



## NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT: NEXT STEPS FOR RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES

In May 2010, Russia and the United States, together with other parties to the NPT, agreed on the final document of the NPT Review Conference, including the list of concrete actions to be undertaken by the nuclear-weapon states (NWSs) in the area of nuclear disarmament.

Though significantly weakened by the delegations on NWSs, primarily by France, Russia, and China, compared with the original proposals, this list, in its final format, is, in any case, an important *roadmap* on nuclear disarmament for the next five to 10 years. I have summarized the key *disarmament requirements* of the NPT 2010 RevCon applicable to the United States and Russia below:

- reduce and ultimately eliminate all types of nuclear weapons, deployed and non-deployed, including through unilateral, bilateral, regional, and multilateral measures;
- Russia and the U.S. commit to seek the early entry into force and full implementation of the START Treaty and are encouraged to continue discussions on follow-on measures in order to achieve deeper reductions in their nuclear arsenals;
- move towards an overall reduction in the global stockpile of all types of nuclear weapons;
- diminish the role and significance of nuclear weapons in all military and security concepts, doctrines, and policies;
- discuss policies that could prevent the use of nuclear weapons and eventually lead to their elimination;
- reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems in ways that promote international stability and security and reduce the risk of accidental use of nuclear weapons;
- enhance transparency and increase mutual confidence;
- refrain from nuclear-weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions, from the use of new nuclear weapons technologies, and from any action that would defeat the object and purpose of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and all existing moratoriums on nuclear-weapon test explosions should be maintained. Promote the entry into force and implementation of that Treaty;
- support cooperation among governments, the United Nations, other international and regional organizations, and civil society aimed at increasing confidence, improving transparency, and developing efficient verification capabilities related to nuclear disarmament; and
- submit regular reports on the implementation of the present action plan and the practical steps agreed to in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference.



FROM THE EDITOR

However, today it is obvious that neither the United States nor Russia is ready to implement even such modest steps in its integrity, and would instead prefer a pick-and-choose approach addressing only those required actions which do not contradict their national security policies.

At the same time, later this year, as the New START has finally entered into force and is now being implemented, both United States and Russia will already face a dilemma: either to press an indefinite *pause* button after the success with the new treaty or to aggressively jump into the next phase of bilateral arms control negotiations.

The current political situation gives an almost equal, 50/50, chance to each of these scenarios, with a slight advantage for the *pause* scenario. However, in case both leaders, Obama and Medvedev, agree to move forward and to stay in line with their April 2009 London joint declaration on their joint leadership towards a nuclear-weapon-free world, the new agenda for negotiators would be much more complex than it was for the New START.

I see five baskets for such new negotiations.

The *first* basket should contain further reductions of *strategic offensive nuclear weapons*. The goal should be to reduce them to 1,000 warhead limits.

The *second* basket should contain the *defensive strategic armaments* issue, i.e. missile defense. The United States and Russia should move from talking about cooperation in this area to real, though inevitably limited, cooperation. Concrete actions toward defensive strategic armaments such as missile defense should be formulated and incorporated in a legally binding format. As an initial step the recent Russian proposal on zonal missile defense cooperation in Europe should be accepted. However, Russia should be in a position to provide detailed explanations of its proposal to avoid any misunderstandings by the United States or its NATO allies in Europe.

A joint U.S.–Russian integrated early warning system should be developed for Europe, with the participation of NATO. Its integration should include, inter alia, mutually acceptable and tested computer software that would facilitate the process of response of this early warning system to a missile attack. Its functioning should be based on conclusions from a joint threat assessment by Russia. As a next step, Russia and the United States should start working on the creation of a common European missile defense system, which is a necessity. This should go well beyond simple sharing of information and joint threat assessment. Going beyond the goal of *interoperability* would be desirable. While Russia is unlikely to be able to participate actively by providing its anti-missile systems, Russia's active participation in the information component of this system will be essential.

Also to be discussed in this *basket*: the need for the opening of a multilateral negotiation process on the issue of banning nuclear weapons from outer space. The starting point for such negotiations could be Russia and China's draft treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, or another mutually acceptable draft. Trilateral consultations on this issue between the United States, Russia, and China could be helpful.

The *third* basket should contain a *combination of issues* related to other types of nuclear weapons, strategic weapons with non-nuclear munitions, and reduction of conventional forces in Europe (CFE). The issue of CFE *re-writing* should initially be part of this package but later has to be separated out as a subject for multilateral talks.

The *fourth* basket should address joint, coordinated efforts in *reassessing national nuclear policies*, including a ban on development of new types of nuclear weapons; reducing the role of nuclear weapons; better transparency and reporting; and, finally, perhaps, reducing the risk of accidental use of nuclear weapons. This basket should address all nuclear weapons, both deployed and non-deployed, both strategic and non-strategic. The work of this basket should be facilitated by a mechanism involving the expert community.

The *fifth* basket should provide preparatory work for *other nuclear nations* eventually joining United States and Russia on their path towards nuclear disarmament. It should include a consultative mechanism with other nuclear nations—the U.K., France, and China, and, arguably, with India as well.

Most of these proposals were discussed between U.S. and Russian experts in Gstaad, Switzerland, at a meeting of the Sustainable Partnership with Russia (SUPR) Group, co-sponsored by the PIR Center and the Ploughshares Fund. Members of this group exchanged numerous ideas on how the

next steps of U.S.–Russian nuclear arms control should be identified and shaped. There are still significant differences in views among the experts, but, what is most important, the discussion was a frank exchange aimed into the future—and to be continued. We will inform our readers on the findings of the SuPR Group in the following issues of the journal.

While the two nations are in the process of negotiations (and working on the five baskets will be a long-term task), they should work in parallel on a series of multilateral steps which should involve both themselves and other nuclear nations as well.

The *first* such step should be a joint declaration by the nuclear five at the UN Security Council, in the form of a resolution, that they agree not to increase their nuclear arsenals from now on. India may make a unilateral statement of the same nature in parallel.

The *second* step should be a joint declaration by the nuclear five at the UN Security Council, in the form of a resolution, that they agree from now on not to deploy their nuclear weapons outside their respective national territories.


The *third* step should be decisions by the two remaining NWSs still outside the CTBT to finally ratify it, which should open the door toward its entry into force.

The *fourth* step should be a joint agreement by the United States, Russia, and China to work together on building a new treaty that would ban the placement of weapons in outer space.

The *fifth* step should include joint lobbying by Russia and the United States to make the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty multilateral.


I understand that such a list of bilateral and multilateral efforts, initiated jointly by Russian and U.S. leaders, looks too ambitious—which poses the question of how realistic it is. But the paradox is that if both leaders choose action instead of inaction/*pause*, they will have to act boldly and ambitiously. Nuclear weapons agenda items are so deeply interconnected that it would be impossible to expect to successfully address only one or two issues while keeping other (more difficult and controversial) ones untouched or unnoticed—if really deep, dramatic reductions in strategic weapons are in mind.

In this sense, the New START was the last arms control treaty that could allow strategic offensive arms to be addressed independently of others (I do not count a soft touching on missile defense). Now, when the PR job on the importance of the New START is done and we no longer need to persuade our legislators, many experts would agree that it was a very modest, mostly symbolic success story.

New bilateral nuclear arms control steps by Russia and the United States have no chance of success if they are not really bold. NPT RevCon 2015 will be a good checkpoint for this progress—if of course both countries do not prefer inaction to boldness which, as I have already mentioned, could very possibly become the case. 

**Vladimir Orlov**





Elena Knyazeva

## RUSSIA WILL USE THE EXPERIENCE OF FOREIGN ARMIES

*The ongoing military reform in Russia aims to reshape the armed forces using the “New Look” model. How could Russian military reformers use the lessons learnt by foreign countries? What is the international dimension of that reform? How will Russia develop its military cooperation with other countries and international organizations? And what effects will that development have on the progress of Russia’s military reform?*

*We have put our questions to the Acting Head of the General Directorate for International Military Cooperation at the Russian MoD, Col. Elena Knyazeva.*

**SECURITY INDEX:** How is international experience being used in the reform of the Russian armed forces?

**KNYAZEVA:** The Russian army is undergoing a serious transformation. Its structure is being optimized, the number of tiers of command is being reduced, and the command bodies themselves are being reformed. We are removing duplication and redistributing the tasks and functions of the various command and control bodies.

At one time or another, similar changes have taken place in the armies of other countries. The Russian MoD is studying the experience of military reform in these countries so as not to repeat the same mistakes and to learn from best practice.

One of the tasks of the General Directorate for International Military Cooperation at the Russian MoD is to collect and analyze information about the experience of military reform in other countries. Especially valuable to us is experience in areas such as social safety nets for servicemen, training, and personnel policy.

We carefully study international experience. We have good relations with a number of foreign countries such as Germany, Israel, France, Italy, and Finland; our representatives have received valuable experience there. Also, following a visit to the United States by Russian Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov, there has been serious progress in exchanging experience between our two countries. U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates has promised maximum openness in sharing any information about the experience of military reform in the U.S. armed forces.

We study the experience of foreign countries not to copy it blindly, but to analyze it and adapt it to the situation in Russia.

Examples include the organization of the system of sergeant training and the outsourcing of functions that do not really belong with the armed forces.

**SECURITY INDEX:** In a recent statement, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen said that missile defense is one of the most promising areas for cooperation between Russia and NATO. Do you agree with that assessment? What are the main areas of NATO–Russia cooperation at this time? How will the adoption of the new NATO strategic concept affect relations?



I  
N  
T  
E  
R  
V  
I  
E  
W

**KNYAZEVA:** On the whole, we are happy with the outcome of the NATO summit and the subsequent meeting of the NATO–Russia Council. It is important that we have left the legacy of the Cold War behind; Russia and NATO are no longer adversaries. For the General Directorate for International Military Cooperation that opens a new stage in the forms and methods of our work. The first step in that direction was made in May 2010, when Russia and NATO resumed cooperation. The statements made after the Lisbon summit are another step towards mutually beneficial cooperation; I hope that more steps are to follow.

Russia and NATO are working together in a number of key areas such as the fight against terrorism, piracy, and the proliferation of WMD. Another area is the creation of a European missile defense system (EuroABM).

Russia still has a number of questions regarding EuroABM; the proposals voiced by Russian President Dmitry Medvedev could help to resolve those questions. They could not only resolve existing concerns but also create a favorable climate for cooperation in other areas, including technology cooperation.

We hope that NATO will realize the importance of these proposals, and that the existing differences will be resolved. In addition, the Russian defense minister has set out a number of tasks for the experts. They need to explain the technical nature of the proposals, work out a joint plan of action, and implement these plans so as to remove the issue of neutralizing missile threats from the European security agenda.

**SECURITY INDEX:** Will limited purchases of foreign-made weapons systems for the purpose of studying new technology become usual practice in the Russian MoD's cooperation with other countries? What are the reasons behind the active expansion of Russian–French defense cooperation in 2010 (the purchase of *Mistral* amphibious assault ships and *FELIN* infantry combat suits)?

**KNYAZEVA:** One of the key elements of the transformation the Russian armed forces are now undergoing is the procurement of the latest weapons systems and military equipment. The Russian MoD is interested in new foreign weapons systems that surpass, in terms of their value for money, not only Russian weapons but also systems entering service in other countries. We conduct detailed analysis and comparison of all the available weapons systems, both Russian and foreign-made, before making a decision to place an order.

As for Russian–French relations in the area of weapons systems, these relations go back a long time. Russia began buying French weapons even before World War I. Now we are discussing not only French weapons supplies but also joint weapons production. Besides, France is not Russia's only partner in this area.

Issues of defense industry cooperation are fairly sensitive, so I will not go into much detail. But I would like to stress that when making decisions about weapons contracts, we are taking into account the interests of not only the Russian armed forces or the Russian defense industry but of our country as a whole.

**SECURITY INDEX:** What are the main areas and prospects for military and technical cooperation between Russia and the United States?

**KNYAZEVA:** Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov's visit to the United States has been a major milestone in our bilateral relations. In many ways it was a landmark event; it has enabled us to take our cooperation to a new level. The factors that have made such a change possible include personal contributions by the Russian and U.S. defense ministers working within the framework of the Reset in bilateral relations declared by the two presidents. We are now pursuing closer relations on a whole range of issues, including military and technical cooperation.

It is no secret that one of the major obstacles in our relations is the lack of proper legal framework. For example, exports of weapons and related technologies from the United States are subject to numerous legal restrictions. The spirit of the Cold War is still present in the thinking of many U.S. legislators. One illustration is the ratification of the New START treaty, which had been delayed for a long time by the Senate for political reasons. That is why our military and technical cooperation should be underpinned by a separate bilateral agreement that would set out all the necessary procedures and commitments by the parties participating in the exchange of intellectual property, as well as sensitive and secret information. Work on such an agreement is already under way. If there is sufficient political will, that work will be brought to a successful conclusion.

**SECURITY INDEX:** The general opinion nowadays is that Russia's military cooperation with the countries of the post-Soviet area has fizzled out. What is the real situation in that area? And what are the prospects for creating a system of exchanging information about any surpluses of weapons and military hardware between the CIS countries?

**KNYAZEVA:** Military and technical cooperation with the CIS countries continues to develop, albeit on a smaller scale. All the events planned on a bilateral basis, in the CIS framework and in other formats that bring together the former Soviet republics, are proceeding as scheduled. As in any other international relationship, military and technical cooperation with the CIS countries has its ups and downs – but the overall trend is positive.

In particular, the agreements reached between Russia and Ukraine on the Black Sea Fleet have strengthened our military and technical cooperation. They have also resolved a number of serious problems that existed between the Russian and Ukrainian MoDs. Russia's relations in this area with Kazakhstan, Armenia, and Azerbaijan are also very productive. With Belarus we have a lot of experience in joint military exercises involving several branches of the armed forces and joint command-and-control scenarios.

**SECURITY INDEX:** What is the situation with international cooperation on military education and training? Who are Russia's main partners in such cooperation?

**KNYAZEVA:** The General Directorate for International Military Cooperation is the main body in charge of coordinating the Russian MoD's international activities. We use a systemic approach that includes planning, preparation of delegations, and taking stock of the results for further work.

We plan bilateral events as well as events in the framework of international organizations such as the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and NATO, as well as peacekeeping activities under UN auspices.

One of the elements of our international activities is the training of specialists. The MoD has a program of foreign trips for its staff; there are also training programs offered to foreign servicemen by the higher education establishments of the Russian MoD. The current priority is language training in order to increase the number of specialists who are fluent in foreign languages. We work very closely in this area with counterparts from China, Jordan, Germany, Canada, and a number of other countries that have shown willingness to cooperate. For our part we offer Russian language training to foreign specialists. We are currently expanding the program of training exchanges and working out the mechanisms of sending Russian specialists for training to military schools in other countries.

The Russian Defense Minister has set out the task of substantially improving the level of training of our international specialists. As part of that drive, specialists at the General Directorate are involved in various training and education programs.


**SECURITY INDEX:** What is the role played by experts of the Russian MoD in developing and improving the body of international agreements (the New START treaty, the CFE, etc)?

**KNYAZEVA:** Speaking about the New START and the CFE, these two issues are closely monitored by the Defense Minister himself.

The General Directorate is one of the main bodies of military command in charge of preparing international agreements. The Directorate has many years of experience in training international relations specialists who can not only take part in negotiating international agreements but actually lead the delegation at the talks.

General Directorate specialists and representatives from other parts of the MoD took part in negotiating and drafting the New START treaty along with experts from the Foreign Ministry, *Rosatom* State Nuclear Energy Corporation, and other federal agencies. The military have made a substantial contribution to that treaty. They worked on all the figures contained in the treaty that directly relate to the interests of the Russian MoD. The level of training of our specialists is very important for our ability to have our position on various issues reflected in international agreements and treaties.





Sergey Ponomarev

## THE SPACE CAPABILITY OF RUSSIA IS A STRATEGIC INSTRUMENT

*Russia has a unique rocket and space capability. However, the Russian space industry is currently being restructured to address new strategic tasks. What are those tasks, and what are the difficulties Russia is facing in developing and manufacturing new space technology? What is the balance between the military and civilian space programs? Can we at last expect a manned mission to Mars with Russian participation any time soon?*

*We have put these questions to the Deputy Head of the Russian Federal Space Agency (Roskosmos) Sergey Ponomarev.*

**SECURITY INDEX:** Is the Russian rocket and space industry fit to respond to the modern requirements and threats? Does it need restructuring?

**PONOMAREV:** Russia is one of just a handful of countries in the world that have a unique rocket and space capability. That capability enables our country to address the strategic tasks of developing modern space technology in the interests of Russia's security, economic and social development, science and international cooperation, and ensuring guaranteed access and presence of our country in space. The core element of that capability is the rocket and space industry, which is a very science-heavy industry producing high-tech output. The industry also has a lot of potential for innovation. Making good use of that potential can bring substantial benefits to the Russian economy and help our country to respond to external and internal challenges and threats.

After a difficult period in the 1990s, the Russian rocket and space industry is on a steady upward trend in terms of science, technology, manufacturing, and skills. But it is also facing certain problems, which are similar to the problems faced by many other Russian industries. Our companies are still lagging behind in terms of innovation. They are not very quick to embrace advanced new technologies. There are sometimes problems with the reliability of our rocket and space technology. One of the key problems faced by the entire industry is that its structure is not well suited to the modern task of competing in the international space market. Sometimes that structure is not even a good match to the task of developing modern space technology for the needs of our own state. The main reason for this is that the manufacturing base of our space industry is oversized, because it was created for the task of churning out large production runs.

One of the key transformations the industry must undergo is to integrate the existing smaller companies into large design and production structures geared towards supplying finished rocket and space products and offering various space services. At present, 10 integrated entities have been created in the Russian rocket and space industry; another four are being set up.

As a result of these transformations, by 2010 we aim to have 100 percent of the finished rocket and space products and services concentrated within the remit of integrated entities. These entities will incorporate 85 percent of the existing companies in the industry.

**SECURITY INDEX:** Russia has a serious problem with producing key components for space satellites. Nevertheless, it has been announced that the Russian space industry has launched a



I  
N  
T  
E  
R  
V  
I  
E  
W

new series of navigation satellites, the GLONASS-K. Has the problem with key satellite components been resolved?

**PONOMAREV:** The new GLONASS-K navigation satellites will have longer service life and better performance specifications. They use a new frequency band with code division, providing better positioning accuracy and more reliable reception of navigation signal. The design of the GLONASS-K satellite is non-sealed. It makes use of a whole number of innovative solutions. It is a new generation of space technology.

The designers and engineers working on GLONASS-K have faced the need to use a number of electronic and radio components which, unfortunately, are not made in Russia at this time. Imports will have to be used until production of these components can be launched in Russia itself. We hope that joint efforts by the Ministry of Trade and Industry and a number of other agencies will solve this problem.

We have great hopes for our own radioelectronic industry—but that industry is not the only possible source of components used in space technology. A number of specialized design centers have been set up within the rocket and space industry itself. Using all the available domestic options will help us to keep the rocket and space industry supplied with the entire range of reliable and high-quality radioelectronic components in the years to come.

**SECURITY INDEX:** How much progress has been made with the new Angara space launcher? Some time ago engineers designed the Baikal automatic reusable stage specifically for this launcher—but now it appears that Baikal has been abandoned. What was the reason for that decision? Will the R&D work done for the Baikal be used in other new launchers?

**PONOMAREV:** Work on the Angara carrier is on schedule. We have completed the bulk of the ground experimental testing for the components and systems of the new launcher. We have nearly completed the work on the universal rocket modules of the lower and upper stages, and they have successfully passed the firing tests. At present the Angara is 90 percent ready to begin flight tests.

As for the Baikal reusable stage, it was designed by the Khrunichev Bureau on their own initiative and using their own funds. The project has not yielded a usable finished product. Nevertheless, the results of this work can be used in the project to create a reusable rocket system of the first phase. The project is part of the Federal Space Program for 2006–2015.

**SECURITY INDEX:** Is *Roskosmos* taking part in developing programs to support small innovative businesses in the space industry? Is private-sector commercial space activity possible at all in Russia at this time? What are the problems and limitations?

**PONOMAREV:** In the interests of fostering productive public–private partnership in the Russian space industry in 2005 we set up the International Association of Space Activities Participants (IASAP). One of its key objectives is to facilitate private enterprise in the space industry, and develop and implement market mechanisms and principles of public–private partnership in order to attract commercial financing for new-generation space technologies. The IASAP has a very successful public–private partnership section.

Attracting private-sector capital to finance various space programs, especially the innovative program for creating a universal reusable aircraft-launched space vehicle, should boost innovation within *Roskosmos* and raise the competitiveness of Russian technology on the international space market.

The new technologies that will be developed as part of these programs will be used to put payloads into orbit and launch commercial space vehicles. In the first phase this will be limited to sub-orbital launches; then we are going to move on to orbital launches, offering more competitive prices to customers. Any area of human endeavor will always benefit from private initiative and private capital. The space industry is not an exception. There will be new forms of partnership between governments and the private sector in areas including the development and testing of space technology.

Private-sector space projects will always involve serious commercial and technical risks for their participants. For example, the suborbital flights using reusable winged spacecraft, which several companies in the United States are now pursuing, are a very risky affair. Even those companies



themselves say it will take about 30 test flights before they can start offering commercial services (space tourism).

By the way, in the United States the system of commercial production of space technology is in private hands. The controlling stakes in most of the space industry companies are not state-owned. Almost the entire space effort is underpinned by private companies. The only question is: who pays for it? The bills are footed either by the private sector or by the government.

Here in Russia, meanwhile, most of the space-industry companies are state-owned. Even those that became joint-stock companies in the 1990s are now once again being taken over by the state, because the government is buying controlling stakes in them. For example, the Rocket and Space Corporation Energia is not a fully state-owned company, but a large stake in it is owned by the state, so the government has a lot of influence on the company's policy and contracts.

The advantage of the private sector is that private companies are good at commercializing the existing technologies. They are usually quite small, employing 200–500 people. For such companies, the combined cost of developing some piece of technology can be much smaller than for giants such as Lockheed Martin or Boeing, which employ tens of thousands of people in the United States and abroad.

A small company can focus all its efforts on one project and see it through. For the giant corporations that would be much more difficult, because they work on many projects at the same time.

In addition, private companies can perfect the technologies that have been abandoned by other firms for some reason or another. For example, starting from the mid-1960s there have been numerous proposals regarding reusable vehicles to put payload into orbit, including space-aircraft and reusable space launchers. The Space Shuttle project was not the only (and not the last) such example. Huge amounts of money and effort have been invested in such projects, but then at some point the companies pursuing them (large state-owned organizations or commercial giants) realized that the potential benefits of such reusable vehicles do not outweigh their costs. The private sector could well pick up those abandoned projects and see them through.

**SECURITY INDEX:** How important is the Baikonur Cosmodrome for the Russian civilian space program? What is the current division of roles between Plesetsk and Baikonur? Are there plans to extend the Baikonur lease?

**PONOMAREV:** At this time Plesetsk is the cosmodrome of the Russian MoD, and is therefore geared to military uses.

For the foreseeable future, the bulk of the civilian components of the Russian space programs will rely on the ground infrastructure of the Baikonur Cosmodrome, which Russia leases from Kazakhstan.

The statistics for the Russian space launches in 2009 are as follows: 24 launches (75 percent) were conducted from Baikonur, and the remaining 25 percent from Plesetsk. The figures for 2010 will be roughly the same.

So there you have the answer to the question of how important Baikonur is to us. In segments such as manned flights or the launches of the entire range of Russian satellites to the geostationary orbit, for the foreseeable future Baikonur will be indispensable if Russia is to preserve its leading positions.

That is why in 2004 Russia signed an agreement on cooperation in productive use of the Baikonur complex with our strategic partner, the Republic of Kazakhstan. Under the terms of the agreement, which was ratified in 2010, the lease of Baikonur has been extended until 2050.

**SECURITY INDEX:** Are there any plans to put Russian cosmonauts on Mars? (The United States has said it wants to take its astronauts to the Mars orbit by the mid-2030s.)

**PONOMAREV:** At the summit of 26 space agencies held in November 2010 in Washington the participants agreed that missions to other planets should be undertaken as an international effort. Theoretically each one of the leading space nations can pull off such a mission on its own. But by pooling our efforts we can achieve substantial savings.



As for the Russian plans for the next few years, the program of outer space exploration should take one step at a time. Robotic missions to the Moon and Mars can help scientists develop and perfect the technology of interplanetary manned flights. But it will probably be another 20 years at the very least before we see the launch of a manned mission to Mars.

As part of our preparations for such a mission, we will first need to build permanent settlements on the Moon in order to learn to live on our nearest planet, which has no atmosphere and a different gravity. But there are plenty of things to study and explore on the Moon. The fact that our natural satellite has no atmosphere will enable us to study the sky without any optical or vibration interference. Scientists believe that the Moon could be the starting point, a learning opportunity before we set off to colonize other planets.

It would be a mistake to think that we already know everything worth knowing about the Moon, and that there is nothing left there to study. Japan, the United States, and other countries have stepped up their efforts to find water on the Moon and to study its geology. Studying the Moon, which, unlike Earth, has never had any tectonic activity, will help us better understand the origins of Earth and other planets in the Solar system.

Sadly, we are not yet ready for a mission to Mars for a number of reasons, primarily technical. For example, a manned mission to Mars would require a space complex with a much higher gross weight. Not a single country in the world has the space launchers that can put such heavy payloads into orbit, and there are no such launchers in the pipeline. This means that a ship to Mars will have to be assembled in the orbit. For now, we don't have the technology to guarantee the reliability of such assembly.

Another thing to consider is that a flight to the Moon takes about a week. An expedition to Mars will take up to two years, which presents a whole new set of requirements.

Also, it will take a long time to put together an international cooperation group for such a mission and agree all the details.

Russia is currently pursuing a unique innovation project to develop a transport and energy module based on a 1 MW nuclear energy and propulsion unit. The project is aimed at large-scale programs of space exploration (missions to the outer planets, an expedition to Mars, lunar bases, etc.). The module will cost tens of billions of roubles to develop. The completion of ground tests for the propulsion unit is planned for 2018.

In order to simulate here on Earth the conditions during a flight to Mars, and to gain practical experience that can be used during the preparations for the actual flight, the Institute of Medical and Biological Problems of the Russian Academy of Sciences is working on the Mars 500 project under the auspices of *Roskosmos* and in cooperation with the European and Chinese space agencies. The project is essentially a series of experiments.

In late 2008 there was a 14-day technical experiment, and in 2009 a 105-day preliminary experiment to simulate a mission to Mars. Six participants in the experiment will now have to spend 500 days in a closed space. Three Russians, a Frenchman, an Italian, and a Chinese have been living since July in a closed space with a total volume of 550 cu m. Each one has private living quarters, 2.8 by 3.2 meters.

**SECURITY INDEX:** It is known that in 2010 and 2011 the MoD did not recruit to higher military education establishments. Have the aerospace faculties of civilian universities seen a notable influx of students who had wanted to enter schools such as the Mozhaysky Military Space Academy? Do Russian colleges offer adequate training courses for future aerospace specialists? What are the areas in which *Roskosmos* cooperates with Russian universities in developing new space technologies?

**PONOMAREV:** The training of specialists for the space industry is conducted in accordance with a national plan as part of a government order for a certain number of specialists each year, based on the requirements of the industry and individual selection of candidates.

This year the number of new students accepted to aerospace faculties based on the requirements of the industry increased by 16.7 percent. But there is no obvious link between that increase and the MoD's decision not to recruit to the higher military training schools this year. Nevertheless, the overall number of students entering aerospace faculties has gone up.

On the whole, Russian aerospace companies are satisfied with the quality of training in the Russian higher education establishments.

That being said, *Roskosmos*, together with the Ministry of Education and Science and the Russian government, is working to maintain the standards of training in the design, engineering, and operation of high-tech aerospace equipment. We believe that in these areas introducing the new system of education based on the bachelor and magister grades would not be appropriate.

The most serious problem with the training of specialists for the Russian space industry is the shortage of vocational training graduates. The number of schools offering such courses is not sufficient to satisfy the existing demand in the industry.

We have submitted proposals to the government regarding the creation of a network of regional training centers that would address the shortage of specialists in these categories.

The government has supported these proposals. Funding for the project has been allocated in the 2011 federal budget, and starting from next year *Roskosmos* will begin practical steps in this area.

Speaking about cooperation between the industry and universities, we have a federal program called "Science and Teachers for Innovative Russia". As part of that program, more than 60 research and training centers have been set up at 12 higher educational establishments and 24 companies in the industry. These centers focus on areas such as rocket technology, space systems, ground control systems, and other space-related technology.





Anatoly Anin

PROMPT GLOBAL STRIKE WEAPONS AND STRATEGIC INSTABILITY

One of the thorniest issues at the Russian–U.S. talks on the New START Treaty that ended in spring 2010 was that of strategic-range non-nuclear systems (or so-called conventional Prompt Global Strike weapons, PGS). Similar to the new treaty, we shall take the term to mean conventional intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). Heavy bombers, although technically falling under strategic offensive arms, in the context of the issues under review do not present a serious threat due to some peculiarities of their use that will be considered below.

One cannot say that the issue of strategic-range non-nuclear systems came as a surprise to the Russian negotiators in the course of working on New START or that it did not exist before. It is worth stressing that, as was the case with START I, the title of the new START Treaty is the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation and Strategic Offensive Arms. The omission of the word “nuclear” is not accidental. Neither is it an oversight on the part of the delegations. Rather it is a result of a difficult compromise with the United States, which has always sought to make sure that new agreements do not involve “conventional arms” and cover only nuclear weapons, without touching strategic-range non-nuclear systems. Whereas the Russian side, on the contrary, has insisted that the new treaty cover all strategic-range offensive weapons.

Russian President Dmitry Medvedev has more than once spoken of the dangers that the creation of strategic-range non-nuclear systems poses for strategic stability and international security since it can undermine the prospects of nuclear disarmament. In particular, in a speech at Helsinki University in spring 2009, he stressed that “it is unacceptable to compensate nuclear reductions by developing strategic systems which are equipped with conventional weapons. This would be an unequal exchange”.<sup>1</sup> Taking this thought further in the context of nuclear disarmament prospects, in an address to the 64<sup>th</sup> UN General Assembly in September 2009, Dmitry Medvedev clearly stated that “unless we address problems such as missile defense and the creation of non-nuclear strategic forces, we cannot make any real progress on disarmament”.<sup>2</sup>

One look at Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s speeches and articles on strategic arms reduction issues over the past year is enough to see that practically all of them voice concern as regards the uncontrolled development of strategic-range non-nuclear systems on the part of the United States. For instance, in an article “The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty in the Global Security Matrix: The Political Dimension”,<sup>3</sup> posted on the Russian Foreign Ministry’s website, Lavrov describes non-nuclear strategic weapons as a hugely serious problem fraught with destabilizing risks: “Chief among them is the so-called nuclear ambiguity; that is, the impossibility of identifying the type of warheads carried by ballistic missiles (nuclear or non-nuclear) after they have been launched. The risk of a nuclear conflict sharply increases in this case.”

The Russian minister went on to cite the problem of a significant decrease in the threshold for the use of conventional strategic missiles and the danger of a missile arms race. It is obvious that in this case other countries that have missile capabilities would consider themselves free to build non-nuclear ICBMs. Combined with the development of global missile defense systems, in certain circumstances strategic-range non-nuclear systems may turn into a powerful military potential that creates the illusion of the possibility of delivering the first disarming strike, destroys the



A  
N  
A  
T  
O  
L  
Y  
S  
I  
S

strategic balance of forces, and does irreparable damage to nuclear disarmament. The Russian side has more than once put this across to ITS U.S. counterparts within the framework of the Russia–NATO Council dialogue.

However, so far this problem has defied resolution. The previous START Treaty did not ban conventional ICBMs or SLBMs. Despite all the difficulties of the negotiation process, the New START Treaty envisages a temporary compromise, thus making this issue less acute.

On the one hand, there is no direct ban on developing conventional ICBMs and SLBMs, that is to say that the parties, if they deem it necessary, can fit these missiles with conventional warheads. On the other hand, these warheads (if deployed on strategic-range systems) fall under the overall strategic offensive arms limits and, therefore, under all the limitations, control, and other procedures under the Treaty. All that makes it possible to ensure reliable controls over these strategic weapons, without giving the United States an opportunity uncontrollably and without any restrictions under the new Treaty to take any action as regards these systems. Yet another important factor is that this provision does not allow the Americans the freedom of choice in ensuring breakout potential.

### **PGS WEAPONS IN THE NEW START TREATY**

It would appear that the Russian and the Western expert communities are only just beginning to analyze what START-2010 has achieved as regards non-nuclear strategic weapons. A fuller understanding of these issues will take time and, naturally, an assessment of how effective the Treaty itself is. An interesting study of the results of talks with the United States on strategic-range non-nuclear systems was presented by Evgeny Miasnikov in his paper “Strategic Conventional Arms: Deadlocks and Solutions”.<sup>4</sup> It would therefore be sufficient to offer just general observations on how the issue of strategic non-nuclear weapons is addressed in that treaty.

New START classifies issues related to strategic-range non-nuclear systems into two groups. The first covers issues related to strategic systems already equipped for conventional armaments. These include heavy bombers equipped for conventional arms and *Ohio*-class strategic nuclear-powered submarines equipped to carry long-range sea-launched cruise missiles. The Treaty envisages the necessary procedures for Russian inspectors to verify that cruise missile launchers have not been restored to the capacity to launch ballistic missiles.

The second group covers issues related to the possible further re-equipment of strategic offensive weapons for conventional armaments. All these systems will fall under the Treaty’s legal remit, with the relevant control mechanisms in place. Furthermore, if conventional ICBMs and SLBMs are deployed, they will fall under the relevant limitations envisaged in the Treaty, i.e. 700 units for deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers. Non-deployed launchers for conventional ICBMs and SLBMs are included in the aggregate limit of 800 units for deployed and non-deployed launchers for ICBMs, deployed and non-deployed launchers for SLBMs, and heavy bombers. However, the Treaty’s limit of 1,550 warheads implies both nuclear and non-nuclear warheads.

Finally, the Treaty envisages that if the United States or Russia develops a new type of strategic offensive arms, the issue of extending the limitations set in the Treaty to cover it too will be considered within the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC) that has been set up to implement this agreement.

An analysis of U.S. officials’ statements and publications, including those that accompanied the ratification of New START in Congress, shows that U.S. approaches to strategic-range non-nuclear systems are fundamentally different from Russian assessments. In particular, the article-by-article analysis of the new Treaty,<sup>5</sup> which has largely been drawn up by U.S. negotiators, says that New START does not set any restrictions on testing, developing, or deploying non-nuclear strategic weapons. Moreover, the Americans note that not all new kinds of arms that have a strategic range will be considered to be “new kinds of strategic offensive arms” subject to the limitations set in the new Treaty.

## PROMPT GLOBAL STRIKE CONCEPT

The Russian side is closely monitoring U.S. plans for future strategic-range conventional missile systems. Reports that are coming in clearly indicate that the United States is developing a significant new segment of the strategic arsenal capable of resolving a wide range of tasks, some of which previously belonged exclusively to strategic nuclear weapons. This work is being carried out within the framework of the so-called Prompt Global Strike (PGS) concept.

This concept was first launched in the United States in the late 1980s–early 1990s. Its aim is to provide the United States of America with full spectrum dominance, including through developing effective strategic non-nuclear arms and at the same time preserving an arsenal of means of nuclear deterrence. If the PGS concept is successfully implemented, the United States will be capable of delivering conventional weapon strikes against targets in any part of the world within an hour of taking the decision to strike. In effect, this may mean a transformation of the U.S. military potential with future conflicts in view.

This thinking also takes into account the changed nature of possible threats to the United States, with the list of perceived sources of these threats expanded to include not just Russia and China but also so-called rogue states, terrorist and extremist groups, the use of nuclear weapons against whom is considered counterproductive.

In 1999–2000 U.S. Defense Department documents began to use the term “conventional prompt global strike”, noting the need to develop technologies for delivering these strikes with the use of precision-guided and deep-penetration conventional warheads.

Work on PGS was given a powerful new boost after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. U.S. experts believe that new threats to the United States and its allies cannot be ignored. Equally, they cannot be countered just with the use of the existing high-precision conventional weapons. It is impossible to predict the time and place from which a serious threat to U.S. national security may come. It is equally impossible to hope to have conventional forces in place in all parts of the world where they may be needed to prevent an attack.

According to American experts, it cannot be ruled out that future conflicts may start far away from existing U.S. military bases and locations where the main sea-based forces are deployed. Furthermore, future conflicts may develop very fast, not allowing U.S. armed forces the time to arrive at the required positions. Everybody remembers how, following 9/11, it took the Americans several weeks to obtain permission to base their forces in countries neighboring Afghanistan and to deploy their naval forces to the region.

In addition, new tasks may emerge in theaters of operations which cannot be resolved by existing means, for instance the task of destroying command-and-control systems that are hardened and deeply buried, warehouses storing weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, air and missile defense systems being deployed by the enemy, etc.

American designers believe that problems like these cannot be resolved by existing conventional weapons systems. For instance, air- (ALCM) and sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCM) have a limited range and a relatively low speed. Hypersonic cruise missiles being developed have a range of under 1,100km. Heavy bombers’ limitations when it comes to operational tasks like these are also well known: they take several hours to prepare for take-off, are vulnerable to air defense systems, and require the additional deployment of tanker aircraft in forward-deployment areas.

At the moment PGS projects are focused on developing and demonstrating technologies that could support weapons systems deployed on U.S. territory. The ongoing efforts in this area are concentrated on studying three concepts: hypersonic technology vehicle-2 (HTV-2), a conventional strike missile (CSM), and an advanced hypersonic weapon (AHW).<sup>6</sup>

This is why the Americans believe that their armed forces should be capable of defending against attacks that may come from deep within inaccessible territories or against attacks to prevent which there may be just a very narrow window of opportunity. The U.S. military believe that non-nuclear ICBMs, deployed in relatively small numbers, are a potential means of preventing most serious threats posed by an enemy state or a non-state actor that operates from a great distance, with high precision and allowing little warning time and no prospects for hiding. During the U.S. Senate hearings on ratifying the New START Treaty, other purposes of using PGS were named too, including the elimination of fleeting mobile targets: terrorist leaders and WMD transfers.<sup>7</sup>



The proponents of these plans believe that having such a powerful weapon at one's disposal will become the best way of deterring aggressive opponents at the regional level since its use is more practical. It is the proportionality of high-precision strikes with the use of long-range conventional systems that makes their potential use against a possible aggressor more acceptable and thus strengthens the deterrence effect that these weapons have for state and non-state actors. If deterrence fails to work, high-precision strikes with the use of long-range non-nuclear systems may become the only way of preventing an attack with the use of weapons of mass destruction or further attacks following the said act of aggression. In effect, their strong characteristics in terms of range, speed, destructive potential, precision, and effectiveness, as well as promptness of response and freedom of maneuver, enable the United States to resolve practically the same tasks with the use of conventional strategic arms as with the use of nuclear weapons.

The U.S. military believe that strategic-range non-nuclear systems will make it possible very quickly to move to planning and delivering a strike against targets that are located thousands of kilometers away, once the U.S. president has taken the relevant decision on the strength of the available intelligence information. They insist that in order to deliver a prompt strike, data gathering, decision-making, and execution should happen in a matter of minutes. It is obvious that with the existing operations and decision-making technologies, such promptness cannot be achieved.

As a further argument in favor of non-nuclear strategic arms, U.S. experts often cite their relatively low cost compared with the incalculable losses from the use of WMD.

In January 2003 the concept of the Prompt Global Strike was approved by the President of the United States. In 2002–2006 the Pentagon was busy developing systems as part of this concept (setting its operational, technical, financial, and production parameters, and conducting target exercises). In 2007, after experts had concluded that the PGS project was technically feasible, the PGS concept was approved by the U.S. Congress too. The U.S. Defense Department's budget envisages the development of a program to provide the U.S. armed forces with a high-speed, powerful, and high-precision conventional weapon system. Thus between 2003 and 2011, the Pentagon has allocated \$308 million for developing HTV-2; between 2008 and 2013, \$477 million for CSM; and between 2006 and 2011, \$180 million for AHW.<sup>8</sup>

The PGS concept envisages the development of intelligence and control systems, communications and computer networks that would make it possible to command the strike and maintain operational communications from the top to the tactical levels.

Weapons like these, not being subject to any limitations envisaged in international agreements, could be used to perform strategic offensive tasks.

The trend towards an increase in the budget funding for the program gives one reason to believe that by 2014–2015 the U.S. military may receive new types of weapons capable of performing PGS tasks.

Now it would seem appropriate to take a critical look at the PGS concept and to voice a number of arguments questioning its expediency and safety for strategic stability. As a justification for deploying "an insignificant amount" of these weapons (speaking in the Senate on June 24, 2010, Erik Edelman cited some recent research, according to which there is currently a need for at least 50 such systems), the United States continues to speak of the need to resolve a number of tasks in the war against terrorism. At the same time, in terms of the possible individual cases for the potential use of these missiles, the United States primarily talks of possible strikes against terrorist strongholds and gatherings and locations where their leaders meet.

However, it would appear that the use of these weapons in this context would be highly ineffective. First, gatherings and meetings like these hardly ever take place in deserted areas, so the use of these weapons, given their high destructive potential, would lead to a considerable number of casualties among innocent civilians.

Second, targets like these are quite mobile and ICBMs' long flying times as well as the time required to prepare and sanction launches like these are unlikely to ensure the guaranteed elimination of individual mobile targets in surgical strikes.

Looking at the experience of using unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to fight the Taliban in Afghanistan, one can conclude that even despite their incomparably smaller size, ease of operation, and limited fire power, the so-called collateral damage from the use of UAVs, including

civilian deaths, is rather considerable. Imagine what the consequences of the use of strategic missile systems to deliver deadly surgical strikes might be! What would be the price of a possible intelligence error? It appears that so far these issues have either not been considered in the United States or have not made it to the list of the military planners' top priorities. Indeed, the main thinking there is about increasing the United States' strategic might, with any humanitarian aspects of a possible prompt global strike retreating into the background.

Third, the United States already has its armed forces (aviation and fleet) close to or directly in parts of the globe that are of vital interest, which enables them, in the event of a crisis, to deliver a powerful strike against the enemy with the use of a high-precision weapon system. Therefore, one can maintain with a high degree of certainty that the probability of a situation whereby the United States would have to use non-nuclear strategic arms is very low, especially when measured against the possible cost to strategic stability.

Besides, the economic efficiency of developing and creating such an expensive weapon system just for the sake of eliminating terrorist leaders appears highly doubtful.

Thus, the grounds Washington cites to justify the production and deployment of these weapons systems appear unconvincing. Hence the legitimate question: what are the real reasons behind the U.S. plans for the creation of strategic-range non-nuclear systems? Could it, by any chance, be a desire to consolidate one's leading military positions in the world, having strengthened one's armed forces with modern high-precision weapons systems, which are not even under development elsewhere in the world?

It is obvious that if the PGS concept, with the decisive role belonging to conventional strategic weapons, is successfully implemented, the U.S. armed forces will be strengthened by a powerful monolith of modern offensive arms enabling them to resolve global tasks in the sea, on the ground, and in space. Thanks to their strong characteristics, these missile systems will be able to perform functions that currently fall under the remit of strategic nuclear arms. At the same time the decision to use non-nuclear strategic arms may be taken at a considerably lower threshold than that applied to means of nuclear deterrence.

It is particularly worth noting that if conventional strategic arms are accepted, the key factor of the so-called nuclear uncertainty and unpredictability will still remain. Any launch of a conventional ICBM or SLBM in the direction of Russia or China (all the PGS targets listed by the United States are located in immediate proximity to the borders of these two countries) may be interpreted as a missile attack, thus dramatically increasing the risk of a retaliatory strike. It would appear that U.S. military experts understand full well that once an ICBM or a SLBM has been launched it is impossible to establish whether it carries a nuclear or conventional payload.

The U.S. military are working on some options aimed at alleviating Russia's concerns regarding these issues. Washington is considering the possibility of improving the existing and devising additional transparency and confidence-building procedures. In other words, options are being considered whereby the PGS concept would not be perceived by Russia as directed against it. In addition, such potentially useful mechanisms as advance notifications and transparency applied within the framework of the relevant Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers (NRRRC) and the joint Data Exchange Center (DEC), if and when it is set up, would allegedly allow our country to unequivocally identify the nature of a ballistic missile strike being launched. As a result, U.S. experts believe, Russia will be able to make prompt decisions on how to react to a U.S. long-range conventional strike against a third country.

When analyzing this option, it is necessary to note that the United States intends to use strategic-range non-nuclear systems exclusively for the interests of its national security, bypassing international law and without a UN Security Council sanction. All this may indicate Washington's attempts to move still further away from the supremacy of law, the leading role of the legitimate international institutions, primarily the United Nations and its Security Council, the primacy of diplomacy in resolving international conflicts, and the legality of the use of force for the purposes of self-defense or for the purposes of ensuring peace and security (under Articles 51 and 42 of the UN Charter). At the same time Washington uses an increasingly broad interpretation of the notion of a direct threat by including in it the actions of hostile states and terrorists.





## RUSSIA'S CONCERNS

One can confidently assume that Russia will not put up with this thinking and will not be satisfied with certain information that the United States will consider necessary to impart to it in connection with a proposed strike with the use of conventional strategic arms. The Russian side has never supported actions like these and is unlikely to support them in future.

I would like to make a few remarks on the substance of the transparency measures as such in this context. Back during the early stages of the talks on the New START treaty, the American side proposed establishing a formula under which future missile systems tested for the purpose of delivering a non-nuclear payload would not have been covered by the new agreement. For quite obvious reasons, however, this proposal was not accepted. It must be noted that a multitude of questions would have arisen during the stage of potential testing—in particular, how would test launches of nuclear and non-nuclear ICBMs be distinguished from one another? After all, even during preparations for flight tests of space launch vehicles (SLVs) that included ICBM or SLBM stages, the Russian and American sides, under the provisions of START-1, informed each other in good time and in detail of the technical specifications of these missile systems and their purpose. With new missile systems intended for PGS, the problem is far more complex and multi-dimensional.

At the present time, all test launches of ICBMs and SLBMs carried out by both Russia and the U.S. are not armed with nuclear warheads. A real warhead is replaced with a dummy, which has the same weight and dimensions, and imitates the delivery of a nuclear warhead to its target. If successful, the tests confirm that any BMs are capable of delivering both nuclear and non-nuclear warheads, provided that their mass, dimensions, and aerodynamic properties are similar or identical.

Of course, when carrying out tests of BMs fitted with multiple warheads, there are certain differences related to their dispensing and the construction of the necessary combat configuration, but none of this alters the substance of the test, which is to check whether the BMs can deliver warheads. So the U.S. assertion that there may allegedly be some kind of special BMs created and tested exclusively for the delivery of non-nuclear warheads gives rise to justified doubts.

One could, of course, try to debate the possibility of removing part of the problem of nuclear uncertainty and unpredictability by calculating the missile's aiming point along its flight trajectory once it has been launched, as well as the possibility of changing the trajectories of ballistic missiles equipped with conventional warheads, so that they differ from the flight trajectories of nuclear ICBMs if they were to be directed at targets situated on Russian territory. It would seem, however, that this method is not viable. So the possible argument that American global strikes using non-nuclear strategic offensive weapons could be launched in such a way as to avoid flying over Russian territory simply does not work.

How will the Russian side react if it discovers that this type of ballistic missile launch has taken place? The answer is clear—in deciding how to react, the Russian military will proceed from the assumption that the missile is carrying a nuclear warhead.

Moreover, when there is clearly insufficient time for a multilateral assessment of the operational environment, the main response measures will be implemented automatically. A legitimate question arises—does the U.S. fully understand the disastrous nature of the risks involved in these types of unidentifiable launches? It is no coincidence that even in the U.S. Congress, where many agree on the need for the president to have at his disposal the means to launch a powerful strike using non-nuclear missile systems against targets around the planet, there are concerns that the aims and objectives of non-nuclear ICBM and SBLM launches might be misunderstood. This is why congressmen are currently choosing to focus on financing continued research and development work in the area of PGS.

In the context of this problem, serious questions remain regarding the consequences of equipping only some of the launch facilities on American SSBNs with non-nuclear SLBMs (and these specific arrangements are being considered in the U.S.). In such a scenario, there remains the problem of preventing accidental and unauthorized launches of SLBMs equipped with nuclear warheads, during combat patrols by SSBNs carrying missiles with various payloads. Launch authorization procedures that have already been repeated on numerous occasions are necessary. Is this possible in technical terms? The question remains open.

Another problem that has not been fully addressed is the issue of notifying other states of launches of ballistic missiles across their territory and of the areas in which missile stages will fall, something that in itself brings an unnecessary potential for conflict and tension in international relations.

It would seem that, in future, the U.S. will seek to bring about a strategic dialogue on non-nuclear strategic offensive weapons, and not only with Russia, but, at the very least, with China as well. One can imagine that, as with other pressing problems, such as the problem of global missile defense, Washington will stress transparency, including briefings, familiarization of Russian and Chinese military specialists with American plans, visits to relevant facilities, participation in exercises involving anti-missile system launches etc. It cannot be ruled out that the Americans may even opt to familiarize our military specialists with their plans regarding the application and combat capabilities of non-nuclear strategic offensive weapons. One would like to hope that in our collaboration on missile defense, the Americans will proceed on the basis that such contacts will make it possible to strengthen trust between the U.S. and Russia and will at least partially allay Russian concerns, something that will in turn influence the dialogue between the administration in the White House and Congress in respect of the financing of PGS programs.

As one of the potential steps that could be taken to allay Russian concerns over non-nuclear strategic offensive weapons, the Americans may consider the possibility of basing their non-nuclear ICBMs in areas far away from the nuclear bases used for those missiles, such as at Vandenberg Air Force Base, or at the base at Cape Canaveral, or possibly in other places. Naturally, non-nuclear ICBMs must carry markings that distinguish them from their nuclear brethren and must be subject to inspections or demonstrations. However, such verification procedures do not provide a complete guarantee that in certain circumstances non-nuclear ICBMs will not be converted back for use with nuclear warheads. Moreover, it would seem that no transparency measures will be sufficient in conditions where time is extremely short and complete information is unavailable, should a conflict break out where the U.S. takes a political decision to launch a non-nuclear strike using non-nuclear strategic offensive weapons.

It has to be noted that many of the means by which the Russian side's concerns in respect of non-nuclear ICBMs can be allayed do not apply to SLBMs. For example, the plan is for non-nuclear SLBMs to be deployed on SSBNs carrying nuclear missiles, and so the opportunity will be lost to base them separately, an opportunity that exists with ICBMs.

All the circumstances that have been listed make using such missile systems much more dangerous. At the same time, the development of the non-nuclear strategic offensive weapons concept is giving rise to ever more concerns, since this amounts to the creation of a qualitatively new and powerful military potential, capable of addressing strategic objectives. That is especially true because all the elements of the American nuclear triad are being assigned dual purpose status and capability (as we know, it has long been possible to use strategic aviation to carry both nuclear and conventional weapons).

## THE U.S. PLANS: TAKING A WIDER LOOK

What is really behind these plans, which seem to be an integral part of the concept of deploying a global missile defense system? Such a system could clearly compromise the capability of Russia's strategic nuclear forces to launch a retaliatory strike. And what is really behind the attractive ideas of a mutual reduction in the operational combat readiness of the strategic nuclear arsenals, which are being promoted against the backdrop of their future reduction?

It is clear that the tangible progress made in the development of conventional weapons systems is being accompanied by the emergence in the U.S. of doctrinal precepts designed to effect a gradual transfer of the deterrent function from nuclear weapons to high-precision conventional weapons. If one takes an even broader look at the strategic stability situation, then the picture that emerges is one that does not bode well for Russia's security.

The implementation of plans for global missile defense, the unresolved problems surrounding the CFE Treaty, the manifest imbalance between NATO and Russia in terms of conventional weapons, the lack of clarity surrounding U.S. intentions in respect of the deployment of weapons in space, the clear U.S. superiority in the development of military information technology and the prospects for the implementation of PGS using non-nuclear strategic offensive weapons in parallel with



future reductions in Russian and U.S. stocks of nuclear weapons—all these developments may lead to a strengthening of America's dominant position in the military-technical field and send out the wrong signal regarding the use of this supremacy for the purpose of achieving unilateral political aims. This scenario does not, of course, meet Russia's national interests.

Taking all these factors into account, Russian experts, from the strictly military point of view, are obliged to view the possible arrival of non-nuclear missile systems in the U.S. strategic arsenal not only as a qualitative improvement in American deterrent forces, but also, first and foremost, as a bid to possess a battlefield weapon at a high level of combat readiness, a counterforce potential for launching a disarming non-nuclear strike against Russia's strategic nuclear forces. It is clear that this type of scenario is fraught with far-reaching destabilizing consequences for international security. Naturally, the Russian military will not be able to ignore these aspects in the course of their military-strategic planning. What gives particular cause for concern is the attempts by the U.S. to place future delivery systems for this class of new strategic weapons outside any restrictions or controls.

This trend was particularly clear when the New START Treaty was being drawn up and ratified in the Senate. In particular, the U.S. said on more than one occasion that it does not view future conventionally armed systems (and at the same time studiously avoided referring to the nature of such systems) that to a certain extent lie outside the definitions of the new agreement as a new type of strategic offensive weapons. At Senate hearings on June 16, 2010, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense James Miller revealed this thinking. In particular, he acknowledged that the Pentagon is studying the potential of long-range non-nuclear systems that do not fly along a ballistic trajectory. By way of example he cited the planned flight system including accelerator (boost glide system), which does not fit in with the definitions set out in the START Treaty and cannot be included in its scope.

During the negotiations, the Russian delegation always proceeded from the notion that any strategic offensive weapons, including new types of those weapons (for example, strategic range systems equipped with both nuclear and non-nuclear warheads), will fall within the scope of the new treaty. Moreover, the procedure for extending the provisions of the agreement to cover new types of these weapons is clearly formulated in the text.

So under Paragraph 2 of Article V of the Treaty, "when a Party believes that a new kind of strategic offensive arm is emerging, that Party shall have the right to raise the question of such a strategic offensive arm for consideration in the Bilateral Consultative Commission"; in accordance with Section I of Part Six of the Protocol to the Treaty, "to promote the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty, the Parties within the framework of the BCC shall: ... (d) resolve questions related to the applicability of provisions of the Treaty to a new kind of strategic offensive arm".

It must be noted that the Treaty does not lay down a definition of a new kind of strategic offensive weapon and it does not address the issue of whether or not a new type of strategic offensive weapon meets the definitions set out in the Treaty (Part One of the Protocol). And that is understandable. At this stage it does not seem possible to draw up a definition of "a new kind of strategic offensive weapon", since this type of weapon does not exist. It is, however, absolutely clear that any strategic weapon has a whole range of criteria that allocate it to the category of strategic offensive weapons. The Russian side therefore believes that the issue of applying the provisions of the Treaty to a new type of strategic offensive weapon may only be resolved within the framework of the BCC and only before such a type of weapon is deployed. Otherwise a loophole will appear to allow the Treaty to be bypassed, a loophole that the sides would be able to use for the uncontrolled expansion of their strategic potential. It is unlikely that this sort of logic fits within the concept of the New START Treaty, which is based on strict parity.

It must be stressed that the references the U.S. makes to a new quality of bilateral relations, which Washington says rules out the possibility of a military conflict between our countries, cannot allay our concerns either. The Russian leadership has noted on more than one occasion that in military matters it is actual potentials that are taken into account, first and foremost, rather than the intentions of the sides, which may change over time, including in connection with existing military capability. It is well known that as the effectiveness of weapons increases and the extent of undesirable side effects is reduced, the threshold for any decision to use those weapons also diminishes.

Moreover, U.S. plans to remove new non-nuclear strategic systems from the scope of the new Treaty ought to be viewed as one of the means of providing breakout potential. It is worth noting that without expending significant amounts of time or money, any conventional delivery system may be reequipped to carry out nuclear tasks.

In this way, by extending dual purpose status and capability to all its strategic delivery systems (it has long been known that reverse conversion can be applied to TB), the U.S. is providing itself with a guarantee, should the need arise, of additional opportunities for breakout expansion, within a short timeframe, of its quantity of nuclear warheads for its strategic offensive weapons systems, both for the systems that have nuclear warheads and for those that have been developed for non-nuclear purposes.

U.S. plans to create non-nuclear strategic offensive weapons could become a major impetus for missile proliferation. Will other countries with missile potential not be tempted to make significant advances in the development and improvement of strategic range missile systems?

Ultimately this means the possible start of a new and dangerous stage in the arms race, based on the latest technologies. And there are no internationally recognized restrictions on such weapons. It is not difficult to imagine how these plans drawn up by the U.S. may affect the missile programs of countries with the capability to use space for military purposes, including those states which Washington considers to be problematic.

Considering all that has been said in the foregoing, it seems that the fears of many authoritative experts that the development and expansion of high-precision conventional missile systems (particularly in tandem with improvements in missile defense systems) are capable of not only freezing the process of reducing stocks of nuclear weapons, but also reversing it, are justified. It is unlikely that this scenario meets the interests of the international community.

It can be stated that the unilateral actions of the U.S., which violate the fundamental principal of equal and indivisible security, may set off a strategic arms race along parallel tracks—nuclear and non-nuclear—particularly given that research and development work in these two areas could mutually complement and sustain each other. It is worth noting that the scientific-technical backup currently forming in the U.S. for the creation of high-precision conventional intercontinental missile delivery systems may also be used for the development of high-precision nuclear combat warheads for ICBMs and SLBMs.

In summing up, it can be said that non-nuclear strategic missile systems are capable of having a highly negative impact on international security and of genuinely undermining strategic stability. Not only may their application not help to bring about a rapid end to conflict, something that American developers have spoken about so much, but quite the reverse, it may aggravate the international situation and increase the likelihood of WMD being used as a result of Russia and China taking the wrong view of the aims behind the introduction of non-nuclear strategic offensive weapons.

Without doubt, the creation and entry into service of such systems could put a major brake on the process of genuine missile disarmament and have a negative impact on the viability of the whole non-proliferation regime.

One would like to hope that the use by the U.S. in connection with these systems of terms such as “non-nuclear long-range systems”, for that is what American officials are seeking to call non-nuclear strategic offensive weapons, should not divert the discussion away from their role in the strategic balance.

The problem of non-nuclear strategic offensive weapons not only has a conceptual dimension, but also has a direct influence on the practical effectiveness and viability of both the New START Treaty and the whole of the existing and future basis of international law in the area of disarmament and nonproliferation.

One can assert with a certain degree of care that the START Treaty 2010 represents the first step in resolving the problem of non-nuclear strategic offensive weapons. It is clear that further work lies ahead in this area.

In this paper I would like to touch on another problem and attempt to respond to the criticism that has been leveled at the new Treaty, to the effect that the unresolved issue of non-nuclear strategic offensive weapons, in other words the lack of a ban on their creation, allows American



high-precision weapons to pose a threat to Russia's strategic forces. This thesis is based on the supremacy of the U.S. and the countries of NATO in terms of conventional weapons, particularly strategic long-range systems. First of all, neutralizing our nuclear potential with the help of non-nuclear strategic offensive weapons is impossible, because this could only happen if serial production of such weapons were to begin. This is not being witnessed at present, and at this point there is only research and development work in this area.

We should stress that the American side is so far only studying the issue of new systems to combat what the U.S. believes to be the most important threats, including the possible deployment of ballistic missiles equipped with non-nuclear warheads. If and when a positive decision is taken, then time will be required for the serial production of such systems, which will lead to a major modernization of the American military-industrial complex, but the main point is that huge funds will be needed, and it will be Congress that will have to assign these.

Second, it is fairly difficult to create a grouping of non-nuclear strategic offensive weapons on a scale that would threaten Russia's national interests but could not be uncovered by our national technical monitoring systems.

Third, Russian military doctrine clearly states that nuclear weapons may be used if our country is attacked with conventional weapons.

Finally, given the current level of Russian-American relations, which the presidents of the two countries are trying to develop and improve as much as possible, there are no political reasons for such deadly scenarios.

It is important to stress, however, that all these factors do not lessen the urgency of the problem of non-nuclear strategic offensive weapons as such. The danger remains of strategic stability being breached if PGS is implemented using non-nuclear strategic offensive weapons. That is why, having said that in the current stage the New START Treaty strengthens our security and temporarily allays our concerns over non-nuclear strategic offensive weapons, the search must go on for negotiated solutions to this problem, without providing the arms race with a new basis.

There is additional cause for concern arising out of the U.S. Senate's ratification resolution, which was approved by a majority (71 for and 26 against) on December 22, 2010. This document touches on many problems, but what interests the U.S. is purely the issue of non-nuclear strategic offensive weapons. In particular, the resolution stipulates that the Senate will on a regular basis receive complete information on systems being developed in the U.S., as well as the plans for the production and deployment of such forms of weapons. It also stresses that, in respect of test launches of non-nuclear ICBMs and SLBMs created as part of PGS, the transfer of telemetric information is only possible in exchange for the same information on launches of new types of missiles. At the same time, the exchange of information is restricted only to the supply of information that would confirm that the missile being tested does not fall under the restrictions set out in the Treaty.

The most sensitive aspect of the document is the fact that the U.S. does not intend to view non-nuclear strategic-range weapons systems as new types of strategic offensive weapons that would fall within the scope of the Treaty. In the opinion of the senators, the New START Treaty does not impose restrictions on the U.S. in terms of conducting research, development work, testing, and deployment in respect of such weapons.


This does not correspond to the understandings achieved in the course of the negotiations. The Russian side has always proceeded from the notion that any strategic offensive weapons the sides may possess, including their new types of strategic-range offensive weapons, equipped with both nuclear and conventional weapons, will fall within the scope of the Treaty. Moreover, the New START Treaty stipulates that if new types of strategic non-nuclear weapons are created, it is the BCC (and not the U.S. Senate) that will decide whether or not the Treaty should be applied to the new type of strategic offensive weapon.

In respect of conventional strategic offensive weapons, the thesis continues to be put forward that such types of weapons do not have any effects on strategic stability between Russia and the U.S. This interpretation contradicts the formulation of the preamble to the Treaty, in accordance with which the parties recognize the existence of such effects and support the need for them to be taken into account as stocks of strategic offensive weapons are reduced. All these aspects of the Senate resolution illustrate the desire of a number of U.S. politicians to correct some of the

fundamental provisions of the New START Treaty in their favor. The Russian side will never accept such an interpretation. It is no coincidence that, in its statement “On the position of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation on issues relating to the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive weapons”<sup>9</sup> (adopted as part of the “package” of documents accompanying the ratification of the START Treaty 2010), the State Duma notes that “any strategic offensive weapons the parties may have and any new types of these weapons, including those that are based on new physical principles, as well as any strategic-range systems, will fall within the scope of the New START Treaty in accordance with its terms, enshrined, in particular, in Paragraph 2 Article V of the New START Treaty, as well as in Section I Part Six of the Protocol to the New START Treaty”.

Whatever the circumstances, Russia will undertake all necessary efforts in as cost-effective a way as possible to maintain parity with the U.S. in respect of strategic offensive weapons, in the context of the deployment by the U.S. of a global missile defense system and their implementation of the PGS concept. This thinking was clearly reflected in the National Security Strategy until 2020, approved on May 13, 2009 by the Russian President Dmitry Medvedev.

Obviously, this does not mean symmetrical action, if only because our country adheres to a strictly defensive military doctrine and does not plan to conduct global offensive operations. The Russian leadership has said on more than one occasion that Russia does not intend to initiate or involve itself in a new arms race. On the contrary, Russia intends to continue strengthening the regime of nonproliferation, disarmament, and arms control and building pragmatic relationships with all of the states in the world, and is focused on dialogue and on reducing the scope for conflict.

As President Medvedev stressed in his speech at a July 2010 meeting with Russian ambassadors and permanent representatives at international organizations, “there is no point in expecting everyone to agree with U.S., and we will not agree with everyone, but an understanding of the world in which we live and of the direction in which this world is developing is a condition for future development in both practical policy and in approaches to international affairs”.<sup>10</sup> 



## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> Russian President Dmitry Medvedev’s speech. Helsinki, April 20, 2009, <[http://archive.kremlin.ru/appears/2009/04/20/2258\\_type63374type63376type63377\\_215266.shtml](http://archive.kremlin.ru/appears/2009/04/20/2258_type63374type63376type63377_215266.shtml)>, last accessed March 22, 2011.

<sup>2</sup> Russian President Dmitry Medvedev’s speech. New York, September 24, 2009, <<http://www.kremlin.ru/transcripts/5552>>, last accessed March 22, 2011.

<sup>3</sup> Sergey Lavrov, “The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty in the Global Security Matrix: The Political Dimension,” *International Affairs*, No. 4, 2010, pp. 1–20.

<sup>4</sup> In *Security Index* (Russian edition), No. 1, Spring 2011, pp. 123–130. The English version of the article “Strategic Conventional Arms: Deadlocks and Solutions” by Evgeny Miasnikov will be published in *Security Index* (international edition), No. 3, Summer 2011.

<sup>5</sup> Message from the President of the United States transmitting Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, signed in Prague on April 8, 2010, with Protocol, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC, 2010.

<sup>6</sup> Bureau of Verification, Compliance and Implementation, Fact Sheet, April 8, 2010.

<sup>7</sup> Hearing of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, June 24, 2010. Witness Amb. Eric Edelman, Distinguished Fellow of Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment, Morton Halperin, Senior Advisor to the Open Society Institute. U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, June 24, 2010, <<http://foreign.senate.gov/hearings/hearing/?id=b92eae5c-5056-a032-5216-92e4d9613a75>>, last accessed March 22, 2011.

<sup>8</sup> Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance Fact Sheet, December 13, 2010.

<sup>9</sup> On the position of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation on issues relating to the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive weapons, State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, January 25, 2011, <[http://ntc.duma.gov.ru/duma\\_na/asozd/asozd\\_text.php?nm=4764-5%20%C3%C4&dt=2011](http://ntc.duma.gov.ru/duma_na/asozd/asozd_text.php?nm=4764-5%20%C3%C4&dt=2011)>, last accessed March 22, 2011.

<sup>10</sup> Russian President Dmitry Medvedev’s speech. Moscow, July 12, 2010, <<http://www.kremlin.ru/transcripts/8325>>, last accessed March 22, 2011.



Vladimir Orlov and Ivan Trushkin

## THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAM: DILEMMAS FACING RUSSIA

*Russia has a long history of close relations with Iran, and we would like to use all our existing opportunities to bring the difficult dialogue that is now under way to a successful conclusion.*

*Russian President Dmitry Medvedev<sup>1</sup>*

A *foreign policy priority*—that is how the key Russian diplomatic documents describe the importance of Iran for Russia.<sup>2</sup> In the revolutionary 1980s, the Iranian regime viewed the Soviet Union as a small Satan. Over the two decades since the normalization of bilateral relations the country has remained an *important* but *difficult* partner for Russia. These two adjectives have always been used side by side in describing the nature of relations between Moscow and Tehran in the past 20 years.

Political and economic ties between the two countries have seen their ups and downs. In fact, these swings have been so wild and frequent that there is simply no precedent for them in Russia's relations with any other nation on the planet. The agreement to complete the Bushehr nuclear power plant (NPP) was followed by momentous protocols on the construction of a centrifuge plant in Iran using Russian technology. Then came the downturn, with most of the preliminary agreements being repudiated. Massive deportations of Iranian spies from Moscow soon gave way to another rapprochement, which became especially obvious against the backdrop of the chill in Russian–American relations under George W. Bush. There has been the embarrassingly sluggish construction of the Bushehr NPP, which dragged on for a decade and a half for reasons that were anything other than technical or financial; the talk of strategic partnership and closer economic cooperation; differences over the division of the Caspian; a pick-up in defense industry cooperation, including the decision to sell the Russian S-300 SAM systems to Tehran; and finally, Russia's backing of the four UN Security Council resolutions imposing sanctions on Iran.<sup>3</sup> There has been a series of constructive compromise proposals offered to Iran, including the offer to supply fuel for the Tehran research reactor, which was largely designed by Russia (the offer was turned down). Tough words were exchanged at the highest political level. The Bushehr NPP has been fully completed—but Russia has also unilaterally pulled out of the agreement to supply the S-300 systems to Tehran.

### PRIORITY AND REALITY

All these ups and downs stem primarily from the fact that neither side can seem to decide exactly what it wants from this relationship in the strategic time frame. Neither Moscow nor Tehran has been able to convert tactical successes into a strategic long-term gain.

To some extent, the swings in Russian–Iranian relations also result from the volatile international climate surrounding Iran and especially its nuclear program. The agenda keeps fluctuating from dialogue and constructive engagement to sanctions and confrontation. It must be recognized that external pressures have seriously affected the Russian policy on Iran, particularly in 1995–1999,



A  
N  
A  
L  
Y  
S  
I  
S

when Moscow was especially flaccid on the foreign policy front. In that sense, the Iranian policy on Russia seems to have been a bit more consistent, albeit far from free of foreign influences—especially when Tehran tried (to no great avail) to play Europe and Russia off against each other.<sup>4</sup>

But for all that, in a number of international security areas which Russia views as key to its interests, its partnership with Iran was quite steady and free of gyrations. We are talking primarily about the fight against international terrorism (especially countering terrorism and separatism in the North Caucasus), the war on drugs, and cooperation in Central Asia and Afghanistan.

After losing its hard-won foothold in the Middle East following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia urgently needed to regain at least some of its influence in the region in the 1990s and early 2000s. Some of the ties nurtured back in Soviet times still kept bearing fruit—but only in a very limited number of countries (primarily Syria), and even there they were beginning to look rather formal. Efforts to establish informal new working relations had yielded tangible results in only a handful of cases, Qatar being the greatest success. But that was clearly not enough for Russia's purposes. Most of the Middle Eastern nations remained firmly in the orbit of the United States or, to a lesser extent, France and Britain. Independent players were being methodically put out of action by the Americans.

In this geopolitical desert, Iran appeared to be the vacuum that Russia hoped to fill. At the beginning of the past decade, Moscow made an attempt to turn the country into a key strategic partner in the region.

The attempt flopped. In addition to unrelenting pressure from the United States and Israel, Moscow was hamstrung by interdepartmental squabbles within the Kremlin itself as to how exactly to deal with Iran. Tehran's aspiration to become a full member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization rather than a mere observer, which seemed to be in line with Russia's own interests, was essentially blocked by Moscow. Neither did it help that Russia insisted on supporting round after round of sanctions against its would-be strategic partner. Of course, the Kremlin did work to tone down the UN Security Council resolutions against Iran, but in the end it supported all four rounds of sanctions.

## DECLINING TRADE AND GRAND PLANS

Speaking of the sanctions, let us look in greater detail at the trade and economic relations between Russia and Iran.

Before the 2008 financial crisis bilateral trade turnover was \$3.3 billion, with \$3 billion worth of Russian exports to Iran and only \$300 million of Iranian exports to Russia. In the wake of the crisis, bilateral trade fell to \$2.5 billion.<sup>5</sup> In 2009 trade between Russia and Iran shrank by 17.1 percent, with Russian exports falling by 13.4 percent and imports collapsing by 46.8 percent. But the share of Iran in Russia's foreign trade actually went up by 0.2 percentage points in 2008 to 0.7 percent. In the first half of 2010 trade fell by 11.2 percent on the same period in 2009. Russian exports fell by 12.6 percent, while imports were up by six percent.<sup>6</sup>

In 2009 the structure of Russian exports to Iran continued to be dominated by metals and metal products at 68.23 percent (63.34 percent in 2008); wood, pulp, and paper products at 8.05 percent (5.57 percent); grain at 5.16 percent (5.01 percent) and fuel and energy at 2.85 percent (5.04 percent). Russian imported mostly food and agricultural products (81 percent in 2009; 57 percent in 2008) and cars (6.8 percent in 2009; 27 percent in 2008).<sup>7</sup>

Below is a roundup of the key contracts between Russian and Iranian companies as of late 2010:

*Space.* In 2002 *Rosoboronexport* and the Institute of the Applied Research of Iran signed a contract for the manufacture and launch of the Sina-1 remote sensing satellite, which was launched on October 27, 2005 by a Kosmos-3 carrier from the Plesetsk cosmodrome. The value of the contract was over \$1 million. The Iranian side expected the project to continue, but work on the second satellite never began. The CIA explained it by Russia's reluctance to help Iran in the development of its Zoreh national satellite program due to fears over the possible uses to which Iran might put Russian technology.<sup>8</sup>

*Aircraft building.* In 2009 Russia supplied five Tu-204-120S transports worth \$200 million to Iran. In 2008 Iran bought a Russian license for the assembly of 50 Ka-32 helicopters from Russian components. In March 2008 Russia's United Aircraft Corporation (OAK) and Iran signed a



memorandum under which the Russian company was to supply 100 Tu-204 and Tu-214 passenger aircraft. The value of the contract was estimated at \$2.5 billion. But the deal later fell through; it turned out that some of the components for these planes are sourced from the United States and are therefore subject to U.S. restrictions on re-exports to Iran.

*Car industry.* Russia's GAZ car and truck maker has signed an agreement with an Iranian partner on the assembly of GAZ minivans and light trucks under license in Iran. So far, however, only fully assembled minivans are being supplied. Under an existing contract, some 28,000 Gazel vans and light trucks were to be delivered in 2007–2009. Under the distribution agreement, the value of Gazel exports is over \$200 million. In 2005 KAMAZ signed a contract with Iran's Rakhsh Khodro Diesel (RKD) on assembly under license of KAMAZ trucks in the city of Tabriz. RKD and KAMAZ have invested \$6.5 million in the joint project.

*Railways.* On April 29, 2008 Russian Railways and RAI, the Iranian railways operator, signed a contract for the electrification of the 48km Tabriz–Azarshahr railway line. Work on the project began after a special ceremony on February 9, 2009. The cost of the project is €8.85 million.<sup>9</sup> Russian Railways also expects to be involved in the electrification of the 800km Tehran–Mashhad line.

In late 2010 the two sides completed preparations for the project to build a high-speed road between Moscow and Resht. The Iranian city of Resht is an important transport hub. A separate road connects Resht to the Persian Gulf port of Bandar Abbas. The decision to build the highway was supplementary to the agreement on the construction of the Resht–Astara–Moscow railway link signed in 2008.

*Defense industry cooperation.* In 2001 Tehran rolled out a 25-year rearmament program for its armed forces. Most of the foreign-made weapons systems to be procured under the program are to be sourced from Russia. The cost of the program is estimated at \$25 billion. Experts believe that at least half of that money could go to Russia.<sup>10</sup>

According to the ARMS-TASS analytical service, Iran was the third largest recipient of Russian weapons in 2000–2007, having signed \$1.96 billion worth of arms contracts with Moscow. Russian suppliers accounted for 85 percent of Iranian arms imports over that period. Large contracts include the delivery of 29 Tor-M1 short-range SAM systems worth \$700 million.

However, Russian–Iranian arms trade was put on hold following President Medvedev's September 22, 2010 decree "On measures to implement UN Security Council Resolution No 1929 of June 9, 2010". That was not the first case in recent Russian history of Moscow being forced to end productive cooperation with Tehran after bowing to pressure from Washington. On June 30, 1995 the Russian Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin and the U.S. Vice-President Albert Gore signed a memorandum under which Moscow pledged not to sign new conventional weapons contracts with Iran, and to complete deliveries on the existing contracts by late 1999. The cost of that memorandum to Russia in lost trade has been about \$2 billion.<sup>11</sup>

*Banking sphere.* The lack of proper cooperation between the Russian and Iranian banking systems is a major drag on further development of bilateral trade. The two countries' banks have been unable to establish letters of credit, so all payments between the Russian and Iranian trading parties have to be done in cash.

*Regional cooperation.* Iranian businesses have offices in several Russian regions, including Moscow, St Petersburg, Tatarstan, and Mordovia, as well as Astrakhan, Volgograd, Nizhny Novgorod, and Omsk Regions. Iranian business interests in Russia are fairly diverse, ranging from wheat and timber deliveries from Omsk to light tractors made in Tatarstan. Russian regions welcome cooperation with Iran as it helps the local economies. There is a lot of trade between Russia's Astrakhan Region and the northern Iranian provinces. In 2008 the Astrakhan Region sea ports processed 3.5 million tonnes of foreign-trade shipments, of which Iran accounted for 95 percent.

In the next two years Russia will build a new port in the Volga delta in Astrakhan. It will be able to process 1 million tonnes of freight every year. Two Iranian companies are involved in the project, which was at the engineering survey stage in 2010. The port will specialize in Iranian trade, and will be connected to the railway network, increasing the volume of shipments along the North–South transport corridor.



Iran also has plans to establish trading houses in Russia, which could contribute to the development of bilateral cooperation. Another topic for future Russian–Iranian talks is the development of coal fields in eastern Iran. It has been suggested that about 20 coal-fired power plants could be built in the region with Russian involvement.

*Fuel and energy.* From the purely economic point of view, the current bilateral trade figures are just a fraction of what they could be. The areas of cooperation that hold the greatest potential include oil, gas, and the arms trade. But these areas happen to be very vulnerable to the international sanctions imposed on Iran.

In 2008 Tehran said it could award contracts to develop its gas fields without a formal competition procedure because the presence of Western companies in the Iranian market has decreased very dramatically. Russian companies could make use of that competition-free environment, but they are being held back by the fear of falling foul of American sanctions.

Russia's oil giant *Lukoil* has been forced to abandon the development of the Anaran field in Iran due to the threat of U.S. sanctions. Breach of these sanctions could lead to the accounts and assets of the offending party being frozen. For *Lukoil*, which has a network of filling stations in the United States, such a risk was unacceptable.<sup>12</sup>

In September 2010 *Lukoil* issued a press release saying that it “does not conduct any business in Iran, and will not work in Iran until the international sanctions against that country have been lifted”.<sup>13</sup>

*Lukoil* went on to say that it had not made any new investments in Iran for years, and that it was gradually winding down its presence in the country. The company made its last shipment of petrol to Iran in April 2010, before the United States imposed new sanctions. The press release was issued in response to accusations by U.S. congressmen that the company was still doing business with Tehran in circumvention of U.S. sanctions.<sup>14</sup>

Meanwhile, back in July 2010 Russian Energy Minister Sergey Shmatko said during a meeting with his Iranian counterpart, Masoud Mirkazemi, that U.S. sanctions would not be allowed to stand in the way of Russian petrol shipments to Iran. The two ministers signed a roadmap of oil and gas cooperation, pledging to “study the possibility of setting up a joint bank to finance oil and gas projects”.<sup>15</sup>

One of the few Russian oil companies still active in Iran is *Gazprom Neft*, which has signed a memorandum of understanding with Iran's NIOC national oil company outlining its intention to invest in the development of Iran's Azar and Shangule fields.<sup>16</sup> The company is still in talks with the Iranian government, apparently undeterred by the new U.S. sanctions on Iran. Sibur Holding is another Russian company still willing to work in Iran. It is now in talks with Tehran on joint oil and gas projects, including the development of the Southern Pars field.

In January 2010 Moscow and Tehran discussed the Mir project to build a joint gas pipeline from Iran to Pakistan and India, but for now those plans have been set aside.

Trade figures suggest that Iran is not a vitally important trade partner for Russia. Speculations in some Western media concerning Russia's alleged “special economic interests in Iran”, which supposedly inform Russia's generally friendly attitude towards Iran, are groundless.


But the two countries are interested in further development of their economic and trade relations. Iran is a chance for Russia to be more than just a supplier of raw materials, which role has been assigned to it by foreign economists.

## THE CURRENT STATE OF POLITICAL DIALOGUE

The current state of political relations between Russia and Iran can best be described as a deliberate time-out, a pause to catch their breath.

Relations between Moscow and Tehran have largely become hostage to the unresolved Iranian nuclear problem. Russia's key diplomatic documents state that very clearly in the summary of Russian–Iranian relations in 2009: “the unresolved issues over the Iranian nuclear program” have had “negative effects” on bilateral relations.<sup>17</sup>

Figure 1 List of Supplying Markets for a Product Imported by Iran in 2009



Source: International Trade Center, <<http://www.intracen.org>>



The general outlines of Moscow's position can be found in the Russian Foreign Policy Concept:

Russia will do everything in its power to facilitate a political and diplomatic resolution of the situation with the Iranian nuclear program based on recognizing the right of all NPT members to put nuclear energy to peaceful uses and on ensuring strict compliance with the requirements of the nuclear nonproliferation regime.<sup>18</sup>

Russia further expounded that position at the 2010 NPT Review Conference:

On the Iranian nuclear program, [Russia] calls on the international community to work towards a political and diplomatic resolution of the current crisis; [Russia] also urges Iran to demonstrate the necessary good will so as to restore confidence in the peaceful nature of its nuclear program through measures that include compliance with the resolutions on Iran adopted by the UN Security Council and the IAEA Board of Governors.<sup>19</sup>

Unofficial Russian estimates of the Iranian nuclear program can be summarized in the following way:

- ❑ In the mid-1980s, still smarting from the war with Iraq, Iran made the decision to launch a military nuclear program and begin developing an independent nuclear fuel cycle.
- ❑ It appears, however, that Tehran has never actually made a political decision to build nuclear weapons.
- ❑ The military component of the Iranian nuclear program has never reached an advanced stage. Around 2003 Tehran froze the program altogether and attempted to reach a reconciliation with the United States and Europe (something Washington was not yet prepared to accept).
- ❑ Since then Iran has made great progress in developing an independent nuclear fuel cycle, especially the uranium enrichment component.
- ❑ The Russian-built Bushehr NPP holds a fairly marginal significance for Iran.
- ❑ Tehran's main objective is to develop the industrial capacity and engineering skills required for the country to launch an independent nuclear fuel cycle that would not rely on any foreign suppliers.
- ❑ At this time, there is no point insisting that Iran halt its uranium enrichment activities.
- ❑ Right now there are two possible scenarios for the Iranian nuclear program. One is to ramp up nuclear activities and develop, within the next couple of years, the capability to put that program to military applications, should a political decision be made to that effect. The other is to move slowly and cautiously towards the Japanese model (i.e. building an advanced nuclear industry that can be switched from peaceful to military applications, should the need arise).
- ❑ For the next year or two, choosing confrontation, withdrawing from the NPT, and building nuclear weapons would not be in Iran's best interests. But neither can such a turn of events be completely ruled out. Its likelihood depends primarily on the urgency of threats that would necessitate unconventional means of deterrence.

Russia has lately been trying to balance between calling on Iran to show flexibility and urging the West (primarily the United States, but also Israel) to stick to peaceful and diplomatic instruments to resolve the conflict.

Moscow was therefore deeply disappointed by how the events unfolded after the meeting in Geneva on October 1, 2009 between the EU's High Representative Javier Solana and the Secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, Saeed Jalili. It was agreed during that meeting, which was also attended by political representatives of the Group of Six, that Tehran would grant IAEA inspectors full access to the new enrichment facility that was still under construction near Qom. The participants also agreed that Russian, U.S., French, Iranian, and IAEA representatives would hold a meeting to discuss the technical aspects of the proposed scheme to remove low-enriched uranium produced in Iran to another country for further enrichment and manufacturing of fuel assemblies for the Tehran research reactor. But that new meeting held in Vienna on October 19–21, 2010, brought no results. What is more, it became clear that Iran had

essentially misinformed Moscow about its intention to accept the Group of Six proposal, on which Russia had worked so hard.

As a result, Moscow adopted a tougher stance on Iran. On November 16, 2009 the IAEA Director-General submitted a report saying that Tehran had broken some of its commitments under the Safeguards Agreement during the construction of the Qom enrichment facility. The subsequent meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a new resolution on Iran, with Russia's backing. The document urged Tehran to abide by the UN Security Council resolutions, suspend the construction at Qom and introduce all the transparency measures required by the IAEA.

But Iran continued to ignore the public calls of the Group of Six and Moscow's quiet diplomacy alike. In 2010 Moscow took an even harder line on Iran and voted in favor of UN Security Council Resolution 1929 of June 9, 2010. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said that Iran was "missing the opportunities to begin normal, respectful and mutually beneficial dialogue with the international community based on the proposals offered to it by the 3 + 3 Group and the IAEA. We are confident that Iran must meet all the demands made by the IAEA and supported in several UN Security Council resolutions."<sup>20</sup>

At the same time, Russia argued that the new sanctions should be smart rather than aggressive or paralyzing; it insisted that they should not affect the humanitarian situation in Iran, targeting only the officials who must make the decision in favor of cooperation with the international community.<sup>21</sup> Russia's position to that effect was reflected in the new UN Security Council resolution.

However, during the NPT Review Conference, Russia (as well as the West) avoided putting direct pressure on Iran so as not to provoke it into disrupting the conference.

The initiative put forward by Brazil and Turkey, and the ensuing trilateral statement by the two countries plus Iran made in May 2010, became an important milestone in the Iranian nuclear crisis. The development did not come as a surprise to Russia; the Brazilian president had paid a visit to Moscow shortly beforehand. President Medvedev essentially supported the Brazilian-Turkish plan, saying this to his Brazilian counterpart before the latter's visit to Tehran:

First, the Iranian nuclear program must be peaceful. Second, it must be verifiable, it must be monitored by the IAEA. Third, Iran must cooperate with the international community and with the IAEA. And fourth, Iran must abide by the rules on the nonproliferation of nuclear technologies. If these conditions are met, we would be happy for Iran to become part of the club of countries pursuing nuclear research. But these are exactly the issues that cause certain concern at the moment. Russia [and Iran]... have longstanding and serious relations, mutually beneficial relations. That puts a certain responsibility on us, and also presents us with a choice. It would be excellent if Iran could be persuaded to the kind of cooperation that has already been outlined, i.e. the swap of low-enriched uranium for high-enriched uranium, regardless of whether such a swap is conducted by Russia, Turkey or some other country.<sup>22</sup>

Tehran, meanwhile, was sending signals that in view of the Brazilian-Turkish initiative, Moscow should revise its position on Iran and adopt a more flexible stance. But Moscow remained unresponsive to those overtures, preferring instead to stand united with the West, while at the same time welcoming the Brazilian-Turkish initiative.

In response to that initiative, Russia, the United States, and France proposed that the IAEA Director-General arrange a meeting of the three countries' technical experts with their Iranian counterparts in order to resolve the issue of fuel supplies for the Tehran research reactor on the understanding that Iran would end enrichment of uranium to the 20 percent level.<sup>23</sup> It was expected that Russia, as part of the Vienna Group (the United States, France, Russia, and the IAEA), would conduct negotiations with Iran to discuss the details of the nuclear fuel swap scheme based on the Iranian-Turkish-Brazilian proposal.<sup>24</sup>

But the subsequent two rounds of negotiations showed that the sides were still very far from reaching a compromise. Talks between the Group of Six and Iran held in Geneva in December 2010 revealed very different approaches. Lady Ashton insisted that the participants would discuss the Iranian nuclear program, whereas Tehran said it was prepared to discuss only the resumption of dialogue with the West.<sup>25</sup> Nevertheless, the very fact that talks had resumed after a year-long pause was a positive signal.

The next round of negotiations was held on January 21-22, 2011 in Istanbul. The West described its outcome as unsatisfactory, and Iran's initiatives as "unacceptable". But Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov had this to say:



Unlike the meeting in Geneva, where the climate was very different, the Istanbul meeting had a more specific nature and pursued a very different goal. In Geneva the sides wanted to air their views on a whole range of issues after a long 14-month pause. In Istanbul we were discussing much more specific questions. Some say the outcome of the meeting has been disappointing. But we can only expect tangible results once the initial phase is over. Now it is important to keep the momentum of the talks; we must not allow another long pause in the talks.<sup>26</sup>

Iran's permanent envoy to the IAEA, Ali Asghar Soltanieh, also spoke of the importance of the resumption of the talks during his visit to Moscow in late January 2011: "For over a year we have been waiting for the international community to supply the fuel for the [Tehran research] reactor, so that Iranian citizens could receive cancer treatment. . . . We hope that the talks will be held soon".<sup>27</sup>

There have been some intricate games behind the scenes over the Iranian nuclear program in the past few months, in which Russia played a prominent role. Meanwhile, Washington is obviously coming to the realization that it has no leverage left to try to break Iran, with the single exception of a large-scale military operation. All sides are therefore looking for a new political and diplomatic round, in an effort to find a solution that would allow both the Iranian and U.S. leadership to save face.

For its part, Russia stepped up pressure on Iran when President Medvedev decided to go even further than UNSC Resolution 1929 strictly required and issued a decree (published on September 22, 2010 but drawn up in early June) banning the sale of S-300 SAM systems to Tehran.<sup>28</sup>

On the other hand, in August 2010 Russia completed all tests at the Bushehr NPP. On August 21 it commenced IAEA-supervised deliveries of fresh nuclear fuel to the Bushehr reactor compartment. In early December 2010 engineers completed loading fuel into the reactor. Nevertheless, on February 28, 2011 *Rosatom* announced that the nuclear fuel needs to be unloaded to thoroughly clean the reactor core and the primary cooling system to remove metal shards left by the pump's failure.<sup>29</sup> That means that the commercial launch scheduled for April 9, 2011 has been delayed again.

The Deputy Chief of *Rosatom* Nikolay Spassky, who is directly involved in the Group of Six talks and is in charge of the Iranian nuclear dossier at *Rosatom*, believes that last year's developments over the Iranian nuclear program have been good for Russia. "The game on the most dangerous of the regional chessboards, the Iranian one, has been concluded successfully", Spassky said. "We have completed the Bushehr nuclear power plant, making good use of this instrument of our influence on the other players and preventing the Iranian situation from triggering a crisis between Russia and the West."<sup>30</sup>

Meanwhile, Russian experts on Iran, regardless of their specific field, are well aware of how limited Russia's leverage is on Iran, and especially on the mechanisms of decision-making in Tehran.

## WHAT NEXT?

A December 14, 2009 communication from U.S. Ambassador to Russia John Beyrle, which has been published by WikiLeaks, offers an interesting analysis of Iran's policy.

"From a purely mercantilist standpoint, sanctions against Iran, particularly its energy sector, would likely translate into a bump in world oil prices, which would boost annual revenues for Russia's state-connected energy companies and the state budget by billions of dollars annually. If sanctions harm Iran's burgeoning economic relationship with China, some in Russia might also regard that as a plus," the leaked diplomatic cable says. "On the other hand, sanctions could damage Russia's own trade with Iran, which is modest (Russia currently has a bilateral trade surplus of about \$3 billion) but concentrated in the politically influential defense and atomic-energy sectors. Since many high-ranking officials in these agencies also favor a more adversarial policy towards the West, an anti-sanctions posture serves them both economically and ideologically," Beyrle concludes.<sup>31</sup>


The cynics in the Russian political establishment are confident that a U.S. or Israeli invasion of Iran would be in Russia's best interests. Such an invasion would drive oil prices through the roof, and entangle the United States in yet another military operation.

But in fact, Russia is actually quite happy with the existing situation in Iran. In this state of neither peace nor war, Russia is actively involved in the negotiating process. This offers an opportunity for the Kremlin to raise the stakes in its bilateral dialogue with the United States, which is far more

important to it than relations with Iran. Russia wants to keep the situation from degenerating into war, but neither would it welcome full reconciliation between Iran and the United States. Both scenarios could be very damaging to Russian interests. Moscow does not want a long-term destabilization in a region adjacent to the South and North Caucasus and the Caspian—but neither does it want to see the Americans setting up economic shop in Iran.

In order to defuse tensions over the Iranian nuclear program, Russia will probably pursue the following line:

- ❑ The approach to resolving the Iranian nuclear problem must be systemic and based on international law, with a recognition that the nuclear nonproliferation regime is not perfect.
- ❑ Further coordinated steps by the Group of Six are needed to involve Iran in the talks on a range of issues, including regional problems.
- ❑ Confidence-building measures would be a good first step. They might include the supply of nuclear fuel for the Tehran research reactor (based on the Brazilian and Turkish initiative). Iran views Russia as the main mediator on this issue.
- ❑ At the same time there needs to be multilateral cooperation with Iran to stabilize the situation in Afghanistan. Here Iran “can play a very positive role”.<sup>32</sup>
- ❑ These actions must be based on the principle of solidarity, i.e. there needs to be mutual responsibility. We must avoid situations when simultaneously with collective efforts in the UN Security Council, Russia’s partners take unilateral decisions on sanctions, including extra-territorial ones, thereby undermining the very foundations for future joint action.<sup>33</sup>
- ❑ At some point in the future, once the first confidence-building measures have begun to bear fruit, they need to be extended to other areas. Forcing Iran to halt uranium enrichment is neither possible nor in fact necessary. What is necessary is to make sure that all enrichment activities are closely monitored by the IAEA. That monitoring could even take the form of an ad hoc IAEA commission with special powers, which would be equivalent to the powers given to the IAEA under the Additional Protocol to the safeguards agreement.
- ❑ Iran itself, meanwhile, must make some gestures (even purely symbolic ones) to demonstrate its respect for the UN Security Council resolutions so as to enable all sides to have a reasonable conversation about withdrawing the demand for Iran to halt uranium enrichment.
- ❑ Iran must do its share of the work to first stabilize and then improve its relations with neighbors in the region, especially with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf nations. Tensions over Iran will not be defused without regional reconciliation and a new system of confidence-building measures.
- ❑ Iran can and should play a constructive role in preparing and conducting the international conference on creating a WMD-free zone in the Middle East, scheduled for 2012. The decision to hold that conference was made at the 2010 NPT Review Conference. Without Iran (as well as Israel), such a conference would be pointless.
- ❑ In the medium time frame Iran, drawing on its formidable nuclear experience and having improved relations with its Arab neighbors in the region, could become a regional center of peaceful nuclear energy development. It could host, within the system of IAEA safeguards, a multilateral uranium enrichment program involving those of the Arab states which plan to develop nuclear energy over the coming two decades. That would solve a whole range of regional problems.

Russia has not abandoned the idea of returning to the Middle East as a powerful independent actor. In the near time frame it has a good chance of coming closer to that goal. Iran is no longer viewed as the sole Russian partner in the region. Moscow’s contacts and plans have become far more diverse. But neither is Russia intending to drop Iran from the list of its allies in the Middle East, especially in terms of geopolitics and the energy sector. It will therefore try to avoid any major bust-ups with Tehran, even though it has realized by now that the laurels of a peacemaker in the Iranian nuclear crisis may not actually yield the dividends it had previously counted on. 



## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> President Medvedev's speech at the opening of the World Economic Forum, January 26, 2011, <<http://news.kremlin.ru/news/10163>>, last accessed February 13, 2011.

<sup>2</sup> "Russian Foreign and Diplomatic Activity in 2009," Review by the Russian Foreign Ministry, March 2010, p. 121.

<sup>3</sup> See: UN SC Res. 1737 of December 23, 2006; UN SC Res. 1747 of March 24, 2007; UN SC Res. 1803 of March 3, 2008; and UN SC Res. 1929 of June 9, 2010, <<http://www.un.org/documents/scres.htm>>.

<sup>4</sup> Nevertheless, the Iranian policy on Russia was not completely free of external influences, either—especially when Tehran tried (with no great success) to play Europe and Russia off against each other, making overtures to Russia but cozying up to the Europeans behind the curtains.

<sup>5</sup> "Russia–Iran: a tenth part of the opportunities," Russian Trade Chamber, <[http://www.tpp-inform.ru/analytic\\_journal/717.html](http://www.tpp-inform.ru/analytic_journal/717.html)>, last accessed January 20, 2011.

<sup>6</sup> "On the state and prospects of trade and economic cooperation with Iran," *Iran News* (Russian information agency), <[http://iran.ru/rus/news\\_iran.php?act=news\\_by\\_id&n=1&news\\_id=71741](http://iran.ru/rus/news_iran.php?act=news_by_id&n=1&news_id=71741)>, last accessed February 13, 2011.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>8</sup> "Russian Scientists Worried Iran Uses Their Know-How for Missiles," *Bloomberg*, February 3, 2011, <<http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-02-03/russian-scientists-worried-iran-uses-their-know-how-for-missiles.html>>, last accessed February 13, 2011.

<sup>9</sup> "Electrification of the Tabriz-Azarshahr railway line," Russian Railways press service, <[http://inter.rzd.ru/isvp/public/inter?STRUCTURE\\_ID=5016&layer\\_id=3290&id=1370](http://inter.rzd.ru/isvp/public/inter?STRUCTURE_ID=5016&layer_id=3290&id=1370)>, last accessed February 13, 2011.

<sup>10</sup> Russia stands to lose up to 13 billion dollars by ending defense industry cooperation with Iran. *RIA Novosti*, October 7, 2010, <[http://www.rian.ru/defense\\_safety/20101007/283231206.html](http://www.rian.ru/defense_safety/20101007/283231206.html)>, last accessed February 13, 2011.

<sup>11</sup> "About the freezing of Russian defense industry cooperation with Iran," Institute of the Middle East, September 27, 2010, <<http://www.iimes.ru/rus/stat/2010/27-09-10b.htm>>, last accessed February 13, 2011.

<sup>12</sup> "Lukoil: U.S. sanctions against Iran freeze the project," IBK, October 23, 2007, <<http://ibk.ru/34016.html>>, last accessed September 8, 2009.

<sup>13</sup> *Lukoil* press release of September 2, 2010, <[http://www.lukoil.ru/press.asp?div\\_id=1&id=2395&year=2010](http://www.lukoil.ru/press.asp?div_id=1&id=2395&year=2010)>, last accessed January 20, 2010.

<sup>14</sup> *Lukoil* press release of September 15, 2010, <[http://www.lukoil.ru/press.asp?div\\_id=1&id=2402&year=2010](http://www.lukoil.ru/press.asp?div_id=1&id=2402&year=2010)>, last accessed January 20, 2010.

<sup>15</sup> "Russia and Iran agree a roadmap of oil and gas cooperation. PRIME-TASS," <<http://www.prime-tass.ru/news/articles/-201/{33DC8F30-FFA3-4081-9325-ADC797190828}.uif>>, last accessed January 20, 2011.

<sup>16</sup> "Map of Iran and Russia," *Interfax*, <<http://www.interfax.ru/business/txt.asp?id=118502>>, last accessed January 12, 2011.

<sup>17</sup> "Russian Foreign and Diplomatic Activity in 2009," Review by the Russian Foreign Ministry, March 2010, p. 127.

<sup>18</sup> "Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation", President of Russia—Official Web Portal, July 12, 2008, <<http://archive.kremlin.ru/eng/text/docs/2008/07/204750.shtml>>, last accessed March 20, 2011.

<sup>19</sup> UN, 2010 NPT Review Conference, Main Committee II. Brief report on the 3<sup>rd</sup> session held in the Central officers, New York, May 12, 2010. NPT/CONF.2010/MC.II/SR.3, <[http://www.un.org/ga/search/view\\_doc.asp?symbol=NPT/CONF.2010/MC.II/SR.3&referer=http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2010/maincommittees.shtml&Lang=R](http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=NPT/CONF.2010/MC.II/SR.3&referer=http://www.un.org/en/conf/npt/2010/maincommittees.shtml&Lang=R)>, last accessed January 20, 2011.

<sup>20</sup> Press conference by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Russian President's website, March 19, 2010, <[http://kremlin.ru/ref\\_notes/490](http://kremlin.ru/ref_notes/490)>, last accessed January 20, 2011.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>22</sup> Joint press conference with Brazilian President Lula da Silva. Russian President's web site, May 14, 2010, <<http://kremlin.ru/transcripts/7751>>, last accessed January 12, 2011.



<sup>23</sup> Minutes of the statement and Q&A by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov at the joint press conference following talks with Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman, Jerusalem, Russian Foreign Ministry, June 29, 2010, <[http://www.mid.ru/brp\\_4.nsf/0/76E3D78770EF06A7C3257753003774E5](http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/0/76E3D78770EF06A7C3257753003774E5)>, last accessed January 20, 2011.

<sup>24</sup> International review: Tensions growing over the Iranian nuclear problem. CRI-online, September 19, 2010, <<http://russian.cri.cn/841/2010/09/19/1s353447.htm>>, last accessed January 20, 2011.

<sup>25</sup> "Group of Six and Russian Representatives meet in Geneva," *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, December 6, 2010, <<http://www.rg.ru/2010/12/06/iran-site.html>>, last accessed February 14, 2010.

<sup>26</sup> "Specifics Discussed at Iran Talks," *Rossiyskaya gazeta*, No. 5388 (12), January 24, 2011.

<sup>27</sup> "Iran Hopes Meeting on Uranium Swap Will Be Held Soon," *RIA Novosti*, January 20, 2011, <<http://www.rian.ru/world/20110120/324135301.html>>, last accessed January 21, 2011.

<sup>28</sup> Russian Presidential Decree No. 1154 of September 22, 2010 "On measures to implement UN Security Council Resolution 1929 of June 9, 2010".

<sup>29</sup> "Failure at Iran's Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant Raises Concerns about Safety", *Bloomberg*, March 8, 2011, <http://preview.bloomberg.com/news/2011-03-07/failure-at-iran-s-bushehr-nuclear-power-plant-raises-concerns-about-safety.html>, last accessed March 20, 2011.

<sup>30</sup> Spassky Nikolay, "The Russian Age," *Security Index*, No. 1 (94), Winter 2011, p. 20.

<sup>31</sup> *Yaderny Kontrol*, No. 19 (400), 2010. [http://www.pircenter.org/data/publications/yki19\\_2010.html#11](http://www.pircenter.org/data/publications/yki19_2010.html#11)>, last accessed January 20, 2011.

<sup>32</sup> Minutes of Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov's speech at MGIMO (U) of the Russian Foreign Ministry, September 1, 2010, <<http://natomission.ru/society/article/society/artpublication/110/>>, last accessed January 20, 2011.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid.





Andrey Frolov

## THE FUTURE OF RUSSIAN ARMS

The State Armament Program (SAP) of the Russian Federation is the main document that outlines the long-term weapons technology policy for the defense industry, controls the annual weapons procurement programs, and defines the national R&D policy in Russia for the longer time frame. The overall goal is to give the Russian Armed Forces and other military formations the instruments they need to achieve the objectives set before them.<sup>1</sup> The SAP is implemented by means of the successive Defense Procurement Programs (DPPs).

In 2010 the government announced that it was working on the next SAP to cover the period 2011–2020 (SAP-2020). The program is to replace the current SAP-2015 document adopted back in December 2006. The exact time frame for the new program coming into effect is not clear but, judging from the previous SAP, it should have been finalized by late 2010. That assumption has been confirmed by Deputy Prime Minister Sergey Ivanov, who said in late October 2010 that the new SAP “will be adopted and signed by the President at the end of this year or early next year”.<sup>2</sup>



A  
N  
A  
L  
Y  
S  
I  
S

### PREVIOUS PROGRAMS

SAP-2020 will be the fourth Russian armament program since the break-up of the Soviet Union. The first was launched in 1996 and covered the period 1996–2005 (SAP-2005). Its main objective was to bring the army’s requirements in line with the available funding, set the budget planning targets for future defense procurement programs and serve as the long-term roadmap for the development of the Russian army.<sup>3</sup> But in 1997, only a year after the program was rolled out, it became clear that the targets set out in it were completely unrealistic because the Russian economy was performing much worse than expected. The projections were for 5–7 percent growth over the coming several years. In actual fact growth was negative in 1996–1997, and a measly 2 percent in 1998–1999. The projected share of defense spending in that unexpectedly weak GDP (initially set at 3.6–5.2 percent) was slashed in 1998 to 3.5 percent by a presidential executive order. The funding actually disbursed came in at about 2.3–2.8 percent of GDP, so the figures looked even worse in reality than they did on paper. The SAP was hit even harder than the overall defense spending, receiving only 23 percent of the projected funding over the period 1996–2000.<sup>4</sup> As a result, the proportion of the Russian defense industry capacity gainfully employed by the SAP-2005 contracts was a paltry 25–30 percent.<sup>5</sup>

SAP-2005 was defenestrated in early 2002 and replaced by the new SAP-2010 document covering the period 2001–2010. The new document did a much better job at reflecting the actual state of Russian finances. Its main goal was to enable the Russian defense industry to survive by focusing on export contracts, and to prop it up further by prioritizing R&D funding. The projected share of defense spending in Russian GDP was 2.7 percent over the period 2001–2010.<sup>6</sup> In absolute terms, the MoD initially requested 7.5 trillion roubles (\$250 billion approximately) for the program, based on the target of replacing 70 percent of the existing obsolete weaponry over 10 years. The initial request was patently unrealistic, so the figure eventually came down to 2.5 trillion roubles (\$83 billion), for a 50 percent replacement target. The structure of Russian spending on

the upkeep and development of the armed forces was also reshaped. In 2001 the ratio between upkeep and development was 70:30. The plan was to bring it to 60:40 by 2005 and eventually to 50:50 by 2010.<sup>7</sup>

In the final version of SAP-2010, spending was set at 2.1 trillion roubles (\$70 billion) over the period 2001–2010, i.e. about \$7 billion every year. Direct budget funding was 100 billion roubles per annum, the rest coming from arms exports revenues.<sup>8</sup> Some 40 percent of the available funds was supposed to be channeled into R&D in 2001–2005.<sup>9</sup> About 70 percent of the R&D projects that were under way at the time were expected to be completed by 2006. As of 2004, the MoD was financing 3,400 R&D projects.<sup>10</sup> SAP-2010 was also supposed to lay the ground for mass production of new-generation weaponry that would form the core of Russian arsenals by 2020.<sup>11</sup> The program also included a section listing the arms and equipment destined for exports.

In the end, the SAP-2010 program, Russia's second since the fall of the Soviet Union, yielded some very tangible results. It enabled the government to clear outstanding debts to defense contractors, launch large-scale weapons upgrade programs, bring a significant number of R&D projects to completion, and enter a lot of modern weaponry into service. Overall, however, the program proved unviable. It over-prioritized spending on strategic nuclear forces, with too little money left to finance the procurement of conventional arms. Up to two-thirds of the weapons procurement budget was being spent on humdrum consumables such as spare parts, training gear, missiles and ammunition, instruments and components, etc. Deliveries of complex finished weapons systems, meanwhile, were small, and few and far between.

For now, not much is known about the priorities of the new SAP in terms of procurement. Prime Minister Vladimir Putin has said that "in accordance with the plan of developing and shaping the 'New Look' armed forces, emphasis will be made on nuclear deterrence, space defense and air defense".<sup>12</sup> The government has also announced plans to equip the Russian armed forces with digital communication instruments, launch mass production of the fifth-generation fighter jet, and complete the design stage of R&D for several types of warships. One of the key targets of SAP-2020 is to bring the proportion of modern weaponry in the Russian armed forces to 70 percent by 2020.<sup>13</sup>

After the relative failure of SAP-2010 the Russian government was forced to prioritize mass production of modern weaponry at the expense of R&D in the third strategic armament program, SAP-2015.<sup>14</sup> The drafting of the program began shortly after the Russian Security Council approved in January 2003 the document called "Fundamentals of Russian Defense Industry Policy until 2015 and beyond", which had been in development since December 2001.<sup>15</sup>

The team working on SAP-2015 set a precedent of including all the source data they used in their projections as a single coherent document. Apart from the traditional military-strategic, operational, and macroeconomic forecasts, it included detailed projections for Russia's defense industry cooperation with other countries; a list of fundamental and critical weapons technologies for the long term; key international economic trends for the foreseeable time frame; a list of standardized weapons components with a set of requirements and specifications agreed by the various branches of the armed forces; and a forecast of science and technology advances in the area of military technology and national security.

Compared with the previous programs SAP-2015 also prioritized large-scale weapons procurement and upgrades programs. One of its key targets was to start delivering the latest weaponry to the armed forces in large batches, and to keep the existing equipment in good working order. Another thing worth noting is that in terms of the annual procurement programs and financing, the SAP-2015 program appears to have been split into two stages, from 2007 to 2010 and from 2011 to 2015. The plan was to ramp up new weapons deliveries very sharply after 2010, and probably to revise the entire program in 2011.

Another feature of SAP-2015 was that it takes into account the costs of weapons systems throughout their entire life cycle, from R&D to production, upgrade, repair, and maintenance, as well as the cost of installation on the existing platforms. The program also prioritizes weapons deliveries to permanent-combat-readiness units.<sup>16</sup>

One very radical departure from past practices is that the program allows the MoD to buy weapons in the West.

The cost of SAP-2015 at 2005 prices was set at almost 5 trillion roubles (\$167 billion), with the MoD receiving 91 percent of that financing.<sup>17</sup> Some 63 percent of SAP-2015 spending was supposed to be channeled into weapons procurement, although according to some reports the figure was initially set at 75 percent.<sup>18</sup> The share of R&D is about 20 percent.

### SAP-2020

The reasons for drawing up and enacting a new SAP program while the existing SAP-2015 has not yet run its course were never made clear. It appears that the revision of SAP-2015 was driven by the ongoing “New Look” military reform, the rethinking of the outcome of the Five Day War between Russia and Georgia in 2008, and the approach of the scheduled mid-term revision date for the current program. The government has announced that the main objective of the new SAP is to rearm the Russian forces, bringing the proportion of modern weaponry currently in service to 30 percent by 2015 and 70–80 percent by 2020.<sup>19</sup>

Conflicting statements have been made regarding the cost of the new SAP. The first announcement in April 2010 mentioned 13 trillion roubles.<sup>20</sup> But then new figures and estimates started to appear in the media. The most accurate estimate appears to have been made in September 2010 by Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov, who put the cost of SAP-2020 at 19 trillion roubles.<sup>21</sup> That figure includes only the MoD spending and rises to 22 trillion if the requirements of Russia’s other uniformed agencies are taken into account.<sup>22</sup>

Incidentally, the MoD also said it would actually need as much as 36 trillion roubles over the period 2011–2020 to finance all of its existing requirements.<sup>23</sup> The sum of 13 trillion would pay for maintaining Russia’s strategic nuclear forces in decent shape and for bolstering air defense and aviation. But that would mean starving the ground forces of the funds they need to do their job. To avoid such compromises, some 28 trillion roubles would have to be spent, the MoD said. An additional 8 trillion would sort out the Russian Navy’s problems as well. The latest available estimate for the cost of the SAP-2020 program is therefore a compromise between the MoD’s wishes and the Russian economic realities. That estimate is just over half of what the army wanted, but still more than initially budgeted.

At today’s prices, 19 trillion roubles equals about 11.38 trillion at the prices in 2005.<sup>24</sup> Compare that with the 4.94 trillion the government expected to spend under the existing SAP-2015 program in the 2007–2015 period. Real-term SAP spending is therefore expected to more than double. Adjusted for the fact that SAP-2020 covers a 10-year period while SAP-2015 covered only nine years, the average annual spending will grow by about 100 percent, from 550 billion roubles to 1,138 billion.


A bit more detail is available on the spending plans for 2011–2013. The government has announced the figures for new weapons contracts, repair and upgrades, and R&D under the DPP program (see Table 1).

The 2011–2013 figures for news arms procurement, upgrades and repairs, excluding R&D are as follows: 380 billion roubles in 2010, 460 billion in 2011, 596 billion in 2012 and 980 billion in 2013 (all at 2010 prices, apparently).<sup>25</sup>

Table 1. **Defense Procurement Programs spending by category, %**

| Year | New Weapons | Repair and Upgrade | R&D |
|------|-------------|--------------------|-----|
| 2010 | 65          | 13                 | 22  |
| 2011 | 64          | 15                 | 20  |
| 2012 | 66          | 15                 | 18  |
| 2013 | 70          | 14                 | 16  |

Source: Viktor Zavarzin, “Effective Defense Requires Latest Weaponry,” *Oren.Ru*, <<http://oren.ru/news/2526253/>>, last accessed November 15, 2010.



## PROCUREMENT UNDER THE NEW PROGRAM

Some open-source information is available on the financial figures of the program, but the details of how exactly that money will be spent remain scarce.

We know next to nothing about any procurement plans for the strategic nuclear forces. But we can assume that production of the new Topol-M and Yars ICBMs for the Strategic Missile Forces will be at or above the current level of 10 missiles per annum; in fact, up to 15 is more likely.<sup>26</sup>

There are also plans for 124–150 Bulava SLBMs for the Project 955 and 955A strategic nuclear submarines now being built.<sup>27</sup> A total of up to eight such submarines will be built. The first, the *Yury Dolgoruky*, has almost completed its sea trials program. The second in the series, and the first “mass-produced”, the *Vladimir Monomakh*, was scheduled for launch in late 2010. The third and the fourth, the *Aleksandr Nevsky* and the *Svyatitel Nikolay*, are still being built. The SAP-2020 program will likely include the production of Sineva SLBMs for the older Project 667 subs, at the expected rate of about 10 missiles per annum. It was announced back in early 2008 that existing orders for the Sineva would be fulfilled by 2014.<sup>28</sup>

More details are available for air force and air defense procurement plans. According to Prime Minister Putin, some 1,500 new aircraft and helicopters plus 200 new air defense systems will be delivered to the Russian armed forces under SAP-2020. That will bring the proportion of modern aircraft currently in service with the Air Force to 80 percent, and the proportion of new air defense systems to 75 percent.<sup>29</sup> Let us recall that the plan under SAP-2015 was to deliver 1,000 “front line and tactical aviation combat systems”.<sup>30</sup> Taking into account the numbers of aircraft and helicopters already procured in 2007–2009 plus the procurement plans for 2010, it becomes clear that at least half of the aircraft and helicopters to be bought under SAP-2020 are unfulfilled “backlog” from the SAP-2015 program. It also appears from the announcements already made that the focus of the SAP-2020 aviation segment will be on helicopters.

The following Air Force procurement plans have been unveiled so far (either contracts signed or plans announced by government officials):

- T-50 fifth-generation fighters: 70, including 10 in the initial batch in 2013–2015,<sup>31</sup>
- Su-35S fighters: 48;
- Su-30M2 fighters: 4;
- Su-27SM3 fighters: 12;<sup>32</sup>
- Su-34 frontline bombers: 28 for delivery by 2015 (under a 2008 contract, excluding six scheduled for delivery in 2010);<sup>33</sup>
- Su-25UBM strike-fighters: 16.<sup>34</sup>

In the transport category there is a good likelihood of the Air Force receiving 20 heavy An-124 transports, 50 medium IL-476 aircraft (including aerial refueling tankers), and 60 medium An-70 transports.<sup>35</sup> The SAP-2015 also included plans for ordering a batch of the light IL-112V transports, but in 2010 the MoD announced that this particular program had been put on hold pending revision, so the prospects of this aircraft are now uncertain.<sup>36</sup> The government had also announced plans to order several special-purpose aircraft built on the civilian Tu-214 platform.<sup>37</sup>

The latest state armament program places heavy emphasis on helicopters. The objective is to bring the proportion of new helicopters in the Russian armed forces to 85–90 percent of the fleet.<sup>38</sup> Some 400 helicopters of various types are to be delivered by 2015, mostly the Mi-28N, Ka-52, and Mi-8 models.<sup>39</sup>

In 2010 the government announced plans to procure the Mi-35M attack helicopters and the Mi-26 heavy transports. That same year the MoD placed an order for 22 Mi-35M units, with final deliveries scheduled for 2015.<sup>40</sup> The armed forces will receive 30 new Ka-52A attack helicopters, also by 2015,<sup>41</sup> and large numbers of the Mi-28N attack helicopters. Some 67 units of the Mi-28N were supposed to be delivered under SAP-2015; so far the armed forces have received about 20. In 2006 the government said 10–15 Mi-28 helicopters would be procured each year.<sup>42</sup> Those plans have been confirmed in later statements by the MoD.<sup>43</sup>

The Mi-8 and its various modifications will secure more orders under SAP-2020 than any other helicopter model; dozens will be delivered each year. Judging from the trends in 2009–2010, the MoD will also buy a handful of the Ansat-U, Ka-60, and Ka-27 helicopters in various modifications.

For now there is very little clarity regarding the naval procurement program. The main project of the Russian Navy, the Project 955 strategic nuclear missile submarines and their various modifications, hinges entirely on the still uncertain future of the Bulava SLBM, which these subs are supposed to carry. Three subs of this type are now in various stages of completion; the first sub in the series, the *Yury Dolgoruky*, is, as mentioned, undergoing sea trials. The Bulava now needs to be test-launched from an actual Project 955 submarine. Five boats of this type were supposed to be built under SAP-2015; the whole series was expected to consist of eight.<sup>44</sup> Based on these figures it can be assumed that a minimum of four Project 955 subs will be procured under SAP-2020 in addition to the submarines already being built. But in any event their entry into service will have to wait until problems with the Bulava SLBM are resolved.

In addition to the strategic nuclear missile subs the government also plans to procure multirole nuclear submarines. At present the first Project 855 submarine, the *Severodvinsk*, is being readied for sea trials. The first “mass-produced” boat of this type, the *Kazan*, was laid down in 2009. Previously plans were announced for a total of six Project 855 subs, so the new state armament program will likely allocate funding for four more submarines on top of the *Severodvinsk* and the *Kazan*.<sup>45</sup>

The MoD has also stepped up the procurement of conventional submarines. In addition to two Project 677 subs already being built (the *Sevastopol* and the *Kronshtadt*), plans were announced in 2010 for at least three Project 6363 subs, which will enter service with the Black Sea Fleet. The first of the three, the *Novorossiysk*, was laid down in August 2010.<sup>46</sup>

Less information is available on the government’s plans for new surface ships. The biggest new project here will probably be the procurement and construction of the French Mistral-type amphibious assault ships. The current plan is to buy two from France and build another two in Russia.<sup>47</sup> The contract for the construction of these ships was expected to be signed by the end of 2010.

Another key project is the refurbishment of the Project 11435 heavy aircraft-carrying cruiser, the *Admiral Kuznetsov*. The project is scheduled for 2012–2017. Given the current state of the ship and the planned upgrades, the cost of the project will be very significant.<sup>48</sup>

SAP-2020 will likely include funding for Project 22350 frigates. Two such ships, the *Navy Admiral Gorshkov* and the *Navy Admiral Kasatonov*, have already been laid down. There will also be money for Project 11611 (the *Dagestan*) and at least three frigates similar to the export-version Project 11356; plus Project 20380 corvettes (at least three: the *Boykiy*, the *Stoykiy* and the *Sovershennyy*), and also, in all likelihood, several corvettes of a new project. The demand for these new corvettes is estimated at dozens of units.<sup>49</sup> SAP-2020 will also include funding for the two Project 11711 large landing ships which have already been ordered (one is already being built), five Project 21631 light missile ships (one has been laid down so far), two Project 21630 light gunships (both are already being built), a Project 18280 special communications ship (being built), and a Project 21300 rescue ship (being built).

Finally, the Navy is planning to procure 26 carrier-based MiG-29K fighter jets for the *Admiral Kuznetsov*, which are to replace the existing Su-33 fighters. The scheduled delivery dates are in 2010–2012.<sup>50</sup>

Scarcest of all is information about procurement plans for ground weaponry under the next SAP. It appears that no final decisions have yet been made, as suggested by the well-known interview by Deputy Defense Minister Vladimir Popovkin in April 2010.<sup>51</sup> The deputy minister said that a number of R&D projects in this segment had been shut down, and criticized the technologies used in the weapons currently being procured for the ground forces, including some weapons systems included in SAP-2015 (such as the T-90 tanks and BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicles). It is clear that the procurement plans for the Russian ground troops announced under SAP-2015 are no longer relevant, if only because the structure of the Russian armed forces has changed so much since those plans were drawn up.




## PROSPECTS FOR SAP-2020

Some adjustments will obviously continue to be made to the SAP-2020 program, but the key figures and targets seem to have already been set. Similarly to the SAP-2015 document, the latest program includes a revision mechanism, with the mid-term revision date some time in 2015.

SAP-2020 is fairly detailed and the funding targets are entirely realistic, given the current projections for Russian economic growth and the planned increase in defense spending relative to GDP.

The new program continues to face the traditional risks, such as the inefficient use of resources and high inflation. But the very fact that work on SAP-2020 has already begun indicates that the government and the MoD are gradually adopting a long-term systemic approach to military planning.

Based on the available information, the new state armament program will prioritize large weapons procurement contracts; the relative share of maintenance and R&D in the overall spending will shrink. That strategy appears entirely justified, given the rapid ageing and obsolescence of the Soviet-made hardware still in service. 

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> Y. Koptev, "Defense Industry Development Program must be Synchronized with the Armament Program," Interview, *Izvestiya*, October 4, 2005; Listovsky V., "State Armament Program: 4 trillion Roubles by 2015," *Natsionalnaya Oborona*, 2007, No. 11, p. 30; Nikolsky A., "How to Spend 5 Trillion Roubles," *Vedomosti*, June 5, 2006.

<sup>2</sup> S. Ivanov, "State Armament Program for 2012–2020 to be Approved in late 2010– early 2011," *ITAR-TASS*, October 28, 2010.

<sup>3</sup> A. Moskovsky, Confidence in tomorrow. *Voyenno-Promyshlenny Kuryer*. March 10–16, 2004.

<sup>4</sup> I. Bulavin and I. Safronov, "The President Programs Weapons," *Kommersant*, January 24, 2002.

<sup>5</sup> V. Pimenov, "The Defense Industry Needs a Leader," *Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye*, November 13, 1998.

<sup>6</sup> I. Korotchenko, "Problems of the Implementation of Russia's Defense Technology Policy," *Voyenno-promyshlenny kuryer*. August 25–31, 2004.

<sup>7</sup> K. Lantratov, "Peace-time Budget in War-Time Situation," *Kommersant*, November 24, 2004.

<sup>8</sup> I. Bulavin and I. Safronov, "The President Programs Weapons."

<sup>9</sup> MoD, "R&D to be Prioritized During First Phase of the State Armament Program," *Interfax*, January 29, 2002.

<sup>10</sup> I. Korotchenko, "We Need Concentration of the Government's Powers," *Voyenno-Promyshlenny Kuryer*, March 17–23, 2004.

<sup>11</sup> I. Korotchenko, "Putin Approves Armament Program," *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, January 24, 2002.

<sup>12</sup> V.V. Putin, "The Government will Place Defense Orders with Companies Offering a Competitive product," *ITAR-TASS*, February 17, 2010.

<sup>13</sup> Enlarged session of the MoD council of March 9, 2010. Official website of the Russian President, <<http://www.kremlin.ru>>, last accessed November 15, 2010.

<sup>14</sup> A. Babakin, "MoD has Drafted Four Versions of the State Armament Program," *Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye*. February 25, 2005.

<sup>15</sup> I. Safronov, "Security Council Approves Federal Defense Technology Policy," *Kommersant*. February 26, 2003.

<sup>16</sup> "New Armament Program Prioritizes Rearmament of Permanent-Readiness Combat Units," *ARMS-TASS*, July 12, 2006.

<sup>17</sup> "Defense Industry Commission Prioritizes Three Main Areas of Defense Industry Technology Refresh," *ITAR-TASS*. June 2, 2006.

- <sup>18</sup> "Draft New Armament Program for 2007–2015 to Plough 75 Per Cent of Funding into Weapons Procurement Contracts," *ARMS-TASS*, July 12, 2006.
- <sup>19</sup> I. Granik and I. Konovalov, "Army of Future Ordered to Get Modern," *Kommersant*, May 25, 2010.
- <sup>20</sup> "Russian Rearmament Program to Cost 13 Trillion," *Gazeta.ru*, April 29, 2010, <[http://www.gazeta.ru/politics/2010/04/29\\_kz\\_3359954.shtml](http://www.gazeta.ru/politics/2010/04/29_kz_3359954.shtml)>, last accessed November 15, 2010.
- <sup>21</sup> I. Konovalov, "MoD has Got Money for Rearmament," *Kommersant*, September 22, 2010.
- <sup>22</sup> "One Third of Russian Air Force fleet to be Refreshed by 2015," *Lenta.ru*, November 16, 2010, <<http://lenta.ru/news/2010/11/16/aviation/>>, last accessed November 15, 2010.
- <sup>23</sup> "MoD Estimates State Armament Program Funding Requirement at 36 Trillion Roubles by 2020," *ITAR-TASS*, June 3, 2010.
- <sup>24</sup> Recalculated based on inflation data provided by the Federal Statistics Service, <<http://www.gks.ru>, last accessed November 15, 2010.
- <sup>25</sup> A. Nikolsky, "New Technology Budget," *Vedomosti*, October 12, 2010.
- <sup>26</sup> ICBM output was supposed to double back in 2007. See "Twice as Many Topol-M ICBMs to Enter into Service Each Year after 2009," *ARMS-TASS*, December 17, 2007.
- <sup>27</sup> "Production Run of the Bulava SLMB Could Top 150 Units," *RIA-NOVOSTI*, October 22, 2010.
- <sup>28</sup> "Krasnoyarsk Governor Aleksandr Kholopin Visits a Defense Plant," *REGNUM-news*, February 24, 2008.
- <sup>29</sup> A. Nikolsky, "Flying Apart," *Vedomosti*, March 2, 2010.
- <sup>30</sup> S. Kuskova, "Mass Production Next," *Voyenno-Promyshlenny Kuryer*, June 7–13, 2006.
- <sup>31</sup> "Russian MoD to Place Order for a Minimum of 50 Fifth-Generation Fighters at the First Phase Starting from 2016," *ITAR-TASS*, June 17, 2010.
- <sup>32</sup> "Russian MoD and Sukhoi Sign Three Aircraft Contracts," *ARMS-TASS*, August 18, 2009.
- <sup>33</sup> "Sukhoi to Deliver a Batch of Su-34 Bombers to the Russian Air Force," *Rossiyskaya gazeta*, November 12, 2010, <<http://www.rg.ru/2010/11/12/su-anons.html>>, last accessed November 15, 2010.
- <sup>34</sup> "UUAZ resumes aircraft production <[http://www.infpol.ru/newspaper/number.php?ELEMENT\\_ID=24043](http://www.infpol.ru/newspaper/number.php?ELEMENT_ID=24043)>, last accessed November 15, 2010.
- <sup>35</sup> "OAK Hopes to Supply 20 Upgraded An-124 *Ruslan* Transports to the MoD by 2020," *ARMS-TASS*, December 28, 2009; "Deliveries of Il-476 Transports to Vommence in 2012," *Avia.ru*, July 2, 2010; An-70 Project to Become Part of the State Armament Program 2020," *Interfax-Ukraine*, October 12, 2010.
- <sup>36</sup> D. Kozlov, "Il-112V Program Still Alive," *Aviaport.ru*, November 12, 2010.
- <sup>37</sup> A. Fomin, "The Presidential Fleet Receives the First Tu-214PU," *Vzlet*, 2010, No. 11, p. 35.
- <sup>38</sup> "Vertolety Rossii Holding Company Wins Record MoD Contract for Army Aviation Helicopters," *ARMS-TASS*, May 12, 2010.
- <sup>39</sup> "One Third of Russian Air Force Fleet to be Refreshed by 2015," *Lenta.ru*, November 16, 2010, <<http://lenta.ru/news/2010/11/16/aviation/>>, last accessed November 15, 2010.
- <sup>40</sup> "Rostvertol Plans to Deliver 22 Mo-35M Helicopters Worth 10–12 Billion Dollars to the MoD," *Interfax*, June 7, 2010.
- <sup>41</sup> "Ka-52 Helicopter Enters Mass Production in Russia," *Avia.ru*, August 31, 2010.
- <sup>42</sup> A. Vitkovsky, "Night Hunter Acquires Target," *Parlamentskaya gazeta*, March 7, 2006; "MoD to Buy 12 Ka-52 Helicopters for the Main Intelligence Directorate and Counterterrorism," *ITAR-TASS*, July 12, 2006; "Two New Mi-28N Helicopters Delivered to the Russian Air Force," *ITAR-TASS*, January 22, 2008; A. Frolov, "Execution of the Russian Defense Procurement Program in 2009," *Ekspert vooruzheniy*, 2010, No. 3.
- <sup>43</sup> "Double the Blades Span," *Expert Online*, June 8, 2010, <[http://ns3.raexpert.ru/2010/06/8/udvoit\\_razmah/](http://ns3.raexpert.ru/2010/06/8/udvoit_razmah/)>, last accessed November 15, 2010.
- <sup>44</sup> S. Babkin, "Two Hundred Military Units to Receive New Hardware by 2015," *ITAR-TASS*, June 2, 2006; *Krasnaya Zvezda*, April 17, 2007.
- <sup>45</sup> "OAO Armalit-1 Contracts for 2010 include Large Russian Navy Orders," <<http://www.armalit1.ru/p2/140/index.html>>, last accessed November 15, 2010).





<sup>46</sup> L. Frolov, "Three Project 636.3 Non-Nuclear Submarines to Enter Service with the Black Sea Fleet by 2014," *ITAR-TASS*, August 28, 2010.

<sup>47</sup> A. Nikolskiy, "Sailors Included," *Vedomosti*, November 15, 2010.

<sup>48</sup> "Heavy Aircraft Carrying Cruiser the Soviet Union Navy Admiral Kuznetsov to Undergo Deep Upgrades," *Lenta.ru*, April 2, 2010, <<http://lenta.ru/news/2010/04/02/juggernaut/>>, last accessed November 15, 2010.

<sup>49</sup> D. Belikov and I. Konovalov, "MoD Gathering Corvettes," *Kommersant*, August 23, 2010.

<sup>50</sup> "Russian Navy to Buy 26 Mig-29K Fighters," *Lenta.ru*, April 27, 2010, <<http://lenta.ru/news/2010/04/23/mig29k/>>, last accessed November 15, 2010.

<sup>51</sup> N. Poroskov, "A Tank that Costs as Much as a City," *Vremya Novostey*, April 13, 2010.



## RUSSIA'S FOREIGN POLICY IN THE PACIFIC REGION

*In 2010 the "eastern vector" of Russia's foreign policy underwent a conceptual rethinking. What are the results of Russia's efforts to establish itself more firmly in Asia Pacific? What are the specifics of Moscow's relations with countries and organizations in the region? What are the obstacles Russia is facing as it tries to integrate itself into the regional context, and what are the tasks that must be addressed to facilitate productive cooperation with countries in Asia Pacific?*

*PIR Center and the International Affairs journal with the support of the Russian Foreign Ministry have held a round table headlined "Asian Vector of Russia's Foreign Policy: Outcomes of 2010 and Future Outlook".<sup>1</sup> The participants in the discussion were: Deputy Director of the Asia-Pacific Cooperation Department at the Russian Foreign Ministry Kirill **Barsky**; Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia Alexey **Borodavkin**;<sup>2</sup> Director of Third Asian Department in Russian MFA Mikhail **Galuzin**; Head of the Center for East Asian and Shanghai Cooperation Organization Studies at the Moscow State Institute of Foreign Affairs (MGIMO) Alexander **Lukin**; Executive Director of the Rysskiy Mir Foundation Vyacheslav **Nikonov**; Editor-in-Chief of the International Affairs journal Armen **Oganesyan**; PIR Center President Vladimir **Orlov**; Rector of the Diplomatic Academy of the Russian MFA Alexander **Panov**; Chief Specialist of the International Cooperation Department of the State Atomic Energy Corporation Rosatom Vadim **Pestov**; Director of the ASEAN Center at MGIMO Victor **Sumsky**; Vice-President of the Unity for Russia Foundation and Head of the Korea programs at the Institute of Economics of RAS George **Toloraya**; and Head of the Korea and Mongolia Department in the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS) Alexander **Vorontsov**.<sup>3</sup>*

**VLADIMIR ORLOV (PIR CENTER):** Russia is a Euro-Pacific nation, and it has taken a strategic course towards restoring the balance between the European and Pacific vectors of its foreign policy. The government has also adopted a plan of action to implement the Strategy of Social and Economic Development of Russia's Far East and the Baikal region until 2025. Now the main issue on the agenda is to move on from declarations and general planning to practical work. Naturally, Russia's foreign policy should aim to support our domestic policy in the country's eastern provinces.

Russian foreign policy-makers are trying not to waste any time here, and the year 2010 has been very productive. The highlight was the Russian President's trip to the APEC summit and the Russia-ASEAN summit. Russia is laying the foundation for future cooperation with countries in the region. That foundation should be firmly in place by 2012, the year of Russia's breakthrough in Asia Pacific, when it will host the APEC summit in Vladivostok.

How much has been done in 2010 to strengthen that foundation?

### STRATEGIC MANEUVER OF RUSSIA

**ALEXEY BORODAVKIN (MFA):** Last year was busy and productive for Russia's diplomacy in the East. Our foreign policy in the Asia Pacific Region was based on the understanding that the future of our country depends on cooperation with countries in this region, which is increasingly



R  
O  
U  
N  
D  
T  
A  
B  
L  
E

becoming one of the centers of gravity of global development, and that there is no alternative to making Russia's economy part of the regional integration processes, which are steadily gaining momentum.

It is very important that we have offered our partners a positive agenda that can bring us together. Russia was not seeking some unilateral advantages; it was not trying to capitalize on the existing differences. It reaffirmed its role by being open to cooperation with every country in the region that wants such cooperation. That is the key to raising our country's profile in Asia Pacific as a key factor of strategic stability and steady economic growth.

One of the highlights of last year was the joint foreign policy initiative by Russia and China on improving the security and cooperation architecture in Asia Pacific. The essence of the initiative is that countries in the region should build their policy on the premise of shared security and renounce any attempts to strengthen their own security to the detriment of the security of their neighbors. These new approaches to security in Asia Pacific can help the region to get rid of the confrontational heritage of the Cold War and prevent the appearance of new division lines in the region, which can jeopardize the future integration and common development goals of the Asia Pacific nations.

We expect that dialogue on this topical issue will continue at the East Asia Summit (EAS), ASEAN Regional Forum on Security (ARF), meetings of the defense ministers of ASEAN and its dialogue partners, and other regional venues. An important role in developing the concept of regional security in Asia Pacific belongs to the expert community working in the second-track format, i.e. venues such as the Council for Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific (CSCAP) and the Shangri-La Dialogue conferences.

Meanwhile, Asian countries have significantly increased direct investment into the Russian economy. I am talking about Siberia and the Far East, as well as the European part of Russia. For example, Komatsu, a Japanese mining and construction equipment maker, has launched a new plant in Yaroslavl. South Korea's Hyundai has opened a car plant just outside St. Petersburg. Asia-Pacific companies have begun to invest in Russia's oil and gas sector. Our partners in the region have shown great interest in the Russian privatization program for 2011–2013.

Russia's cultural and humanitarian contacts with its eastern neighbors also became more meaningful in 2010. More than 200 separate events were held as part of the Year of the Chinese Language in Russia. A program of cultural exchanges for 2010–2012 was signed with India. New Russian Centers of Science and Culture are being opened in the region. As part of the project to set up the Shanghai Cooperation University, member-states have launched a pilot program of training Master's-level specialists at 62 higher education establishments in the region's countries using an agreed curriculum. The ASEAN Center has been inaugurated in Moscow. Four new centers of the *Russkiy Mir* Foundation were set up in Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh, Shanghai, and Dalian. There are also growing tourism exchanges between the Asia Pacific countries.

On the whole, 2010 has been a good year for Russia's foreign policy in Asia. We are beginning to see practical results from the efforts to turn Russia eastwards in accordance with the objectives set out by President Dmitry Medvedev following the July 2, 2010 meeting in Khabarovsk to discuss the social and economic development of Russia's Far East and strengthen Russia's positions in Asia Pacific.

**KIRILL BARSKY (MFA):** Asia Pacific is a region which, unlike Europe, does not have a common security system, no Helsinki Act, and no security and cooperation organization. As such, that region needs some kind of flexible, multi-layer, multi-dimensional architecture that would be open, equitable, and transparent, based on the principles and norms of international law, and take into account as much as possible the interests of every country in the region. These are the ideas that we have invited all the countries in Asia Pacific to work on in the years to come.

Similar ideas have been proposed by other countries in the region. Meanwhile, the initiative we have proposed jointly with China has attracted interest from India and other ASEAN partners.

In general, conditions for Russia (and for the promotion of its initiatives) in the region are favorable. We have longstanding relations of friendship and partnership with a whole number of countries in Asia Pacific, including the key countries such as China, India, and Vietnam. We are actively pursuing cooperation with ASEAN countries and with South Korea. We have a whole plan of action on information support of our foreign policy in Asia Pacific, which will help us to achieve a

more favorable perception of Russia and its policies in the region. That plan of action, by the way, is one of the outcomes of the already mentioned meeting in Khabarovsk.

Our Chinese partners are interested in Russia establishing a stronger position in the region. They truly see us as close partners on many issues of the global agenda, on our vision of modern world order, and on security issues. The Chinese are interested in cooperating with us. For now, we are not strong enough in Asia and in the Pacific Region to be a competitor to China.

India too is interested in Russia's active involvement in regional affairs. The Indians also have their doubts about the ascendance of certain countries in the region, and they would be happy for Russia to act as a sort of counterbalance. India wants our support in securing APEC membership, something they have long aspired to, and in a whole number of other areas.

As for the ASEAN countries, the entire policy of that regional group is based on maintaining a balance of power. ASEAN wants all the outside powers, as well as regional powers, to conduct a balanced and well-thought-out policy here. In that way, ASEAN strengthens its own role in the region and stabilizes the situation as a whole.

The whole region has founds itself between the hammer of the United States and the anvil of China. Nobody wants a conflict between these two countries. On the other hand, everyone wants there to be some system of checks and balances to help countries in the region pursue their interests while avoiding conflicts between the great powers. That is why the initiative on creating a security architecture is so topical. There are reasons to believe that this initiative has a future.

**VYACHESLAV NIKONOV (RUSSKIY MIR FOUNDATION):** It is true that 2010 was the year when Russia's foreign policy turned around to face the east, the Asia Pacific Region. At the already mentioned meeting on social and economic development of the Far East in Khabarovsk in 2010, the Russian President tasked the Cabinet and the Foreign Ministry with developing a new strategy of strengthening Russia's position in Asia Pacific. That certainly reflects the mega-trends which are taking place in the world and which have been given additional momentum by the world economic crisis.

The key mega-trend is the shifting of the global center of power to Asia Pacific. Countries in the region are becoming the engine of the global civilization, taking over the role which has been played by Europe over the past 500 years. Asia Pacific already accounts for 60 percent of global GDP and about 40 percent of global investment, and these figures keep growing. Asia Pacific is home to the three largest economies in the world: the United States, China, and Japan. Exactly half the countries of the G20 are in Asia Pacific—and of those 10, only Mexico is not an Asian country. Average GDP growth figures in Asia Pacific are much higher than in other countries of the world, in the developed countries. While the European countries are going through yet another crisis, and while the EU's economy is unlikely to grow by more than 1.5 percent, growth in all the countries of Asia Pacific is over 7 percent; in some countries in the region the figure is over 12 percent.

For Russia this strategic maneuver is extremely important, because tying our economy to Europe, which now accounts for 60 percent of our foreign trade, is a trap for Russia in many ways. The depth of our own economic crisis owed much to how hugely dependent we are on demand for our energy in the EU.

The Asian part of the Asia Pacific Region is also a very important global test bed for a distinct model of political modernization that is seen not as pure Westernization, but as a special path of development based on the synthesis of democratic forms of government and local political culture. The region is very important from the point of view of the conflict potential that it has, the multiplying security challenges, and threats that directly affect Russian interests. I am talking primarily about the Korean problem, where tensions are growing rapidly. Another problem is the old disputes over territories in the East China and South China Seas, which are also coming to the fore. The South China Sea is becoming a focus of the geopolitical interests of the world's greatest powers. Many border disputes there remain unresolved. There is a very serious danger of internal political instability in several countries in the region.

The region is also important because that is where the focus of military-political rivalry between the global powers is now shifting. The top five countries with the world's largest armies (the United States, China, India, North Korea, and Russia) are all in Asia Pacific. Military spending and military potentials in the region are rising sharply. In the developed countries the process is just the



opposite. Meanwhile, the United States, China, Japan, India, and South Korea are in the lead in terms of increasing military spending. That is why any single one of the conflicts simmering just under the surface could blow up into a serious crisis. These regional conflicts therefore require careful attention.

The concept of Russia being a Euro-Pacific country is much more promising than defining Russia as a purely European or Eurasian country. The Eurasian concept would draw us southwards, while the Euro-Pacific orientation opens up prospects for greater cooperation with all the leading global powers. The policy of transforming Russia into a truly Euro-Pacific nation (the only other such nation is the United States, there are no others) must address three main tasks.

The first task is to develop Russia's own Far East, making use of the rapid growth in the neighboring countries, so that later on we could use the increased potential of that part of Russia to maximize our influence in Asia Pacific. The second task is to turn Russia into an important component of the Asia Pacific Region's economy—and I mean the whole of Russia, not just the Russian Far East. And the third task is to strengthen our role as a key geopolitical and geo-economic player in Asia Pacific, as an important participant in the regional migration processes and collective security mechanisms.

Cooperation with the Asia Pacific Region is a crucially important priority of Russian foreign policy and the policy of developing Russia's Far East. That is an unconditional imperative.

Another important thing to consider is the demographics. The population of the Russian Far Eastern territories to the east of Lake Baikal is seven million people. The population of China's border provinces is 280 million people. There are 24 million people in North Korea and 50 million in South Korea. The Philippines has the same territory as Russia's Kamchatka, and a population of 95 million, adding two or three million every year. Let alone the 85 million people in Vietnam, where Russian is hardly ever spoken these days.

In 2010 the Russian committee of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) prepared a report on the Asia Pacific strategy. The report has already been published. It ends with the following conclusion: "In the late 1990s Chinese politicians unofficially put forward the following strategy: draw strength from the North, stabilize the West, go South. Russia could formulate its geopolitical strategy for the coming decade in the following way: draw strength from the West, stabilize the South, go East." The West is the source of modern technology and high-quality investment. The South is the source of the main security threats. The East, meanwhile, is a growing center of the modern world, a huge market for our exports and a place of excellent opportunities for integration and comprehensive cooperation.

## **DOES ASIA PACIFIC NEED RUSSIA?**

**MIKHAIL GALUZIN (MFA):** From the point of view of Russian regional interests, i.e. Russia's deeper integration into the Asia Pacific Region, especially in the modernization and innovation segments, in according with the tasks set out by the Russian leadership, the year 2010 has been quite productive. Russia has strengthened its positions in Asia Pacific, including the political and economic aspects. We should not rest on our laurels, there is still a lot of work to be done—but we have already achieved some tangible results.

The preliminary results, which are, nevertheless, distinctly positive, were made possible by a combination of our own efforts and a favorable regional situation.

Many countries in Southeast Asia and Oceania are recovering from the world economic crisis very rapidly; they have once again stepped up the search for an optimal model of regional security, and Russia is once again in high demand. For all the obvious difficulties of Russia's integration into the Asia Pacific Region, we are seen as a very promising market and investment destination. In certain segments, we are seen as a potential investor, and as a supplier of energy. Besides, many countries see us as a significant factor of stability in the complex military-political situation in the region. Here we are feeling the effects of the new global challenges (proliferation of WMD, international terrorism, transnational crime, etc.) and of the old regional problems and dormant conflicts (from the Korean nuclear problem to territorial disputes in the South China Sea).

This growing demand for Russia in the region is manifesting itself in developments such as Russia's accession to the East Asia Summit, our participation in the Asia-Europe Forum dialogue,

our growing profile in APEC and the ASEAN countries' growing interest in cooperation with us, as demonstrated by the second Russia–ASEAN summit. In many cases these things were made possible by greater cooperation in the high-tech innovation segments with these countries.

We have significantly strengthened our strategic partnership with Vietnam. A number of agreements were reached during the Russian president's visit to Hanoi in October 2010, including cooperation in developing nuclear energy in Vietnam, with Russia's technical and financial assistance.

We have continued to develop our cooperation with Singapore based on the agreements reached by the Russian president and the Singaporean government in November 2009. The country is an important economic, technological and financial hub in the region. A high-level bilateral commission co-chaired by Deputy Prime Minister Vyacheslav Volodin began its work in September 2010. We have signed an agreement on mutual protection of investment. Another important thing is that we are working closely with Singapore to implement here in Russia the country's truly groundbreaking experience in creating a system of electronic government. That is extremely important to us.

We have significantly stepped up our relations with Australia and New Zealand, which until recently, and for a number of reasons beyond our control, were not as active as we would have liked.

We have established close, friendly, and constructive contacts with the new Labour Government in Australia following the Russian President's meeting with the Australian Prime Minister in Seoul in November 2010. We have also completed the ratification of the Russian–Australian agreement on peaceful nuclear energy cooperation.

With New Zealand, we have established really close contacts with the country's government and launched a new project that is quite unique for Russia. We have started official dialogue on signing a free trade agreement between the Customs Union (Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan) and New Zealand. Russian experts believe that the project could yield substantial dividends, because the New Zealand economy is firmly integrated into the Asia Pacific Region's economy.

Naturally, in terms of the scale and strategic significance, Japan remains a key country. Unfortunately, our relations with Japan are still burdened by the difficult heritage of the past, i.e. Japan's territorial claims to Russia. The damage this factor can do to the climate of our relations was demonstrated by the Japanese reaction to President Dmitry Medvedev's visit to Kunashir Island. But even despite these tensions and despite the difficult and sensitive border issue between our two countries, our bilateral cooperation is still showing gradual progress, especially in terms of trade. During a meeting between the Russian President and Japanese Prime Minister Naoto Kan on the sidelines of the APEC summit in Yokohama in November 2010, the two leaders agreed to step up bilateral relations in such areas as trade and economic ties, cooperation in the Asia Pacific Region, and closer coordination on the international arena as a whole. Such a format of our relations can create a more favorable climate for future dialogue on the peace treaty. The two leaders agreed to continue that dialogue.

**ALEXANDER PANOV (DIPLOMATIC ACADEMY):** The situation with Japan shows that we have not been doing enough to improve our relations with Tokyo, or maybe even not doing anything at all. All these festivals of ours, all the stunts with Tshiburashkas [Russian cartoon character—Ed.] in Japan, they have not produced the results we had hoped for. They have not changed Japan's attitude to Russia. Meanwhile, our own attitude to Japan has always been, "So what about Japan? They can't do us any real harm, and we can't make a lot of money doing business with Japan, either. So let us just ignore it." But Japan is important to us not just as an economic or technology partner, but as a counterbalance in our relations with China. That is quite obvious. So what is to be done in this situation?

We should not be talking just with the Japanese government. The problem is, we know next to nothing about Japan's political elite, especially the current crop of its political leaders. We have not had any close contacts with them. Who are these people in the Japanese government and in the ruling party? What is the balance of power in Japan? We have next to no contacts with the Japanese media, or the Japanese scientists, apart from those we have known for 30 or 40 years. We need to establish broader dialogue with the Japanese.



The second problem is the unresolved territorial dispute. It may actually be good that tensions have increased again [over the Kuril Islands—Ed.] because they have highlighted our differences with the Japanese. But we really do need to start some kind of dialogue, to pick up where we left off in the late 1990s and early 2000s. We need to try to draw them into some kind of dialogue, even if that dialogue focuses on the islands.

In the general regional context, the situation with Japan could have some rather undesirable consequences. There are some regional organizations of which Russia is not yet a member but would like to join, such as the Asian Development Bank. But, given the state of our relations with Japan, we are unlikely to receive an invitation to join any time soon. Let us recall that the Japanese had been opposed to our APEC membership as well, and withdrew their objections only after the meeting in Krasnoyarsk in 1997.

Now let us talk about more general issues. I agree with my colleagues' assessment that 2010 has been a very successful year for our foreign policy in terms of strengthening our positions in Asia Pacific. We have finally been admitted to the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) and the East Asia Summit. For many years our foreign policy, hobbled by scant diplomatic, political, and economic resources, has been working to achieve Russia's recognition in the region as an Asia-Pacific nation.

Another problem is that we have been adopting concept after concept, strategy after strategy—but very little changes in practice. Now we are creating yet another concept, which we hope will be the right one. But there is no longer any need to persuade anyone that Russia should establish its presence in the East. Everyone agrees with that. The question is how to achieve that, and what should be done? Here things are much less clear. What exactly do we mean by the much talked about integration into the Asia Pacific Region? We want to enter the region, but we do not allow anyone to enter Russia. That is our true approach to integration. And that is felt very clearly in the Far East. Any attempts by foreigners to do business in Russia are being rejected. The problem is, our entire economic model rejects innovation and modernization. Why should things be any different in the Far East? The APEC summit will come and go, and everyone will forget about it. The only thing that will remain is the bridge to Russkiy Island (for which there is no real need), and that beautiful university as well.

I have been researching this field for more than 20 years. Unfortunately, I don't believe that any radical shift is under way in the Russian policy in the Far East. Hope springs eternal, of course—and maybe this latest concept that is being developed now will actually change the situation. But I have no great optimism in that regard.

### **CENTRAL PROBLEM: KOREAN PENINSULA**

**PANOV:** Clearly, we want to firmly establish our position at all the forums, we want to propose our initiatives and be noticed. But do we actually need all that energetic activity at all these forums? Maybe we should focus on supporting the initiatives proposed by the region's nations, instead of pretending that we know better than everyone else what needs to be done in the region? On the other hand, there are a number of problems where we could and should adopt a more energetic stance.

One of those problems is the Korean peninsula. There has been another bout of tensions, but the only proposal on the table is to go back to the Six-Party talks. Who are these six parties? They have clearly failed to prevent the nuclear tests in North Korea. They have failed to achieve any tangible progress, although there have been some interesting proposals. They have failed to produce the results everyone had expected, and the crisis on the Korean peninsula is a clear demonstration of the fact that the Six Parties can do nothing, no matter how hard we try to resurrect these talks—provided that they can actually be resurrected at all. Of course, it is always difficult to throw away the old briefcase; it did actually have some potential. But why not try to adopt some new approach to the talks?

The nuclear problem is an important problem to China, Japan, South Korea, and the United States. But it is not an important one to North Korea itself. It is just a card Pyongyang tries to play. And until the North gets what it wants, it will keep brandishing that card. That is why we need to formulate a new agenda for the Six-Party talks or for a broader format. The question should be, how do we pick up where we left off in 1953? We need to replace the truce with a proper peace

treaty, and resolve all the problems linked to that issue. If we could formulate a proposal jointly with China, North Korea would agree to such talks, because such an agenda would be in its own interests.

**ALEXANDER VORONTSOV (RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES):** The year 2012 will be an important year for North Korea: they will be celebrating Kim Il-sung's 100th birthday.

Some people are laboring under the delusion that a change of regime is possible in North Korea, that we need only push a little harder. It seems that the decision-makers in Seoul have been counting on such an approach in the last few months even more than they had before. Meanwhile, the United States has stepped up its efforts to contain China; the instruments used by Washington include bringing military infrastructure closer to China's borders. The Korean problem is an excellent excuse to step up military maneuvers, which have been going on non-stop. There is a mistaken belief in Seoul that ousting the regime in Pyongyang is something that not only can be done but actually must be done. Washington has used this to put extra pressure on China. They have tried to break North Korea away from China and show to Beijing that the price of supporting Pyongyang is becoming too high.

Although the North Korean regime is quite stable internally, all these factors can lead to the worst-case scenario. We hope things will not come to that. But, unfortunately, there is a growing likelihood of the worst-case scenario materializing, i.e. of a large conflict on the Korean peninsula, which would complicate our APEC summit in 2012 and jeopardize the development of Russia's Far East.

We need to pay attention to maintaining the status quo on the Korean peninsula. A change of regime in North Korea achieved through the use of force would not be in our interests. In order to resolve that problem we need to step up our traditional policy. We need not only declarations but some tangible steps to steer that conflict into the path of negotiations and diplomacy.

**GEORGE TOLORAYA (RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES):** What was the reason for the latest bout of tensions on the Korean peninsula? In 2008 South Korea's conservative government adopted a policy of pressure. That policy of pressure and isolation was based on the conservatives' confidence that the North Korean regime was doomed, that Kim Jong-il was having health problems, and that the problem of succession had not been resolved. The situation with the nuclear problem was getting worse, which gave a pretext to apply sanctions to North Korea and try to isolate it. Some circles in South Korea had decided that the fall of the regime was imminent, and that they needed to make serious preparations for reunification—or, at the very least, for serious practical steps in that direction.

It is surprising that the South Koreans were saying all that to the Americans. According to a diplomatic cable published on WikiLeaks, the South Korean president's security assistant was trying to persuade the Americans that the Chinese would accept the reunification of Korea on Seoul's terms, that the Chinese were fed up with the North, and a last big push was required to resolve the problem once and for all. That shows that the South Koreans had totally misunderstood the real situation and that their analysis was absolutely inadequate. For 20 years now they have been waiting for the regime to collapse any minute—but the regime is still there, and it looks unlikely to collapse any time soon.

North Korea was put into a situation where, out of its rather meager arsenal of foreign policy instruments, it was forced to resort to the most potent one: the policy of escalation, military threats, and provocation. All of that was exacerbated by problems with the transition of power. The North Korean government needed to look strong and decisive. The incident with the *Cheonan* in March 2010 was used to unleash an unprecedented campaign of isolation and pressure against the North in an effort to make the regime capitulate. North Korea simply had no other choice but to use the instruments that were available to it—namely, military force. That is the real explanation for the Enphendo incident in November 2010. The nature of that incident was not some ideological or deep political-military confrontation between the North and the South. It was a plain and simple territorial dispute, of which there are dozens in Asia and in other corners of the globe. Each party has its reasons to believe that it is right, but from the point of view of international law North Korea's position in this particular dispute seems more justified.

The United States has clearly tried to make use of that incident as a pretext to force China to play second fiddle on the issue of security in North Korea. That was a dangerous precedent. Our experts and decision-makers need to watch that process closely and use all the available





opportunities to forecast the situation and protect our interests using purely diplomatic means, including contacts in the international organizations.

In 2010 it became clear that it is too early to consign *hard power* to the dustbin of history and rely solely on economic instruments and *soft power* to resolve all the problems. Growing tensions in the Korean conflict and in the territorial conflict between Japan and China, the situation in the South China Sea and with the other border conflicts, and America's now obvious intention to contain China through instruments that include a certain structure of alliances and military presence along the perimeter of China's borders—all these developments indicate that Asian security issues play an important role in regional relations.

Speaking about Russia's Far East, we need to remember that it became Russian territory only two or three hundred years ago. For the Asian countries, whose history goes back thousands of years, that is not a long historical period. We must not discount that factor. We need to realize that this can be a source of threats, including military threats. The region could become a scene of bitter conflict. If the situation deteriorates on the Korean peninsula—if, for example, the United States continues its policy of pressure—we could be faced with a conflict which is beyond our control, but whose repercussions will affect us in a big way. So the question is, how effective are the multilateral security mechanisms?

We need to make a distinction between the PR efforts, between the methods of public diplomacy and the real opportunities to resolve problems, the existing channels that do not always work in a public way. It is extremely important to create a network of a multitude of organizations that serve as a venue for experts and officials to meet and discuss the most serious issues. The first meeting of the ministers of defense that took place in 2010 was a very important event, and we need to be fully involved in these processes.

So far, economically Russia is still a dwarf, and it will not become a leader in Asia any time soon. But Russia has political weight, and it can play an important role as a counterbalance and a great power with formidable diplomatic potential. Russia is needed in Asia Pacific, even though its resources are limited. We need to take part in many processes and we need to make our position clear.

## THE ROLE OF THE ECONOMY

**BORODAVKIN:** It is important to note that our trade with the Asian countries has already surpassed the pre-crisis levels. In the first 10 months of 2010 Russia's trade with the Asia Pacific Region had reached over \$120 billion, a 35 percent rise on the same period in 2009. The figures are even more impressive with some individual countries in the region. For example, our trade with China and South Korea is expected to more than double in 2010 compared with the previous year. On the whole, our trade with Asia Pacific has been growing much faster than with other parts of the world in 2010.

In the East, Russia is beginning to form modernization alliances with a whole number of technologically advanced countries. One example is the interest in the Skolkovo project expressed by South Korea, China, Japan, India, and Singapore.

We have successfully pursued large-scale bilateral economic projects in cooperation with our neighbors in the Asia Pacific Region. We have launched the Skovorodino–Daqing oil pipeline between Russia and China. We have stepped up nuclear energy cooperation with China, India, Iran, Vietnam, Mongolia, Australia, Japan, and Bangladesh. We are expanding space cooperation with China, India, Japan, and South Korea. We have signed an agreement with India on the joint use of Russia's GLONASS global satellite navigation system. Our supplies of liquefied natural gas to South Korea and Japan from the gas fields in Sakhalin have been growing steadily. Another testimony to the growing level of Russian–Chinese financial and economic cooperation is the beginning of the rouble–yuan trading on the Moscow Interbank Currency Exchange and the Shanghai Stock Exchange. As a result we have been able to start using our national currencies in bilateral transactions.

Another landmark event was the start of the free trade talks between the members of the Customs Union (Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan) and New Zealand. This is a pilot project which will give a new impetus to Russia's involvement in the liberalization of trade and investment in Asia Pacific, especially taking into account the prospects for Russia's WTO membership.

Other important developments for Russia's policy in Asia Pacific included our accession to the EAS; our participation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization; our work at the APEC forum and preparations for the APEC summit in Vladivostok in 2012; our relations with India and China in the RIC format (Russia-India-China), and our accession to the Asia-Europe Forum.

**VADIM PESTOV (ROSATOM):** Despite the negative repercussions of the world economic crisis, nuclear energy is once again on the agenda in many countries throughout the world, in what has been termed *nuclear renaissance*. Many nations are now assessing the potential of nuclear energy. According to the IAEA, about 60 countries have declared their intention to pursue nuclear energy programs. That is why one of *Rosatom's* priorities in the coming years is the development of peaceful nuclear energy cooperation with other countries. That includes the construction of nuclear energy infrastructure and exports of nuclear technologies and services. In 2010 Russia and *Rosatom* signed more than 20 bilateral agreements and memorandums on peaceful use of nuclear energy.

The greatest interest in developing peaceful nuclear energy programs has been demonstrated by countries in Asia Pacific, where some of the nations already have a powerful nuclear industry, such as South Korea, Japan, China, and India, as well as newcomer states such as Vietnam and Bangladesh.

During President Medvedev's official visit to Vietnam in October 2010 our two countries signed an intergovernmental agreement on the construction of Vietnam's first nuclear power plant. We are also negotiating a similar agreement with Bangladesh. We have signed a number of bilateral agreements with India and China, which are already building nuclear power plants. We are also working with regional organizations in Asia Pacific.

On July 5–7, 2010 a *Rosatom* delegation took part in the second regional forum of ASEAN countries, where it conducted a presentation of Russian nuclear technologies and spoke about Russian experience in building power plants abroad. As part of the preparations for the second Russia-ASEAN summit on September 29–30, 2010, a *Rosatom* delegation took part in a science and technology seminar headlined "Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy in Asia Pacific". The seminar was held to promote Russia's potential for cooperation with ASEAN countries in peaceful use of nuclear energy and to advertise Russia's innovative nuclear technologies in areas such as the construction of nuclear power plants, nuclear research centers, and other nuclear facilities in Russia and abroad. The agenda also included science and technology aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle, development of nuclear legislation and regulations in compliance with the IAEA requirements and guidelines, training of specialists for the nuclear energy industry, and commercialization of nuclear technologies in industries such as isotopes, nuclear medicine, water treatment, and others.

We are now developing and pursuing proposals aimed at expanding our science and technology cooperation, technology exchange, and commercialization of the most promising Russian technologies in Southeast Asia. We are also working to develop an effective mechanism for establishing direct contacts in this area, and fostering public-private partnership. Russia is ready to enter international markets with competitive high-tech offerings. We have a lot of international experience in implementing nuclear energy projects in other countries, and we continue to increase our participation in the leading multilateral organizations in Asia Pacific.

**GALUZIN:** The year 2010 brought us many tangible and successful examples, albeit on a fairly limited scale, of Russian companies working in the high-tech segments of the Southeast Asian economies.

Russia's *Vympelkom* is becoming one of the leading operators of cell phone networks in Southeast Asia, steadily increasing its presence in mobile phone and other telecommunications markets. We have made a good start on selling the *Sukhoi* company's Super-Jet aircraft in the region, and on a number of other projects.

We expect the trends that prevailed in 2010 in our bilateral relations with countries in Southeast Asia to continue in 2011 in the run-up to the upcoming APEC summit in Russia, reaffirming our strategy of increasing our presence in Asia Pacific and our role in the economic integration and political cooperation organizations in the region.

As we all know, the Sakhalin projects have made a good start. In Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk we have built, jointly with Japan, Asia's largest LNG plant. And that is just the beginning. The task for the future is



cooperation for emergency response in Asia. We have things to offer here. Finally, we have some promising projects in the telecommunications sector with countries such as Japan.

Although we have things to offer in this region, for now we have not achieved as much as we would have liked in terms of tangible, detailed, and well-thought-out strategic projects.

## PROBLEMS AND FORECASTS

**ORLOV:** There is a whole number of domestic problems that hamper Russia's foreign policy progress in Asia Pacific.

The first problem is obvious: I am talking about the geography, about the difficulties of governing and developing a region that lies 9,000 km away from the Russian capital.

The second problem is the demographics. The population of Russia's Far East is only seven million people, concentrated mostly in the big cities that are separated by an average distance of 400km. The problem of demographics is compounded by the problems and challenges of migration—and here the question is, should we view migration as a problem or as a possible solution?

Third, although Russia has formulated a clear agenda for its Far East, it is not at all clear that Russia has a clear development strategy for the region.

And fourth, with very few exceptions, we are not offering any large-scale and attractive strategic projects that are important to the region as a whole, to central Russia, and to our Pacific neighbors in equal measure. That is one more reason to discuss today not only problems—although that is a very interesting subject—but opportunities as well. There is no doubt that we have plenty of opportunities to become part of the twenty-first century, the century of Asia-Pacific, claiming a worthy place for ourselves rather than playing the role of a junior partner.

**NIKONOV:** One extremely important area is the social and economic development of Siberia and the Far East as part of the integrated Russian industrial complex. That strategy was approved by the Russian Cabinet in December 2009; I mean the strategy of social and economic development of the Far East and the Baikal region until 2025.

The region's proximity to the huge and rapidly growing Asian markets offers great opportunities for modernizing the Russian economy, ramping up our exports, attracting more investment, setting up joint ventures, and bringing high-tech projects to Russia by making our economy part of the integrated regional and global economy. That is a matter of priority.

Prior to the world economic crisis in 2008, only 5.8 percent of foreign direct investment into the Russian economy originated in Asia Pacific. But the crisis has changed the situation very radically. The flow of Western investment into Russia has dried up; there has been a sharp decline. Meanwhile, the volume of foreign investments in the Russian economy originating from Asia Pacific has tripled. It now makes up 21 percent of the total. That is a truly impressive growth. The situation is changing right before our eyes.

The potential areas of our cooperation are very diverse. Our traditional exports to the Asia Pacific countries are energy (oil and petroleum products, coal), primary metals, timber, and marine bioresources. In the next few years we can also add electricity and natural gas to that list. But for now, Russia is not a significant actor in the regional markets for energy or raw materials. Our share of these markets is tiny. Russian exports account for only 1.7 percent of the region's consumption of oil, 0.002 percent of gas, and 0.8 percent of coal. And these are our main exports to the region.

While paying close attention to strengthening our traditional exports, we need to win a share of the Asia Pacific markets for new high-tech products and services. We need to pursue innovation projects in high-tech industries.

We have already discussed nuclear energy and nuclear fuel cycle projects. One potential market here is Vietnam. But Japan is also working hard to enter the Vietnam market. We have won a \$5.5 billion contract. Meanwhile, the contracts that went to Japan are worth over \$14 billion. The Japanese are offering credit financing on their nuclear contracts, while Russia is yet to confirm that we can extend a similar credit facility. Meanwhile, other countries in Southeast Asia

are watching our first foray into the region very closely, including countries such as Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, and the Philippines, where *Rosatom* also hopes to win nuclear contracts.

We have great potential for space industry cooperation with countries in the region in areas such as building space launch sites in South Korea, making space launchers and rocket engines (Japan and South Korea), and offering commercial space launch services (Japan, South Korea, India, Malaysia, and Indonesia).

Another important program is to encourage companies in the region to build their high-tech industrial facilities in Russia, and to stimulate the imports of technologies and high-tech equipment into our country. We already have great experience in the car industry: almost all the large Asian producers are working in Russia. There are new pilot projects being discussed now in pharmaceuticals, medical equipment, electronics, engineering tools, and transport machinery.

There are also projects to upgrade the Russian shipyards to enable them to build large ships, including LNG tankers, and to upgrade the Russian chemical industry in partnership with companies from Japan, South Korea, and other countries. There are plans to make greater use of Russia's transit potential, especially the trans-Siberian railway, and a proposal to export grain to Asia Pacific via the Russian ports in the Far East. Right now we do not have any grain shipment facilities in the Far Eastern sea ports. Meanwhile, APEC countries account for 38 percent of world grain imports.

It is very important to position Russia properly in the complex geopolitical system of the Asia Pacific region, and to step up our participation in the regional integration processes.

Attitudes to Russia in the region are quite ambiguous. On the one hand, we are still being seen as a political superpower that wields great influence in world politics, and as a possible counter-balance to other political (and not only political) superpowers in the region. But, at the same time, Russia is regarded in the region as an economic dwarf, which is not very far from the truth. In addition, there is a certain degree of wariness about Russia, especially in terms of the civilization we are seen to belong to. The perception of Russia as an Asia Pacific nation is yet to materialize. To give you an example, our proposal to hold a meeting of the CSCAP in Moscow caused a veritable panic among the organization's leadership—they want all such meetings to be held in the ASEAN countries. In other words, ASEAN has made its intention to remain firmly in the driving seat very clear.

All that being said, Russia is closely integrated into all the largest regional organizations such as APEC, the ASEAN Regional Forum, the Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia, RIC, BRIC, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and many others.

In my opinion, the year 2010 marked the end of an important stage. After several years we are approaching, or maybe we have already arrived at, an important junction in the competition of the various integration projects and proposals on security architecture in Asia Pacific. The extended format of the East Asian Summit, which can also be described as the ASEAN + 8 format, seems to be gaining the upper hand. It appears that this format will become the foundation for the Asia Pacific architecture in the twenty-first century.

Not everyone is happy with such a state of affairs. There is growing opposition among the ASEAN Regional Forum leadership—they are gearing up for serious rivalry, especially on security. Until now the ARF saw itself as the main security organization in Asia Pacific. But now that role is being claimed by the meeting of the Asia Pacific defense ministers. The first such meeting was held in Hanoi in the ASEAN + 8 format, the format of the extended East Asian Summit.

**ALEXANDER LUKIN (MGIMO):** Speaking about Russia's presence in Asia Pacific we need to be aware of a number of problems; the situation is not quite as rosy as some believe. Foreign policy cannot be active and productive if it is not backed by real domestic achievements, by the country's internal strength.

Therefore the first problem here is the problem of development and reform. It is now fashionable to talk about Gorchakov. But the thing is, real reforms were being conducted back at the time in every single area. They brought Russia real economic growth, a more capable army and growing military might. Are we seeing such reforms now? Of course, some reforming is being done, but it is far too early to say whether their results will be as brilliant as in the nineteenth century.



The second problem has to do with specific regional projects. True, some projects are being implemented in the Far East. There has been some improvement; we have the Sakhalin project, for example. Things are being built in Vladivostok, on Russkiy Island and in the city itself. For the first time in decades something is being built there. But all these improvements are being negated by the demographics. People are fleeing from the Far East and Siberia, the population there has shrunk by two–three million people compared with the Soviet period.

The poor investment climate in Russia as a whole and in the Far East in particular is hampering the development of these projects. It takes two visits by the Russian prime minister for the building of a bridge to start. We cannot have any serious influence on that basis. In the United States or China government officials don't have to visit the future construction site and say, "you build me that bridge, or else..."

We need to resolve these two domestic problems and build up our internal strength if Russia is to bolster its presence in Asia Pacific.

What then are the instruments of power that Russia already has? The only real one is our military might, but its significance has been changing lately. We can use that instrument very cautiously, but only provided that we take into account the growing political influence of some other countries. Meanwhile, economically we are very weak.

For now, Russia is not perceived as part of the region in the expert community and among the decision-makers. In the foreign ministries of other countries Russia is part of the remit of the Europe, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia departments. In the Asia Pacific Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences there is not a single expert on Russia; they do not study Russia at all. But they do have separate Russia and Central Asia institutes, and a lot of experts on Russia. In other words, Russia is still seen as a predominantly European and partially Central Asian country.

The key reason for that situation is that Russia's economic presence in the region is inadequate. Our trade with countries in the region has been growing, but even so, Russia's bilateral trade with China is about 13 percent of American–Chinese trade, and just a fraction of China's trade with Japan or South Korea.

Now let us discuss the cultural component, and more generally the so-called soft power, which *could* become an important addition to our economic presence in Asia Pacific. What are the models Russia can offer to the region? The list is quite short. There is the traditional American model, which is now losing its popularity. There is also democracy, market economy, etc. The Chinese model, the so-called Beijing Consensus, or, simply speaking, the Chinese model of economic development, is becoming increasingly popular. Meanwhile, what can Russia offer? Sovereign democracy? Modernization, which we ourselves are only just starting, to put it mildly? Innovation? Maybe our cultural potential, especially our cultural traditions, would be a much better choice.

On the bottom line, our country needs to work in the following areas. First, we need to work with the existing organizations; we need to facilitate and, inasmuch as is possible, stimulate Russia's economic presence in the region. We need to develop bilateral cooperation, encourage trade, and pursue an improvement in our trade balance. Second, we need to work consistently on increasing Russia's role in international organizations and regional processes. I also believe that now is not the time for global projects. We just need to work to improve our own situation domestically—that will enable Russia gradually to build up its presence in the region.

**VORONTSOV:** Russia's Far East is the main reason for our coming to the Asia Pacific Region as a respectable partner. We are talking about the need to pursue a policy of integration, presenting our Far East as an integral part of our economy and so on—but the feelings in the region itself are quite different, and they are very widespread among the local population. To put it bluntly, people there believe that Moscow is treating the region as a colony. There is a feeling there that the region is being exploited, that its natural resources are being exploited, that all the profits are being channeled to Moscow, and nothing is being left to the Far East except for pollution.

But let us come back to our situation, and in particular to the construction projects in Vladivostok ahead of the APEC summit. Vladivostok will get two new bridges and sewage treatment systems (up until now all the sewage was simply dumped into the ocean). One of the problems is that there

are not enough people in the city. That needs to change, we need to channel migration flows to the region. But people say to us, first you have to create normal living conditions for those few who are already living there, then we can talk about bringing in extra people.

## GLOBAL FACTORS: UNITED STATES AND CHINA

**ARMEN OGANESYAN (INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS):** Looking at Asia, especially China, Europe has lately been feeling slightly inadequate. The Americans too keep saying that Europe, even a united Europe, is no superpower. So what should we think about that triangle, about those powers that some believe will play a global role in the future, and not just in Asia? I am talking about *Chinerica* not as an alliance, which most experts believe is not a real possibility at this stage, but as a factor of influence, as a tectonic plate that weighs on all the global processes.

Some believe that a united Europe absolutely needs Russia if it is to take its rightful place in that triangle. In other words, Europe needs much closer relations with Russia, economically and maybe strategically as well.

**NIKONOV:** Relations between China and the United States will be the axis of global development in the twenty-first century. There is no doubt about it. *Chinerica*, in the sense that it has been mentioned (a G2) is absolutely impossible because right from the start the United States had expected that China would play along with that game and accept the role of a junior partner, with America in the lead. As we all know, the United States always views all its partners as junior partners.

But the Chinese have realized that, and they have realized that the United States can influence internal Chinese processes. So the idea of a G2 will never materialize. On the contrary, the United States has now begun energetic efforts to build a coalition to contain China. The main limiting factor for China's growth and ascendance is the external reaction to that growth and ascendance. Almost none of the leading world powers like that ascendance. Looking at the geography of Barack Obama's latest visit to Asia, it pinpoints all the countries America would like to recruit for the alliance to contain China. That includes Indonesia, the largest country in Southeast Asia. India also figures very large in those plans.

China is becoming the other superpower of the modern world. Relations with Russia are very important to China strategically because only they can provide China with a reliable strategic rear and strategic depth. They have to fight for and protect all the rest, one way or another. So our relations with China are important to China most of all. Meanwhile, being neighbors of China, we have no alternative to maintaining good and friendly relations with China.

**VICTOR SUMSKY (MGIMO):** Asia is deeply globalized. And if we are to achieve something there, setting aside a global vision for ourselves and the region, setting aside some global plans would doom all our efforts there to failure.

The primary objective now is to produce a policy that would be realistic and have global implications at the same time. The second issue is the issue of threats; we need to understand whether they are real or not, and if they are, then what is their nature and what is the danger that they pose? The third subject is the need for proper geopolitical positioning of Russia in Asia.

Rivalry between China and the United States is becoming the core of geopolitics in East Asia. The focus of global economic development is shifting to that region, but the potential for conflict is growing there as well. These two trends are interrelated. The more East Asia can offer the world in terms of economic development, the more it becomes the focus of various conflicting interests. That increases the potential for not only reconciliation and harmonization, but conflict as well. So it is inevitable that as Asia continues to grow, the potential for conflict there will increase as well.

It is important to realize that rivalry between the United States and China is not regional. It is global. The rivalry between them is not just for regional dominance, but for global dominance as well. In Europe, such rivalries have never led to anything good. I would say that the dangers being accumulated in the region are not as ambiguous and vague as some argue. Of course, no one is threatening anyone else directly, there is no doubt about it—but all the other assertions are rather debatable.

So how should Russia position itself geostrategically?



The one thing Russia should never do is throw its weight fully behind one of the two main players, either China, its closest great neighbor, or the United States, which still remains the leading world power. By throwing its weight behind one of them, Russia would rapidly accelerate the polarization of forces in the region and encourage processes that could undermine the very economic dynamism that attracts us to Asia. By siding with one of the two players, Russia would immediately turn the other into an enemy, which, for the time being, is much stronger than us. Russia would risk being drawn into a conflict that would cause unacceptable and irreversible damage to it.

What, then, is the alternative to aligning ourselves with one of the two powers?

The obvious answer is nonalignment. In the twenty-first century Russia must play the role that was played by the Nonaligned Movement in the twentieth century. From the moral-political point of view that is an extremely advantageous position, as the twentieth century has amply demonstrated. Such a position would free us of the need to take part in a fight in which we have nothing to gain, because we are not a real contender for world domination. That strategic position is also very advantageous as it would be good for our cooperation with the vast majority of the Southeast Asian nations. ASEAN is the group that has been the most consistent in trying to maintain the regional balance and prevent any irreversible shifts in the regional equilibrium.


**ORLOV:** To summarize, it is important for Russia to address the problems of foreign policy as well as internal social and economic problems in our Far East.

In the run-up to the APEC summit Russia will need to resolve several sets of tasks in its relations with partners in the region. These include high-tech nuclear energy cooperation (international projects such as the International Uranium Enrichment Center in Angarsk), nanotechnology, space, and IT cooperation. Some Russian IT companies, such as *DST*, the owner of *Mail.ru*, have very ambitious plans for cooperation with countries in Asia Pacific, especially Japan, South Korea, and the United States. There is a lot of unused potential for cooperation here.

Meanwhile, the security agenda includes some traditional challenges as well as new ones, including the proliferation of WMD, missile technologies, and dual-use technologies (North Korea is the greatest concern), terrorism and especially its financiers, and a combination of terrorism and proliferation. Serious work is already being done in this area.

Speaking about the importance of social and economic development of Russia's Far East for the Russian foreign policy priorities in the region, I would like to draw our attention to an interesting coincidence. Today [December 6, 2010—Ed.] the Russian Prime Minister was in Khabarovsk to chair the inter-regional meeting of the United Russia party and discuss the problems of the Far East. Speaking about these problems, he said this today: "What are the key issues? The main priority is the development of infrastructure and the energy sector, job creation, and more intensive development of innovation, because our Far East must be an integral natural part of the Asia Pacific Region." Moscow is already viewing the need for a social and economic breakthrough in the region as an urgent priority. But we are not going to succeed in integrating the Russian Far East into the world economy without attractive large-scale projects.

Then there is the issue of the overall objective, i.e. why are we doing all this? I was quite interested in the formula proposed by Maria Teploukhova, a young expert from the Far East writing for the *Security Index* journal. Her vision of the overall objective is this: "One of the most rational and promising paths is the path of integration, which requires attention in equal measure to the regional economy of the Russian Far East, as well as its politics, education programs, and security projects. That path requires a change in the model that has been built over the past two decades, whereby Russia's far-flung border provinces are viewed only as a source of natural resources."<sup>4</sup>

We can talk about the strategy of integration or the strategy of nonalignment—but we need to have a vision and understand the overall objective for the Asia Pacific Region. 

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> The Round Table was held on December 6, 2010.

<sup>2</sup> Contribution is based on the introduction speech.

<sup>3</sup> All positions accurate as of the time of the Round Table meeting.

<sup>4</sup> Maria Teploukhova, "Russia and International Organizations in the Asia Pacific: Agenda for the Russian Far East," *Security Index*, No. 2 (91), Spring 2010, pp. 87–104.



R  
O  
U  
N  
D  
T  
A  
B  
L  
E





Victor Sumsky

## EAST ASIAN SUMMIT AND RUSSIA: LONG-AWAITED INVITATION

Everyone who follows Russian foreign policy in East Asia (let alone the people actually formulating and implementing that policy) will remember the year 2010 for a long time to come. Russia's diplomatic activity in the region was unprecedented. It culminated at the end of the year, when President Medvedev visited China, Vietnam, South Korea, and India, attended the second Russia-ASEAN summit in Hanoi and the G-20 summit in Seoul, and then met the leaders of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) countries in Yokohama. Other landmark events included Russia's accession to the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) and the first conference of the defense ministers representing the ASEAN countries and the organization's eight dialogue partners, attended by the chief of the Russian General Staff. Finally, there was the official invitation to join the East Asia Summit (EAS), which Russia received simultaneously with the United States.

The first annual meeting of the EAS was held in 2005. The event is now attended by top officials of the 10 ASEAN countries and their counterparts from China, Japan, South Korea, India, Australia, and New Zealand. Russia officially said that it would like to join even before the first annual meeting was held. But its application was declined on the grounds that Russia's links with ASEAN (which determines the agenda and the list of participants at EAS meetings) were not yet "substantive" enough. Moscow was given to understand that it would be offered membership of the EAS only after a greater level of trade and economic cooperation has been achieved between Russia and countries in Southeast Asia. At least, that is how most commentators interpreted ASEAN's position at the time. A similar view, with some reservations, was expressed by Nikolay Maletin, a Professor at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO), who has studied ASEAN since its inception. He detailed his views in an article headlined "Why We Are not a Member of the EAS" (2009).<sup>1</sup> However, looking at the dynamics of Russian-ASEAN relations and the new trends in the regional balance of power, Maletin, a highly reputable expert, predicted that Russia might receive the invitation to join EAS fairly soon. That prediction has now come to pass.

Has Russia's trade with the EAS countries increased in the five years since the organization was set up? It has, but not in any radical way. In terms of investment in the region's economies Russia is still lagging far behind the United States, Japan, China, the EU, and lately even India. The gap is wide and completely unacceptable.

So why, despite all these failings, is Russia still being invited to join the EAS (moreover, invited simultaneously with the Americans, who until recently did not show the slightest inclination for membership)? The answer to that question requires a brief foray into the background. And we are going to have to start with things only indirectly related to Russia.

### EAST-ASIAN REGIONALISM: WITH AMERICA, OR WITHOUT?

During the momentous shifts of the late 1980s-early 1990s, countries in East Asia were struggling with the question of what role the United States should play in their common future. Arguments in favor of preserving close ties with Washington included the habit of relying on American military and political security guarantees, and easy access to the U.S. market. These two benefits



C O M M E N T A R Y

underpinned first the Japanese miracle, and then all the other economic miracles in East Asia. But there were also strong arguments against including America in the new integration schemes that were already being drawn up. The most vocal proponent of that second approach was the longstanding prime minister of Malaysia, Mahathir Mohamad. He argued that in the new international situation Washington would never make the kind of concessions to its regional partners that were possible in the era of confrontation between the two superpowers. The United States would always see countries in the region as junior partners, forcing its own priorities and values down their throats and preventing East Asia from making the full use of its potential accumulated over the previous decades of successful modernization. The proposed solution was to respond to the competitive challenge posed by the united Europe and North America by creating a separate, purely Asian alliance.

In the end, Mahathir failed in his bid to launch the so-called East Asia Economic Grouping. The winners' euphoria after the end of the Cold War helped the Americans and their closest allies to push through an alternative plan of rapid trade liberalization in the framework of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). The prize awarded to the ASEAN countries in return for signing up was the decisive collective vote in any internal APEC debates. That is how ASEAN acquired its central position in APEC and all the subsequent East Asian initiatives. Any attempts to question that central position are now being seen by ASEAN as a direct threat to itself.

By offering such an incentive to ASEAN, the Americans clearly hoped that their old partner would remain as docile as before, and toe the American line at APEC. But things turned out rather differently. By the mid-1990s ASEAN and certain other participants had succeeded in turning the APEC forum into a talking shop that did not produce any firm decisions regarding the timing or terms of the hoped-for transition to free trade. But after the joining of the four Indochina countries (the process began in 1995) the organization started to display clear signs of growing confidence. The practical manifestations of that confidence included the creation of the regional ASEAN Regional Forum on Security (ARF) in 1994 and ASEM in 1996. That latter platform was aimed at pursuing dialogue with the EU bypassing the United States. The final stroke was the admission of Burma to ASEAN in 1997, despite all the Western criticisms leveled at the country's military regime.

The chain of events and achievements that were very flattering to the ASEAN countries' ego was broken by the Asian crisis. The financial, economic, political, social, and psychological damage wrought by the upheavals of the late 1990s was compounded by the feeling that in the American establishment the crisis were seen as something the stubborn Asians had brought on themselves. These suspicions were further strengthened by the policies of the International Monetary Fund: the austerity measures the IMF had imposed on the Asian economies in return for loans had only exacerbated the consequences of the crisis rather than ameliorating them. Mahathir's predictions of how America would behave once it had established itself as the unrivalled sole superpower were coming to pass right before our eyes. No wonder then that the Malaysian prime minister's ideas were discussed with renewed interest at the time. In December 1997 ASEAN held its first summit in the ASEAN + 3 format, the three being the economic powerhouses of northeast Asia: China, Japan, and South Korea. Very soon such meetings became a regular occurrence. At the turn of the century the rapprochement between ASEAN and the big Asian three produced the Chiang Mai Initiative (2000) aimed at protecting the Asian economies from the depredations of currency speculators.<sup>2</sup> There were also discussions on creating a free trade zone in the ASEAN + 3 format. It seemed that the list of participants in the purely East Asian bloc had already been decided, and outsiders need not bother.

## **CHINA'S RISE AND ITS SIDE EFFECTS**

For ASEAN as a whole and especially for countries such as Indonesia and Thailand, the Asian crisis will always be synonymous with tragedy. For China, however, that calamity brought unexpected benefits. Having weathered the financial storm, the country's economy began to grow even more rapidly. China also showed itself willing to help the victims of the crisis, and reinforced its reputation as the engine of the region's economy. Trade between China and its southern neighbors was growing at a break-neck pace. In foreign policy, meanwhile, Beijing was increasingly developing a taste for leadership and multilateral diplomacy, which it had previously lacked. All of that combined produced the impression of China's peaceful offensive

in Southeast Asia, making it the main contender for the role of regional leader, especially as America's standing in that part of the world continued to decline.<sup>3</sup>

So what was ASEAN's reaction to such a trend? On the one hand, China's unprecedented achievements had won it grudging respect. Many had come to believe that, with China at the helm, the region's place in the sun was secure. But on the other hand, China was breaking so far ahead of the rest of the pack that even the nimblest of the ASEAN economies had trouble keeping up. That fueled concerns that the region's existing economic as well as political balance might very soon be irreversibly disturbed. After only three or four years it became clear that ASEAN's attempts to treat China, Japan, and South Korea as equals, in the hope that in the great multilateral scheme of things the big three will somehow balance each other out, was not really working. China was simply becoming far too powerful for that. The ASEAN + 3 format was increasingly looking like ASEAN + 1, with China outweighing all the other players put together.

And what of America? The neo-cons in George W. Bush's administration were gyrating between the pretence that ASEAN was hardly worth any attention whatsoever and the portrayal of the ASEAN-China tandem as a deadly sin. At the height of the anti-terrorism campaign Washington attempted to take the East-Asian security remit away from the ARF and give it to APEC. Burma was chosen to play the role of the scapegoat within ASEAN (its main transgression being very close ties with China rather than any human rights violations). Annual conferences of ASEAN foreign ministers, their meetings with dialogue partners, ASEAN summits and similar events were accompanied by laments in the Western media that the organization was turning into a talking shop. The concerted nature of that PR effort gave reason to believe that ASEAN was being prodded to make the right choice between America and China, and that woe betide it should it choose wrongly.<sup>4</sup>

Such an ultimatum was completely unacceptable to ASEAN. In purely pragmatic terms, both the United States and China were indispensable to countries in the region as business partners. Another reason was the deep-seated Asian tradition of looking for a compromise, the middle way between the political extremes. Rather than being scared rigid by the new challenges, ASEAN began an energetic search for a way forward. In the early 2000s it unveiled a plan for the ASEAN Community, a union designed using the EU model but with a clear understanding that simply copying that model would be pointless. There was also a clear realization that a new step was needed towards integration on the scale of the entire East Asia. Such a step would make it more difficult for China to become the sole regional leader—but it would also avoid giving the impression that ASEAN was simply yielding to American pressure, and doing so right at the time when the Bush administration was showing its true colors. Those intentions led to the decision to convene the EAS, portrayed as the beginning of the process that would culminate in the creation of the East Asian Community. The countries already participating in the ASEAN + 3 format were joined by India, Australia, and New Zealand. These three new participants (each having a fairly close relationship with the United States) were brought in thanks largely to the efforts of Japan, despite the distinct lack of enthusiasm in Beijing. However, the ASEAN + 3 format, in which China was playing such a prominent role, was in no way being phased out. Washington, meanwhile, continued to ignore the ASEAN + 3 meetings, making the point that membership of such a club was not a privilege it cared for. What was the purpose of such a display? Was it to demonstrate that any discussion in which America was not included—especially with ASEAN playing the central role—was doomed to failure?

It is not quite clear what exactly Washington had hoped to achieve. Moscow, meanwhile, chose a very different tactic and applied for EAS membership right away. As an official ASEAN dialogue partner and a signatory of the Bali Treaty on friendship and cooperation in Southeast Asia since 2004, Russia met at least two of the three criteria for EAS membership. The third criterion, which required substantive ties with ASEAN, was a bit of a problem. But there was—and still is—no clear definition of “substantive”, so the matter ultimately required only the common political will of the ASEAN members. So why was that political will lacking only five years ago? An honest answer to that question has been given by Rodolfo Severino, who served as ASEAN Secretary General in 1998–2002: “If Russia were to become a full member, that would have only emphasized the absence of the United States to those who believe that Washington should be part of the East Asian process.”<sup>5</sup>



## KEVIN RUDD'S AND YUKIO HATUYAMA'S FALSE STARTS

Even before the EAS members had a chance properly to agree their agenda and say something to the world of their intentions, they were facing the same accusations as ASEAN. The new body was written off as a talking shop unable to do anything useful in practice. What is worse, even the participants themselves seemed to be pulling in different directions regarding the formats of future East Asian integration. Some of the most off-beat ideas were aired by two heads of state who would soon lose their jobs in their home countries. Australia's Labor Party leader Kevin Rudd, who served as prime minister in 2007–2010, took the whole region by surprise by calling for the creation of an Asia-Pacific Community that would include all the large players, such as the United States, China, and Russia. Japan's Democratic Party leader Yukio Hatoyama, who led the government in 2009–2010, announced another proposal that seemed quite superfluous. He envisioned a new East Asian Community that would include exactly the same members as the EAS—though he did later add the United States.<sup>6</sup>

Some might think that America's old allies were merely doing their best to please Washington—but that impression is superficial. According to some analysts, Rudd's true purpose was to keep U.S.–Chinese rivalry contained within the new organization, thus preventing it from spiraling out of control and giving Australia the role of an honest broker between the two great powers. Hatoyama, on the other hand, had won the election in 2009 riding the wave of popular discontent over the Liberal Democrats' kowtowing to America. But his proposal was a challenge to China, which wanted the future East Asian Community to retain the ASEAN + 3 format. Hatoyama's calculation was that the participation of India, Australia, and New Zealand would improve Japan's chances of remaining a regional leader.

In clarifying their positions Rudd and Hatoyama both paid lip-service to ASEAN, but their initiatives were not well received in the 10 ASEAN capitals. No matter how hard both of them tried to couch their initiatives in acceptable terms, it was clear that ASEAN would lose its central role in regional projects if either of the two leaders had his way.

Neither Rudd nor Hatoyama had the time to take his initiative forward, and not just because both soon lost their jobs. The overall objective of the two initiatives was to steer the process started by ASEAN in a somewhat different direction. But both proposals were necessarily vague and muddled, i.e. both suffered the same flaws that were excoriated by ASEAN's critics. Such flaws were largely inevitable: Rudd and Hatoyama were forced to keep maneuvering, sometimes coming very close to outright U-turns, because the establishment in their own countries was increasingly being split between pro-American groups and proponents of closer ties with China.<sup>7</sup>

After the two lost their jobs, ASEAN was able to take a short breather from its constant struggle to keep its central role in East Asian affairs. But the problems and challenges that had given rise to Rudd's and Hatoyama's initiatives did not just go away. Meanwhile, at the end of the first decade of the new century the world was in the throes of a global crisis, and the country where that crisis had originated was behaving itself rather differently under its new Democratic president than under his Republican predecessor.

## AMERICAN COUNTERATTACK IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Although the Cold War as we knew it in the second half of the twentieth century is now a thing of the past, the military-political instruments and stratagems of that era are still very much in use. The George W. Bush administration had demonstrated that to preserve America's status as the world's sole superpower, that administration was prepared to start as many as three new Cold Wars at once: with the Islamic world, with China, and with Russia. By failing to achieve anything close to a decisive advantage on any of the three fronts, and by presiding over the deepest economic crisis in the United States since the Great Depression, the Republicans had essentially laid the foundations for the Obama phenomenon. The new U.S. president's declarations of a Reset in America's relations with critically important partners, such as the Muslim world, China, and Russia, proved so timely that the Nobel committee gave Obama the Peace Prize without even waiting for him to actually deliver on his promises.

The new administration simply could not lose by proclaiming East Asia's special significance to the United States and indicating its willingness to work towards a mutually acceptable

arrangement with Beijing. Ironically, China's ability to keep its economy in rude health even as some of the developed countries are teetering on the brink of bankruptcy is beginning to work against it in some ways. So, incidentally, is Beijing's ambitious program of bulking up its armed forces. Some of China's neighbors are looking at the rising giant with growing unease. They seem to have already decided that as time goes by China will become increasingly overbearing, because that is how rising giants are always supposed to behave. The slightest hint of such an attitude on the part of Beijing is now being viewed with exaggerated concern by its neighbors, who want to limit the potential troublemaker's ability to do damage. At this moment, the United States is the only power whose active presence in the region can counterbalance China. Hence the enthusiasm with which the region has taken the glad tidings of the Americans' return.

Are the Asians not worried by the prospect of the United States and China teaming up as a G2 to become the undisputed co-rulers of the whole region? From ASEAN's point of view, such a scenario is highly unlikely. Southeast Asians have had plenty of time to study the Americans and the Chinese. They know the limits of any potential rapprochement between the two great powers. To make sure they have a say in their own region's affairs, ASEAN countries need the relations between Washington and Beijing to be somewhere in the middle between hostility and an outright alliance. The preferred model would be based on clear but not unbridgeable differences between the two powers, which the ASEAN nations could exploit for their own benefit without running any serious risks.

That, in fact, is exactly the model of relations Obama has been pursuing with China since 2009. And that is part of the reason why America's foreign-policy counterattack in Southeast Asia has been going relatively well. In a very short period the United States has managed to step up bilateral ties with almost every single ASEAN nation, including even Burma, where new approaches are being sought, but with special emphasis on Indonesia and Vietnam. Washington has also made plenty of gestures to demonstrate its support for ASEAN as a significant regional actor. The practical steps include America's decision to join the Bali Treaty, which, as we have already established, is a necessary step for anyone wishing to join the debate concerning the new regional architecture now underway at the East Asia Summit.<sup>8</sup>

The motives for inviting America to join the EAS are therefore quite clear. But why is Russia being invited as well? Could it be simply because, after half a century of confrontation between the two superpowers, people are used to thinking of Russia whenever they think of America? Or is it just a matter of political correctness, and the Asians' unwillingness to keep us in the waiting room for too long? Such considerations may have played a part—but when the time comes to make decisions, they usually recede into the background.

## SO WHY IS RUSSIA BEING INVITED?

Let us proceed from the opposite direction and discuss the conditions under which Russia's participation in the EAS would have been completely impossible.


First, Russia would never have been invited if the Russian political and economic trends were clearly at odds with what is going on in East Asia. We may criticize our own democracy and market economy, but it is important to recognize that we have laid the foundations of both. We may not be happy with our economic growth or government institutions—but it would be unfair to ignore the fact that our economy has been growing steadily since the turn of the century, that the chaos of the first post-Soviet decade is now a thing of the past, and that the country is being governed better than it used to be. Our policy of modernization is far from perfect, but that policy is now at the core of our national strategy. All of this means that Russia is now very much in tune with the rest of the region, unlike 10 years ago.

Second, we would never have been invited to join the East Asian cooperation process had our foreign policy been based on confrontation, hostility, or threats against any of the region's nations. East Asia already has plenty of potential conflicts just waiting to break out; it does not need any more. Russia is welcome in the region precisely because of its obvious interest in maintaining peace. Without peace, East Asia will never be able to keep its economic dynamism that has made countries in the region attractive partners for development projects in Russia's own Far East and indeed for the modernization of the entire Russian economy.



Third, East Asia definitely does not need a new actor whose huge territory, rich resources, and solid military capability are not backed by an independent foreign policy. The explanation is simple. In a situation where the main regional tensions lie along the U.S.–China axis, such an actor would, sooner or later, inevitably succumb to the temptation of throwing its weight behind one of these two great powers in pursuit of short-term gains. Such a turn of events would contribute to regional and possibly even global polarization, because for all its political dependence, that actor would still remain a very significant power in itself.<sup>9</sup> Are we to understand, then, that the invitation to join the EAS is the East Asian nations' vote of confidence in Russia's independent foreign policy? It appears that Asia has appreciated no less than Europe the difficult but necessary demonstrations of Russia's independence such as the Munich speech or the choice Moscow made in August 2008 in the North Caucasus. East Asia needs another powerful and independent actor on the region's political scene, especially in the crucially important middle part of it run by ASEAN.

If all the above assumptions are correct, the answer to the question of why Russia has been invited to join the EAS is clear. Russia is seen as a nation that is not alien to East Asia and is generally compatible with the rest of the region. It is seen as a country that can add to the region's economic momentum, and a power whose political position will help to preserve the existing balance and peace in East Asia.

There is certainly more to be said about the motives for extending the invitation to join the EAS to Russia. But what we have already said is enough to make the following conclusion. That invitation is not an inconsequential decision made on the spur of the moment. The decision is profoundly logical, because it is based on the compatibility of our own long-term national aspirations with the interests of the region as a whole. 

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> Maletin Nikolay, "Why We Are not a Member of the EAS," *South-East Asia: Topical Problems of Development* (in Russian), No. XIII (SEA 2008–2009), M. (2009), pp. 49–65.

<sup>2</sup> V.B. Amirov, "History and Evolution of the Chiang Mai Initiative," *International Affairs*, No. 10 (2010), pp. 49–55.

<sup>3</sup> Victor Sumsy, "China's Peace Offensive in Southeast Asia and Russia's Regional Imperatives," in *Russia–ASEAN Relations: New Directions* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2007), pp. 53–69.

<sup>4</sup> Victor Sumsy, "The Art of the Possible in ASEAN's Future," *Global Asia* 3, No. 1 (Spring 2008), pp. 97–100.

<sup>5</sup> R.C. Severino, *Southeast Asia in Search of an ASEAN Community: Insights from the Former ASEAN Secretary-General* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2006), p. 272.

<sup>6</sup> J. Ratus, "Squaring the Japanese and Australia Proposals for an East Asian and Asia Pacific Community: Is America In or Out?," *East Asia Forum: Economics, Politics and Public Policy in East Asia and the Pacific*, November 4, 2009, <<http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2009/11/04/squaring-the-japanese-and-australia-proposals-for-an-east-asian-and-asia-pacific-community-is-america-in-or-out/>>, last accessed February 14, 2011.

<sup>7</sup> P. Symonds, "WikiLeaks Cables Expose U.S. Hostility to Rudd's Asia Pacific Community Plan," *World Socialist Web Site*, January 31, 2010, <<http://www.wsws.org/articles/2010/dec2010/rudd-d31.shtml>>, last accessed February 14, 2011.

<sup>8</sup> "Special Focus: America Re-engages Southeast Asia," *Contemporary Southeast Asia* 32, No. 3 (December 2010).

<sup>9</sup> Victor Sumsy, "Russian Modernization, Geopolitics of Southeast Asia and the ASEAN Factor," *International Affairs* No. 10 (2010), pp. 15–20.



Victor Litovkin

THE *BULAVA* MISSILE: A RUSSIAN MILITARY TRUMP CARD?

On October 29, 2010 Russia conducted the latest in a series of test-launches of its new submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) R30 3M30 (RSM-56) Bulava (NATO code: SS-NX-30). The missile was launched in the White Sea from the *Dmitriy Donskoy* submarine (Project 941UM, Typhoon-class). According to an official representative of the Russian Navy, “20 minutes after the launch the head sections of the missile arrived on schedule at the Kura training range in the Kamchatka”. The official said, “Telemetry data from the launch and the actual flight are still being processed, but it is already safe to say that the missile performed as per specifications during the launch and the flight”. The missile hit the designated target.<sup>1</sup>

That was the 14th test-launch of the Bulava, and the second in 2010. The previous test launch held three weeks earlier, on October 7, was also successful. The missile is designed to be carried by the new Borei class (Project 955/955A/955U) nuclear missile submarines. The first sub in the series, the *Yuriy Dolgorukiy*, is nearing the completion of sea trials. Three more—the *Aleksandr Nevskiy*, the *Vladimir Monomakh*, and the *Svyatitel Nikolay*—are now being built at the *Sevmashpredpriyatiye* shipyards in Severodvinsk (Arkhangelsk region, Russia). After the two successful test launches in October 2010 the *Bulava* project finally seems to be on track. The 15<sup>th</sup> test launch is scheduled for the spring 2011, and it is to be performed from the *Yuriy Dolgorukiy*. The success of that launch would mean that all the hopes the military and political leadership in Moscow had been pinning on the latest Russian SLBM are finally coming to fruition, despite the numerous and very disappointing setbacks that had plagued the long-awaited missile throughout its research and development (R&D) cycle. According to deputy prime minister Sergey Ivanov, the earliest date the Bulava could enter service with the Russian armed forces is in the autumn of 2011, after another five or six test launches scheduled for the spring and summer of that year.



C O M M E N T A R Y

**A SYMBOL OF NEW RUSSIA**

Part of the reason why the Bulava program is attracting so much attention is that it has become a kind of symbol of new, post-Soviet Russia. The program is seen as a litmus test for the Russian defense industry’s ability to deliver new strategic weapons, ensure the country’s security, independence, and sovereignty, and underpin the Kremlin’s leading role in world politics. This is probably why the Bulava has been at the epicenter of so much controversy and outright scandals, both in the expert community and in the government itself.

The job of creating a new intercontinental missile system for the first Borei class nuclear sub, laid down in 1996 at the *Sevmashpredpriyatiye* shipyards, was entrusted to the Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology (MIT), the designer of the RT-2PM *Topol* (SS-25 Sickle) and the RT-2PMU *Topol-M* (SS-27) ground and silo-based solid-fuel strategic missiles. The *Topol-M* and the mobile ground-based RS-24 Yars missile carrying multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle (MIRV) warheads, which was also created at the MIT and which entered service in late 2009, form the core of the Russian strategic deterrent, and will retain that role for the foreseeable future. The three-stage solid-fuel Bulava SLBM can carry up to 10 maneuverable independently targetable warheads, which can alter their altitude and direction in mid-flight and which can hit targets at a

range of 8,000km. The missile is supposed to become the core of Russia's naval-based strategic nuclear deterrent. The missile systems currently in service with the Russian Navy (R-29R or 3M40, RSM-50 Skif, SS-N-18, R-29RM or RSM-54 Sineva, and SS-N-24) as well as the submarines that carry those missiles (Projects 667BDR and 667BDRM, Calmar and Dolphin class) will reach the end of their service life over the next 10–15 years and will need to be replaced with more effective and accurate weapons. Russia's has placed all its bets on the Project 955 submarines (Borei class) and the Bulava SLBM these subs are designed to carry.

The problem was, however, that the MIT has had no experience in designing SLBMs. That was traditionally the turf of the Makeyev Design Bureau in Miass, later renamed the Academician Victor Makeyev State Rocket Centre (OAO Makeyev GRTs). That is why before the MIT was given the Bulava contract, it was the Makeyev Bureau that designed Russia's new strategic missile system for the Project 955 submarines (such as *the Yuriy Dolgorukiy*). The system was called D-19 Bark. But the Bark project was beset by problems from the very beginning; all three consecutive launches had ended in failure.

To this day there is no agreement in the expert community as to why exactly the project failed. Some blame lack of attention to detail during the assembly. Others say the actual design was at fault. Still others point out that the then defense minister, the now deceased Marshal Igor Sergeyev, hailed from the Strategic Missile Troops and was therefore used to working with MIT technology rather than the products of the Makeyev Bureau, which specialized in naval weapons. This is why, the argument goes, as soon as the Bark missile ran into trouble during the first test launches—and that kind of trouble is almost inevitable when developing such complex weapons systems—Sergeyev seized that as a pretext to take away the contact from the Makeyev Bureau and give it to his old pals at the MIT. He was apparently won over by their promise that their SLBM would share a lot of components with the new Topol-M, resulting in huge savings during development.

The truth of the matter, according to Col. Gen. Anatoly Sitnov, the former head of armaments at the MoD, is that the final decision to abandon the Bark and develop a new missile instead was made after the Makeyev Bureau had failed to come up with a naval-based missile system weighing less than 40 tonnes, as required by the specifications for the new Borei class nuclear missile subs that were supposed to carry the new SLBM. Makeyev's offering came in at a whopping 100 tonnes, so the Bark simply was not an option under Russia's new strategy for its naval nuclear deterrent. That, the general said, is the main reason why “it was decided to develop a compact missile using a promising new fuel that had just become available. Another consideration in favor of the MIT was that it had already designed the Kuryer missile, a fairly advanced system with a range of 9,500km and weighing 16 tonnes.”<sup>2</sup>

The Kuryer design was later used as the starting point for the Bulava, according to Sitnov. The initial expectation was that the new SLBM would weight 26–28 tonnes. But after the project ran into trouble with the procurement of new Russian-made materials, the weight specifications had to be revised upwards.

The former armaments chief also said that all the leading Russian designers of missile systems had been invited to submit their bids for the new SLBM contract. “The MIT won because they had come up with the most detailed design proposal that relied on technologies already used in the Topol-M, including the third stage and numerous components,” Sitnov said. “It was also decided that the IT system for the Bulava would use the model developed for the Topol-M.”<sup>3</sup>

Experts draw parallels between the fate of the Bark and another project in the early 1970s. Back then the Rubin Central Design Bureau was working on the new Project 941 Akula class nuclear missile submarine. The project was led by Igor Spassky under the direct supervision of the bureau's Chief Designer, Sergey Kovalev. Meanwhile, Victor Makeyev, the chief designer of the Miass Design Bureau (then called KB Machine-Building) developed Russia's first solid-fuel SLBM for that submarine. The missile, the R-39, weighed 90 tonnes and shared the first-stage engine with the RT-23UTTKh Molodets (SS-24 Scalpel), a heavy ground-based missile made by the Yuzhnoye Design Bureau. That was the Soviet defense industry's first attempt at using the same technology and design solutions for an SLBM and a ground-based ballistic missile.

At the time the solid-fuel R-39 missile was considered a great success. It took much less time to prepare for launch than the liquid-fuel missiles, and had a number of other advantages. In addition, the Americans were also making solid-fuel naval-based missiles at the time, which was a very important consideration for the Soviet political and military leadership. To accommodate the



R-39, the Rubin specialists were forced to redesign the Project 941 sub. The result was a unique double-hulled submarine, the largest in the world and certainly deserving of a place in the *Guinness Book of Records*. The sub's full displacement was 33,800 tonnes, compared with 26,650 for America's largest Ohio-class submarines.

But in the late 1990s, GRTs Makeyev designers failed to pull off the same feat as their bureau's legendary founder. Perhaps they simply lacked the influence which Makeyev had in abundance, with his two Hero of Socialist Labor awards, one Lenin Prize, three State Prizes, and full membership of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. Or maybe the country itself lacked the economic and financial muscle it had back in the 1970s, and was not ready to plough what little money it had left into another gigantic sub. It is hard to say.

We do know, however, that supporters of the GRTs bureau have not forgiven the MIT and its chief designer, Yury Solomonov, for winning the missile contract for the Borei class subs. Like the fans of a rival football team, they have met every single failed test launch of the Bulava (seven out of 14, to be precise) with waves of scorn and criticism.

Nevertheless, the fact remains that in accordance with the decision of the Russian Security Council and the then Russian president, Boris Yeltsin, starting from 1998 the task of developing the new SLBM for the Borei class nuclear submarines belongs to the MIT and its lead designer, Yury Solomonov. Incidentally, specialists from the GRTs Makeyev are also involved in the project—but that is something that the critics of the MIT prefer not to mention.

Meanwhile, the requirements and specifications for the new Russian SLBM remain the same. It should be launched from a submerged position, have a range of up to 8,000km, and carry up to 10 MIRV warheads capable of penetrating any missile defense system, with a gross throw-weight (payload) of 1,150 kg. The missile should also be fairly light for its class, weighing in at 30–40 tonnes. The RSM-56 Bulava meets all of the above specifications.

### NOT ALL FAILURES ARE CAUSED EQUALLY

There is no denying that half the test launches of the Bulava (seven out of 14 as of the time of writing) have been unsuccessful. On the one hand, these failures are understandable. Not a single Russian or Western missile has been a success from the very first test-launch. To illustrate, of the 42 test-launches of the R-29R liquid-fuel naval-based missile, only 31 were successful; 11 failed. There is nothing out of the ordinary about that—after all, the purpose of the test launches is to see how the various design innovations and theories perform in practice, to learn from the mistakes, and to find solutions. Computer modeling, which is widely used nowadays by technology designers, cannot predict actual performance with absolute accuracy, especially if the missile has to perform in such an unforgiving environment as the sea. Water has 800 times the density of air, and it is no mean feat for a missile to punch a hole through it when launched from a submerged and moving submarine. Rare TV footage of the Bulava test launches clearly shows that the missile emerges at an angle from under the incoming flow of water, and only then rights itself to take the ballistic trajectory to its target.

We also have to admit, however, that due to the serious shortage of skilled engineers and technicians in the Russian defense industry in recent years, the company that assembles the Bulava, the Votkinskiy machine-building plant, sometimes receives faulty components from its numerous subcontractors. A total of 650 companies, of various forms of ownership, are involved in the RSM-56 project. For all the rigorous quality controls, faulty components sometimes slip through the net. That just cannot be helped, given the current situation in the industry. After all, every single time a Bulava test launch ends in failure, the cause turns out to be different from the last time. This means that the design of the missile is not at fault; the problem lies with the manufacturers. Interviewed by the author of this article for the newspaper *Izvestiya*, Yury Solomonov, who was the MIT director and chief designer at the time (and who is now only a lead designer), had this to say:

Whenever there is a problem with a missile, the cause lies either with the designers or with the manufacturers. And you have my word that not a single element of design has been altered as a result of the Bulava test launches. All the problems we have identified lie further down the line in the design–technology–manufacturing chain. Sometimes it is a matter of substandard materials, sometimes it's the lack of proper equipment to eliminate human error during manufacturing, sometime it is inadequate quality controls. It would be wrong of course to absolve the designers of all responsibility



and lay all the blame at the feet of the engineers and manufacturers. But let us be clear that no amount of good design can obviate the need for a properly functioning system, even if the designers work 24/7.

The problem of the Soviet and Russian industry, especially the defense industry, is that many operations have to be done manually due to the lack of proper equipment. In Soviet times, that deficiency was compensated to a large extent by the office of defense industry representatives at large industrial companies. The importance of that system was hard to overestimate. Unfortunately, the current situation [i.e. the absence of defense industry reps at many companies, especially privately owned—V.L.] has predictably led to slipping quality standards. We have raised this issue repeatedly with the MoD and even with the prime minister—but to no avail.

We are mass-producing the Topol-M missile and the Bulava—but on the list of materials required for manufacturing, there are 50 entries that we simply cannot get hold of in this country. So we are frantically trying to find replacements, but that requires changes to the design, so we have to run the whole set of trials again, including the firing tests for the engines. That costs money, and that money is not made available to us. The MoD says this should not be the ministry's problem—but that is fair only up to a point.<sup>4</sup>

Nevertheless, the RSM-56 has been doing a little better with every test launch. The last failed launch was on December 9, 2009. The cause was said to have been “problems with the separation of the third stage”. After that, two separate commissions were formed to establish the cause of the latest failures. “One of those commissions was formed as part of the state commission for the flight tests of the Bulava system. It investigated the technical problems and causes of the failure during the last launch,” said the deputy chief of *Roskosmos*, Vitaly Davydov. “The cause was eventually established. The commission produced recommendations for preventing the same problem repeating itself during the later launches. Those recommendations have now been fully implemented.”<sup>5</sup>

The commission's findings were announced on June 30, 2010. “The state commission set up to investigate the causes of the latest failed test launches of the Bulava completed its work in June and has concluded that further test launches are both possible and necessary,” first deputy defense minister Vladimir Popovkin said. The second commission, an inter-agency body that conducted a separate investigation in May–July 2010, also concluded that the test launches must continue.

The commander of the Russian navy, Admiral Vladimir Vysotsky, said that “quality controls during the delivery of components and the missile itself were made much more rigorous.”<sup>6</sup> According to defense minister Anatoly Serdyukov, video cameras were installed at all the workplaces of missile assembly technicians to record each step on computer hard drives. The recordings were then watched repeatedly by the lead specialists of the company, and adjustments were made if and where required. “If the possible problems turn out to be the same each time, we are going to fix them,” the defense minister said during a trip to the United States in September 2010. “But if there's a different problem each time, we are going to have to dismantle the entire system and find out what is wrong with the manufacturing and quality control process. If that happens, we will know that the whole supervision and quality control process is inadequate and needs to be changed radically.”<sup>7</sup>

Meanwhile, the Bulava project had acquired a political rather than purely technological significance. Russia's ability to sort out the problems with the missile and enter it into service had repercussions for the progress of the New START treaty with the United States and the treaty's ratification. In a broader sense, the reputation of the Russian defense industry and indeed the entire country was on the line. Another thing to consider is that the Bulava project has been very expensive, as experts of the journal *Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye* had calculated back in 2006. For example, one day at sea for a nuclear-powered submarine costs \$100,000. The tracking and telemetry systems on the territory from Arkhangelsk to the Kamchatka cost another \$500,000 a day to operate. The actual missile costs \$50 million per unit, its delivery to the submarine, and loading operations add hundreds of thousands of dollars on top of that. Every test launch therefore costs a minimum of \$51 million. Meanwhile, the cost of the entire project since 1998 has been well over \$60 billion. In late 2009, deputy prime minister Sergey Ivanov admitted that about 40 percent of Russia's defense spending was being channeled into the naval component of the armed forces; 25 percent was being spent on the nuclear missile forces.<sup>8</sup> One can only guess at how much of that money the Bulava has gobbled up.

## THE CONCLUSIONS THAT ARE YET TO BE DRAWN


Nevertheless, the last two successful launches of the Bulava give reason for cautious optimism. One more test launch was due to be conducted in late 2010, this time from the *Yuriy Dolgorukiy* submarine, for which the RSM-56 was actually designed. Deputy prime minister Sergey Ivanov said there would have to be a minimum of five to six launches in 2011 before the missile could enter service. In the meantime, certain conclusions need to be made following the latest successful tests. These conclusions are not yet final, but they are important nonetheless.

For all the controversy, the designers of the missile have been able to meet the required specifications. The MIT team led by Yury Solomonov, which was asked back in the late 1990s to develop the Bulava, has coped with the task set before it. The 50 percent of the more or less successful launches out of the total 14 are clear testimony to that. If half the missiles have reached their target, the design is adequate. The fact that the cause of the other 50 percent of the launches failing was different for every launch indicates that the design is not at fault. The MIT has been able to sort out its own issues despite all the problems that were not of its own making, including the loss of technological expertise by the Russian defense industry, the unavailability of the necessary materials (such as bleached pulp, which the Baykal pulp plant used to produce, graphite carbon fiber, which the Tver chemical combine used to make, and other composites), and problems with the quality of the components delivered by the subcontractors.

Another important conclusion is that the Bulava saga has demonstrated the utter failure of the reform (which often looked more like the abolition) of the office of defense industry representatives, which the MoD rolled out back in 2008. It has turned out that our highly qualified specialists and technicians who assemble and fine-tune even high-tech produce such as strategic missiles cannot be relied upon to deliver the required standards without constant and rigorous supervision by the defense reps. This applies to every single stage of the manufacturing process. It was only after the assembly technicians' work was put under constant and comprehensive monitoring that the quality standards started to improve.

One important qualification is that those standards have picked up during the work on the last two or three missiles, with everyone working flat out to prevent yet another failed launch. Meanwhile, each Project 955/955A and 955U Borei class sub will need a complement of 12, 16, or 20 missiles. It will take several years and a certain number of combat training launches to see whether the quality standards remain adequate once the missile enters mass production.

Nevertheless, after the 14th test launch it is probably safe to come to the preliminary conclusion that the Bulava project has achieved its objective. Of course, critics of that project are not going to fall silent overnight. The team that had lost the contract to develop a new-generation SLBM for Russia's latest nuclear missile submarines is looking a bit despondent following the two successful Bulava launches. But they will still be envious and jealous of the MIT's achievement, and try to even the score by, for example, developing a new heavy ground-based liquid-fuel missile. One has to understand, however, that fierce competition between the two missile technologies (liquid fuel and solid fuel), which inevitably leads to some ill feeling between the two rival teams, is actually a good thing for our country. It is a guarantee that Russia's nuclear shield will be reliable despite all the post-Soviet problems. The Bulava, meanwhile, will become the core of the Russian naval-based strategic nuclear forces until 2045–2050.

Finally, the Bulava case has demonstrated that for all the enormous difficulties and problems of the transitional period, the Russian defense industry is still very much alive and kicking. And that is probably the main conclusion that can be drawn from the story of Russia's new SLBM. 



C  
O  
M  
M  
E  
N  
T  
A  
R  
Y

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> INTERFAX-AVN report of October 29, 2010.

<sup>2</sup> INTERFAX-AVN report of October 7, 2010.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

<sup>4</sup> D. Litovkin, "The *Bulava* Story: Interview with Yury Solomonov," *Izvestiya*, April 13, 2010, <<http://www.izvestia.ru/person/article3140744/>>, last accessed November 20, 2010.


<sup>5</sup> M. Ivanova, "The Unbearable *Bulava*," *Vzglyad*, September 8, 2010, <<http://www.vz.ru/society/2010/9/8/431124.html>> , last accessed November 20, 2010.

<sup>6</sup> ITAR-TASS report of October 7, 2010.

<sup>7</sup> INTERFAX report of September 17, 2010.

<sup>8</sup> S. Safronov, "Lion's Share of MoD Spending Channeled into the Navy, Primarily the Nuclear Component," *RIA Novosti*, June 3, 2009, <[http://rian.ru/defense\\_safety/20090603/173122482.html](http://rian.ru/defense_safety/20090603/173122482.html)> , last accessed November 20, 2010.

Figure 1. The International Security Index (*iSi*) in November 2010–March 2011



#### ***iSi* INDEX IN JANUARY–MARCH 2011: WINTER OF CHANGE**

The *iSi* international security index has demonstrated a steady downward trend throughout the winter period of 2011, sliding from **2,945** points on January 1, 2011 to **2,809** on April 1, 2011—a record low since January 2010. The fall reflected continuing turmoil in the Middle East and North Africa, which has had wide-ranging implications for regional and global security. Arab governments in the region have been forced to make concessions to the protesters and promise serious reforms. Libya has been plunged into civil war between the opposition and supporters of Col. Muammar Gaddafi followed by the UN SC resolution authorizing the use of force to protect civilians. The United States, Britain, and France launched airstrikes against Col. Gaddafi's forces. Unrest in the world's key oil-producing region has pushed the price of a barrel well above \$100. Meanwhile, talks between Pyongyang and Seoul, which had resumed after an armed incident in the Yellow Sea in November 2010, ended without any result. Terrorist attacks continued to claim more lives in Pakistan, Iraq, and Afghanistan. The *iSi* index was pushed further down by the earthquakes in New Zealand and Japan, and the ongoing nuclear emergency at Japan's Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant.

- **Natural and man-made disasters.** On March 11 **Japan** was struck by an 8.9–9.1 magnitude earthquake followed by a tsunami. The Miyagi, Fukushima, and Iwate prefectures were the worst hit. Disruption of power supply to the Fukushima nuclear power plant led to the shutdown of the reactors' cooling systems and a series of explosions of hydrogen, which ripped apart the concrete shells around the reactors. Several other power plants had to be shut down as well, including the Onagawa NPP, where the turbine



had suffered serious damage. More than 13,000 people are dead or missing. The Japanese government has declared a state of emergency over the situation at Fukushima. It has also evacuated people from a 30km radius around the stricken power plant. The authorities had initially graded the Fukushima emergency as a Level 4 incident on a 1 to 7 INES scale, then raised it to Level 5.

Floods and mudslides in densely populated areas of **Brazil** killed more than 600 people.

- **Africa and the Middle East.** In January–March 2011 the situation in the Arab countries continued to pose a major threat to international security. In **Tunisia**, demonstrations over unemployment and high food prices that began in mid-December grew into a nationwide campaign of protests, eventually forcing President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali to flee the country and the government to resign. On January 25 protests spread to **Egypt**; the demonstrators called for the president's resignation and radical reforms. On February 11 the military took over power in the country; President Hosni Mubarak resigned. The high military council suspended the constitution, dissolved parliament, banned the demonstrations, and said it would govern the country until new elections.

The events in Tunisia and Egypt triggered unrest in **Yemen**, **Bahrain**, **Jordan**, and **Algeria**, which are all facing similar social and political problems. Mass protests spilled over into neighboring oil-producing and transit countries, including Iraq, Kuwait, Djibouti, and Oman, as well as Uganda, Morocco, Mauritania, Benin, and Zimbabwe. There were Kurdish demonstrations in Turkey. Yemeni President Abdullah Saleh, who has ruled the country for over 30 years, said he will not seek re-election once his current term of office expires. The authorities in Algeria were forced by the protesters to lift the state of emergency imposed 19 years ago. In Jordan, King Abdullah II appointed a new government and promised radical political reforms. **Iraqi** Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki said he would not run for a third term.

**Libya**, meanwhile, has been plunged into civil war between the supporters and opponents of Col. Gaddafi. The opposition set up a transitional national council in February and retains control over the east of the country. Government forces launched a counteroffensive using heavy weapons and aviation; the number of casualties among civilians has run into thousands. In response, the UN Security Council passed a resolution 1973 authorizing the use of force to protect the civilians in Libya. The United States, Britain, and France launched airstrikes against Col. Gaddafi's forces, but ruled out the use of ground troops.


In **Lebanon**, the opposition parties' decision to boycott the Special UN Tribunal in The Hague investigating the assassination of former prime minister Rafic Hariri led to the resignation of the national unity government and a fresh political crisis. In **Palestine**, the entire Cabinet resigned on February 14. The HAMAS movement said it was withdrawing from the dialogue to restore Palestinian national unity.

Turmoil in the Middle East pushed the price of oil well over \$100 a barrel.

Clashes continued in **Ivory Coast** between forces loyal to Laurent Gbagbo, who has lost the presidential election but refuses to concede defeat and step down, and supporters of the election winner, Alassane Quattara. In **Southern Sudan**, 90 percent of the voters supported independence in a referendum.

**Iran.** Protests in the Arab countries spread to Iran. On February 14 thousands took to the streets in Tehran, but were quickly dispersed by riot police. Iranian opposition leaders Mehdi Karroubi and Mir Hossein Mousavi were put under house arrest. On February 22, for the first time since the Iranian revolution, two Iranian warships passed the Suez Canal on their way to Syria, causing extreme concern in Israel. Nuclear talks between Iran and the Group of Six on January 21–22 ended without any result. Meanwhile, Iran was forced temporarily to halt its uranium-enrichment centrifuges due to technical problems. In late February it was reported that the Iranian authorities were


intending to unload nuclear fuel from the Bushehr nuclear energy reactor to run technical tests on the reactor—but the Iranian Foreign Ministry denied the reports.

 **Abdulaziz Sager**, *Chairman of the Gulf Research Center (Saudi Arabia)*—by e-mail from **Dubai**: The ongoing wave of anti-government protests in the Middle East certainly destabilizes the situation in the region—but that is a concern for the short and medium time frame. The bigger worry is that the leading world powers have failed to realize the seriousness of the situation and its possible consequences. They will now have to adjust their policies to the rapidly changing situation in the Middle East. The United States and the European Union are revising their strategic relations with many nations in the region in order to be certain that they remain in control of the situation. At the height of the Egyptian crisis many observers discussed the role of Facebook, Twitter, and other social networks. I would not overestimate their significance. Modern information technologies have clearly put an end to state monopoly on information and given powerful communication tools to various groups. In and by themselves, however, they remain mere instruments in the hands of certain political forces.

- ❑ **Afghanistan–Pakistan.** Relations between Kabul and Washington deteriorated in early March after U.S. airstrikes led to more civilian deaths, triggering mass protests. The parliamentary crisis in Afghanistan continued unabated. In late February a special tribunal investigating reports of election fraud during the December 18, 2010 poll said one-third of the members of the Afghan parliament must relinquish their seats. On March 21 President Hamid Karzai declared the beginning of a gradual transition of responsibility for security in the country from coalition troops to the Afghan forces.

Relations between Washington and Islamabad became even more strained over the scandal concerning Raymond Davis, a U.S. consulate worker in Lahore. Pakistani police had detained him for killing two Pakistani citizens and held him for a long time, refusing to hand him over to the Americans. The Islamist radicals made use of the situation to increase their influence and stoke anti-American sentiment. Meanwhile, a stand-off continued between the country's two main political parties, the Pakistan People's Party and the Muslim League, and their respective leaders, President Ali Zardari and former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. In February, Pakistani Cabinet ministers resigned in an effort to cut government spending.

- ❑ **Europe.** The slowly recovering eurozone once again faced the need to rescue the economies of **Greece, Spain, Belgium, Portugal, and Ireland.** At a summit on March 12 eurozone leaders decided to grant the troubled economies more time before they have to repay EU and IMF loans, reduce interest rates on loans, and set up a permanent EU stabilization fund by 2013. They also agreed the *EU Competitiveness Pact*. The proposal was put forward by France and Germany in February in an effort to reduce social spending. It creates a mechanism to keep the lid on wage rises and introduces new labor market reforms, including a reduction in unemployment benefits to encourage Europe's unemployed to seek new jobs more proactively. The pact also includes measures aimed at modernizing Europe's education system. The proposals triggered a wave of popular anger; Belgium and Greece saw mass demonstrations against new austerity measures; the protesters urged their governments to say no to Paris and Berlin.

 **Pál Dunay (Hungary)**, *Head of the International Security Program of the Geneva Center for Security Policy*—by e-mail from **Geneva**: The member-states of the European Union still have no agreement on how to overcome the financial crisis. This puts EU cooperation under stress. Migratory pressure from the Middle East has increased. Moreover, Libya and Algeria are the major hydrocarbon producers. The situation in the region will cause a rise in gas and oil prices which may have a negative impact on the economic development of some European countries.

- ❑ Political tensions rose in **Eastern Europe and the Balkans.** Albania, Croatia, Serbia, and Romania saw mass opposition protests calling for the government's resignation and new political reforms. Clashes broke out in February in Macedonia between the ethnic Slavs and Albanians over the government's decision to build a new museum shaped as a church



in the ancient fortress of Skopje. In Bosnia parties that won the parliamentary elections in October 2010 are still unable to reach a compromise on forming a new government. The first talks between Belgrade and Pristina since Kosovo's declaration of independence took place in Brussels in March.

- **Former Soviet republics.** The level of terrorist threat remained high in **Russia**. A terrorist attack at Moscow's Domodedovo airport on January 24 killed 35 and injured more than 100 people. **Belarusian** President Alexander Lukashenko was re-elected for yet another term of office in December 2010. The ensuing opposition protests were dispersed by riot police. After the OSCE criticized the conduct of the poll, Minsk decided not to extend the organization's mandate in Belarus. **Kazakhstan** began preparations for an early presidential election scheduled for April 3. In **Kyrgyzstan** the parliamentary parties formed a coalition and the Cabinet, appointing Almazbek Atambayev as prime minister. But tensions are already simmering within the coalition amid general political instability in the country. Relations between **Azerbaijan** and **Armenia** deteriorated in January over Nagorny Karabakh.



*Farkhod Tolipov, Professor of Political Science at the National University of Uzbekistan (Uzbekistan)—by e-mail from Tashkent:* Events in the Middle East are being cautiously discussed by the general public and the political elites in Central Asia, and are therefore already having an impact on the situation in these republics. Some are discussing the implications and similarities between the Middle East and Central Asia. The political regimes in the two regions have a lot in common. It cannot be ruled out that the situation with the early presidential elections in Kazakhstan reflects to a certain extent the events in the Arab countries. In other words, the government in Kazakhstan may be trying to stay ahead of the game and bolster the president's legitimacy. On the other hand, the early election is part of the scenario devised by Nazarbayev and his allies to reformulate the old idea of a referendum on extending the incumbent president's term of office until 2020. The idea is now being dressed in fine democratic trappings, but the result will be more or less the same: the current president will stay in office until 2018. The president and his entourage clearly have a plan to restructure the political system in the country, but the exact nature of that plan remains unclear.

- **Koreas.** South Korea conducted a firing exercise near the demilitarized zone in January. Only by the middle of the month did Seoul lower the level of combat readiness of its forces in the Yellow Sea, the scene of armed clashes in November 2010. Pyongyang proposed the resumption of talks to stabilize the situation on the peninsula. Low-level negotiations were held between the military representatives of the two countries on February 9, ending without any results.

On February 28 South Korea and the United States held their annual joint naval exercise, drawing harsh criticism from the North and triggering a new bout of tensions on the peninsula. Pyongyang was also very annoyed by Seoul's tactic of dumping thousands of leaflets over the territory of North Korea with news of anti-government demonstrations in the Arab countries and calls for the overthrow of the North Korean regime. Rioting was reported on February 24 in the North Korean town of Sinuiju on the border with China. Chinese leader Hu Jintao promised his help in defusing tensions on the Korean peninsula during a visit to the United States in January.

- **Southeast Asia.** There was an armed incident between **Thailand** and **Cambodia** in February over the disputed territory near the ancient Preah Vihear temple. The **Philippines** saw armed clashes between extremist rebels in the south of the country. More than 30,000 people were displaced by ethnic clashes in the Indian states of Assam and Meghalaya.
- **Strategic stability and nuclear security.** The new strategic offensive reductions treaty between Russia and the United States entered into force on February 5. The new U.S. National Military Strategy released on February 9 emphasized America's intention to




pursue further nuclear cuts. The new document also details Washington's plans for improving its missile defense capabilities. Meanwhile, NATO representatives have said that the alliance is not yet ready to set up a joint "sector" missile defense system with Russia proposed by President Dmitry Medvedev in November 2010 at the NATO summit in Lisbon.

Galiya Ibragimova

### TURMOIL IN THE MIDDLE EAST

The events in the Middle East were unexpected only at first glance. The fact that many secular regimes in the Middle East (traditionally designated as nationalist) were in a pre-crisis state had been widely discussed in many newspapers and journals, including *Security Index*. Those events should therefore be described as instructive rather than unpredicted.

 *Evgeny Satanovsky, President of the Institute for Middle East Studies (Russia)—by e-mail from Moscow:* The Middle East is entering a period of revolutions, wars, changing borders, and the growing influence of radical political Islamism. A similar period in Europe began back in 1917 and ended in 1945. The security situation is not going to improve any time soon. The time of stable authoritarian and military dictatorships or monarchies is at an end. In the medium time frame the situation will deteriorate very seriously across the entire region from Morocco to Pakistan. Sudan has already split. Libya and Algeria are teetering on the brink of civil war. Syria may yet see a repeat of the Egyptian scenario. The situation in Yemen, where water reserves have dropped to zero, is a catastrophe waiting to happen. Sana has become the first capital city in the world to have been left completely without water. The small islands of stability in Qatar, the UAE, and Oman can be swept away at any moment. As the tide of revolution gains momentum, the number of refugees fleeing the region, heading mainly to the EU, continues to grow, creating a potential security threat. As the United States pulls its troops out of Iraq and Afghanistan, the number of terrorist attacks in the region continues to increase. A new bout of tensions over Iran's nuclear program is yet another thundercloud on the horizon.

Why, then, had leaders such as Hosni Mubarak, Muammar Gaddafi, and Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, who never really cared about their own people, ruled their countries to their heart's content for 20, 30, or 40 years? Why had the bulk of their rule coincided with the period when Washington kept talking of nothing else but democratization (even of exporting democracy by force) and human rights? Why had the Middle East turned into a sanctuary for rulers who, as the example of Ben Ali demonstrates, had lost all touch with reality and paid more attention to their partners in various international clubs than to their own people?

One does not have to be an expert on the Middle East to realize that the three countries that have been affected the most by the popular uprisings (though the list looks set to keep growing) were key U.S. allies in the region. Tunisia seems an exception, but only at first glance. The leaders of those three countries had reigned unmolested thanks only to American support and approval. It is only with Washington's tacit consent that all the questions about replacing some of the most notorious figures for the sake of democratic appearances had remained unanswered. Those very same figures are now paying for this. Only five or six years ago Mubarak could still make a dignified exit, keeping intact his reputation as the father of Egypt's economic miracle. The country's economy had really made a breakthrough during his tenure; Egypt had been making steady progress, at least until the late 1990s. Mubarak's family, meanwhile, could still retain its strong positions in the Egyptian politics and economy. All Washington had to do was drop a hint. Now Washington is not dropping any hints—it is saying outright that the time has come to hand over power to someone else. In the final stages, Washington's efforts to push Mubarak out began to look quite unseemly. It was also amusing to observe London and Paris, which, despite all the political changes, continue to try to run in front of Washington's steam engine. It was even more amusing to watch them being shown their place by America when they tried to lead the way on Libya.



R E V I E W O F W O R L D E V E N T S



**Dayan Jayatilleka**, Ambassador of Sri Lanka to France, Permanent representative of Sri Lanka to UNESCO, professor (**Sri Lanka**)—by email from **Paris**: Regardless of its outcome, the growing wave of anti-government protests in the Middle East will lead to changes in the geopolitical situation in the region. But we should not be considering only the negative scenario. Security in the region is a dynamic and continuously evolving process, not a frozen status quo. These days the definition of security includes various social transformations, as well as people's hopes and expectations. The governments of many Arab countries often ignore those new factors, fuelling popular discontent. The resignation of former Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak does not automatically mean the return of stability in Egypt. But continuing rule of leaders not very different from Mubarak in other Arab countries can further radicalize public sentiment. The region must urgently develop a strategy of a soft exit from the ongoing political crisis. That strategy should be based on holding open and democratic elections, creating a multi-party system and consolidating civilian control of the military. If such a plan were to be put into effect, the Arab countries could well see an entirely new phenomenon that resembles the Turkish model of *Perestroika*.

It is quite telling that none of the serious analysts even tried to pretend that the events in Tunisia or Yemen were spontaneous. Attempts at deposing the ruling regimes in Algeria, Syria, and Jordan were carefully planned and premeditated. In Egypt the developments looked a bit more spontaneous, owing probably to the fact that events had begun to unfold more rapidly than their organizers had expected. But whichever way you look at it, America's mighty outlines are clearly visible behind all the latest events in the Middle East—even though, after the WikiLeaks scandal, Washington was supposed to be going through a period of utter dejection. It is not even a matter of condemning the Americans for their contempt for the national sovereignty of other countries. After all, they are merely working to achieve their own foreign policy objectives, and doing so more successfully and more aggressively (in a good way) than anyone else in the world. It is not even just about money. It is about political will and clear strategy.

So what had moved the Americans to try to replace the people who were prepared to continue to serve American interests as best they could? It appears that Washington had envisaged a scenario of developments in the Middle East under which a preventive change of a friendly and allied regime, even if it involves elements of chaos and civil war (casualties among the locals had never stopped the Americans) would be a positive scenario. What is that scenario? Washington probably saw a real threat that after another two or three years of the old regimes remaining in place, power in those countries could well be seized by radical Islamists. The consequences of that would be beyond America's control. So far, Washington is still more or less in control. Incidentally, apart from some degree of instability in Jordan, the Arab revolutions have not touched any of the regimes that are considered to be the cornerstone of the American presence in the Middle East, such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, or the UAE. It seems that the masters of Facebook and Al-Jazeera have not detected any problems with democracy in those particular countries.


In the current situation the United States has lots of room for maneuver. I would not completely discount the potential of the new generation of secular nationalists; after all, many of the demonstrators in Cairo held portraits of Gamal Nasser. The history of the Arab countries is very complex, but I believe a far more likely scenario is the arrival in Egypt of a new oppressive military regime with little respect for human rights. In the end, the so-called democratic revolution in Egypt ended on February 15, 2011 with a classic military coup, and a serious crackdown is already on the horizon. That is why it would be premature to expect that the United States will now leave the Middle East in Twitter's capable hands.

As for Libya, the developments there have been quite a surprise for me in many ways. It seemed for a while that Gaddafi had become a walking political corpse—not when the revolution began, but some 15 years ago—and that his chances were zero. But events took a different turn. And it would be a mistake to think that mercenaries from Chad and Niger had played a key role in those events. There is no doubt that the mercenaries were there, but they are not to blame for the bloodbath the Libyan colonel and his relatives had ordered in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. It would be a mistake to deny that after a week and a half of vacillations many Libyans took the side of their exalted leader, to a greater or lesser extent. Gaddafi's opponents are leaderless, and the Libyans

must have been depressed by the example of Tunisia and Egypt, which, after decades of relative stability, are sinking into chaos. Even more importantly, the social networks revolutions—or at least their Arab iterations—were not designed to overcome determined resistance, let alone armed assault. In other words, virtual reality wins only so long as it is not opposed by tanks and artillery shells. If it meets that kind of opposition, the situation unfolds according to the classic principles described by a well-known Russian political scientist of the early twentieth century, Vladimir Ulyanov [the real name of Vladimir Lenin—**Ed.**] in his book “State and Revolution”.

Who has profited from the situation? Let us admit that the United States has been the undoubted winner of the latest round of Middle Eastern diplomacy. Another winner is Iran. The idea of secular and moderate (especially with regard to Israel) nationalism has probably been discredited for the next several decades in the Arab world. Tactically, the inflexible Iranian leadership will find it much easier to maneuver in the current chaos. Its realistic ambitions will now include extending Iran's influence rather than merely surviving. To make use of this favorable situation, the Iranian leaders will have to keep domestic pressures under control; the most urgent task is to make the country's economic and social model more sensible. Unless Washington manages to topple the regime in Iran, or at least replace it with a coalition where its puppets in Iran are well represented, America's tactical victory could very quickly turn into a strategic defeat.

In the absence of any ideological competition from the Arab states (which can now forget about being the leaders of the Islamic world for a long time to come), Tehran has received additional freedom of maneuver. It is now in a position to pursue ideological expansion—something it has been unable to do since the late 1980s, when the initial impulse of the Islamic revolution had fizzled out (or had been squandered on the war with Iraq and confrontation with the Soviet Union in Afghanistan). Hence the question: if the Americans are aware of this threat (and there is little doubt that they are), will they not try to channel the Iranian ideological expansion northwards, towards Central Asia? Fuelling anti-Iranian sentiment among America's new-found regional allies would be very easy for Washington. Adopting an anti-Iranian stance was their immediate reaction after the Islamic revolution of 1979. Back then, the Soviet Union failed to discern that maneuver. Have our politicians become any smarter since then?

 **Konstantin von Eggert**, Member of the Royal Institute of International Relations (**United Kingdom**)—by e-mail from **Moscow**: Anti-government demonstrations in the Arab-Muslim world have demonstrated that the topic of democracy in Asia and Africa is still alive. For all the instability these events have caused in the region, they have uncovered a fundamental shift in the Arab world. That enables us to formulate a realistic view of the Middle East as one of the most important regions on the planet, and to raise a wide range of issues about government accountability and responsibility to its own people. Many of the former Soviet countries, where security and stability have long turned into stagnation, are facing the same dilemmas. From that point of view, in the longer time frame the Arab rebellion will lead to a rethinking of the situation in favor of a more positive scenario. For Russia, the latest events in the Middle East call for a revision of its foreign policy strategy (which has focused on interests and ignored values in the past few years). They should also prompt Russia to rethink its domestic situation, which, sadly, gives a lot of reasons to ponder the state of the relationship between the government and the people. The increasingly hostile rhetoric between Russia and Japan on the subject of the South Kurils is another demonstration of Moscow's uncompromising stance on protecting its interests in Asia. But the main potential threat to Russian national interests is China, and that is a country nobody wants to pick any fights with.

Who is the immediate loser in this situation? Many analysts point to Israel. But, strategically, the European Union may have lost even more. The United States cannot afford to withdraw its support from Israel, even though the sentiment among the American elite has changed a great deal. The EU, meanwhile, is gradually finding itself in an extremely difficult situation that is not very different from strategic isolation—more on that later.

The main lesson, however, is this. The major strength of American foreign policy is that America calculates its strategy for years to come, not from one G8 shindig to the next. Another strength is that Washington is always ready to sell out each and every one of its allies, if the price is right.



Mubarak may have been a bit stubborn sometimes, but Pervez Musharraf had always been Washington's most loyal servant in Asia. Now the new pro-U.S. government in Pakistan has dragged him to court, clearly with Washington's approval. The latest events in Egypt and the wider Middle East are a clear signal to all the post-Soviet elites in Central Asian republics. If the rulers of those republics hope that Washington will honor its promises, they should think again.

**Dmitry Evstafiev**

### RATIFICATION OF THE NEW START TREATY

Specialists in propaganda and upbeat rhetoric have been quick to proclaim the ratification of the New START treaty a victory for common sense and a new lease of life for the arms control regime. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has described the treaty's entry into force as "a sign of change" that was made possible "by the realization that unilateral approaches to security are counterproductive. The principles of equality, parity and shared security on which the treaty is built are a strong foundation for renewed Russian-American cooperation in a whole number of areas."<sup>1</sup>



*Evgeny Buzhinsky, Head of the International Treaty Directorate of the Main Department of International Military Cooperation of the Russian MoD (2002–2009), PIR Center Consultant (Russia)—by e-mail from Moscow:* Judging from the new U.S. National Military Strategy released seven years after the previous document was adopted under the Bush administration, Washington's views of its role in the world and of its relations with Russia have undergone a significant transformation. The wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have been a serious blow to the idea of American self-sufficiency. It has turned out that, for all its power, America cannot achieve a convincing victory even in one of those wars, let alone two at once. Hence the declaration in Barak Obama's military doctrine that from now on America will seek to act as part of broad international coalitions. Another difference compared with the 2004 doctrine is that Washington's main concern these days is China's growing economic and military might—hence the clear eastward prioritization of the new U.S. military strategy.

Russia, meanwhile, is well on its way towards strengthening and modernizing its armed forces, despite the continuing lack of resources. Washington's view of Moscow as a junior partner is therefore becoming rather obsolete. In this new situation America has decided that it would be better to have Russia as a partner (if not an outright ally for now) rather than trying to establish U.S. supremacy. On the issue of further strategic offensive reductions Russia will probably take a time out to make sure that the latest treaty is being implemented without any complications. The unfreezing of the CFE situation remains the top issue on the U.S.–Russian disarmament agenda. The Americans will almost certainly step up their efforts to begin dialogue on tactical nuclear weapons. Dialogue has also begun between the United States, NATO and Russia on missile defense cooperation. Deadlock in these talks would lead to another chill in our relations.

Alas, Minister Lavrov has been too hasty in his upbeat assessments.

Militarily, the impact of the treaty will be miniscule. In practice it does not ordain any actual reductions or limitations. It would not make any sense to try to prove that in this review. But the treaty's ratification and its consequences deserve a more careful look, because they could become the focus of bitter controversy in the coming months.

Proponents of arms control (sarcastically labeled by John Bolton as "arms control theologians") had expressed concerns that the Senate Republicans would derail the ratification of New START.<sup>2</sup> It is true that the Republicans were very critical of the treaty—and for very good reasons. The Senate's refusal to ratify the treaty would be a clear demonstration of the political impotence of the White House. But had the Republicans derailed the ratification, public opinion in America itself and abroad would label them as warmongers, or at the very least as retrogrades and enemies of progress. The general public does not have the duty to be proficient in the finer details of arms control negotiations. It is usually led by a simple (but not always correct) formula: nuclear treaties strengthen international security, their absence undermines it. The Obama administration would not have balked at making use of that simplistic logic to discredit the Republicans and score political points. But it seems that the White House preferred not to run any unnecessary risks. It decided to get the treaty ratified whatever the cost—and got itself into a trap.

The Republicans have pulled off an elegant political combination. They have voted for the ratification—but first they had extracted a number of concessions from the White House in return. First, the Obama administration has committed itself to increasing the financing of the modernization of American nuclear weapons and to pressing ahead with the program of creating a missile defense system that will protect America and its allies. According to media reports, \$85 billion will be spent over the next 10 years on the modernization of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. Second, after the Senate vote the Obama administration must accept several interpretations of key provisions in the treaty that do not match the Russian interpretations. In particular, the United States will now proceed from the notion that non-nuclear strategic-range weapons do not fall under the definition of “new types of strategic offensive weapons”, which are covered by the new treaty. It has also been said very unambiguously that the new treaty, including its preamble, does not impose any legal restrictions on the United States with regard to the development and deployment of missile defense systems, apart from the article in the treaty banning the use of IBCM and SLBM launchers for interceptor missiles.<sup>3</sup>



**Andrey Kortunov**, President of the New Eurasia Foundation (**Russia**)—by phone from

**Moscow:** The entry into force of the New START treaty is a significant event, but largely symbolic. Further progress on the reset of relations between Washington and Moscow will depend on both sides’ willingness to abandon the Cold War logic that persists to this day. In essence, the New START treaty follows the logic of maintaining nuclear parity between two superpowers. We need a new platform for cooperation if relations between Russia and the United States are to attain a new quality. Meanwhile, relations between Russia and the EU leave much to be desired. The EU’s recent sanctions against Belarus have been a further complication, although they have not really changed anything. Judging from the reactions in Moscow, Russia does not intend to form a united front with the proponents of sanctions against President Lukashenko. Events in the Middle East and North Africa have brought a further deterioration in the international security situation. Russia has benefited from the sharp rise in the oil prices triggered by those events, but that benefit may yet be outweighed by the resulting losses elsewhere.

The most important provision of the Senate resolution on the ratification of the New START treaty is the demand for the White House to seek talks with Moscow on tactical nuclear arms reductions. The resolution does not specify what exactly Washington should do if Russia rejects such talks—but it does lay the ground for America’s possible withdrawal from the treaty should Moscow refuse to discuss non-strategic nuclear weapons cuts. Militarily and politically such a step would be entirely justified. Russian tactical nuclear weapons are causing growing concern among Western politicians and the general public. It is understood very well that in the event of an armed conflict between Russia and NATO, Moscow could resort to using such weapons.

On the whole, the Senate resolution has set a legally binding framework for the U.S. administration’s further interactions with Russia on nuclear weapons issues. Any breach of that framework would trigger a serious scandal in the United States. Moscow, meanwhile, is facing a dilemma. It can either accept the U.S. interpretations of the New START treaty, despite the irritation caused by these interpretations among the Russian military and political leadership—or it can simply withdraw from the treaty. In that latter case Russia would bear all the blame for the collapse of the treaty and of the entire nuclear arms reduction process.

Yury Fedorov 

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> Sergey Lavrov’s statement at the 47<sup>th</sup> Munich Security Conference, Munich. Russian MFA, February 5, 2011, <[http://www.mid.ru/brp\\_4.nsf/2fee282eb6df40e643256999005e6e8c/f1631eb48c8fa55cc325782e004eba9e?OpenDocument](http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/2fee282eb6df40e643256999005e6e8c/f1631eb48c8fa55cc325782e004eba9e?OpenDocument)>, last accessed March 1, 2010.

<sup>2</sup> John Bolton, *Surrender Is not an Option* (New York: Simon & Shuster, 2008), p. 55.

<sup>3</sup> Resolution of advice and consent to ratification agreed to as amended in Senate by Yea-Nay Vote. 71–26. Record Vote Number: 298.





## ASYMMETRIC CONFLICT AS A NON-MATHEMATICAL CATEGORY

**Deriglazova L.V. *Asymmetric Conflicts: an Equation with Many Unknowns* (Tomsk: Tomsk University Publications, 2009), 284 pp.**

*Reviewed by Ekaterina Stepanova*

Theoretical studies of asymmetric violence usually focus on the various types of armed resistance by a weaker opponent to a much stronger one. They began from the original *theory of asymmetric conflict* proposed in a book by Andrew Mack,<sup>1</sup> the publication of which coincided with the inglorious end of America's military intervention in Vietnam in 1975.

Almost all the authors and theoreticians of asymmetric conflict are Westerners; the philosophy of their work tends to be distinctly positivist. The work itself falls into two separate categories: books and articles by military analysts, and academic research. There are also two main topics on which that work focuses. One is the reasons and conditions that compel the weaker adversary to armed confrontation with a stronger one (A. Mack, J. Scott, T. Paul, P. Peterson, S. Kalyvas, J. Weinstein and others).<sup>2</sup> The other is essentially attempting to explain the outcome of an asymmetric conflict and understand why the militarily weaker adversary can achieve victory over the stronger one. Researchers who focus on that latter topic (R. Thompson, P. Trinquier, D. Galula, M. Shafer, I. Arreguin-Toft, J. Record and others)<sup>3</sup> usually devote their energies to developing the strategies which the stronger states or groups of states can bring to bear against the weaker adversary.

For all the importance of these problems, they are probably secondary to the core issues that have to do with the very idea of asymmetry in armed conflict. There are three such issues in particular, which make use of all the existing reams of knowledge concerning asymmetric conflict, but which are still not understood very well, even though the theory of asymmetric conflict has been researched for more than three decades now.

First, who are the main participants in asymmetric conflict, and how has the nature of those participants changed since World War II? Mainstream research on asymmetric conflict (A. Mack, T. Paul, R. Thompson, I. Arreguin-Toft, J. Record) has long been preoccupied with wars between sovereign nations and large-scale anti-colonial wars, which had largely ended by the late 1970s.<sup>4</sup> Meanwhile, by the 1980s asymmetric conflicts involving non-state actors and not related to anti-colonial struggle had become no less common than other types of asymmetric conflicts. By the 1990s–2000s such conflicts had actually become more prevalent. It is only in the early 2000s that the nature of asymmetry in conflicts involving non-state actors began to attract more attention from researchers and military analysts (J. Nagl, David Petraeus).<sup>5</sup> This is not to say that such conflicts had not been studied as part of research into low-intensity conflicts and insurgencies. But for that field of research issues of asymmetry have usually been secondary. Meanwhile, the nature of participants in asymmetric conflict continues to evolve in the twenty-first century, as demonstrated by the new phenomenon of transnational networks waging struggle, including armed struggle, against nations, groups of nations, etc.

Second, the initial and traditional interpretation of asymmetry as substantial military superiority of one of the adversaries over the other does not fully reflect the nature of any asymmetric conflict. That interpretation is especially inadequate when dealing with the type of asymmetric conflict that has become predominant in the early 2000s, the conflict between a nation (or a group of nations) and a non-state group (such as a transnational network). Describing such asymmetry in purely military or even purely calculable terms and numbers does not paint the whole picture. Adding the international status of the opponents (i.e. whether they are state or non-state actors) to the



L  
I  
B  
R  
A  
R  
Y

equation helps, but not by very much. If those were the only necessary factors, decisive victory in any asymmetric conflict would require only a qualitatively superior military capability plus internationally recognized status. In the real world, however, many such conflicts drag on for ages without any signs of either side gaining the upper hand; indeed, sometimes the apparently stronger side actually loses. Hence the question: what are the other criteria, apart from military strength and international status, that define and describe asymmetry in a conflict?

Third, there is growing universal recognition of the decisive factor of support from the local population, which can bring victory to the weaker adversary in an asymmetric conflict. Military leaders from Mao Zedong to Harold Briggs and John Templer, who formulated strategy in Britain's confrontation with Communist rebels in British Malaya in the 1950s, knew the importance of that factor very well. Now it has come to the fore once again, figuring large in the internationalized conflicts of the past decade and being a decisive factor in the failures of the U.S. counterinsurgency strategy in Iraq and Afghanistan. It has become the core of a whole number of new counterinsurgency strategies and doctrines. One is to undermine the social base of the insurgents by prioritizing the goal of providing security over military goals and "winning the hearts and minds" of the local population (R. Thompson).<sup>6</sup> Another is "defending the population", a key element of the latest U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine ("the Petraeus Doctrine").<sup>7</sup> There is little doubt that widespread support for the insurgents among the local population is a compulsory and even decisive precondition for the victory of the weaker adversary in an asymmetric conflict. Nevertheless, that weaker adversary can start such a conflict and/or continue the resistance for a long time without any significant social support for its objectives and programs. As a result, measures to deprive the insurgents of social support can prevent them from achieving an outright victory—but they will not necessarily be enough to bring about the end of the actual asymmetric conflict. Therefore, apart from the questions of who takes part in asymmetric conflicts and what the criteria of asymmetry are, there is also a third important question. What exactly enables the armed adversary who does not enjoy widespread support among the local population to continue asymmetric armed confrontation indefinitely, preventing the stronger adversary from achieving a decisive victory?

Every modern concept of asymmetric conflict that lays claim to independent theoretical interpretation must provide definitive answers to the three basic questions just listed. These answers are needed for a clear understanding of asymmetry as such; they can also help us to understand the comparative advantages of not only the militarily stronger side, but also—and even more importantly—of the militarily weaker adversary as well. The actual answers to these questions vary. Some rely on a rigid, almost mathematical formula of asymmetric conflict as bilateral strategic interaction, as proposed by I. Arreguin-Toft. Others, such as the one put forward by the author of this review, are based on the idea of ideological and organizational asymmetry.<sup>8</sup> This second approach argues that the main asymmetric advantage of the weaker adversary (who nowadays is almost always a non-state actor) is the ability of the more radical ideologies to mobilize support at the grassroots level. The other advantage stems from the differences between the organization of the weaker adversary (which often takes the form of a network or a hybrid) and the traditional organization of the militarily stronger state actors.

In Russia the theory of asymmetric conflict is not very well researched. All the more reason, then, to look closely at the first Russian historical research book on the subject, "Asymmetric Conflicts: an Equation with Many Unknowns" by Larisa Deriglazova, a historian from Tomsk, published in 2009. Comparing the balance between the adversaries in an asymmetric conflict to a mathematical equation in the title of the book implies that the author prioritizes rational and calculable parameters of asymmetry. In fact, the range of issues and interpretations of asymmetric conflict discussed in the book is much wider than that.

As for the theory of asymmetric conflict itself, the biggest strength of the book and its main value is the meticulous and in many ways exemplary historiographic study of the subject-matter (Sections 1 and 3). For all the abundance of research into asymmetric conflict in Western, especially English-language sources, the book is the first serious historiographic study by a Russian researcher. It offers intelligent critical review of all the key trends in modern research into various types of conflict (mostly Western, but some of it Russian or Soviet as well) covering the period since the 1950s. One thing in common between these various types of conflict is that they involve adversaries who differ in terms of their "status, resources, interests, strategies and tactics" (p. 61). The main areas covered in the book include research into the causes and general trends in the development of armed conflicts since World War II (§1.1); a selective but fairly

representative review of research into the theory of asymmetric conflict (§1.2), along with critical analysis of the definitions and interpretations of asymmetry as part of the force-based, paradoxical, status-based (political and legal), and tactical-strategic approaches (§1.3). Those latter approaches, incidentally, are often combined in the theories proposed by the same authors (such as I. Arreguin-Toft). Another interesting section is the brief but informative review of academic and special literature on insurgencies in the third chapter (pp. 196–216).

Nevertheless, the detailed review of the available research into the subject-matter offered by the author does not resolve an inherent contradiction in the book's focus and definitions. On the one hand, the author analyses reams of research and statistics on a wide range of asymmetric conflicts, taking into account the asymmetries in status, military capability, resources, strategy, and tactics. These conflicts are between different types of adversaries, and their outcomes vary: some end in the victory of the stronger adversary; in others the weaker side comes out on top; still others can last indefinitely or end in a stalemate. The nature of the contradiction is that the author tries to artificially restrict the definition (!) and range of asymmetric conflicts analyzed in the book to: (a) those involving great powers (i.e. leading Western countries and large regional powers), and (b) those in which the great powers invariably lose to the weaker adversary (p. 23 and onwards). The term "asymmetric conflict", meanwhile, is applied both to all the conflicts of the first type and, in a narrower sense, to conflicts of the second type. This introduces some confusion and muddles the concept of the phenomenon being analyzed.

The author's generally positivist approach is dictated not only by her use of statistics, but also by the fact that the sources of those statistics are fairly trustworthy. She offers a brief review of several databases on conflicts, focusing on the databases maintained by Uppsala and Heidelberg Universities (pp. 50–70) and a consolidated table of conflicts covering the period 1945–2006 in Annex 3 (pp. 270–282) compiled from figures in those two databases. That section is very useful, although there have been other books in Russian making use of the statistics in the leading global databases. The Uppsala database of conflicts in particular is quite familiar to Russian specialists; excerpts from it are published in Russian every year.<sup>9</sup>

It would not be fair to say that the author expects the statistics to provide all the answers. She recognizes, for example, that formal analysis of those statistics cannot predict the relationship between the strategies used in asymmetric conflicts and the resulting outcomes (p. 85). She also admits that analysis of the databases "must be used only as the first stage of research that relies on qualitative and quantitative methods" in order to "avoid errors...and unfounded generalizations" (p. 102). She stresses that it is "difficult to capture the [asymmetry] phenomenon by looking for its repetitive manifestations in the databases" (p. 217). Nevertheless, there are problems with this book related to its use of statistics. They stem from overreliance on databases and incomplete use of the data contained in them; there are also certain flaws in the methods used to collect the data. Let me give you two examples.

To begin with, the author spends too much effort trying to prove statistically that asymmetric conflict has been the dominant form of conflict during the postwar period (§2.2). That point does not actually require much proving. It becomes quite obvious once you look at the basic statistics of conflicts involving state actors, such as the widely circulated findings of the Uppsala program, which shows the predominance of internal conflicts over international ones since World War II.<sup>10</sup> Since internal conflicts are conflicts between a state party and a non-state actor, they are always asymmetric in some way (usually in terms of the resources available to the opposing sides).

To illustrate, let us look at the statistics for the past decade. According to the Uppsala database and other similar databases, the vast majority of the conflicts involving a state (any state, not just a great power) over that period were asymmetric, because they were internal. But when the Uppsala specialists looked at the statistics for conflicts between non-state actors and not involving any state party (they created a special database for such conflicts covering the early 2000s), it turned out that the number of such conflicts was comparable to the number of conflicts involving a state party.<sup>11</sup> These non-state conflicts are predominantly symmetric (in terms of the status of the opposing sides and, in most cases, in terms of the resources available to them). Once those conflicts are taken into account, the resulting balance between the symmetric and asymmetric conflicts will have to be seriously adjusted, at least for the period since the year 2000. In actual fact, no one has been collecting statistics for non-state conflicts for the period since World War II, so any conclusions made on the basis of that incomplete picture have to be taken with a pinch of salt.





The book's oversimplified and selective approach to statistics has also compromised the author's efforts to understand the relationship between terrorism and conflicts since World War II. In the absence of any reliable statistics for terrorism until the 1970s, accurately describing that relationship in statistical terms for the past 65 years is hardly possible. The Uppsala conflicts database used by the author does not keep a separate tally for terrorist acts and terrorist campaigns (p. 78), although detailed figures for terrorism since the 1970s are available in specialist databases. Serious acts and campaigns of terrorism are also accounted for in the Uppsala program, but it categorizes them as unilateral acts of violence against civilians rather than conflicts, and keeps them in a separate database. Analysis of those Uppsala data reveals very tight correlation between conflicts and violence primarily targeting non-combatants, including terrorism. In the period since 1989, conflict zones have accounted for 88 percent of all campaigns of unilateral violence against civilians and 99 percent of the deaths resulting from such violence.<sup>12</sup>

Such examples illustrate that, on the one hand, databases are a valuable source of information. In fact, they may be the only available source of reliable scientific information when trying to detect global trends. But, on the other hand, one must always be aware of the limitations of the databases, and exercise extreme caution when drawing conclusions.<sup>13</sup> For example, one must not count on the universality and reliability of conclusions made on the basis of substandard statistics simply because better statistics are not available for the period chosen by the researcher—even though such partial statistics may significantly change our view of the latter stages of the period under review.


The main weakness of the book is to a certain extent the reverse side of its main strength. It suffers from a lack of conceptual clarity, and from the weakness of the author's own substantive conclusions regarding the essence of the issue being studied, as opposed to summarizing the theories concerning its various aspects proposed by the existing academic and special literature. The real contribution by the author to research in the field is limited to certain conclusions about the numerical parameters of asymmetric conflicts made on the basis of the available statistics. But some of those conclusions labor fairly obvious points. Take, for example, the conclusion that "asymmetric conflicts are more frequent than the symmetric ones"; that the weaker adversary is more likely to win in an asymmetric conflict if one of the great powers intervenes on its side (p. 86); or that "there is no clear rule of thumb" (p. 101)—which, by the way, may be a useful observation in itself. The case studies in Section 3 (the breakup of the British Empire and the war(s) in Iraq in 2003–2009), which the author presents as detailed historical analysis, follow the traditional descriptive approach and do not really offer any insights into the nature and problems of asymmetry between the opposing sides (even if we limit the range of asymmetric conflicts to those involving one of the so-called great powers and a weaker adversary).

Going back to the three core questions concerning asymmetry mentioned earlier in this review, the first and the third sections of the book briefly outline some of the answers that have been proposed in the existing scientific and military-strategic literature. But the author does not offer any logical, independent, or innovative answer of her own to any of those three questions. In her discussion of the criteria of asymmetry other than the military-strategic parameters (resources, tactics, etc.) and international status, the author merely repeats the conclusion that has been made elsewhere quite some time ago—namely, that other factors of asymmetry should be taken into account as well (p. 216). Merely repeating the fact that asymmetric conflict is "an equation with many unknowns" may be useful, especially for a Russian audience. But the assertion itself is nothing new, and the book does not offer an independent or substantive analytical model of asymmetric conflict.

As I have already mentioned, the author is also guilty of some confusion in the theoretical definition of the problem and the interpretation of asymmetric conflicts. This raises a number of questions concerning the author's interpretation of such a basic term as "international conflict". There is a clear contradiction in the book between the initially proposed definition of asymmetric conflict as an international relations phenomenon involving one of the great powers and the author's use of research and statistics relating to all types of asymmetric conflicts (including internal ones) and her references to the whole body of research into insurgency. Insurgency is always asymmetric by its very definition; but it does not have to be an international relations phenomenon, which is the topic of the book as defined by the author herself. Large numbers of insurgency campaigns have been waged as part of conflicts that were neither international nor

even involved internationalization of an internal conflict (i.e. intervention in the conflict by a foreign country on the side of one of the opposing forces).

In her review of existing research into the subject-matter the author often confuses and treats as almost equivalent such terms as “asymmetric conflict”, “low-intensity war”, and “civil war”. But although most civil wars involve insurgency, not every internal conflict is asymmetric. The author recognizes that a conflict between two opponents who have equal status can be symmetric—but she believes that is true only of conflicts between state parties (p. 73). Meanwhile, the period since World War II offers numerous examples of very large-scale civil wars where the difference in status between the two sides was not at all clear, whereas the military capability of the sides was roughly equal (such as the armed conflict between the Communists and the Kuomintang in China). There are also internal conflicts in which the state itself is not one of the opposing parties, or in which there is no state as such (i.e. the struggle between the competing groups of the Mujahedeen in Afghanistan in the early 1990s, or the armed conflict between the warring factions in Darfur (Sudan) and in Somalia).

But for all its obvious flaws, this book by Larisa Deriglazova has undoubted scientific and especially historiographic value. It demonstrates that the familiarity of Russian researchers, including those working in the leading provincial universities, with the latest international research in the field, military-political ideas, and statistics can be very impressive. Even more importantly, the book offers intelligent and critical analysis of Western scientific, applied, and special literature rather than merely summarizing Western ideas in an effort to bring them to the masses. Conceived and written as a monograph, this work, nevertheless, can be a valuable textbook. I would recommend it to the attention of civilian specialists, including members of academe, and I believe it should be recommended reading at military and security academies. 



## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> A. Mack, “Why Big Nations Loose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict,” *World Politics* 27, No. 2 (1975), pp. 175–200.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.; T. Paul, *Asymmetric Conflict: War Initiation by Weaker Powers* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994); R. Peterson, *Understanding Ethnic Violence: Fear, Hatred, and Resentment in Twentieth-Century Eastern Europe* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002); S. Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil Wars* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006); J. Weinstein, *Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

<sup>3</sup> R. Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgents: Experiences from Malaya and Vietnam* (London: Chatto & Windus, 1966); P. Trinquier, *Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964); D. Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964); M. Shafer, *Deadly Paradigms: The Failure of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy, 1945–1965* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988); T. Hammes, *The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century* (New York: Zenith Press, 2004); I. Arreguin-Toft, op. cit.; J. Record, *Defeating Goliath: Why Insurgencies Win* (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2007).

<sup>4</sup> In the main conflict databases anti-colonial wars are usually categorized as neither strictly international nor internal conflicts (civil wars). They usually make up a separate category. See: *UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset Codebook*, Version 4-2007 (Uppsala; Oslo: UCDP/PRIO, 2007), p. 10

<sup>5</sup> David Petraeus, commander of U.S. troops in Iraq (January 2007–September 2008) and Afghanistan (since July 2010) is the main author of the new U.S. counterinsurgency strategy: *The U.S. Army-Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007). See also: J. Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002).

<sup>6</sup> R. Thompson, op. cit. An alternative to that strategy is a forceful military approach, including punitive sanctions against the population which supports the adversary. See: P. Trinquier, op. cit.

<sup>7</sup> *The U.S. Army-Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual*, op. cit.

<sup>8</sup> See: E. Stepanova, *Terrorism in Asymmetrical Conflict: Ideological and Structural Aspects* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), or E. Stepanova, “Asymmetric Conflict as Asymmetry of Power, Status, Ideology and Structure,” *Voyennaya Mysl*. No. 5 (2010), pp. 47–54; E. Stepanova, *Terrorism in Asymmetric Conflict: Ideological and Structural Aspects*, IMEMO RAN. M.: *Nauchnaya Kniga*, 2010.

<sup>9</sup> See primarily UCDP/SIPRI data for large armed conflicts in sections on conflicts in the Russian-language edition of the SIPRI Annual Report, which is a partner of the Uppsala program.

<sup>10</sup> See diagram: "Armed Conflicts by Type, 1946–2009," UCDP, <[http://www.pcr.uu.se/digitalAssets/20/20864\\_conflict\\_types\\_2009.pdf](http://www.pcr.uu.se/digitalAssets/20/20864_conflict_types_2009.pdf)>, last accessed March 12, 2011.

<sup>11</sup> "Non-State Conflict Dataset, 2002–2007," UCDP, <[http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/datasets\\_archive/](http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/datasets_archive/)>, last accessed March 12, 2011; there will soon be another update and additions of data for 1989–2008. See: <[http://www.pcr.uu.se/digitalAssets/41/41526\\_non\\_state\\_region\\_2008.pdf](http://www.pcr.uu.se/digitalAssets/41/41526_non_state_region_2008.pdf)>, last accessed March 12, 2011; *UCDP Non-State Actor Dataset Codebook, Version 1-2009* (Uppsala: UCDP, 2009); L. Harbom and P. Wallensteen, *Patterns of Major Armed Conflicts, 1998–2007*, SIPRI Yearbook 2008 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 79.

<sup>12</sup> "UCDP One-sided Violence Dataset v 1.3-2010, 1989–2008," <[http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/datasets+\\_archive/](http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/datasets+_archive/)>, last accessed March 12, 2011; Ralph Sundberg, *Revisiting One-Sided Violence: A Global and Regional Analysis*, Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Paper No. 3 (Uppsala: UCDP, 2009), p. 14; K. Eck and L. Hultman, "One-sided Violence against Civilians in War: Insights from New Fatality Data," *Journal of Peace Research* 44, No. 2 (2007), p. 237.

<sup>13</sup> For detailed review and analysis of databases on conflicts and other forms of armed violence, see: E. Stepanova, "State and Individual in Modern Conflicts," *Mezhdunarodnye protsessy* No. 1 (2008), pp. 29–40; E. Stepanova, "Global Trends in the Development of Modern Armed Conflicts," *Union Magazine* (special edition ahead of the Yaroslavl Global Security Summit) No. 1 (2009), pp. 40–53.



## ABOUT THE AUTHORS

**Anin**, Anatoly, is an independent expert, member of the Russian delegation at the CFE and START talks (pp. 15–26).

**Barsky**, Kirill, is a Deputy Director of the Asia-Pacific Cooperation Department at the Russian Foreign Ministry. Holds a PhD in History. Previously served as an Adviser-Envoy at the Russian embassy in Indonesia (pp. 47–62).

**Borodavkin**, Alexey, is a Deputy Foreign Minister of Russia in charge of relations with Asian countries and multilateral cooperation in the Asia Pacific region. Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary. Joined the diplomatic service in 1975. Held various diplomatic posts in Moscow and abroad (Thailand, Slovakia, Austria). Head of the Fourth CIS Department of the Russian Foreign Ministry in 1999–2002. Russian Ambassador to Slovakia in 2002–2004. Russia's Permanent Representative at the OSCE in Vienna (pp. 47–62).

**Evstafiev**, Dmitry, is a Director of the Department of the Communication Strategy in TNK-BP (Moscow, Russia). PhD in Political Science. Graduated in 1989 from the History Department at Moscow State University's Asia and Africa Institute, served as a junior research associate, and then as a research associate, at the U.S. and Canada Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences. In 1995–1998 he worked as a senior leading expert at the Russian Institute of Strategic Research (RISI). Later he served as a senior research associate and project director at the PIR Center. He was a leading expert in the military and political facets of Russian national security, U.S. foreign and military policy, and regional aspects of nuclear nonproliferation. In 2001–2006 he worked for the Mr. Evstafiev also worked for KROS Public Relations Development Company, serving part of that time as Vice President, for the Techsnabexport (TENEX) as Director of the Public Relations Department and for the National Laboratory for Foreign Policy as Deputy Director General. He is a member of PIR Center Advisory Board and Security Index Editorial Board (pp. 79–81).

**Fedorov**, Yury, is an Associate Fellow in Chatham House – The Royal Institute of International Affairs (London, UK). Member of the *Security Index* Editorial Board. He graduated from Moscow State University's Physics Department. He worked at the Sociological Research Institute of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, and headed the section on disarmament issues at the Institute for International Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) of the Russian Academy of Sciences. He also worked in the international division of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee, after which, in 1991, he became Deputy Head of the political science department at MGIMO. In September 1998 he became section head, and in December 2000 head of the division on military policy research at the U.S. and Canada Institute. In 2001–2002 he served as Deputy Director of the PIR Center. In 2002–2003 he was Deputy Director of the Institute of Applied International Research. He is the author of a monograph entitled "Substrategic Nuclear Weapons and Russian Security Interests" (2001). E-mail address: [yufedorov@rambler.ru](mailto:yufedorov@rambler.ru) (pp. 82–84).

**Frolov**, Andrey, is an independent expert. Graduated from the International Relations faculty of the St. Petersburg State University. Graduate of the Russian–French Masters program at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations under the Russian Foreign Ministry. In



2003–2004 worked as a researcher with PIR Center, releasing editor of the *Yadernyy Kontrol* journal, editor of PIR Center's electronic publications. Email address: *andrew\_han@mail.ru* (pp. 39–46).

**Galuzin**, Mikhail, is a Director of Third Asian Department in Russian MFA. Served as an Advisor-Envoy at the Russian Embassy in Japan in 2001–2008. E-mail address: *datr@mid.ru* (pp. 47–62).

**Ibragimova**, Galiya, is a PIR Center Consultant, Coordinator of the *iSi* (International Security Index) Project. Post-graduate student of the University of World Economy and Diplomacy (Tashkent, Uzbekistan). Graduated from the University of World Economy and Diplomacy. In 2008–2009 participated in Professional Management Program (intensive MBA program) at the Uzbekistan–Japan Center for Human Development. Has the Project Management Professional (PMP) degree. Graduate of the PIR Center International Summer School on Global Security. PIR Center intern in 2009. Research interests include the problems of regional security in Central Asia, information security. E-mail address: *ibragimova@pircenter.org* (pp. 75–78).

**Knyazeva**, Elena, is a Colonel, Acting Head of the General Directorate for International Military Cooperation at the Russian Ministry of Defense (previously served as Deputy Head). Graduated from the Military Institute of Foreign Languages (Military University). Lecturer, then Deputy Head of the English Language department of the Military University. Holds a PhD in Language Sciences (pp. 5–9).

**Litovkin**, Victor, is a military commentator, Deputy Editor of the *Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozreniye* (*Independent Military Review*) newspaper. Graduated from the Journalism Faculty of the Higher Military School, and the Editor's School of the Military Academy. Worked in the *Izvestiya* and *Obshchaya Gazeta* newspapers, and the *RIA Novosti* news agency. Email address: *vlitovkin@rambler.ru* (pp. 69–74).

**Lukin**, Alexander, is a Head of the Center for East Asian and Shanghai Cooperation Organization Studies at the Moscow State Institute of Foreign Affairs (MGIMO). Served in the Soviet Foreign Ministry, Soviet Embassy in China, Oriental Studies Institute of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. Elected member of the Moscow City Council in 1990, where he chaired the sub-commission for regional ties. Awarded a PhD in Politics by Oxford University in 1997, and a PhD in History by the Russian Foreign Ministry's Diplomatic Academy in 2007. Worked in Harvard University and the Brookings Institution (United States). Lecturer at the Comparative Political Science department of the MGIMO institute in 1999–2007. Associate researcher of the George Washington University's Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies in 2000–2006. Member of the Russian National Committee of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP). Email address: *a.lukin@inno.mgimo.ru* (pp. 47–62).

**Nikonov**, Vyacheslav, is an Executive Director on the *Rysskiy Mir* Foundation, Acting Dean of the State Governance faculty at the Moscow State University. Holds a PhD in History. Political analyst and a public figure. President of the *Politika* foundation and the *Unity for Russia* foundation. Editor-in-Chief of the *Strategiya Rossii* journal. Chairman of the Russian National Committee of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP). In 1997–2001 served as a member of the political consultation council under the Russian president, Commission for Human Rights under the Russian president, Expert Council under the Presidential Commission for Countering Political Extremism. In 2005–2007 served as a member of the Public Chamber of the Russian Federation, chairman of the Public Chamber commission for international cooperation and public diplomacy (pp. 47–62).

**Oganesyan**, Armen is an Editor-in-Chief of the *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn* (*International Affairs*) journal. Graduated from the Moscow Lomonosov State University. Served as the Chief Editor of Moscow International Radio's Britain and Ireland broadcasting in 1983–1990. Appointed as the Soviet State TV and Radio Company's London correspondent in 1987. Director-General of the Ostankino Radio and TV Corporation's Astra Company in 1990–1992. Head of the Moscow International Radio in 1992–1994. In April 1993 – October 2008 served as chairman of Voice of Russia, the Russian state-owned radio broadcasting company. External advisor to the Russian Foreign Minister (pp. 47–62).

**Orlov**, Vladimir, is the founder and President of the PIR Center – the Russian Center for Policy Studies and Editor-in-Chief of the *Security Index* journal. Dr. Orlov is a member of the Public Board at the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation. Graduated from the Russian Foreign Ministry's Moscow State Institute of International Affairs (MGIMO). In 2001–2002 he served as UN

consultant on disarmament and nonproliferation education by appointment of the UN Secretary General. Dr. Orlov regularly publishes his views in Russian and foreign periodicals and has edited more than a dozen books on international security issues, published both in Russia and abroad. Dr. Orlov continues to teach on a regular basis, giving lectures on Russian foreign policy and WMD nonproliferation. E-mail address: [orlov@pircenter.org](mailto:orlov@pircenter.org) (pp. 1–4; pp. 27–38; pp. 47–62).

**Panov**, Alexander, is a Rector of the Diplomatic Academy of the Russian MFA (until December 2010), holds a PhD in Political Sciences, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary. Served as the Russian ambassador to South Korea, Japan and Norway. Email address: [Alexander.Panov@dipacademy.ru](mailto:Alexander.Panov@dipacademy.ru) (pp. 47–62).

**Pestov**, Vadim, is a Chief Specialist of the International Cooperation Department of the State Atomic Energy Corporation *Rosatom*. Email address: [VAPestov@rosatom.ru](mailto:VAPestov@rosatom.ru) (pp. 47–62).

**Ponomarev**, Sergey, is a Deputy Head of the Russian Federal Space Agency (*Roskosmos*). Graduated from the Serpukhov Higher Military Command School in 1976 and from the Dzerzhinsky Military Academy in 1987. Served in the Russian Strategic Missile Troops in 1976–2006. Head of the Combined Directorate for Organizing Space Activities at the Federal Space Agency in August 2006 – February 2008. Author of several published research papers. Holder of the Red Star, For Military Service, and For Services to Motherland 4<sup>th</sup> Rank awards (pp. 9–14).

**Stepanova**, Ekaterina, is a Lead Researcher at the IMEMO institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Specializes in international conflicts and terrorism, transnational crime and network structures. Served as a program coordinator and foreign policy researcher of the Carnegie Foundation's Moscow Center in 1995–2000. In 2001–2009 worked as a senior researcher and head of the non-traditional threats group at the International Security Center of the IMEMO institute. In 2007–2009 served as head of the SIPRI Armed Conflicts and Conflict Settlement Program. Author of more than 100 published research papers, including six monographs in Russian, English and Spanish. Member of the editorial boards of the *Terrorism and Political Violence*, *The International Journal on Conflicts and Indeks Bezopasnosti (Security Index)* journals. Email address: [stepanova@imemo.ru](mailto:stepanova@imemo.ru) (pp. 85–90).

**Sumsky**, Victor, is Director of the ASEAN Center at MGIMO, lead researcher of IMEMO institute, holds a PhD in History. Graduated from the MGIMO institute in 1975. Served in the Foreign Ministry, the Oriental Studies Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences, and the IMEMO institute. Specializes in the domestic politics of Southeast Asian countries and international relations in Southeast Asia, the history and present of ASEAN. Email address: [victor.sumsky@gmail.com](mailto:victor.sumsky@gmail.com) (pp. 47–62; pp. 63–68).

**Toloraya**, George, is a Vice President of the Unity for Russia Foundation and Head of the Korea programs at the Institute of Economics of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Holds a PhD in Economics, professor of Oriental studies. Graduated from the MGIMO institute in 1978. Served in the Soviet Trade Mission in North Korea in 1978–1980 and 1984–1987. Researcher with the IEMSS institute of the Soviet Academy of Sciences in 1980–1990. Lecturer at the MGIMO institute from 1981. Secretary of the Soviet–South Korean Council for Economic Cooperation at the Soviet Chamber of Trade and Commerce in 1990–1991. Head of the Korea department at the Russian Foreign Ministry (1991–1993), Advisor-Envoy at the Russian Embassy in South Korea (1993–1998), Deputy Head of the First Asia Department at the Russian Foreign Ministry (1998–2003), Russian Consul-General in Sydney (2003–2007). Email address: [rusmirasaf@yandex.ru](mailto:rusmirasaf@yandex.ru) (pp. 47–62).

**Trushkin**, Ivan, is a Coordinator of PIR Center's "Nuclear Nonproliferation and Russia" program. Editor of the *Yadernyy Kontrol* and *Vienna + Geneva* information bulletins. Graduated from the History faculty of the Altay State University in 2007. Post-graduate student at the World Economy and Politics faculty of the Higher School of Economics. Graduate of PIR Center's 2009 International Summer School on global security. Co-author of PIR Center's White Book "NPT-2010: Strengthening the Regime" (pp. 27–38).

**Vorontsov**, Alexander, is a Head of the Korea and Mongolia Department in the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences (RAS). Holds a PhD in History. Email address: [okm@ivran.ru](mailto:okm@ivran.ru) (pp. 47–62). 