).

PATES technical design has gone through all state expert reviews including the environmental one. PATES has five radiation security mechanisms, it can withstand an earthquake with magnitude of 7-8, wind speed of up to 45 m/sec, strong snowfalls and even a plane crashing into the NPP.

Expertise in sea nuclear reactors should be the standard of truth. *Kursk* submarine tragedy demonstrates strong evidence that even after a huge explosion within dozens of meters from it and within one vessel, the reactor automatically shut down, not only keeping its integrity, but also ready to operate again.

As it was said before, safety of a smaller nuclear reactor is guaranteed not only by its high reliability and controllability, but also by significantly lower stored reactor energy and radionuclides on site.

Great expectations are connected with the development of small nuclear reactors as they can be very much like household batteries: during production they are loaded with so much fuel as needed for uninterrupted power supply to a specific area or a huge enterprise for several years. After the fuel has been used the whole unit is shipped back to the service facility for maintenance and fuel reload.

For example, PATES will thus be towed back to *PO Sevmash* once in 12 years. Used fuel assemblies will be stored at a special facility in line with all international standards and located at *Zvezdochka Ship Repair Center*, which services atomic icebreakers and submarines of the



Y
R
A
T
N
E
M
M
O
C

Russian Navy. After some time spent fuel will be shipped to recycling facilities to be buried eventually as nuclear waste at the end of the uranium or plutonium fuel cycle. This part of the cycle is repeated for large-, medium-, and small-capacity NPPs. It is at the basis of long-term strategic development of Russian nuclear energy sector.⁴

Also, there is nothing too hard to solve in the areas of physical security and unauthorized use. For example, *50th Anniversary of the Revolution* mentioned above has a comprehensive set of equipment for physical security to timely detect and prevent unauthorized activities.

PATES reactor is located within a security area that can prevent intrusion from sea or land.

Sea-based NPPs have another major requirement, which is political and spells nonproliferation. This mainly means the enrichment level of 21 percent. Naturally, the requirement can be implemented, which is proven by PATES project now in construction phase.

Banned on-site fuel and radioactive waste management, handling new and spent fuel and radioactive waste only in regional service centers are real measures to counter proliferation of nuclear materials and technologies.

Thus, we see no objective reasons for the media to place that much emphasis on the fact that sea-based nuclear powers plants might be *especially sensitive* against the background of land-based ones. On top of that, a misbalanced approach to the peaceful use of nuclear energy in developing countries (which have a large room for small reactors) could result in unjustified opposition to people of those countries benefiting from best achievements of world civilization, which in turn would nurture terrorism.

A ROAD TO THE FUTURE

Joint design studies by Russian nuclear energy and shipbuilding industries show that it is possible to use existing ship reactor designs with some improved solutions for better security to engineer a new class of nuclear reactors—both land- and sea-based—with a wide range of capacity. Existing research and knowledge base make it possible to develop those reactors within a relatively short period of time (about three years), while the first unit could be completed by Russian plants within four-five years after that.

Characteristics of nuclear plants with small and medium-capacity reactors provide five extra arguments in support of this nuclear energy system:

- ❑ mass production of equipment by assembling blocks into units;
- ❑ simple design, easier control, lower sensibility to human error;
- ❑ more cost-effective, mass production raising quality, standard projects, single licensing procedure;
- ❑ turnkey for the buyer: from personnel training to fuel reloading and transportation;
- ❑ more reactor applications, including cogeneration, water conversion, hydrogen production, engine synfuel generation, etc.,

Extra capacity of small and medium nuclear reactors allows to build local grid networks with the required reliability and extra capacity without connecting them to the major grid.

A relatively low capital value (against the background of high capacity plants), quicker building as well as payback help to minimize investment risks and make small and medium blocks commercially feasible within their class with good prospects on the international market.

However, certain limitations are still there. PATES will require a large number of trained personnel (designers' estimation is 125-175 people). On top of that, sea-based plants require special measures to blanket the coast line and arrange for a special canal for dislocation. Site preparation would account for 10-15 percent of the total construction cost. All that can be done in Severodvinsk for the pilot PATES and in Russia in general. However, exporting sea-based NPPs might be difficult, also from the viewpoint of international law. Nevertheless, new perspectives,

also in promoting economic growth in a particular area, make PATES quite feasible. Developing the technology would inevitably cut the costs.

Icebreaker reactor technologies have already been developed into nuclear reactors, as well as sea- and land-based NPPs with the capacity of 12 to 600 MWe. Those include the already mentioned devices with heavy-metal lead-bismuth coolant.

Small nuclear power plants are designed for regions with compounds of inhabitants on islands and in distant areas (over 300 km away from densely settled locations), which would be impossible or unfeasible to be connected to the grid. Today people in most of such distant compounds use power generated with all kinds of fossil fuels (which are usually not found on-site) or by small hydro plants.

In low and mid-latitudes there is no special problem about delivering fuel for such systems, especially given that people in such areas agree to pay more for energy than those who buy it from medium and large capacity plants. They have two reasons: they either live there because of beauty and environment or they produce goods (or raw materials) that pay for higher energy prices. Thus, such small energy networks are located in accessible areas, and their reliability depends on that of fuel delivery.

A different situation is seen in Northern and Northeastern areas of Russia. Pretty many people (about 10 million) live there. They are mainly employed in mining of gold, nickel, tin metal, lead, wolfram, and many other needed natural resources. Economic viability, and hence the very point why all those people live there, is defined by energy supplies to those areas, the cost of which should not undermine feasibility of mined resources.

Most of such regions of Russia are not only distant from sources of fossil fuels. They are also hard to reach, which means a significant price of delivered fuel and no guarantee of timely delivery. Moreover, limited availability of road transport, which is to be allocated also for delivery of foodstuffs and other necessities, adds to the cost of fuel should the supply be increased.

The situation in Russia has unveiled the striking unprofitability of producing crude resources in distant areas. It became obvious when energy and fuel prices there were no longer fixed and began to reflect the real costs.

Given the current world prices and existing energy supplies, production of resources, and hence, keeping many people there, seems no longer to have any sense. Thus, huge reserves of various resources in hard-to-reach areas with severe climate might help Russia to benefit from its geographic location, but only in the distant future.

However, the benefit turns real in the near future if we consider and use opportunities to develop nuclear energy in our country. It is especially true for small capacity reactors for hard-to-reach areas.

Today experts estimate the potential size of the home market for reactors of 1, 5, and 50 MWe unit capacity as 2,000, 1,000, and 100 items respectively.

Investments into their construction have a guaranteed return as energy is most liquid. When there is no longer need for energy in one location, small nuclear reactors can be transported to a different one, where the energy is in demand. Such places will always remain, should there be reliable, safe, and efficient energy sources capable of producing electricity and heat for 5-10 years while being independent from fossil fuel, and economic or political circumstances.

Such small nuclear reactors do not compete with medium- and high-capacity nuclear plants, but rather somehow harmonize the energy network providing humankind with resources they need. They allow for expanding the resource base and make more locations for people to live in comfort and operate efficiently. Thus they offer possibilities of new quality to tackle issues of energy security and resource provision for sustainable development of all people.

CONCLUSION

Today Russia obviously keeps the lead in designing and building small nuclear plants. *Rosenergoatom*, the state nuclear power plant operator, negotiates with 22 countries on building sea-based reactors for them. But no one can guarantee the situation would remain the



same. In addition to 11 projects in Russia IAEA analysts know about 20 designs of small nuclear reactors without on-site refuelling in Brazil, India, Indonesia, Japan, and the United States, some in advanced stages⁵.


Let's look at some of those within the given capacity range (below 300 MWe), which see very active development. Take *CAREM* in Argentine with a modular reactor of 27 MW (pressurized water) and an integrated design of the primary circuit used both to produce electricity and convert water. A similar design is used in South Korean *SMART* with 100 MWe of capacity. Very much like Russia, *AREVA* in France would like to sell *NP-300* reactors (100-300 MWe) with passive security based on technology used in atomic submarines. Finally, *Westinghouse* from the United States leads an international team to promote *IRIS* (335 MWe), which also uses modular technology and traditional pressurized water. Here we even have the dates: design phase completed in 2012, construction in 2015-2017.

The trend towards decentralized energy supplies together with a less regulated market in the energy sector will inevitably lead to more interest of end users to small- and medium-capacity sources. This includes nuclear reactors, which are environmentally safe, reliable, and economically sustainable in the long-term perspective.

Obviously, it could be beneficial for the whole nuclear energy industry branch of the world from the viewpoint of building up the technological potential and ideas. It could also move ahead to satisfy rising demands for small-capacity nuclear plants, which is now obvious and felt in Russia and abroad.

But the question remains: will decentralization and deregulation of the energy industry create only potential for rising share of nuclear power in the energy balance or would they contribute to implementing that potential?

To keep the potential of the nuclear industry as a branch and its growth in new circumstances by developing small-capacity units it is necessary to have an economic basis supported by state policy in general and a legal framework in particular.

It is a serious and multi-level task, though atomic energy industry might already have an economic basis and a developed infrastructure. However, to use them efficiently, certain conditions are required. Today there are none, which is demonstrated by lack of understanding of totally new possibilities, which are created by an anaerobic (nuclear) small capacity reactor, which is environmentally safe. Another proof: underdeveloped legal categories of private property and international law governing nuclear technologies. And again, inadequate financial mechanisms targeting quick money instead of sustainable development for the future. 

Notes

¹ Y. Velikhov, A. Gagarinsky, S. Subbotin, V. Tsibulsky, *Russia in world energy in the XXI century* (Moscow: Izdat, 2006).

² V. Asmolov, A. Gagarinsky, V. Sidorenko, Yu. Chernilin, *Nuclear energy. Assessments of the past, realities of the present, expectations for the future, ozhidaniya budushchego* (Moscow: Izdat, 2004).

³ A. Timonov, "The work on construction of the first floating nuclear plant has started," *Bulleten po atomnoy energii*, No.1 (2007).

⁴ N. Ponomaryov-Stepnoy, V. Tsibulsky, "Nuclear energy and energy security," *Atomnaya energiya*, Vol. 101, No. 4 (October 2006), pp. 247-254.

⁵ International Atomic Energy Agency. *Status of Small Reactor Designs without On-Site Refueling*. IAEA-TECDOC-1536, January 2007.



Yury Morozov, Soren Bo Bojesen

PROSPECTS FOR EXPANDING COOPERATION BETWEEN RUSSIA AND NATO IN THE AREA OF JOINT PEACEKEEPING¹

INTRODUCTION

Peacekeeping activities are one of the most important elements of national and collective security for many of the world's nations and are directed towards stabilizing global *hot spots*.

In 2008, the global community will mark the 60th anniversary of the first UN peacekeeping mission (the mission was established on May 29 as the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, or UNTSO). Russia, for its part, has significantly lagged behind the global community in the area of peacekeeping; the year 2008 will be the 35th anniversary of Russia's participation in UN peacekeeping missions.²

During the first years after the Cold War, from 1995-2003, the estrangement in relations was overcome at the regional level and the peacekeeping forces of Russia participated jointly with NATO countries and other nations in stabilizing the situation in the Balkans. During the course of IFOR/SFOR in Bosnia and Herzegovina and KFOR in Kosovo, military contingents of the Russian Federation and NATO nations obtained unique experience that could be of potential benefit in the future, especially considering that, at this early point in the 21st century, numerous conflicts on the Eurasian continent (in Cyprus, Kosovo, Transnistria, Georgia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Afghanistan) remain unsettled. These conflicts, due to the efforts of regional organizations and alliances as well as those of individual countries, could be described as *frozen* (with the exception of the conflicts in Afghanistan and in the region of Nagorno-Karabakh), but as yet resolved.

Some ongoing conflicts are located in the post-Soviet space, where Russia is trying, virtually on its own, to bring them to a peaceful resolution.³ At the present time, the process of peacefully resolving the conflicts in Moldova/Transnistria and South Ossetia/Georgia/Abkhazia has bogged down, and no real movement towards improving the situation in these conflict zones of the post-Soviet space can be seen. The *smoldering* conflict in the region of Nagorno-Karabakh could flare up anew, leading to the destabilization of the situation in the Caucasus and Trans-Caspian region. Therefore, in the 21st century, tendencies in the development of the military-political situation in the post-Soviet space provide an objective rationale for the transition from having Russia conduct independent operations to activities within the framework of joint peacekeeping with regional European organizations and alliances, to which the Russian Federation does not belong.

The authors of this article propose a concrete plan for joint peacekeeping by Russia and NATO that could serve as a model for forming avenues of cooperation with other security organizations at the regional level. Practically speaking, the main prerequisite for implementing the proposed cooperation plan will be the existence of the *political will of the parties* participating (presumed to be participating) in resolving the conflicts.



C
O
M
M
E
N
T
A
R
Y

AN ANALYSIS OF THE PEACEKEEPING EXPERIENCE IN THE POST-SOVIET SPACE

The unique aspects of Russia's peacekeeping operations in the CIS territories was, to a great extent, predetermined by the specific conditions of intra-national armed conflicts within the territory of the former U.S.S.R during a very specific, or early period after the end of the Cold War, when there were still objective difficulties and obstacles to deploying multilateral peacekeeping operations in the post-Soviet space. This is why, during the disintegration of the U.S.S.R, the peacekeeping operations of the Russian Federation were of a "reactive nature," complicated by the overtones of the subjective relations between Russia and the CIS countries. Russian peacekeeping forces were often formed from military units deployed in the conflict zones of the former U.S.S.R.⁴ It should also be noted that, prior to 1992,⁵ Russia had never dispatched its troops to participate in peacekeeping operations under the aegis of the United Nations or any other organization.

Threats to national security associated with local military conflicts along its borders forced Russia to take emergency measures to establish a regulatory and legal basis for peacekeeping while virtually at the same time launching operations to keep the peace, learning the theory and practice of all aspects of peacekeeping activities pertaining to conflict resolution, and adapting global experience to the specific conditions that had arisen in the conflict regions of the post-Soviet space.

On the whole, the characteristic features as well as the problems of peacekeeping operations within the post-Soviet space are:

- ❑ the absence of a clear UN mandate for operations in the post-Soviet space and limited participation by CIS countries (in Tajikistan) in peacekeeping operations under a Commonwealth mandate, or delegation of their powers to Russia (in Abkhazia). A head of mission is not appointed when the mission is established. For this reason, political control on the part of the body establishing the operation is weakened;
- ❑ conducting operations without a Commonwealth mandate (in South Ossetia and Transnistria) with an atypical, but effective involvement of *loyal* contingents from parties to the conflict themselves;
- ❑ only those nations whose interests are directly affected by a conflict are participating in current operations, with CIS countries patiently *ignoring* the problem of resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, into which CIS member states – Azerbaijan and Armenia – have been drawn;
- ❑ careless adherence to the requirements of equidistance, with peacekeepers supporting one party to the conflict at certain stages of operations, and *blurring* of the boundaries between operations to maintain peace and to enforce the peace (in Tajikistan);
- ❑ a discontinuity between the military, political, and economic components of operations, with the military being forced to assume certain economic responsibilities after a conflict is resolved. Within the Russian regulatory and legal framework, military-civilian cooperation (CIMIC) on economic rehabilitation in regions suffering as a result of military operations is, for the time being, still in its *formative* stage;
- ❑ divergence in the practice of political decisionmaking and in the organization and management of discrete operational stages from the plan, principles, and documents adopted by the CIS countries in the field of peacekeeping, with political and diplomatic settlements lagging behind the resolution of the military aspects of operations;
- ❑ a poor job of keeping the public informed at the local and global levels about the current state of operations and their outlook.

One of the main problems for Russian peacekeeping within CIS territories has to do with parties to a conflict and their mediators, having ended the violence more than 10-15 years ago, making very little progress towards a political settlement of existing disputes. In Abkhazia, in South Ossetia, and in Transnistria, the peacekeeping forces have separated the warring parties and are not allowing them to resume military operations. These conflicts have been frozen.

At the same time, the reality of the situation in these regions is instability, shattered economies and life-supporting networks, disrupted transportation networks, and hundreds of thousands of refugees and displaced people living in foreign places.

The strong points of Russia's peacekeeping activities are:⁶

- ❑ a clear adherence to the legitimate basis for conducting operations. The legal basis for these operations are the ceasefire and separation of forces agreements, decisions by CIS heads of state regarding the periodic renewal of the mandate for peacekeepers in the conflict zones, and existing bilateral agreements between Moldova/Russia/Georgia on conducting appropriate operations, and decrees and resolutions issued by the legislative and executive authorities of Russia;
- ❑ a sound structure and plan for positioning peacekeeping forces, making it possible to observe the ceasefire and other provisions of these agreements;
- ❑ a sufficient level of troop training that reflects the specific nature of peacekeeping functions in the zones of operation and observation of fundamental UN principles applicable to peacekeepers;
- ❑ putting an end to military activities by all sides, timely interdiction of military provocations, prevention of activities by illegally armed and bandit formations, participation in the interdiction of arms, ordnance, and drugs trafficking, mine removal, partial repatriation of refugees, and engaging in certain tasks related to the social and economic rehabilitation of conflict regions;
- ❑ rational interaction between peacekeepers from the Russian Federation and UN and OSCE missions in regard to the basic avenues of stabilization and current operations at the operational-tactical level and implementation of a *division of labor* in their zones of responsibility;
- ❑ Development and reinforcement of the legal foundation for peacekeeping on the basis of operational experience and a transition to an increasingly greater regard for UN standards and requirements.

On the whole, while recognizing existing areas of non-compliance with UN norms, it should be noted that operational experience within CIS territories involving Russian peacekeepers confirmed the viability of this approach. Corroboration of this can be found in the words of the former UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "... to achieve success and to reflect the changing needs of the community of nations, ways of implementing peacekeeping operations must constantly be reinvented, (...) today there are as many types of peacekeeping operations as there are types of conflicts." In our view, the *classic* approach of peacekeeping operations carried out under the aegis of the United Nations cannot be regarded as fixed and permanent. Operations in Afghanistan, Somalia, and the former Yugoslavia have shown that, in practice, UN operations reveal new tendencies that are convergent with operational experience in the CIS.

One approach to improving Russia's peacekeeping activities is the formation on February 1, 2005 of the 15th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade, which is assigned to participate in international peacekeeping operations in support or restoration of global peace and security in accordance with a decision of the government of the Russian Federation. Organizationally, the brigade consists of the brigade command, three detached motorized rifle battalions, and combat, engineering, and medical support units. The brigade's total strength is 2,158 troops and 23 civilian personnel.

NATO OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS: LESSONS LEARNED

In comparison with the *frozen* conflicts within the post-Soviet space, the multinational peacekeeping forces (with Russia's participation) operating under the aegis of NATO and by UN mandate have been accorded extensive authority, especially in regard to the use of military force, making them reliable guarantors of the peace agreements in the Balkans. By the begin-



ning of the 21st century, the goals of peacekeeping operations in former Yugoslavia had, for the most part, been achieved. The most important outcome characterizing the efficacy of the operations of the multinational operational forces (MNF) is the cessation of civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Kosovo.⁷

The end of combat operations was a much more important event than a simple ceasefire. It facilitated the process of reform and restoration, during the course of which the potential for self-government was created, partial destruction of arms and ammunition was completed, and war criminals were more effectively tracked down and prosecuted. For this reason, the former warring sides were able to enter into a dialogue, using the tools and institutions of the democratic process to move towards the restoration of peace. Thus, NATO's dynamic response made it possible to effect a smooth transition from Alliance operations (SFOR) to European Union operations (EUFOR).⁸

At the same time, peacekeeping forces under the aegis of NATO in the Balkans were, to a certain degree, hostage to the political situation that had formed as a result of the interaction of many factors that need to be taken into consideration in the future.

The most important of these are:

- ❑ striving by one side (an ethnic community) to achieve a dominant position within the framework of a unified state (for example, Kosovars with respect to Serbs in Kosovo);
- ❑ differing views among the leaders of former conflicting parties (FCP) over the essential nature of the basic problems of peaceful conflict resolution and ways to resolve them (for example, Croats and Bosnian Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the differing views of Belgrade and Pristine towards the future of Kosovo);
- ❑ an unbalanced approach by international and nongovernmental organizations towards rendering the parties with various types of assistance to ethnic (religious) communities, often engendering distrust towards the activities of these organizations.

The problem of refugees in the Balkans has yet to be completely solved. After the signing of the respective treaties by leaders of the FCPs, the pace at which refugees returned to their former residences increased insignificantly (for example, Kosovo Serbs or refugees of other nationalities from Western European countries). One of the main problems with refugees is not so much their return from Western European countries (which they are not at all in hurry to leave) as it is having a half-million Serbian refugees from the entire former Yugoslavia returning to Serbia itself. They receive little international attention, even of a purely humanitarian nature, and they are poorly integrated into the economy and have no place to which to return.

An analysis of MNF operational experience has shown the necessity of additional research on the proportional use of military and non-military measures to enforce peace agreements, secure rear areas, and set up systems for deploying national military contingents.

It is also worth noting that, even with the presence of a strong MNF formation, the civilian component of missions was often unsuccessful in meeting planned tasking deadlines for agreements implemented with non-military means.

- ❑ first, during the years of their activities in the Balkans, international organizations have not been able to form an MNF structure tightly interconnected with the military component and able to effectively influence the development of a situation and coordinate the activities of multiple nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in the conflict zones. Their contribution, however, to the economic rehabilitation of the regions that suffered during combat operations was much more significant in comparison with the operations of peacekeepers in the post-Soviet space;
- ❑ second, without the support of MNF parties, deciding on the tasking with regard to stabilizing a situation non-militarily were doomed to poor results. This also distracted the MNF from fulfilling its own (typically military) operational tasks;

- ❑ third, the results of this often haphazard practical activity on the part of NGOs in the Balkans (in particular, in Bosnia and Herzegovina) were thus unable to gain sufficient authority among the local populace, especially the Serbs.

All of this prolonged the time needed to achieve agreement objectives, compelled the UN Security Council to extend mandates for conducting operations, and increased the number of casualties among peacekeeping forces.

The primary military aspects of the problems that came to light during the course of conducting joint NATO and Russian peacekeeping operations include:

- ❑ the presence of national regulatory and legal caveats regarding the engagement of military contingents, leading to uncertainty in the organization of a harmonized use of combat troops (forces) within a region;
- ❑ a partial manifestation of double standards on the part of peacekeepers with respect to FCPs,⁹ engendering distrust towards the integrity of MNF intentions;
- ❑ discontinuity in the unified core command structure by the Russian contingent at the operational level of command;¹⁰
- ❑ divergence in understanding the concepts, terms, and procedures adopted by the armed forces of non-NATO countries and NATO standards and procedures;
- ❑ differences among national contingents in the expectations for training personnel and preparing arms and materiel, which complicate the estimation of timelines and the degree to which assigned missions will be completed;
- ❑ problems of compatibility with the methods and equipment used to command troops and control weapons of the armed forces of NATO and non-NATO countries;
- ❑ the presence of a *language barrier*, which presented difficulties for the interaction of military units from different nations.

Obviously, both the positive and negative experiences of joint peacekeeping in the Balkans should be taken into consideration in the future. Primarily, this has to do with the system of training and the basic principles for employing a separate peacekeeping brigade of the armed forces of the Russian Federation.

JOINT PEACEKEEPING: PROSPECTS AND OPPORTUNITIES

Prospective avenues for cooperation between Russia and NATO in the area of peacekeeping could include:

- ❑ The inclusion of Russia in the process of planning NATO peacekeeping exercises and a more substantive participation by Russia in these exercises, as well as the participation of NATO representative in the process of planning and conducting exercise by the Russia. There should be set up a specialized (political) group for rendering assistance when planning an exercise scenario. This could be a mechanism for that could help avoid the possibility of adopting exercise scenarios that could indirectly be of a potentially provocative nature.
- ❑ Planning for the possibility of having Russia and NATO peacekeeping forces of “enhanced combat readiness” that could provide a rapid response to crisis situations in those regions of the world in which there is a common interest and establishing basic principles for joint command, logistics, and support of joint peacekeeping activities; in the long run, it would be possible to form a joint Russia-NATO brigade;¹¹ provide this brigade with the special peacekeeping status and use its capabilities to conduct joint peacekeeping actions in a shared geopolitical space.

It should be noted that, at present, for political reasons, practical cooperation in the area of joint peacekeeping with NATO in Afghanistan or in the Balkans is not a priority for Russia. However, in the future, it would possible to expand cooperation in this area, for instance in the



post-Soviet space (e.g., assisting in the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict) and on the African continent, including operations to keep the peace and peace-building, identifying specific areas of cooperation in crisis- response or emergency situations and providing relief in the event of natural and other types of disasters. Cooperation is also possible in other unstable or potentially dangerous regions of the world.

However, there are many problems in this regard that could hinder efforts by NATO and Russia to work together to establish peace and security within a shared geopolitical space. In the more general sense, these could lead to sets of questions requiring answers from national leaders and the leaders of organizations and alliances in the near future.

Would NATO member-states participate in joint peacekeeping operations in a region where they have no national interests, subject only to existing alliances and charters?

Would countries, where local and internal conflicts are either taking shape or are ongoing, allow outside forces to interfere in their internal sphere of influence? What should be done with unrecognized, yet *de facto*, national entities, emerging as a result of local military conflicts (for example, Abkhazia, Transnistria, and Nagorno-Karabakh)?

And, finally, the main question – is Brussels prepared for genuine cooperation with Russia in this area, taking upon itself the responsibility for joint regional peacekeeping? Moscow must also answer this same question.

Answers to these questions will be required in order to form a genuine mechanism of cooperation between Russian and NATO in the area of joint peacekeeping, in which it will be feasible to unite their efforts (or redistribute them).

Despite the complexity of resolving these questions, advocates of integration in the area of peacekeeping have arguments that attest to the objective necessity of unified efforts in the interests of stability in a shared geopolitical space.

Moreover, the multiethnic and religious nature of unresolved conflicts in the early 21st century in the Balkans and the post-Soviet space, with the inherent phenomenon of divided peoples, and the impossibility of refugees to return to where they used to live due to unresolved socio-economic problems, conceal within themselves a potential for elevated danger for many Eurasian countries. This potential is *inflamed* by the unresolved problem of the relationship between the right of a nation or nationality to self-determination and the preservation of the unity of national integrity. An analysis of the tendencies of how a situation develops in these regions shows that they are interconnected, have many common features, and present a potential military threat to the national interests of both the Russian Federation and NATO countries.

The existing common threats in the area of security represent not only challenges for regional stability, but also an opportunity for NATO to reevaluate the substance of its relations with Russia in the area of peacekeeping, taking into account their mutual dependence in protecting vital security interests.

Despite certain differences in the approaches by NATO countries and Russia to carrying out peacekeeping operations, it can be stated that, in the future, their cooperation in the area of joint peacekeeping could become one of the cornerstones of preserving global peace and security. Moreover, Russian peacekeeping activities do not display a striving for self-isolation; Russia advocates a more substantive participation by international organization in conflict resolution, based on the premise that these conflicts threaten not only national, but regional and global security. This is connected with the fact that national interests, including the basic national interests of the Eurasian states,¹² could be subject to the influence of a diverse range of challenges. The latter emerge as a result of the politico-military developments and could manifest themselves politically, militarily, and through government coercion.

One possible way to develop conflict resolution processes within the post-Soviet space could be the transformation of current operations by Russia, the CIS, and the United Nations into comprehensive multifaceted operations with the broad participation of military, police, and civilian personnel from other nations, particularly NATO and OSCE member states (for exam-

ple in Georgia and Moldova). Clearly, shifting from existing peacekeeping operations to multi-national peacekeeping missions under UN/OSCE mandate until a complete political resolution of a crisis is attained could provide the impetus to settling the majority of existing problems. In meeting future objectives, it would be wise to focus on providing guarantees to the agreements achieved by the parties in politico-military and economic areas and on the implementation of peacekeeping and policing functions in the security zones. These types of approaches conform to the rules of forming and activating UN peacekeeping contingents at the culminating stage of peace-building in the conflict zones.

Moreover, the authorities in Moldova and Georgia, as well as other actors participating in the peaceful resolution of *frozen* conflicts are inclined towards the opinion that OSCE and NATO should have a more substantive role in conflict resolution. If agreement by all sides participating in peace-building is to be achieved, then, in the future, in addition to Russian peacekeepers, NATO and, eventually, EU peacekeeping contingents could appear in the post-Soviet space. Shifting the focus from keeping the peace to peace-building will allow for the utilization of the accumulated potential of cooperation to adopt more effective measures for providing for the organized repatriation of refugees and displaced persons and economic rehabilitation of regions that suffered during hostilities.

POLITICAL AND MILITARY ASPECTS OF JOINT PEACEKEEPING

It can be said that the foundations for joint peacekeeping by Russia and regional organizations and alliances in the 21st century have actually been established. Thus, for example, heads of state and governments of the NATO member states and Russia reached an agreement on cooperation in the arena of crisis resolution.¹³ A decision was also made to form and further elaborate a basic Concept for Joint Peacekeeping Operations by NATO/Russia.¹⁴ The first of the documents relating to this initiative was developed by the NATO-Russian Council (NRC) working group in 2002, and can be regarded as the basis for drafting similar documents in the sphere of cooperation by Russia with other regional organizations.

As was previously mentioned, considering the similarity in the regulatory and legal acts of NATO and the EU in the area of peacekeeping and their coincident interests within the shared geopolitical space, there seems to be an opportunity to utilize the following political-military foundations and avenues for preparing joint operations within the framework of developing a relationship between Russia and the EU in the area of regional peacekeeping.¹⁵

The political-military avenues of cooperation are pragmatic in nature and, therefore, can be used in practice. They touch upon, *inter alia*, the procedures for participating on an equal footing in consultations, planning, decisionmaking, political control, and strategic leadership across the full spectrum of joint Russian and NATO peacekeeping operations. At the same time, it is presumed that decisions regarding these issues should be made by consensus in each specific case. Joint NATO-Russia operations, for Russia as well as for NATO, are being considered as one approach to carrying out peacekeeping operations. They will not have any direct bearing on current operations in the post-Soviet space, in the Balkans, or in Afghanistan.¹⁶

Joint peacekeeping operations under the aegis of the NRC may require the use of military force as foreseen by the UN Charter. In addition to this, a UN Security Council mandate can be requested by any member of the NRC for an NRC operation. In any event, the use of force should comport with the provisions of international law, including the UN Charter and UN Security Council resolutions, and in accordance with the provisions and principles of the Final Act of the Helsinki CSCE Conference and the OSCE Charter on European Security.¹⁷ Moreover, it is presumed that joint NATO-Russia peacekeeping operations will be conducted on the basis of directly expressed consent by the host and the parties to the conflict unless otherwise directly stipulated by a corresponding UN Security Council mandate.

A joint operation should be as transparent as possible, taking into consideration operational requirements, including the necessity of safeguarding the security of participating personnel.



The following algorithm for decisionmaking and planning operations is proposed on the basis of experience accumulated by the United Nations, NATO, and the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation. It is presumed that the NRC will be the working mechanism and the main political-military body for consultations, cooperation, joint decisions, and joint actions of the armed forces of Russia and NATO member states. Within this framework, Russia and NATO member states will regularly discuss areas of common interest, as well as the threats and risks to common security. The final objective of consultations should consist in the early recognition of the signs of a developing crisis, the prevention of its escalation, and peaceful conflict resolution.

In the future, it would seem necessary within the framework of the NRC peacekeeping working group to develop a mechanism for applying combined pressure on the conflicting parties, primarily through diplomacy with the objective of securing peace and stability through prevention. It is also necessary to have the active and joint support of representatives and organizations from the conflicting sides who would strive to prevent an incipient conflict from entering an active phase continuing with the involvement of military force.

Operational planning could be done by the Joint Multinational Staff with observation of the requisite measures for Russian participation in the planning on an equal basis. The NRC will be able to request expert opinions from representatives of military commands regarding the strategic options for using military force, which will provide a basis for conducting political and military assessment of the outlook for a peacekeeping operation. A consensus-based political and military assessment of a regional conflict situation will serve as the foundation for planning an operation.

Proceeding from a consensus-based political-military assessment, the Council should issue an appropriate initial directive authorizing Russian and NATO military structures to jointly develop one (or more) concepts for an operation that would be based on selected military response scenarios. In this context, the NRC could establish a consultative body, for instance – a “Political-Military Committee” for advising the Council on political and military matters, and, once an operation has begun, to review its various aspects in order to prepare recommendations and decision drafts for the NRC.¹⁸

If Russia and NATO come to a consensus at the political level with respect to the conceptualization of an operation and possible ways to conduct it, they could authorize Russian and NATO military structures to develop a detailed operational plan for using joint peacekeeping forces (JPF). It would be desirable if, at the same time, or even before the approval of an operational plan, the process of bringing national peacekeeping forces into a state of operational readiness could be sanctioned.

Russia and NATO should review within the Council the operational plan developed by the military structures, including detailed proposals for conducting an operation, its final objective, tasks, command and control issues and procedures, and rules of engagement. At the same time, Russia and NATO member states should agree on the provisions of Status of Forces Agreements and the exchange of letters with hosts.

An executive directive issued by the Council will authorize the military structures of Russia and NATO to begin implementing the provisions of the operational plan. At the same time, it will be necessary to agree separately upon the procedures for forming peacekeeping forces and transferring authority to a unified command apparatus, as well as on the sanctions for using approved rules of engagement.¹⁹ The Council should also implement comprehensive and continuous political control and strategic leadership of joint NATO-Russia peacekeeping actions, particularly to provide the most efficient possible coordination between the political and military bodies of the parties participating in the operation, as well as to track the development of events and the course of the operation.²⁰ The overview and revision of an operational plan could be effected under the leadership of and with the approval of the Council, using a parallel working method. The NRC should also have the right to cancel any operational plan in case the operation is replaced by an alternative plan.

When necessary, through its Secretary General, the Council can consult with the United Nations and other international organizations. A procedure for informing the global community about a joint peacekeeping operation also needs to be developed.

During the course of an operation, the Russian and NATO staff structures at the operational and tactical level should report to Council on a regular basis. These reports may include: situational reports and intelligences summaries with a frequency appropriate for the operational plan; special reports on specific aspects of an operation at the request of the Council or upon the initiative of the Russian and NATO military structures.

A POTENTIAL COOPERATION MECHANISM

Taking into account the Balkan experience of joint actions by multinational peacekeeping forces, a potential mechanism for establishing basic avenues of cooperation in the area of joint peacekeeping may include: the formation and development of a system for jointly monitoring the evolution of a political-military situation in conflict-generating regions of the world; improving the common and national regulatory and legal basis for peacekeeping forces and systems for planning and commanding joint peacekeeping contingents; developing interactions between military and civilian components of the peacekeeping forces at various levels and the stages for conducting joint operations; assessing the effectiveness of the use of peacekeeping forces at each stage during the course of an operation.

The effectiveness of the process of joint international control and situational management in a potentially conflict-generating region depends on a multilevel inter-state system of monitoring a political-military situation in a shared geopolitical space. Clearly, such a system could be based on unified organizational and methodological principles and could integrate into its functional structure informational and analytical bodies and technical resources for obtaining information sourced from various national entities.

Analysis of the operation of multinational forces in the Balkans confirms the necessity of unifying the rules for conducting a peacekeeping operation that are developed *prior to the onset* of joint actions. It seems reasonable for unified rules to be harmonized not only with UN Charter and NATO provisions, but also with the provisions of the national regulatory and legal acts that serve as the primary guidelines for each state participating in an operation. Clearly, the reverse applies as well.

The first obvious step on the road towards joint peacekeeping after entering into the appropriate agreements could be the development of a draft version of "Concept of Peacekeeping Activities at the Regional Level" with the input of international experts from the United Nations, the OSCE, the CIS, NATO, the EU, and individual countries. The next step after national and international vetting of this document would be the incorporation of its basic provisions into national legislation. In parallel with developing the concept, it is possible to unify and finalize a corresponding national regulatory and legal basis in the area of joint peacekeeping. At the same time, it would be sensible to refine (develop) a system of joint practical measures of preventive activities in potentially conflict-generating regions in order to forestall and prevent disputes and conflicts that would lead to armed confrontation. These measures should presume joint informational, psychological, political, and economic measures with respect to conflict initiators.

One of the steps towards joint peacekeeping is improving the mechanism for taking decisions regarding the conduct of joint peacekeeping operations, with the unconditionally equal participation of the appropriate representatives of national administrative bodies in collective planning. Together with improving the decisionmaking mechanism, it would be useful to undertake a series of measures to form an integrated system of commanding the military and civilian components of joint peacekeeping forces at the regional and sub-regional levels.

In the area of joint peacekeeping, it would be of considerable importance to implement a set of measures regarding the formation and gradual establishment of programs for investing in the provision of training and the joint use of peacekeeping forces. Clearly, this is the most complex task, but it is highly necessary for enhancing the effectiveness of joint peacekeeping. However, this problem can also be solved through the political will and desire of the parties as well as through their appropriate economic contribution to joint peacekeeping activities.



In the future, it would be useful to introduce tasking dedicated to running military command structures. The main tasks would be the formation of the basic parameters of a universal (modular) plan for implementing the military and civilian aspects of peacekeeping operation for each category. This plan would be fleshed out and refined depending upon the specific conditions of a situation in the regions of impending actions. It seems necessary to refine the terminology and war room procedures when planning and conducting joint operations and when developing measures regarding the organizational and technical compatibility of intelligence-gathering and troop command and weapons management systems.

As a result of implementing the foregoing tasks, objective factors will make it necessary to develop unified standards for conducting basic and specialized training for national peacekeeping forces and to establish common regional training centers utilizing existing national centers for joint training of peacekeeping units.

It will be of immense importance for the practical aspects of joint peacekeeping that the initial training of troops and forces for fulfilling peacekeeping functions takes place. Its content should be quite multifaceted and may include improvement of individual training; providing theoretical training and field exercises for officers; training camps for learning how to organize and implement the most complex missions.

During the course of individual training, special attention should be given to elucidating for peacekeepers the political-military situation in the conflict zone and the history of its conception and course of development, to learning about the customs and traditions of the local populace, to legal issues, and to learning how to negotiate with local residents and how to use interpreters.

The direct training of JPF should provide for joint reconnaissance, training camps, field exercises, classroom training and exercises. Here it is necessary to give attention to questions of communication and interaction, actions in non-standard situations, and the rules of engagement. In the future, it would be sensible to consider, within the NRC framework, the possibility of direct joint training of peacekeeping units at national ranges that are similar in their physical geography to regional conflict zones where forces could be engaged.

When conducting training exercises for JPF directly in the peacekeepers' zones of responsibility, it would be sensible to plan for the following: conducting joint classroom training, firing range, and field exercises, visiting places where the troop interaction has become dysfunctional; holding conferences and giving demonstrations on various types of logistics, security, and other issues. Joint training is also desirable from a political standpoint, since it promotes the efforts of peacekeepers to unify their forces in the interests of providing international security.

Of especial importance to achieving the final objectives of a joint operation will be the clear reinforcement and strict adherence to the fundamental principles of leadership by the military and civilian components of a peacekeeping operation. Among such principles are: a unified command system in combination with the allocation of command functions according to the operational and administrative *hubs* of the military and civilian command; the presence of common objectives and missions and the regular exchange of information; common systems of control and the management of both military and civilian force component movements; and coordination among the command bodies in the process of informing the media.

It would seem that, during the planning stage of a joint peacekeeping operation, its military and civilian aspects should be closely tied to the objectives, timelines, and forces and resources utilized.

An important precondition for effective cooperation is, first and foremost, the necessity of clearly and intelligently allocating the missions among the various organizations participating in fulfilling the mandate of a peacekeeping operation and enforcing a peace agreement. Therefore, it is necessary, as early as possible during the planning stage, to establish interaction between the mandate-issuing organization, i.e. the United Nations, the regional and civilian organizations, the countries providing military contingents, and the NGOs, and to maintain this interaction throughout the course of the operation.

In order to assess the effectiveness of using JPF during the course of an operation, it is important to have an assessment template. It should be noted that such a template was developed under the aegis of the Institute of Europe of the RAS while drafting an international version of *Conflicts and Peacekeeping Activities in Eurasia*. The usefulness of this checklist was validated during field visits by a joint Russian-Danish research group to zones where peacekeeping operations were underway – in Georgia, Moldova, Kosovo, and Afghanistan in 2005-2007. The template made it possible to assess the effectiveness of using peacekeeping forces during the course of an operation and the completeness of the operational tasking at each stage, as well as to develop recommendations for enhancing the effectiveness of peacekeeping activities.

CONCLUSION

For the near term, while carrying out complex intra-national transformations, Russia is vitally interested in preserving global stability. The emergence of both intra- and international armed conflicts in close proximity to Russia's borders continually forces Russia to take various steps of a political, economic, and, especially, military nature to ensure their peaceful resolution. Searching for forms and ways to resolve these conflicts is one of the most basic objectives of Russia's geopolitical activities in the area of peacekeeping in the foreseeable future, in which it is impossible to predict whether "enduring peace" will be a characteristic feature of the 21st century, or, as was the case in the previous century, it should expect shocks occasioned by armed conflicts and wars. What is quite evident, however, is that it would make sense to immediately introduce structural changes to the existing mechanisms for preserving peace and stability at the regional level. Without well-defined practical measures in the area of peacekeeping, attempts to independently resolve security problems at the regional level are doomed to a low level of effectiveness.

In the Eurasian space, it would seem possible to finalize conflict resolution by utilizing the common peacekeeping mechanism proposed in this paper. For this, the following will be needed: the political will of the parties participating in conflict resolution, compatible interests of states within the shared geopolitical space regarding common threats; the availability of opportunities to prevent and/or eliminate these threats through joint efforts; the conformity of peacekeeping experience in actual situations in conflict zones; and unification of the regulatory and legal norms of Russia and regional organizations in the area of peacekeeping.

It can be presumed that there will be specific difficulties and divergent views in the area of joint peacekeeping while putting all of this into practice. However, the unwillingness or non-participation of Russia in peacekeeping activities will not only deprive it of the opportunity to influence the development of events in the international arena, but, in the broader sense, will compromise Russia's standing in the global community. Each step towards unifying the efforts of Russia and regional organizations and alliances during the process of laying the aforementioned groundwork for joint peacekeeping will become the next contribution to the foundation of global and regional security while jointly resisting common challenges and threats.

Notes

¹ The point of view expressed in this article does not necessarily reflect the official views of the Russian Federation and NATO regarding the questions of peacekeeping.

² This occurred in 1973, when, by decision of the government of the U.S.S.R., in accordance with the resolution of the UN Security Council, the first group of Soviet military officers was sent to the Middle East. Their tasks included monitoring the ceasefire in the Suez Canal Zone and in the Golan Heights after the cessation of military operations.

³ Thus, the resolution of the conflict in Tajikistan was assured primarily by Russian peacekeepers, while the participation of other military contingents from the Commonwealth countries, despite the CIS mandate, was purely symbolic. In Abkhazia, the Collective Peacekeeping Forces of the Commonwealth are represented by Russian only, and in the Transnistria and South Ossetia, operations are also carried out by Russian Federation forces according to bilateral agreements with Moldova and Georgia, respectively, without a CIS mandate.



- ⁴ For example, the 201st Motorized Rifle Division, which was deployed in Tajikistan, or the airborne troops of the U.S.S.R armed forces, deployed in Abkhazia.
- ⁵ The year when Russian peacekeepers entered the Georgian-South Ossetia conflict zone.
- ⁶ These strong suits of Russian peacekeeping were noted many times during the course of field interviews by representatives of the former conflicting parties and by UN and OSCE experts who participated in observer missions in conflict zones in the post-Soviet space.
- ⁷ For more detail, see Yu. Morozov, V. Glushkov, and A. Sharavin, *The Balkans Today and Tomorrow: Politico-Military Aspects of Peacekeeping* (Moscow, 2001), 375 pp.
- ⁸ This is the assessment of retired U.S. Navy Admiral Gregory G. Johnson. From 2001 to 2004, he was Commander-in-Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe, which was subsequently renamed Allied Joint Force Command Naples. During this time, he was responsible for all NATO operations in the Balkans.
- ⁹ Thus, representatives of peacekeeping contingents from Muslim countries were often quite “favorably inclined” to fellow Muslims among FCPs or Kosovars, while representatives of Western countries showed a similar tendency towards Croats, and Russian peacekeepers towards implicit support of the Serbs.
- ¹⁰ This had to do with the fact that cold war relics were still able to exert their influence on the processes of making politico-military decisions; therefore, in questions pertaining to command by Russian peacekeepers even when making operational and tactical decisions with their zone of responsibility, a lengthy and complex command procedure was adopted (through Brussels and Moscow).
- ¹¹ As was suggested during the administration of the ex-President Clinton.
- ¹² Including: sovereignty, territorial integrity, sociopolitical stability, a constitutional order, and strategic stability within the framework of the global community, free access to vitally important economic and strategic zones and communications routes, and so forth.
- ¹³ This agreement was reached at a meeting in Rome on May 28, 2002.
- ¹⁴ The decision was based on the 2002 Rome Declaration and the 1997 Founding Act, in which it was indicated that the NATO-Russia Council, in the event consensus is achieved during the course of consultations, would make joint decisions and undertake joint actions in each concrete situation, including participation on an equal basis in the planning and preparation of joint operations, including peacekeeping operations under the leadership of the UN Security Council or at the direction of OSCE.
- ¹⁵ The Russian Federation is a full member of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, the Commonwealth of Independent States, and the Collective Security Treaty. The avenues of joint peacekeeping within the framework of these organizations are determined by the corresponding regulatory and legal acts and, therefore, are outside the scope of this paper.
- ¹⁶ The political aspects of the basic concept laid out in this document do not apply to exclusively NATO operations, to NATO-led operations with participation of partners, or to operations with the participation of Russia and other states.
- ¹⁷ Within the framework of cooperation by members of the NATO-Russia Council, it was agreed that potential suppliers of troops/forces retain the right to review the legal status of their peacekeeping forces prior to giving consent to conduct any joint NATO-Russia peacekeeping operation.
- ¹⁸ Other Council committees and groups, such as a “Preparatory Committee,” as well as Russian and NATO military structures could be brought into this process.
- ¹⁹ In order to use military force, the operation commander should utilize all necessary operational flexibility and judgment to assess each situation as it develops.
- ²⁰ In addition to these procedures, the NRC, taking into consideration the expert opinion of the parties, may also review the approval of the appointment and retention of command personnel; the authorization of the appropriate Russia and NATO bodies to develop a number of measures for crisis management in order to achieve the ultimate political objective of the operation; provide overall leadership and possibly participate during contacts among representatives of the International Secretariat in consultation with the Russian representatives, the conflicting parties, and other international organizations; decisions on restructuring, reduction, and cessation of an operation.



Alexey Ubeev

RUSSIA AND CEE: THE NUCLEAR CHANCE THAT SHOULD NOT BE MISSED

Speaking about the prospects for the promotion of Russian nuclear technologies in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), I have to note that the review of Russia's nuclear presence in the region published in this issue of *Security Index* is detailed enough. After the dismantlement of the ideological pressure, commercial ties with Central European nations in the area of nuclear energy continue to develop with significant success. Russia complies with its commitments related to nuclear fuel supplies, return of spent nuclear fuel for storage and reprocessing, or modernization of existing power plants. During these years there has been no blackout in the region, where nearly half of electricity is generated at the Russia-designed nuclear power plants (NPP). *Quae sunt Caesaris Caesari* – whatever political environment is, nobody wants to read by the light of the pine splinter.

Obviously, politics matters. Sometimes this factor plays technical and economic role without any serious arguments behind it – such things happened in Bulgaria and Lithuania, where the third and the fourth units of the Kozloduy NPP and the first unit of Ignalina NPP were shut down early. In 2006 Bulgaria was the largest electricity exporter in the region – with the amount of 7.8 billion kWh, it covered about 80 percent of the energy deficit in the neighboring countries (Albania, Greece, Macedonia, Romania, Serbia, and Turkey). The licenses for operations of Kozloduy-3 and 4 were valid until 2010 and 2012 respectively. No wonder that now it is not only Bulgaria, but also *victims* of power shortage, that appeal to the European Union with the request to extend the use of reactors.

Clumsy attempts of the EU officials to explain the early closure of the reactors by «insufficient safety level» are hardly convincing to specialists. First of all, one has to admit then that many-year billion-dollar investments in the enhancement of nuclear safety of Russia-designed reactors have been spent in vain. And this was the money of taxpayers allocated by international institutions under such programs, as *PHARE*, *TACIS*, etc. Secondly, the Europeans surprisingly forget the statements by the IAEA and WANO that Paks NPP in Hungary and Loviisa NPP in Finland are considered to be the safest and the most reliable nuclear power plants in the world. And these two plants are equipped with the second-generation reactors – *VVER-440 (B-213)*.

The desire of the Europeans to reduce energy dependence on Russia results in the impediments for the Russian companies to buy shares in the energy production and distribution assets in the region. EU's unofficial quota for import of uranium production from Russia (in accordance with the so called *Corfu Declaration*) is nothing else, but a political barrier. We do not need any special preferences on the European market, but it is not reasonable from the point of economics and technology to set up artificial discriminative constraints either. Let the technologies, not ideologies, compete. Political bias may lead to some unexpected outcome.

For instance, on the eve of President Bush's visit to Ukraine, Kyiv decided to sign a contract with *Westinghouse*. The U.S. company pledged to supply fuel assemblies to Ukrainian NPPs.



C
O
M
M
E
N
T
A
R
Y

This step was, in fact, beneficial for the Russian monopolist – *TVEL*. Since the cost of U.S. assemblies is 25–40 percent higher, the Russian corporation is now free to set a new price as well.

The technical ambiguity of this experiment was proved by the accident at the nuclear plant in Temelin in the Czech Republic. The same attempt to change the supplier ended up with the failure and refusal to cooperate with the U.S. company. Finland also prefers Russian fuel for the NPP in Loviisa. At the same time, such Western expansion into the traditional Russian nuclear fuel markets in Central and Eastern Europe has encouraged Russian manufacturers to speed up the introduction of innovations (i.e. new fuel assemblies – TBCA). One also has to note that nearly three quarters of *Westinghouse*'s shares belong to Japan-based *Toshiba*, which has recently signed a framework cooperation agreement with *Atomenergoprom*, the Russian holding which comprises *TVEL*. Are we going round in circles?

To assess the prospects of Russia's nuclear technologies in Central and Eastern Europe, one has to look at the existing basis and the prerequisites for cooperation. A short history lesson. As long ago as in 1956 the Soviet Union signed its first agreements on technical assistance in construction of Reinsberg NPP in East Germany (pressurized water reactor with the capacity of 70 MWe) and Bohunice NPP in Czechoslovakia (*A-1* heavy water reactor with the capacity of 150 MWe). Later on, until its collapse, the U.S.S.R supplied socialist countries of Eastern Europe with nuclear power plants, nine research reactors, six cyclotrons and seven radio-chemical laboratories. The construction of these facilities gave impetus to education and training of national professionals, who knew how to deal with the Soviet/Russian nuclear technologies. The number of such specialists amounts to dozens of thousands.

The Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA or COMECON) played special role in integration and specialization of CEE nations in nuclear energy sector. Large production facilities were set up to manufacture certain components of NPP equipment. Czechoslovakia possessed enterprises that produced *VVER* reactors, including the most wanted equipment with the long manufacturing cycle – vessels of reactors, steam generators, etc. By the way, *Škoda Alliance* benefited from the heritage of socialist integration and together with *Westinghouse* competed with Russia at the tender on construction of Belene NPP in Bulgaria with Russia-designed *VVER-1000* reactor. One must add that the major Czech enterprise of nuclear machine-building – *Škoda JS* – belongs to the Russian *Alliance of Machine-Building Plants* (OMZ). Again we are making a circle.

An illustration of the Russian practical capabilities in this area may be two units equipped with third-generation *VVER-1000* reactors in Tianwan in China. The units were built by *Atomstroyexport* and became commercially operational in 2007. At present, it is the most advanced NPP in the world, which has active and passive security systems, unique know-how, including the container for core melt in case of accident beyond the design basis, digital system of automatization and management of technological processes, and other innovations. Nuclear reactors that are being built in India and Bulgaria should be even better. The participation in construction projects abroad helped us to preserve Russian production plants, professional staff, including designers, nuclear engineers, construction specialists and top managers.

There are many examples that prove – integration and specialization within the CMEA was not meaningless. Bulgaria produced the systems of biological protection, transportation and technology equipment for NPPs; East Germany made overhead cranes and special fittings; Hungary was in charge of equipment for specialized purification of water, refueling machines and large-diameter wrenches; Poland manufactured heat-exchange equipment, pressurizes, reserve diesel plants; Romania produced key circulation pumps and coolers for the cores; Yugoslavia made special pumps, overhead cranes, fittings, etc. The cooperation goes on now in the course of modernization of existing plants and construction of new ones. The scale is smaller, but still – the construction of the Tianwan NPP in China involved the use of materials and equipment manufactured in a number of CEE states.

To sum it up, one has to admit that in the recent decades there was created a solid basis for continuing nuclear energy cooperation with the countries of the region. Beside machine-build-

ing facilities and professional human resources, Russia and CEE are connected with the common school of design and standards. Nowadays when these countries introduce the EU legislation, we will have to harmonize norms and standards. The construction of the Belene NPP is quite an eloquent example – after all possible feasibility studies and examination the Russian project was eventually certified by the EU. So we have a precedent.

Eastern European market creates a unique opportunity for integration of Russian and Western technologies. There are only four-five transnational corporations in the area of nuclear energy that are capable of building modern and safe nuclear power plants. Strategic alliances can be forged for specific projects. During the construction of the Tianwan NPP, *Atomstroyexport* maintained close cooperation with the French-German *Areva NP-Siemens*, as far as instrumentation and control (I&C) systems were concerned. Such interaction is also envisaged in the course of implementation of the Belene project. Now it is not a matter of construction of nuclear power facilities, but more a matter of business diversification – development of appropriate infrastructure, joint use of the power plant, electricity sales, complex maintenance services during the entire life cycle, and decommissioning.

Global nuclear power sector will reach a critical point in the next twenty years – there will be a need to find an urgent solution to the issue of safe management of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive wastes. So far not a single serious power plant in the world has been decommissioned to *green grass* level. CEE countries possess many closed or temporary closing-down nuclear reactors. This *test range* could be used to join the efforts of Russian and Western experts in developing advanced technologies of decommissioning, reprocessing and safe disposal of wastes. One cannot rule out that in the near future such business may become more profitable than construction.


The long era of stagnation in construction of nuclear power facilities is over. We are facing the epoch of nuclear renaissance. CEE states start to voice their national plans of nuclear energy development – first cautiously, looking back at Brussels, and then at the top of their lungs. The reasons are well-known – increasing energy consumption, enormous prices of hydrocarbons, the need to diversify sources of energy, and climate change. Unlike in Western Europe, general public here does not demonstrate substantial opposition to nuclear energy and the infrastructure exists as well. The EU has a vivid discussion on auctions for industrial corporations – they have to buy quotas for carbon dioxide emissions. If such decision is taken, it may boost the construction of new safe NPPs, which are much more environmentally friendly than power plants using coal or gas.

However, the issue is not that simple. Most of the new NPPs in Eastern Europe should be built with the help of private investments, above all, large Western companies and banks. The latter hesitate because of the high costs of projects, lack of assurances about security of investments, and political uncertainty in some countries. Bulgaria confronted all these difficulties when it was selecting financial partners for Belene. It is always difficult for pioneers. This is why the involvement of Russian private capital, establishment of joint ventures (such as *Engineering Procurement Construction Management*) should not be hampered by European bureaucrats and may become an alternative solution. Russian manufacturers of equipment and engineering companies, unlike their Western colleagues, continued to build nuclear plants in India, Iran, or China during the nuclear *break*, and we have a lot to offer to our partners. Such industrial and financial alliance would be useful both for energy sector of Eastern Europe and Russia, and for joint conquering of the third markets.

Russia has recently announced the decision to construct an NPP in Kaliningrad. By 2015–2016, it is planned to build a two-unit NPP with the capacity of 2,300 MWe. Two *VVER-1000* reactors (belonging to «*generation 3+»*) will be installed there. The estimated cost of the project, including infrastructure, is 5 billion euro. For the first time in Russian history, foreigners, notably Europeans, are offered 49 percent of shares of the future company. Leading European energy corporations have demonstrated their interest. Lithuanian authorities showed immediate negative response; as such construction may allegedly jeopardize the plans of Baltic states and Poland to build their own NPP for joint use. The Russian decision may also encourage the authorities in Belarus to speed up the decisionmaking process with respect to selection of the site and schedule of construction of its own NPP. Hence, *Rosatom's* deci-



sion may cause different comments, but this is a strong geopolitical move. There is a real chance of integration of Russian and Western technologies, but this should not be a *one-way street*.

Optimal use of existing economic ties with CEE in nuclear energy sphere, introduction of innovative nuclear technologies, search for new forms of cooperation, removal of political barriers – all these are components of successful mutually beneficial cooperation. 



Dmitry Evstafiev

LIFE WITHOUT CFE AND NOT ONLY CFE

The hysteric response of our European partners to Russia's decision to suspend the implementation of the CFE Treaty looks strange. Actually it is a withdrawal, which Moscow delicately called moratorium. Firstly, the reaction is strange since it is caused by the decision that in fact, changed nothing from the point of their security. Secondly, Russia was warning NATO and the EU many times about the intention to do so, while our partners did not believe it, or pretended not to believe. Anyway, it would be utmost foreign policy cynicism to describe the act of Moscow as a cunning and sudden decision.

Seriously speaking, by depriving Europe of the CFE Treaty, Moscow has demonstrated that it will no longer preserve comfortable military-political situation at the European theater of war. Our partners do not deserve such comfort, as they were persistent in ignoring all Russia's appeals to start substantive discussion on the new European security architecture. Let us remember, for instance, NATO's reaction on Vladimir Putin's speech in Munich, which was regarded by all as a purely propagandistic event. This was a mistake – the speech did not only contain warnings for our Western partners, but also suggested the ways out of the existing complex situation. NATO preferred to neglect both parts, thinking that Russia would apparently confine itself to another *final warning*.

But this must be the new sense of the Russian foreign policy – warnings and persuasion eventually turn into some action.

As far as the CFE Treaty is concerned, everyone – in the West and in Russia – should follow the rules of reason. The agreement was quite decent in the time it was signed, but then it became outdated and lost any sense after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Hence, it could not be even a nominal basis for building European security architecture. By the way, such process did not even start, as everyone in the last 15 years was focused on NATO expansion and squeezing Russia out of the post-Soviet space. Under these circumstances, the CFE Treaty naturally transformed into the means of limiting Russia's military capabilities – this new essence of the agreement was vividly demonstrated to Boris Yeltsin at the Istanbul summit. Our partners demanded from Russia specific concessions directly affecting its military-political interests. And all these demands were justified by *cosmetic adaptation* of the treaty. Russia was asked to make concessions in order not to meet Moscow's own interests or specific requirements, but simply in order to make the treaty fit the reality. And Russia agreed.

Let us be realists. The CFE Treaty was dead long before Russia's moratorium. And it makes little sense to carry on any dialogue with NATO on the terms of Russia's return to this regime. The parties should immediately launch negotiations on a new regime, which would regulate military and political relations in Europe, taking into account the current configuration of forces, politics and technologies. NATO would hardly give consent to such transformation – the alliance felt quite comfortable in the permissive environment of the old CFE Treaty, so it



does not need adaptation or any new arrangements. It is easier and more pleasant to accuse Russia of bad faith.

However, one cannot ignore the existing problem – in the last 25 years Europe is left without system that regulates military-political relations on the continent and even without appropriate negotiations on such matter. And this happens at the moment when the United States decides to deploy missile defense units in some European countries and, thus, returns Europe the status of the theater of war for the first time since the fall of the Berlin Wall. All that occurred between 1990 and 2007 was within the framework of political maneuvers and discussions. Now after the deployment of U.S. missile defense, Europe becomes a ground for military operations. And it is not clear against whom such European bridgehead is targeted – this is a different significant issue. So far the very fact is important. It is quite a sensitive moment from the point of stability and future military balance, so it would be advisable at least to launch the negotiation process, or ideally start detailed dialogue on European security and stability. If Russia sets forth the idea of such discussion and is able to suggest appropriate format and mechanisms, the decision on withdrawal from the CFE Treaty would not only be justified politically, but would also indicate geopolitical foresight.

On the other hand, it is obvious that moratorium and even denunciation of the CFE Treaty would not substantially change the balance of power in Europe. It is simply the step that sets Russia free from the most humiliating part of commitments that were imposed on Moscow during the period of its temporary weakness. At the same time, we should face the truth – the elimination of the CFE as a constraint to Russia's military and security policy will hardly solve the problem of containing NATO at the European theater of war. It is evident to all reasonable politicians and experts that fruitful dialogue with NATO or constructive partnership is possible only through explicit deterrence of the alliance with nuclear or conventional arms. Only then the NATO politicians appear to have some need in communicating with Moscow and considering its interests.


Taking into account the current inability of Russia to form the system of deterrence on the basis of conventional arms (and such situation will continue in the foreseeable future), one should admit that constructive dialogue with NATO and policy of engagement can be pursued only through reliance on nuclear weapons. This brings us to a logical conclusion – the problem is not the CFE, but the ugly baby of the Gorbachev era, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, which inflicted damage to our national security even at the moment of its signature.

By possessing the arsenal of delivery systems for medium-range nuclear weapons, Moscow would be able not to worry about European processes and maintenance of stability in Europe. There is no need in deploying such arsenal in the European part of Russia. For instance, it could be stationed in the central part of the country, somewhere in the Volga-Ural military district, and easily redeployed to the European theater of war (it can easily be done by air) in case of difficulties in dialogue with our European partners and *allies*. Such missile group can also be redeployed to the Far East, e.g. to enhance efficiency of negotiations with the United States or to *strengthen partnership* with any other state in the Asia Pacific region. And such state should not necessarily be Japan. And the most important thing is that Russia does not need many such missiles – 150-200 carriers would be enough and affordable to our economy.

And you see – without arms race at all.



Figure 1. The *iSi* International Security Index (January 2008–May 2008)



- ➔ **THE INDICATORS OF *ISI* INDEX – A COMPREHENSIVE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY INDEX**
- ➔ ***Yury Fedorov*. A VIEW BY A RUSSIAN LIBERAL: «NUCLEAR MIDDLE AGES.»**
- ➔ ***Dmitry Evstafiev*. A VIEW BY A RUSSIAN CONSERVATIVE: «CONSENSUS OF THE PAST AND DILEMMAS OF THE FUTURE.»**
- ➔ **Marian Abisheva, Fulvio Attina, Dayan Jayatileka, Konstantin Eggert, William Potter, Abdulaziz Sager, and Yevgeny Satanovsky. COMMENTS BY MEMBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL EXPERT GROUP**





iSi – A COMPREHENSIVE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY INDEX
JANUARY–MAY 2008
SECURITY VS. THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION

The *iSi*¹ index is a quantitative indicator of the global security from the point of well-being of the population of the planet. It is meant to demonstrate the extent to which the international security situation differs from the *ideal* at each point in time. The *ideal* situation was determined to 4,210 points; i.e., the closer *iSi* is to this number, the more secure the world is. Vice versa, the lower, the higher the level of *iSi* insecurity.

In January-May 2008 the index continued to decline – from 2,982 points to 2,920 by May 1. In many conflict zones tension have increased; there is more uncertainty about the prospects for resolution of many urgent international issues; some new negative factors emerged. Beside traditional security factors, some domestic political differences, notably separatism, affected the situation.

- ❑ **Iran.** On March 3, 2008, the UN Security Council approved the third resolution which tightens sanctions against Iran, since the country refused to stop the uranium enrichment programs. Tehran once again repudiated the terms of the document. The scenario for resolution of the Iranian nuclear issue, which is being sought by the international community since late 2006 (Resolution 1737), seems to fail. Present-day Iranian leadership, whose positions strengthened after the victory of conservatives at the parliamentary elections in March and local elections in April, defiantly speak about the launch of new centrifuges and tests of other nuclear equipment.
- ❑ **North Korea.** The agreements on nuclear disarmament between the DPRK and South Korea in late 2007 contributed a lot to the growth of *iSi*. However, now the threat of disruption in the process of rapprochement and de-nuclearization of the peninsula has a negative impact on military and political stability in the region and in the world. In late March 2008, Pyongyang argued that the dismantlement of nuclear facilities would be suspended, if the United States did not take back its demands to disclose the uranium program (the existence of which the DPRK denies). After the election of a new conservative president, Lee Myung-bak, Seoul declared the possibility of preemptive strikes against nuclear sites of the neighboring country. Pyongyang promised in response to exterminate South Korea. However, the continuation of contacts, especially within the *Group of 6* and at bilateral level (e.g. between North Korea and the United States), keeps the window of opportunities open and there are still hopes for stabilization.
- ❑ **Middle East.** The conflict in the Middle East continues to deteriorate at all fronts and there is a danger of new spin of regional violence. In response to missile attacks from Gaza, Israel tightened the blockade of the enclave and conducted a series of military operations, which led to numerous casualties among the Palestinians. In early March leader of the Palestinian national administration Mahmoud Abbas suspended contacts with Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, which had started within the peace process launched in Annapolis. The dialogue was resumed only in April, but it is still fruitless – there is no unity in the position of Palestinians, Hamas continues to abstain and rule the Gaza Strip. Meanwhile, the political crisis in Lebanon aggravates, Syria's isolation in the Arab world grows, and relatively stable Egypt faces confrontation between the authorities and Islamists.

Large terrorist attacks and new hostilities between the government forces in Iraq supported by the U.S. military and the *Mahdi Army* militia broke the seeming silence in **Iraq**. In late February, Turkey conducted a large-scale operation against Kurdish separatists in the Northern Iraq.

- ❑ **Kosovo.** The expected unilateral declaration of independence in Kosovo on February 17 was taken calmly in the Balkans, in Europe and in the world. The countries that refused to recognize the independence of the region confined themselves to statements about the need to solve the issue within the international law and called for an extraordinary meeting of the UN Security Council. The authorities in Serbia do not have

a consistent approach to the issue and, hence, the government had to resign. Belgrade recalled the ambassadors from more than 30 states, which had recognized the independence of Kosovo. The highest tensions took place in the Serbian enclaves of the region, especially in Kosovska Mitrovica, where on March 14 the court building was seized by Serbs, who were later squeezed out by international police force and KFOR staff.

- ❑ **Africa.** Many internal political conflicts in Africa take an intertribal character and threaten to spill over national borders. Civil strife in **Kenya** stopped (in early February the government and the opposition agreed to stop the violence and formed the coalition Cabinet in April), but electoral war started in progressively impoverished **Zimbabwe**. The authorities tried to rig the results of the presidential elections, where a dinosaur of African politics Robert Mugabe allegedly lost to Morgan Tsvangirai, the opposition leader.

In February the population of Ndjamena, the capital of **Chad**, suffered from bloody clashes between the government forces and the rebels who claimed for resignation of President Idriss Deby.

A positive event is the signature of the peace agreement between the government of the **Democratic Republic of Congo** and separatists from eastern provinces.

- ❑ **China.** A new factor for the fluctuations of the index is the situation in and around China. Manifestations of the Buddhist monks, which started on March 10 in Lhasa in Tibet, transformed into riots, which were suppressed by the Chinese. The supporters of the independence of Tibet conduct their demonstrations all over the world. China feels substantial pressure on the part of the European countries. Washington reacts more calmly. Moscow backs the position of Beijing. China's leader Hu Jintao stated firmly that the issue of Tibet is exclusively a China's internal affair. So far the major protest activities focused around the Olympic Flame and the presence of western leaders at the opening ceremony of the 2008 Olympics in Beijing.

The positive event for the region was the election of Ma Ying-jeou. New president of Taiwan is a nominee of the *Kuomintang* party and he is a proponent of rapprochement with continental China.

- ❑ The **post-Soviet space** indicates some changes with respect to the status of unrecognized republics and frozen conflicts. The leaders of Moldova and Transnistria met in person for the first time in many years on April 11 and the chances for settlement of the conflict have risen. In the Caucasus the situation is different. New tensions in Russian-Georgian relations result from the hard line of Moscow, which intends to provide specific support to the population of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Georgia regards this as an attack against its sovereignty and appeals to Western nations. An alarming sign that demonstrates vividly the thin line between the frozen conflict and hostilities was an exchange of fire in Nagorno-Karabakh between the local forces and Azerbaijan.
- ❑ Strategic security issues in **Europe** remain unresolved. The NATO-Russia Council meeting in Bucharest and the Putin-Bush *farewell summit* in Sochi clarified the positions of the parties and emphasized their intention to overcome the differences in the spirit of mutual respect, be it NATO enlargement, the future of the CFE Treaty, or missile defense deployment.

Albert Zulkharneev

Note

¹ The chronology of events that affect the iSi, methodology of calculations, monthly results, and comments are published at <http://isi.pircenter.org>. The comments are provided by the International Expert Group, which includes specialists from Russia, Kazakhstan, India, China, the United States, France, Saudi Arabia, and other countries. They do not affect the monthly figure, but help to understand how different regions of the world perceive the changes in the international security situation.





A VIEW BY A RUSSIAN LIBERAL: NUCLEAR MIDDLE AGES

The events of the first quarter of 2008 have proved that in international relations there is an accumulation of prerequisites for a principal shift, the outline and the impact of which can only be forecasted in general. But yet, the dominating character of the changes which take place in the international scene provides evidence that despite the fact that the “end of days” is not predicted, there is no reason for optimistic forecasts either.

In particular, there is a growing probability of a global crisis. The growth in the number and acuteness of the problems, cannot be solved either by the unilateral efforts of nation states, nor by existing multilateral institutions and procedures, including the ones, as determined by international law. For example, the failure in putting a stop to the Iranian nuclear program, in interfering with the radical movements of mainly Islamic extremist doctrines, elimination of the threat of nuclear terrorism, stabilization of the situation in the Greater Middle East, prevention of the deepening social and economical degradation in Africa and Asia, putting under control mass migration from the depressed regions of *third world countries* to Europe and North America, reduction of the developed countries dependence on energy imports, elimination of the threat of serious climate change and so on. These, as well as many other factors, especially in a cumulative action, can result in an explosion in the existing world order. In this case it is inevitable that the global crisis, may result either in the appearance of new more efficient mechanisms in world trade regulation and security provisions, or an escalation of global chaos.

WHO KNOWS WHAT TOMORROW HOLDS ...

The cataclysm for a world crisis could come from an act of nuclear terror in one of the American, European or Russian metropolitan areas. It will lead to mass panic and disturbances, more likely to the loss of control of the country and probably to an irreversible disorganization of society. Among the victims of the social breakdown will be national and religious groups which according to common perception are responsible for the act of terror, more likely the Muslim population. Unavoidable military actions against Islamic states, which are suspected in supporting terrorism, will call for a response from the Islamic world. Its collision with the Christian world can become total and spread across European, Russian and American cities.

The global crisis could be provoked by a nuclear war in the Persian Gulf region, by a breakdown of world communication networks, a failure of the world financial system, abrupt climate change and so on. The growing food prices, which started not so long ago, are fraught with disturbances in the poorest countries, international conflicts in areas of the *third world* suffering from hunger and the flow of refugees with extremist views to the developed countries of the North. Events which are absolutely unexpected today could start a chain reaction resulting in the disintegration of the present-day international system.

There exists a possibility for a less dramatic and severe change in the present world political paradigm, a relatively smooth transition to a new, unfamiliar, more complicated than in 17th-20th centuries, international reality. The latter is being formed in a swift manner after the end of the Cold War, and disintegration of the last world empire with its center in Moscow and, consequently, the decomposition of the bipolar system. Sometimes it is called the *New Middle Ages*. Particularly, the French philosopher and political scientist Pierre Hassner wrote: “A contradictory variety of acting forces makes us return, with certain reservations, to the 16th century with its powerful trading cities and religious wars, or even to the Middle Ages with its mixture of disorder and strict hierarchy.”¹

The term *New Middle Ages* has been first used, at least in Russian literature, in 1920 by Nikolay Berdyaev – one of the deepest, original and controversial Russian thinkers of the 20th century. With amazing, penetrating clarity he almost one hundred years ago foresaw the change of

the epochs, disintegration “of the world of the new history”, “corruption of the old societies” and advent of the “chaotic and barbarian forces”, which, as such, happens in our times.

“It is our fate to live in a historical time of changing epochs”, – wrote Berdyaev – the old world of the modern history ... comes to an end and corrupts, and gives birth to an unknown yet new world ... I will nominally determine our epoch as the end of modern history and the beginning of the New Middle Ages ... the transition to the New Middle Ages, at some point as it was in the transition to the old Middle Ages, and is accompanied by the decomposition of the old societies and the imperceptible formation of new societies. The old, stable, settled social and cultural universe is overthrown by chaotic and barbaric forces.”²

While thinking about the New Middle Ages, Berdyaev mainly turned to the supercession of values and cultural models. This is a uniquely interesting problem, though it is relatively distant from the issues of this present review. By no means all conclusions made by Berdyaev particularly, the idea, in the beginning of the previous century, of the irreversible degradation of liberalism as a basis for political system, have managed to stand the test of time. However, the very concept of the epoch of change, in other words, the formation of the new paradigm of the international system, is without any doubt correct. In geopolitical and strategic plans the change of the epochs, in essence, has started not after the World War I and revolution in Russia, but at the end of the 20th century.

In the majority, the *Westphalian system*, in which the main, and above all the only, acting subjects of international relations were national states and world empires, and the prevailing principle of national and international policy was the so called *raison d'état*³, has gone away. In its place appears a complex assembly of interlacing states and interstate integrated formations, supranational unions and transnational structures, various nongovernmental parties, which unite in regional and global networks. The interpenetration of national and international policies increases. The international environment that has appeared doesn't discount nation states, but *dilutes* them. Correspondingly, the term of national sovereignty which was fundamental not so long ago, is now losing its sense. The spectrum of self-determination and loyalties, antagonisms and conflicts expands. The new world system which is forming, indeed in some aspects is similar to the international system, which existed in Europe in the Middle Ages before the establishment of the *Westphalian model*.

But a difference from the Middle Ages in this system which is establishing itself is that the nuclear factor plays an important role. In this sense it could be called not only New, but also a Nuclear Middle Age. Taking in consideration that the Old Middle Ages was a period of permanent chaotic internecine conflict and wars, which lasted for years and decades, there appear natural questions like: how stable is international security in 21st century? How stable is the international system that is establishing itself and can it compensate and neutralize destabilizing impulses that appear or, on the contrary, could it develop avalanche-like processes which could lead to global disturbances and disruptions. These questions still remain open. However there are numerous signs that international institutions, first of all the United Nations, and legal system, intended for regulating the relationship between nation states, have failed to fulfill their purpose. As a result, the approaching New Middle Age can become a period of nuclear chaos or it can be a period with rigid hierarchy with nuclear arms as one of the factors.

IRAN: «NUCLEAR PROGRAM IS NOT NEGOTIABLE»

The region where chaos resulting in a nuclear conflict may become the most probable is the Greater Middle East. One of the reasons for that is the persistent desire of the Iranian political class to obtain nuclear weapons. In the very beginning of April 2008 the president of Iran Mahmoud Ahmadinejad once again launched a challenge to an international community. He declared that the issue of termination of the uranium program was “now in the past”, that “this is not a subject for negotiations” and that he is not inclined to discuss the conditions of the termination of this program. This was the answer from one of the most odious and – in the case Iran obtains nuclear weapons – one of the most dangerous public figures in the modern world to the new sanctions against Iran, introduced by the UN Security Council in March 2008, and simultaneously to the news concerning the European Union preparing for Iran some tempting



S
I
E
W
T
S
I
E
N
T
S
V
E
V
E
N
T
S
R
E
E
V
E
N
T
S
O
F
W
O
R
L
D
O
F
W
O
R
L
D
O
F
W
O
R
L
D

offers, if the former stops uranium enrichment. In other words, Tehran ostentatiously rejected hints originating from Washington in the end of 2007 regarding the possibility and desirability of some deal, supposing that Iran to shut down their nuclear military program in exchange to the restoration of the relations with the U.S. and other measures, attractive to the Iranian elite.

The events around the Iranian nuclear program in the beginning of the 2008 have developed according to a familiar scenario. On February 22, 2008 the Director General of the IAEA Mohamed El Baradei introduced another report concerning the nuclear activities of Iran. There he made a conclusion that "contrary to the decisions of the Security Council, Iran has not suspended its enrichment-related activities, having continued the operation of PFEP and FEP. Iran has also continued the construction of the *IR-40* and operation of the Heavy Water Production Plant."⁴


Thus the Director General of IAEA in fact confirmed to the press that Iran possesses the new *IR-2* centrifuges, which are twice as productive as the obsolete *P-1* models, which were illegally acquired by Iran at the end of the last century. The press referring to diplomatic sources announced that in the underground nuclear object in Natanz were assembled two cascades consisting of more than 300 of such improved centrifuges and the assembly of the third cascade is in progress. And Mahmoud Ahmadinejad declared the intention to increase their number to six thousand.

On March 3, 2008 the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1803. In this resolution, the fourth in number, which was devoted to the nuclear program of Iran, it was noted

"with serious concern that (...) Iran has not established full and sustained suspension of all enrichment related and reprocessing activities and heavy water-related projects as set out in resolution 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), and 1747 (2007), nor resumed its cooperation with the IAEA under the Additional Protocol, nor taken the other steps required by the IAEA Board of Governors, nor complied with the provisions of Security Council resolution 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007)."⁵

However, the unequivocal affirmation of Tehran's contemptuous approach to the decisions of the Security Council was not supplemented by measures which could make the government of Iran listen to the opinion of the body, which is considered to be one of the most authoritative multilateral organizations concerning international security. Member states of the United Nations have prohibited the entry to their territory of five Iranian officials. They were told «to exercise vigilance» to the business relationships of the financial institutions, located on their territory, with all the banks, based in Iran. The property of 13 Iranian companies and 13 Iranian officials was frozen. It was prohibited to sell to Iran any items, materials, goods, equipment, and technology which could be used for production of nuclear weapons. Finally, a proposal was made to "inspect the cargoes to and from Iran, of aircraft and vessels, at their airports and seaports, owned or operated by *Iran Air Cargo* and *Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Line*, provided there are reasonable grounds to believe that the aircraft or vessel is transporting goods

prohibited under this resolution or resolution 1737 (2006) or resolution 1747 (2007)."⁶

 **Abdulaziz Sager (United Arab Emirates)**, Chairman of the Gulf Research Center – by e-mail from **Dubai**: "The violence in Iraq which again began to flare up after months where it appeared to have calmed down definitely was a negative factor. The failure of the Arab summit in Damascus which reflected the division in the Arab world and which underscored the isolation of Syria was another factor. The testimony by General Petraeus before Congressional committees in Washington will also throw the spotlight on Iran and heighten tension with Tehran."

It was not difficult to forecast the reaction of Tehran to the adoption of such a resolution. Of course, it was met with acute irritation. But the sanctions which were introduced, look like petty annoyances, they are too weak to make Iran seriously agree with the opinion of the Security Council. As a result, Iran declared its refusal to negotiate over the nuclear problem both with the *Group of 6*, consisting of Russia, U.S.A, China, Great Britain, Germany and France, and with any separate country. From now on, as declared by the leaders of Iran, they will

deal only with the IAEA. This naturally narrows the possibilities of the member states of the *Group of 6*, including Russia, in negotiations with Iran. Besides, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad refused to discuss the measures, which the EU was ready to offer Iran in exchange for the freezing of its nuclear program. The rumor says that they discussed the establishment of a joint oil company between Iran and the European countries, consultations on security issues in the Middle and Near East and the supply of spare parts for Iranian aircraft.

Thus, the international community again demonstrated its impotency. Actually, everyone agrees in general with the fact that they should not let Iran obtain nuclear weapons. It is quite often said that the only way to stop the nuclear program of Iran in a peaceful way is through the consolidated diplomatic and economic efforts of the leading states. In theory, there is no doubt about that. But in practice these consolidated efforts turn out to be inefficient. And such an inability of the greatest powers of the modern world to solve one of the most severe and dangerous problems of international security gives rise to a no less, if not greater concern, than the consequences of Iran obtaining nuclear weapons.

The hardness and lack of flexibility of the Iranian position on the nuclear issue, to a certain extent, was a result of the parliamentary elections which took place in the middle of March. During the elections more than 70 percent of seats were won by the conservative circles, representatives of which won the elections in all the large cities of the country. This is quite an alarming sign. Actually, the answer of Iranian society to the declining social and economic situation in the country was not the support of reform-minded opposition forces, demanding liberalization of the economy and the normalization of relations with the West, but the support of conservative forces, responsible for galloping inflation and a decline in the standard of living. And there is still no answer to the question of whether this was the result of some temporary and transient factors or it reflects some deeper tendencies in the development of a society, which is in the process of a disintegration of the traditional social system.

PAKISTAN: MARGINAL INSECURITY

Another source of potential nuclear chaos in the area of the Great Middle East are events in Pakistan, a nuclear weapon state, which has survived a severe crisis in its domestic policy. The elections to the national parliament of Pakistan, which took place in the middle of February 2008 and to the provincial assemblies in the provinces, did not result in the stabilization of the political situation in the country. Rather, on the contrary, the perspective of a collision between the president Pervez Musharraf and the opposition to him in government, which is supported by the parliamentary majority, became quite real. What is more important, the strategic line of Islamabad could be seriously considering a review of its strategic line in cooperation with the West, first of all with the United States, in fighting with Islamic extremism and terrorism.

During the elections, which took place on February 18, a landslide victory according to all expectations was won by two opposition parties: *The Pakistan Peoples Party*, which was before headed by Benazir Bhutto who was murdered in the late December 2007 and *The Pakistan Muslim League-N*, governed by ex-Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. *The Pakistan Muslim League-Q* which supported President *Pervez Musharraf* in addition to a coalition of Islamic parties suffered a setback. As a result the *Pakistan Peoples Party* and *Pakistan Muslim League-N* received 212 seats in the national parliament out of 336, and could form a government.

After long lasting negotiations, reciprocal concessions and compromises the two leading opposition parties agreed and adopted a candidate for the position of the prime minister. It was the representative of the *Pakistan Peoples Party* Yousaf Raza Gillani – a famous politician, belonging to an aristocratic Punjabi family. One of the first steps of the prime minister was the release from home arrest of the Chief Justice of Pakistan and of the supreme judges of the provinces strongly opposed to the president. It is suggested that within a month after the formation of the government the judges will be restored to their former positions. It means that there is a real probability of Pervez Musharraf being suspended from power, because from the moment of his election for the position of the president in the fall of 2007 he has combined the



positions of the president and head of the army, which contradicts the Constitution of the country.

After the parliamentary elections the ruling circles of Pakistan faced two main problems. The first one is the destiny of President Pervez Musharraf, and in a wider political context – political role of the army, more precisely, the role of the army command, which holds not only key administrative, but also key economic positions. The second one is further participation in the *war on terrorism*, above all, continuation or termination of the combat operations against *Taliban* in the Pakistani provinces adjacent to Afghanistan. Nawaz Sharif sticks to the most radical positions, and considers Pervez Musharraf his personal enemy. The administration of the *Pakistan Peoples Party* follows a more careful line, striving, first of all, for limitation of presidential authority. The question of the ability of the *Pakistan Peoples Party* and *Pakistan Islamic League-N* to find *modus vivendi* with the present president remains open. But it is as likely as not that in case of the resignation of Pervez Musharraf, the army once again will interfere in the political process, especially if the present parliamentary leaders will not be able to overcome their own discrepancies on other vital issues important for Pakistan.

In both last and first place is the fight against Islamic terrorism. Pervez Musharraf and the army generals call for a continuation of active combat operations in the so called *Tribal Zone*. Nawaz Sharif and – in a milder form – the leaders of the *Pakistan Peoples Party* – demand the curtailment of hostilities and reconciliation with the *Taliban*, if the former in its turn agrees to lay down arms. In the very end of March 2008 the Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gillani declared that although the war on terrorism is one of his priorities, the government proposes to start negotiations with those groups of Islamic fighters, who are ready to abandon war and conclude peace with the government. This initiative immediately called for a positive response from some leaders of the Pakistani *Taliban*, who hurried to inform the state that they were waging a sacred war on America, but not against the Pakistani government. In other words, there has been outlined a possibility for agreement between the new Pakistan government and *Taliban* with Islamabad's termination of cooperation with the United States as a basis for it.

If such an agreement is reached the military and political situation in the region will suffer a great change. The situation in Afghanistan will become more complicated, as in the bordering areas of Pakistan located imported logistic installations and bases of the *Taliban* and *Al Qaeda*. There will be a rise in tensions in the relationship between Pakistan and the United States. The significance of Central Asia as a transportation corridor connecting the forces of the international coalition acting in Afghanistan, with Europe will increase. The conflict between the army leadership and civil government will increase, because despite all the rest, the Pakistani army is vitally interested in receiving military support from the United States. That could result in another military coup and the renewal of hostilities in the *Tribal Zone*. It is hard to forecast its results, because the war on terror is more or less not widely supported by the Pakistan society.

In other words the democratic elections, which took place in Pakistan did not lead to a stabilization of the situation, rather, on the contrary, they formed several lines of antagonism in domestic policy, which will lead to serious international consequences. However, the most dangerous variant of the development, which is not excluded, and perhaps after the elections even became more probable, than ever, is an escalation of this political antagonism into a chaotic armed conflict. In a country which possess nuclear weapons, it could have the most unpleasant of consequences. With that the political dynamics in Pakistan shows that traditional societies are facing a deadlocked situation. On the one hand, a tough autocratic regime supported by the military clique is unable to provide stability. On the other – the attempt to remove tensions in society through democratic elections can finally lead to the coming of power of groups which are not inclined to cooperate with the West in the sphere of ensuring security.

KOSOVO INDEPENDENCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

The independence of Kosovo became indeed one of the most intense international events in the beginning of 2008, it caused numerous comments from politicians and the media, it was accompanied by intense debate in the United Nations and other international forums. As far as

it can be seen, the importance of this event is not only in the fact that on the political map of the Balkans appeared a new barely recognized state, but in the fact that it allows us to review some deeper and far-reaching tendencies of international policy. And indeed, everything which accompanied the independence of Kosovo, as well as the fact of its own declaration of independence without the approval of the UN Security Council highlighted, on the one hand, the relevance of the problem of unrecognized states and quasi-public formations, which strive for independence, and on the other hand – demonstrated the inefficiency of the Security Council as an instrument for solving actual international problems.

Equally important and also another question: how fair is the thesis declared by Russian diplomats concerning the fact that the independence of Kosovo shatters lawful foundations of international relationship and can provoke a chain reaction, resulting, according to the Permanent Representative of Russia at the United Nations Vitaly Churkin, in “destructive consequences for international relations that took decades to build.”⁷ If this is really true, then the system of international relations has a strong disequilibrium and can disintegrate into a deep crisis after comparatively insignificant events on the regional scale.

In the key documents of the United Nations which for the time being are the most authoritative sources of international law, the unalienable right to self-determination is regarded as one of the key principles of international relations. In Article 1 of the UN Charter the goals of this organization include developing “friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples.”⁸ The Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, adopted in 1960, declared the right of nations to independence. It reads: “all peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development; inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational preparedness should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence.”⁹



Fulvio Attina (Italy), Full Professor of International Relations and Jean Monnet Professor of European Union Politics, University of Catania – by e-mail from **Catania**: “The striving for independence by Albanians in Kosovo undermines security in Europe. Elections in Russia managed to contain the growth of tensions, but after the elections the situation may change. Moscow may be unable to deter Belgrade against tough response to the self-proclaimed independence of Kosovo.”

This declaration speaks about colonial countries and peoples, though in this document there is no clear criterion for defining this or that people as colonial. But the formula of this Declaration referring to the right of peoples for self-determination is verbatim repeated in the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966, which covers not only colonial nations, but nations in general. In other words, the right of a nation to self-determination is regarded in these documents as one of the key principles of modern

international relations. However, one of the serious drawbacks of these documents is the absence of a legal and political definition of the term “nation”. It is not clear, if it implies an ethnic group, a population of a certain territory or something else.

In its turn the principle of territorial integrity, which is often referred to by adversaries of Kosovo independence, is treated in the UN documents and in the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference above all as inadmissible, since it implies the disintegration of a state through use of force from outside. Thus, Article 2 of the UN Charter reads: “all Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”¹⁰

This approach was developed and worked out in detail in the Helsinki Final Act. It mainly read about the inadmissibility of the violation of the boundaries of member states resulted in occupation, divestiture and usurpation of the part of the territory.

At first glance, the relationship to the problem of self-determination has a provision that the states that have signed the Helsinki Act would abstain from any actions against the territorial



S
W
T
S
E
I
E
N
T
S
V
V
E
E
D
L
L
O
R
L
D
W
O
R
L
D
O
F

integrity and unity of other member states. This formula can be treated as an obligation not to encourage secession movements. However, it is emphasized that this is incompatible with the mission and principles of the UN Charter. But the right to self-determination refers to the key principles and goals of the United Nations.

Further, international legal documents which sanction or deny the right of this or that people for independence, are mainly the resolutions of the UN Security Council. Particularly, resolution 1244, adopted by the Security Council in 1999 refers to the situation in Kosovo. But, first of all, the resolutions of the UN Security Council are adopted in particular conditions of military, political, social and economic situations, existing in this or that region in this or that moment. They do not claim to formulate some firm principles and norms; moreover, they can *de facto* lose their force in case the situation changes. Second, in one case the Security Council confirms the right to independence and in another – denies it. Particularly, the UN documents constantly point out the right of the Palestinians for creation of their own state, although such a state as well as such an ethnic group as the Palestinians has never existed. At that, there is no legally precise criteria in which cases peoples can and must realize their right for self-determination or when to acknowledge *unrecognized states*.

In other words, the statement that the independence of Kosovo undermines international law does not correspond to reality. The other thing is more terrible. The events in the Balkans have proved that the international community doesn't have at their disposal legal norms regulating a solution to the problems of self-determination and independence – which is one of the most severe challenges to security. And if such norms are not developed and approved, the sources for conflicts and tensions will remain in the world system that is establishing itself.

EMPTY PANDORA'S BOX

Russian diplomatic officials and politicians loudly protested against the independence of Kosovo, representing proof that it will provoke a burst of separatism and will destabilize the situation both in a European as well as a global context. Should this forecast be a correct one, it would have showed that the stability of the international system, particularly in one of its key elements – in Europe, has an extremely low level. However it looks like that this kind of *Pandora's box*, which, according to Moscow, could be opened with the declaration of Kosovo's independence, appeared to be almost empty.

Needless to say that the declaration of Kosovo independence and its acknowledgement by the majority, though not all, of the leading Western states caused a burst of negative emotions in Serbia right up to disorders in Belgrade and areas of Kosovo populated by Serbs, attacks on foreign embassies and NATO forces. This is clear. Serbian public opinion till now mourns the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the unsuccessful attempts to retain the dominating role of Belgrade in the *post-Yugoslavian space*, after the defeat in the war of 1999. Within such an emotional context the independence of Kosovo became another shock to the national ambition of the Serbian society. It is extremely hard for it to accept international realities, established after 1990, including the loss of Kosovo. It is no surprise that the nationalistic political forces in Serbia have fired up nostalgic sentiments and revanchist flames, implying not so much a return of Kosovo, it is not real at all, but the strengthening of their own positions in the country.

In these conditions, the entry of Serbia into the European Union became the subject of the major disagreements in domestic policy. In the beginning of the March, 2008 the Serbian government with a majority of votes declined a resolution offered by the nationalists about further negotiations with EU, which assumes that Serbia can enter the European Union only with Kosovo as a part of it. The pragmatic thinking circles in the Serbian elite understand that they can not put under risk the future of the country by attaching the entry of Serbia to the EU to the position of the latter on the Kosovo issue. Some time later the minister of foreign affairs during his speech in the UN Security Council declared the ritual formula that Serbia would never agree to the independence of Kosovo but rejected the suggestion to introduce economic sanctions against Pristina, to say nothing about the use of force.

As a result, Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica – one of the leaders of the Serbian nationalists, addressed President Boris Tadic – an advocate for Serbia’s accession to the EU regardless of the Kosovo situation, with a demand to dissolve parliament and conduct new elections. Both nationalists and pragmatics hope for a victory, which will allow them to avoid the formation of a coalition government and, respectively, to put under complete control the foreign policy course of the country. It is not clear yet if these expectations will be met. But it is evident that Serbian society faces the necessity of a historical choice between nostalgic dreams, leading to self-isolation and regression, and pragmatic decisions, which would allow Serbia to enter the European community of nations and become a standard European country.

The current situation puts Russian diplomacy into a difficult, perhaps even awkward position. If during the elections victory is won by the pragmatic circles, the line of Moscow appears to be meaningless: Russia could neither prevent Kosovo’s independence, nor to somehow substantially strengthen its influence in Serbia. If the elections are won by the nationalists, Russia becomes an ally of a country isolated both in the Balkans and in the international community as a whole. And finally, it is impossible to forget that persistent support of Slobodan Milosevic at some point turned into an abrupt decline, if not a complete loss, of Russia’s influence in the Balkans.

CAUCASIAN ECHO OF THE KOSOVO INDEPENDENCE

Though the independence of Kosovo, declared on February, 17, 2008 didn’t cause catastrophic consequences on a planetary scale, the leaders of the secessionist regimes, which appeared after the collapse of the Soviet Union didn’t take long to make the use of events in the Balkans. In its turn Moscow used the situation for pursuing its goals in the Caucasus and for an attempt to bring pressure on NATO. The developments confirmed that the destabilizing effect of Kosovo’s independence on the Caucasus region depends not so much on the efforts of the secessionist Caucasus groups to achieve their objectives in the Caucasus, but from the readiness of Russia to make advances to these groups.

The governments of the two unrecognized states – Abkhazia and South Ossetia once again called Russia, CIS and the international community to recognize their independence. The reaction of Moscow was reserved. In the beginning of March 2008, the MFA of Russia declared the unilateral cancellation of economic sanctions against Abkhazia, which were introduced by the CIS resolution in January, 1996. This at least theoretically opens up the way to Russian capital which can transform Abkhazia and turn it into a developed resort area. As a pretext, the Russian MFA used the fact that the majority of Georgian refugees, who lived there before, have returned to the Galsky region of Abkhazia. Such a claim sounds less then convincing. Out of more than 250,000 Georgians, who left Abkhazia during the war of 1992-1994, only about 55,000 people returned to the Galsky region. Quite doubtful is the legality of the unilateral cancellation of sanctions, which were imposed by a collective resolution of the CIS heads of states. To be strict, Russian diplomacy should have coordinated such a step with the government of other CIS member states, because the decision about sanctioning Abkhazia was adopted collectively by the supreme body of the CIS.

Right after the NATO summit in Bucharest there appeared some leak in the Russian media which confirmed that Moscow considers some additional measures which could change the character of the relationship with Abkhazia and South Ossetia. And indeed in the middle of April, President Putin assigned the government with the task to develop measures for *objective aid* to the population of Abkhazia and South Ossetia and interaction with the actual governmental bodies of the unrecognized republics. He implied recognition of their domestic passports, the visits of Russian diplomats, establishing of official representation by Russian ministries and offices in their territories and so on. At the same time, the Russian government didn’t go so far as to recognize the independence of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria. There may be several reasons for this. The military and political situation around these territories would be substantially complicated. There would arise a question about the status of Russian peacemaking forces. The relationship with Moldova and Georgia would have been damaged definitively and for a long time.



The cancellation of economic sanctions towards Abkhazia and other actions of Moscow in the Caucasus eventually caused extreme discontent from Georgia where it was regarded as the beginning of the actual annexation of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by Russia. In Abkhazia itself, naturally, the cancellation of sanctions was welcomed. However, if Russian economic expansion will be on a broad scale it could provoke serious opposition from the Abkhazian elite. The latter will of course strive for political support from Moscow; to attract Russian tourists and investment to the region, but not to cede to the Russian capital the most attractive assets of the Abkhazian economy.

It is difficult to understand another thing. The Russian press does not make any secret that the steps towards Sukhumi and Tskhinvali are regarded as a kind of response to the plans of NATO to accept sooner or later Georgia and Ukraine as member states. But recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia *de facto* or *de jure*, and even deployment of the Russian peacekeeping force will hardly affect the security interests of the member states of the North Atlantic community. At the same time, such measures will convince the governments of these countries in expansionistic intentions of Moscow. The natural reaction to that will be a desire to strengthen the military and political positions of the West in the regions bordering with Russia.

SPRING AGGRAVATION OR “NOW DO HEAR THE SOUND OF TRAMPLING BOOTS?..”

Russian policy in the Caucasus is one of the elements of the general political line of Moscow during the period of the transfer of leadership from Vladimir Putin to Dmitry Medvedev. After the name of successor of President Putin became clear, the contradictions concerning foreign policy came up and became strained. In particular, in the beginning of 2008 Vice Prime Minister Alexey Kudrin, Anatoly Chubais, Yegor Gaidar and some other prominent Russian politicians and scientists came out flatly against confrontation with the West, having justly assumed that it prevents the realization of the economic plans and goals of Russia. Dmitry Medvedev who was elected as president of Russia has repeatedly pointed out his adherence to the course established by Putin both in domestic and foreign policy. Along with that he several times, though very carefully, hinted to a watering-down of the strategy of the foreign policy. In particular, during his speech at the World Economic Forum in Davos he mentioned that Russia is determined to be, and to be recognized as a major economic and political power, but he added that “this will be achieved not by the use of force, but by the example of our own behavior and achievements”.¹¹

We could suggest that the responsible and progressive circles of the Russian elite have associated the election of Dmitry Medvedev with the expectation for a positive change in Russian foreign policy. Such expectations can prove to be realistic, taking into consideration that the responsibility for establishing foreign and defense policy lies with the president.

An activation of forces which for some reason are interested in confrontation with the West could be an indirect but quite persuasive sign of a possible change in the Russian foreign policy course after the inauguration of the new president. One cannot exclude that such forces, afraid of a potential positive change in Russian foreign policy can try to impede its realization and to strongly hinder, as much as they can, the existing course of the country in the international scene.

These efforts became especially noticeable after the NATO summit in Bucharest and the promise given to admit sooner or later Ukraine and Georgia. Moscow expressed explicit threats towards NATO and especially towards Kyiv and Tbilisi. Thus, in the beginning of 2008 Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov sullenly exhorted everyone that “we will do our best not to let Ukraine and Georgia become NATO members, not to let it become inevitable in this case, that there would be breakdown of our relationship both with the Alliance and its leading members and our neighbors.”¹²

As a matter of fact the foreign minister indicated that Russia claims the right to veto the expansion of NATO and intends to exercise this right. Mr. Lavrov is an experienced enough diplomat not to understand the negative reaction of NATO, Ukraine and Georgia to his words. That is



Konstantin Eggert (Russia), Editor-in-chief of the Moscow Bureau, BBC Russian Service – by e-mail from **Moscow**: “The positive event is the signature of the U.S.-Russian strategic framework in Sochi. However, this document is designated to fix and slightly mitigate the unsurpassable contradictions between Moscow and Washington. NATO’s split over admission of Macedonia (FYROM) and heated argument over invitations to Membership Action Plans for Georgia and Ukraine do not contribute to the stability of Alliance’s political line. The most positive event is the French decision to join the ISAF in Afghanistan. Another positive thing is the Russia-NATO agreement on provision of land transit for non-military cargoes over the Russian territory.”

why, it is quite probable that he consciously wanted to provoke such a reaction. Several days later some high-ranking military leaders added fuel to the fire. Chief of the General Staff Yury Baluevsky supplemented the vague hints of the foreign minister with a no less vague promise to take measures of not only military, but also of some other kind. He reported that in case Ukraine and Georgia join NATO “Russia expressly will take actions, aimed at guaranteeing its interests alongside its state borders. These are going to be not only military measures, but also measures of a different character.”¹³

He was echoed by Secretary General of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) Nikolay Borduzha, who declared that the CSTO will be forced to “adequately react in the case of Ukraine and Georgia joining NATO.”¹⁴ The last statement sounds very aggressive. The Secretary General of CSTO, despite his respectable title, has no right to formulate the political position of the organization.

The latter is determined by the resolutions of the Council of Collective Security, consisting of the heads of the member states. And according to Article 18 of the CSTO Charter, the Secretary General coordinates the development of draft suggestions and documents of organizational bodies and is in charge of working contacts with other international intergovernmental organizations and states, moreover “in conformity with the resolutions of the Council”. In other words, the statement of Mr. Borduzha on the one hand – exceeds his authority, and on the other hand – is nothing but an attempt to impose the Russian point of view to several member states, though the latter could have their own, different from the Russian, points of view.

Of course, there now arises the questions: What are the reasons and what are the consequences of this *spring aggravation* of Russian foreign policy? What could be the result of Russia’s guarantee of its interests near its state borders not only through military measures, but also through the measures of a “different character”? It is quite clear that accession of Georgia and especially Ukraine to NATO does not give rise to enthusiasm in Moscow. Partially, this is caused by an attitude inherited from the Soviet past, a panicky perception of NATO as a military opponent. A certain part of the Russian political class hasn’t passed over this anachronism of the Cold War. Within the frame of this strategic thinking the *Near Abroad* countries are regarded as a kind of buffer strip, separating Russian army forces and the armies of the NATO member states. Partially, Ukraine’s and Georgia’s membership in NATO is regarded as having the heaviest impact on the plans, in fact utopian, to restore in this or that form the military, political and economic control over former Soviet Union territory. There well could be other motivations for this confrontational strategy. In particular, the Russian political class includes influential groups that are interested in the self-isolation of the country. For them this is the only way of survival in a tough, complicated and competitive international environment, the mechanisms and tendencies of which are hardly understandable for them.


However, no matter what the reasons are for the negative attitude of Moscow towards the potential offer to Ukraine and Georgia to join NATO, the question is what Russia can do to prevent such an invitation? Indeed, we can argue about the compliance of the threats of Russian diplomats and military leaders with international law and the interests of Russian and European security. But can Russia really achieve its goals through heating up tension in its relations with Ukraine and Georgia?



Russia of course can recognize independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and try to annex these territories, to deploy military contingent there. But this wouldn't stop Georgia from joining NATO. On the contrary, as it was mentioned before, it could stimulate this event. Relying on the fact that in case Ukraine joins NATO, the eastern regions of Ukraine will secede and join Russia does not take into consideration the interest of the native East Ukrainian elite. The latter have no sympathy for NATO. However, the perspective to appear under the direct or indirect control of Russia causes explicit rejection. In this case, the tougher and ruder the rhetoric of the Russian authorities will be, then the more the Ukrainian elite and public opinion not only in the west, but also in the east of the country will strive to neutralize the pressure of Moscow in the way of strengthening the relationship with the West in the political and military field as well. In other words, the political line in the relationship with the West, Ukraine and Georgia, established by Moscow by the spring of 2008, can lead to the consequences which it tries to prevent.

As a result Russian foreign policy can be caught in a serious trap. As soon as it becomes clear that the acceptance of Georgia and Ukraine into NATO is real, Moscow will have to either acknowledge its defeat, or start execution of military and other measures, which were mentioned by Gen. Baluevsky. In this case, the confrontations relating to domestic policy are inevitable, as the opposing political groups will not be lenient in imposing the responsibility for a foreign policy failure to the government of the country. Moreover, the tougher the existing anti-Western rhetoric will be, the more far-reaching and dangerous this failure will be. In the second case, a new stage of military and political confrontation with the West is inevitable, and Russia is doomed to be defeated in this confrontation.

CLOUDS LOOMING OVER THE WORLD

The dynamics of international events in the beginning of 2008 once again poses rather annoying questions concerning the extent to which the world powers are able to adjust their foreign and military policy to the changes taking place in the international arena, to which extent they are ready to counter the challenges and threats of the new nuclear Middle Ages. As of now, there is no basis for a positive response to these questions. The Iraqi syndrome in the U.S.A; the adherence of *old Europe* to the principles of soft power and political correctness, which puts it in opposition to the confrontational policy of Russia, based on the illusionary idea about its restored power; the hidden, but indomitable preparation of China for a struggle for world leadership – these are just some of the reasons for the incapacity of the international community to curb accumulating destructive forces. And that is why, we more and more often recall the lines of Valery Brusov about the “iron clatter” of onrushing Huns “who as a cloud looming over the world”. 

Yury Fedorov

Notes

¹ Pierre Hassner, *Violence and the world. From an atomic bomb to an ethnic cleansing* (St Petersburg: Vsemirnnoye slovo, 1999), p. 297.

² Nikolay Berdyaev, *New Middle Ages*. <http://www.philosophy.ru/library/berd/midl.html> (last accessed on April 20, 2008).

³ *Raison d'etat* – principle of Cardinal Richelieu, assuming that the interests of states are justified by the means used for their achievement.

⁴ IAEA. Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007) in the Islamic Republic of Iran. The report of the Director General to the Board of Governors. GOV/2007/58. November 15, 2007, p. 8.

⁵ UN Security Council. Resolution 1803 (2008) of March 3, 2008. S/RES/1803 (2008).

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ UN Document S/PV.5839. Preliminary report of the Security Council meeting, February 18, 2008.

⁸ *UN Charter*. <http://www.un.org/russian/documen/basicdoc/charter.htm#chapt1> (last accessed on April 20, 2008.).

⁹ *Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples*. A/RES/1514(XV), December 12, 1960.

¹⁰ *UN Charter*. <http://www.un.org/russian/documen/basicdoc/charter.htm#chapt1> (last accessed on April 20, 2008).

¹¹ Russia is determined to be, and to be recognized as, a major economic and political power, said Dmitry Medvedev, First Deputy Prime Minister of the Russian Federation, in a speech to this session. http://www.weforum.org/en/knowledge/KN_SESS_SUMM_19222?url=/en/knowledge/KN_SESS_SUMM_19222 (last accessed on April 20, 2008).

¹² Sergey Lavrov on Russian-American relationship. *Ekho Moskvy*, April 8, 2008. <http://www.echo.msk.ru/programs/beseda/506017-echo.phtml> (last accessed on April 20, 2008).

¹³ Vadim Soloviev, "In the CIS countries: declared all-out mobilization," *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, April 14, 2008. http://www.ng.ru/week/2008-04-14/12_sng.html (last accessed on April 20, 2008).

¹⁴ *Ibid.*



A VIEW BY A RUSSIAN CONSERVATIVE: CONSENSUS OF THE PAST AND DILEMMAS OF THE FUTURE

The past historical period superficially reminds of some kind of movement without a vector. You should agree that the majority of the important military and political events looked multidirectional and chaotic. Stabilization of the situation in Iraq is there (though Muqtada al-Sadr showed the Americans that the problem is not in *Al-Qaeda*, but in the fact that weak and weak-willed power is impossible in Iraq as a matter of principle). The deceleration of the *flywheel* of the American military campaign against Iran looks evident and at the same time unmotivated. The crisis of Western European economic and political institutions, which is hidden almost as it was during the Brezhnev era of Soviet Union by reports of enormous success, becomes more and more evident. The deadlock in the missile defense talks is obvious. Indeed, all major military and political events of the last several months look somehow chaotic, sometimes even senseless. However such judgments are true only if considering the situation superficially.

MOVING WITHOUT A VECTOR AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RESOURCES


It is true to say that events in the military and political sphere and in the security sphere have become only a superficial and not always adequate demonstration of the deep tendencies in the development of international relations. It has always been so, but the last three to four months have shown the obvious *superstructural* character of military and political issues. Chaotic events in the *military and political sphere* turn out to be secondary against the background of other geopolitical and geoeconomic processes, which have been recently outlined. Of course, the majority of these events have not yet, and probably, will not ever, influence the political and military sphere; however these are those which will determine the character of the actions of the states on the international arena.

And from that point of view the events in the sphere of energy supply have become the main theme of the past quarter. They not only confirm the growing importance of energy supply for international politics, but demonstrate the beginning of the reorganization of the global hydrocarbon and energy supply in the overall market, which started to determine global military and political processes. All other events and statements in the recent period are not more than the background for this global, in its meaning process.

One can suggest that the system of guarantying the energy supply for the system of world economics which was so hardly created during the Cold War and the first post bipolar years



S
S
T
E
N
E
V
E
E
R
D
L
W
O
R
L
D
O
F

 Yevgeny **Satanovsky (Russia)**, President of the Institute of the Middle East, – by e-mail from **Moscow**: “The security situation feels a negative impact of the ongoing crisis with the presidential elections in Lebanon, parliamentary elections in Iran (which resulted in the strengthening of position of the conservative wing), Turkish prosecutors’ decision to consider the possibility of banning the ruling party, and power struggle in Pakistan. The failure of the League of Arab States summit in Damascus threatens with the quickly approaching war of Israel with *Hezbollah* in Lebanon and Syria both supported by Iran. The positive effect is ensured by counterterrorist operations of Turkey in Kurdistan and of Israel in Gaza.”

starts if not to collapse then to finally run out its potential. In other words, the present day paradigm of hydrocarbon energy economy cannot provide steady economic growth and that means—global stability as well. The global financial crisis, which has started and was probably provoked by the mortgage problems in the U.S.A, has a more fundamental basis. It is as likely as not that this basis is the crisis of the global energy economy system.

The crisis, which starts to be outlined, sooner or later will break out and will make the political and economic elite of the industrially developed countries look for a way out from the energy deadlock. And, probably, this search will be carried out in the political and military sphere as well. That is why everything which happened outside the global security sphere should be considered as the main events in global security. All major players in

global politics (who are reasonably the major players of the global economy) start preparation for an era of relatively slow economic growth and absolute shortage of basic natural resources and, above all, energy resources. And this would be a significantly different system of international relations than before.

Of course, we can assume that Europe and the United States and even China will see the light and turn towards the idea of *sustainable development* and proclaim moderation in the usage of resources, first of all energy, and restrict consumerism. However, it will hardly become true. It is more probable that, being not ready and not able to change the paradigm of economic development, our partners from industrially developed states will choose a superficially more simple way: they will try to cancel the paradigm of the energy resources procurement. And it means that the role of military power in international relations, including international economics, will increase in the nearest future.

Probably, the initial struggle for hydrocarbons will start from the outskirts of the global arena, where there are plenty of such places which were well forgotten (or the high and mighties just pretended that they forgot about them) in the years of relative hydrocarbon well being. These are oil fields in the area of the Spratly Islands, and shelf of the Bering Sea, the Arctic zone and the deposits on the African continent. That is to say the *great powers* can swing a cat here? And in this sense the existing world gives a lot of opportunities for state self-realization and overcoming a national inferiority complex.

Only what will be the difference of the modern world from the late colonial epoch of the last part of the 19th century, when there was no African slave trade, but the representatives of other races were not considered equal yet? It was the century when the great powers considered the developing world primarily as a source for raw materials and didn't even start to think about capital export, its partial industrialization and modernization. Did it turn out that from the geopolitical point of view, from the point of view of the global economy and international relations development of the last one hundred years with two world wars, communism, *The New Deal* of Roosevelt, liberalism, other ideological exoticism like Euro-communism for humanity, or rather for its European part, were in vain?

GLOBAL NUCLEAR RENAISSANCE AS A GEOPOLITICAL FACTOR

With all the gloominess of the hydrocarbon present, it is not correct to say that the world has the same *dismal* perspectives from the energy point of view. It is now when the global energy

industry starts implementation of what was several years ago called the global *nuclear renaissance*. But it was just an idea then, a dream of escaping a hydrocarbon deadlock, if you like. And now this dream acquires a form of reality. The major players of the world economies—the United States, Great Britain, China, India, as well as the regions of *catching-up* industrial modernization like Southeast Asia and the Middle East, – start the practical implementation of the peaceful nuclear energy programs.

Development of nuclear energy sector for Russia is not just a question of creation of the basis for continuous economic and first of all industrial growth, but a question of geopolitical status and security of its energy supply. It is a question of geopolitical status, because this country possesses all the resources and capabilities for being a leader in the global *nuclear renaissance*. And the main part of these resources is experience in the construction of top quality nuclear power plants in different types of regions. Very few competitors of the newly established state corporation *Rosatom* can boast the same credentials. Such leadership costs are high, as with all the success of the Russian economy there are not so many (if there are any) hi-tech fields in which this country is acknowledged to be the leader, and our companies are really feared by competitors.

However, the point is not just in satisfaction of the state ambitions. The global *nuclear renaissance* can significantly change the context of the present-day resource antagonism, provided the issues of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and hazardous technologies are solved, as well as the nuclear safety is reinforced. In other words, the declining need for classical hydrocarbons can significantly strengthen international stability in case it is accompanied with corresponding multilateral agreements, which guarantee a non-discriminatory access to peaceful nuclear energy uses. At the very least, it can defuse the resource antagonism.

Although the development of nuclear energy can really become a factor of global significance, in the near future it is impossible to say that the situation is without problems. We can point out three issues which could be pending and which can significantly complicate the realization of the dream of a global *nuclear renaissance*.

Above all, it is the question of producing a platform for the development of modern nuclear energy. In their essence all the existing nuclear power plants, both mass-produced and *planned* are the product of the technological breakthrough of the late 1960s–1970s. Of course, all of them are highly reliable and effective, they are *referential*, and that is to say they have a certain experience of being in operation. But, nonetheless, this is the equipment of the 20th but not 21st century, though it has been brought to perfection, especially in Russia. This sad circumstance can be explained not only by the *failure* in the development of nuclear technologies, which took place after the catastrophe in Chernobyl, but also by the absence of the proper experience in the sphere of cooperation in the nuclear power. And if during the period of the Cold War this could be explained by the closed nature and military importance of the sphere, the increase of commercial competition is what prevents cooperation now. As a result the majority of international projects in the sphere of nuclear energy development which have already been announced, appear to be in stagnation for the moment, and new initiatives, including even such a breakthrough idea as The International Uranium Enrichment Center is perceived with a great deal of precaution. These circumstances should no doubt be overcome; if we want that the global *nuclear renaissance* to be not only a quantitative, but also a qualitative event.

Second, life teaches us to treat nuclear power with a great responsibility. Theoretically we can prove that the scale of the Chernobyl tragedy is exaggerated and that in fact there was nothing terrible, but these attempts look very unconvincing. All of us both in Russia and abroad should understand that *every housewife* can not be a head of an NPP or an enterprise of the nuclear fuel cycle. And from that point of view, there arises a natural question: what professional base will be the basis for development of the *nuclear renaissance* not only in Russia where the level of technical literacy has been preserved, but also in other countries? How can the global community provide the competence and responsibility of the atomic energy user? I think, that implementation of the technical “*fool protection*” mechanisms where it is only possible, will not be enough. It is necessary to form a new understanding of the users’ responsibility.



Third, the new situation from the point of view of the atomic energy and related industries and technological development poses a question of necessity of the new understanding of export control provisions, especially in what is concerned the possibility of technology and materials accumulation. It is obvious that in the nearest future the circulation of nuclear materials and technologies will increase. And simultaneously it will broaden the economic opportunities, but also it will increase the number of foreign policy risks. And from that point of view it is necessary to develop a new understanding, a new ideology of export control, if you like, which would at least partially eliminate the new risks, but not excessively restrict the commercial circulation of nuclear materials and technologies. The dialogue on such a wide range of questions should be started already now, and not when the problem becomes full fledged and the technologies, materials, equipment and carriers will start to circulate in an uncontrolled manner.

Finally we cannot miss the questions concerning the disposal of spent nuclear fuel (SNF). Indeed, if nuclear energy sector will be significantly activated from the point of view of uranium raw materials consumption, the increase of such a subfield of nuclear energy uses as spent fuel disposal is as inevitable as the morning sunrise. And we will feel such activation very soon, as soon as the political decisions concerning the development of nuclear energy adopted in a number of states will transform into practical actions. However, for now there is no breakthrough in this area, and we can hardly expect them in the nearest future, although at some point the Russian atomic field had very interesting results, which unfortunately have been buried by the avalanche of cheap commerce-like offers to turn Russia into a SNF storage area. It is very good that the fathers of these ideas at the moment are removed from the atomic industry and not only from it. However, it is inadmissible to throw out the baby with the *dirty water*, e.g. the opportunity to offer the world new methods and technologies of SNF and, in general, radioactive materials disposal. It is too early to talk about a global *nuclear renaissance*.

Probably, it is not quite fair when people say that Russia should develop nuclear energy in order to escape from the energy crisis and decline in industrial development. After all, the implementation of power-saving technologies and alternative renewed energy sources can bear the increase of energy supply shortage in Russia. And this would be to some extent cheaper than development of the nuclear energy sector, especially taking into consideration the expenses for security and high ecological standards. Russia should develop nuclear energy in order to remain among the states which are efficient players in the hi-tech market, because atomic energy and its related research spheres are the key to the solution of a large number of issues of the economic and social development of the country and retaining its place as a mighty global power.

Finally, indeed, the difference between such terms as the raw-export country and energy superpower is that the energy superpower possesses the newest power and *parapower* technologies which allow it to transform its energy resources into industrial power. And this is radically impossible in the modern world without atomic energy.

KOSOVO AS A MIRROR OF EUROPEAN POLITICS

When talking about Kosovo we deliberately start to think that it was exactly what was supposed to happen, and no one made any surprises for us. The independence of Kosovo was declared in a manner and at a time that was appointed by Washington. The United Nations appeared to be marginalized out of the process. The Serbs protest, but *in a walk through manner*, trying to use the image of the being hurt for earning additional dividends for entering the European Union. The only ones who surprise us are the European politicians, who with enthusiasm have created a future source of European instability close by. There is an impression that in the race for showing-off democracy and liberalism they have completely lost the invisible string of foreign policy processes, which are crucial for the survival of any state.

The amazing void of European politics in the context of the situation around Kosovo appears in the article by two ministers of foreign affairs: Carl Bildt of Sweden and Bernard Kouchner of France, which in its essence represents a letter to *Serbian friends*. Two brilliant European state officials, who have claims for geopolitical status, cannot even clearly explain to their *Serbian*

friends why they have supported the politics of the United States. Some mumbling explanations about preventing a new war in the Balkans, and if the Serbs walk up to the trough, they will have everything like in the song by a famous Russian bard Vladimir Vysotsky: “And for that my drunken fellow, answered he to Epiphany...” An astonishing example of geopolitical simplicity, if not to say immaturity. And the question here is not only in Kosovo—mumbling and the immaturity of modern Europe has shown itself in a number of other questions, particularly, in the notorious third deployment region of the U.S. missile defense. But long-lasting situation around Kosovo has fully and truly highlighted this mumbling and immaturity—even the geopolitical infantilism of the modern European elite, if you like. Are these the people with whom somebody in Russia wanted to build a strategic partnership?

What amazes in the situation around Kosovo is the shortsightedness of the European elite. It was obvious already when the United States so elegantly drew them to the operation in Afghanistan, from which, as it became clear later, there is no way out, and actually, even earlier when European politician preferred the expansion of NATO to a partnership with Russia. The most surprising for healthy cynics to envy and learn from is how Washington continues to *drag* its European allies into the Kosovo *swamp*. Indeed, the decision to immediately cancel the embargo of weapons supplied to this Balkan drug trafficking empire is not only and is not as much an invitation to a big war in the Balkans, as a direct menace to Europe. Taking into consideration the way of life of Kosovars and the area of the main activity of the Kosovar community (it is commonly known that Kosovars work in Europe not only as violinist and pianists) the weapons supplied to Kosovo with the benevolence of George Bush will soon start shooting in criminal shootouts in European cities.

They say that Russia has lost the situation around Kosovo. They mean that it could not prevent the declaration of independence of the drug enclave and supported Serbia. It is thought that with all its shortcomings the Russian government has enough of a realistic perception of the environment and it didn't pursue such kind of goals. A pragmatic Kremlin would hardly aim at helping Serbia as well. But Russian diplomacy could achieve a good number of goals which will prove to be very important for international relations in the nearest future.

First of all, despite all the statements of the American leaders and their European satellite-states, they fail to make a triumphant introduction of a new drug trafficking country in Kosovo to the family of civilized peoples. International recognition of the Kosovars is very low, because the majority of countries in the world preferred to use their right to *abstain*. And that means that Moscow managed to show that the position of Washington, Berlin and Paris, which were the locomotives of Kosovar independence recognition was unconvincing.

But even that has not the major importance. Despite everything it became clear that in the world there are a lot of states that listen to Moscow and share its concerns. Moreover, even to my surprise, it turned out that not everyone in modern Europe is absolutely sane. Many European politicians, including ones in office, had enough brains, wisdom and civil courage to express their concerns about the naivety of making advances to Kosovar drug dealers, despite the obstructionist in its form brain washing campaign in the best traditions of Soviet *Agitprop*, which was supported by almost all European media. These are the people and political forces we could and should start dialogue with in the future. They are the ones who can to the full extent be named new political forces in Europe. And the fact that even in modern Europe we could find partners, worth being *stubborn* and protective of the positions you consider right, in spite of all *progressive humanity*.

However, instead of running ahead of the train and rushing the Kremlin to recognition of Georgian autonomous areas, it would be good to stop for a second and think. The point is, that after the United States and Europe recognized Kosovo and with the possibility of responsive actions towards the post-Soviet unrecognized states, e.g. the breakdown of the former geopolitical stereotypes, may end the post-Belovezhsky period for Russia, when Moscow at any price tried to put off restructuring of the post-Soviet area. And the question is not only in South Ossetia, Abkhazia and even not in Transnistria. The question is in dozens of territories which in no way comply with the structure and character of the states which appeared in the place of the Soviet giant. The thing is that Russia by saying «A» in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, which is naturally clear and acceptable for the Russian elite and society, will have to say «B»



also to other territories. That is to say, for Russia recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia will be just the first step to a deeper restructuring of the Soviet space.

Probably, it is already inevitable, no matter how strongly the Kremlin wants to delay these processes. But these processes will require from Russia a lot, and not only in the financial and military aspect (it is when it becomes clear what was the military success of the country during the last five years or it was just a talented *promotion*). This will require a new level of governmental wisdom, sophistication in foreign politics and civil responsibility. Is our society (and political elite) ready for that?


Remember the plot of the really talented Hollywood film *The Gangs of New York*? The decision to mobilize the army of the North during the Civil War against the Confederate causes in city riots and pogroms during which New Yorkers lynch and hang the blacks, whom they actually intended to free.

And here deliberately start to think, if the stimulation of the repartition of post-Soviet territories is another mega project of America? They are such pranksters there, in Washington...

THE EXPANSION OF NATO AS A FALSE MIRROR OF EUROPEAN POLITICS

The NATO summit in Bucharest in which there was a discussion about the continuation of the NATO expansion process, was proof that Russia's opposition to the major world powers in the Kosovo question was not in vain. We cannot but to melt at the blessed picture which was painted by NATO propagandists and which was slightly spoiled only by American president George Bush who spoke about «a fight in NATO». This phrase was immediately declared another *Bushism*, however it is clear that it is not so. George Bush just said what is being thought by everyone in NATO. And not only that, he also showed that it is the United States who decides when and how to finish the internal discussion about the development of the Euro-Atlantic

community and that the time for that has come. It is notable that the time to stop discussions coincided with elections in the U.S.A.

 William C. **Potter (United States)**, Director, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies and Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar Professor of Nonproliferation Studies Monterey Institute of International Studies – by e-mail from **Monterey**: “I regard the international security situation to have improved marginally during the past month, mainly due to the serious, if inconclusive, deliberations between senior U.S. and Russian leaders regarding ballistic missile defense and other arms control issues. NATO’s decision to defer action on Ukrainian and Georgian membership also helped to avert a major political confrontation between NATO and Russia. Another positive development was the election of Ma Ying-jeou to the presidency in Taiwan, a electoral outcome welcomed by Beijing. The most negative development probably involves the further deterioration of North-South relations on the Korean peninsula, which in turn jeopardizes implementation of the de-nuclearization plan for the DPRK.”

Of course, this event can be declared as another representation of American neo-imperialism, but it is not so simple. Indeed, in the question of NATO expansion our European partners are even more infantile than concerning the Kosovo issue. The leaders of the European countries are themselves not happy that they started an uncontrolled process of NATO expansion. By all appearances, the process of European Union expansion is also not admired by all, because it is paid from the pockets of the recently socially well to do France, Germany, Italy, but leads to the decrease of their influence in the European Union. The annoyance with the impudence and pushiness of the *new Europe* has already become a political factor in the *old* one and is close to being transferred to the social level. And this is not to mention such a *trifle* as the steady decline in relations with Russia, which led the Europeans to the *point of no return* in the relationship with Moscow threatening absolutely clear and natural economic

consequences. The understanding of this being that Europe leapt to regulate the situation and its destiny, if you like, has been clearly seen in the faces of European politicians on the threshold of the NATO summit in Bucharest. However, the countries of *old Europe*, in spite of all the warnings, have launched both the process of NATO enlargement and the process of the expansion of the European Union and, moreover, have made these processes the heart if not the basis of the development of these alliances, turned out to be unable to regulate them.

And though the *old Europe* would like to slow down, and its leaders start to openly talk about that – it is useless. The strings of this process of manipulation are strongly controlled by Washington and are used exclusively in the interests of the United States. And these interests are clear and understandable: to prevent Europe from becoming an independent and self-sufficient geopolitical player. And Washington solves this problem steadily and strongly enough, and literally pushes its European partners, as it was, for example, during the NATO summit in Bucharest on the issues of the acceptance of Ukraine and Georgia to the Alliance, into such a system, where *old Europe* will finally lose its minimal freedom for geopolitical maneuver. It is so obvious that the European Union is a self-sufficient community of states. Nothing of the kind, and the point here is not only in the energy sphere, which is evident, but in military potential, access to transportation corridors, dependence on American finance and Asian sales markets, in growing domestic uncompetitiveness, which starts to show itself in the crisis of some individual corporations. And the list of the noncompetitive factors of the *old Europe* is not complete at all. Thus, the suggestion to add antagonism with Moscow to its own problems, which the United States literally suggested to Europe during the summit in Bucharest, is very well timed.

And the question is not that the United States is so cynical towards their European partners – it just confirms the role of the United States as a serious player in the international scene. The point is that Europeans again and again cannot counter anything from the United States.

The dependency and involvement of European politicians shows itself not even through toadyism before the U.S.A, which becomes a good tone in Europe, as it was a good tone five-seven years ago to be rude towards the only superpower. It shows itself through a panicky fear of European elites towards their people, and their society. It is the reason why through manipulation and an unhidden political, crooked gamble, they did everything possible to eliminate the possibility of a referendum on ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon. European elites have no foothold. And what is characteristic (if to judge by the formal measures of economics and world power, etc.) the influence of the United States should have declined and the European influence–increased. However, in fact we have an absolutely contradictory process: the influence of the United States in Europe has grown to the next higher-order but in other regions, particularly in Russia, it has obviously declined. That means that the influence of the United States in Europe is based not on the potential of the United States as a country, which is obviously decreasing, but on the use of the processes taking place in Europe in their own interests. And only two significant geopolitical processes take place in Europe at the moment: The expansion of NATO and enlargement of the European Union. So, make your own conclusions.

Probably the leaders of the former great powers, which claimed only about ten years ago to displace the United States from the throne of the only superpower, will have to continue to eat hot-dogs and hamburgers in the family manor of the next American president. Thus, the present condition of Europe represents a strategic decay until this time hidden under the smiles and assurances of total well-being.

It is very similar to the NATO summit in Bucharest, which was represented as an enormous success for NATO. And this despite the fact that the *meeting of associates* was accompanied by unprecedented internal arguments and was held in a country torn to pieces by political confrontations and corruption, with a stagnating economy, in a poor and dirty city, with stray dogs in the streets which were to be caught before *the triumph of democracy* by the police, brought here from the rest of the country. Toasts in honor of NATO were declared in a monstrous in its size and extremely gaudy palace which was constructed by an exalted tyrant, shot extra-judicially under very questionable circumstances.

By the way, why not to consider it the symbol of the modern Europe?



S
S
E
W
T
I
E
N
V
E
R
E
E
D
L
O
R
L
W
O
F

THE UNITED STATES: TWO WORLDS, TWO MORALS

Elections in the United States are important for the future of the system of international relations not only because the United States remains the only superpower, e.g. the only state which can project its power and political influence over the whole world, no matter if anyone likes it or not. The elections in the United States are important because they have focused on many global problems and global dilemmas. And we should say that the nomination process was extremely illustrative from the point of view of the programs which were offered to the American voter by the candidates.

To start with the two pairs of candidates from the Republican and Democratic parties which led during the final stage of the primaries (John McCain and Michael Huckabee from the Republicans and Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton from the Democrats), who are absolutely similar. One of the semi-finalists is rather a foreign policy oriented candidate for the post of the President, the other – a domestic policy oriented one. One emphasizes the role of America in the world, the other – the necessity of domestic reforms. In other words, McCain and Clinton are oriented mainly towards dealing with foreign policy issues; Huckabee and Obama represent rather the necessity for a serious reconstruction of the American economic and social system. The fact that Michael Huckabee fell out of the presidential race at a relatively early stage shows that the Republican part of the elite, rather the part which received the most during the presidential terms of George Bush, is not interested in a serious change in domestic policy priorities and restructuring of the American economy at all. But this is a quite clear and obvious choice, if we take into consideration the economic interests of the Republican elite. But the fact that Democrats will also have nonetheless a tough struggle between their candidates, says that the Democratic elite also has a strong feeling towards refusal of the accelerated reformation of the American economy in favor of a restructuring of foreign policy obligations. No doubt, this is a new factor that makes us, with growing attention, observe the state of the American economy.

That is to say, if to discuss logically, that in the American elite prevail those who consider that there is nothing to change in America, because the possible results cannot be predicted and that all efforts and the accumulated domestic tension should be poured into the world. And this happens despite the evident financial crisis, the growing uncompetitiveness of those industry fields in which the U.S.A was the undisputable leader (aircraft and automotive). It means that either in the U.S.A domestically it goes so bad that it is better not to try to correct it, or foreign policy problems have reached such a stage that Washington starts to loose influence in the world not virtually, but really.

Despite all these problems, despite the decline in the authority of the United States in the world, Washington still regularly manages to outplay Europe, very often China and from time to time Russia in the geopolitical sphere. As likely as not that the present-day elections line up in the U.S.A is connected with the strategic decision to rise above domestic problems or at least to gain time to prepare for the reorganization of the domestic economy by means of a serious external crisis. Such a model has been used more than once by the Americans and as a rule it has had a great success.

In such a format the chances of the recently considered as an outsider John McCain become very serious. Of course, it is not McCain himself, it is that his individually brilliant opponents from the Democratic party contrived to loose the elections which they seemed to have won due to internecline fighting. In any case, the idea that the next U.S. president could be a Vietnam War veteran of retirement age doesn't seem fantastic. Some say that the election of John McCain for presidency will be a catastrophe for Russian-American relations. And it is true to some extent – President McCain will not intellectualize about the strategic partnership and *closeness of souls*, as he will not look into the eyes of Russian politicians. But may be it is not so bad after all?

Of course, John McCain will be a very tough partner for Russia. Maybe he will not be a partner for Russia at all in the sense we are used to perceive American presidents: a good uncle who visits distant relatives from time to time, preaches about geopolitical *rowdiness* and violation of human rights, promises to help with money, which he, by the way, never does. And then he

leaves, letting distant relatives to breathe freely and to return to the customary building of Russia's statehood. Yes, John McCain is not such kind of person – he believes in what he says, and no matter what he will continue his *Crusade* for those values and views, which, after the fall from several-kilometer height into the Vietnam jungle, he considers to be a democracy. But John McCain will introduce into the Russian-American relationship a very important element, which wasn't there during the last years. His element is the sincerity and clarity of the relationship. We should admit that the obvious definition for Russian-American relations during the last years could be called *muddled or vague relationship*. This is a relationship, where the honest position (and this is not only the fault of Washington) was replaced by different insubstantial discourse about "looking into ones soul" and that some of the officials from the Washington administration are crazy about Fedor Dostoevsky and Pyotr Tchaikovsky. But the phrase about "a tear of a child" and mantras about a love of Russian culture do not prevent them from the official declaration of the ideas of forceful rebuilding of the world, creation of the force potential for pushing around our country, not to mention that the admirers of Dostoevsky consider the striving to govern Russia's domestic policy as a matter-of-course.

MISSILE DEFENSE: RECONCILIATION AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF STALEMATE

The situation around the positioning of the American missile defense systems (GMD) in Europe broke off somewhat elusive. On the one hand, the meeting in Sochi, of course, was unexpected, but on the other hand – quite predictable: both Russia and the United States perfectly understood that the discussion around GMD is in a deadlock, and the absence of some way out from it may result in unpredictable complications. As a result the United States has found itself in a position which can hardly be called advantageous: on the threshold of elections in which the chances of the Republican candidate have turned out to be unexpectedly high, the continuation of pushing through the question which hasn't received significant support, not only from traditional allies, but also in the American establishment, would be extremely dangerous. Especially, it is obvious now that the large number of media reports about the successful test operations of the American missile defense hide the low readiness of the Americans for beginning deployment of a fully-fledged system in Europe due to economic and technological reasons. At this stage the most important thing for them is to set up political stakes to make doing this possible and set a format (legal and technical framework) for their new geopolitical project. Particularly the United States has achieved its political goals: deepened the split in Europe and formed a major military governing component which is not controlled by the Europeans, neither at the European Union level, nor at a level in separate countries (that is why the radar and tracking system is more important than the antimissiles themselves). And now this position could be *sold* to Russia as a big concession.

And now that there is a certain compromise, which would allow Russia to take part in the process in relatively dignified conditions, reached, instead of an isolation, which was promised by some zealous followers of appeasement to Washington, it is time to think what we could do in order to make the next round of negotiations with the United States about the missile defense deployment in Europe (and it is obvious for everyone that it will happen, the only question is when) more productive for our country. And for that purpose we need to learn the main lesson of the present round.

If we reject rhetoric and mutual recriminations, then the main lesson we can derive from the situation with the negotiations is not even about the fate of the third deployment area (once again we should note in the margin – not an antimissile defense of Europe, but elements of the missile defense system of the United States in Europe, placed in the territory of the *satellite countries* of the United States), we could summarize as follows: on the one hand, it is possible and necessary to start a dialogue with the United States in a tough tone, receiving the necessary effect at that, but on the other hand, the result – I mean the result, but not the effect – can be reached only if there is real military potential to back it up.

It is hopeless to overplay the Americans by playing virtual politics. They are unsurpassed masters of that game. Compared with them all renowned Russian political technologists and promoters are participants of the "Do-It-Yourself" society of the children's art center in the neigh-



S
S
T
E
W
I
E
V
E
V
E
R
D
L
O
W
O
F

borhood center. There are a lot of reasons why we will not be able to overplay the United States in the virtual politics. Never shall we overplay them. It must be understood and recognized and we should never return to it. We can hope for a positive result only there and then, when besides the virtual combination we will put on the chess board something really substantial, something that could change the rules of the game.

Indeed, finally who won the biggest prize from Russia's position on the issue of U.S. missile defense systems in Europe? Poland, which under the cover of Russian rhetoric managed to pull from the United States all possible concessions and bonuses. And if Russian negotiators had behind their back not political offers and propaganda-like constructions, but at least a middle-sized group of medium- and short-range missiles, Russia could have gained a real result from that bargaining.

For now we have to be satisfied by just the status of the state with which the United States has to consider. Not so bad after all.

THE BATTLEFIELD – ARCTIC

The appearance of the historical report of the European Commission on the problem of the Arctic policy of the European Union, written by, according to rumor, Javier Solana, is a truly historical event. The point is not even in the fact that there for the first time it was acknowledged that the simple goal of this community is not economic development and not even the strengthening of democracy, but just a simple and hard struggle for resources. Just this remarkable statement also makes it necessary to reevaluate many actions of the European Union including the ones concerning Russia. In particular, their aspiration to destroy Gazprom at no matter what price. Another amazing thing in the report is the admittance that the interests of Russia and the EU on a number of issues, the most fundamental ones, such as the subsurface management regime in the most strategically important region of the world, are not only different, but antagonistic. At that, the antagonism is so strong that it could lead to a military conflict. It is understood that the European Union which doesn't have its own military potential will have to use the NATO capabilities and above all the United States, to carry out their permanent military presence in the Arctic zone.

What is most important in the situation developing around the Arctic zone? First, the zone for resource antagonism is growing and it is these new regions which were happily outside the international antagonism sphere before.

And just recently it was declared from the high-pitched pulpits that the Arctic is the zone which was supposed to be conserved, that the use of the Arctic region resources is a crime against humanity and indigenous peoples and that the industrial *capacities* created there as a result of Stalin's industrialization should be dismantled, and people evacuated from the Arctic. This was the recipe prescribed to Russia by the *specialists* of different kinds. Second, it was for the first time declared that for the introduction of new resources into the economic circulation of quite definite interstate communities military power could be used. There is no doubt in that, but, we should outline once again that this position is openly formulated by our Western partners in a foreign policy status document. And the fact that it is Russia, which will be the main object of the military power implementation in the struggle for the resources, is not a new thing at all. Long time ago all sober politicians knew that the resource base of the European Union and the United States could be *increased* only at the expense of Russia through its liberation from the *Curse of Siberia*, and only the deaf didn't hear these conversations in the corridors of American and European power. Russia had a surprisingly great number of the deaf.

And this in its turn requires from Russia a considerable reevaluation of its views towards the resource development of the Russian part of the Arctic. It is very good that there is a Russian flag in the Lomonosov Ridge. However, this area of the Arctic, rich with natural resources, will actually become Russian then and only then, when three conditions will be fulfilled.

First, the territory of Russian Arctic zone must be economically developed with regard to all ecological and historical peculiarities. The principle which rules the Arctic is "if you don't devel-

op it – you loose it”, and Russia hadn’t done anything for the development of its Arctic territories during the last twenty years.

Second, the territory of the Russian Arctic must be well covered with the instruments of military power, especially given the attitude of our European partners. They should not have any doubts concerning the possibility to *check Russia’s strength* in the Arctic sphere.

Third, the Arctic territory of Russia must be populated. Uninhabited territories are prone to become *nobody’s* very quickly, e.g. the object of other states’ interests.

It looks like these are not so crucial conditions, however they will require a completely different approach to these territories, and what most important – to reject the stereotypes which reigned in the minds of Russian politicians throughout the last 20 years. And it is quite questionable if Russia will be able to return to the Arctic within the existing economic paradigm.

AFRICA: A FORGOTTEN TRAGEDY

Just ten years ago only the lazy didn’t talk about Africa. For fighting poverty in Africa international forums applauded and Nobel prizes were won, Africa was promised assistance, it was talked about that the social gap between rich *North* and poor *South* should be actually diminished, it was talked about the necessity of overtaking the development and industrialization of Africa, about the introduction of democratic principles to the political life of the Africans. Everyone admired Nelson Mandela and African art. It was talked about the necessity to raise up African countries to the world level social and economic standards.

There is nothing of the kind now. Africa is forgotten, but not from the point of view of appearing on television. On the contrary, the events in African countries are always on the news, and primarily in the format of battlefield reports. Only during the last quarter there appeared the news stories about domestic conflicts in Kenya and Zimbabwe, and this is not to mention the slaughter in Darfur which has become common place, confrontation in Somalia, the situation in Congo, the struggle for the *blood diamonds* in Angola and other minor troubles like the regular blowing-up of an oil pipeline, or the assault of a French cruiser yacht by pirates, the common place hostage taking of international specialists in Nigeria. In Africa, if not to mention its Mediterranean part and the island of Mauritius, so loved by the Russian oligarchs, there are hardly any stable regions and there are no regions at all, with social and economic development which could be called *dynamic*.

Africa is forgotten in the aspect that the *progressive humanity* which is outraged with the next slaughterhouse in some, until recently calm, country, protests against *blood diamonds*, the number of which only increases on the international market, and sends humanitarian aid from time to time to the conflict zone. There is no thought at all about trying to deal with the fundamental problems which during the last 20-25 years have practically eliminated Africa from the normal political and economical development zone.

Let’s think. After the disintegration of the U.S.S.R the situation in Africa, at least for the most part, has a *declining trend*, despite the fact that there should have been an era of democracy and common well-being. Hardly any country in Africa has implemented serious economic and social modernization programs. Hardly any country in Africa has created a normal energy supply system. Healthcare is supported mainly through the efforts of international organizations and volunteers. And most importantly, there are no signs of improvement in this situation. On the contrary, the zone of catastrophe for civilization, disintegration of stable social systems, military chaos covers one country after the other.

And despite the unalleviated conversations about the democratization of Africa, which have sometimes transferred into the practical sphere, the exploitation of the natural resources of the *Black continent* has increased, and the prices for natural resources have risen.

But if to sort it out, the present situation in Africa shows the strategic defeat of the North which appeared unable to integrate Africa, with some rare exceptions, into the system of the civilized economic and that means civilized political relationships. And this in its turn means that more



likely sooner than later the strategic conflict between the North and the South which was so widely discussed by politicians and political scientists will come true. And this conflict will develop, as some think, not in some far away savannas of Africa, but in the slums of big European, and in the future, of Russian, cities.

If you have any doubts, please ask the Parisians and inhabitants of Brussels.

A PRESENT TO THE CELESTIAL FROM TIBET

The events in Tibet, as it seems, are rather a political and national problem, than an issue which determines international relations and international security. If we look at the chain of events of the last 18 months, it becomes evident how consistently, rigidly and circumspectly the United States increased their pressure on China. And the point here is not only in the desire of Washington to spoil the mood of the leaders of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on the threshold of the Olympics; though such a goal could also be seen. The goal of Washington is to surround China with borders, which the Chinese government proclaiming its goal as turning the People's Republic of China into the second superpower, will not be able to cross. Let's recall this chain of events once more.

Everything started with the scandal with the quality of toys China supplied to the United States: it is a kind of a trifle, but this trifle threatened our Chinese partners with big economic problems. Washington very mildly and almost gently demonstrated to the Chinese leadership the extent to which China depends on the American market. By the way, according to many experts, including those from Hong Kong, who could hardly be suspected of not being aware, it was the situation with the export of toys to the United States which upset the plans of Hu Jintao to finally defeat the conservatives in the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China.



Dayan **Jayatilleka (Sri Lanka)**, Permanent Representative of Sri Lanka to the United Nations Office in Geneva – by e-mail from **Geneva**: “The violent rioting in Tibet, and the unbalanced, sensationalist coverage it received in the world's media. This can have effects not only on China, but in the region as a whole. In China, it cannot but inflame nationalist passions, while in Asia, it can act as stimulus for ethnic separatism. The West hopes to stir up trouble in what it perceives as the *soft underbelly* of China with a view to eventually causing China's unraveling.”

Regarding the limitation for foreign government investment funds to buy infrastructure assets in the United States, it looks like this decision didn't directly influence China. However judging by all its investment of enormous gold-value, mainly in U.S. dollar reserves in the American economy, this was the plan of the *big game* played with the United States by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. Now Chinese assets are *pending* and are constantly decreasing with the drop in the value of the dollar.

There is an almost forthright stimulation of the attitude in the Taiwan elite in favor of a declaration of independence, which could not be interrupted even by the return of the *Kuomintang* party to power

in Taiwan. You would think that it is a foreign policy PR-campaign, but it put Beijing in a dilemma: either to make up its mind to decide on an operation for the return of Taiwan under its control with obscure military prospects and the possibility to grow into a confrontation with the United States at that, or to *lose its face* in case of the declaration of independence.

Finally, the occurrence of the crisis in Tibet and some other regions, populated with national minorities. The massive information and political pressure campaign started immediately with the threat of boycotting the Olympic Games in Beijing. The campaign was clearly prepared and coordinated in advance, but what is interesting, the United States has appeared in this situation as a defender of Beijing and an opponent of extremism.

Indeed, what did the events in Tibet show? That the international community is not ready to enter into a conflict with Beijing because of human rights? It was clear a long time ago. And that's a pity, by the way, because the incapability of the international community to show their Chinese comrades certain limits, within which a member of the international community must act, gives rise to a dangerous feeling of permissiveness not only in the human rights sphere, but also in more important issues. So the Dalai-Lama is not such a big international figure? It was something which many people had surmised. Most importantly, the uprising in Tibet highlighted that despite serious growth in their economy and the construction of mega-cities like Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou China is still very vulnerable from the point of view of domestic stability. And above all – that if desired, it is very easy to destabilize the situation that is most important for the well-being of the Celestial Empire. Indeed, it is obvious that the uprising in Lhasa in March was basically spontaneous. If outside pressure and financing took place there, they were very scarce. And could you imagine that the instigators of this pogrom in Lhasa were supplied both with weapons and money? The situation for the communist government in Beijing would have been absolutely different from the point of view of the foreign policy image, because for putting down the uprising they would have needed to use the army with quite clear consequences, especially for their domestic policy. Indeed the present-day leadership of China is in general liberal and oriented towards America.

Hu Jintao *parlayed* his political future on the economic growth which is closely tied to the capability of the Chinese economy to expand its presence in the American market. And the Olympic Games for China are not only another corporate project, but a kind of instrument for fixing the new geopolitical status of the Celestial Empire. The failure of the Olympic Games and even an *unconvincing success* will be a catastrophe for *comrade Hu*, the leader of the *liberal wing* in the Communist Party of China, who has suffered already a great deal in the situation surrounding the Olympics. So, he will sacrifice a lot, so that the Americans may not destabilize the situation further.

The Americans demonstrated both to Beijing, and to the rest of the world how gently and superficially without any confrontations to put traps around the *Chinese tiger*, which of course, is not made out of paper, but started too early give voice in claiming its geopolitical status. And after putting traps around the *tiger* one can control the *expansion* of Chinese influence in the region, making it secure for oneself and dangerous for competitors.

All this is fine from the point of view of Russia's interests. But we have to remember that if China is not able to expand figuratively speaking to the east and south, our Chinese partners will inevitably direct their eyes to the north, where they will see half-deserted territories, a declining military and civil infrastructure, alcoholism, corruption and vulgar thievery. That is to say – Russia's Far East.

RUSSIAN ELECTIONS AND LIBERAL HOPES

In recent times much has been written about the change of power in Russia, both in the country and abroad. Different things have been written: quite witty observations, the standard set of thesis and wild-opinions, which reflect the misunderstanding of the basic trends of Russian politics by these authors. However, the general impression can be summarized as follows: despite all assurances for the continuation of the domestic and foreign policy course, changes are inevitable and they will be in the way of certain liberalization of the economic and social life. That is to say that the elite and society are expecting some kind of new thaw and a decrease of the *siloviki* influence, which, according to the consensus of society's opinion, have went over the top with the struggle for the levers of control of the economy.

But in parallel with the Russian elite there are obvious symptomatic expectations of the change in course also from the foreign elite; they are already tired of the brashness of the Russian side which has become especially obvious in recent times. These expectations are very na?ve and at the same time very realistic. It is obvious that the Americans, and to a lesser extent, Western Europeans have a quite good understanding of both the attitude of the Russian elite, and the way things are in the leadership of the country, and the character of the domestic policy discussion.



S
S
T
T
E
E
V
V
E
E
R
R
D
D
L
L
O
O
W
W
O
O
F
F

The question is that these hopes are based on the evaluation of the personalities and under-valuation of the tendencies. It is understandable: the American approach is based on the experience which they acquired during the presidential term of Boris Yeltsin who they could come to *any terms* with, and the story of Vladimir Putin who could break the system built by Yeltsin. But being focused on personalities, many people both in Russia and in the West didn't see that the work and the destiny of personalities reflected all the basic tendencies of Russia's politics as seen in a mirror.


Generally, it can be formulated like this: in Russia the head of government always and everywhere is the instrument of history. Either this power corresponds to the current historical moment and the demands of society, or it is in this or that form will have to leave the political arena. As in the case of Boris Yeltsin, who left before the end of his term and like Vladimir Putin who stayed. And the value of the current forecasts and discussions about the basis of the contemporary Russian government and its foreign policy course is quite simple: not so much time is needed to clearly understand if the political course of the *neo-liberal stagnation* which can be obviously seen behind the diplomatic statements of the new president, corresponds to the attitudes in society. If not, we will witness many exciting moments in Russian politics and as a consequence in world politics also. But it is not the distinctive feature of the Russian domestic policy situation. Practically every significant domestic policy or economic action of the new government in Russia almost invariably has a clear, not just foreign policy aspect, but rather a foreign policy result.

What are the key questions facing the new Russian government?

First, to stop industrial and especially technological degradation, which has become a direct threat to national security. However, any steps in this way, even made within the framework of the liberal paradigm (though the efficiency of this program for the solution of the task is quite doubtful) will lead to a considerable redistribution of resources. And as a consequence – the priorities of foreign policy. Particularly, the concept of the energy superpower will finally become history, and what is more important this will affect the unconditional priority of the relationship with Europe, because it shall cease to be the only key market for Russia.

Second, to provide a reasonable economic turnover for new resource regions, above all the Arctic zone because it will be impossible with the present-day resource base to retain such influence in the hydrocarbon market, even provided that all alternative pipeline routes are blocked which can hardly be achieved. And this also will assume an almost predetermined succession of foreign policy activities with the strengthening of not only economic, but also the political and military presence in the Russian Arctic regions as an important element.


Third, to stop the avalanche in the decline of the environment and the ecological standards of life of the population, which has become in some regions one of the key problems. The point is not in the practical implementation of the ideas of *sustainable development*. However, the Russian government will have, to some extent, to correct its relationship towards world economic processes and to think if it is worth it, at any price, to return to the place of the Soviet Union in the world industrial division of labor.

 **Marian Abisheva (Kazakhstan)**, Deputy Director of the Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, – by e-mail from **Almaty**: “Recently the natural disasters has become an additional reason for decreasing security indices. For instance, it happens after hard winter in Tajikistan. The country now faces another problem – heavy rains, which result in energy and food crisis. In Kazakhstan the floods inflicted damage to some towns and villages in the Southern Kazakhstan oblast.”

Fourth, to develop small and medium-size businesses. And even this priority, non-harmful in the foreign policy aspect will lead to a change of foreign policy priorities. Because the realization of the priorities of the industrial giants in the foreign policy area should be eventually replaced by the interests of small and medium-size companies, especially the ones implementing innovative programs and projects. And this is not simple at all and will require innovation. But what is most important – it implies seeking absolutely different consumer markets.

All these four tasks, to a different extent, but equally convincingly require the government to carry out quite specific foreign policy actions. And this government if it has come sincerely and for the long haul should implement these actions to this or that extent. This is a requirement of history. Or it will not be saved either by its popularity, or any administrative measures.

However, behind these discussions about the future foreign policy course of the new Russian government both foreign and Russians political scientists and analysts have overlooked one important change in Russian foreign policy. Superficially the event was not a very significant event, it occurred right after the visit of Mikhail Saakashvili to Russia, after which everyone started to talk about a warming in the bilateral relationship, and the Georgian leader didn't take long to declare that under his government small, but proud Georgia managed to withstand a confrontation with *imperial Russia*. However, after the smiles and conciliatory statements Moscow unexpectedly lifted economic sanctions from Abkhazia and started transport communication with this unrecognized yet autonomous region. In fact, there was a revolution in Russia's foreign policy, if, of course, this was not circumstantial. It was the first time for the last 15 if not 20 years when Moscow acted according to the principle *speak gently, act tough*. Before that everything was just vice versa: Moscow was easy to jump to its feet in what concerned political declarations and statements, however as soon as it was needed to implement them in practice the enthusiasm of Russian power slowed down. The *verbal great power statehood* which lasted more than one and a half decade, resulted in irreparable injury to the image of the country and led to the fact that even the most reasonable and tough statements of Russia in the West (in the East as well) seized to be considered serious. So, it would be not bad if the eloquence of Russia becomes more moderate.

And this is the first sign that the arrival of this *silent* epoch of foreign policy is encouraging, because it shows that the government values and understands the demands of the country and of society and its considerations. The might of the *great power* shows itself first of all in its right to be silent about its plans or actions. 

Dmitry Evstafiev



O
F
W
O
R
L
D
R
E
V
E
N
I
E
N
T
S



TRIALOGUE CLUB

A MEETING PLACE FOR SENIOR POLICYMAKERS, DIPLOMATS, BUSINESSMEN, RESEARCHERS, AND JOURNALISTS

The ***Trialogue Club*** Provides:

- Exclusive information and analysis from leading politicians and nongovernmental experts from Russia and abroad;
- Efficient and professional commentary on a wide range of facts, positions and opinions on the key international security issues;
- Independent, impartial and balanced expert appraisal of events taking place in Russia and abroad.

Club Membership Includes:

- Subscription** to the full set of PIR Center publications (with courier delivery in Moscow):
 - The journal *Security Index* (4 issues per year in Russian, print version; 4 issues per year in English, print version);
 - Monographs and Reports from the *PIR Center Library* series (in Russian/English);
- o All of the PIR Center's electronic publications, including: *PIR PRESS News* (in Russian/English) and *Yaderny Kontrol* (in Russian)
- Access** to the PIR Center's information resources (the «Nuclear Russia» database, library and academic archives), as well as access to exclusive parts of the *Trialogue* company and the *PIR Center* websites, which are only available to the *Trialogue Club* International members (www.club.pircenter.org);
- Invitations** to all PIR Center events (seminars, conferences, press conferences);
- Meetings** of the *Trialogue Club* International. The working languages of the quarterly meetings are Russian and English.

You can join the *Trialogue Club* International as an **individual** or **corporate** member. The **corporate** membership includes a «**1+1**» offer, which allows two members from the same organization to participate simultaneously in the Club.

For information on how to join the Trialogue Club please contact us:

Tel.: +7-985-764-9896, +7-495-234-0525

Fax: +7-495-234-9558

e-mail: trialogue@pircenter.org



Vladimir Shustov

THE CFE TREATY: DEATH OR REVIVAL?

In mid-2007 tough polemics over the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) started. The discussion about the fate of this document that provides substantial reduction in forces from the Atlantic to the Urals involved politicians, the military, diplomats, and journalists. It was not a debate about a particular issue related to the functioning of the agreement or its provisions. It was a “to be or not to be” hard talk about the cornerstone of European security, as the CFE Treaty is often referred to. There is no unequivocal answer to this question, so it would make sense to look back and see the development of the CFE record in the last few years, as well as to share my assumptions about the future of this legal regime.

HARD DECISION RUSSIA WAS FORCED TO TAKE

At the beginning of all was Russia’s important step. Nearly two decades have passed since the signature of the CFE Treaty. The world has changed – both politically and militarily. Such changes could not but affect the agreements related to the security of states, one of which is the Russian Federation.

The treaty involved two groups of states as high contracting parties – members of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO). It provided for two group levels of forces – similar ceilings for both blocs. Within the alliances the quotas for reduction were distributed among the members upon their own agreements. However, after the disbandment of the WTO, many CFE provisions ceded to reflect the reality.

It was necessary to eliminate this disparity. As a result of complex and long negotiations, the Agreement of Adaptation was elaborated. Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine ratified the adapted CFE Treaty. However, their partners refrained from this under weak pretexts not directly related to the text of the agreement. At the same time, some provisions of this new document are out of date by now and do not meet the current military-political situation. Therefore, after ratification by all state parties the adapted treaty should still be revised further, as it affects some sensitive aspects of national security.

The position of Western nations forced Russia to raise the principle issue of future fate of the CFE and Russia’s participation in it, especially if NATO members continue to dodge the ratification of the adapted treaty and neglect the concerns of Moscow.

On April 26, 2007, President Putin deliberated on the advisability of Russia’s moratorium on implementation of the treaty due to the lack of progress in talks with Western partners. Such moratorium should have continued unless all states parties ratify the adapted agreement and strictly comply with it, thus, contributing to the arms reduction.



H
I
S
T
O
R
Y
P
A
G
E
S

After getting no response on the Western side, on May 28, 2007 Russia undertook the next step – Moscow appealed to the depositary (the Netherlands) with a request to convene the Extraordinary Review Conference and to discuss the situation around the treaty. Russia expected the conference to give a thorough analysis of the status of the agreement and the changes that occurred in recent years. Moscow hoped that the parties would demonstrate political will and find a mutually acceptable compromise, hence, overcoming the crisis over the CFE Treaty.

Unfortunately, NATO countries preferred to repeat word by word their positions that allegedly justified their non-ratification of the adapted treaty and did not show any desire to proceed with modernization of the latter.

All this forced Russia to take a unilateral and tough decision. On July 13, 2007, the president signed the decree on suspension of the CFE Treaty and related agreements. The decision was communicated to both chambers of the Federal Assembly and the corresponding bill was submitted to the Duma. It was approved in fall 2007.

The United States and its NATO allies showed discontent with this step of Russia. A draft resolution was submitted for the consideration of the U.S. Senate – it urged Russia to revise its decision on suspension. The document stated the disappointment with Putin's decision and was regarded as a step back for the security of Europe and U.S.-Russian relations.²¹ The authors called for sending Moscow a decisive signal that the United States was not going to ignore such policy. Chair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee Tom Lantos argued that Russia resorted to anti-American and anti-Western sentiments in order to cause instability. According to him, none could benefit from Russia's suspension of its commitments under the CFE.²

The U.S. Administration also supported this criticism. Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Daniel Fried maintained that for the first time in many years the CFE Treaty was jeopardized.

“It is the intention of the United States and our NATO and other European allies to defend the CFE Treaty regime and help it remain what it has been since 1990, which is a great, a major, success and a cornerstone of European security. It is so successful that its elements have long been taken for granted and forgotten by many in the general public, who have learned to take for granted the security of Europe from conventional military threats.”²³

This statement indicates clearly that the United States was pretty much satisfied with the fact that the old treaty was effective, even though Washington did not ratify the adapted CFE. Washington did not object the situation when Russia complied with the terms of this new agreement in good faith, especially as far as exchange of military information and access of Western inspectors to Russian military facilities were concerned.

The United States should not have been surprised by the Russian decision. Moscow made numerous warnings implying that such situation could not be endless – after all, Western partners did not let the adapted agreement come into force for seven years.

So what was the initial version of the CFE Treaty and why, despite its transformation during lengthy talks, Russia still believes it to be outdated?

After the end of World War II NATO and WTO concentrated substantial armed forces in Europe and their further buildup did not strengthen security of either party. Understanding this fact, both sides began to think about limitation and then reduction of their military potential. When the parity between the two blocs was reached, it made possible to achieve a compromise.

In the 1970s the parties attempted to agree on reduction of forces in Central Europe. The negotiations eventually failed, but from military-technical point of view it was an important experience for further negotiations that resulted in the conclusion of the CFE Treaty.

Very complex and unprecedented talks on conventional forces were launched in 1989 and finished on November 19, 1990, when the CFE Treaty was signed. The agreement comprised 6 member states of the WTO (the German Democratic Republic had stopped to exist by that

time) and 16 NATO nations (parties to the 1948 Brussels Treaty and the 1949 Washington Treaty).⁴

The core of the CFE regime was the idea of quantitative reduction in five categories of conventional arms in the area of application – battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, pieces of artillery, attack helicopters, and combat aircraft. Key provisions introduced the ceilings for arms and materiel for each of the two groups of states. An important element of the treaty was the regime of zonal (regional) limitations, which was aimed at reducing the density of deployed arms in the areas of contact of NATO and WTO. The treaty also included the sufficiency rule, under which none of the member states could possess more than one third of general amount of arms and materiel permitted for stationing in the area of application.

The levels were further distributed within the groups upon their own arrangements. For instance, the WTO members signed a respective agreement in Budapest – the U.S.S.R got 13,150 battle tanks, 20,000 armored combat vehicles, 13,175 artillery pieces, 5,150 combat aircraft, and 1,500 attack helicopters.

Immediately after the signature of the CFE Treaty, the parties began the process of its revision and adaptation to the rapidly changing situation. One of the most serious challenges emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union. On May 15, 1992, eight former Soviet republics covered by the area of application (Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia, and Moldova) agreed in Tashkent on the principles and course of implementation of the CFE Treaty. The most important issue there was the division of Soviet maximum levels upon availability. The difficulty occurred, as each state was trying to get the largest possible share of the Soviet quota. The agreement did not come into force, but in general, its participants comply with the document.

In parallel the talks on the quantity of personnel of conventional armed forces in Europe were under way. They ended on July 10, 1992 with the signature of the Final Act in Helsinki – this was a politically binding document. It cuts down the personnel strength in times of peace (for Russia it means 1,450,000 men).

Since July 1992 the CFE Treaty became effective ad interim and on November 9 of the same year it officially entered into force. The significance of the document was in its historical nature – it put an end to the era of bloc confrontation. The treaty provided for the balance of forces of both alliances at reduced levels, limited the capabilities for deployment of conventional arms at the line of contact of WTO and NATO, ensured high transparency and facilitated realistic military planning (and not planning based on “just in case” principle). The Russian Armed Forces could have become more compact, more mobile, could have been liberated from the burden of outdated arms and materiel.

However, the USSR and WTO collapsed, the Soviet troops were withdrawn from Central and Eastern Europe, the Baltic states and the CIS, a few conflicts emerged on the territory of Russia or in near neighborhood, NATO expanded... All this weakened the mechanism of maintenance of balance of power and the treaty was losing its viability.

The flank issue was very sensitive for both military-strategic and socioeconomic reasons. In the course of further adaptation of the CFE Treaty it was decided to introduce a new system of limitations instead of area and group limits – the so called national ceilings for all types of arms and materiel and territorial ceilings for the ground forces of each nation. As a result, on November 19, 1999 the Agreement of Adaptation was signed in Istanbul.⁵

The new regime should have strengthened security of all states, regardless of their belonging to this or that group. For instance, in Central Europe the so called stabilization measures (establishment of the stability zone) should have been implemented – reduced territorial levels for Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. They should not be revised and increased (just as the levels of Germany, Ukraine, and Belarus). NATO members pledged not to station on a permanent basis substantial combat forces on the territories of new members. The right to temporary deployments on its territory above the set limits is accompanied with additional transparency and verification measures.



The flank zone is preserved and comprises Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Bulgaria, Greece, Norway and Iceland, as well as some parts of Russia and Ukraine. This area is under special regime designated to establish tougher assurances against destabilizing concentration of conventional forces. The flanks cannot be used for temporary deployments and redistribution between national and territorial ceilings is allowed only between the states making the zone.

Meanwhile, the signature of the agreement coincided with the approval of the Final Act of the Istanbul Conference of the states parties to the treaty. The document took into consideration the statements of a number of nations and their unilateral political commitments – various measures aimed at showing restraint in military activities in the area of application of the CFE Treaty.

Today the adapted treaty signed in Istanbul has been ratified by Belarus, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine.

The modernized treaty contains a series of compromising clauses, and not all of them meet Russia's interests. However, the document in general is acceptable for all states.

THE ADAPTED CFE: RUSSIA'S EFFORTS TO MAKE IT EFFECTIVE

The Final Act of the 1999 Istanbul Conference states that all parties should "move forward expeditiously to facilitate completion of national ratification procedures, so that the Agreement on Adaptation can enter into force as soon as possible."⁶

Since then two Review Conferences have been held (in 2001 and in 2006), where this commitment was reconfirmed. However, it did not help (Russia's appeals were not efficient either) to change the position of NATO.

In 2001 Russia addressed the conference participants with the proposal to refrain from any measures that might undermine the treaty. Such steps could be the withdrawal from key agreements on nuclear weapons and nonproliferation, breach of the existing balance of military potentials in Europe and its regions, the use of force and the threat to do so without appropriate decision of the UN Security Council, and shortsighted bloc policy. The Russian statement pointed out that accession of the Baltic States to NATO could have negative ramifications for principal provisions of the CFE Treaty, especially with respect to flank limitations.

Nonetheless, despite Russia's warnings, the Alliance continued to stipulate the start of ratification procedure with various preconditions. One of them was the request to Russia to implement fully the flank limitations. By late 2001 Moscow accomplished this mission in spite of the difficult situation in the North Caucasus.

Starting from 2002, NATO countries altered their major demand for ratification – now it was Russia's full compliance with the Istanbul commitments with respect to Georgia and Moldova. What did this formula mean? There was no clear answer on how "full commitment" should be measured. Our negotiation partners went beyond the CFE topics and spoke about bases, military materiel, bilateral relations of Russia with the aforementioned countries. At the same time, the list of such demands was growing step by step. Moldova began to insist that the Istanbul commitments implied withdrawal and further elimination (or transportation to the Russian territory) of all conventional arms available to Transnistria. Georgia demanded for withdrawal of Russian peacekeepers from ex-military base in Gudauta and even withdrawal of Russian military pensioners and their families.

In mid-2006 at the CFE Review Conference NATO members reiterated that the CFE Treaty in its current form served as a cornerstone of European security and worked satisfactory. Meanwhile, they argued that the ratification of the adapted treaty could happen only Russia's full compliance with the Istanbul commitments, notably Moscow's elimination of its military presence in Georgia and Moldova.

In response, the Russian side emphasized that the treaty was outdated and lost its link with reality. Zonal and group limits were washed out as a result of NATO expansion. Moscow also reaffirmed that all CFE-related commitments had been implemented.

The situation was dramatic – the conference participants had to choose between fast entry into force of the Agreement of Adaptation, further accession by new members and modernization of the treaty, or its inevitable death in the foreseeable future.

Russia tried to convince all states parties to ratify the agreement. One of the last drops was its proposal to convene the Extraordinary Review Conference, which took place in Vienna on June 12–15, 2007.

Sometimes one may hear the question – why did Russia set forth this initiative so late and so suddenly? Well, Moscow demonstrated due patience, expecting NATO to take a more realistic position and encourage ratification. However, this assumption was wrong.

Western countries were also wrong when they believed that Russia needed the treaty more than them, the treaty meant détente in relations with the West, and endless discussions on adaptation might camouflage the buildup of military potential along Russia's borders.

Anatoly Antonov, who headed the Russian delegation, pointed out that Russia's interest in maintaining and improving the CFE regime should not be abused for exerting pressure on Moscow. After all Russia is interested in the treaty to the same extent as other parties – no more and no less.⁷

The Russian delegation composed the draft of the key provisions of the Final Document of the Extraordinary Review Conference. It contained a set of measures aimed at breaking the deadlock in negotiations on the CFE adaptation. The following steps were proposed:

- ❑ Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania to sign the ratified or at least temporarily validated treaty, so as to fall under its restrictions. These countries are within the area of application but have no restriction to build up their military potential.
- ❑ New “group” limits to be negotiated on NATO armaments and military hardware, so as to “compensate” Russia for the accession of new member countries to NATO. Arms deployments and/or numerical ceilings are to be lowered in most of those countries.
- ❑ A political decision to remove the “flank” limits on Russian force deployments on the Russian territory.
- ❑ Development of the common understanding of the term “substantial combat forces” and demonstration of restraint until the term is agreed upon. The formula comes from the 1997 Founding Act between Russia and NATO, which urged the parties to refrain from deployment of such forces. For Russia it was important to ensure the non-deployment of such forces in Central and Eastern Europe. U.S. brigades that popped up in the region make “substantial forces” for Russia.
- ❑ Entry into force or at least, interim application of the Agreement on Adaptation no later than on July 1, 2008.
- ❑ Elaboration of new terms of accession to the CFE Treaty of new members and further modernization of the Treaty.⁸

Unfortunately, the Final Document was not approved. The West has failed to seek constructive solutions. This forced Russia to suspend the implementation of the CFE Treaty one month later.

Some journalists attacked the Russian delegation with the question whether such suspension would contradict the treaty itself, since the document mentioned only the right to withdraw. Russian diplomats argued that Moscow could confine itself to suspension until all states parties complied with the terms required for fully-fledged modernization of the treaty. Such measure can even be regarded as tougher than withdrawal. It is in conformity with the general principle of international law – if more is allowed (the withdrawal), the less is allowed as well (suspension).

Thus, on December 12, 2007 the moratorium became a reality. It is obvious, however, that such situation cannot last forever, so it would be useful to consider the very reasons for further existence of the CFE Treaty.



THE CFE TREATY AND GEOPOLITICS

Successful elaboration and entry into force of the CFE Treaty were welcomed by many states around the world. For decades, Europe was the region of direct rivalry between the two major military-political groupings. Hence, the agreement was of great geopolitical significance for the entire globe.

It was associated with military détente and symbolized the willingness of the nations to stop arms race typical of the Cold War. Effective and unprecedented verification mechanisms served as an example for other similar agreements in this area. Verification measures were the result of years of suspicion, but they also encouraged confidence-building and assured both parties that the treaty was implemented in good faith.

The review procedures should have helped to keep the treaty up to date and to maintain effective balance of power and stability in the region. The modernization went in parallel with the implementation and negotiations were held in the atmosphere of serious diplomatic discussions aimed at reaching compromise, not unilateral gains. The Agreement of Adaptation was, hence, a big success.

However, the United States and other NATO members preferred not to ratify the new agreement, in order to use the CFE Treaty for their own political purposes. Firstly, with the help of the appropriate provisions of the treaty related to information exchange and site inspections, they could recheck the data on the armed forces of other nations obtained by national technical means.

Secondly, hoping for Russia's interest in normal functioning of the CFE Treaty and modernization of this regime, they could exert pressure on Moscow, in order to solve the problems not directly related to the scope of the treaty.

Thirdly, the treaty could serve to remove the impediments for NATO expansion to Russia's borders. In July 2007, President Putin in his speech to the commanders of the Russian Armed Forces pointed out,

“in the modern world there are many destabilizing factors – the threat of emergence of local conflicts, the danger of extremist activities and terrorist attacks... Let me emphasize a number of other global challenges. For instance, the plans for the deployment of U.S. military bases in Eastern Europe are promoted in a more and more active way. The ratification of the adapted CFE Treaty and international agreements related to it is delayed by all means.”⁹

The inclusion of the refusal to ratify the adapted CFE into global challenges is an important conclusion. This was a well-grounded warning.

Russia is not yet pessimistic about the prospects of preserving the CFE Treaty. Some ways to do it can still be found. But it is necessary to ensure the existence of two preconditions for that. First of all, none of the parties should be eager to gain over its former enemy and current partner. Secondly, speculations about partnership should not disguise the desire to neglect the interests of the other in violation of the principle of equal security.

WHAT'S NEXT?

One has to turn to the positions of key parties to the treaty, which determine its fate. Unfortunately, even scrupulous analysis of official statements bears little fruit. Ambiguous formulas indicate that the way out of the deadlock is yet to be found.

Global media wrote a lot about the situation with the CFE Treaty. Diplomats and experts from various parts of Europe made a joint statement and voiced their concerns about Russia's decision. The moratorium introduced by Moscow may undermine the system of common security in Europe and create new dividing lines, as well as revive the confrontation, they say. Such statements sound strange, since NATO's advancement eastwards to the Russian borders, the establishment of U.S. military bases in Romania and Bulgaria, protracted reluctance of NATO members to ratify the adapted treaty and similar steps could help to strengthen cooperative security in Europe and were not matters of concern for anyone. Strange logic! However the key

message is worth approving – all states should comply with primary principles of the CFE Treaty and existing differences should not undermine or eliminate the regime that was fundamental for European security. The parties should seek compromise.

Western media have repeatedly urged Russia to return to its previous position, i.e. to sacrifice the interests of national security, as before, for the sake of agreement. However, even the best intentions need some response from the partners.

It is evident that at present, there is no shift towards making the treaty more viable. It may sound pessimistic, but that is the reality.

The United States once decided to put an end to the ABM Treaty. Now Washington deploys missile defense components near Russian borders on the territory of Poland and the Czech Republic. None of those alleged proponents of preservation of the CFE Treaty has criticized such U.S. decision, which inflicted damage to the entire system of arms reduction treaties created in the course of long and difficult diplomatic negotiations.

Probably some people expect that Russia would abandon its position and lift the moratorium. However, such expectations are in vain. Moscow needs reciprocity from partners – this is a normal diplomatic practice. Suspension is an interim thing, but it can be extended, if the partners are not mature to take reasonable and mutually acceptable decisions. 🐘

Notes

¹ U.S. senators ask Russia to review the decision on the CFE. Rosbalt, June 26, 2007. <http://www.rosbalt.ru/2007/07/26/402103.html> (last visited on January 15, 2008)

² RIA Novosti, July 26, 2007. <http://www.rian.ru/world/conflict/20070726/69700622.html> (last visited on January 15, 2008)

³ Washington: the CFE should be preserved. *BBC*, June 12, 2007. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/russian/international/newsid_6746000/6746217.stm (last visited on January 15, 2008)

⁴ Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1992), p. 5.

⁵ The Agreement on Adaptation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (Moscow: Ministry of Defence, 2000).

⁶ Final Act of the Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. The Istanbul summit, 1999, http://www.osce.org/documents/mcs/1999/11/4050_ru.pdf (last visited on January 15, 2008)

⁷ Speech by Head of the Russian delegation, Director of the Department for Security and Disarmament Affairs of the Russian MFA Anatoly Antonov at the Extraordinary Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. Vienna, June 12, 2007. <http://www.mid.ru/Ns-dvbr.nsf/arh/8192AD478355579EC32572F90028C9EF?OpenDocument> (last visited on January 15, 2008)

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ See President Putin's statement on July 25, 2007 at http://www.kremlin.ru/appears/2007/07/25/1845_type63376_138512.shtml (last visited on January 15, 2008)





CENTRE RUSSE D'ETUDES POLITIQUES, GENEVE

"With numerous international organizations based here, Geneva is an impressive international crossroads. No less impressive are Geneva traditions in the diplomatic and humanitarian fields. We are happy that the inauguration of the Centre russe d'études politiques in Geneva coincides with a remarkable anniversary in Swiss-Russian relations: one hundred years ago Switzerland launched its diplomatic presence in Russia."

Vladimir Orlov,
President, Centre russe d'études politiques

The goal of *Centre russe d'études politiques* (CREP) is the strengthening of international peace through reenergizing dialogue on international security issues between Russia and Europe, as well as Russia and Switzerland. This dialogue should involve international experts, government representatives, political scientists, university students, business executives, and media representatives.

Key areas of research include the transformation of the international security architecture; analysis of responses to new security threats and challenges; energy security; and nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

CREP is a nongovernmental, nonprofit organization incorporated in the form of an Association, with a few dozen members from Russia, Switzerland, the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Kazakhstan, among others. PIR Center has become new center's key Russian partner, and CREP, for its part, represents the PIR Center in Switzerland and Europe.

Website: <http://www.crep.ch>

(available in English, French, German, Italian, Russian)

For more information, please, contact info@crep.ch



POLICY IN SLAM DUNK STYLE

George Tenet, with Bill Harlow. At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA. New York: Harper Collins Publishers, 2007, 832 p.

Reviewed by Gennady Evstafiev

I have in front of me a huge 2007-published volume (832 pages with appendices) of recollections of George Tenet, ex-Director of the CIA. The book contains his memories of seven years that he spent at the head of this notorious department. Strictly speaking, Mr. Tenet served in the agency for nine years – during the first two he was a deputy of notorious John Deutch, whose 18 months of disgrace in the CIA ended in 1997. However, this is a different instructive story.

So George Tenet and his directorship of the intelligence occurred during, probably, the most aggressive years of U.S. foreign policy and arrogant self-confidence of Washington in its unsurpassable global power. Decisions taken in these years by two American administrations shook the stability of the world and continue to have their destructive impact on the prospects of international cooperation and peaceful democratic development of many countries. Reliance on military power, neglect of the opinion of the majority of nations, arms-twisting policy towards weak countries and U.S. allies, *enlightened* use of official lies – all this resulted in an unenviable situation, in which the United States finds itself now. George Tenet is a participant of this process and an executor of many acts that have nothing to do with international law, the commitment to which is a popular topic of propaganda for the fans of U.S. system of human values.

One has to say outright that Mr. Tenet is not a professional spy. His book speaks about dozens of U.S. intelligence agents, but he himself is a typical representative of the U.S. ruling bureaucratic elite. He easily finds his way in the *corridors of power* and can sail well in the troubled waters of bureaucratic struggle between various power groups that replace each other in D.C. Tenet is a Democrat by origin, but he was inherited by Republicans and stayed for four years, meaning full confidence in his political views on the part of the Bush administration. Tenet's resignation is a result of failures and mistakes that the CIA made under his leadership. We are not going to analyze the errors of the U.S. central intelligence – this job has been done by numerous commissions of the U.S. Congress and by American experts on secret services. By the way, this made the CIA lose its leading role in the giant structure of the U.S. secret services and led to the establishment of the so called National Intelligence, which is now at the top of the pyramid. So there is no need to comment the activities of the CIA as an organizing force of the American intelligence community – George Tenet's deliberations are outdated.

A different issue is the attempt of Mr. Tenet to justify himself before the history and tell about the toughest specific episodes of his participation in setting and executing the orders of his employers. One can find here many curious revelations and characteristics of some acting political figures – and this has a serious practical importance. Taking into account the large amount of available material, I will comment only on a few significant episodes, the dark sides of which are described by George Tenet in detail. In some cases it is clear that Mr. Tenet tries



to find scapegoats to blame for failures, so I have to resort to the publications by other U.S. and foreign authors, in order to give the reader full and objective impression of the past.

9/11 – A TRAGEDY IN FIGHTING TERRORISM

George Tenet's description of a few months of work in the CIA that preceded astonishing air attack by *Al Qaeda* against the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon compound in Washington, clearly indicates – the agency had a dominating feeling that the catastrophe was on the way, but there was no idea when, where and in which form it might happen. As usually in such situation, there is an everyday flow of fragmented and contradictory information from the agents and other sources and there is no indication of approximate time and place of a terrorist attack. Nonetheless, such terribly huge organization as the U.S. intelligence community with dozens of thousands of employees and thousands of foreign agents around the world should have discovered the line of main attack by *Al Qaeda* and give approximate forecast about the means to be used. After all, one of Tenet's best advisors on terrorism *Rich B.* (see p. 241) firmly believed, "They come here". The U.S. intelligence failed to give an adequate assessment of available information, including Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri statements to their close circle that something "very big" was prepared, such as a powerful blow against the U.S. and Israeli interests (June 2001, see p. 226).

Americans underestimated such factors, as the ability of *Al Qaeda* to train and coordinate the use of several groups of kamikaze terrorists, who were psychologically ready to perform their deadly mission. In August 2001, the CIA lost control over two active terrorists from *Al Qaeda* – Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi – who by that time entered the U.S.A without any difficulties and on September 11 changed the route of Flight 77 of *American Airlines* and attacked Pentagon. Instead George Tenet provides lengthy deliberations about his inability to use *Predator* unmanned aircraft (UMA), a popular gadget in the arsenal of the CIA and the U.S. military that might have been used against *Al Qaeda* leadership. The book gives an honest description of hesitation and confusion of the U.S. ruling elite – a sudden, defiant and effective operation of international terrorists was a complete surprise for the secret services. As Americans normally do, the search for reasons of failure allowed them to kick even those *terrible Russians*, who had not provided on time the necessary information about Osama bin Laden, the man who was, by the way, so close to the CIA in the past. Meanwhile, our American partners took quite an ambiguous position with respect to Chechen terrorists and their sponsors from abroad.

Anyway in the evening of September 11, 2001, at the bunker meeting under the White House, George Bush, who turned out to be calmer than many of his staff, proclaimed the famous Bush doctrine, "I've directed the full resources of our intelligence and law enforcement communities to find those responsible and to bring them to justice. We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them." (p. 261). George Tenet writes that for the CIA the new doctrine meant elimination of all restrictions – the agency had old plans to chase *Al Qaeda* and its sponsors – the *Taliban* movement in Afghanistan. The U.S. strike in Afghanistan was predetermined. The U.S. expedition corps was ready to deploy in southern parts of the country. The future ruler – Hamid Karzai – was also found, as he was well-known to the U.S. secret services. *Al Qaeda* succeeded in its mission – global war with *crusaders* became a reality and caused many thousands of victims. The 9/11 terrorist attack gave birth to a link of dangerous developments – illegal prisons in Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib, CIA secret prisons in a few Western and Eastern European countries, political investigations permitted to Pentagon on the U.S. territory. In my opinion, this was the start of de-coronation of the CIA as a primary intelligence service in the United States and decrease in influence of George Tenet – the events that followed only gave additional impetus to this process.

CIA AND WAR AGAINST WMD PROLIFERATION

The issue of *Al Qaeda*'s access to the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is always in the focus of attention of the leading secret services of the world. It is accounted for by Osama's statement of December 24, 1998, "Acquiring weapons for the defense of Muslims is a religious

duty. If I have indeed acquired these weapons, then I thank God for enabling me to do so.” At the same time, the intelligence community and the U.S. Government in general was quite sure that people *hiding in the caves* could not get WMD. One has to pay tribute to the persistence of the CIA experts, who after a little while found a narrow and clandestine group in bin Laden’s entourage. The group was in charge of getting access to WMD – this was extremely important for *Al Qaeda* from the point of long-term prospects of struggle against *crusaders* and had little possibility to be used in the immediate plans of terrorist operations.

Nonproliferation experts would be excited to read pp. 394-397. George Tenet mentions Pakistan there, which in 1998 conducted its nuclear tests. It was supposed before that notorious international illegal proliferator of nuclear weapons technologies and the *father of the Pakistani A-bomb* Abdul Qadeer Khan had contacts with Osama bin Laden to discuss nuclear matters. Mr. Tenet, however, points out that A.Q. Khan denied such contacts for the reasons unknown to the CIA. The reasons are known and they are evident – A.Q. Khan was overloaded with more reliable business for many years, as he was supplying nuclear weapons technologies to the so called *rogue states*. Analysis of the information collected by the CIA through its own and partner channels, led to the discovery of another Pakistani NGO with broad network – *Umma-Tameer-e-Nau* (UTN). This association was headed by retired Pakistani nuclear scientists, military and engineers, who sold their expertise to *Al Qaeda* and assisted in the development of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons. UTN was guided by the radical Islamist – Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood, who used to be one of the leaders of Pakistan’s Atomic Energy Commission. Choudri Abdul Majeed, a famous Pakistani nuclear scientist, who retired in 2000, agreed to play the key role in helping Dr. Mahmood to provide access to WMD for bin Laden and *Taliban*. They even met somewhere in the mountains and discussed it all sitting by the fire in good revolutionary traditions. George Tenet also points out that omnipotent ex-Director General of the Inter-Services Intelligence Gen. Hamid Gul also felt sympathy towards such intentions. And this was very *hot news*.

Upon George W. Bush’s instruction, George Tenet established confidential contacts with Gen. Pervez Musharraf, the military dictator of Pakistan, and provided the latter with the CIA dossier on UTN. Further investigation allowed the CIA to conclude that the danger of using UTN by *Al Qaeda* was prevented at the early stage. Frankly speaking, one cannot guarantee this on the basis of information supplied by George Tenet in his book. What is more important, the confidential contact with the Pakistani dictator was established and Washington began to trust him more.

After *surrender* of Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi, the CIA obtained documented data on the Libyan nuclear program based on the Pakistani technologies, illicitly transferred to Tripoli by A.Q. Khan (for a large amount of money, of course). In September 2003, George Tenet had a secret meeting with President Musharraf in New York (during the UN summit) and showed him the design of *P-1* centrifuge. The general took measures once again and put the *national hero* under the home arrest. One has to note that the Pakistani regime again *got away* with it – the secret ties of the United States with such people should be extremely strong.

It is curious that nonproliferation experts do not normally refer to the UTN materials, and information on A.Q. Khan is also quite fragmented. Pervez Musharraf in his book *In the Line of Fire: A Memoir* (2006) confirms his meeting with George Tenet in New York, but says nothing about UTN. As for A.Q. Khan, Musharraf argues that he started to restrain his activities long before Mr. Tenet’s reports, even though he admits that he was stunned with the scale and geography of A.Q. Khan’s activities.

Thus, military regime of Pakistan, which has been the U.S. strategic partner for many years, has let down its patron – an obvious result of the deep-rooted American practice of double standards.

CASUS BELLI

Now let us speak about the ongoing U.S. drama in Iraq – Chapter 16 of Tenet’s book is devoted to this hot topic. It begins with the surprising statement of the ex-head of the central intelli-



gence – allegedly it is still a big mystery for him when the war in Iraq became inevitable. He admits that being engaged in fighting terrorism, he did not pay due attention to Iraq. Incredible! Famous chief weapons inspector of the UN Special Commission in Iraq Scott Ritter in his book *Iraq Confidential: The Untold Story of the Intelligence Conspiracy to Undermine the UN and Overthrow Saddam Hussein* reports in detail about the CIA-prepared operation to overthrow Saddam Hussein under the disguise of Inspection No. 150 (*Operation Silver Bullet*). The plan involved officers of the Iraqi secret services and servicemen of the 3rd Battalion of the 1st Brigade of the Special Republican Guard of Iraq, i.e. the major unit of dictator's personal guard. The plan failed and people died (Chapter 13, pp. 161-164).

With all my respect to George Tenet, I can hardly believe that being the First Deputy Director of the U.S. Central Intelligence, he did not know anything about this failure of the CIA, which discredited the U.S. government. George Tenet indirectly confirms this well-hidden fact and notes that the failure of the coup resulted in 1998 in the adoption of the *Iraq Liberation Act* by the Congress and allocation of \$100 million on destroying Saddam's regime. Mr. Tenet knew this for sure, since by that time he headed the central intelligence and as a cunning bureaucrat he could easily spot the priorities declared by the Republicans who were coming to power with the *Project for the New American Century*. The document stated clearly that there was a need to *behead* Saddam's regime.

To my mind, there is a different reason for such Tenet's modesty. It is unpleasant to admit that he did not belong to the near circle of President Bush by the time of war in Iraq and, hence, was not in the know of many secret intentions of Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld. Both regarded him as an executor, but not as an independent player. As the feeling of failure of the U.S. adventure in Iraq was growing, the same officials plus Condoleeza Rice made George Tenet and the CIA the scapegoats, while Mr. Tenet had to play along their rules in order to *keep floating* in the U.S. political waters. However, his relations with the ruling group continued to deteriorate.

WHAT IS SLAM DUNK?

There are many examples – here are a few of them. For many in the Bush administration Iraq was an unfinished enterprise. They decided to catch the emotional wave of the public caused by 9/11 and create the psychological linkage between the struggle against *Al Qaeda* and the threat allegedly posed by the WMD programs of Iraq. And they succeeded in this process. Few days after the destruction of the twin towers, the *man in socks with holes* – notorious U.S. hawk Paul Wolfowitz – maintained at the closed meeting of the U.S. National Security Council that any response to the terrorists should include the attack against Saddam Hussein. He said nothing about WMD, but the U.S. intelligence community *de facto* got two tasks – to prove that Saddam's regime was connected with and supported *Al Qaeda*, and that it continued to develop nuclear weapons and delivery systems despite the UN Security Council resolutions. In his book *Disarming Iraq* Hans Blix, who chaired the UN commission, devotes Chapter 12 to disavow the U.S. attempts to impose on the international community the falsified version instead of the real state of affairs.

And now it's time to speak about *slam dunk*. Most of the Americans do not know that this is a specific basketball term – it means that the ball is sent into the basket from above with two hands and in a jump. In other words, “for sure”.

It's common knowledge that George Tenet is a big fan of basketball. And he used this very term on December 21, 2002 to assure George Bush that Saddam Hussein possessed WMD and the elimination of the WMD programs could justify the coming invasion. In his book *Plan of Attack* Bob Woodward provides an anecdotic description of George Tenet's speech – he jumped twice to show how *slam dunk* worked. In his memories George Tenet agrees that he was hurt by Mr. Woodward's text and if it was not for the *slam dunk* episode, he might not have written his recollections. Besides, he apparently tries to explain to ex-Secretary of State Collin Powell how it happened that he let down the latter in the notorious speech of February 5, 2003 at the UN General Assembly.

Another book by Woodward, *State of Denial: Bush at War. Part III* (p. 90), argues that this very statement by George Tenet was the one that was expected from him by Condoleeza Rice, Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld and other *hawks*, who were willing to hunt. So we have all reasons to consider Mr. Tenet to be one of the primary sponsors of the Iraqi drama. His attempts to explain his decision cannot justify him, since he was one of a few who knew the real situation and was not courageous enough to tell the truth. Fairly speaking, the Americans, as usual, got strong helping hand from junior partners – the British. It was Tony Blair and Co. which made public the biased MI-6 report on Iraqi WMD. The document was written under the guidance of ex-British intelligence station chief in Moscow John Scarlett, who chaired the Cabinet Office Joint Intelligence Committee at that time. The Brits informed the secret services of the partners to gain their support of the prepared intervention in Iraq. By the way, now John Scarlett is Director of MI-6, so it is not difficult to understand why we have complicated relations with the gentlemen from London. They know how to make provocations.

George Tenet agrees that the CIA and he himself were not ready for intense obsession of the Bush administration with the search of evidence of close relationship between Iraq and *Al Qaeda*. He maintains that he was under constant pressure on this issue on the part of Dick Cheney, Paul Wolfowitz and other *hawks* (pp. 518-523), so eventually the report appeared – *Iraq and Al Qaeda: Interpreting a Murky Relationship*. The document was created in the “yes, minister” style again. After the resignation of George Tenet, Dick Cheney and Condoleeza Rice justified their statements by citing Tenet’s testimonies to the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence – the CIA Director made a lot of equivocal declarations during those hearings, trying to *serve two masters*. This looks strange, since many of his subordinates disagreed openly with the fiction called *evidence* of Saddam-*Al Qaeda* relationship.

In this review, I am not going to touch upon many other exciting episodes of Tenet’s service in the CIA. It is worth reading by oneself, especially the cases of actual disinformation about Iraq’s purchase of 500 tons of *yellowcake* from Niger, or the mean behavior of the Vice President towards a U.S. agent under cover – Valerie Plame – and her husband Ambassador Joseph Wilson, which resulted in imprisonment of Dick Cheney’s closest assistant I. Lewis “Scooter” Libby.

George Tenet’s book gives a very good impression of how the U.S. administration and its support elements work. It makes one conclude that *a cat may look at a king* and administrative bureaucracy in all social systems follows the same rules, regardless of national specifics.

To a certain extent, George Tenet’s lessons of being in power are worth learning. I was very much impressed with his statement that once one decided to cast the country into war, he should be sure not only of military ways to defeat the enemy, but also had clear plan to achieve peace. The second part of this message is something that the administration in D.C. has lacked and still runs out of.





ASIAN DIMENSION OF ENERGY SECURITY

Energy Dimensions of International Relations and Security in East Asia (ed. by A.D. Voskressensky). Moscow: MGIMO-University, 2007, 1040 p.

Reviewed by Tatiana Mitrova

Real energy diplomacy can be experienced by anyone in Russia practically every day while watching the TV or reading a newspaper. Russia's top leadership is involved in international negotiations of strategic issues for the energy sector development, which serves to prove the ultimate importance of those issues on the international agenda. Meanwhile, the very term *energy diplomacy* was not used by Russian scientists until recently.

These *boundary issues*, where traditional diplomacy merges with ensuring the region's energy security, are discussed in a fundamental work *Energy Dimensions of International Relations and Security in East Asia*. Its contributors pioneer the scientific community in their apparently successful attempt to look into topical, basic issues of the energy dimension of international relations and security in East Asia from the perspective of Russia as a global exporter of energy. To put it differently, it is an attempt to understand interconnections between international relations, geopolitics, and the energy sector.

The book was produced by joint effort of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (University) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia and *BP Trading Ltd.* as an outcome of a large-scale research project focusing on political, economic, social, and energy sector developments in the modern world with special consideration for specifics in East Asia. The partnership itself guarantees that the reader will get a profound scientific approach of a fundamental work on the one hand, and specific, practical information, so valuable today, on the other.

ENERGY DIPLOMACY: ITS PAST, TODAY, AND THE FUTURE

The most comprehensive definition of the scope of research is given by Alexey Voskressensky: "We are interested in general questions connected with a transformation of world leadership, particularly, whether energy issues promote or hinder that process, as well as something more specific, like how exactly the transformation could go and what influence will be exercised over it by the Asian, or, more specifically, the Chinese component" (p. 23). The author goes on to say it is obvious that energy issues (at least energy security, energy diplomacy, and energy geopolitics) are becoming part of international relations and diplomacy. However, the applied theory of international relations is just beginning to comprehend and analyze this link.

The analysis offered in the book is comprehensive, to say the least. The topic is reviewed in the aspects of geopolitics and geoeconomics, considering the natural-geographic and politico-military factors, going as far as the assessment of terrorism, ethnic, and religious risks. Let us not touch the politico-military sections of the book, but rather concentrate on the energy-focused chapters. Even though energy experts might be more interested in a broader analysis. Just so, we often overlook the ethnic and religious components of energy security, analyzing volumes and areas of sales of hydrocarbons. It is hard to argue against the obvious: an over-

whelming majority of most prominent oil- and gas-producing countries of the East can be defined as extremely authoritarian states, most of those regimes being unstable. No doubt, this issue deserves significant attention.

The first and probably major advantage of the research is that its contributors openly and clearly declare *energy causes* behind today's policies of most countries, as they underlie many current political processes, international conflicts, whether ongoing or potential, included.

Another inarguable advantage is that the contributors look towards the East, while Russia's hydrocarbon capacity has traditionally been Europe-oriented. In other words, from the Russian perspective, Europe is the past, today, and the future, while Asia is only to a certain extent today and to a large extent the future. We are yet to penetrate the vast energy market of dynamically developing Asian countries. Most of the research contributors underline the importance of the current situation, as it is right now that Russia has an opportunity to *discover* the Asian market to supply its energy to. It explains why the market should be looked at very closely as well as the need to establish Russia in that area.

Few would question the idea of Alexey Voskressensky that "in the new global context of the 21st century relations between the United States, Russia, and China in East and Central Asia, whose positions on major issues of international relations will eventually define the structure of a new world order and global security as well as regional security in East Asia, should not be in opposition... Energy topics and global energy security are capable of becoming an element of common vision into the future" (p. 47). However unquestionable the quoted idea is, ways to achieve this new harmonious world order are proportionally complex.

Q & NO A

Generally speaking, the overall context of the discussion suggested by the book's contributors is *open* in its nature as it looks into many processes at their early stage when it is hard to speak about working solutions. Many questions raised in the research can have no answers, as yet. Just one example here: who will endeavor today to give a definite answer, whether the growing interest of China and Japan to Russian energy resources would lead to trouble in terms of regional stability or, quite the opposite, will open an opportunity to strengthen it?

However, general approaches to the future system of multilateral cooperation in the energy sector in East Asia are starting to take shape. Here the contributors offer the following range of approaches that is generally acceptable:

- active and equal participation of Russia as a major producing country of the region in all talks and steering bodies aimed at establishing a system of multilateral energy cooperation in East Asia;
- full use of Central Asian potential;
- meeting interests of producers in the areas of technology sharing, environmental protection, on-site processing;
- truly comprehensive program of ensuring energy requirements of the region's countries that would incorporate oil, gas, and electric energy supplies;
- joint work on establishing strategic reserves, energy saving, a decisive effort to settle ongoing conflicts in the region by developing multilateral energy cooperation;
- simultaneously, work on issues of political and military cooperation to ensure security of energy transportation (p. 304).

It is obvious that a key role in the region is played by China, which is also in the focus of the research. China has long been relying on the notorious idea of *self-reliance* striving to achieve self-sufficiency. Contributors to the research speak in one voice when assessing shortages of energy in the Chinese economy and the growing dependence of that country on imported resources. These ideas lie in the foundation of forecasts of such exports to China. However, they overlook a probable scenario when Chinese energy strategy could be steered away



towards full use of internal capabilities, primarily, hard coal. Generally speaking, it should be noted that the research was written mainly by experts in politics and diplomacy rather than energy, which is reflected in analysis methodology, its interpretation and approaches to possible solutions.

The research contributors pay significant attention to integration processes, outlook for the development of various regional unions, the most prominent being the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Will it work only *on paper*, like many other organizations within the post-Soviet space, or will it develop a concrete regional strategy based on *cooperative security*? Only time will tell.

GENERAL TRENDS

It is interesting to look at Chapter 22, which stands a little bit apart from the general context. “*Geopolitics of pipelines in Northeastern Asia...*” looks into media reports to understand the attitudes of countries in the region to the planned East Siberia-Pacific Ocean oil pipeline. It might look as a stand-alone example, but it appears to reflect general trends pretty well. E.g., media in Japan are still cautious when covering this issue, as are their colleagues in China, which is explained by uncertainty over its final route. Western media cover the issue primarily in terms of confrontation, while the media in oil-producing Gulf countries understand the issue of the final route for the pipeline as a question of competition for crude oil markets in Northeastern Asia.

Special mention goes to Chapter 38 “*Potential and Prospects of the Nuclear Factor in Energy Sector of Northeastern Asia*” (by Ildar Akhtamzyan). It is a very concise, but extremely information-intensive description of one of the traditional no-mention topics.

Regretfully, the fundamental and multidimensional research claiming to have the freshest analysis seems to lose much of its quality by citing outdated reference and statistical information. All data given in the book are mainly of 2002-2003, seldom surmounting 2005, which is a clear drawback. Especially given that it is in recent years that East Asian countries have demonstrated particular progress in their development. With that view, updated data might be crucial.

Another drawback might be the book’s redundancy. Its over than a thousand pages often reiterate same ideas. Thus, information on China’s energy strategy, its market and demand of energy resources can be found practically in every third chapter.

The book’s editors introduced an innovation of a kind by complementing the major chapters with materials related to real discussions on most urgent issues of the energy dimension in international relations. This certainly *heated up the discussion*, again proving that the subject has been there for some time and is far from offering ready-made solutions.

An apparent advantage of the book is its contributors, who are not only established experts in the field, but also make up an international team. Together with famous Russian scientists, foreign experts are involved, who represent a different viewpoint, which is always important and interesting (see, for example, Chapters 6 and 9).

The publication will be of interest for the expert community, analysts of public institutions and private corporations, and students in relevant fields.

There is no doubt that the research represents a contribution to a comprehensive analysis of issues related to establishing the concept of East Asian direction of Russian energy policy. Especially given that Russian intellectuals are now more active in finding ways for Russia to join integration in the region.





TROUBLED WATERS OF THE BLACK SEA

S.F. Grinevetsky, S.S. Zhiltsov, I.S. Zonn, *The Black Sea Knot*. Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniya Publishers, 2007, 200 p.

Reviewed by Anatoly Ushkov

The fundamental research was published in 2007 covering the tight knot of economic, political, international legal, sociocultural, ecological, national, ethnic and other kinds of issues of the Black Sea region. Its authors are well-known to the expert community by their profound works, such as *The Geopolitics of the Caspian Region* or *The Black Sea Encyclopedia*. Despite the publication's not so large volume, they managed to give a detailed explanation of key issues of the Black Sea region, with which countries of the region have been confronted during the recent decades.

The authors focus their study on a region with a unique history, geographical position and capabilities. Six countries lying in the Black Sea basin have about 300 million of population and produce over \$2 trillion of total GDP. It is a crossroads of civilizations as well as geopolitical interests and aspirations of different countries and international organizations, even very distant from the Black Sea basin.

The region's importance is explained especially by the fact it is adjacent to the Greater Middle East. It is also part of a transcontinental transportation link with the Black Sea naturally continuing the Caspian energy corridor used to transport oil and natural gas from tremendous reserves in the Caspian basin to Europe, hence it is a key transit route for Caspian oil. All that draws attention to the region on the part of the United States, the European Union, and NATO. There is a growing importance of stability in that transit area adjacent to Iraq, where the war continues, and other problem areas like Israel, Palestine, Iran, etc.

Even a short list of subjects in the focus of the publication shows how topical it is: social and economic development of the region as well as its environmental issues, load of transport corridors and pipeline networks, defence issues, a difficult knot around the Crimean peninsula, capacity for conflict and prospects of regional cooperation, new geopolitical projects, developments in U.S. policies in the Black Sea region, etc.

The book contains many facts and references to show how the regional situation is evolving, how relations are built between countries or groups of countries. Those processes are looked at, most importantly, from the viewpoint of each country's national interests with special emphasis on how they benefit from their geographic location at the Black Sea.

GEOGRAPHIC SKEWER

It is probably the first attempt among similar writings to define what the Black Sea region is. Heading for this task seems to be reasonable due to a great variety of different interpretations. Modern and earlier works feature fragmentary descriptions starting from a philosophic insight into the region as a universe of its own, with a special mentality, traditions, world view and per-



B
o
o
k
r
e
v
i
e
w

ception, to a formally legal dimension as a subnational entity defined by law. There are other understandings of the region: historical, geopolitical, economic, etc.

Special attention is paid to the historical connection between the regions of the Black and the Mediterranean Seas, which form a single space not only geopolitically, but also geostrategically. The authors introduce a very fitting term of *geographic skewer*, since the Mediterranean, the Black, and the Caspian Seas form a single entity with regard to economic and trade relations.

The book renders a good understanding of developments in rivalry in the Black Sea region after the collapse of the Soviet Union, as well as socioeconomic trends. The two processes appear to be inseparable as growing competition between countries of the region in areas of transportation services, cargo services, shipbuilding, and oil transshipment has led to significant changes in living standards for people in Black Sea areas of some countries. This leads to strong differences appearing between former Soviet republics, which had different starting conditions and technological capacity, and now harshly compete with one another. This allows the authors to make a reasonable conclusion that the struggle for Black Sea ports and their infrastructure is now in its new phase.

At the same time, 16 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, we can say that increased rivalry did not bring good to all countries. For example, it concerns Ukraine as a country and all of its ports. Ukrainian companies leaving the cargo market reduce the traffic of cargo, which in its turn leads to low load of ports, lower revenues, and hence, reduced contributions to the budget.

The book notes that Russian ports see a better situation against the background of that in Ukraine. Amounts at Novorossiysk Port alone are comparable with those of all Ukrainian commercial ports, and the trend is there. Should more investments be streamed to reconstruct facilities in Novorossiysk and Tuapse, as well as to build new ones, export-import operations may boost. Especially given that the Russian government has come up with a recent initiative to establish special port zones.

The Black Sea region is an important communication hub at the crossroads of international transport corridors leading from the Caspian basin to the west, where interregional and international transportation flows are being actively shaped. Formation of new transport corridors has become especially active after news of large hydrocarbon deposits at the Caspian Sea. The increasing role of transportation links is explained by delivering energy sources to world markets, which in the future can significantly increase cargo and goods turnover in the Black Sea states.

BLACK GOLD OF THE BLACK SEA

The book looks into an issue topical for all Black Sea countries: off-shore hydrocarbon reserves. Some experts from those countries now say the reserves are comparable with those of the Caspian Sea arguing that the sea bed of both was formed in one geological era.

The Black and Azov Sea shelf has one inarguable advantage as a potential oil and gas field, which makes projects in the area attractive regardless of reserve volumes: that is its geographic location and developed transportation network. Should tanker transit through the Bosphorus be limited, Black Sea oil may be streamed to Bulgarian and Rumanian ports. New pipelines may make oil from the Black and the Azov Seas even more attractive. At the same time, the book's contributors reasonably note that a major factor hindering the development of the Black Sea shelf is not just environmental issues, but no clearly defined borders as well. On top of that, many Black Sea countries have no technologies as yet that would allow drilling at the depth of 200-600 m. All that allows the authors to conclude that Black Sea shelf reserves may become an important factor in development of the Black Sea area only in the future.

Despite numerous problems, interest towards Black Sea hydrocarbon reserves is shown by literally all countries of the region. Practically all of them plan to develop those hydrocarbons.

Petroleum producers from many countries have rushed into the area striving to drive stakes for most promising fields.

The research gives a detailed analysis of existing and potential pipelines as well as their influence on the situation in each of the countries of the region. New projects for oil and gas transportation from Central Asia to Europe have boosted interest in the Black Sea region, at the same time increasing competition of Black Sea countries and their neighbours for transportation routes. Lack of clearly defined routes for hydrocarbon pipelines pushes some countries and companies to review the future pipeline network.

After a certain pause, the Black Sea region has attracted Western attention, where countries failed to clearly define their interests in the first place, keeping in mind that only in the future can countries of the region become part of transport corridors forming a chain essential for hydrocarbon transportation as well as a huge market for oil and gas. However, the pause was very short indeed. New geopolitical processes do not allow Western countries to stay away from the area, and mainly this relates to the United States, which has launched a multifaceted policy line in the Black Sea region. It should be noted that American involvement in the region was very well prepared, especially given that starting conditions for understanding geopolitical processes in the Black Sea region and working out a policy to respond to them were very different at the time of the Soviet Union collapse in the West and in the former republics. The United States was quick to respond to the geopolitical change in the Black Sea region, which has become a top priority in its geopolitical targets, in its readiness to be seen as a guarantor of stability required for the free flow of oil from there and into Western markets. Especially given that the issue of stable hydrocarbons supplies has always been a priority of the United States.

The region now has a different configuration keeping in mind the fact that NATO members like Rumania, Bulgaria, and Turkey dominate on western and southern shores of the Black Sea, while new independent states—Ukraine, Georgia, and Russia—are strong in the north and in the east. The idea of statehood is still being established in Ukrainian and Georgian societies, which gives a new sense to issues of socioeconomic development, as well as international legal and political issues related to Black Sea states.

The book's authors note that competition in the Black Sea area over energy exports will grow every year, which can be explained not only by increasing production volumes at the Caspian Sea, but also key players (United States, Russia, and the European Union) striving for control over transportation routes for that energy. If predictions are correct, Black Sea countries will be able to strengthen their economies and political institutions, solve at least part of their social problems. Alternatively, predicted oil and gas production figures for Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan might be part of yet another *game*, which was the case with Caspian reserves pursuing very different goals. In that case there will be an escalation of the struggle over oil and gas for new and existing pipelines, thus turning Black Sea region into competition grounds.

Worldwide increased competition for access to origins and delivery routes of natural resources, and mostly energy resources, has led to more active efforts of the United States, the European Union, and NATO to strengthen their positions in the Black Sea region. E.g.: U.S. Navy bases at the Black Sea coast of Rumania and Bulgaria after they have become NATO members, country groupings objectively and even openly targeted against Russia to push it back gradually from former Soviet territories, and to promote U.S. interests in the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea regions (GUAM, as well as the so-called Community of Democratic Choice—the Commonwealth of the region between the Baltic, the Black, and the Caspian Seas, etc.)

A new step down that road was marked by Ukraine joining the so-called Multinational Peace Force South-Eastern Europe under NATO, which actually represents an attempt to induce Ukraine into the Alliance. The book notes that it introduces extra ambiguity into the region, while “NATO should not be allowed to use countries outside the Black Sea region to play the first fiddle in the area while at the same time forcing local countries into banana republics.” The authors think that the Black Sea should remain an area of cooperation, not contradiction.



B
o
o
k

r
e
v
i
e
w

THE CHOICE OF UKRAINE

The research pays special attention to regional policies of Ukraine, a major country in the area. A fair notice is made that the country's leadership, especially under President Viktor Yushchenko, decided to opt for an unconstructive position supporting countries with anti-Russian attitudes and trying to position Ukraine as an alternative to Russia in the Black Sea region as well as on the former Soviet territory.

Case studies in the book demonstrate the negative consequences Ukraine will encounter while pursuing its course. Supporting examples: the notorious situation around Odessa-Brody pipeline (the country losing hundreds of millions of dollars on that project), excessive time needed to delimit the border with Russia in the vicinity of Azov Sea basin, the Kerch Strait, etc.

Materials of the research give ground to say that Ukrainian diplomacy is short-sighted, to say the least, in handling important issues related to the country's national interests in the region, particularly that their line towards Moldova and Transnistria is inconsistent and waffling. A case is analyzed that describes the issue of adjusting the border between Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova, and what a corresponding agreement has led to. By the way, the Constitution of Ukraine provides that such issues shall be decided by an all-Ukrainian referendum, which was not the case. The inconsistent line of Ukrainian leadership is seen in regard to resuming navigation on the Ukrainian part of the Danube and construction of a deep navigable link between the Danube and the Black Sea using the bed of Bystroye. The construction was many times suspended by Yulia Tymoshenko's government, which in fact meant elimination of Ukraine from the transportation market in that section of international routes, and loss of significant money. The mistake seems even worse if we keep in mind that the region has a large potential yet never touched, as well as economic, environmental, and social problems.

Inconsiderate policies of Transnistria central authorities mean a real threat to national interests of Ukraine. Relations with Rumania are also troubled, which is connected, among other things, with a controversy over Zmeinyi Island surrounded by oil and gas reservoir in the continental shelf. Now the Rumanian side does not even need an effort, the job is done by Ukrainian *patriots*. Ukrainian policy in the Black Sea region serves to prove yet again what a lopsided orientation of a country's foreign policy might lead to.

A survey by contributors to the *Troubled waters...* demonstrates that countries of the region have not managed to launch the machine of cooperation. Each of the countries claims the leading role in the area forgetting about interests of its neighbours. Not only it makes interregional cooperation less probable, but it also provokes discord and regional instability.

In the light of NATO and EU membership for Rumania and Bulgaria there is established a new regional model of cooperation, attempts are made at a new structure for regional security. The Black Sea region has become the focus of competing interests and aspirations of different countries, international organizations, industrial holdings, and enterprises. Whether or not Black Sea countries and some other regional states will manage to establish mutually acceptable cooperation mechanisms will define whether or not the Black Sea will turn into an apple of discord or a uniting factor.

The book will be appealing to everyone interested in issues related to the Black Sea. It would be useful for government officials who develop and carry out the country's foreign policy. It is a really remarkable reading, mainly because it gives unusual problems as well as solutions.



PIR CENTER'S ACTIVITIES ARE VISIBLE IN RUSSIA AND ABROAD

To the Editor-in-Chief,

I would like to emphasize the high significance of publishing, research and political activities of the PIR Center as far as strengthening of nuclear nonproliferation and international security are concerned. Your efforts are visible not only in Russia, but far beyond its borders.

PIR Center's publications, including *Security Index*, textbooks and research papers, various electronic editions, such as *PIR Press*, *Yaderny Kontrol* and so on, cause natural interest and positive response of professional audience dealing with the global security and disarmament issues.

I try to ensure that PIR Center's publications, which I regularly receive, become available to my colleagues in the Office of Nuclear Security and to senior officials concerned from other IAEA departments. To a certain extent, the IAEA is a unique place for dissemination of such publications and generation of internationally approved standards.

I also find it useful to be the member of the PIR Center Advisory Board and to participate in promotion of goals and ideology of the Center in Russia and abroad.

I hope for further fruitful cooperation with the PIR Center as far as expert and information activities are concerned. Good luck to you and the PIR Center staff!



Yury Volodin,
*Senior Nuclear Security Project Specialist
Office of Nuclear Security
International Atomic Energy Agency
Wagramer Strasse 5, P.O. Box 100,
Vienna 1400, Austria*



L
E
T
T
E
R
S
T
O
R
I
E
S



ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Angelova, Anastasia, editor of the academic journals review in the *Democracy and Governance* newsletter published by the research committee on comparative political science of the Russian Association of Political Science. She is also a member of the UN Association in Bulgaria. Born in 1983. In 2007 Ms. Angelova graduated with honors the faculty of philosophy and political science of the St. Petersburg State University. In 2006 she had an internship in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria. Her research interests include Russia's relations with the European Union, problems of adaptation of the CEE countries after the accession to the EU, and energy security. Email address: angelova.angelova@gmail.com

Arbatova, Nadezhda Konstantinovna, head of the Department on European Political Studies at the Center for European Integration, Institute for World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), Russian Academy of Sciences. Dr. Arbatova is also Director of the Center on International Relations at the Russian Academy of Sciences' Institute of Europe. Furthermore, she serves as the Director of Policy Studies and Editor at the *Committee Russia in the United Europe*. She graduated MGIMO in 1973. In November 2003, she was granted the Onassis Foundation Professor fellowship and worked at ELIAMEP (Hellenic Foundation) on *European Security and International Terrorism: The Balkan Connection*. Dr. Arbatova received her Ph.D. in History from the Institute of World Economy and International Relations. In 1998-1999 she was visiting researcher at the Department for Strategic Studies at the Swedish National Defense College.

Bojesen, Soren Bo, Defense Attaché of the Royal Danish Embassy in Moscow, also in Minsk, Astana, Bishkek, Dushanbe, and Tashkent. Brigadier General Bojesen joined the military service in 1974. Two years later he graduated the Specialized Army School (as a military translator from Russian). He then served as a staff officer in the Danish Armed Forces. In 1995-1996 he headed the Danish national intelligence cell (DANIC) at the IFOR headquarters in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 1996-1998 he served in the Main Operational Control Directorate (peacekeeping operations) of the Supreme Command of the Danish Armed Forces. In 1999-2000 he was Deputy Commander and Chief of Staff of the Danish peacekeeping contingent within KFOR in Kosovo. After graduating the General Staff Academy of the Russian Federation, he was promoted to the rank of Brigadier General in 2003. In 2004 he was elected president of the Moscow association of military attachés.

Evstafiev, Dmitry Gennadievich, Deputy Director General of the National Foreign Policy Laboratory. Born in 1966. Graduated from the History Department of Moscow State University's Institute of Asian and African Countries with honors in 1989, then served as a junior research associate, and then research associate, at the RAS U.S. and Canada Institute, where he received a degree of candidate in political science in 1993, defending a dissertation in the area of military policy. In 1995-1998 worked as a senior, leading expert at the Russian Institute for Strategic Research (RISI). Later served as a senior research associate and project

director at the PIR Center. Leading expert on the military and political facets of Russian national security, U.S. foreign and military policy, and regional aspects of nuclear nonproliferation. In 2001-2006 worked for the *KROS* Public Relations Development Company, serving part of that time as vice president. Member of the PIR Center Advisory Board and *Security Index* editorial board.

Evstafiev, Gennady Mikhailovich, PIR Center Senior Advisor, Lieutenant-General (ret.). Born in 1938. He has worked in governmental agencies for over 40 years, including Soviet embassies in Pakistan and other countries, and the UN Secretariat. In 1986-1991 Lieutenant-General Evstafiev participated in CFE negotiations. In 2000-2003 he worked in the Russian mission to NATO headquarters in Brussels in charge of WMD nonproliferation and arms control issues. Email address: evstafiev@pircenter.org

Fedorov, Yury Yevgenyevich, Associate Fellow, Chatham House – The Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, the U.K.; Member of the *Security Index* editorial board. Graduated from Moscow State University's Physics Department. Candidate of Historical Sciences, Professor. Worked at the Sociological Research Institute of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences. Headed the section on disarmament issues at the Institute for International Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Worked in the international division of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee, after which, in 1991, he became deputy head of the political science department at MGIMO. In September 1998 he became section head, and in December 2000 head of the division on military policy research at the RAS U.S. and Canada Institute. In 2001-2002 he served as deputy director of the PIR Center. In 2002-2003 he was deputy director of the Institute of Applied International Research. Several of his academic studies have focused on energy security, particularly of the Caspian region. He is the author of a monograph entitled *Substrategic Nuclear Weapons and Russian Security Interests* (Moscow: *Nauchnyye zapiski PIR Tsentra*, No. 16, 2001). Fedorov is a member of the *Security Index* editorial board. Email address: yufedorov@rambler.ru

Gagarinsky, Andrey Yurievich, advisor to the Director of the Russian Research Center – the Kurchatov Institute, deputy director of the Institute of Innovative Energy. Born in 1939. In 1962 he graduated the Moscow Engineering Physics Institute (MEPhI) and since then he has joined the Kurchatov Institute. Dr. Gagarinsky's research interests include the physics of experimental nuclear reactors, critical security, pressurized-water reactors, innovation technologies of nuclear fuel cycle and nuclear energy. He is one of the founders of the Soviet Nuclear Society and Vice-President of the Russian Nuclear Society. Dr. Gagarinsky is awarded with the Order of Courage for participation in the elimination of consequences of the Chernobyl accident. Member of the editorial boards of *Atomnaya Energiya* (Russia), *Nukleonika* (Poland), and *International Journal of Nuclear Science and Technology*. Email address: agagarin@kia.ru

Lavrov, Sergey Viktorovich, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary. Born in 1950. Graduated from the Moscow State Institute of International Relations of the MFA of the U.S.S.R in 1972. Began his activity in 1972 at the Soviet Embassy in Sri Lanka. Worked in the Department of International Organizations of the Soviet MFA between 1976 and 1981. From 1981 to 1988 – First Secretary, Councilor and Second Councilor at the Permanent Mission of the U.S.S.R to the United Nations. From 1988 to 1990 – Deputy Head of the Department of International Economic Relations of the MFA of Russia. In 1990-1992 – Director of the Department of International Organizations and Global Problems of the MFA of Russia. In 1992-1994 – Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. From 1994 – Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations. On March 9, 2004 he was appointed the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. Decorated with state awards.

Makarychev, Andrey Stanislavovich, Professor of the Department of International Relations and Political Science of the Nizhny Novgorod Linguistic University. Dr. Makarychev was born in 1965. He graduated Nizhny Novgorod State University in 1989 and the European Institute of High International Studies in Nizza (France) in 1994. He worked as a Visiting Research Fellow at the Center for Security Studies (Zurich, 1999-2001) and the Danish Institute for International



Studies (2003-2005). His areas of research include regional aspects of security, soft security, constructivism. Email address: amakarych@mail.ru

Markedonov, Sergey Miroslavovich, head of Interethnic Relations Section, Institute of Political and Military Analysis. Born in 1972 in Rostov-on-Don. In 1995 he graduated with honors the faculty of history of the Rostov State University, and in 1998 he finished his postgraduate studies there. He defended his doctoral thesis in the Institute of Russian History of the Russian Academy of Sciences in 1999; member of the Russian Union of Journalists (since 1998). Dr. Markedonov is the author of two books, 200 articles and over 300 media publications on sociopolitical development of the Caucasus, problems of interethnic relations and conflicts, religious situation in the Caucasus and in the post-Soviet space. His articles were published in *Izvestia*, *Moskovskiy Novosti*, *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, *Politichesky Zhurnal*, *Znanya*, *Novy Mir*, *Apologiya*. He has a substantial field experience in the North and South Caucasus (visits to conflict zones and unrecognized republics). Email address: smark-72@mail.ru

Mitrova, Tatiana Alexeevna, head of the Center for Global Energy Market Studies, Institute of Energy Research of the Russian Academy of Sciences. After graduating the Department of Economics of the Moscow State University in 1994, Dr. Mitrova worked in consulting firms dealing with energy issues. Since 1998 she joined the Institute of Energy Research, where in 2006 she was appointed head of the center. Tatiana Mitrova is a member of the regional study group on energy scenarios of the World Energy Council, the Program Committee B (Strategy, Economics, and Regulation) of the International Gas Union and takes part in the work of the group on foreign economic activities and international cooperation of the Russian Gas Society. In 2006 she was a member of the Energy Safety and Security Group of the G-8 Organizational Committee. Dr. Mitrova is the author of more than 30 articles on energy issues. Major research areas are analysis of the development of global energy markets and export-import policy of Russia in this area.

Morozov, Yury Vasilievich, head of the European security section of the Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Col. (res.) Morozov leads the joint Russian-Danish research project on peacekeeping. He graduated the Frunze Military Academy in 1982 and the General Staff Academy in 1992, as well as the NATO Defense College in 2000. Prof. Morozov participated in the UN peacekeeping missions in the Balkans and in the Caucasus; he served as a UN military observer in former Yugoslavia (1994-1995), in Georgia/Abkhazia (2000-2001). Dr. Morozov is an author of many research papers on peacekeeping, local conflicts, etc. He is professor of the Academy of Military Sciences, International Science Academy for National Security Issues, corresponding member of the Russian Academy of Geopolitical Problems.

Orlov, Vladimir Andreevich, the founder and President of the PIR Center – *Center for Policy Studies (Russia)* and Editor-in-Chief of the *Security Index* Journal. He is the President of the *Centre russe d'études politiques, Genève*. Dr. Orlov is a member of the Public Board at the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. He is the Chairman of the *Dialogue Club*. Vladimir A. Orlov was born in 1968 in Moscow, Russia. He graduated from the Russian Foreign Ministry's Moscow State Institute of International Affairs (MGIMO). In 2001-2002 he served as a UN consultant on disarmament and nonproliferation education by the appointment of the UN Secretary General. Dr. Orlov regularly publishes his views in Russian and foreign periodicals and has edited more than a dozen books on international security issues, published both in Russia and abroad. Dr. Orlov continues to teach on a regular basis, giving lectures on Russian foreign policy and WMD nonproliferation. Email address: orlov@pircenter.org

Romanenko, Sergey Alexandrovich, leading research associate of the Institute of Economics of the Russian Academy of Sciences. He graduated the faculty of history of the Moscow State University in 1979. In 1986 he defended his doctoral thesis at the Institute of Slavic and Balkan Studies of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. In 1979-1999 Dr. Romanenko worked in the same institute; and in 1999-2006 he joined the Institute of International Economic and Political Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences. He is the author of over 120 publications (including two books and two brochures) and actively contributes to the Russian and foreign media.

His analytical articles and interviews were published in 17 countries. Email address: persik11@mtu-net.ru

Shustov, Vladimir Viktorovich, consultant of the Center of History of the Russian Diplomatic Service at the Russian MFA. Amb. Shustov was born in 1930 in Leningrad. He graduated the faculty of history of the MGIMO in 1953 and in 1956 finished his postgraduate studies there. In 1957-2002 Dr. Shustov served in the Foreign Ministry. He participated in the numerous negotiations on disarmament issues (test-ban treaties, NPT, etc.). In 1979-1986 he worked in New York as Deputy Permanent Representative of the U.S.S.R to the United Nations. In 1992-1995 he represented Russia in the OSCE and headed the delegation at the CFE talks. Until 2002 he was ambassador at large at the MFA.

Subbotin, Stanislav Anatolevich, head of section of the Russian Research Center – the Kurchatov Institute. Born in 1949. In 1972 he graduated the MEPhI and until 1977 worked in the Institute of Physics and Power Engineering (IPPE) in Obninsk. Since then he has joined the Kurchatov Institute. Dr. Subbotin is the author of several books and numerous articles. His research interests include nuclear energy reactors, innovation technologies of nuclear fuel cycle and nuclear energy, systemic research of power engineering progress. Email address: subbotin@dhtp.kiae.ru

Ubeev, Alexey Vadimovich, Deputy Head of the Department of External Relations, ZAO *Atomstroyexport*. Dr. Ubeev led the IAEA section at the Russia's Permanent Mission to the International Organizations in Vienna. Later on Associate Professor Ubeev headed the Nuclear Security, Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation and International Cooperation Desk at the MFA's Department of Security and Disarmament Affairs. In 1986 he participated in the elimination of consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl NPP.

Ushkov, Anatoly Mikhailovich, professor of the Department of Political Science of the Russian University of Friendship among Nations. Born in 1935, he graduated the MGIMO in 1958 as an expert on oriental studies. In 1965-1977 after completing his postgraduate studies in the Institute of Philosophy of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, he worked as Associate Professor of Philosophy and Deputy Dean of the Preparatory Faculty of the Moscow Auto-Road Institute (MADI). In 1977-1990, Dr. Ushkov was Associate Professor at the Department of Political Science of the Institute of Professional Training of the Moscow State University. In 1990-2000 he was professor and headed the Department of Political Science of the Bauman Moscow State Technical University. Since 2000 he works in the University of Friendship among Nations. His research interests include international relations in the East, geopolitics, etc.

Yakovenko, Alexander Vladimirovich, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. Born in 1954. In 1976, he graduated the faculty of international economic relations of the MGIMO. In 1976-1993, he worked at different positions in the central staff of the Ministry, including the Department of International Organizations, the Department of Foreign Policy Planning, the Department of Pan-European Process, and Russia's Permanent Mission to the United Nations. In 1993-1995 Dr. Yakovenko was Deputy Director of the Department of International Scientific and Technical Cooperation; in 1995-1997 he served as Deputy Director of the Department of Security and Disarmament Affairs and represented Russia in the Board of Governors of the International Science and Technology Center in Moscow. In 1997-2000, Prof. Yakovenko was Deputy Permanent Representative of Russia to the International Organizations in Vienna. In 2000-2005 he headed the Department of Information and Press, was the official spokesman of the Russian Foreign Ministry. In 2005 Amb. Yakovenko was appointed Deputy Foreign Minister and now he covers the issues of international cooperation, Russia's participation in the work of international organizations, and human rights matters.

Zulkharneyev, Albert Farkhatovich, Education Programs Coordinator at the PIR Center. In 2007 he received master degree in history with honors from the Central European University (Budapest, Hungary). Currently he is a graduate student of the Urals State University, International Relations Department. In fall 2004 he participated in the PIR Center's course on «*Nuclear nonproliferation: international legal, political and economic aspects*,» organized at the premises of the Urals State University. In 2007 he completed his internship at the PIR Center.





PIR CENTER ADVISORY BOARD
(as of May 25, 2008)

Akhtamzyan Ildar, Dr., Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO-University) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Moscow, Russia

All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Experimental Physics (VNIIEF), Federal Nuclear Center, Sarov, Russia

Antipov Sergey, Dr., Nuclear Safety Institute of Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia

Antonov Anatoly, Amb., Dr., Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Moscow, Russia

Arbatov Alexey, Corresponding Member, Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS); Center for International Security, Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), Moscow, Russia

Baev, Pavel, Dr., Research Professor, International Peace Research Institute in Oslo (PRIO), Oslo, Norway

Baranovski Vladimir, Dr., Corresponding Member, Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS); Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), Moscow, Russia

Bertsch Gary, Prof., Center for International Trade and Security, University of Georgia, Athens, U.S.A

Bunn George, Prof., Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University, Stanford, U.S.A

Cirincione Joseph, Ploughshares Fund, Washington, D.C., U.S.A

Dhanapala Jayantha, Amb., Pugwash Movement of Scientists, Colombo, Sri Lanka

Dvorkin Vladimir, Maj.-Gen. (ret.), Carnegie Moscow Center, Moscow, Russia

Eggert Konstantin, *BBC* Russian Service, Moscow, Russia

Einhorn Robert, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C., U.S.A

Eleukenov Dastan, Dr., Counsellor, Embassy of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Washington, D.C., U.S.A.

Evstafiev Dmitry, Dr., National Foreign Policy Laboratory, Moscow, Russia

Fedorov Alexander, Dr., Moscow, Russia

Geneva Centre for Security Policy, Geneva, Switzerland

Gottemoeller Rose, Carnegie Moscow Center, Moscow, Russia

Institute of Strategic Stability, Moscow, Russia

Ji Zhiye, Chinese Academy of Contemporary International Relations, Beijing, China

Johnson Rebecca, Dr., *Acronym* Institute, London, U.K.

Kirichenko Elina, Dr., North American Research Center, Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), Moscow, Russia

Kortunov Andrey, Dr., *New Eurasia* Foundation, Moscow, Russia

Krasnov Alexey, Federal Space Agency of the Russian Federation, Moscow, Russia

Kurchatov Institute – Russian Research Center, Moscow, Russia

Ladygin Fedor, Col.-Gen. (ret.), Aircraft holding company *Sukhoy*, Moscow, Russia

Laverov Nikolay, Acad., Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia

Lebedev Vladimir, Moscow City Government, Moscow, Russia

Lewis Patricia, Dr., UNIDIR, Geneva, Switzerland

Luedeking Rudiger, Amb., Federal Foreign Office, Berlin, Germany

Lysenko Mikhail, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Russian Federation to New Zealand, Wellington, New Zealand

Margelov Mikhail, Committee for Foreign Affairs, Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, Moscow, Russia

Moscow Engineering Physics Institute (MEPhI), Moscow, Russia

Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO University) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Moscow, Russia

Mueller Harald, Dr., Peace Research Institute, Frankfurt-am-Main, Germany

Nikitin Alexander, Dr., Center for Political and International Studies, Moscow, Russia

Novikov Vladimir, Dr., Russian Institute for Strategic Studies (RISI), Moscow, Russia

Parkhalina Tatyana, Dr., Center for European Security Studies, Institute of Scientific Information on Social Sciences (INION), Moscow, Russia

Pikayev Alexander, Dr., Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), Moscow, Russia

Piontkovski Andrey, Dr., Hudson Institute, Washington, D.C., U.S.A

Ponomarev-Stepnoi Nikolay, Acad., Russian Research Center – the Kurchatov Institute, Moscow, Russia

Potter William, Prof., James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey, U.S.A



Rybachenkov Vladimir, Dr., Embassy of the Russian Federation to the United States, Washington, D.C., U.S.A

Satanovsky Yevgeny, Prof., Dr., Institute of Middle East Studies, Moscow, Russia

Saveliev Alexander, Dr., International Security Center, Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), Moscow, Russia

Semin Valery, Prof., Dr., Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the United Nations Office and other International Organizations in Geneva, Switzerland

Slipchenko Victor, Committee Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1540(2004), United Nations Headquarters, New York, U.S.A

Sokov Nikolay, Dr., James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Monterey, U.S.A

Trenin Dmitry, Dr., Carnegie Moscow Center, Moscow, Russia

Tuzmukhamedov Bakhtiyar, Dr., Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, Moscow, Russia

Ubeev Alexey, Dr., *Atomstroyexport*, Moscow, Russia

Yesin Viktor, Col.-Gen. (ret.), Academy of Security, Defense and Law Enforcement, Moscow, Russia

Zababakhin **All-Russian Scientific Research Institute of Technical Physics** (VNIITF), Federal Nuclear Center, Snezhinsk, Russia