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Non multa, sed multum. Not many things, but well. The PIR Center, the first Russian non-governmental organization in the field of international security, was created with this motto in April 1994.

Today, ten years later, we have decided not simply to celebrate this anniversary. We wanted to calculate the Center's results: have we been able to do well in these past years, despite the fact that we have had not many, modest powers?

Our first achievement: We survived. Only those present at the creation of the PIR Center – both our colleagues themselves and our friends in the government and state structures, as well as the community of experts – can say how difficult, and, at times, how unexpected, this has been. But it turned out that we were not easily frightened.

The second achievement is that we maintained our independence. The PIR Center's very existence disproves the thesis that under Russian conditions a non-governmental organization in the international security sphere is an oxymoron. We proved that working in a delicate issue area connected in part to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), while simultaneously preserving a position that is independent of the state and at times criticizes state policy, is not only not suicide, but is in fact the opposite – the only way to save face and maintain quality expertise that is not effected by either short-term trends or external pressure.

The third achievement is that we did not allow short-lived trends to crowd out science. Never forgetting that the truth is often born of arguments, we provided a platform for debates, but at the same time developed our own positions, staying away from conformism. It is not by chance that every one of our young associates is working on either a master's thesis or a dissertation.

Our fourth achievement is that we created a powerful mouthpiece. An institute without its own printed publication is like a bell without a clapper. We have Yaderny Kontrol Journal (Nuclear Control). Seventy-two issues is solid proof of a stable organization. A look at the content of these issues is even weightier proof. Among the authors are presidential aides, parliamentarians, military leaders, top diplomats, and non-governmental Russian and foreign experts. Beginning as a journal on nonproliferation, Yaderny Kontrol is now the leading Russian publication on a whole complex of international security concerns. Yaderny Kontrol readers sit in Kremlin offices, on Smolenskaya ploshad (where the Foreign Ministry is located), at Znamenka (home of the Ministry of Defense), on Bolshaya Ordynka (at the Federal Atomic Energy Agency)... and beyond Moscow's Garden Ring. The Yaderny Kontrol issue you are holding in your hands is being read simultaneously in Russian and English in 115 world cities: from Vladivostok to Vancouver, and from Seversk to Los Alamos.

The fifth achievement is that we have mastered the universe of the Internet. We are among the leaders in distributing information and analysis on international security affairs on the Russian web. Our Internet presence has been transformed from stories about PIR to a chronicle of nonproliferation. News and commentaries are combined with analytical materials. The Disarmament and Nonproliferation Educational and Training (DisNET) Channel is in operation, with distance learning courses that have been approved by a number of Russian and CIS institutions of higher learning and have been converted into the PIR Nonproliferation University Online.

The sixth achievement is that we have become the sole Russian institute providing educational programs in the field of WMD nonproliferation and international security in the whole of Russia. Having begun seven years ago with a Master's degree program at the Moscow Physics Engineering Institute (MEPhI), we have added programs and visiting lecture courses in a whole series of Russian institutes of higher education. Today the PIR Center has career development courses to increase
the qualification of young specialists and young instructors, a fellowship program for beginning government specialists, and internships for college and graduate students from Russia's regions. There are more than 350 graduates of our educational programs and career development courses working in Russia today.

Our seventh achievement is that we are energetic participants in partnerships with other Russian non-governmental organizations and in international cooperation and exchanges. We began with just a few research partners. Now their number is in the dozens, and the cities and countries where the PIR Center flag is flying are deliberately varied: St. Petersburg and Geneva; Nizhniy Novgorod and Washington; London and Tehran; Monterey, California and Athens, Georgia.

The eighth achievement is that we conducted (together with our partners from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace) the largest conference in Europe on WMD nonproliferation. In September 2003 more than 300 experts from 36 countries and international organizations met in Moscow at this unique forum, where government representatives, experts, and journalists met and discussed relevant issues.

The ninth achievement is that we not only established a comfortable PIR Center office in a quiet corner of Moscow, just two steps away from Tverskaya street, with an extensive library and other information resources, but also exported the PIR Center to the American continent, incorporating a non-profit Center for Policy Studies in Russia in California.

Our tenth achievement is that we formed a group of people who enable us to solve the most complicated substantive and organizational problems. The Center is small but at the same time highly professional. Could we have imagined when we established the PIR Center that ten years later four retired generals would be working in it? That there would be an Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, or that three Russian Academy of Science academicians and 16 doctors of sciences would serve on the PIR Center's Advisory Board? At the same time, anyone who has been to PIR could not help but notice the presence of our youthful team.

The results we have achieved are an object of pride, but by no means a reason to rest on our laurels. We are celebrating the tenth anniversary of the PIR Center by holding the international conference “GS Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction,” by publishing new issues of Yaderny Kontrol (in both Russian and English) and PIR Study Papers, and by holding the annual meeting of the institute's top administrative body – its Executive Board – with the question “what tasks and goals do we pursue next?” the main agenda.

Our first goal is to conduct a comprehensive study of the threats and challenges to the international regime for the non-proliferation of WMD and means of their delivery, and to formulate practical recommendations to avert threats to Russia's national interests. The PIR Center has traditionally been associated with studies and publications on nuclear nonproliferation. Preserving this as a critical area of interest, in the next few months and years we will use our best minds to work out a system to evaluate threats in the nuclear, chemical, biological, as well as the missile area, and we will similarly not limit ourselves to assessments of the presence or maturing of WMD programs in individual states, but will also look at the capabilities of non-state actors.

As one step toward this goal, we are beginning to prepare expanded informational and analytical research activities on all states and non-state actors that elicit concern from the point of view of the nonproliferation of WMD and means of their delivery.

As a next step, in the foreseeable future we intend to create an Internet forum on non-proliferation issues, initially in Russian, where visitors will be able to conduct an ongoing dialogue.

Our second goal is development. In recent years we already have begun to introduce new topics in addition to our traditional ones – WMD nonproliferation and arms control – into our research and publishing agenda. These include information security, the prevention of international terrorism, and the evaluation of critical infrastructure protection in metropolitan areas... It is unseemly to rush to cover all fashionable topics immediately. Yet we are increasingly interested, alongside nonproliferation, in the other challenges and threats
to national and international security that have recently appeared. It is not by chance that one of our reports, which is being prepared, has a working title "The 21st Century: Abandoning the Nuclear Paradigm in Arms Construction." Our recent seminar "The Transformation of the National Security Concept in the Information Age" is yet more proof of the fact that we are moving into new areas, and this trend will continue.

Our third goal is sustainability. We have progressed at a fast tempo. It is now important that, while maintaining this rate, our activities do not become contingent on external circumstances or, at the very least, we should reduce the risk of this happening to a minimum. In order to achieve this, we must diversity our funding sources.

First of all, we need to gradually increase the portion of the PIR Center budget funded from Russian sources, especially from large domestic enterprises that, unfortunately, have not yet established tradition of philanthropic activity in the field of science, research, the propagation of knowledge, and education, and formation of a civil society, but are probably examining such possibilities for the near-term future. We are not indulging in a vain hope, or counting on immediate results. We nevertheless believe that success is possible, thanks to the good name and clout that the PIR Center has earned in the past ten years, through the authority of our experts and the influence of our publications.

Furthermore, we are building up our consulting activities, including the PIR Center Club, which unites large enterprises, diplomatic missions, the media, and scientific research organizations. We are giving him a new name reflecting its discusional format – The Trialogue Club.

Our fourth goal is to retain our independence. Over the years we have learned to conduct increasingly successful dialogues with the executive and legislative branches and effectively report our research and recommendations to government bodies. However, it is precisely the PIR Center's independent, non-governmental status and our equidistance from all of the different players in the political spectrum that allows us to best conduct our analyses. We will continue to operate in this manner henceforth.

Our fifth goal is to improve the quality of our scientific research and expertise. The Center's small staff, with all its obvious pluses, has one minus: researchers must take on several tasks simultaneously, and are not always able to concentrate on strategic areas where there will not necessarily be results in the next few weeks or even months. Not all young researchers are ready for intensive analytical work, and may need additional education at Western institutes of higher education. We plan to send more and more of our young specialists for training abroad. And we will give a green light to those researchers who are concentrating on issues we deem to be strategic.

Our sixth goal is to achieve concrete, practical results from our educational programs and career development courses. At the present time we are purposefully acting to reach the largest possible number of interested institutes of higher education, students, and young instructors with our educational programs. In the very near future, however, we will examine our accomplishments and cease to have activities on a massive scale. Based on the results of our analysis, we will develop large-scale educational and training programs that will probably meet less often than at present, but be more thorough in nature.

Our seventh goal, after the international Global Partnership conference this April is over, is to infuse the Council on Sustainable Partnership for Russia (SUPR) with renewed urgency. This international expert group has as its goal the practical realization of the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, adopted at the G8 summit in Kananaskis in 2002, which envisions the provision to Russia of up to $20 billion by the year 2012. SUPR will help in providing independent expert analysis of the effectiveness of the international assistance, and in ensuring the soundness of current projects – both in the next few years and after the provision of foreign assistance has ended. SUPR will bring together the efforts of governments, experts, and civil society. Moreover, the Council's flexible structure will allow it to avoid bureaucratization and ensure a quick response to any problems that emerge during the realization of Global Partnership programs.
Our eighth goal is the development of proposals and participation in side events for experts during the G8 summit to be held in Russia in 2006.

The ninth goal is to promote our programs beyond Russia's borders. If for the first decade of its existence the PIR Center focused its research on Russia (predominantly on Russian problems for a Russian audience), then the time has come for us to export our experience and expertise. The most obvious, though not the only, place to which we should expand our activities is to the former Soviet states, first of all in Central Asia, where governments, research institutes, and educational organizations all actively use the Russian language.

In addition, we will be more energetic in promoting our research and publications in Europe. As one way to realize this goal, we are increasing the number of PIR Center partner organizations on the European continent and undertaking joint projects, something that we previously only regularly carried out with U.S. institutes.

The further diversification of our partner institutes and organizations abroad also means that we will pay even closer attention to cooperation with researchers from all corners of the world. We have already established ties to Iran's Institute for Political and International Studies, we are initiating a relationship with Cuba's Higher Institute for International Relations, and the list will not end there.

The PIR Center will become a Russian institute with the most extended international ties possible.

The tenth goal is to have our own home. Living in "rented quarters" at the PIR Center's present age is becoming increasingly difficult. This will not happen quickly, but it has become apparent that the ambitious development goals that we have set ourselves in the next few years will eventually require the PIR Center to have its own place that will allow us to carry out the combined functions of a scientific research institute, information and publishing center, and a nonproliferation university.
On December 19, 2003, after ten months of secret talks with the United States and the United Kingdom, Libya declared that it was renouncing efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction (WMD), including its nuclear program, and would destroy WMD components in its possession as well as delivery vehicles with a range exceeding 300 km.

On the following day, Libya began negotiations with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). They led to IAEA Director-General Mohamed El Baradei's visit to Libya and to the Libyan decision to sign the Additional Protocol to the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement.

"Now Libya will play its international role in building a new world, free from weapons of mass destruction and all forms of terrorism," stated the country's leader, 61-year-old Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi. "We do not have any WMD. You know, there are many rumors, propaganda against Libya, when we simply have nothing to hide. There are so many countries in the world that possess nuclear programs, but in reality only a few have WMD. These countries disclose their nuclear programs. So that I simply followed their example," Mr. Qadhdhafi clarified. He said, further, that Libya would "become just the second country, after South Africa, to disarm voluntarily."

Libya ratified the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1975. In 1980 it signed the IAEA Safeguards Agreement. The country belongs to the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (the Treaty of Pelindaba). Libya is also a member of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). At the same time, for the past three decades the Libyan Jamahiriyya repeatedly figured in western official and unofficial expert lists of states of concern due to the risk that they might proliferate WMD and means of their delivery. At times there were serious bases for this concern.

In the second half of the 1970s Libya, which possessed large reserves of petrodollars at the time, attempted with the aid of Soviet organizations to create a complete nuclear fuel cycle, including both a heavy-water reactor based on natural uranium, and a heavy water production facility. Although the leaders of the Soviet government and nuclear authority were ready to go ahead with the transaction (the Libyans had promised a sum on the order of $10 billion), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced its disagreement, and in the end this reasonable approach prevailed. Libya also manifested an interest in Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, and tried to develop nuclear cooperation with Belgium, Argentina, and Brazil, frequently in the pursuit of dubious goals.

Nor did BTWC participation prevent Libya from moving forward with work on biological weapons. As representatives of U.S. and U.K. intelligence organizations now testify, Qadhdhafi showed them “dual purpose biological agents, which can be used both legally (for civilian purposes) and for military purposes.”

But where Libya was truly successful was in its creation of chemical weapons. Not a member of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) – the country joined it only in early 2004 - Libya was able to produce about 100 tons of toxics at the Rabta chemical plant, possibly retaining up to about 80 tons of mustard gas to this day: at least, the Americans and Englishmen who visited Libyan CW facilities speak of “tens of tons,” though produced “about a decade ago.” In contrast to the nuclear program, the presence of a developed CW program in Libya was not news for the experts.

Finally, Libya evinced interest in increasing the distance of its delivery systems, collaborating with, among others, North Korea, India, Iran, China, and Serbia.

After December 2003, statements of intent by Libya took the form of concrete agreements on the dismantlement of existing arsenals and those in the process of being created. This was an unprecedented step, by which a state ends all its military programs in the sphere of WMD and means of their delivery.
delivery, and places their dismantlement under international control.

Of course, the comparison with South Africa is not completely correct: that nation voluntarily destroyed its nuclear weapons, foregoing the status, though unstated, of an actual nuclear power. Qadhdhafi parted with much a more modest operation.

In contrast to its chemical program, at the time of Qadhdhafi's announcement of his acknowledgement of guilt Libya's nuclear program was in the very initial stages. El Baradei estimates that Libya was three to seven years away from possessing its own nuclear explosive device.

According to IAEA, Libya began a nuclear program in the early 1980s but halted it in 1992. In July 1995, the Libyan authorities made a strategic decision to reinvigorate its nuclear activities, including gas centrifuge uranium enrichment. Components for the centrifuge program began to arrive in Libya from foreign manufacturers in 1997, and shipments continued until a German freighter, the BBC China, was seized – by an intelligence tip of Libyans themselves - in October 2003. aboard were centrifuge components manufactured in Malaysia and transported via Dubai. The head of the Pakistani nuclear-weapon program, A.Q. Khan, and his network also gave Libya designs of a second-generation nuclear weapon.

According to IAEA personnel, what they have seen in Libya already is enough to open their eyes to the ineffectiveness of the international system of export controls and to the scale of the nuclear black market.

In fact, the meager data we possess already allows us to see how particular states, primarily Pakistan, skirted international pressures and barriers and supplied centrifuge and other equipment to Libya.

The degree of the involvement of individual states and the chains linking state and non-state players in Libya's WMD and missile programs must still be studied in detail. This, undoubtedly, will help us to better understand what opportunities (apparently, as gaping as ever) are open to those who are seriously determined to obtain WMD and means of their delivery.

What were Colonel Qadhdhafi's motives? First of all, he is interested in the smooth transfer of authority to his son, Sayf al-Islam, and, in order to avoid internal convulsions and external pressure, he decided – as early as 1988 – on a strategic union with the West. Last December this political swing reached its logical conclusion. Sayf al-Islam clearly formulated this new policy – his own and his father's – when he said: "It will pave the way for the normalization of political relations with the (United) States and with the West in general and also will lead to the elimination of any threat against Libya from the West and from the States in particular." We should particularly note that Libya entered into talks with the United States and the United Kingdom prior to the beginning of the war in Iraq.

The seventh largest producer of oil in the world and, most likely, location of one of the largest reserves in the world, Libya is returning to capitalism, opening the door to Spanish, Italian, French, and now British and American companies. Its friendship with the USSR (which, incidentally, was never strong) is already ancient history. Qadhdhafi's attempts to play first fiddle in the Arab world failed and caused him such deep disappointment, that they led him to turn towards black Africa. There was a lot to be found in this relationship, but no sources for economic prosperity. Therefore a return to the West was almost inevitable. The president of the United States responded to Qadhdhafi's move just as Tripoli expected: "Its (Libya's) good faith will be returned."

What might the international consequences of Libya's voluntary disarmament be?

First, and this is most important, the Libyan precedent emphasizes the advantages of a diplomatic solution to questions related to nonproliferation. We see that diplomacy, even when secret in its initial stages, has serious possibilities. Through the use of diplomacy we can open up worrisome WMD programs more successfully than via military operations.

Second, the Libyan decision demonstrates the effectiveness of UN sanctions as a tool against states supporting terrorism or developing secret WMD programs. Indeed, the sharp turn in Libyan policy occurred under the influence of international sanctions, and in many respects was caused by them. It is indicative that an editorial in the New York Times on the morning after Qadhdhafi's declaration noted the "value of... UN sanctions" against Libya in the country's decision to choose the option of nonproliferation.
Third, the Libyan situation should mean the larger involvement of the IAEA, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), and, possibly, other international organizations. It is remarkable and gratifying that, in the case of IAEA, this is already happening, and that Libya has joined the OPCW. The IAEA leadership must be completely unquestioned in its dismantlement of Libya's nuclear weapons program and monitoring of the complete and irreversible destruction of all its components.

Fourth, the Libyan decision is a signal to those states in the Middle Eastern region and elsewhere in the world that still expect to count on their secret WMD programs. Moreover this is equally a signal to Syria, which now faces a tough and urgent decision with respect to its chemical weapons program; and to North Korea, which is playing nuclear and missile games with the United States and the international community and is on the verge of fouling out; and for Israel, which, due to the patronage of the United States, for some reason has been beyond criticism, while it should not be an exception, and its nuclear weapons and military nuclear program, as the IAEA recently noted, should be put under monitoring and then dismantled, most likely as an intermediate step in the creation of a WMD-free zone in the Middle East.

Fifth, when we say “Libya,” we should now thrice think “Pakistan.” Pakistan is the main proliferating state in the world today. Traces of its nuclear technologies can be found in North Korea, Iran, and now Libya. Who else has benefited from its nuclear brains still has to be determined, though three nations has been clearly identified by A.Q. Khan’s revelations and further investigation by the Pakistani leadership. They are Libya, Iran (in mid- to late 1990s), and Iraq (in 1990). Pakistan’s last deliveries to Libya, it appears, occurred after September 11, 2001, when the United States strongly warned President Musharraf about the inadmissibility of sharing nuclear technologies and received the appropriate promise from him. Pakistan is an unstable and weak state, where the central government does not control significant swaths of territory and where international terrorist organizations find sympathy. Can the international community continue to be reconciled to a nuclear Pakistan that is a proliferator?

And finally, sixth, the Libyan decision, or, more exactly, the way it came to that decision, is a lesson for Russia as well.

Russia cannot remain outside of the process of deciding the vital, concrete questions relating to the struggle against global WMD proliferation. This would contradict our declared foreign policy. We should more actively make use of the traditional ties and levers of influence that remain to us. A successful example of Russia’s involvement in the solution of a critical proliferation problem was the painstaking work with Iran in the past few years and particularly past few months, in large part thanks to Moscow, and already subsequently through the efforts of Berlin, Paris, and London, leading to Iran’s signing of the Additional Protocol in the same days last December when Libya was opening up information on its nuclear program.

It does not make sense for us to remove ourselves from the dialogue with our traditional partners, like Syria.

But if in certain situations Russia would be better off acting alone, in most cases we would work more fruitfully in concert with the United States. The best example of this sort of concrete cooperation in the past few months is the removal of spent nuclear fuel from research reactors in Central and Eastern Europe (Serbia, Bulgaria, and Romania). The geography of this cooperation has now been extended to the former Soviet states.

And it is not by chance that, on March 8, 2004, Russia imported nuclear fuel from Libya’s Tajura reactor – eighty eight fuel rods, with 14.6 kg of highly enriched U-235. It as a visible result of Russia – US – IAEA cooperation., and it should be applauded.

If the softening in Washington’s tone with regard to Iran finally takes place – under a Kerry-led administration or, though much less likely, under Bush Jr. - lets us look into the distant future and – although today this still seems a fantasy – suggest that we consider the possibility of joint Russian-U.S. projects to develop peaceful nuclear energy in Iran. This is precisely the sort of cooperation that could serve as a guarantee against mutual suspicion, and against the emergence of secret nuclear weapon programs.
**Interview**

**ALEKSANDR RUMYANTSEV:**  
*THE NUCLEAR SECTOR IS ONE OF RUSSIA'S LARGEST EXPORTERS*

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Abridged version

Minister of Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation Aleksandr Rummyantsev gave an interview to Yaderny Kontrol editor-in-chief Vladimir Orlov.

**YADERNY KONTROL:** In one of your interviews you stated that nuclear power engineering should become the basis for the construction of the global energy system. What is this system?

**RUMYANTSEV:** Nuclear power engineering using fast-neutron reactors uses a practically limitless fuel resource, and can provide the world with energy. Furthermore, new generation fast reactors solve the problem of radioactive wastes, as they minimize their quantity and activity. If we add to this the organization of international nuclear fuel cycle centers, then the acuteness of the nonproliferation problem is removed as well. Taken together, these factors make it possible to speak of building a global energy system based on nuclear power engineering.

**YADERNY KONTROL:** What are the prospects for nuclear power engineering in Russia? What are the plans for its development? What is the role of the Ministry of Atomic Energy (Minatom) in the realization of Russia's Energy Strategy?

**RUMYANTSEV:** The future development of nuclear power engineering in Russia has been delineated in Russia's Energy Strategy for the Period up to 2020, confirmed by the government of Russia in August 2003. According to the Energy Strategy, "... an increase in the national economy's demand for electric power should to a considerable degree be covered through an increase in electricity generation by nuclear power plants (predominantly in the European part of the country), which must grow, if the economy develops in an optimistic and favorable way, from 140 billion kW/h in 2002 to 195 billion kW/h in 2010 and 300 billion kW/h in 2020. In addition, the strategy envisages a growth in the production of thermal power from nuclear energy sources to 30 million Gcal/year." Given moderate economic development, nuclear power plant (NPP) production must equal 230 billion kW/h in 2020, and if production of thermal energy is included, up to 270 billion kW/h. These are the parameters provided for the development of nuclear power engineering.

The nuclear sector will fulfill these parameters by:

- prolonging the service lives of first and second generation NPPs (Novovoronezh NPP, Kola NPP, Balakovo NPP, Leningrad NPP, etc.);
- completing and commissioning units that are nearly completed (Kalinin NPP Unit 3, Rostov NPP Unit 2, Kursk NPP Unit 5, Balakovo NPP Units 5 and 6);
- constructing new reactor units at sites that are already prepared (Leningrad, Novovoronezh, Kursk, Bashkiriya, Smolensk, etc.).

**YADERNY KONTROL:** How strong is competition between "traditional" power engineering and nuclear power engineering in Russia? How are relations between Minatom and the Unified Energy System of Russia (RAO YeES)?

**RUMYANTSEV:** Competition is an integral part of a market economy, and it will only be strengthened by electric energy reform. By the way, initial trades in the free wholesale electricity market showed a reduction in the wholesale price of electricity in comparison with the regulated market. So market competition shows concrete benefits. As for our relationship with the Unified Energy System, it is a normal, working relationship. We maintain an ongoing business dialogue with Unified Energy System leaders, and there has yet to be a case where we do not agree on the most important questions.
**YADERNY KONTROL:** What, in your opinion, is Minatom's general export potential? How will the results of the tender for the construction of an NPP in Finland affect this?

**RUMYANTSEV:** Priority tasks in the nuclear sector include: dynamic growth, a steady increase in our export potential, the expansion of its geography, and structural improvements.

Minatom's foreign economic cooperation, it goes without saying, is carried out in strict compliance with current legislation, and is regulated by inter-state, intergovernmental, and interdepartmental agreements, as well as by the concrete obligations in the contracts fulfilled by subordinate enterprises.

In recent years we have seen annual increases in nuclear sector exports. Experts estimate that the nuclear sector is one of the nation's most important exporters, coming in among the “top five” in export volume.

As for the tender for the construction of an NPP in Finland, we have to draw the correct conclusions from this loss and actively work on this market.

**YADERNY KONTROL:** Could you estimate the level of competition in the international nuclear technology market, particularly in the area of NPP construction?

**RUMYANTSEV:** First of all, I want to emphasize that one of the most important characteristics of our export products is that they are exceptionally research intensive.

The fact is that competitive production in the nuclear sector has always been and continues to be determined to a considerable degree by intellectual achievements – scientific research, for example, that leads to new technologies and goods – that substantially increase competitiveness, and, consequently, boost the export potential of individual enterprises and the sector as a whole.

At the same time, it is well known that in the 1990s conditions for foreign economic activity in this sphere were not particularly positive for sector manufacturers. Leading western companies, with active state support, actively displaced Russian suppliers from their traditional global markets, primarily in eastern and central Europe.

Resisting this expansion by western competitors could only be done through a balanced and well-considered policy, as well as by providing customers with a complete package of services covering the entire life cycle of the exported product. In particular I would like to point out the development of promising new fuel cycles and nuclear fuel, the provision of high-quality products, and the maintenance of competitive prices for fuel and services.

The level of quality achieved by domestic fuel element producers is revealed by the following indicator: the quantity of non-hermetic fuel elements does not exceed 2 in 100,000.

Technical assistance in the construction of reactor units abroad is a very significant area for the development of mechanical and technical exports. Nuclear sector prospects in this sphere are determined to a considerable degree by our accumulated scientific and technical potential, and also by our experience in the construction of foreign scientific and power-production nuclear facilities. The expansion of this type of cooperation favorably influences the development not only of enterprises and scientific organizations that are strictly subordinate to the nuclear sector, but also of many enterprises in related fields.

A serious problem constraining Russian participation in the construction of NPPs abroad is the insufficient number being built in Russia today. This naturally reduces the chances for domestic industry to build reliable and high-quality nuclear power engineering equipment, which, in turn, increases the prospects for our competitors in the NPP construction market or forces us to provide our foreign customers with the most advantageous conditions, at times to the detriment of our own economic interests.

In the area of foreign economic cooperation our most important partners are China, Iran, and India.

Today we need to take a more active position in order not to allow Russia to be displaced from these large, promising markets.
YADERNY KONTROL: What are Russia's prospects for obtaining construction contracts for new power units in China, India, and Iran? Will the November 2003 resolution of the IAEA Board of Governors on Iran influence Russian-Iranian cooperation in any way? What steps could Russia undertake to overcome existing obstacles and broaden cooperation with India?

RUMYANTSEV: Russia has been in the international NPP construction market for a long time and has a solid reputation as a reliable partner. Naturally, we are interested not only in preserving but in strengthening our position in this market. We have the bases needed to accomplish this. It is well known that Russian technology in this sphere is in no way inferior to western technology, and in certain cases exceeds it.

We are currently constructing two reactor units in China and, if the Chinese leadership decides to construct two additional units at the Tianwan NPP, we are counting on entering an official proposal to participate in the tender, based on our construction of the initial two units. It would appear that we should have a good chance to win this tender.

We are also building two additional units in India. Any expansion of Russian-Indian cooperation in the nuclear sphere currently is limited by Russia's international obligations under the framework of the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

In Iran, as you know, we are building one reactor. The NPP at Bushehr is by its nature a complex and unique facility, the construction of which requires large-scale efforts, special solutions, and a nonstandard approach.

Russian-Iranian cooperation in the nuclear sphere is legitimate, transparent, and meets Russia's international obligations in the nonproliferation sphere. We have no other intentions or purposes in this cooperation than those that have been declared. It has been, is, and will continue to be thoroughly monitored by the IAEA and is exclusively in the area of the peaceful use of atomic energy.

From my point of view, Russian-Iranian cooperation in the nuclear sphere is a model of transparency, predictability, responsibility and, I would say, well-considered.

Adherence to its international nonproliferation obligations is the basis for a constructive solution to the current Iranian nuclear problem.

I want to remind you that Iran has signed the IAEA Additional Protocol. This step, which we welcome, will serve to further expand transparency.

YADERNY KONTROL: What new promising areas for Minatom exports would you point to? How great is interest abroad in the Russian project for the construction of floating NPPs?

RUMYANTSEV: Of course, nuclear fuel cycle products such as uranium (natural and enriched), enrichment services, and nuclear fuel dominate sector exports (up to 85%). Nevertheless, the “palette” of sector exports is considerably brighter and includes, in addition to the above, the construction of facilities abroad, the delivery of scientific and technical production and isotope production, electricity provision, etc.

Thus, for example, our deliveries of stable isotopes meet 30% of world demand, radioisotope production - 3-3.5%, and metallic calcium - 15%.

Objectively considered, we have something to propose to our foreign partners in the area of scientific and technical cooperation, and these proposals are in high demand. The United States, France, Germany, and China are all users of our nuclear technologies.

At present, China, Indonesia, and Australia have expressed their interest in the Russian floating reactor project.

YADERNY KONTROL: Could there be joint projects with leading developed countries for the construction of nuclear reactors in third countries?

RUMYANTSEV: This sort of project is already being realized in practice. For example, the Mochovce NPP in Slovakia is being built by a consortium made up of Atomstroyexport (Russia), Framatom (France), and Siemens (Germany). The same consortium is modernizing Kozloduy NPP (Bulgaria).
Siemens is participating in the construction of the Tianwan NPP (China). However, its participation only consists of certain NPP systems and equipment deliveries.

One of two variants of the Russian proposal in the tender for the construction of an NPP in Finland consisted of a project in which the “nuclear island” would be produced by Russia, Alstom Power (France) would provide the turbines, and Groupe Schneider (France) the process control system.

YADERNY KONTROL: Is any form of participation by developed countries in the construction of NPPs on Russian territory realistic?

RUMYANTSEV: The Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy has proposed to the European Community the joint construction of a new European pressurized-water reactor (EPR) on Russian territory, to be funded by credits that will be repaid through electricity deliveries to Europe. An analogous proposal was made to the French and Canadians for the construction of an NPP in the Far East. However, E.U. representatives said that they can only take these proposals into consideration on the condition that first-generation Russian reactors are shut down before the end of their service lives, which Russia finds absolutely unacceptable.

YADERNY KONTROL: What are the basic elements of Russia’s strategy in the sphere of nuclear fuel deliveries abroad, in particular to Ukraine, and also your evaluation of the state of affairs, say, at the TVEL nuclear fuel company?

RUMYANTSEV: Ukrainian NPPs (4 operational NPPs, containing 13 reactor units of Soviet design with an installed electrical capacity of 11.1 GW) play a critical role in the provision of energy to Ukraine, providing about 50% of that nation’s electric power. In the draft Strategy for the Development of Nuclear Power Engineering in Ukraine through the Year 2030 and Beyond the construction of 7-11 reactor units is anticipated. In essence the development of Ukraine’s entire economy in the future depends on the effectiveness and safety of its nuclear energy complex. In addition, Ukraine possesses a raw material base (of uranium and zirconium) and produces a whole series of nuclear power equipment.

Minatom is interested in the development of Russian-Ukrainian cooperation in nuclear power engineering and deeper integration. Since the volume of Russia’s nuclear exports to Ukraine exceed imports (to Minatom enterprises) by approximately 6-8 times, Ukrainian nuclear power engineering is an important market for Russia, the retention of which is necessary for the functioning and development of our industrial enterprises.

The priority tasks in Russian-Ukrainian cooperation, ways to tackle them, and time frames are determined by an annual protocol on cooperation in the sphere of the peaceful use of atomic energy signed by the Minister of Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation and the Minister of Fuel and Power Engineering of Ukraine at a working conference.

In accordance with its contractual obligations, the TVEL Joint Stock Company carried out deliveries of nuclear fuel to all 13 NPP reactor units in Ukraine in 2003, including one delivery of an alternative fuel assembly (AFA).

TVEL and Ukraine’s National Nuclear Generating Company (Enerhoatom) have prepared contracts, anticipating a Ukrainian payment for the initial load of fresh nuclear fuel to the №2 reactor unit at Khmelnitskyy NPP and №4 reactor unit at the Rivne NPP. TVEL will be delivering an alternative fuel assembly (AFA) for the initial load at Khmelnitskyy Unit 2.

Fresh fuel deliveries in 2004 will exceed $300 million, including fuel made by TVEL using Ukrainian uranium concentrate.

A joint venture, UKRTVS JV, is functioning under the May 13, 2003 Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Government of the Russian Federation, and the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine on the development and functioning of the Joint Ukrainian-Kazakhstani-Russian Nuclear Fuel Production Enterprise.

YADERNY KONTROL: What, in your opinion, are the most successful U.S.-Russian projects in the nuclear sphere?
RUMYANTSEV: A good example of joint work in the nuclear sphere, in my view, is the so-called HEU-LEU Agreement. At present Russia is the only nuclear power in the world putting into practice a complete nuclear disarmament measure – the irreversible disposal of weapons materials obtained as a result of nuclear weapons dismantlement.

To date more than 170 tonnes of HEU have been irreversibly destroyed and converted into nuclear fuel. This means that humanity has been saved from more than 6,500 nuclear warheads, and obtained instead 2 billion megawatt-hours of electric power.

Due to the market orientation of the program, there have been no significant administrative expenditures. That is, all earnings – about $3.5 billion since 1994 – are entering the real sector of the Russian economy, and being invested by the national budget in scientific research, defense conversion, security improvements, and the solution of environmental problems.

Within the framework of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, I would point to Nuclear Materials Protection, Control, and Accounting cooperation as among the most successful Russian-American projects. This cooperation is being undertaken in accordance with an October 2, 1999 bilateral agreement. The executing agencies for the realization of this agreement are Minatom and the U.S. Department of Energy. However, the project deals with many Russian agencies that have nuclear materials or participate in the prevention of the illegal trafficking of nuclear materials. This includes Minatom, the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Interior Affairs (MVD), the Nuclear Inspectorate (Gosatomnadzor), and the State Customs Committee.

Under this agreement the United States renders financial assistance to Russian enterprises for the modernization and improvement of systems for the physical protection, accounting, and control of nuclear materials; and to increase the security of nuclear materials transport.

I particularly want to note that under a joint Minatom-U.S. Defense Department project the construction of a safe, protected, and ecologically reliable depository for fissile materials obtained as a result of the destruction of nuclear weapons (the Fissile Material Storage Facility, or FMSF) has been completed.

The United States financed the design, survey work, construction, assembly, purchase of construction equipment, production of 25,000 fissile material storage containers, and other necessary materials.

In December 2003 a State Commission under Deputy Minister of Atomic Energy Ivan Kamenskikh signed the FMSF Acceptance Act.

Cooperation with the United States on plutonium production reactors began as early as 1998. We set the goal of curtailing the production of weapons plutonium. In the United States there were 14 such reactors and they had all ceased operation. In Russia three industrial reactors producing plutonium remained.

A plan to modify these reactors was developed, but it proved to be complex and expensive. Instead a plan to halt these plutonium production reactors and remove them from operation was adopted. But these reactors also provide heat and electricity to the cities of Zheleznogorsk in Krasnoyarsk kray and Seversk in Tomsk oblast. We cannot leave people without heat and power, so we are now working on the construction of new coal-fired heat and power stations to replace these reactors. Russian specialists will conduct all of the construction with U.S. financial support.

I think that these are the clearest examples of cooperation with the United States in the nuclear sphere.

YADERNY KONTROL: Recently the public has been regularly informed about the state of the HEU-LEU program. U.S.-Russian agreements in the sphere of plutonium disposition, on the other hand, have remained in the “shadows.” What is the state of the program at present?

RUMYANTSEV: Until July 23, 2003, cooperation in the area of managing plutonium withdrawn from nuclear military programs was governed by two agreements: the intergovernmental agreement of July
1998 On Scientific and Technical Cooperation in the Management of Plutonium that has been Withdrawn from Nuclear Military Programs (the 1998 Agreement) and the intergovernmental agreement of September 2000 On the Management and Disposition of Plutonium Designated as No Longer Required for Defense Purposes and Related Cooperation (the 2000 Agreement).

The 1998 Agreement, which operated for the last five years, made it possible to produce the basis and technical approaches for the Russian and American programs for the disposition of excess weapons plutonium. The 1998 Agreement expired on July 23, 2003. Unfortunately, the United States decided not to extend this agreement for the subsequent five-year period, as we had assumed it would. The reason for this was the divergence of the Russian and U.S. positions on questions concerning the release of donors from civil liability for damages.

Russia is proceeding from the belief that liability provisions must be based on internationally acknowledged principles, as fixed in international agreements in the nuclear sphere. Taking into account the great significance of the 2000 Agreement, it is important that we continue to look for a mutually acceptable legal solution to this problem as quickly as possible.

The most important issue that must be solved in order to realize the Russian program to dispose of 34 tonnes of excess weapons plutonium (the 2000 Agreement) is the question of financing. The program can only be achieved with international financing.

In 2001-2002 consultations were conducted at the G8 expert level on finding a mechanism for the international financing of the Russian plutonium disposition program. At the G8 summit in Canada in June 2002 a political understanding on the Global Partnership on Nonproliferation was reached, which foresaw the provision of financial assistance to Russian programs, among them fissile materials disposition, including weapons plutonium. However, to date pledges for the Russian program total a little more than $800 million, while current estimates are that the program will cost $2.1-2.3 billion.

Currently multilateral negotiations on the preparation of a draft agreement on a funding mechanism for the Russian program to dispose of 34 tonnes of excess weapons plutonium continue. A program outline has been chosen, a site for the construction of a mixed uranium-plutonium fuel (MOX fuel) fabrication facility has been selected, and a decision to use French MOX fuel production technology has been made.

YADERNYY KONTROL: The news of a joint Russian-American initiative to evacuate spent nuclear fuel (SNF) from research reactors in the CIS was sensational. Could you comment on the status of the initiative?

RUMYANTSEV: First of all, I want to emphasize that no SNF has been removed from research reactors in CIS countries. Consultations between Minatom, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the U.S. Departments of Energy and State with the participation of the IAEA to study the possibility for cooperation in the area of returning fuel from Soviet/Russian-built research reactors to Russia began in 1999, and occurred regularly from September 2001. Based on preliminary agreements, in August 2002 fresh highly enriched uranium fuel from the Vinca Institute of Nuclear Science in Belgrade, Serbia was delivered to Russia, with a total weight of more than 817 kg, and in September 2003 fresh HEU fuel was removed from the Institute for Nuclear Research in Pitesti, Romania, with a total weight of 190 kg.

In December 2003 fuel from a research reactor at the Institute of Nuclear Research of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences in Sofia, with a total weight of about 99 kg, was transferred to Russia.

In all of these cases Minatom enterprises took part in the transfer of the fuel to Russia, and the United States provided financing either directly or through the IAEA.

Uzbekistan was chosen as a country from which the “pilot” transport of irradiated nuclear fuel could be done. The basic technical and financial aspects of this operation have been coordinated between the United States and Uzbekistan. Now we are preparing to conduct environmental and other
state assessments of the import project, in accordance with Russian legislation.

On November 7, 2003 U.S. Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham and I issued a statement on cooperation to remove highly enriched uranium fuel from research reactors of Russian construction in the Russian Federation, the first official document on cooperation in this sphere, signed by Minatom and the U.S. Department of Energy. The statement includes the principles for cooperation and discusses the completion of preparations for a corresponding intergovernmental agreement. A draft agreement has been coordinated with the Americans and contains the following fundamental provisions:

- Fresh and irradiated fuel, containing HEU as well as LEU, will be imported into the Russian Federation.
- Russia will bear no financial expenditures, connected with the import of the fuel.
- The import of the fuel will occur in accordance with Russian legislation.
- The goal of this cooperation is the decrease, and, as far as possible, the elimination, of the use of HEU in civilian applications. At the same time, conversion to LEU is possible only after the creation of the necessary conditions.

**YADERNY KONTROL:** For a decade Russian-Iranian cooperation has been a stumbling block in Russian-American relations. How strong is the negative influence of the “Iranian factor” on Minatom cooperation with the U.S. Department of Energy at present? Are there projects, the realization of which the United States has tied directly to a Russian rejection of cooperation with Iran?

**RUMYANTSEV:** Since December 1998 a paradoxical situation has emerged – after the expiration of the intergovernmental agreement of June 1, 1990, which regulated Russian-American cooperation in the sphere of the peaceful use of atomic energy, Russia and the United States had no legal basis for full-scale cooperation in this area.

The memoranda on cooperation in the sphere of environmental restoration and on the handling of radioactive wastes; controlled thermonuclear fusion and the magnetic confinement of plasma; and research on the fundamental properties of matter have all expired.

In fact, to date the United States is tying the possibility of extending cooperation in all of these spheres to the resolution of the “Iranian question.”

**YADERNY KONTROL:** What is the status of Russia’s contacts with the global community within the framework of the Global Partnership program? Could you describe Russia’s international cooperation in the area of increasing nuclear materials security in greater detail?

**RUMYANTSEV:** At present there is significant forward movement in the development of the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction initiative.

In 2003 we signed intergovernmental agreements with the United Kingdom and Italy, and interdepartmental agreements with Germany and Japan. They made it possible to begin practical work.

We signed an agreement with Germany on the construction of a complex at the Nerpa Shipyard and in Sayda Bay (Murmansk oblast) to prepare reactor compartments from dismantled nuclear-powered submarines, transport them, and put them into long-term storage. In addition, Germany contributed over 4.5 million euros in 2003 for the physical protection, control, and accounting of nuclear materials. Contracts for the scrapping of two nuclear submarines were signed with both Great Britain and Norway, while Japan signed a contract to dismantle one. We signed contracts with the United States for the dismantlement of three nuclear submarines, as well as for the production of 12 spent nuclear submarine fuel transport and storage containers and the building of special rail cars for the transportation of SNF containers. Besides this, work on the expansion of SNF container storage sites was conducted along with upgrades of nuclear materials physical protection, control, and accounting measures.

In 2003 contracts totaling about $66 million were signed for nuclear submarine dismantlement, environmental rehabilitation, and increasing nuclear and radiation safety.
Nevertheless, we must continue work on expanding the legal basis for cooperation, and create effective arrangements for the realization of international projects. We are currently preparing legal provisions for the provision of assistance for nuclear materials protection, control and accounting and the hiring of nuclear specialists.

At the present time increasing the security of nuclear materials is an extremely urgent concern. In this context, IAEA programs to prevent nuclear terrorism deserve all possible support. Strengthening the physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities, averting illegal trafficking of nuclear materials, improving national nuclear materials control and accounting systems, providing for the security and safety of sources of ionizing radiation – these are the types of measures that should be undertaken by all countries, with the active assistance of the Agency, in order to exclude the possibility of acts of nuclear terrorism.

We are continuing our cooperation with the IAEA in such areas as nuclear materials physical protection, control, and accounting, personnel training, the coordination and provision of assistance, and the organization of international cooperation in the area of the provision of special purpose equipment.

Agency activity in the field of physical protection began in 1994, when the Agency adopted a resolution on “Measures against Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear Material.” Work tied to the realization of the Agency's plan to combat nuclear terrorism is continuing. The program envisions concrete measures to strengthen national systems of physical protection of nuclear material, and state system of accounting and control.

Minatom participates in the Agency program in important ways, such as the organization of personnel training, the coordination and provision of assistance, and the organization of international cooperation in the provision of special purpose equipment.

I'd like to highlight the following activities:

- The interdepartmental Russian Methodological and Training Center in Obninsk regularly conducts IAEA courses on using physical protection equipment. These courses are oriented towards technical specialists from facilities that have physical protection systems using technical equipment of Russian (Soviet) manufacture.
- Minatom specialists participate in International Physical Protection Advisory Service (IPPAS) missions, evaluating the state of physical protection in a country, organized by the IAEA at the country's request.
- We participate in the Agency program to create and maintain the Illicit Trafficking Database (ITDB). There are currently 71 countries participating in database work. Russia has announced its entrance into the program and participates in information exchange.
- We are involved in the effort to strengthen the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. The Convention is an effective tool for strengthening the international regime of nuclear materials physical protection. It is extremely important that as many countries as possible join the Convention.

Minatom is involved in cooperative efforts directed toward the strengthening of the physical protection of nuclear sites. This cooperation is conducted predominantly on a bilateral basis. Russia's relations with the United States, Germany, and France are the most advanced in this sphere. These cooperative efforts are predominantly realized on the basis of contracts concluded within the framework of corresponding bilateral agreements. The basic areas in which we are working include: modernizing facility physical protection systems, equipping sites with the most modern technical equipment, developing documentation (including normative documents), and exchanging information.
Head of the "Rodina" ("Motherland") faction in the Russian State Duma Dmitry Rogozin gave an interview to Yaderny Kontrol correspondent Andrei Frolov.

YADERNY KONTROL: An important outcome of the St. Petersburg summit was that the presidents of Russia and the US have exchanged instruments of ratification for the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty. How do you see the future process of nuclear arms reduction in the world, especially since the US Senate has authorized research and development of new types of nuclear weapons abolishing the Spratt-Furs Amendment of 1993, which banned their development?

DMITRY ROGOZIN: There is nothing good, of course, about this program. The world will not become more durable or lasting for that. The very name of the weapon that will be developed – "low-yield nuclear warheads" – seems to lift any, even moral restrictions, on the practical employment of nuclear weapons. So far, they are perceived by many as an indicator of the country's economic development, an element of its political status. But the perfection of low-yield nuclear weapons will very likely lift that taboo under the pretext that a limited and "proportionate" use would rule out the extermination of civilian population or fatal impact on the planet's environment. That is bound to trigger a race of conventional arms in the countries that consider themselves to be potential targets of an attack. And think how many cruise missiles and unexploded air bombs the US armed forces "lost" during the wars in Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and Iraq, and what can happen to the USA itself and to all of us if absent-minded Americans again forget low-yield nuclear weapons somewhere. Then actions of "suicide bombers" will take a toll of hundreds of thousands of lives.

As for the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, it regulates the numerical strength of strategic offensive weapons specifically. Under the Treaty Russia has the right to determine independently the structure of its nuclear forces within 1700-2200 warheads limit until the year 2012. That number is sufficient to inflict the unacceptable damage to any country if it encroaches on our sovereignty. Moreover, the Treaty rectifies some dubious provisions of the START-II Treaty whereby we were to give up the most advanced type of strategic weapons – the MIRVed missiles, which for the foreseeable future will remain the most effective means for penetrating through any air defense or missile defense systems.

In the process of preparation of the Treaty for ratification at the State Duma some of its provisions raised questions among the deputies, and these were taken into account in substantially modifying and improving the draft law on ratification. We have added some fundamentally new provisions that allow us "to keep our powder dry", that is to ensure the security of the Russian Federation even if the strategic situation develops in the most unfavourable way. In particular, we have included a provision on the possibility of withdrawing from the Treaty if another state or group of states deploys missile defense systems that could undermine the effectiveness of the strategic forces of the Russian Federation.

On the whole, I believe that the Strategic Reductions Treaty fully meets our interests in spite of the differences between Russia and the USA on issues of development and introduction of improved low- and medium-yield nuclear weapons.

YADERNY KONTROL: What are we to make of the Russian leadership intention to take part jointly with the USA in development and deployment of the missile defense system?

DMITRY ROGOZIN: I am not sure that this idea has a future. The Americans are too selfish a nation. By the way, we should diligently learn such nationalism from
them. They are interested in the NMD system not so much in terms of its military effectiveness as an impetus for the development of its entire military-industrial complex, science, technology and economy as a whole. They will funnel 300 billion dollars into the project and provide millions of people with jobs for ten years ahead; they will invent and craft something new. As a result, the US will make such a mighty economic leap that it will leave 50 years behind everyone, even the most loyal and economically advanced allies. What is the point for them in sharing with us? I wouldn't if I were in their shoes. Until these projects of cooperation with Russia acquire concrete outlines and real investments are in the pipeline, I will remain a skeptic. Let us face it, the US does not have much of a reputation on this issue.

YADERNY KONTROL: The growing role of the so-called “non-state actors” – transborder crime and international terrorist organizations – is one of the modern threats to peace. It is no secret that sometimes they form close alliances. With what states does Russia cooperate to counter that threat? And how fruitful is that cooperation?

DMITRY ROGOZIN: This is perhaps the least explored topic in the modern world in terms of law. It would seem that everyone is ready to plunge headlong in the fight against international terrorism, banditry and transnational crime. But each time concrete decisions are to be taken all sorts of human rights groups, advocates and other “peacemakers” rise up in arms. Their impact on the political decision-making cannot be underestimated.

Take the notorious case of Akhmed Zakayev who was first given shelter by the Danes, and then by the British. He should go on trial if only for organizing illegal armed formations for which the simple Russian word is “bands”. It is only “the oldest democratic law courts” that seem not to know what such bands are created for. They probably think that they band together to set up gardening partnerships. Zakayev is a Russian citizen and he was a bandit here. If not he personally, his underlings were killing people, our soldiers, young men who served their country. And the country must punish anyone who encroaches upon the lives of those who defend it.

These “democracies” sabotage our national justice and hinder the investigation bodies. As we know, simplicity is worse than a criminally punishable deed. It is nothing if not an attempt at making banditry politically acceptable, political sponsorship of international terrorism. They bear part of the blame for the fact that the first Chechnya campaign had not been carried through. And it is indeed a major problem for international counterterrorist cooperation when the lack of universally accessible and understandable and, most importantly, effective legal norms hinder that struggle. And, come to think of it, puts into question the future of the modern Russian-European civilization condemning it to a bloody war for the right to live. World history is not written by protocol diplomatic notes.

This is my stand: in the face of a terrorist threat that does not recognize the rules or norms of modern civilization Russian citizens should not be hostages to flawed legal norms. A weak legal framework cannot justify the inaction of the authorities when the life, freedom and civic dignity of a country’s population are under threat.

YADERNY KONTROL: Dmitri Olegovich, as a representative of the State Duma, you maintain an active dialogue with European structures. What are the main avenues for Russian-European cooperation in the security field? Does Russia intend to cooperate with Europe in creating a theater missile defense?

DMITRY ROGOZIN: They are terrorism, drug trafficking, which must be equated to the proliferation of mass destruction weapons, and illegal migration as a potential spawning ground for crime. And of course, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and other types of WMD. Everything that meets our mutual interests and contributes to security and stability.

As for the theater-missile defense, for starters one should study the potential source of threats and possible actors in this “theater” and to build lines of defense matching these threats. Otherwise, it may happen that we will become preoccupied
with the local missile defense systems while disaster will creep up on us from a different shore. Think of America on September 11. So, work on issues of security should be comprehensive, involving purely military resources and political mechanisms. The so-called “failing” regimes or “rogue states” can well be treated by political methods. This is much cheaper than resorting to the services of armies. In Iraq, for example, although the military victory has been achieved, it means absolutely nothing in this region. It is full of “sons-of-bitches” and Hussein's place will easily be filled by another. And it wouldn't be half as bad if he turns out to be like Saddam, but he might turn out to be a Bin Laden. But still one should keep one's powder dry. The world is not as stable as we would like it to be. Theatre missile defense systems should of course be improved, including in cooperation with the European partners. But, I repeat, it should only be done after a study of the real sources of threats and in combination with political levers.

YADERNY KONTROL: A lot is being said about a crisis of the non-proliferation regime. The media are full of reports about a number of states seeking to obtain nuclear weapons in violation of the non-proliferation regime. How do you assess the effectiveness of the regime?

DMITRY ROGOZIN: The non-proliferation regime cannot be verified with absolute effectiveness. Science and technology are spreading rapidly and aggressively. I am told that you can find instructions for making a crude nuclear device in the Internet. While 50 years ago the most advanced countries could only do this, today it is within reach of countries with a medium level of technological prowess. And what will happen in 15 years' time is dreadful to contemplate. And the number of people who relish walking the razor's edge is not diminishing in the world. On the contrary, they boldly and easily take up all the novelties in the range of goods designed to destroy their fellow humans. It means that the non-proliferation regime should be strengthened and made more effective, while all international actions must be precisely targeted and sanctioned at least by the UN Security Council, the most influential countries that are responsible for global stability. Not like it was recently – inspectors were working in Iraq, looking diligently for traces of WMD and spending the money of international tax-payers. They did not find anything, but the war began anyway. And Pakistan, India and Israel do not go to any lengths to conceal that they have nuclear weapons. But the international community is strangely silent. So, if you ask me what the main difficulty is, it is double standards.

In the case of Iran, an agreement was reached that no nuclear research be conducted there without the IAEA sanctions and that they should not fiddle with fissible materials. But these technologies and this equipment did not come to Iran from Russia. Some trace them to European laboratories via Pakistan. So one can say that this is a relevant topic and there is a lot of room for work there.

YADERNY KONTROL: How should Russia build its relations with Iran considering that Iran is a strategic ally of Russia and a major business partner?

DMITRY ROGOZIN: Iran is our immediate neighbour. It does not have nuclear weapons and it is in our interest to rule out the possibility of Iran obtaining them, in spite of the fact that our current relations with Iran are good. Iran is well aware of it. It would be far better for us to build a nuclear power plant there whose content we would know better than the Iranians themselves and then we would be sure that nothing untoward can happen there even if the worst comes to the worst. For us Iran is a huge market that we can develop for years. And it has a powerful culture, which has not been much affected by quasi-cultural globalism. And this is another thing that makes it interesting for us. There is vast untapped potential for our relations.

YADERNY KONTROL: What, in your opinion, should be the role of Russia in the process of settlement of the situation around North Korea?

DMITRY ROGOZIN: North Korea is our neighbour, just like Iran. And it is also a traditional partner, although our relations in recent years have faltered due to ideological differences. It is a pity. Nevertheless, there is obvious progress in our relations
with Seoul in recent years. And Russia will probably have to play an important role in the process of putting inter-Korean relations on an even keel.

Of course, the affair of the launching of nuclear reactors in the DPRK is unpleasant. But it is very much in line with the main world processes including the war of the US against Hussein. The Americans wanted to scare the entire world “rogue states”, but they failed. Not many countries want to stand at attention on Washington's command.

What is Pyongyang's logic? Why “cave in” to the international community and accept cooperation, allow inspectors and lose faith before its own people if the Americans will not be persuaded anyway and will find a pretext for making use of their fists. It is much more safe – without forced smiles and diplomatic protocol to declare that we don't give a damn for all your bans if you don't know how to behave decently yourselves. The UN today is like sake compared to our vodka, sugary syrup for the treatment of impotence: it cannot offer any guarantees to anyone. So it is every man for himself. You have doubts? Try and fight us. Korea is not the Persian Gulf. If you venture here you will get another Vietnam, the full menu with hot nuclear spicing.

North Korea is not a hamburger from genetically modified products to be to the Americans' liking. To them it is like the proverbial rat. And to us and China it is a neighbour. A difficult neighbour, but the one with whom it is possible and necessary to come to terms. It is like a Far-Eastern tiger. You have to treat it like a cat – surround him with care and lavish with gifts. But if you try to intimidate such countries with a big stick, I am afraid, an effective precedent of nuclear blackmail by the DPRK will produce recurrence.
**Analysis**

**TOWARDS STRATEGIC STABILITY**

By Igor Sergeev,

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Abridged version

As the fundamental directions of structural changes in the existing world order become clearer, questions of how to provide for its security are occupying an increasingly prominent position in international relations and in states’ internal politics.

In today’s world, national economic independence and international antagonism have given way to globalization and the absence of fierce confrontations, while nuclear deterrence has been retained as a reliable means of ensuring strategic stability.

Today, nuclear deterrence does not serve as the basis of strategic international relations. Most countries have other purposes and mutual interests. Within the international community, the idea that it is inadmissible and unwise to use nuclear weapons in armed conflicts is widespread and well supported. Nuclear weapons are a nonselective means to wreak mass destruction against civilian populations, and people the world over – through various movements and peace organizations – are striving to obtain their complete prohibition and destruction. At the same time, there are other opinions, which are based on a pragmatic approach to nuclear weapons and their development trends.

Since their creation, attitudes toward nuclear weapons and their role have been constantly changing. The influence of nuclear weapons has grown ever broader.

The understanding of the nuclear weapon as a battlefield weapon was expanded to include the possibility that it could be used to obtain political goals. By now, a particular stereotype of how to understand nuclear weapons has developed. Since 1945, nuclear weapons have not been used in a single armed conflict. The world, to a certain degree, got used to the dangerousness of its existence. Against the backdrop of environmental catastrophes and other global threats, this danger does not appear particularly alarming. Yet at the same time, it would be wrong to overlook a new interpretation taking root in the world. The concept that “limited” use of nuclear weapons is admissible and the United States’ adoption of programs allowing for nuclear strikes on storage sites of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) that pose a threat to US security, along with their delay in ratifying the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) could quickly change the “trouble-free picture” of global strategic stability. The view of nuclear weapons as a highly effective practical tool in armed conflicts makes it appear, at first glance, that they are a quick and easy means to solving strategic military problems. However, in the long run those who will have to pay for this optimal solution will be not only the initiator of such an action, but all of humanity.

In the second half of the 20th century and the beginning of the current millennium, a significant number of major international issues have had a nuclear subtext. Environmental, space, disarmament, and terrorism issues are, to a large extent, linked with the nuclear issue and it, in turn, is influenced by them. Comprehension of the fact that the principles of mutual guaranteed destruction cannot be relied on in the modern world are encouraging the search for theoretical bases that can replace or change them. There is a whole series of various conceptual approaches aimed at modernizing the general theoretical positions underlying nuclear deterrence. The main fact, though, remains unchanged: nuclear capability continues to be seen as the only permanent security guarantee under circumstances which are highly uncertain and marked by a political and military situation and international relations that are dynamic.
Nuclear deterrence is not currently the center of attention. At the same time, nuclear assessments serve as a context for determining international relations and are a constituent part of the process of political decisionmaking.

A historical review indicates that nuclear deterrence was the product of the Soviet-American standoff and served as the basis for global international security in the second half of the 20th century. In the opinion of most researchers, it was the presence of an excessively destructive nuclear arsenal in two countries that exerted a deterrent influence on the foreign and military policy of great powers and allies. Ideological differences between the USSR and the US notwithstanding, during this period, both powers came to the same understanding and, to a certain degree, a common vision of security threats. Both specialists and politicians spoke the same terminological language within the framework of conceptual approaches to strategic stability. All of this led to a realization that the nuclear arms race was unproductive and to progress on the path toward real reduction of nuclear arms. Without making the nuclear factor absolute, it can be said that nuclear deterrence is largely responsible for the fact that there have been no world wars for more than a half-century.

The effectiveness of nuclear deterrence is often questioned. It is a highly controversial issue since – excluding well-known large-scale events – instances where the beginning of armed conflicts were successfully prevented or states were restrained from taking undesired actions, as a rule, did not attract great attention and were often not publicized. There is no doubt that nuclear weapons are not an absolute security guarantee suitable for all situations, yet their indirect influence can be seen in many armed conflicts, regional and internal conflicts among them. A world without nuclear weapons is desirable, but to what extent is still unclear. Regardless of all of the negative effects of reliance on nuclear deterrence, no other real mechanisms for preventing large-scale armed conflicts has yet been developed. Therefore, the prospects of nuclear deterrence ceasing to exist entirely must obviously be discussed in terms of the distant future.

It is significant that, in today's understanding of security, increasingly fewer people regard nuclear deterrence as the leading element of Russian-American relations. An altogether different situation is forming in the realm of bilateral strategic interactions.

Most experts are currently examining several aspects of bilateral nuclear deterrence, and mutual assured destruction. First, as the existing and horrific legacy of the Cold War; second, as “a strategic armored train on an emergency route;” and third, as a model for military-strategic calculations and nuclear planning. In its turn, strategic stability as it has traditionally been understood – based on bilateral nuclear deterrence – is giving way to global strategic stability connected with worldwide calls for security.

It is obvious that a lack of serious contradictions, the presence of common interests in various spheres, and a continued dialogue on strategic armaments is facilitating the transfer of nuclear war scenarios and the direct threat of the use of nuclear force onto the virtual plane. Pragmatic approaches are becoming the main characteristic of Russian-American interactions. One can hope that the current retreat of nuclear deterrence into the background is not a temporary occurrence, but rather a lasting trend.

At the same time, it must be noted that many of Russia's high-priority interests remain on the sidelines of the general agenda, as America implements its global leadership position. It is generally understood that the tendency towards erosion of a certain amount of mutual understanding in the strategic sphere has not been completely overcome. The end of the 1972 ABM Treaty and the American vision of and attitude towards the international legal base for control over armaments as a whole is actually hindering constructive resolutions.

The current level of Russian-American relations is often characterized as a limited partnership. Definitions such as strategic, mature, real, privileged, and advanced partnership are also used. This abundance of terms suggests the somewhat intangible results of such a partnership. In many ways the relations are of a declaratory nature, while we also see problems in the US view of equity and observation of the
reciprocity principle. In the end, this points to the absence of appropriate efforts to meet mutual interests. This results in several unneeded complexities when attempting to shift the positive potential of bilateral cooperation developed in the sphere of nuclear armaments onto a practical course.

Without delving deeply into the entire host of problems, the main point can be singled out – over the past decade, the level of the nuclear standoff has successfully been significantly decreased. Russia and the United States have met the conditions of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START I), cutting their overall strategic forces roughly in half, and they are continuing to uphold the treaty provisions.

At the same time, some believe that the potential of the START I Treaty has not been fully realized. The mechanism for adapting the treaty to new realities in the interests of both parties, which was foreseen by the Treaty’s creators, was not fulfilled. It is possible that mutually beneficial ratified amendments to the START I Treaty could allow for the resolution of many current and future problems in the strategic area, including interests of both sides in modernizing their strategic armaments.

The Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions (SORT) between Russian and the US is now in force. The two countries are to reduce their warheads to 1,700-2,200 units, or roughly by three times in comparison with the START I threshold level. Under these conditions, with rational strategic forces structures, strategic stability – as it has traditionally been understood – should be strengthened. In assessing the Moscow Treaty as the next step in preserving and developing Russian-American relations in the strategic area, there are several principal points that deserve attention.

Unlike other agreements currently in force, the SORT Treaty allows for its contents to be broadly interpreted. A common understanding of its key provisions has not yet been reached. The objects of reduction are not clear and the terminological basis of the Treaty has not been defined, including its fundamental notions of “strategic offensive potential” and “strategic nuclear warhead.” The concrete definition of the SORT Treaty is essential in maintaining its effectiveness and viability, and it requires joint expert resolution.

Another serious problem is the verification of new agreements. To ensure that implementation of the agreement does not result in a unilateral reduction in the operational readiness of strategic forces, there must be a verification mechanism. This mechanism is presumed in the principles of nuclear deterrence codified by the Treaty. Without trustworthy information about each party’s capabilities, deterrence has no credibility. Therefore, dependence solely on transparency measures cannot be considered reliable. The text of the SORT Treaty, however, does not contain tools for verification of its terms, and using the START I monitoring procedures for this purpose is clearly insufficient. The START I verification system was developed in totally different geopolitical circumstances, and it has been in need of updating for a long time. It is also worth remembering that once the START I Treaty expires in 2009, the verification activity it provides for will also cease. This means that we will not be able to determine the development of the realization and implementation of the SORT Treaty’s conditions with sufficient reliability.

Taking this into account, the verification system for the SORT Treaty must be based on more than just the monitoring mechanisms of the START I Treaty. To achieve this goal, elements of other existing agreements in the strategic sphere can be used; for example, the 1989 Agreement on Reciprocal Advance Notification of Major Strategic Exercises and the Agreement of Exchange of Technical Information in the Field of Nuclear Warhead Safety and Security of 1994. At the same time, the increase in the effectiveness of the START I verification functions in relation to nuclear warheads is possible without amending the actual text of the START I Treaty. It would suffice to change the relevant protocols on reconversion and inspections within the framework of the Joint Commission on Inspection and Compliance of the START I Treaty.

These and other alternatives for strengthening the efficacy of the SORT Treaty can
be the subject of mutual review. Dialogue, mutual obligations, responsibility, and trust have always been the basis for any cooperation between states, and for the delicate sphere of mutual strategic relations, it is of primary importance. The situation should not be altered now, when mutual contacts regarding conceptual problems in the nuclear sphere are becoming common and diversified in form and content.

Among other possible points of cooperation for long-term US-Russian mutual interests, as noted in the Joint Statement on the New Strategic Relationship, are issues concerning anti-missile defense and joint actions in the fight against new global challenges for the 21st century, including terrorism, WMD proliferation and others.

Here, priorities are important. From a practical point of view, a serious and far-sighted contribution to ensuring international security would serve to strengthen the international legal base for security, which was created through the joint efforts of states over the past several decades. This process is largely hampered by the negative attitude of the US toward most arms control treaties and regimes, and toward the activities of the UN and other multilateral security institutions. The most advantageous policy for America, which is oriented toward instant results, is poorly suited to practical cooperation in the security field and significantly reduces its effectiveness.

It is entirely understandable that, although our countries hold similar positions on a broad spectrum of international problems, their national interests cannot completely coincide. We have different views regarding how to maintain strategic stability, and the means and methods to ensure it. Therefore, a logical condition for cooperation would be understanding of – rather than opposition to – each other's interests, and the resolution of differences in a nonconfrontational spirit. It is likely that events will progress in this manner.

In the recent past, Soviet-American nuclear deterrence eclipsed other nuclear issues, including the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. Today, it is accepted that the issue of nonproliferation of nuclear weapons is particularly acute, new, and complex. This is probably not completely accurate. The nonproliferation problem has existed ever since nuclear weapons appeared. And one of its most complex stages was when most countries made the choice to be non-nuclear, which was confirmed in the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Those countries which are suspected of possessing nuclear weapons or intending to acquire them chose that path a long time ago, and it is common knowledge.

At the current stage, routine issues are on the agenda. First the NPT and the entire existing nonproliferation regime must be strengthened, while universalization of the NPT and the immediate, full liquidation of nuclear weapons will most likely have to be postponed. This is not the end of the NPT, but rather information for the world community to ponder and use in developing a long-term strategy.

In this area, the behavior of world leaders is currently of crucial importance, as are their subsequent actions on broadening the international nonproliferation base and relying on it to eliminate political and military stimuli for acquiring nuclear weapons.

There truly are problems in this sphere. Complaints can be lodged against all of the nuclear powers. The first-use principle appears in the strategic concepts and plans of practically all of the nuclear states. The existence of double standards and the attempts to use nonproliferation slogans to achieve selfish nationalist goals does not facilitate regime strengthening. The use of counterproliferation to resuscitate a policy of force – the realization of which would be a blessing to several regional leaders' ambitious plans – could turn out to be a time bomb.

Nonproliferation and the war on terrorism should not become goals in and of themselves or the current vision of any single state. It is in the interests of the entire world community not to tolerate emerging threats, but the measures used should be legitimate, and the goal of common efforts should be the security of all countries.

It is also obvious that ideas of preemptive strikes without the consent of the world community, regardless of which state they
come from, undermine the foundations of the existing world order.

The rule of law, universal equality before the law, and the necessity of having a domestic legal base are not questioned in the slightest by law-abiding citizens. While these principles do not completely eliminate setbacks, crimes, and other transgressions, no one is prepared to do away with the legal foundations of existing states. Why, then, should there be doubts about the wisdom of abiding by similar behavior on the international scene? Ensuring global strategic stability assumes the implementation of deliberate approaches. Haste and attempts to act outside of the system of international agreements are counterproductive.

To briefly address the reality and inevitability of the threat of nuclear proliferation:

Representatives of the American administration talk about the absolute unmanageability of the international nonproliferation regime. They limit the prospects for nuclear extortion only in terms of time. In her memoirs, Margaret Thatcher also writes that the process of WMD proliferation is, in point of fact, not stopping. The real issue is to maintain superiority over competitors, and she believes that nuclear weapons will ultimately be used.

This is an overly pessimistic picture. It would be useful if it were part of a constructive course to effectively overcome current challenges. But this is not the case. For the time being, there seems to be little forward movement using the trial and error method (Yugoslavia, Iraq, North Korea). Destructive trends and the creation of obstacles to the reorganization of existing nonproliferation methods are quite noticeable.

At the same time, the general opinion at the September 2003 Second Moscow International Nonproliferation Conference was that this process is not unalterable, and the Iran and North Korean situations, as well as the issue of Israeli weapons and the Pakistan-India situation, are perfectly solvable.

The situation concerning the possibility that terrorist organizations might use nuclear weapons is more complex due to its high level of uncertainty and the fact that strong international measures to counteract such actions have not been worked out.

Without excluding the possibility that certain technologies or fissile materials could fall into the hands of extremist forces, it must be considered that a terrorist group actually using full-fledged nuclear ordnance to achieve its goals is, practically speaking, an unlikely event, and it is quite a stretch to call so-called “dirty bombs” WMD. WMD components of interest to terrorists can be found in many countries, and information about illicit trade in nuclear and other radioactive materials is added to the IAEA database annually. Nevertheless, taking into account the well-known challenges of obtaining access to nuclear components and technological complexities, terrorist organizations will most likely turn to other types of WMD.

Current attempts to understand the nuclear problem and the role of nuclear weapons are taking place at a time when the balance of power relationships in the world is being restructured. Attempts to integrate the nuclear factor into the world order that is being formed and to adapt it to new circumstances are becoming more pronounced. These processes must not only be considered, but also actively influenced in order to ensure state security and global strategic stability. Russia currently has everything it needs to consolidate its position as an active participant in the creation of a new world order and strengthen its role among leading states. The country has made a strategic choice to pursue full integration into the world economic system, and we are, of course, far from indifferent about the international conditions we will find ourselves in during the coming years and decades.
There is increasing discussion of late regarding questions related to the role and place of nuclear deterrence policy in the contemporary world, as well as the prospects for its use. These questions have also been considered within the framework of Russian-American relations.

The preparation and then the signing of the Russian-American Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty further accelerated this discussion.

While the Russian and U.S. delegations worked on the text of the treaty, adjusted its provisions, and searched for points in common and mutually acceptable compromises, experts actively formed their own versions of the treaty, evaluated the prospects for the further development of Russian and U.S. strategic weapons, and determined their possible quantitative and qualitative parameters. The poignancy of such research was aggravated by a number of essential factors. On the one hand, there was the U.S. declaration of withdrawal from the 1972 INF treaty and of plans to implement the large-scale development of antimissile systems in the immediate future—by 2004-2005—as well as the attempt to realize not real, but “virtual” reductions in offensive weapons by means of the adoption of the concept of “operationally deployed nuclear warheads.” On the other hand, there was Russia’s difficult economic position, and the hardships and challenges faced by its armed forces and military-industrial complex.

Many opinions, at times in direct opposition to each other, were expressed. This can probably be explained by the fact that questions relating to strategic weapons reduction and the development of antimissile systems are not only important but interest the public at large.

I believe that today we are participants in a “qualitative jump” in both the theory and practice of nuclear deterrence. New forms of such deterrence are appearing, such as deterrence by threatening not the use of, but merely the acquisition of nuclear weapons. And not only direct military action is being deterred, but also political and economic pressure.

Thus we can conclude that we will not part with nuclear weapons in the foreseeable future. We must live with them, but live in accordance with strict rules, elaborated collectively by the entire global community.

Here is precisely the value of the Russian-American Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, in our view. Its signature emphatically signaled the need for firm rules of behavior, as well as for stability and continuity in the policies of the leading nuclear powers, in the sphere of nuclear weapons.

Of course, problems in the sphere of the reduction and limitation of strategic weapons cannot disappear in a moment. We will have to continue to work to reduce the nuclear danger for a rather long time. But, probably, one of the most essential moments of this process will be that at long last we have abandoned the concept of the “quantitative parity” of nuclear forces, and have ceased counting individual warheads and nuclear weapon delivery vehicles and scrupulously comparing missile throw weights and ranges.

We understood that national security is not only obtained by mountains of weapons (which, incidentally, swiftly become obsolete thanks to the accelerating scientific and technical revolution, and the breakthroughs in one or other sphere or another that occur on nearly a daily basis), but by the entire capacity of each country.
Although they remain a most important part of the provision of national security, nuclear weapons, in our view, have ceased nevertheless to be its sole guarantee. Humanity now has a great deal to lose in the blaze of a nuclear war. The contemporary world has become too complex and interdependent for such a conflict, even were it to be a local nuclear conflict, not to reverberate practically in all countries and upon all peoples. Any rational politician would find the losses to economic, ecological, humanitarian and other aspects of our civilization that would result from such a conflict to be unequivocally unacceptable. All the more so, since there have been many examples of catastrophes and crises that have been far smaller in their consequences and qualitatively different and yet have proven similarly unacceptable. For instance, there was the economic crisis in the late 1990s in Southeast Asia, the Chernobyl NPP accident, and the SARS epidemic. The terrorist acts of September 11, 2001, also showed the danger and depth of consequences to such acts.

It has become obvious that strengthening strategic stability cannot be conflated with consolidating and strengthening nuclear deterrence policy. On the contrary, a reduction in the role of the nuclear element in providing security could occur only after the substitution of other, primarily nonmilitary, elements. This decrease became possible only as a result of a fundamental change in the nature of international relations brought about by the nuclear powers, primarily Russia and the United States, re-examining a number of the strategic elements in their general policies.

Today much is said about the need to abandon the concept of nuclear deterrence in Russian-American relations. It is generally argued that the concept belongs to the “Cold War” era and, therefore, must be rejected. However, let us consider: is it possible to reject this concept, i.e., is it possible to actually exclude the fear of nuclear weapons from our lives? This fear can only be eradicated when nuclear weapons are destroyed. But can we say today that nuclear weapons might forever disappear from our lives? That, having reached the current level of development, we will forego nuclear weapons, and that no one, no terrorist or dictator, will ever want to create such a weapon anew in order to use it to dictate his conditions to the world?

This scenario is unlikely. Most likely, we will be forced to preserve some minimum level of nuclear weapons, just as we preserve strains of pathogenic bacteria and viruses like anthrax and smallpox. Without such collections we cannot create effective vaccines against this danger and new, similar dangers.

These circumstances are all the more important today, as we anxiously watch the revival of a new type of nuclear element in global politics, and the return of these weapons to the foreground of world developments.

These developments include the attempt of the United States, during its preparations for the second war in Iraq, to legitimize possible applications of tactical nuclear weapons, as, in its opinion, extreme yet unavoidable methods of fighting such enemies as Usama Ben-Laden or Saddam Hussein. It also includes the attempt of North Korea to conduct a type of nuclear blackmail of the global community in an effort to ensure its security and the preservation of the current regime. In this unique Korean “nuclear deterrence,” there is not so much a threatened use of nuclear weapons that really exist, as the possibility of their creation in the near or not-so-near future.

At the same time, many other non-nuclear countries, observing the methods by which the United States is attempting to achieve its goals in its relationship with them and the way the tone of the dialog between the Americans and India and Pakistan changed after the latter's acquisition of nuclear status, have begun to think about their own entrance into the “nuclear club.” The form of entering this club, as the North Korean example suggests, can vary.

As for the future of nuclear deterrence in Russian-American relations, one can certainly point to many technical yet familiar terms, refer to the work of scholars and the statements of political figures, or cite the “classics of the nuclear era.” Such discourse, however, might well be intelligible only to a comparatively small circle of specialists.
who do not need these explanations. Instead, a rather straightforward analogy should elucidate this very complex question far more simply.

Figuratively speaking, we have already left a “nuclear dead end” and are traveling along a new road. The current system of agreements for the limitation and reduction of strategic armaments is, if we continue our analogy, a “road map” of nuclear policy showing that “nuclear traffic lanes” on this road have become somewhat narrower and are no longer priority lanes for fast vehicles. At the same time, the good quality surface of these lanes, clear markings, and intelligible traffic rules prevent unskilled or excessively reckless drivers from slipping off the road into a ditch or getting into an accident, including one with catastrophic consequences for the majority if not all other drivers. Besides the fact that the “nuclear lane” is a reliable and proven path to maintaining one’s security, it provides a good example to those constructing and repairing all other traffic lanes to similarly strengthen road surfaces and produce intelligible and acceptable rules of the road.

This, essentially, is how the value of nuclear weapons in contemporary global life is determined. And one should clearly recognize that nuclear weapons are unlikely to disappear from face of the earth, at least in the foreseeable future. The possibility of their threatened use will not disappear, and, consequently, the natural fear that they cause. Therefore, nuclear deterrence based on mutual fear will not go away either.

But we face a peculiar paradox. The nuclear factor, which for a long time led to confrontation and to a worsening in relations, mutual suspicion and distrust, is now working in exactly the opposite direction. This is primarily true not in the relations between countries that are members of the “nuclear club,” but between countries that are striving, both de facto and de jure, to join this club.

Threats and dangers exist until individuals and countries, and even humanity as a whole, perceive them and become afraid. Fear is a very strong and dangerous feeling that is further aggravated by ignorance or incomprehension. When we feel ourselves threatened, at least potentially, by one or another process or weapons system, we fear it. Therefore even defensive weapons, particularly those that not only ensure the protection of the possessing state from external attack but also provide a sort of “impunity” in the case of various actions, cannot but give rise to completely natural fears.

Too much here depends on subjective factors, such as the particular leaders of states and their mutual relations. As former US Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara correctly said, not one rational, cool-headed political or military leader is likely to resort to nuclear weapons first. But political and military leaders at moments of sharp crises are neither rational, nor cool-headed.

Surely, it is best to avoid conflicts. The best way is by reliance on negotiations, dialogue, clarification of one’s position to one’s partner, and close attention to others’ points of view. The existence of concrete, legally binding agreements is one way to guarantee that many dangers and threats will be averted.

To be sure, any treaty borne as a result of complex negotiations cannot but be a mutual compromise. Thus, as expectable, the SORT treaty was unable to address all possible issues related to strategic stability, issues that had been discussed in Russian society for a long time. For example, questions of space weapons, antisubmarine warfare, and high-precision weapons were not addressed. However, we continue to be concerned with all of these questions and discussions on these topics will continue, in particular within the framework of the Consultative Group for Strategic Security chaired by the Russian foreign and defense ministers and the U.S. secretaries of state and defense, which was created by the two countries as stipulated in the Joint Declaration on the New Strategic Relationship.

One of the most important aspects of this treaty is that it represents a truly new type of agreement, a “post-Cold War” agreement.

During the U.S.-Russian negotiations a new type of negotiating process was elaborated, together with new negotiating prin-
principles that can serve as an example and a basis for the formation of Russia's relations with other states—with nuclear states, first and foremost. This process is directed toward the **solution of concrete problems within concrete time periods set by political leaders**, and is not aggravated by tunnel vision, mutual distrust, or obsolete approaches.

Oriented toward rejecting Cold War principles, we did not strive for any sort of "bargain," or linkage between positions adopted by our negotiating partners in one sphere with concessions in another, but instead based our approach on respect for each other's position. Taking into account our many years of negotiating experience in the area of strategic weapons reduction, we understood perfectly well that the old negotiating process, based on the negotiating partners' advancement of deliberately high demands and the gradual decrease of these demands to a mutually acceptable level—even though it led to positive results—did so only with great difficulty and after a very long time. Clearly recognizing that success in this important sphere would allow us to advance more rapidly in other areas as well, we firmly charted a course towards the **obligatory attainment of a positive result**.

We have rejected the principle of a "quantitative parity" of strategic armaments, and have made our chief concern a **new qualitative parameter of state power, strategic offensive potential**, or the capabilities, reserves, and other possible means that could be used to solve particular strategic problems.

This term, strategic offensive potential, appeared in the name of the treaty,* and is the result of a compromise achieved in the course of negotiations during the process of developing a common concept of reductions. Within the SORT framework, it combines warheads, delivery systems, and everything that determines the capabilities of strategic offensive armaments to solve a variety of problems. Of course, this term opens up the possibility of a fairly wide and ambiguous interpretation of the spirit and letter of the treaty. On the other hand, however, it also makes it possible for participating countries to display and prove its adherence to radical and irreversible reductions of strategic weapons. Thus, we found a **mutually acceptable compromise**, making it possible for us to continue the process of reducing the nuclear threat, since the very name of the document, in which the term «strategic offensive potential» appeared for the first time, made it possible for us to place emphasis on that aspect of our approaches that we hold in common, while putting off the resolution of exacting questions until they can be handled by the Bilateral Implementation Commission, which is to be created under the terms of the treaty.

Nuclear weapons have always been, are, and will remain strategic weapons. They are strategic in the sense that they are used to solve strategic and national-level problems, to achieve the goals of wars, and ensure strategic stability.

In sum, the distinctive feature of the new SORT treaty is that it answers **basic questions** about the future development of strategic weapons, determining their levels and the time frame for the further reduction of both parties' nuclear forces. Nevertheless, practically all of the mechanisms for strategic weapons reduction and monitoring remain as they were in the START I Treaty. This is the real agreement ensuring the extension and continuity of the processes of limiting strategic offensive weapons.

At the same time, its format, which differs from the format of the START I and START II agreements, is determined by the current state of Russian-U.S. relations and global military-political circumstances, as well as by the entire history of the development of the negotiating process involved. This history began 30 years ago with the Interim Agreement between the USSR and the United States on Certain Measures With Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT I), reached on July 1, 1972, which stopped the quantitative growth of strategic weapons by

* Editor's note: While the official name of the SORT treaty in English is the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty, the official Russian name can be literally translated as the Treaty on Reductions in Strategic Offensive Potential. The names in both languages allow a broader interpretation of what strategic offensive reductions entail, unlike previous treaties that focused on actual weapons and delivery systems.
both parties. Afterwards, there were other agreements and treaties, SALT II, START I, and START II, that allowed us to reduce considerably the level of nuclear confrontation. We traveled a long way during those years, not only developing mechanisms and procedures for reductions, but also altering the perception of the role and place of nuclear weapons in our relations and in guaranteeing global strategic stability. True, there were losses: the START II treaty which, in my view, became the object of political horse-trading in both Russia and the United States, was overloaded in the nine years after its signature with a pile of conditions and requirements, until it quietly passed away under the weight of its irrelevance for both states. Thus, the new format of this treaty emerged as a natural consequence of the path we took, as well as of the current state of Russian-U.S. relations and our present understanding of the way to further reduce nuclear weapons.

As for the absence of concrete quantitative indices and the halting pace of intermediate reductions, we believe given the realities of today that these are not drawbacks, but the advantages of the document. Thus each country can select the reduction method optimal for itself, primarily from an economic point of view. A similar approach, in our view, is very important not only in this agreement, but also in the entire process of reducing and limiting weapons, which, I hope, both our countries sincerely want to continue and to deepen, all the more so, since the positions of the leaders of our countries are providing the foundations for this to occur.

It is also very important that the new SORT treaty make it possible for us to reduce our strategic nuclear forces to a level of minimum sufficiency, without fear for our security. Russian President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly declared the readiness of our country to reduce our nuclear arsenal to a level much smaller than that provided for in the signed treaty: to 1,500 warheads and even lower. I believe that today, and also for the long term, that this will be wholly sufficient to undergird our national security. This level is what is meant by the concept of minimum sufficiency, which has been discussed so much of late. I hope that Russia's position will be understood, approved, and supported by the world community.

Finally, one of the main consequences of this agreement is that today we have the possibility of continuing the dialogue not only on strategic offensive weapons, but also on defensive weapons, taking into account their interrelation and reciprocal effect. Further dialogue must be conducted not only on the determination of the directions for the continued reduction of the global nuclear threat and the reduction of nuclear forces, but also on the problematic questions of antimissile defense. In this regard we believe that it is necessary to draw other countries, including European members of the NATO alliance, into the discussion.
Analysis

THE ROLE OF US BUSINESS IN IMPLEMENTING THE COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION PROGRAM

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This study explores participation by American companies in the implementation of projects under the Cooperative Threat Reduction program (CTR) and the Global Partnership. The issue of Russo-American cooperation in the disposal of arms stockpiles today demands the closest attention on the part of both Russian and Western experts and researchers. Nevertheless, the lay reader may not have a clear understanding of the content of the above programs, how they work, their objectives, and the relationship that American businesses have to the implementation of such programs. For a number of wholly objective reasons—primarily due to the lack of perspective and the absence of a sufficient amount of declassified information, the role of American businesses has only been studied at a fairly superficial level. Meanwhile, an insufficiently high level of information awareness sometimes leads to somewhat subjective judgments and unfounded suspicions. For this reason, the author believes it important and necessary to consider the given topic in greater detail and more thoroughly. This will make it possible to view the processes in CTR and GP programs “from within,” and understand the nature of drawbacks and advantages of the cooperation mechanism, as well as strategies for improvement, and to understand how US companies see participation in CTR and GP programs: simply an opportunity to generate income, or, in addition to this, a means of entering the Russian market.

In this research effort, we will attempt to fulfill the following tasks:

- Systematize information about the companies which are most actively involved in GP projects, outline the area of activity of each of them, highlight salient characteristics about the way that they work, and identify key problems which lead to difficulties in cooperation between Russian and American partners;
- Identify the main tendencies in the development of cooperation between American business, Russian state structures and other organizations;
- Based on the assembled materials and conclusions drawn in the process of completing the preceding tasks, attempt to determine the prospects for further cooperation.

It is important to note that there are fairly few open sources in the given area. This is primarily due to the fact that the majority of data are either state or commercial secrets. The author has therefore been forced to depend mostly on sources on the Internet (official sites of the ministries and agencies of the RF, USA, Great Britain, and the official sites of general contractors), as well as the intense use of interviewing (meetings with the representatives of ministries, agencies, and US companies). It should be noted that the representatives of just one company, Parsons Delaware, declined a meeting, stating that no such permission had been granted by the US Department of Defense. A number of official documents were also used in the study (international agreements, domestic US and RF legislation, etc.).

The structure of cooperation between the US and the RF, under the CTR program

In order to objectively assess the role played by American business in the implementation of the Cooperative Threat Reduction program, determine the functional elements of this role, and understand why this particular structure was chosen, rather than another system for conducting projects, it is necessary to first identify all the participants in this process, and track the way in which they interact between themselves, and on the basis of which legislation they act.
The structure of cooperation can be seen as consisting of three different levels: intergovernmental, interagency and the level of companies and subcontractors. On the highest level, the parties develop the general provisions and areas in which assistance is to be provided, laying a foundation for cooperation. This can be clearly seen in the fundamental documents, such as the Agreement Between the USA and the Russian Federation Concerning the Safe Transportation, Storage and Destruction of Weapons and the Prevention of Weapons Proliferation, dated June 17, 1992, and the protocol to this agreement, dated June 16, 1999. Both of these documents are “umbrella” agreements, and presuppose the conclusion of separate, interagency agreements for the implementation of each individual project.

At this point, there is a transition to the second level of cooperation. The text of the 1992 agreement states that the main “executive agents” responsible for cooperation in specific fields are the US Department of Defense and the RF Ministry for Atomic Energy, and the 1999 protocol adds the RF Ministry for the Economy and the RF Ministry for Defense to this list. However, due to the broad spectrum of tasks, a number of other state structures are also involved (see Table 1). These bodies actively interact with one another within certain cooperation areas in their jurisdiction, under the corresponding interagency agreements. Representatives of these ministries carry out general, coordinating functions, determining the main areas of activity and distributing funds among those areas.

At the next, third level, the key players are the organizations involved in practical project implementation. In this sector, participants may be divided into two sublevels: contractors and subcontractors (although this chain may also be longer). The former include representatives of the American companies mentioned above. These companies receive funds from the US Government for the implementation of a specific project, are responsible for the selection of subcontractor and executive organizations (which are capable of executing a specific volume of work most effectively and in the shortest time), control the quality of work performed, ensure that schedules are observed, and that funds are correctly allocated, etc. Thus US companies act as a sort of bridge between the representatives of departments and agencies of the United States, and Russian Government and businesses.

It would be reasonable to ask at this point, why the US chose this particular structure for delivering aid. The author believes that the choice can be explained by the following factors:

- The implementation of individual CTR projects requires significant experience in specific, highly specialized fields, for example: the construction of ballistic missile storage sites; facilities for the burn-out of solid-fuel motors; chemical weapons processing facilities, and much more. Companies already active in
CTR programs boast many years of experience, obtained in the fulfillment of defense orders in the US and other countries.

- By participating in tenders, companies are constantly in search of ways to fulfill orders as effectively as possible—both qualitatively and quantitatively.
- Funds invested in Cooperative Threat Reduction and Global Partnership programs are spent not only on Russian aid, but also on the development of American business (unique experience is obtained in cooperating with Russian government structures and businesses, while companies consolidate their presence in the Russian market and new jobs are created, etc.).
- During a transfer from bilateral to multilateral cooperation (in compliance with the agreements concluded in Kananaskis), the services of American companies may be required by representatives of other states (as has already been the case with Bechtel and Great Britain).

The financing structure

Now let’s consider the route, by which funds flow from the donor to the companies that conduct the physical implementation of projects. The fundamental document in US legislation, which forms the basis for Russian aid in the disposal of weapons stockpiles, is the National Defense Authorization Act, which was passed on October 11, 1993 (previously the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act, passed on December 12, 1991).

The process of allocating funds is, in itself, a fairly complex system which involves interaction between the organs of executive and legislative power of the United States. Initially, each agency compiles a draft budget for the follow-

Table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>USA</th>
<th>RF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Strategic offensive arms elimination</strong></td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
<td>Rosaviakosmos (RASA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Disposal of chemical weapons</strong></td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
<td>Rosboyepripasy (RMA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Transportation of nuclear materials</strong></td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
<td>Ministry of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Physical protection, control and accounting of nuclear materials</strong></td>
<td>Department of Energy</td>
<td>Ministry of Atomic Energy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Shutting down production of weapons-grade plutonium</strong></td>
<td>Department of Energy</td>
<td>Ministry of Atomic Energy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>ISTC [International Science and Technology Center]</strong></td>
<td>State Department</td>
<td>State Customs Committee (GTK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Storage of fissile materials</strong></td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
<td>Ministry of Atomic Energy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Disposal of nuclear submarines</strong></td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
<td>Ministry of Atomic Energy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Second Line of Defense</strong></td>
<td>Department of Energy</td>
<td>State Customs Committee (GTK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Prevention of biological weapons proliferation</strong></td>
<td>State Department</td>
<td>Ministry of Defense</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ing year which, amongst other things, requests funds for the implementation of CTR projects. There are several different legislative documents, which determine the procedure for requesting appropriations in the necessary areas. For example, the Clinger-Cohen Act stipulates a condition, whereby tried and tested methods of conducting business must be used—the effectiveness of which is monitored by the Office of Management and Budget.\textsuperscript{17} In the next stage, the department's draft budget is directed for a presidential reading. By the first Monday in February, this document is submitted for review to the US Congress, where it is discussed for the following eight months by four different committees. First the Budget Committees in the House of Representatives and the Senate review the expense items and approve or disapprove them, and then the Committee on Appropriations passes the Appropriations Bill,\textsuperscript{18} which confirms the allocation of funds corresponding to the budget items. Finally, the Authorizing Committee passes a bill, under which authorities are granted to expend funds on the corresponding budget items,\textsuperscript{19} one of the chapters of which is dedicated to financing nonproliferation programs. The receipt of these authorities allows the responsible agency, and as Table 1 shows, this is usually the Department of Defense and the Department of Energy, to use the allocated funds within a certain period of time (as a rule, three years). A period of two years usually passes after the submission of a draft for discussion, before the allocation of funds actually begins.

Throughout the 1990s, the lion's share of appropriations for CTR programs was dis-

\textit{Fig. 2. Project financing structure.}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.8\textwidth]{project_financing_structure.png}
\caption{Project financing structure.}
\end{figure}

\textit{Fig. 3. Financing of CTR programs via the US Departments of Defense and Energy, in millions.}\textsuperscript{20}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.8\textwidth]{CTR_financing.png}
\caption{Financing of CTR programs via the US Departments of Defense and Energy, in millions.}
\end{figure}

tributed via the US Department of Defense. Gradually, however, financing of nonproliferation projects via the US Department of Energy has become more and more intense, and by 2002 drew approximately level, while in 2004 the US Department of Energy allocated a sum twice as large as that handled by the Department of Defense.

Both organizations feature special bodies, which work on problems directly connected to CTR programs. These are the DoD's Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)\textsuperscript{21} and the DoE's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA).\textsuperscript{22} Both agencies conduct the core of activity in coordinating CTR programs, holding tenders to select general subcontractor companies, based on the Federal Acquisition Regulations.\textsuperscript{23} The US companies capable of most efficiently implementing a specific project are identified, and the US agency also verifies the expediency of one project or another with the responsible Russian ministry, after which the two agents sign a contract.

The Integrating Contract

Since 1992, around ten of the largest and most established companies in the US military-industrial complex have participated in the implementation of CTR projects. Among these are companies such as: Bechtel International Systems, Inc., Westinghouse, Morrison-Knudsen, now known as Washington Group Int., Kellogg, Brown & Root (KBR), Lockheed Martin, Parsons Delaware, Raytheon Technical Services Company, ATK Thiokol and others. The CTR Integrating Contract (CTRIC) was established in 2001, to use funds allocated by the DoD's Defense Threat Reduction Agency more effectively. Under this contract, five companies were selected—general contractors which had most successfully built a reputation for implementing CTR programs over the preceding decade. These were: Bechtel, Washington Group, Parsons, Kellogg, Brown and Root (a subsidiary of Halliburton), and Raytheon.\textsuperscript{24}

Despite the fact that each of the above companies was capable of coordinating the entire cycle of work in any given project, following a large volume of work in the Russian Federation, it was determined that there were areas where each Integrating Contract participant possessed unique experience:

- For the Washington Group, this was the construction of ICBM storage facilities;
- For KBR—land rehabilitation following the elimination of silo launchers;
- For Parsons—implementing the full work cycle for the disposal of sea-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) (from transportation to elimination of missile motors) and the construction of facilities for the destruction of chemical munitions;
- For Raytheon—the provision of logistics services;
- For Bechtel—the construction of fissile material storage facilities.

It is noteworthy that in 2002 Washington Group and Raytheon won a tender and became general contractors for the US Department of Energy under the Elimination of Weapons-Grade Plutonium Production Program (EWGPP).\textsuperscript{25} Meanwhile, Bechtel is the main coordinator for projects financed by Great Britain's Ministry of Defence.

It should not be forgotten, however, that individual programs are continuing to be implemented by such companies as ATK Thiokol (disposal of SS-N-20 SLBMs), and Fluor Corporation (construction of a heat and power plant in Zheleznogorsk). However, the goal of this study does not include a more detailed consideration of activities by these companies.

A significant amount of attention has been spent analyzing activity by participants of the Integrating Contract, based on the following criteria: the main projects implemented, interaction with government agencies and other companies, problematic issues and their solutions, and the results of activity. Initially, we will consider the main projects on which the above companies have worked.

Bechtel

Bechtel was founded in 1898, and has become one of the leading American com-
panies in the field of high-tech design and construction. Bechtel has approximately 47,000 employees, and currently manages about 900 projects in more than 60 countries around the world. The annual turnover of company orders amounts to an average volume of $14.2 billion.26

As one of the leading companies offering project management and integration services, Bechtel has been implementing programs in the former USSR as a contractor of the US DoD's DTRA for more than ten years. More than eleven projects worth more than $1 billion have been implemented with Bechtel's participation.27 In the former Soviet republics, Bechtel coordinated work on the elimination of SS-19 and SS-24 missile launch silos and related infrastructure (Ukraine), and a project to prevent the proliferation of biological weapons (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan). In the Russian Federation, Bechtel has faced a broader range of tasks, and work has continued in several different areas.

Bechtel's first experience of work in CTR programs in Russia involved the destruction of chemical weapons. In May 1994, the US DoD's DTRA allocated $7.4 million for the development of a Comprehensive Implementation Plan for destruction of Russian chemical munitions.28 Within the framework of this document, the company worked with a number of Russian Scientific Research Institutions (NII) to compile a plan for the construction of a chemical weapons elimination facility (in which the approximate cost of construction, the ecological safety level of the facility, aspects of construction, etc. were determined) and chose a site for the facility in the vicinity of the town of Shchuchye, in Kurgan Oblast.29 In December 1996 a contract for future work—specifically for the construction of the facility—went to Parsons.30 In subsequent years, Bechtel once again became active in this area. Unlike other projects in Shchuchye since 2002,31 the company remains the general contractor of the Government of Great Britain, which provides aid to Russia for the destruction of chemical weapons stockpiles on the basis of a bilateral agreement32 and plans to allocate another $8 million for this purpose.33 It should be noted that Bechtel currently coordinates the supply of equipment (transformers, switching equipment and control systems) for the construction of substations to provide electricity to the facility at Shchuchye.34 The project is planned to last 18 months. In addition, for various objective reasons (frequently due to the absence of bilateral agreements), the Government of Great Britain directs funds from the European Union (which plans to allocate $2.5 million), from Norway ($2.5 million), and from the Czech Republic ($75,000).35 All of these funds will pass through Bechtel. The construction of the substation itself will be conducted by Russian subcontractors. On November 19, 2003, Canada and Great Britain signed a Memorandum of Understanding in Moscow, under which Canada will allocate $25 million to lay an 18-kilometer railroad branch line to transport munitions to the disposal facility at Shchuchye.36 Projects connected with the construction of the chemical weapons destruction facility at Shchuchye are currently among the most promising in the Global Partnership program, and Bechtel's participation in the this area may become even more active in future.

Another example of close cooperation between Integrating Contract participants is a project to decommission SS-25 missile systems. Here we can see active cooperation between the Washington Group (construction of a storage facility and a solid-fuel missile motor elimination facility), Raytheon (modernization of an ICBM disposal facility in Votkinsk and the disposal of missile launchers in Pibanshur) and, again, Bechtel (ensuring the safe decommissioning of 2 regiments near Novosibirsk and Nizhniy Tagil).

As regards the biological security project, in current conditions this is an extremely timely and relevant issue.37 This program is set to run for five years, and its main goal is the reinforcement of measures of physical protection for facilities where research is conducted into the development of biological weapons. As one of the company's specialists described the project, “we are replacing a wooden door with a steel one.” Bechtel is implementing the first stage of activity in the Russian Federation (September 2003-September 2004). This includes: enhancing the degree of security and protection of facilities (the State
### Table 2. Projects coordinated by Bechtel

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Project name</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Task</th>
<th>Contract sum</th>
<th>Schedule</th>
<th>Result</th>
<th>Agency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elimination of strategic offensive arms</td>
<td>Facility for the disposal of 916 solid-fuel missile motors and 316 SS-24, SS-25 and SS-N-20 ICBM containers</td>
<td>Volgograd</td>
<td>1. Planning and testing</td>
<td>$235 mln.;</td>
<td>2002-2006</td>
<td>Planning and testing completed</td>
<td>US DoD, RASA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2. Assembly work</td>
<td>$95.6 mln. already invested</td>
<td></td>
<td>Project closed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3. Disposal of 365 SS-25 ICBMs at 9 missiles bases</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5. Construction of repository for 400 tons of plutonium (25,000 containers), and fissile materials</td>
<td>$413 mln.</td>
<td>1996-2003</td>
<td>Facility opened in December 2003</td>
<td>US DoD, Minatom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6. Destruction of chemical weapons</td>
<td>$7.4 mln.</td>
<td>1994-1996</td>
<td>Plan prepared, further work now implemented by Parsons</td>
<td>US DoD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>7. Construction of substation to supply power to facility, supply of equipment for substation</td>
<td>$9 mln.</td>
<td>2002-2004</td>
<td>GB MoD, Russian Munitions Agency</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>8. Biological security</td>
<td></td>
<td>2003-2004</td>
<td>Meetings and consultations conducted with scientists at leading NIs</td>
<td>US DoD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>9. Enhancement of security at RF nuclear facilities</td>
<td>$14 mln.</td>
<td>1997-2004</td>
<td>The Center at Sergiyev Posad was opened in 1999. The project will be mostly completed by February 2004</td>
<td>US DoD</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Research Center for Applied Microbiology (Obolensk), the All Russian Institute of Biology and Technology, Vektor (Novosibirsk), Scientific Research Institutes (NIIs) in Moscow, Goltytsino and Pokrov) by conducting consultations, drawing the attention of scientists to the problems of nonproliferation of WMD, increasing their level of employment and involving them in various joint projects. A contract for executing the next stage in Russia has been won by Raytheon. Bechtel will participate more actively in implementing these programs in other CIS countries.

The company received a contract for the elimination of buildings at a microbiology institute in Stepnogorsk (Kazakhstan), where work was once conducted on creating weaponized viruses. It is planned that work on this project will be conducted jointly with Raytheon, which will provide services for the transportation of equipment and other necessary materials.

The commitments which Russia accepted under the START treaty in the early 1990s required the rapid creation of an infrastructure for the safe decommissioning of missile systems, including infrastructure for the storage of fissile material extracted from missile warheads. This was the objective behind plans to construct a fissile material storage facility. The decision was made to build such a repository at PO Mayak in Chelyabinsk-65 (now Ozersk). The first stage of construction—laying a foundation—was executed using Russian funds between the fall of 1994 and the fall of 1996. Then, in March 1996, DTRA chose Bechtel to be the general contractor. Bechtel coordinated the second stage of construction: the erection of the first (fall 1996-fall 2000) and second wings (fall 2000-winter 2003). In December 2003, the repository was commissioned, according to official statements, “with a high level of preparedness.” It was designed to hold 400 tons of plutonium (25,000 containers), with a storage period of at least 100 years. According to experts, the repository is capable of withstanding an earthquake measuring eight points on the Richter scale.38

Another significant project was the construction of a training base for the RF MoD’s 12th Main Directorate at Sergiyev Posad. It was commissioned in 1999, and functions to this day.

Washington Group International

The Washington Group (Morrison Knudsen) was founded in 1964. Currently, it is one of the leading US companies in the field of high-tech construction and project management, and operates in more than 30 countries, with 27,000 employees. In 2002, the annual income of the Washington Group was on the order of $3 billion, while in 2003 it signed contracts worth $3.318 billion.39

The Washington Group (then known as Morrison Knudsen) gained its main area of expertise—the disposal of ICBMs—in Ukraine. The company won its first contract in September 1994, when it became a DTRA general contractor conducting work on the disposal of 111 liquid-fuel SS-19 missiles (disposal of first and second stage fuel tanks, missile motors, transportation containers, etc.). Then Washington Group signed several more contracts, specifically: in September 1997, for the preparation of a facility designed for the disposal of SS-24 solid-fuel missiles and the construction of storage facilities for these missiles (Pavlograd, Pervomaysk, Mikhaylenki); in March 1999, for the disposal of 7 SS-24 (completed in October of 1999); in September of 1999, for the disposal 46 SS-24 silo-launched missiles (completed in December 2002); in June 2000, for the supply of equipment for a facility extracting solid fuel using “wash-out” technology in Pavlograd (currently in progress).40

The company won its first tenders in the Russian Federation at the end of 2002 (the construction of storage facilities for SS-24 ICBMs in Surovatikha and Gremschinsky).41 Currently the facilities have been commissioned. Since September 2002, Washington Group has been involved in coordinating work on the destruction of rail-mobile missile launchers for SS-24 missiles.42

In addition this company, together with Bechtel and Raytheon, became a participant in a large-scale project for the disposal of SS-25 missile systems. Washington Group is coordinating the construction of

### Projects coordinated by Washington Group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Project name</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Task</th>
<th>Contract sum</th>
<th>Schedule</th>
<th>Result</th>
<th>Agency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strategic offensive arms elimination</td>
<td>Destruction of solid-fuel SS-24 ICBMs and mobile</td>
<td>Perm</td>
<td>Disposal of SS-24 rail-mobile missile</td>
<td>$80 mln.</td>
<td>Sept. 02-Apr. 08</td>
<td>no data available</td>
<td>US DoD, RASA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>launchers</td>
<td></td>
<td>system</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gremyachinsk</td>
<td></td>
<td>Design of additional storage facilities</td>
<td>$1 mln.</td>
<td>Jan. 03-July 03</td>
<td>completed</td>
<td>US DoD, RASA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>for SS-24 ICBMs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Surovatikhha</td>
<td></td>
<td>Construction of storage facility for SS-</td>
<td>$4.8 mln.</td>
<td></td>
<td>completed</td>
<td>US DoD, RASA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>24 ICBMs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Destruction of solid-fuel SS-25 ICBMs and mobile</td>
<td>Perm</td>
<td>Construction of storage facility for 144</td>
<td>$30 mln.</td>
<td>Oct. 03-Dec. 04</td>
<td>no data available</td>
<td>US DoD, RASA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>launchers</td>
<td></td>
<td>SS-25 ICBMs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Destruction of 24 SS-N-23 SSBNs</td>
<td>Kirov</td>
<td>Design of storage facility for SS-25</td>
<td>$3 mln.</td>
<td>Sept. 02-Dec. 03</td>
<td>completed</td>
<td>US DoD, RASA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>ICBMs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Closure of 2 plutonium-producing reactors</td>
<td>Kemerovo</td>
<td>Modernization plan for solid-fuel missile elimination facility</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Construction of facility for the destruction of</td>
<td>Krasnoyarsk</td>
<td>Safe transportation to disposal area</td>
<td>$4 mln.</td>
<td>March 03-March 04</td>
<td>no data available</td>
<td>US DoD, RASA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>chemical weapons stockpiles</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shutting down production of weapons-grade</td>
<td>Seversk</td>
<td>Construction of replacement facilities</td>
<td>$230 mln.</td>
<td>Aug. 03-Apr. 08</td>
<td>no data available</td>
<td>US DoE, RASA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>plutonium</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Disposal of chemical weapons</td>
<td>Shchuchye</td>
<td>Facility construction</td>
<td>$6 mln.</td>
<td>From Oct. 97 to 08</td>
<td>no data available</td>
<td>US DoD, Russian Munitions Agency</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ICBM storage facilities in Perm and Kirov, and the modernization of a solid-fuel missile motor elimination facility. It is important to note that Washington Group is the only company of the “five” that possesses the unique experience of building ICBM storage facilities. Washington Group is also participating in a project for the disposal of the SS-N-23 liquid fuel SLBM. Under this project, the company provides transportation of missiles from Severodvinsk to a plant in Krasnoyarsk for disposal.

The experience of Washington Group, accumulated during work on the disposal of chemical weapons in the US, could not fail to be of use in Russia. In this connection, the company has become a contractor for Parsons in Shchuchye. Here, Washington Group supervises building construction at the facility, while Parsons is involved in the general coordination of the project. This is the only example of Washington Group receiving a contract from another DTRA general contractor.

The company's largest project is the creation of replacement power production facilities in the town of Seversk, in Tomsk Oblast. The implementation of this program was the result of bilateral agreements, reached between the governments of the United States and Russia in Vienna, Austria, pertaining to the implementation of the Elimination of Weapons-Grade Plutonium Program (EWGPP). Under this project, the three remaining plutonium production reactors are to be decommissioned: two in Seversk and one in Zheleznogorsk. The total volume of the contract is estimated at $466 million. Since May 2003, Washington Group—along with Raytheon—has been the general contractor of the US Department of Energy for the implementation of this project.

However, no final assessment of the project cost has been made. Each company is expected to receive approximately 50% of the total contract sum. As the above reactors provide electricity to the surrounding areas, the main task is to assemble a parallel electrical power supply system, prior to plant closure. For this purpose, works are planned to create a replacement facility (a fossil-fuel heat and power plant). Washington Group will supervise work at the facility in Seversk, and Raytheon in Zheleznogorsk. In Seversk an existing, fossil-fuel facility will be modernized. It is expected that after the corresponding contracts are signed with the company Rosatomstroy, work will be conducted until 2008, after which the reactors will be closed. Major operations at the Seversk facility will include restoration or replacement of existing coal-fired boiler units, supply of one new high-pressure, coal-fired boiler unit, replacement of generator units, completion of construction of a fuel-supply system, restoration of an industrial heating system and auxiliary systems. Once the replacement facility starts operating at full capacity, the plutonium reactors will be decommissioned. At the current time, the project is one of the largest in the entire Joint Threat Reduction program, both by volume of financing and by the volume of work conducted.

Kellogg, Brown and Root
(a Halliburton subsidiary)

Halliburton is one of the most established companies in the US hydrocarbons indus-

Fig. 4. The ratio of Washington Group contracts, received from the Departments of Energy and Defense, in millions

It has a payroll of 96,000 employees in more than 20 countries across the globe. The company's income in 2002 amounted to $12.75 billion. Kellogg, Brown and Root, as a subsidiary of Halliburton, coordinates defense projects, including, in 1995, work under the Joint Threat Reduction program, such as projects to dispose of SS-17, SS-18 and SS-19 liquid-fuel ICBMs, silo missile launchers and 30,000 tons of missile fuel. Initially, the company worked in Kazakhstan (land rehabilitation), a project which it completed in 1999.

Despite being one of DTRA's five general contractors, KBR nevertheless operates in Russia under two independent contracts (implementation schedule: 2000-2009). However, these are implemented in compliance with traditional DTRA practices (Federal Acquisition Regulations). Under these contracts, the company coordinates the disposal of SS-17 and SS-18 missile systems: both the actual ICBMs and their silo launchers.

The total cost of the projects is approximately $300 million. As of December 2003, 48 silos have been disassembled, and land rehabilitation has been completed on the territory of 30 of these, while 81 SS-17 and SS-18 ICBMs have been eliminated. The disposal of ICBMs took place at facilities in the town of Aleyks (Altay Kray) and Kartaly (Chelyabinsk Oblast). In future, the company plans to commence disposal of ICBMs at facilities in Dombarovskiy (Chelyabinsk Oblast) and the town of Uzhur (Krasnoyarskiy Krai).

**Parsons**

Since it was founded in 1944, Parsons has become one of the leading US companies in the field of infrastructure creation, supply of transportation services, high-technology, telecommunications, aviation, commerce, ecology, planning, industrial production, pharmaceuticals and implementation of domestic security projects. The company's annual income in 2002 amounted to $2.4 billion, and the company has a staff of 9,100 employees. Parsons' clients are US departments and agencies, as well as private companies. For example, since 1986, the company has been a contractor for the US Department of Defense, under the Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program.

Parsons became a participant in the CTR program in 1996, by winning a tender for the construction of a facility to destroy stockpiles of chemical weapons (CW), such as Vx, sarin and soman, at Shchuchye. This will be the first major facility CW stockpile destruction facility to use chemical neutralization. The first stage of work (design and licensing) was conducted by Bechtel. The contract sum for Parsons was $888 million, with an implementation deadline of 2008. Parsons' duties include: coordination of the project, enhancement of programs to test agent processing equipment, and enhancement of the treatment process itself, as well as supplies and provisions, managing construction, training, launching the facility and providing consultations during its operation.

The facility is scheduled for use starting in 2006, and in the first year of operation, the destruction of 1,700,000 tons of CW in military shells is planned, followed by 4,500,000 tons of aircraft munitions in 2007. In total, the facility at Shchuchye is expected to destroy up to 30% of all Russian CW stockpiles. Parsons will also modernize security systems at chemical weapons storage facilities in Planovoye and Kizner.

Parsons won a contract for the disposal of SS-N-20 solid-fuel SLBMs. This is a unique project; the company controls the entire work cycle for the disposal of SLBMs, from transportation to disposal.
facilities, and ending with the destruction of missile engines. Ten missiles of this class were destroyed before July 2001. In September 2002, Parsons received a contract, under which it was to provide transportation, disassembly and disposal of another 40 SS-N-20 SLBMs. The contract sum amounted to $24 million, and the project is to be completed by 2006. As of December 2003, seven SS-N-20 units have been eliminated.

Parsons provides the secure transportation of missiles in special isothermal containers from Nenoksa in Arkhangelsk Oblast to Zlatoust in Chelyabinsk Oblast (Zlatoust Machinery Plant (ZMZ)), where SLBMs are disassembled into seven major components. The plant is capable of disassembling no more than ten missiles annually. The stages, containing missile engines and solid missile fuel, are then transported to Altay, a Federal Scientific and Production Center (FNPT) in Biysk, where they are mounted on a burn stand and subjected to burn-out.

Raytheon Technical Services

Raytheon Technical Services (2002 income: $2.1 billion) is a subsidiary of Raytheon (2002 income: $16.8 billion). The company employs a staff of around 15,000 employees. The first contract in the field of nonproliferation was won by Raytheon in 1988. The company is now one of the five DTRA general contractors and, together with Washington Group, is a DoE contractor. For a significant period of time, Raytheon has been recognized as a world leader in the field of providing logistics services, and for this reason the company's key role under the Integrating Contract consists in the provision of all forms of transportation and shipping.

On the territories of Ukraine and Kazakhstan, Raytheon provided logistics services as a participant in the implementation of the following projects: the disposal of SS-18, SS-19 and SS-24 missiles; silo launchers; Tu-22, Tu-95 and Tu-160 strategic bombers; and prevention of biological weapons proliferation. In addition, Raytheon had a presence in Belarus, although all projects on Belarus territory have ceased following complications in relations with the United States.

Under the Elimination of Weapons-Grade Plutonium Program, alongside Washington Group (which coordinates the project to

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Project name</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Task</th>
<th>Contract sum</th>
<th>Schedule</th>
<th>Result</th>
<th>Agency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strategic offensive arms elimination</td>
<td>Destruction of solid-fuel SLBMs and mobile launchers</td>
<td>Biysk, Nenoksa, Zlatoust</td>
<td>Disposal of SS-N-20 SLBMs</td>
<td>$24 mln.</td>
<td>2001-2006</td>
<td>no data available</td>
<td>US DoD, RASA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Destruction of chemical weapons</td>
<td>CW stockpile disposal facility</td>
<td>Shchuchye</td>
<td>Construction of CW stockpile disposal facility</td>
<td>$888 mln.</td>
<td>1996-2008</td>
<td>no data available</td>
<td>US DoD, Rosboyepri-pasy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Projects coordinated by Raytheon Technical Services

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Project name</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Task</th>
<th>Contract sum</th>
<th>Schedule</th>
<th>Result</th>
<th>Agency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strategic offensive arms elimination</td>
<td>Destruction of solid-fuel SS-25 ICBMs and mobile launchers</td>
<td>Votkinsk</td>
<td>Modernization of solid-fuel missile motor elimination facility</td>
<td>$5 mln.</td>
<td>Feb. 03-Dec. 04</td>
<td>Work is not being conducted</td>
<td>US DoD, RASA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Piban’shur</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Destruction of solid-fuel SS-24 ICBMs and mobile launchers</td>
<td>Zheleznogorsk</td>
<td>Destruction of mobile launchers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Servicing of railroad cars for transportation of ICBMs</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sept. 02-Dec. 03</td>
<td>no data available</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Supply of equipment</td>
<td></td>
<td>Supply of bulldozers, fire trucks and fire-fighting equipment</td>
<td>$15 mln.</td>
<td>no data available</td>
<td>no data available</td>
<td>US DoD, RF Ministry of Defense</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
build a fossil-fuel heat and power plant in Seversk, Tomsk Oblast), Raytheon has won a tender to construct a fossil-fuel heat and power plant in Zheleznogorsk, Krasnoyarsk Kray. By agreement between the Departments of Defense and Energy, funds are directed from the US DoE, via DTRA. The total contract sum amounts to $466 million. Raytheon will receive approximately 50% of this.

The plant will supply electrical power and heat to the town of Zheleznogorsk and surrounding areas. Work will include the installation of an additional boiler unit, a steam turbine, heating boilers and other auxiliary units. Currently, work is underway on the first stage: approval of the construction plan and the design of the facility. Construction will begin in the second stage. Implementation of the project will take a total of about eight years (until 2011).

Because Raytheon does not possess experience building such facilities, a contract has been signed with the construction company Fluor Corporation. Fluor will coordinate the erection of the facility and all connected technical aspects, while Raytheon will provide cooperation with the US Government and use contacts acquired over many years of work in the former Soviet Union. The final contract sum for Fluor has not yet been determined.

In September 2003 Washington Group and Raytheon completed negotiations with the Russian investment and construction company Rosatomstroy on preliminary designs for the modernization and construction of fossil-fuel power plants. When these plants come on-line, it will be possible to shut down the plutonium reactors.

In September 2002, Raytheon won a contract to service special railroad cars for the secure transportation of solid-fuel SS-24 ICBMs to the disposal site. The company is also involved in such projects as the modernization of a solid-fuel missile motor elimination facility in Votkinsk, the destruction of mobile launchers at Pibanshur as part of an SS-25 ICBM elimination project, and the supply of equipment for the needs of the RF Ministry of Defense (bulldozers, fire trucks and fire-fighting equipment).

**Subcontractor organizations**

The companies would not have been able to implement projects without close cooperation with both Russian and American subcontractor organizations. For this reason, it is necessary to consider this issue in greater detail. All Integrating Contract participants maintain a policy of careful selection of subcontractors, based on the Technical Qualifications Program, in compliance with which the capabilities, experience and competence of subcontractor companies are verified. All candidates have to be licensed by the responsible Russian agency. In projects connected with the disposal of chemical weapons, the relevant agency is Rosboyepripasy (the Russian Munitions Agency, or RMA); issues relating to the strategic offensive arms elimination are handled by the Russian Aviation and Space Agency (RASA); projects involving the shutdown of weapons-grade plutonium production fall under the jurisdiction of the Ministry for Atomic Energy (Minatom).

The experience of American companies has shown that all Russian subcontractors are, as a rule, elements of the Russian military-industrial complex: scientific research institutes and design bureaus (such as Makeyev Design Bureau and FNPT Altay), arms manufacture plants (Zlatoust Machinery Plant, Krasnoyarsk Plant, Votkinsk Plant, etc.), as well as private organizations that originated in Minoboronprom, the Ministry of the Defense Industry, and the Rosobshyemash group, consisting of Askond, Ista, Promtekon, Promtekhsbopsosnast, SMM, and others.

In certain individual projects, subcontractor organizations may include American companies such as Fluor Corporation (construction of a heat and power plant at Zheleznogorsk), ATK Thiokol and Los Alamos Technology Associates (LATA) (consultations in the field of security, licensing and ecology) or Washington Group (construction of facility at Shchuchye).

The selected subcontractor organization may, in turn, hire the immediate project executors, as a rule from local companies near the site, involved in construction and possessing the necessary capabilities to undertake complex technological processes.
Financing of contractor and subcontractor organizations by the American party is implemented based on the actual expenditure for works conducted.

Cooperation between American contractors and Russian subcontractor organizations has come to involve a practice which is fairly atypical for business in the United States, that of making what the Russians refer to as proplata payments. This means that Integrating Contract participants sometimes have to make advance payments of certain sums to Russian subcontractors, for the execution of initial stages of work, while American companies are used to effecting payment based on the actual costs of the execution of the work.

**Problematic issues**

The unique character of the area of cooperation is, in itself, grounds for a series of problematic issues. The implementation of CTR programs has become—for both the Russian and American participants—something of a school, in which the two sides have needed, and still need, to learn from each other, overcome various difficulties and find compromises even in the most complex situations. As a result, the general contractors and Russian ministries and agencies have managed to accumulate invaluable experience of interaction during the past decade of activity. Of course, this process has not been easy; the American partners have had to become accustomed to the peculiarities of the Russian market, while the Russian partners have had to learn about the work methods of American subcontractor companies. In order to assess the activity of companies more objectively, it is important to identify the main problem issues, which the two sides have encountered during work in the Russian Federation. These are on the whole typical for companies in the “five,” and they include:

- The problem of access, by company representatives, to facilities.
- The problem of taxation of assistance provided.
- The problem of licensing Russian subcontractors.

We will consider each of these in more detail. Access to secure facilities is one of the hardest issues to resolve, for obvious reasons. Representatives of American companies, as coordinators of any given project, need to monitor the progress of work in real time, observe their schedule, the expenditure of funds, etc. According to the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR), the DTRA or other agency does not have the right to pay for work, if it is unable to verify that such work has been conducted. In the Russian Federation, rules governing access to such sites are listed in the State Secrecy Law, and in special intradepartmental codes. For this reason, the following system was developed for obtaining clearance for access to facilities: the subcontractor organization submits, no later than one month prior to a visit to a site, lists of representatives of the American company to the RF FSB (Federal Security Service), where they are studied, approved and returned to the representatives of the subcontractor organization, who in turn submit the approved lists to the General Headquarters of the relevant armed force, depending on the type of project.

For self-evident reasons, this procedure is fairly protracted. This, in turn, is the cause of various differences between the Russian and American partners. The position of the United States was clearly expressed by Linton Brooks, director of the National Nuclear Security Administration at the US DoE, when he noted that, in his opinion, the Russian Federal authorities sometimes “give greater emphasis to denying access in the name of security than to facilitating access in the name of cooperation.” Meanwhile, the position of the Russian Federation was no less clearly explained by the deputy minister for atomic energy, Sergey Antipov, when he noted that “virtually all the necessary issues have been resolved, so work can go ahead, and those who have a desire to work are using what there is as a foundation, and are fully satisfied.”

Washington Group chose a different method of resolving this problem. The company has a practice of hiring independent Russian engineering companies, so-called “trusted agents,” that control the execution of work, the expenditure of funds, and the observation of the schedule. To
some degree, this system removes the need for frequent visits to secure facilities by representatives of American companies.

The next, and no less difficult, issue is that of taxation. Article 10 of the 1992 Agreement Concerning the Safe Transportation, Storage and Destruction of Weapons and the Prevention of Weapons Proliferation clearly states that employees of US agencies and the personnel of subcontractors are exempt from the payment of any taxes and dues in the Russian Federation, and the equipment imported is not subject to any duty.\(^2\) Technical assistance is exempted from customs excise and VAT using a complex system, including the consideration of each individual application submitted to the Ministry for the Economy (now the Ministry for Trade and Economic Development) and documents are then considered by the State Customs Committee, given a positive decision by the Ministry for the Economy. Of course, supplies of equipment and services provided within the framework of cooperation programs have not in practice passed through this complex system, and were imported into the Russian Federation without payment of VAT and other taxes and dues, but such a practice was not reinforced by any codes in domestic legislation, which gave opponents of concessions grounds for criticism.\(^2\) On May 4, 1999, the Russian President signed the Federal Law on Uncompensated Aid (Assistance) to the Russian Federation Regarding Taxes and Amendments and Additions to Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation on Taxes and the Establishment of Concessions on Payments to State Budgetary Funds In Connection with the Execution of Uncompensated Aid (Assistance) to the Russian Federation, in which aid is exempted from:

- Profit tax for enterprises and organizations;
- VAT;
- Property tax for enterprises;
- Personal income tax;
- Road tax;
- Customs tariffs;
- Insurance contributions to the RF Pensions Fund, the RF Social Insurance Fund, the RF State Public Employment Fund and mandatory medical insurance funds.\(^4\)

In addition, a mechanism was stipulated, by which aid programs are registered with the RF Government. Based on this registration, the consulate of the country providing aid issues a certificate confirming that certain goods or services are a part of technical aid. This certificate is the main document for providing the above concessions. However, some unresolved nuances remain to this day.

In the opinion of some American partners, they encounter some difficulties as a result of the procedure for licensing subcontractor organizations in the appropriate Russian agency. Without a doubt, the requirement of obtaining a license for organizations functioning at a defense facility is justified. In addition, this practice is also typical for the United States. However, in the US, licenses are only required by those companies which, in the course of their operations, come into contact with sensitive materials or classified information, as it is thought that this allows projects to be conducted more effectively.

Speaking of problematic issues, there are a number of issues which, though not systemic in character, deserve attention. One illustrative situation is that which has developed around the construction, by Bechtel, of a closed solid-fuel missile engine elimination facility at Votkinsk. After Bechtel received the contract for the construction of the facility and began the practical implementation of the project, certain insurmountable complications arose. The federal authorities (in the form of Rosaviakosmos) were unable to reach agreement with the local authorities to allocate land to build the facility, which had then already passed the planning and technical design stage, as well as State Environmental Review by Russia's State Environmental Committee (the results were recorded in report #170, dated March 21, 2000), and a list of special expert reviews stipulated by RF legislation.\(^5\) However, a Green movement which became more intense in the beginning of 2002 and the forthcoming elections did not allow local
authorities to reach a compromise with RASA. As a result, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency decided to halt the implementation of the project in the fall of 2002, after investing $81 million in planning and $14.6 million in repairs to approach routes, a gas pipeline and storage facilities. In the spring of 2003, work began here on modernizing open stands, but this contract had been won by Raytheon.

Another example of atypical complications was the project to create mobile oxidizer processing systems. After the commencement of work, Bechtel closed the program with the mutual consent of the DTRA and RASA, when Russia began to use heptyl (liquid missile fuel) for peaceful launches. For this reason, it was decided to cancel the processing of fuel oxidant.

The fate of the project at Shchuchye also remains unresolved. Recently, the American mass media have begun to carry statements about a possible shutdown of the project. In the last report of the US DoD, in January 2004, one highly-placed Pentagon official expressed doubts that Russia would utilize the facility at Shchuchye to its full capacity, and indicated that the facility may be relocated to another area, or even closed, in compliance with RF environmental legislation.

Conclusions and prospects

As Sergey Antipov noted in his presentation to a conference of the PIR Center Club, “The greatest assistance in the past ten years in the field of WMD stockpile disposal has been delivered to us by the United States under the CTR program.” Between 1992 and 2003, 6,212 warheads have been decommissioned under this program (the warheads themselves have been eliminated, and the fissile materials sent for storage) and assistance has been provided in the destruction of 520 ICBMs, 451 launchers, 122 heavy bombers, 624 launch vehicles, 424 SLBMs, 27 SSNs and 194 test site tunnels. All of this helped Russia to fulfill its obligations under the START treaty (see fig. 6).

To be fair, it must also be noted that Russia is itself capable of independently eliminating its WMD stockpiles. However, the time that would be required is unknown, and would surely be incomparably greater. Considering the type of material to be eliminated, the environmental situation, the threat of proliferation of nuclear materials (especially given conditions of more frequent terrorist activity), it becomes clear that these programs must be implemented as soon as possible. Unfortunately, this is only possible with foreign aid.

The success of the program of assistance to Russia for the disposal of WMD and means of their delivery provided by the US Departments of Defense and Energy would be impossible without the active participation of American business. It should not be forgotten that 84% of the expenditures to assist Russia have been made not through direct financing but by attracting American companies that receive contracts to realize concrete projects in Russia.

**Fig. 6. Number of warheads and carriers (SLBM+ICBM) in Russia and the United States.**

![Graph showing number of warheads and carriers (SLBM+ICBM) in Russia and the United States.](image)
If we consider each individual company separately, the following aspects can be highlighted:

1. As can be seen in Figure 7, the largest contracts were won by Parsons and Bechtel. The primary reason for this is the fact that the two companies have been working on the Russian market since the mid-1990s: Bechtel since 1994 and Parsons since 1996. The latter is implementing one of the largest and most long-term of all projects: the construction of a CW disposal facility at Shchuchye. Meanwhile, Bechtel is the most diverse company, involved in the greatest number of projects.

2. In addition, years of work in the Russian Federation have exposed areas, in which each of the participants in the Integrating Contract possesses unique experience. For Washington Group, this means construction of infrastructure (storage facilities, repair of approach routes); for Parsons: disposal of chemical weapons and the full work cycle for the disposal of SLBMs; for Raytheon: logistics; for KBR: elimination of silo launchers and land rehabilitation; and for Bechtel: construction of a fissile material repository.

3. It is important to note that the companies have shown a fairly high level of cooperation with each other. Clear examples of this are the construction of the facility at Shchuchye (Bechtel, Washington Group and Parsons) and the disposal of SS-25 missile systems (Bechtel, Washington Group and Raytheon).

4. There is a tendency for Integrating Contract participants to be hired by the governments of other countries, as can be seen from the example of Bechtel and the Government of Great Britain.

5. Moreover, several companies, including Washington Group, intend to capture the Russian market, which is demonstrated by numerous projects not connected with the Nunn-Lugar program (for example, development of the Sakhalin shelf).

It seems fair to say that projects linked to the Global Partnership are of interest to Integrating Contract participants from an economic point of view, and even from a certain political point of view. In the near future, even if none of these companies wins a new contract, they will continue to operate in Russia: Raytheon until 2011, Parsons until 2008, Kellogg, Brown and Root until 2009, Washington Group until 2008, and Bechtel until 2011.

Any possible complications in their path are more likely to be technical, than political. As regards Russia, it is evident why such cooperation is a necessity. Nevertheless, one cannot rule out the possibility of new situations, similar to those that arose with the construction of the closed solid-fuel missile engine elimination facility or the design of mobile oxidizer processing systems (MOPS) for missile fuel oxidant. If this happens, the prospects for future cooperation may be threatened.

It would appear that the fate of the Cooperative Threat Reduction program depends mainly on the development of a dialog between Russia and the United

Fig. 7. Distribution of contracts between the five IC companies, in millions.
States in the field of nonproliferation (including issues of counterproliferation), as well as the domestic political situation in the United States. An illustrative example of this was the cessation of work at the facility in Shchuchye, when in November 2002 Congress blocked financing of assistance to Russia for the disposal of chemical weapons stockpiles. Another example is the attempt by Senators John McCain and Joe Lieberman in the fall of 2003 to introduce sanctions against Russia in response to some of Russia’s domestic policy activities. This trend reached a peak in November 2003, when the dissatisfaction of individual congressmen combined with an Anti-Russian campaign in the US mass media to throw into doubt the subsequent development of CTR projects in Russia, especially the project at Shchuchye. However, these trends failed to become a determining factor, and Congress approved the request of the presidential administration for 2004, allocating $450.8 million, including $200.3 million for the destruction of chemical weapons.

In summarizing the above, it should be once more emphasized that the participation of Russian companies in the implementation of CTR and GP programs will continue for the next few years. The level of intensity of such participation currently depends on the overall development of bilateral relations between the United States and the Russian Federation.

1 The author wishes to thank Tom Deters, Daniil Kobyakov and Anton Khlopkov for their assistance.
2 The CTR program, also known as the Nunn-Lugar program (after its creators, Senators Richard G. Lugar and Sam Nunn), has been conducted since 1993. The program’s chief goal is providing assistance to Russia for the elimination, safe transportation and storage of WMD. To this day, this is the most large-scale and multilateral of all such programs.
3 Under the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, signed in June of 2002 in Kananaikas (Canada), the G8 countries agreed to allocate 20 billion USD in aid to Russia, for the disposal of WMD stockpiles. Subsequently, the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program became the core element in the Global Partnership program, in which the US undoubtedly holds and will continue to hold the key positions. This work will mainly focus on CTR programs, as US companies have for more than ten years been working under contracts from the US Government, specifically under US aid programs.
4 Natalya Kalinina. “The Effectiveness of the Chemical Weapons Convention Depends on Actions Taken by Russia,” Yaderny Kontrol No. 1, winter 2003, pp. 89-123.
7 State Secrecy Law (Federal Law # 131-FZ, dated 10/06/97)
84 This trend reached a peak in November 2003, when the dissatisfaction of individual congressmen combined with an Anti-Russian campaign in the US mass media to throw into doubt the subsequent development of CTR projects in Russia, especially the project at Shchuchye. However, these trends failed to become a determining factor, and Congress approved the request of the presidential administration for 2004, allocating $450.8 million, including $200.3 million for the destruction of chemical weapons. 86
bodies of executive authority;" the RF Ministry for the Economy was reorganized into the RF Ministry for Trade and Economic Development.


18 Specifically, the Department of Defense Appropriation Act for the US Department of Defense, and the Energy and Water Development Appropriations Act for the US Department of Energy; for more detail, see: www.thomas.gov.loc...

19 Specifically, the National Defense Authorization Act for the US Department of Defense, and the Department of Energy National Security Act for the US Department of Energy; for more detail, see www.thomas.gov.loc...


27 Bechtel National, Inc. Short company report.


34 Interview with Bechtel spokesmen, December 16, 2003.

35 The UK (which has donated Ј4.5m), Norway, the EU (each to the tune of some Ј1.5m), Canada and the Czech Republic (345,000) are jointly funding procurement of equipment for the electricity substation, http://news.mod.uk/news/press/news_press_notice.asp?news Item_id=2653.


37 Biological Weapons Proliferation Prevention Project. Fact Sheet 01_1026 11/01.


44 Ibid.


46 For more detail, see: Elimination of Weapons-Grade Plutonium Production Program (EWGPP), http://www.nnsa.doe.gov/na-20/ewgpp.shtml.


55 “Timeline of construction and operation of chemical weapons destruction facilities in the Russian Federation (with financial and technical aid provided by the USA),” http://www.munition.gov.ru/rus/schm3_1.html.


59 Ibid.

60 Ibid.

Fluor Corporation is a company which specializes in high-tech construction, including the construction of power supply facilities. Fluor has been operating in Russia and the Soviet Union since 1975, and currently coordinates such projects as the development of Sakhalin and Tengiz (Kazakhstan) oil fields. The company recently completed the construction of a 1,500-km oil pipeline in the Caspian region. http://www.flour.com/

Elimination of Sea-Launched Ballistic Missiles,

State Secrecy Law (Federal Law # 131-FZ, dated 10/06/97)
Brought into force by RF Supreme Court resolution # 5486-I, 5485-I on July 21, 1993.

Intradepartmental codes.


For more detail, see: “Fact Sheet: Liquid Propellant Disposition Project,” House Armed Services Committee. 2003, 4 March.


It seems that 2004 will be yet another year marked by close attention to the “perpetually incomplete” process of nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction and means of their delivery. It is also becoming obvious that the main focus will have to be on preventing terrorists from coming into contact with technologies suitable for creating weapons of mass destruction (WMD technology), even of the most primitive kind. Both of these problems are never-ending and, in fact, feed into one another.

The Results of 2003

The outcome of 2003 is ambiguous. On the one hand, there was the G8 leaders’ close cooperation on global nonproliferation and the success of the meeting in Evian, which confirmed and developed the principles of the Global Partnership on Nonproliferation, agreed to the previous year in Kananaskis. There were also the discussions and cooperation, of varying degrees of usefulness, during the course of dozens of multilateral meetings and bilateral working groups, which included special services. Non-governmental organizations were active participants in the process as well. And, finally, there was a certain strengthening of the national and international regimes that control the spread of WMD technologies, etc. On the other hand, there was the first out-and-out hot war under the pretext of disarmament and the destruction of WMD allegedly thoroughly hidden by Iraq, as a result of which the dictatorial regime of Saddam Hussein was overthrown. The dictator himself finally was caught, but Iraqi WMD has not yet been found (could any remain after the successful, multi-year activity of the United Nations Security Council’s special commission?) The country is occupied, the guerrilla warfare occurring there is presented as evidence of the subversive activity of foreign terrorists, and thus it appears that from the very beginning the enterprise was not about WMD. And then there are the acts of selective pressure, such as the threats of repeating the Iraq scenario in Syria, Iran, and, in particular, the DPRK – the leaders of which know well how to balance on the verge of conflict – and many other less significant situations. All of this has led to a serious overloading of the entire structure of international relations and to the appearance of a noticeable crack between countries previously quite united in the struggle against WMD proliferation. In our view, in many respects current difficulties in the sphere of nonproliferation also are connected to the fact that the traditional global agenda has reached something of a deadlock, and in a number of cases has fragmented, having concentrated on solutions that though useful, nevertheless concern fairly secondary matters.

Actually, for a long time the alarming trends that have been developing have kept the center of attention away from the most acute problems – the achievement of the universality of international treaties and agreements in the area of WMD, questions about the legality of the unilateral application of force and the role of the U.N., an updated approach to the concept of sovereignty, among others. In many situations the world has not noticed as the U.N. was somehow left on the sidelines, where it has begun to lose any influence it had on the behavior of some of its most influential members. All of this apparently disturbed U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan and the organization’s leadership long ago and finally led them to create an advisory group, consisting of experienced representatives of a number of leading countries, to seek responses to new and extraordinary threats and challenges in international relations. Annan put a number of key issues that have caused increasing concern before this group: how to best protect the global community from international terrorist attacks and stop WMD proliferation, including the
creation by extremist forces of ersatz military equipment based on WMD technologies, such as so-called “dirty bombs”?

The Legitimacy of the Application of Force

Under what circumstances, then, is the application of force possible and who must sanction it? Are there certain situations in which preventive war is justifiable? Is national sovereignty absolute and inviolable or should the understanding of this question evolve, and in that case how would the system of checks and balances look?3

Certainly, given the conflicts and events that are taking place today and the evolution of the international security situation, the U.N. should have had answers to these questions earlier, particularly after serious differences emerged between the approaches of the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, which is fundamentally responsible for maintaining peace in the world. Even in NATO, different points of view appeared among the allies, a fact that became one of the reasons compelling the United States to act practically alone in a number of cases. However, for a long time it has been axiomatic that global issues such as non-proliferation and terrorism can only be solved on the basis of consensus, and not by dashing off cavalierly and attacking in order, essentially, to intimidate the enemy. Certainly, it might be possible to frighten the crafty Mu‘ammar al-Qadhdhafi, who is pursuing his personal and family interests, but the rest will be more difficult “clients,” and for the near future we should forget about transparency in the actions of so-called proliferators in either the nuclear sphere or in their other activities.

In December 2001 the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty declared that in principle coercive action against another state may at times be necessary, but for this it is necessary to:

• establish clearer rules, procedures and definitions to determine if intervention is required at all and
• if so, how and when can it be justifiably put into practice.

Thus, both the commission and Annan do not exclude that in certain circumstances the use of force may have to be sanctioned by the U.N. – only decisions regarding procedures remain to be made. But this is where we encounter the objections of the United States and some of their nearest allies, who sympathize with the concept of counterproliferation, which stresses the unilateral application of coercive methods that Washington has been promoting for the past decade and a half. On the whole, the idea of “counterproliferation” is nothing new. Even during the presidency of George H. W. Bush, then-Secretary of Defense (and current vice president in the administration of George W. Bush) Dick Cheney, together with a number of other administration employees who have recently rise to positions of influence, drafted a document on this concept entitled “Defense Planning Guidance.” The Clinton era slowed development of the concept of counterproliferation somewhat, but it resumed when the earlier ideologists came to power under George W. Bush, and gathered further momentum when the “axis of evil” was proclaimed and military action was taken in Iraq in order to destroy Iraqi WMD.

What was new in the policy of our most important partner in guaranteeing global stability? The George W. Bush administration simply converted the tactic of preventive attack from one of a range of possible options into the basic principle of its foreign policy in one fell swoop. The entire world felt sympathy after the tragedy of September 11, 2001, and for the first time in 50 years a broad coalition for dealing with this monstrous evil – international terrorism in all its forms and manifestations – arose, that could, had it been sensibly and cooperatively used, over the course of time and within the framework of international law, have resulted in a decisive victory over international terrorism and the removal of many dangers in the sphere of WMD proliferation. But this, unfortunately, has been thus far impossible to achieve on a long-term basis.

There are many reasons for this: the complexity, and, unfortunately, the global community’s unpreparedness in many respects for the highly organized group of criminals and extremists that has challenged the world, the inadequacy of the legal basis for dealing with this phenomenon, and the hidden, and sometimes open, tendency to...
divide terrorists between “real” ones and so-called freedom fighters, and proliferators of WMD technologies between allies and those belonging to the “axis of evil,” etc.

Nevertheless the critical factor is something else: the United States feels that it is now so strong that it can solve its international security problems by whatever means it determines are best for it, and propose that the rest of the world join in U.S.-created coalitions on American terms. Some have done so, especially when this promises political and economic benefits.

As is well known, a concise official statement of the basic elements of the coercive component of counterproliferation can be found in the “National Security Strategy,” released in September 2002. Former Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Central Command (which in practice carries out military counterproliferation operations in the Middle East) Joseph Hoar said the following in this regard: “I think one of the mistakes associated with the articulation of the policy is the very fact that it was made a policy.” And further, “I am sometimes concerned that the neoconservatives in Washington are very quick to play the military card.”

Several Russian analysts go somewhat further, and assert that the present domination of the United States in questions of nonproliferation and combating terrorism, given its tendency toward unilateral coercive action, now presents an even greater threat than the colossal threat of terrorism. This, of course, is an emotional outburst, caused by the events in Iraq. True, in the activities of the current U.S. administration one sees a strange symbiosis of legitimate means and, let us say directly, methods and procedures that are doubtfull from the point of view of international law, while some far-reaching and mercenary purposes are distinctly visible. But at the same time there are many sufficiently sound judgments and proposals, including that “the risks of inaction are far greater than the risk of action.”

The combination of civilized and uncivilized foreign policies is characteristic of leading states in times of sharp international crisis. However, it is precisely at such times that the balancing role of the U.N. Security Council should manifest itself, brought forth through legal arguments and calls for morality, to intercept imperial ambitions. But it is absolutely clear that Russia cannot slide into hackneyed anti-Americanism and open confrontation with the United States. In the past few years we have improved bilateral relations considerably and are cooperating actively in the international arena. We cannot now walk away from this painlessly, particularly without first making sufficient use of the broad possibilities for limiting and neutralizing their “overextensions” in foreign and military policy.

The coming summit in Sea Island, Georgia, and preparations for the summit, especially, are just such opportunities. Certainly, in 2003 we saw many U.S. actions in the sphere of nonproliferation that caused serious concern and strengthened disagreements within the international anti-terrorist and anti-proliferation coalition.

Apart from the Iraqi action, which from the point of view of nonproliferation did not obtain any results that would justify it (the most recent media reports tell of the “quiet” departure of the 400 specialists sent to Iraq after the occupation with strict orders to find Iraq’s WMD, whatever it takes), there are several other events that caused global anxiety. First and foremost, there was the U.S. Senate’s repeal of the 1993 Spratt-Furse provision, which banned research and development (R&D) that could lead to U.S. production of new low-yield nuclear weapons. As yet there have been no additional decisions, but if any are made, the fate of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) will evidently have been decided in the negative, since there are those who would like to make use of such a U.S. decision, even some people quite near Washington. And this would be the largest of failures when it comes to strengthening the nonproliferation regime. Nor did the U.S. position with regards to the ratification of the verification protocol to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) hearten us.

The U.S. State Department’s chief spokesman on nonproliferation questions, John Bolton, has declared to “negotiators” that any legally binding inspection protocol to the BWC is unacceptable to Washington. And this would be the largest of failures when it comes to strengthening the nonproliferation regime. Nor did the U.S. position with regards to the ratification of the verification protocol to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) hearten us.

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their favorite “hobbyhorse” – monitoring and verification.

In May 2003, in the wake of euphoria after the comparatively easy victory over Saddam Hussein, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) was announced in Krakow. The very correct ideas regarding the need to prevent the transfer by sea and air of forbidden dual-use and WMD technologies and materials that the initiative contained alternated with claims of the United States’ “sovereign right” to decide when to intercept, inspect and confiscate the cargo of foreign states in international waters, without consulting any international bodies. Meanwhile, they cite a general statement made by the rotating chairman of the United Nations Security Council in January 1992, which has no legal force. The possibility of military actions by the United States and a small group of “initiative supporters,” among whom, surprising as it may be, one finds those who continue to speak out against the Iraqi action, has been negatively evaluated by many scholars of international law, including such authorities in the field of nonproliferation as Thomas Graham and Jonathan Granoff, who have noted that the initiative does not have proper legal force and a number of key elements completely contradict international maritime law as established by the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, which as a signatory the United States is obligated to protect and uphold.5

In our opinion, Washington has realized that with PSI they were “overextending” themselves and needed to find a more legitimate foundation for their actions. As a result, on December 17, 2003 a U.S. draft U.N. Security Council resolution appeared that makes the appropriate curtseys to critics, but naturally includes the PSI ideas. The draft develops a proposal made by George W. Bush at a plenary session of the U.N. General Assembly in 2003, in which there is much with which one can completely agree, but again, as in the December 17 draft resolution on nonproliferation, there hides a purely American agenda: “give us at least a fig leaf of legitimacy, and we will develop the concept ourselves.” U.N. Security Council members, clearly, must be very prudent and not accidentally unleash consequences that they will come to regret. Speaking at a U.N. Security Council session on December 3, 2003, Russian President Vladimir Putin stated that “international agreements in the sphere of WMD non-proliferation do not contain mechanisms that guarantee the security of either individual countries, or the world as a whole. Neither can these agreements be called universal, or the measures taken fully adequate to the degree of present-day threats.” And further, “any attempts to use this as an instrument of momentary political or economic gain must be met with resistance and an appropriate response on our part.”

Naturally, the American “angle” is not purely negative, providing nothing but problems and preoccupations. After all, even National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice has said that the administration in Washington understood from the very beginning that preemptive action could only be undertaken with great caution, and the number of cases in which it might be justified would be small. This opens up the possibility of diplomacy.7

In 2004, preparations for the upcoming conference on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), planned for the spring of 2005, will near the “finish line.” This, certainly, is a separate topic of conversation, but two issues tightly connected to the conference are quite worrisome, and we would like to discuss them here.

Challenges to the NPT

The first challenge is the DPRK’s withdrawal from the NPT and declaration of its intent to acquire nuclear weapons. Obviously, this is a very alarming sign for the NPT, which to date has failed to become a universal organization. In the opinion of many experts, the DPRK’s primary goal in developing a nuclear program is not the strengthening of its military capacity. Instead, the reasons for it seem to lie in the country’s perception of its strategic deterrent – an attempt to protect itself from possible U.S. military intervention, as well as a desire to have a “bargaining chip” in that risky game of “political poker” that has been played, more and less vigorously, in northeast Asia for a long time. One can speak with some hope of a certain softening of the United States’ initial hard line, but we are still very far from a return to

the starting point, that is, to Pyongyang’s return to the bosom of the NPT and renunciation of nuclear weapons. A compromise in this situation can only be achieved as part of a package deal, which must include a collective security guarantee for the DPRK and its retention of the right to conduct a peaceful nuclear program under strict international control. Many believe that for the time being we should welcome a continuation of the status quo, but in our view the concept “for the time being” could prove counterproductive and once again result in the existence of yet another de facto nuclear power. And a corresponding deepening of the crisis on the Korean peninsula. Furthermore, on the threshold of the 2005 NPT conference Korean developments are being regarded with increasing interest by a number of “threshold and pre-threshold” countries; some of which have economic and technical capabilities that are considerably greater than those of the DPRK, and no less geopolitical ambition.

It looks as if a “window of opportunity” has appeared for U.N. initiatives, primarily to delicately interrupt the traditional cyclic recurrence of Korean crises, and stimulate a search for transitional decouplings as part of the work of the “Group of Six,” which, it seems, is finding its modus operandi.

In our view, there is no more eloquent example of the application of “dual standards” than the very ambiguous and dangerous nuclear situation on the Indian subcontinent. Absorbed by the need to eliminate the nuclear legacy of the Soviet Union and by the confrontation with the “axis of evil,” everyone overlooked the appearance of a paradoxical dilemma – the emergence and consolidation of two completely real de facto nuclear powers – India and Pakistan. Not adherents to the NPT, Additional Protocol, or a number of other important agreements, these countries, at least formally, are not held back in any way, other than by their material and financial capabilities, from increasing their nuclear capacity. There is also substantial reason to say the same of the “old” de facto nuclear power, Israel, which, it is generally agreed, already possesses several dozen tactical nuclear weapons. On the subcontinent there is no reliable regional deterrence, nor do international mechanisms have any influence.

Sometimes people point to the well-known bilateral confidence-building measures between the two countries in the nuclear sphere. Without understating the positive nature of these initiatives, it is nevertheless difficult to leave off thinking that, first of all, the world community has reconcile itself to the existence of de facto nuclear states outside the NPT and, secondly, is making no practical effort to seek a more durable solution to this extremely vital problem. Probably the world will stir when both states create nuclear capabilities comparable to those of the other nuclear powers. The situation in the region, which is prone to prolonged intergovernmental conflict, makes one think, on the one hand, that classical deterrence theory erred in its estimation of the likelihood of nuclear proliferation at the regional level and, on the other hand, has suffered a serious delay in developing new conceptual approaches to the liquidation of stimuli and neutralization of the motivations of these “graduate students.” But we cannot be inert forever. The world community is right to expect the U.N. Secretary General, IAEA, and other international organizations to provide moral leadership in the search for realistic ways to overcome present circumstances. The need for prompt action is dictated by the constant receipt of information from Pakistan, which has apparently become a “transfer point” for secret nuclear and missile technologies. One would think that in this country in particular, given its traditional alliance with Washington, our American partners would have great room for action to strengthen the export control regime and suppress the illegal transfer of WMD technologies delivery systems.

Conclusion

In conclusion, we would like to express, as the scholar Mikhail Lomonosov once wrote in a letter to his patron Count Shuvalov, “thoughts that arrived separately”:

- First and foremost, there is a need for an initiative by the U.N. and leading states to provide the world with a balanced and coherent agenda of high priority measures to strengthen international security, which would situate the U.N. in a new, more democratic world.
order with a larger role for the institutions of civil society.

- The concept of counterproliferation is inadequate given the present level of dangers and cannot be the only answer to developing challenges and threats. The U.S. presidential elections in November 2004, like the elections in Russia in March 2003, place George Bush in a complex domestic political situation. The history of the behavior of America’s ruling groups in such situations testifies to their tendency to conduct “small, but victorious wars” to help them in the electoral struggle, without a moment’s hesitation about the foreign policy consequences. The global community should use all possible means to save George W. Bush from steps that would be fraught with severe consequences for all.

- From the point of view of Russia’s strategic interests it is important in the nearest future to create a new mechanism (or mechanisms) to guarantee the transparency of military activity throughout the globe by the world’s leading powers.

- The U.N. should become a stauncher member of the global anti-terrorist coalition, and try to replace the narrow coalition operating against Iraq that the U.S. has been trying to position as the main instrument in the formation of a “new world order” with a resuscitated anti-terrorist coalition based on the widest possible international foundation;

- In the near future the most important problem from the point of view of “new challenges” in the nuclear sphere may become the threat of the use of a “dirty bomb” or analogous surrogate weapons based on other types of WMD and the most diverse means of their delivery. Consequently, the U.N. must support efforts to create effective methods to avert and reduce in the damage of their possible use in every way possible. A special U.N. agency should be created that, using the resources of appropriate organizations in developed countries, could react quickly to a terrorist use of a “dirty bomb.” It should primarily be oriented toward developing countries, where the terrorist use of devices based on WMD technologies or extreme situations caused by the technical illiteracy of extremists could result in catastrophic consequences. In the majority of these countries the authorities are badly prepared to handle such situations and the population and critical infrastructure are practically unprotected. Furthermore, there is practically none of the necessary special equipment, experience, and procedures for overcoming the “psychological, social, ecological, and radiological consequences” of acts of terror or catastrophic accidents. In such cases NATO and Russia could make a contribution in the form of joint actions and initiatives along the line of the NATO-Russia Council, which has already accumulated some appropriate experience.

- The global community must strongly support the accelerated development and introduction (naturally, without any discrimination) of proliferation-resistant nuclear, chemical and biological technologies, and find means to reliably combine the global interest in nonproliferation with developing countries’ needs in the rocket sphere. In this connection we should remember that the potential of the Russian initiative on a Global Control System for the Non-Proliferation of Missiles and Missile Technology (GCS) is far from exhausted.

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3 Vitaliy Tretyakov, “How we should relate to America now,” Rossiyiskaya gazeta, March 27, 2003.
Poemes

DOES RUSSIA'S FOREIGN POLICY NEED REFORMING?

By Yuri Fedorov,
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Abridged version

Foreign policy is both an indicator of and a substantial factor influencing the state of affairs inside a country. Here we should have no illusions. Not only the prestige of our country in the international arena but also the political and economic situation inside Russia itself depend on the competence, skill and effectiveness with which we use our diplomatic resource.

From President Vladimir Putin's Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, April 3, 2001

The parliamentary and presidential elections of 2003-2004 marked an important milestone in Russian political history. For the first time since the collapse of the USSR, the Russian president showed that he was in complete authority. The Kremlin established full control over both chambers of parliament. The communists and their nationalist-patriotic fellow-travelers, who played an important and, we should note, extremely destructive role in the political life of the country for the past decade, were pushed far aside, to the periphery of the nation's political life. At the same time, complicated questions about the key trends in Russia's further development arose in 2003 as well. Specifically, the supporters of a new authoritarianism became quite active. It became clear that the direction of Russia's long-term foreign policy strategy is not irreversible. Thus, in the beginning of 2004 there was a caesura, or possibly even a recoil with respect to Russia's relations with the leading democratic states. This once again raises questions about the basic line of Russian foreign policy, and its relationship to domestic policy developments.

The Crisis of the 1990s

Russia's international position underwent fundamental changes during Vladimir Putin's first presidential term. The most important fact is that the replacement of Russia's highest political leadership at the turn of 1999-2000 made it possible to strengthen the country's position in the global arena and overcome the crisis that faced Russian foreign policy during the latter half of the previous decade. There were several ways in which this crisis manifested itself. First and foremost, beginning in the mid-1990s, and particularly after Yevgeniy Primakov's appointment as Minister of Foreign Affairs, Russia balanced on the edge of confrontation with the United States and the North Atlantic alliance, at times approaching the threshold of a new "Cold War." The peak of this confrontation was brought about by Russian troops' adventurist "advance" into Pristina in June 1999. This event absolutely could have resulted in a collision between Russian and NATO military forces, with unpredictable consequences.

No less important was Russia's inability to achieve its stated strategic goals in the international arena. Even risking the disruption of relations with developed democracies, Moscow was unable to prevent either NATO's expansion or its operation against Belgrade, or stop the United States from abandoning the ABM Treaty. The integration of the post-Soviet space did not occur, nor did the confirmation of Russia as the leading power on the territory of the former Soviet Union. The stubborn support of the Milosevic regime, in the end, turned into a loss of Russian influence in the Balkans, and also weakened the role of the UN Security Council and, thus, the role of Russia as one of its permanent members. Thus we saw serious failures in one of the key elements of foreign policy – the achievement of the state's strategic goals in the global arena.
The bottom line is that inadequate evaluations of their situation together with great-power ambitions led to the advancement of admittedly unattainable aims. The inevitable failures, of course, were explained not as due to their own errors, but to the hostile intrigues of the West. This distorted their perception of international realities even further. In the West, Russia's foreign policy was increasingly seen as created by traditional Soviet motivations: unhealthy suspiciousness; an imperial syndrome; attempts to play the U.S. off against Europe; the desire to preserve Central and Eastern Europe as zones of probable expansion, and so on. This formed a vicious circle fraught with confrontation and led Russian foreign policy down a dangerous blind alley.

Only the normalization of relations with China was carried out successfully. Halting the confrontation with the PRC strengthened the security of Russia's Far Eastern borders. However, helping Chinese military power grow is unlikely to serve Russia's security interests in the Russian Far East, especially over the long term. Attempts to create a genuine political, to say nothing of a military, partnership with Beijing, the goal of some of the Russian elite, proved unsuccessful.

The situation approached a critical juncture in the end of the 1990s. Moscow considered the possibility of harsh military “countermeasures” in response to the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty and the invitation to the Baltic states to join NATO. Russia's withdrawal from most, if not all, arms control treaties was discussed, including withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range and Short-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. The strengthening of armed forces units in the west was contemplated, even going so far, as the Russian press noted several times, as the possible deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in Kaliningrad region. The forced acceleration of military integration with Belarus was considered as well. It is no accident that in 2000 Margaret Thatcher noted that “The behavior of modern Russia becomes ever more similar to the behavior of the old Soviet Union with each passing day.”

The realization of such “countermeasures” would unavoidably have led to a new round of military and political confrontation. The West could resume the arms race; create a “cordon sanitaire” along Russia's borders; or support separatist forces in its regions. But even if Russia's leaders limited themselves to the curbing of relations with the United States and NATO and bellicose rhetoric, the country would have been pushed to the periphery of world politics. They would, most likely, simply cease dealing with Moscow.

The crisis of Russia's foreign policy in many respects was caused by the mentality typical of a substantial part of the Russian elite. Their Great Power ambitions were further and further removed from Russia's real authority in the global arena. An equal sign was set between influence, on the one side, and national security, on the other. The West was accused of undermining Russia's international position, displacing it from those regions where its traditional interests were concentrated. “All of us in the leadership of the Foreign Intelligence Service, - wrote, for example, Primakov, - realized perfectly well that the concept of the enemy will not disappear with the end of the “Cold War.” ... the leaders of a number of western countries are acting in order not to allow Russia its unique role in the stabilization of the situation in the former republics of the USSR, and to disrupt the trend of their increasing rapprochement with the Russian Federation.”

This sort of world view made it possible to explain foreign policy failures as the result of intrigues by hostile forces, and aggravated the suspiciousness towards the outside world. At the same time the nation's weakening position in the international arena, for economic and other objective reasons, was perceived as a threat that had to be counteracted, by military means if necessary. The degradation of the conventional armed forces led to the exaggeration of the role of nuclear weapons. However, although it can neutralize the threat of large-scale aggression, the possession of nuclear weapons is nearly impossible to convert into political influence. Although Russia has the second largest nuclear force in the world, this did not prevent NATO expansion, the war against
the Milosevic regime and its fall, or other events that Moscow considered undesirable and dangerous.

Further, the depth and significance of divergences of key interests and strategic visions between the United States, European states, and Japan were fundamentally exaggerated. It was believed that the military and political unity of the West would break down after the end of the “Cold War” and international politics would be determined by the interaction of “independent power centers”: Russia, an integrated Europe, Japan, China and the United States. “After the end of the Cold War, - Primakov asserted soon after joining the leadership of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, - a trend toward a transition from a confrontational bipolar to a multipolar world began to develop. The centripetal forces that attracted most of the world’s nations towards one or the other of the two superpowers weakened sharply... The countries of Western Europe began to manifest more independence than before as they ceased to depend on the American “nuclear umbrella.” Their gravitation to the “Euro-center” is gradually winning over the transatlantic orientation. The bonds of Japan’s military and political dependence on the United States are weakening against the background of Japan’s rapidly expanding position in the world.”

The strategy based on these ideas, which frequently were referred to as the “multipolar world concept,” supposed that a formal or informal coalition of Russia, China and possibly an integrating Europe could be formed that would be directed toward the weakening of the U.S. position in the global system. Furthermore, supporters of this concept supposed that Russia, being relatively weak, would be able to influence world affairs by manipulating the contradictions between the other “centers.”

The incorrect political conclusions arising from the “multipolar” concept led to gross miscalculations. They believed, for example, that the critical view of a number of European states towards American plans for the development of antimissile defense could prevent the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. As a result of this, as well as an erroneous estimation of the alignment of forces in American ruling circles, Moscow refused to conduct serious negotiations with the Clinton administration on modifications to the ABM treaty that would be acceptable for the two states. This made it easier (and, perhaps, made it possible) for the Republican administration to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, which was considered in Moscow at the time to be the “cornerstone of strategic stability.”

Another example was the expectation, by supporters of the “multipolar concept,” that Japanese-American military cooperation would weaken. Were this to occur, to say nothing of a cancellation of the U.S.-Japanese Security Agreement, Japan would almost unavoidably arm itself with nuclear weapons. This would cause a “chain reaction” in the Asian-Pacific region, stimulating the military nuclear programs of China and the DPRK and pushing South Korea and Taiwan to acquire nuclear weapons, among other things. As a result, Russia would encounter a new situation in the Far East, one much less favorable for its national security.

The influence in the Russian bureaucracy of a mentality inherited from the collapsed USSR is caused in many ways by the country’s path from totalitarianism to democracy. With the exception of the events of September-October 1993, Russia was able to avoid sharp civil conflict and maintain a strong state. But it paid for this, in part, by the retention of “interest groups” and lobbies in the elite whose public status and position in the bureaucratic or economic system were tied to confrontation with the West, even though this conflict was weaker than during the “Cold War.” Their influence strengthened during the 1990s, in part as a result of President Yeltsin’s weakening. The latter repeatedly explained opposition to the West on one question or another as resulting from pressure by the State Duma, which was dominated by the left and nationalist factions.

Without a doubt, renewed confrontation with the West would lead to the ascension of revanchist groups to key positions in Russian politics. The redistribution of scant resources in favor of the army and defense industry would occur, until a mobilized command economy was established. This would aggravate the economic crisis and
turn back the formation of market mechanisms. This course of events would be resisted by a substantial portion of the country’s business and political elite, regional heads, and the majority of the “new middle class.” The inevitable political conflict would end in either the establishment of an authoritarian regime and mass repression, or in the disintegration of the country. In either case, Russia would be cast far back. Even if democratic forces were eventually victorious, time would have been lost, while time is a critically important factor in Russia’s revival.

**Breaking the deadlock**

The situation at the beginning of the present decade required a revision in Russia’s international strategy. And immediately after the transfer of authority to Vladimir Putin the Kremlin began to emit signals indicating that Moscow was striving to overcome the crisis in relations with the West. Contacts with the NATO leadership were restored. A series of conversations between the Russian leader and the heads of leading European states took place. The Russian-American summit in Ljubljana in June 2001 marked the beginning of a change in Russian-American relations.

Moscow’s support of American anti-terrorist operations in Afghanistan became the most important, but not only, formative event shaping the new U.S.-Russian relationship. This was followed by the Kremlin’s calm reaction, very unlike the hysterics of the second half of the 1990s, to the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM treaty, which made possible the conclusion of the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions, a very important agreement for Russia. Its signing had not only military, but also significant political value. It confirmed that the factors bringing Russia and America together were stronger than those leading to divergent political positions.

A conceptual breakthrough occurred at the Russian-American summit in May 2002. The Joint Declaration on new U.S.-Russian strategic relations adopted at the summit emphasizes that current security conditions are radically different from those of the “Cold War” era. Putin and Bush established that “the era in which the United States and Russia saw each other as an enemy or strategic threat has ended,” and rejected “the failed model of ‘Great Power’ rivalry that can only increase the potential for conflict in Central Asia and the South Caucasus.” Areas of cooperation were designated: combating terrorism, regional instability, preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction and missiles, and helping to regulate conflicts in the Near East and South Caucasus.

The shift in Russian-American relations contributed to overcoming the stalemate in Russian relations with NATO. A meeting of the NATO-Russia Council at the level of Heads of State and Government occurred right after the May 2002 U.S.-Russian summit. A line was drawn through the unproductive discussions about the expansion of the North Atlantic alliance to the east, which had poisoned the international climate in previous years. New conceptual, legal, and institutional bases for a new model of relations between Russia and the states of the West were at least partially established.

The changes in Russian foreign policy in 2001-2002 were caused not just by a determination to avoid a crisis in relations with the West, but also by a realization that both Russia and the developed democracies faced common threats. The most important of these are international terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the instability generated by regional and local conflicts. The events of September 11, 2001 thrust Moscow and Washington closer together, and pushed divergences into the background. Putin was given an excellent chance to demonstrate a constructive approach to the sharpest of international problems.

Russian foreign policy’s emergence from crisis and shift to a pragmatic orientation was far from simple. The inertia accumulated in the past decade interfered. Among other things, several policy papers that had been prepared earlier were confirmed in 2000. Among them were the National Security Concept, the Military Doctrine, and the Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, which bore the strong imprint of confrontational approaches. In particular, although they varied in the...
details, they all noted a trend toward the establishment of a "unipolar world" as the country's main external security threat. Moreover, in the Foreign Policy Concept this fuzzy concept was made concrete. The strengthening of the United States' position in the world as the main and only "center of power" was named directly as a threat to Russian security. "In the international sphere, - this document affirms, - new challenges and threats to the national interests of Russia are emerging. There is a growing trend towards the establishment of a unipolar structure of the world with the economic and power domination of the United States."4

Another example: development of the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions was hindered by the Russian demand that the nuclear warheads of eliminated missiles be destroyed. Not only the United States, but even Russia itself found this requirement unacceptable. Its realization would require inspections covering the entire "life cycle" of the nuclear warheads, from production to dismantlement. This would lead to the disclosure of extremely delicate information about the construction of nuclear weapons. Not one nuclear power could agree to this then or now. A failure to sign this treaty would have given rise to doubts about the goals and the very possibility of new Russian-American relations, which were oriented toward overcoming the inherited policy of "mutually assured destruction." Surmounting these types of difficulties required fundamental decisions at the highest political level.

In practice, beginning in 2001 Russian foreign policy evolved in a direction directly opposite to that denoted in the policy papers of 2000. The Russian president's speeches in 2001-2002 set forth a global political vision that contrasted sharply with the views prevailing in the latter half of the 1990s.5

In contrast to the "Primakov School," which reduced world politics to a primitive interaction between "centers of power" in the spirit of the classic XVII-XIX century "balance of power," Putin formulated a much more complex, nuanced, and realistic idea of international relations in the beginning of the XXI century. However, the policy papers on foreign and military policy that were affirmed in first half of 2000 were neither abolished, nor disavowed. This creates conceptual and doctrinal uncertainties, of which supporters of a confrontational or, to be more precise, traditional approach to relations with the West, make full use. This has a terrible effect on both Russia's international position and on the country's domestic politics.

The Lessons of Iraq
The Anglo-American operation against the regime of Saddam Hussein was an exceptionally difficult test of the vitality of

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Russia's foreign policy strategy, as affirmed in mid-2002. The preparation and subsequent military operation against Baghdad put a complicated choice before Moscow. Were the U.S. victorious, it would affirm its role as the sole global superpower. Adaptation to this fact would require significant political decisions, while opposition would push Russia to the periphery of international politics. But a loss by the Anglo-American coalition would lead to a surge of terrorist movements, and inspire "outcast governments," including those in regions adjoining Russia. Averting the war against Iraq was the preferred solution to this problem. In that case the predicament would be removed automatically. But when military operations proved to be inevitable, Russia should have indicated its disagreement with them, but in such a way as to not to aggravate its relations with the United States. This is precisely, for instance, how China acted.

From the very beginning of 2003 Moscow began to send out contradictory signals. On the one hand, Russia's leaders exerted pressure on Baghdad, striving to get the Iraqi regime to satisfy all of the U.N. demands relating to the searches in Iraq for weapons of mass destruction. In addition they made it clear that maintaining cooperation with the United States was far more important to Russia than the fate Saddam Hussein. Thus, speaking at the end of January 2003 in Kiev, Putin said of the developing situation in Iraq: "We really have reached a good level of interrelations with America and we value this. ... The way we construct the edifice of international security is much more important than Iraq itself."6

Similar themes were present, for example, in an article by Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Igor Ivanov published in the Washington Post on the eve of the commencement of the Anglo-American operation against Baghdad. There it was written "Regardless of what happens with Iraq, Russia hopes that Moscow and Washington will allow their actions to be guided by the spirit of Russian-American cooperation, which is defined in the joint declaration signed in May by Presidents Putin and Bush in Moscow."7

However, concurrently with this type of constructive efforts the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs repeatedly spoke out in a rigidly defiant manner against the adoption of a UN Security Council resolution that directly or indirectly justified the application of force against Baghdad. This might have made sense if the Security Council's position might have influenced the activities of the United States and Great Britain. But the decision to go to war against Iraq was made without the sanction of the Security Council. Therefore, the Russian diplomats' rhetoric only served to irritate the U.S. establishment and undermined the Security Council's power. This directly contradicted Russia's own interest. For its membership in the Security Council is the symbolic confirmation of its former status as a Great Power.

This destructive course, however, fit with the beliefs of an influential part of the Russian political and state elite, for whom the partnership with the regime of Saddam Hussein was more important than the one with the United States. Thus, former State Duma chairman Gennadiy Seleznev said in 2002 without a trace of discomfiture that Russia considers Iraq to be its strategic partner in the Near East, and the prospects for the further development of Russian-Iraqi cooperation enormous.8

After the war's beginning and up to the fall of Baghdad Russia insisted on the cessation of military activities, the removal of Anglo-American military forces from Iraq, and the renewal of the consideration of the Iraqi problem in the U.N. Effectively, this meant a return to the status quo ante. There was no chance that these demands might be met. Moreover, the hypothetical realization of this plan would mean the victory of the Hussein regime, which would immediately whip up extremist circles throughout the Islamic world.

Simultaneously, a shrill anti-American campaign was developed in Russia. The political instincts of its organizers were inherited from the Soviet past, and harmonized with the calculations of careerists, who perceived in the Kremlin's position on the eve of and during the first days of war in Iraq a cardinal change in Russian foreign policy and hurried to become "more Catholic than the Pope." This campaign was directed against the Russian president, among others. Hysterical criticism of the
United States, in fact, blamed Putin for adopting an erroneous policy with regards to the partnership with America.

A disruption of Russian-American relations would, among other things, provide a justification for a sharp increase in defense expenditures and, accordingly, the curtailment of economic reforms. It was no accident that the State Duma, in which hawks from both the left and the national-bureaucratic wing prevail, once again demanded an increase in defense expenditures immediately after the beginning of military actions in Iraq. To the accompaniment of irresponsible statements, the parliament put off the ratification of the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions, the conclusion of which was attained by Russian diplomats only with difficulty.

Pressure from revanchist circles hampered the formation of a realistic approach to the war in Iraq. But as early as April 1, 2003 Putin stressed that Russia was not interested in the defeat of the United States and Great Britain. And on April 3, 2003 Putin called for a revision of the Russian position. He stated then that Russia cannot allow itself the luxury of being pulled into international crises. The president emphasized that Russia had always cooperated and would continue to cooperate with the United States in the solution of any and all problems. The shift in political arrangements that began shortly afterwards made a gradual softening of the crisis in Russian-American relations possible.

Russia's support of U.N. Security Council resolution № 1483, which legalized, among other things, the temporary authority formed by the United States and Great Britain to govern Iraq, played an important role in this.

Of fundamental importance was Putin's Annual Presidential Address to the Federation Council, given on May 16, 2003. In it, in part, Putin specified the combination of the threats to Russia's national security: “In the modern world, relations between nations are to a large degree determined by the existence of serious real and potential threats on an international scale. These threats include international terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional and territorial conflicts, and the drug threat.”

This coincides with the American vision of national security threats nearly completely, and, accordingly, creates an objective basis for constructive relations between the two states. Furthermore, not only Washington, but Moscow too is earnestly examining the possibility of undertaking preventive strikes against terrorist bases outside its own national borders. In fact, a refusal to undertake preventive action in the fight against terrorism would doom its victims to retaliatory actions alone, a situation fraught with losses of innocent civilians and a loss of the initiative. It should be noted that Putin never repeated the declarations heard during the war in Iraq about the threat from the United States, having clearly denoted his political position on this exceptionally important question.

Thus, by the summer of 2003 Russia's foreign policy had become more reasonable and constructive. In the initial phase of the Iraqi crisis the Russian position had been counterproductive. There were the political and diplomatic failures described above. The crisis in relations with the United States was combined with the promotion of unachievable goals: averting war in Iraq, strengthening the role of the U.N., and so on. For some time the fact that the support of a terrorist totalitarian regime suspected of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is in the interest of extremist forces and threatens not only the United States, but also Russia, was overlooked. And yet there are influential circles in Russia that continue to bet on a U.S. failure in handling postwar Iraq. In the United States, in turn, the Russian position on Iraq caused doubts about the very idea of a strategic partnership and nudged that country to reevaluate arrangements with Moscow.

There were other reasons for the diplomatic failure of early 2003. Until the fall of Baghdad, the Russian position was based, one can assume, on erroneous assumptions about the prolonged resistance of Iraqi military forces. The majority of Russian military and political figures and prominent foreign affairs experts expected that the United States would get seriously “stuck” in Iraq for a long time. There is evidence that the Russian military establishment forecast a long war in Iraq. Thus, according to information in the Russian
press, in the spring of 2003 Russian warships were preparing to go to the Persian Gulf. Moreover, direct interference in the course of military events in Iraq was not excluded. Nezavisimaya gazeta, a paper that is usually well-informed about Defense Ministry plans, wrote in the beginning of April 2003 “Observers believe that a naval presence in the conflict zone will make it possible to track the situation and, if necessary, to land military forces and participate in the postwar reorganization. The calculations of the Russian General Staff have been proven correct – the war in Iraq will be protracted... The Baltic Fleet may act together with the navies of Germany and France.”

The presumption that in early 2003 Russian policy was based on the idea that the war would be protracted makes it possible to explain the specific features of this policy. Among them – the rigidly defiant manner of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with regard to a possible UN Security Council resolution sanctioning the application of force against the Iraqi regime. Indeed, if military action in Iraq was prolonged, and U.S. and U.K. military losses exceeded permissible limits in these countries, Washington and London would begin to search for ways to withdraw from the war. This would require the support of Moscow, Paris, and Berlin. The UN Security Council would be the most suitable place for this diplomatic horse-trading. The diplomats could solemnly state that, as they had warned, violating the United Nations Charter would result in disaster. The U.S. global military posture would be put in serious doubt. This may have been considered favorable for the confirmation of the influence of Russia, France, and Germany. In truth, the defeat of the United States and Great Britain rapidly, and with minimum losses, to destroy the army of Saddam Hussein is an inseparably linked complex of profound changes in the armaments, operations, tactics, and organization of the armed forces and the “military philosophy” as a whole. In particular, personnel training has acquired a special role, since they must know how to use effectively complex contemporary arms and military equipment systems, and act independently and on their own initiative in rapidly changing combat situations. This, in turn, requires a transition to a professional, well-trained, mobile army. However, Russian military reform has stopped.

Another source of the diplomatic errors of early 2003 was the exaggerated estimate of the consequences of the “transatlantic crisis.” This was the basis for illusions about the rapid formation of a “multipolar world” and the attempt to form a sort of strategic “triangle” made up of Russia, France, and Germany. Apparently, for a certain period of time these ideas became the basis of Russian policy. Accordingly, in an article by Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Igor Ivanov published in mid-February 2003, he made it clear that cooperation between Russia, France, and Germany...
could become a long-term determinant of global politics, “the value of which exceeds the scope of the Iraqi crisis,” He wrote: “Russia, France and Germany recently presented a common approach to the settlement of the situation in Iraq. Many observers view this initiative as a new phenomenon in world politics, the significance of which goes beyond the Iraqi crisis. … These developments reflect an emerging multipolar order that has been called forth to replace the previous bipolar system with its rigidity, stagnation, and determinism.”

Some Russian experts spoke seriously about the “partial dismantlement of NATO,” of the possibility – albeit over the very long term – of Russia’s real military integration within the framework of the European Union, and of the likelihood that Europe would become a counterweight to U.S. power. Thus, the prominent Russian political scientist Sergey Karaganov wrote in the summer of 2003, after the end of military actions in Iraq, “All Europeans and the world as a whole need the European Union to be a powerful force to fill the “power vacuum” and strengthen international stability. This is needed so that the situation does not occur in which just one country in the Atlantic treaty – the United States – has the ability and will to counteract new threats.”

These sorts of calculations proved to be yet another example of “wishful thinking,” a frequent characteristic of Russian experts. The Iraqi crisis demonstrated in practice precisely how brittle European integration is in the military and foreign policy spheres. The Atlantic alliance became divided, but not only was the United States cut off from a number of European states – the European states themselves were divided. This did not help the formation of a united European military policy, which was already encountering very serious difficulties. France and Germany’s determination to oppose the strategic policy of the United States proved to be exaggerated. The European states lag seriously behind the United States in creating contemporary armed forces that make complete use of recent achievements in military science. This makes the European states dependent on the United States in military affairs and interested in the retention of NATO. The end of the transatlantic crisis that began in the second half of 2003 confirmed that predictions of a prolonged and deep division between Europe and the United States, and the consequent formation of a “multipolar world,” were unfounded.

But the main lesson of the Iraqi crisis appears to be that the Russian president’s attempt to revise foreign policy strategy was fraught with unpleasant consequences. In fact, if Putin had not succeeded in late spring-early summer 2003 in ameliorating the crisis in relations with the United States, Russia would be in virtual semi-isolation today. One must note that the transatlantic partnership, including the military relationship, is noticeably more important to both the United States and Europe than their relations with Russia.

**Post-Iraq Problems**

Overcoming the crisis generated by the war in Iraq made it possible to stay on the course of cooperation with developed democracies. However, no perceptible progress was made in this area in the second half of 2003 and beginning of 2004. Moreover, there was a caesura in the relations between Russia and leading Western states. In many respects this was the result of pressure from revanchist forces, as well as the unwillingness or incapacity of a substantial part of the Russian political, military, and academic establishment to forego Soviet approaches to foreign policy and security.

But this is only part of the story. In 2001-2002 it was critical that a severe crisis in Russia’s relations with western countries be prevented. This required, first and foremost, political will. But the tasks before us today involve the deepening and institutionalizing of Russia’s relations with its western partners, which is considerably more complex. Not only must we reject obsolete approaches, but also come to agreement on a wide range of issues, and, most importantly, develop operational procedures, mechanisms, and institutions for cooperation. There must be a clear understanding that this cooperation is increasingly important for all. But this fact is frequently questioned. As a result, the formation of a positive agenda for Russia’s rela-
tions with leading western states is a pro-
longed and difficult process. However, if
this process is too protracted, both the
expediency and the possibility of new rela-
tions between Russia and the West will be
brought into question.

As for the positive elements in Russian for-
egn policy (including after the Iraqi war),
there is the slow, but nevertheless contin-
uing construction of a partnership with the
North Atlantic Alliance. The Framework
Document on Submarine Crew Rescue has
been signed with NATO. A joint document
has been adopted that contains detailed
threat assessments on the terrorist threat to
the Euro-Atlantic area. The political
modalities for NATO-Russia Council
peacekeeping operations have been
approved. Within the Council framework
total security problems are being consid-
ered: crisis regulation, the nonproliferation
of weapons of mass destruction, theater
missile defense, and so on. In December
2003 an extensive plan for Russia-NATO
cooperation that contains more than a hun-
dred joint measures was affirmed. Further
development of cooperation in the military-
to-military sphere is envisaged, including
technical cooperation, information exchange
on military planning, increasing the opera-
tional interoperability of military forces,
consideration of mechanisms to exchange
reconnaissance information in the interests
of anti-terrorist operations, and so on. Joint
exercises are planned, including in Russian
territory. All this contrasts sharply with the
strained relations characteristic of the
recent past.

Russia's top leadership considers NATO to
be an important long-term partner.
President Putin has emphasized “For
Russia, with its geopolitical position, the
enhancement of cooperation with NATO
as equal partners is truly embodies the
multiple approach, to which there is no
alternative and which we intend to pursue
resolutely. We do not think of ourselves as
outside Europe.”

The changes occurring in NATO are cre-
ating the conditions for the development of
cooperation between the North Atlantic
Alliance and Russia. In fact, they shape
Russia's interest in such cooperation.
Russian Ambassador at Large Aleksandr
Aleksseyev writes “For Russia NATO's
transformation is very important. Its ori-
entation towards a search for answers to
new threats and challenges together with
respect for international law will doubtless
contribute to the expansion of Russia's
coopetion with the Alliance. Russia and
NATO in many respects have similar eval-
uations of their security needs. All of the
directions in which the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization is transforming itself
echo the basic areas of cooperation indi-
cated in the Rome Declaration. The adap-
tation of Russian and NATO military
capabilities to contemporary realities can be
considered an important part of the with-
drawal from Cold War military stances.”

Underestimating NATO, to say nothing of
ignoring it, is counterproductive for Russia.
The North Atlantic Alliance is gradually
becoming a Euro-Atlantic security system,
the activity of which covers ever more
extensive areas. Russia already borders
NATO in the Baltic zone. Ukraine and the
countries of the South Caucasus are
increasingly interested in developing ties to
NATO. The military forces of NATO
member states are located in Afghanistan
and a number of countries in Central Asia,
while China would like to discuss this
region's security problems with NATO. In
other words, NATO is becoming one of
the strategic “players” in the geographic
region where Russia's vital interests are
concentrated. Russia can solve its security
problems in this area more easily through
coopetion with NATO than ignoring it.
This is in part tied to the fact that Russia
lacks the economic and military resources
independently to oppose the destructive
forces in neighboring regions.

At the same time, NATO often considers
Russia a source of military threats, as
before, and the participation of the North
Atlantic Alliance in the solution of securi-
ty problems on the territory of the former
USSR a strategic challenge. Many believe
that Russia must be counterbalanced by
increasing military capacity and strength-
ening the influence of the newly inde-
pendent states. This position runs counter
to Russia's interests. However, attempts to
prevent the development of relations
between NATO and the newly independ-
ent states are viewed by the latter as chal-
lenges to their independence. This further
stimulates their inclination to cooperate with NATO, and, in the future, join it.
The Russian military in particular tends to have a negative attitude towards NATO. The repellant position formulated in October 2003 by Russia's military leaders testifies to this. It unequivocally threatens to realize certain reciprocal measures if the NATO military doctrine is not changed. A pamphlet published in October 2003 by the Russian Defense Ministry emphasizes: "Russia... expects NATO member states to put a complete end to direct and indirect elements of its anti-Russian policy, both from military planning and from the political declarations of NATO member states. ... Should NATO remain a military alliance with its current offensive military doctrine, a fundamental reassessment of Russia's military planning and arms procurement is needed, including a change in Russian nuclear strategy."17

If such threats are realized, planned NATO-Russian cooperation will be scuttled. It is unclear who will determine, or how it will be determined, if "indirect elements of anti-Russian policy" are fully removed from the political declarations of NATO member states, or to what extent the "offensive character" of the Alliance's current military doctrine is changed. There is no recognition of the fact that for NATO, as for Russia, altering strategy is a prolonged and complex process, in which mutual confidence plays a principally important role. Any ultimatums complicate this process and can turn it backwards.

U.S.-Russian relations are characterized by contradictions. The political leadership and foreign policy establishment emphasize their interest in a partnership with the United States. However, the country's leadership pushes through activities that objectively contradict this course. The main role here is being played by those forces in the Russian establishment for whom opposing the United States can be used as leverage to maintain or restore their political status or realize economic interests.

The incoherence in Russia's U.S. policy can particularly be seen in approaches to averting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In the United States this problem is seen as one of the chief threats to national security. The American leadership appraises the activities of other states in this area, if not as the critical issue, at least as one of the basic criteria determining their own approach to a particular state. Russia's top political leaders also have repeatedly emphasized that the spread of weapons of mass destruction is one of the most dangerous security threats. But Russian policy does not demonstrate the necessary persistence and toughness towards states that have been exposed as violators of the nuclear nonproliferation regime.

For instance, Russia has yet to join the Proliferation Security Initiative, which was proposed by the United States in mid-2003. The initiative is aimed at preventing, by force if needed, shipments of weapons of mass destruction, means of their delivery, and related materials to and from states of proliferation concern. Its realization would be an important practical step in averting WMD proliferation. Russia's main argument against this initiative is that it contradicts the right of free passage fixed in the U.N. Law of the Sea Convention. However, first of all, the U.N. convention was promulgated more than 20 years ago, when the threat of proliferation was not so trenchant. New realities always demand corresponding corrections of legal standards, in proportion to the degree of change. In the second place, the convention itself has exceptions to the right of free passage. These are connected to the suppression of slave trade, piracy, and drug trafficking. In other words, the convention in principle allows the use of force against ships suspected of dangerous activity. It is also important that by the end of 2003 there were 11 states participating in the initiative, and about 50 states had declared their support for it. In other words, it will be realized whether Moscow agrees with it or not.

Many observers believe that Russia's diplomatic approach to the nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula is dictated not so much by a wish to restrain Pyongyang's extremely dangerous nuclear ambitions, as by a desire to strengthen its own influence in the region, including by ingratiating itself with the North Korean regime. For instance, the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has spoken against the consideration of the Korean "nuclear crisis" at the UN.
Security Council. This contradicts Russia's strategic interest in the strengthening of the role of the Security Council. Excluding the United Nations from the efforts to resolve the Korean crisis seriously undermines its role in the provision of international security.

Russian-Iranian cooperation in the nuclear sphere is a serious obstacle to U.S.-Russian relations. Despite the multiplying evidence of Iraq's drive to create nuclear weapons, the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy, as before, is not prepared to end Russian-Iranian nuclear collaboration. There is now a noticeable contradiction between the fundamental security interests of the Russian state, which presuppose the need to halt the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and the economic interests of the atomic energy industry. This dooms Russia to an inconsistent position on a number of specific issues related to non-proliferation. If this is not overcome, Iran will remain a stumbling block in Russian-American relations in the future as well, particularly given Tehran's support of "Hezbollah," one of the most dangerous Islamic terrorist organizations.

By the end of 2003 Moscow's unwillingness to change its stance on these acute problems had resulted once again in the United States' strengthening its negative view of Russia. According to analysts, Washington has begun a process of revising its strategic approach to relations with Russia.

In 2003 the dynamic relationship between Russia and the European Union decelerated as well. In late 2002-early 2003 the Kaliningrad transit problem, a key issue for Russia, was solved. Unfortunately, attempts to ease Shengen visa requirements for Russian citizens – another critically important problem for Russia – have little prospect for success. The endeavor with France and Germany jointly to oppose U.S. policy in Iraq fell through. The division of Europe into "old" and "new" caused serious doubts about the possibility of transforming the European Union into an influential military and political force. The process of ratifying the agreement that would adapt the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, which is important for Russia, has been blocked by Moscow's reluctance to remove military forces from the Pridniester region of the Republic of Moldova and to come to an agreement with Georgia on the timeframe for the removal of Russian military bases. All this noticeably narrowed the field of Russian-European cooperation. Furthermore, European states are far more concerned about the difficulties in the adoption of the E.U. Constitution than about relations with Russia. E.U. expansion, most likely, will force European states to concentrate even more on relations within the union, and weaken their interest in the development of political relations with Russia yet further. The need to overcome the crisis in transatlantic relations will do the same. Against this background, different estimations of the economic and political consequences of E.U. expansion for Russia have come to the fore. Moscow is afraid that the expansion will have negative consequences for Russia's economic interests in Central and Eastern Europe.

The hurdles in Russia's relations with the leading western states are also tied to Russian domestic politics. The developed democracies view the growth of authoritarian tendencies and increasing influence of generals and the military-industrial complex with concern. These groups, as the history of the post-Soviet period shows, are rarely interested in genuine cooperation with the West. Their expectations were clearly formulated by a weekly publication that is close to military circle, VPK: voenno-promyshlenny kuryer: "It seems that the realities of 2004 will only strengthen the trends of 2003. ... This opens up the corresponding possibilities and opportunities. In the political arrangement that is unfolding, the defense-industrial complex and armed forces are right to calculate that their pressing problems and needs will become the Russian political and military leader's chief object of attention." The West is also anxious over the appearance of the extremist left-wing and revanchist movement "Rodina" (Motherland), which many believe was created with the assistance of the Kremlin administration. This bloc has gotten the support of a substantial part of Russia's marginalized population. Its chaotic but aggressive ideology not only includes a hostile attitude towards the West, but also the slogan of the reuni-
fication of the Russian population. Thus, its leader Dmitriy Rogozin wrote: “We should set ourselves the task of unification, no matter how unrealistic it may seem under present conditions. And to create the necessary conditions we must have the consistency in our chosen position that Germany demonstrated for 40 years, until it was finally unified.”

Thus far this sort of statement is no more than irresponsible rhetoric. But if someone attempts to realize the idea of the “reunification of the divided Russian people,” the consequences could prove to be catastrophic.

The difficulty forming a positive agenda for its relations with developed democracies has resulted in Russia’s focusing its foreign policy on relatively secondary problems. Among them are relations with Georgia. On the one hand, Moscow contributed to the peaceful transition of authority from Eduard Shevardnadze to the opposition. But on the other hand, the temptation has again arisen for the Russian establishment to use the separatist mood in a number of Georgian territories in order to pressure the new Georgian leaders. Intensive talks with the leaders of Abkhaziya, South Osetia and Adzhariya, which are not under Tbilisi control, have begun. The leader of Adzhariya, Aslan Abashidze, unequivocally hinted that in the case of a complication in relations with Georgian authorities he would not fail to use the aid of Russian soldiers stationed at the 12th Russian military base locating near Batumi. In turn, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Valeriy Loshchinin declared that Moscow considers Abashidze’s activity the “most important factor in the stabilization of the situation in Georgia.”

The question of Russian bases in Georgia became especially acute. At the OSCE summit in Istanbul in 1999, Russia took upon itself the obligation to remove two of four military bases by 2000 and to conclude an agreement with Tbilisi on the timeframe for a withdrawal from the remaining two military bases. The first obligation has been met; the second has not. This causes serious dissatisfaction in Georgia. The Russian military insists that the bases must remain in Georgia for a long time, since withdrawing the forces and equipping a new location is extremely expensive.

The latter causes serious doubt. According to London’s International Institute of Strategic Studies, there are approximately 3,000 soldiers, about 65 tanks, 200 armored personnel carriers, and 140 artillery installations at the bases in Georgia. It is difficult to agree that the transfer of so insignificant a contingent to Russia and its re-equipping on a new site would require large expenditures. Furthermore, the Russian armed forces must be reduced within the next few years, and the soldiers currently located in Georgia will either be discharged after their period of military service has ended or retire.

On the whole events in the post-Soviet space are the result of several established trends. Russia does not have enough political, economic, or military resources to ensure its stability and security in the territory of the former USSR and affirm a special position there. However, its reduced posture in the newly independent states, although caused by the shortage of resources, frequently is explained as the result of intrigues by the U.S. and other western states. They suspect the latter of trying to “force” Russia out of the zone of its vitally important interests. The situation in the post-Soviet space often is interpreted as a “zero-sum game.” In other words, the development of relations between the West and the newly independent states is considered to be a strategic loss for Russia. The latter is also attempting to neutralize the increasing military presence by supporting circles that for various reasons lean towards Moscow. Under these conditions, even elites in the newly independent states who are loyal to Russia are inclined to develop relations with the North Atlantic alliance, USA, and European countries. They see them as forces capable of neutralizing attempts by influential Russian circles with imperial ambitions to attain prevailing positions on the territory of the former USSR.

The West is not prepared to agree to the restoration of Russian Empire in one form or another on the territory of the former USSR. In Europe and the United States they are against Russian attempts to impose its military presence on the newly
independent states when these states do not want to see Russian troops on their territory. But we can only treat this position as contradicting Russian interests if we assume that these interests are best served by the restoration of something similar to the former Soviet Union.

In reality Russian security interests are related, first of all, to the stability of the regions bordering the country and the effective functioning of security and social systems there. Only in this case can flows of narcotics, illegal migrants, and weapons, and operations of trans-border criminal associations crossing from the territory of the newly independent states be halted. In a number of cases cooperation with the United States, NATO, and the European Union are important in guaranteeing the security and stability of former Soviet territory. In fact, it is very much in Russia's interest that western countries and structures help solve these problems, since by themselves neither Russia nor the newly independent states can do so without serious aid from abroad. But moving to such a strategy requires the rejection the stereotypes that are widespread in Russian political thinking.

**Conclusion**

Having overcome serious crises inherited from the past decade, Russian foreign policy is once again facing a serious challenge: either the Kremlin will be able to provide new momentum for the development of genuine cooperation with developed democracies, especially in the security realm, or these relations will eventually stagnate and turn backwards. This would weaken Russia's global position, as well as its position in the newly independent states, and Russia's political and strategic interactions with the world at large would gradually diminish. The likelihood of such a course of events depends in many respects on the dynamics of the domestic political situation, particularly on whether or not the influence of revanchist circles in the Russian bureaucracy and political elite can be limited.

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5. The idea for this table and its principal points were taken from Igor Zevelev’s article “Russia and the United States at the Beginning of the New Century: Anarchy is the Mother of Partnership,” Pro et Contra, Vol. 7, No. 4 (Fall 2002), pp. 79-80. Several positions and formulations were added by the author of this article.
19. Dmitry Rogozin, We Will Get Russia Back (Moscow, 2003), p. 70.

Round Table

COUNTERPROLIFERATION: AN ANSWER TO NEW CHALLENGES?

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At the end of 2003 a round table was held at the PIR Center with the title: "Counterproliferation: A Response to New Challenges?" Presentations were made by Yevgeniy Zvedre, head of a division at the RF Ministry of Foreign Affairs North America Department, and Senior PIR Center Advisor Vladimir Dvorkin. The presentations covered issues related to the development and implementation of the Proliferation Security Initiative proposed by the US on May 31, 2003. In these statements and in the discussions that followed, the key provisions of the Initiative were considered in detail, as was the situation around Iran and North Korea in the context of nonproliferation measures. Russia's point of view was represented, and attention was drawn to the legislative weaknesses in the Initiative.

During the discussion of the presentations a proposal was made to create a special UN body responsible for the alternative collection of information on WMD development, which could subsequently be presented to the leaders of states and governments. Expression was also given to ideas for modernizing the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) to take into consideration the realities of the current international situation; and ideas for reinforcing the system of export controls, to prevent WMD technologies and samples from coming into the possession of non-government structures.

Representatives of the RF Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the Russian Nuclear Society, PIR Center, Russia's Institute for Strategic Studies, Moscow State Institute for International Relations (MGIMO), Washington Group International, the Committee of Scientists for Global Security, the RF Constitutional Court, the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), and the embassies of Denmark and Israel all participated in the round table.

An abridged transcription of the round table discussion follows.

Yevgeniy Zvedre (Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs)

Recently, the term "counterproliferation" has once again become a part of popular political jargon, and is being used ever more frequently—primarily by the Americans themselves—to describe the course of the Bush administration as regards nonproliferation.

It is clear that the fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and means of their delivery has increasingly become the focus of US foreign policy. This issue, as we know, occupies one of the prime positions in a series of "doctrinal" documents published by Washington in recent years, and which are dedicated to various aspects of ensuring US national security.

This is an approach we can well understand; it does not require any additional proof of the similarity between the approaches of Russia and the US, as regards counteracting new global threats. We primarily see these threats as the interconnected problems of WMD proliferation and international terrorism. We are not always prepared to unconditionally accept or share one or other nonproliferation initiative "straight off." In each case, it is necessary to assess how much one or another proposal by our American partners meets Russian national interests—which in many ways do not coincide with US national interests—and to what degree it crosses the gaps that separate us, as regards how we envision methods of ensuring global security. For this reason, we give the greatest importance to the search for points of convergence between our interests, the organization of joint work. This fully relates to the efforts in the fight against proliferation, where the success of all our work in many ways depends on our commitment to cooperation.

Let's move on to President Bush's so-called "Krakow Initiative," or the Proliferation
Security Initiative—PSI. I would like to very briefly give a reminder of the history of this issue, and focus on Russia's relationship to the Initiative, and attempt to understand the key issue: will we cooperate with the Americans here, and if so, then to what degree?

As you remember, President Bush announced PSI in very general terms in Poland on May 31, 2003, en route to a meeting with President Putin in St. Petersburg. The Russo-American summit was followed by a G8 summit at Evian and, on the whole, we didn't really have a clear understanding of what PSI was. Naturally, we tried to start a dialog with our American colleagues from the US embassy in Moscow, and asked them to explain how they see the main content of the Initiative, and how it could be implemented. In our time we became used to giving frequent explanations about Soviet “peaceful,” “disarmament” and other initiatives, that have appeared at very regular intervals, and which we have had to explain, advocate and defend.

This time, we were amazed when we encountered no more than the most general knowledge of the subject on the part of American diplomats. In other words, no-one knew, or could tell us, anything specific. In our opinion, this shows that if PSI wasn't an impromptu move, then at the initial stages it was at least a somewhat poorly developed idea, thrown together in the hope that the “substance” would be developed by the joint efforts of the countries that acceded to the Initiative.

In a nutshell, as far as we could make out, we were talking about the seizure, by force, of suspicious aircraft and seagoing vessels for inspection, to uncover shipments of materials which could be used in WMD development programs or ballistic missiles. Although interception of sea, land and air transport was mentioned, Washington initially concentrated on shipping by sea.

On the one hand, it was immediately apparent that the Initiative is aimed at a positive goal: the struggle against WMD proliferation. On the other hand, from the very beginning it was apparent that there were discrepancies between the main provisions of PSI and a number of international codes, primarily those ensuring free navigation and international trade; specifically, the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea. In addition, the Initiative from the very start read as if it was directed against those countries that had been included in the US foreign policy “blacklist.” This could only be met with a cautious approach by Russia, which will categorically not accept the practice of dividing states into “rogues” and “good guys.”

Moreover, the participants of the Initiative themselves also admitted that existing international rules and codes were clearly insufficient to legalize PSI. The authors of the Initiative saw the solution to this problem in the development of additional provisions to existing international mechanisms, which would cover up the “gray areas” and provide the legal foundation necessary for PSI to be implemented.

Less than three weeks after the Initiative was proposed in Madrid, a meeting was held of the 11 so-called “core” countries: the United States, Australia, Great Britain, Germany, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, France and Japan. In July 2003, the “core” participant countries held a second meeting in Australia, when plans were laid out for executing joint, spot detentions of sea-going vessels suspected of shipping WMDs or WMD components, both in territorial and international waters.

By mid-September 2003, naval training exercise Pacific Protector was being conducted in the Coral Sea (in the western part of the Pacific Ocean, off the coast of Australia). This was followed by exercises in the Mediterranean and the Arabian Sea, and then by maneuvers of the air and ground forces of all the 11 PSI participant countries.

At one of the meetings between “core” PSI countries in early September 2003, in Paris, an “ideological basis” was developed for the Initiative. A joint statement was made, regarding the “Interdiction Principles” for implementing PSI. This document was fairly curious in nature, and one feels that the authors worked diligently, taking into consideration the criticism that had been directed at PSI, primarily in the context of giving legitimacy to the type of actions to be used by PSI crews in forced seizures in international waters.
Amongst other things, the document states that: PSI is built on efforts by the international community to prevent the proliferation of WMD, including existing international security treaties and regimes; the Initiative is in line with statements by G8 countries and the European Union on the topic of nonproliferation, and flows from the need for more coherent and concerted efforts in this field. Nevertheless, it can be understood from the document that the execution of specific actions in the seizure of cargo which raises suspicions with respect to nonproliferation, openly exceeds both national jurisdictions and the codes of international law. In the statement, emphasis is also placed on the need to activate work with countries that have not joined the "core," in order to involve them in implementing the Initiative.

Judging by consultations with our contacts, the countries of the "core" were themselves far from complete unanimity about the legal foundation and the general direction of PSI, and frequently expressed interesting thoughts regarding possible development of the American Initiative. For example, at the Paris meeting, Germany and France formulated a number of ideas. In part, they stated the need to consider the renewal of national legislation of participant countries, in order to give the navies, border forces and customs services an opportunity to show initiative when it becomes necessary to seize a vessel; it was also proposed that other states be approached with an appeal to join the Initiative, based on experience already accumulated.

A meeting of the "core" participant countries in London on October 9-10, 2003 was mainly dedicated to initiating practical activity, and moving from discussion and the endorsement of general principles to definite tasks. It was in this context that the meeting considered the possibility of seizure of hazardous cargo by each of the PSI members. Incidentally, it is worth remembering what has so far been the only case of seizure of a sea-going vessel, which took place last year, when Spain detained a North Korean ship carrying a cargo of missiles bound for Yemen, and which was later released.

At this meeting it was noted that the Initiative had received a more-or-less positive assessment by more than 50 states. The participant states therefore agreed to continue to work on the development of mutual understanding with countries interested in joining the efforts of the "core" members. This included planning events to be held by Japan and Australia, aimed at explaining the principles behind PSI to the member states of the Asia-Pacific Economic Council.

Above all, the London meeting highlighted that PSI had become a global initiative, which was attracting the participation of more and more states. In this context, participation on PSI has to be open to any states or international organization, in compliance with the Paris statement of "Interdiction Principles."

Since the appearance of PSI on the bilateral political agenda, we have been engaged in a fairly active dialog with the USA. This dialog is based in the concordance between PSI and the goals and objectives of our countries' policies with regard to the fight against WMD proliferation—with the threat of WMD falling into the hands of international terrorists. In addition, from our very initial involvement, we have frankly stated that such cooperation must be based on the principles of international law, on objective criteria, and on the prevention of the abuse of law or attempts to use the Initiative for the political ends of individual states.

Very many questions remain regarding the relationships between PSI and existing nonproliferation regimes, and the export controls in international trade and shipping law. The ambiguity of key organizational and legal aspects of seizure is cause for concern. These aspects include: the application of coercive actions against means of transport beyond national jurisdiction, responsibility for the groundless detention of vessels or cargo, procedures for the confiscation or destruction of cargo, and the handling of vessel crews. The list goes on.

Fundamentally, the object of seizure itself requires definition, as any act could be classified as an infringement of legal trade in "dual purpose" items, which may be related to WMD, such as the Yemen missiles mentioned above. I would like to emphasize here that the issue is legal international trade, which we have no right to restrict.
We retain significant reservations with regard to the fact the Russia is supposed to join an initiative on conditions and principles which it did not participate in developing. Naturally, we have reasonable observations and comments to make regarding these principles. For this reason, it would be unacceptable to approach the issue in the following fashion: either you accept everything unconditionally, or you do not participate in the process. Naturally, Russia is not yet participating in the process, as we can only participate in agreements that correspond to our foreign policy positions and Russia's obligations within the framework of those international nonproliferation agreements in which the country is a participant, without contradicting Russian national legislation and obligations under various bilateral agreements.

In our contact with partners, we constantly repeat one simple consideration: that the application of sanctions can only be allowed with the consent of the international community, i.e. by resolution of the Security Council, or even at a regional level. Any other coercive actions exceed the limits of international law.

Here we are also faced with the major task of investigating the issues that interest us. We can only interact as partners, be a participant in such an initiative, when the necessary legal foundation has been formed and endorsed, and this activity is met with the support of the international community and the corresponding institutions within it—primarily, the UN. I'll stop here, and if there are any questions, I'll do my best to answer them.

Vladimir Dvorkin (PIR Center)

Respected colleagues, in discussing the problem of counterproliferation, I would not claim to be able to define this concept. I first ran into this term in the early 1990s, when the US was once again reviewing its nuclear strategy. The problem of counterproliferation per se has been mentioned fairly frequently in recent years in a broad context and, naturally, has also entered our field of study. For example, Joseph Cirincione stated at the Second Moscow International Nonproliferation Conference—reproducing Washington's viewpoint and underscoring the growing threats of WMD proliferation—that the administration is extremely concerned by the low level of effectiveness of nonproliferation regimes, and is forced to expend great efforts organizing nonproliferation, while the results are not as apparent. For this reason, the administration is increasingly lean towards preventive, coercive measures. Considering the priorities of the US, and using budget financing records as an example, Joseph Cirincione showed that counterproliferation has clearly been seen as a priority: it has received appropriations of $8 billion, while nonproliferation programs have been allocated $1.5 billion.

One could suppose that certain movements toward counterproliferation have been observed in Moscow, although these have mostly been at a declamatory level. At the same conference, Igor Sergeev spoke about the erosion of state control in a number of relatively trouble-free countries, and sanctions cannot be ruled out against those who are incapable of controlling the situation in their own country. This can be compared with the statement of Minister of Defense Sergey Ivanov at the expanded leadership conference of the Ministry of Defense in the presence of the Russian president, where he theoretically posited the issue of possible preventive strikes. However, for such strikes one must possess the corresponding real-time reconnaissance and the necessary high-precision weapons.

All of this may indicate that the positions of Moscow and Washington are to some degree converging, although for Moscow this is only at the verbal level.

Scientists, specialists and experts disagree as to the depth of the crisis in nonproliferation regimes, but nobody denies that there is a problem. The only question is the permissible forms of possible future activity. In other words, the issue is—where do we go from here? Reinforce the international nonproliferation regimes, opt for localized countermeasures to resolve specific problems or accept the concept of counterproliferation, including coercive measures? Thus approaches to the problems of nonproliferation are at a sort of crossroads, and now more than ever, thoughtful and circumspect collective actions are required to develop.
recommendations and agreements to identify plans for future activity.

Nobody contests the role of international regimes in nonproliferation, and the results they have helped achieve. But the questions of how to move forward arise constantly. And the answers to them are extremely varied. It has been noted that nobody plans to annul or review the NPT. This is one of those rare cases, when one of a few small articles protects the world from the proliferation of nuclear weapons. If it was not for the NPT, we would already have about 40 nuclear states.

The proposals of Rose Gottemoeller and Jon Wolfsthal have also drawn the attention of experts. Without denying the need to reinforce NPT, they suggest that the solution to the problem of nuclear weapons in Israel, India and Pakistan should be sought in the field of regional security and politics, and not in the framework of the NPT. They are convinced that the mechanism of nonproliferation itself cannot be considered an effective mechanism for solving problems connected to India, Pakistan and Israel. That is to say, the problems of these states must be resolved gradually, region by region, and not as problems of the same order, selected by virtue of the failure of these countries to participate in the NPT. Highly-placed political leaders must be involved in resolving these issues, as the use of traditional methods used by diplomats working on monitoring issues cannot produce positive results with respect to the nuclear programs of India, Israel and Pakistan.

Of all the instruments for counteracting the proliferation of WMD and means of their delivery, the largest amount of discussion has centered on the role and location of coercive actions. This discussion has become most acute in connection with the operation by the US and Great Britain in Iraq. Justifying its invasion of Iraq, the US has stated that first, Saddam Hussein has been pulling the wool over the UN’s eyes and refusing to disarm for more than ten years. Second, Baghdad is linked to an international terrorist network, which is responsible for the acts of September 11. Third, this regime, while brazenly infringing on human rights, simultaneously presents a threat to international peace and security in general, and for American specifically. Washington was ultimately unable convincingly to support its claims, primarily as regards the presence of WMD in Iraq. But it is another aspect that is important here: the armed incursion once again drew attention to the debate between academics and politicians around the conception described as “humanitarian intervention.” The viewpoints of Aleksandr Bovin and Andrey Piontkovskiy are most illustrative in this discussion; their logic goes as follows.

The UN Charter is strictly based on the principle of state sovereignty and, correspondingly, resolutely rejects interference in their internal affairs. However, in the late 1980s and early 1990s the inviolability of this principle, of absolute state sovereignty, began to raise doubts. The sovereignty of a state was juxtaposed against the sovereignty of the individual, his rights and freedoms. It was emphasized that the sovereignty of an individual is more significant, of greater priority, than that of the state, and if this is so, then the international community has the right—and is even duty-bound—to interfere. If necessary, armed force should be used. A state must not expect to have a sort of sovereign impunity.

It was in the light of these thoughts that the concept of “humanitarian intervention” appeared. Considering the entire history of intervention, humanitarian intervention in Cambodia, in Vietnam, and in India without the sanction of the Security Council, it was noted that no reaction was provoked from democratic states. It is hardly likely that anyone would now deny that intervention was the lesser evil, compared to the continuation of bloodletting and extreme forms of suppression. Operations to restore order and establish peace were conducted in East Timor, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Haiti and Bosnia. Not all were successes. In Somalia, as we know, they ended in failure.

The discussions around the right to intervene at Security Council conferences and UN General Assembly sessions have shown that there are many opponents. The strongest protests have come from countries who are party to the Non-Aligned Movement, and as one can probably guess in advance, Iraq and North Korea have been especially implacable with regard to the violation of sovereignty. The current
UN Charter allows intervention, if it is caused by the presence of a threat to international peace and security. However, this can be stretched to cover responses to threats which may lead to a connection with a terrorist network, the presence of WMD or persistent attempts to create such weapons. However, neither genocide nor mass persecution by political beliefs, race or faith—if one scrupulously follows the UN Charter—give one the right to humanitarian intervention. This is because, in the eyes of international law, all authoritarian, tyrannical regimes are also sovereign, just like democratic regimes. The main problem here, and the biggest difficulty, is the modernization of international law. Kofi Annan formulated the issue as follows: if humanitarian intervention truly is an unacceptable blow for sovereignty, then how should we respond to flagrant, systematic violations of human rights, which contradict all the precepts of human existence.

To answer this question the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty was created on a proposal from Canada. Vladimir Lukin represented Russia on this commission. In December 2001, the commission presented a voluminous report, in which the possibility of intervention is theoretically allowed, but in order for the principle to turn into policy, more precise criteria and rules are required, to define what is required in an intervention, when and how to implement an intervention, and a determination of the legitimacy of military intervention, if it is necessary. Intervention may be applied only to achieve the stated goals, must be effective and the necessary level of attention should be paid to minimizing the loss of life.

In practice, this means that the international community has the right and the duty to intervene when and where human rights are flagrantly violated, where the actions of a sovereign pose a genuine threat to world peace and security. The fact that Saddam Hussein killed his own people with poison gas is in principle sufficient grounds for intervention. If we are to speak not of specific wording, but of the sense, the legalization of intervention into internal affairs demands—as a minimum—precise and trustworthy reports of phenomena and processes considered grounds for intervention, a clear and unambiguous UN Security Council sanction, or a regional, international organization, to which the Security Council may delegate its authorities and rights. There must be confidence that success is guaranteed, and that the pluses outweigh the possible minuses. On the whole, we are talking of situations, where intervention is to be not the rule, but an exception, and armed intervention is to be an exception to the exception.

Considering the entire spectrum of coercive measures, it must be emphasized that there are very varied forms of counteraction by force. They do not necessarily have to consist of large-scale military intervention against states which violate nonproliferation regimes. This follows, at least, from the proposals of 29 influential US analysts, presented in the summer of 2002 before the commencement of Security Council discussions on Iraq. Proposals were made to destroy WMD by means of forced inspections. Forced inspections could be conducted in compliance with a Security Council resolution, providing modern, high-tech surveillance and international forces deployed near Iraqi borders.

Later, similar proposals appeared in Russia, partly voiced by Grigory Yavlinsky. Given such a compromise option, the chances of disarmament without a wide-scale military operation would remain. However, the proposals went unheard by both Russia and the US, which had then already decided to invade without a UN Security Council resolution.

The lessons to be learnt from the removal of the Hussein regime are fairly self-evident. Joint opposition against totalitarian regimes, including through the use of force, is significantly more effective than unilateral actions. In this connection there are prospects for mechanisms that could be developed by the G8, which is becoming even more important in international politics. In any case, we can suppose that the G8’s solutions will influence the Security Council, when it is necessary to take urgent measures in high-intensity regional conflicts. One of the solutions of the G8 and the Security Council could be the legitimization of compulsory UN inspections, accompanied by international forces of various scales, whose tasks would be to verify the fulfillment of all nonproliferation regimes; com-
pulsory verification measures could be expanded to cover inspections of training bases and other support centers used by international terrorist organizations.

If we are to discuss the entire spectrum of counterproliferation measures, at the current time the threat of WMD proliferation may be countered by the synthetic combination of existing international regimes. One can imagine an escalation process consisting of certain actions in the following format: trade and economic sanctions against persistent violators, followed by a partial or complete blockade, the organization of compulsory inspections, or perhaps vice versa: compulsory inspections followed by a blockade. This is followed by preventive, high-precision strikes against WMD locations and means of their delivery. The final step is humanitarian intervention with the deployment of occupying troops.

Naturally, each subsequent stage comes into play after the failure of previous stages. This pattern could be discussed with a view to its legitimization in the framework of the G8. It seems to me that even the straightforward designation of the issue as a problem that is acceptable and subject to discussion could serve as a deterrent. It is hard to imagine that such a pattern could help to resolve the North Korea problem, which could become a catastrophe not just on a regional, but on an international level. If North Korea conducts just one nuclear test explosion, then it may be just a few months before several nuclear warheads are made and fitted to missiles. And if no decisive measures are taken in that space of time, then not only will the existing regime there be indefinitely preserved, but nuclear missiles will spread through other regions as easily as missile technology has spread until now. If North Korea obtains even limited nuclear weapons, then no coercive solutions will be possible with regard to that country.

Modeling has shown that, in this case, no preventive strikes will produce a guarantee that a retaliatory nuclear strike will not follow, as a certain number of mobile systems can be deployed in mountain tunnels, and they are hard to hit, even with penetrating munitions. Of course, stationary launch systems for long-range missiles, which may be able, in future, to reach as far as Alaska, will be destroyed, but without a 100% rate of certainty. Several nuclear strikes will be delivered to South Korea and Japan, and one or two to Alaska.

Recently, we have heard ever more frequently that terrorist acts are coming one after another all around the world; that regional armed conflicts are constantly arising; that, in essence, the third world war has already begun, and that international law is different, in very obvious ways, for peacetime and wartime.

In these conditions, demonstrating the legitimacy of the abovementioned sequence of escalating counterproliferation measures could be seen as timely and fully justified.

**Viktor Lichayev (Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs)**

Let’s determine what exactly PSI is and what its goals are, and we can then act on the basis of this information. If we were to theoretically posit that a resolution is being passed today on Iran, and the situation around Iran is more or less on course to be resolved, and let’s also posit that as a result of the six-party talks North Korea also agrees to complete openness in its nuclear infrastructure, what then will be the direction taken by PSI? After all, PSI can be applied to approximately 10 countries, including Japan. Will PSI be used against them? There is not yet any certainty about this.

**Yuriy Fedorov, Moscow State Institute for International Relations (MGIMO)**

The attitude to the American Proliferation Security Initiative in the field of nonproliferation is a sort of litmus test that can be used to assess the actual approach of any given country to tangible efforts to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and means of their delivery. The importance of this Initiative consists in the fact that it represents the first attempt to create an international mechanism with practical applications, which prevents the transport of such weapons, or of materials that may be used to make or deliver such weaponry. It is clear that in many cases, transport is a critically important element of proliferation.
In this context, the refusal of Russia to join PSI provokes serious questions, especially in the light of the fact that 10 states have already joined the Initiative, and 50 have supported it. In other words, PSI will be implemented, whether we want it or not. And if Russia refuses to accede, then it will be left high and dry, and we will once again be left with no more consolation than the thought that we didn’t trade in our principles. We should also be equally clear on another aspect: we can only influence the development of procedures for implementing PSI, once we have acceded. It is simply hopeless to criticize it from the outside.

The attitude to PSI reinforces the impression that Russian governmental agencies, charged with implementing the strategic approaches of President Putin, are demonstrating an inexplicable passivity. In truth, the country’s president has often stated that the proliferation of WMD is one of the most serious threats to Russian national security. But when it comes to practical actions, we are faced with a series of caveats, doubts and attempts to prove that the interests of agencies or sectors are more important than those of national security. For example, we continue to flirt with the regime in North Korea. The Russian MFA, for example, is against discussion of the Korean “nuclear crisis” at the UN Security Council. How does this relate to our support for strengthening the role of the UN and its Security Council? We are receiving more and more reports of Iranian efforts to create nuclear weapons, but our Minatom appears not to notice. This not only complicates Russo-American relations but, what is far worse, throws into doubt the coherence of Russian policy in nonproliferation as a whole.

But let’s return to PSI. The main argument used against accession to the Initiative is the discrepancy between the idea behind the Initiative and the right to free passage, as stipulated in the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Indeed, this document states the principle of “free and open seas,” in other words, the inspection and detention of vessels is forbidden. But there are exceptions to this rule. The principle of “free and open seas” does not extend to vessels suspected of transporting slaves (Article 99), the illegal trade in narcotics and psychotropic substances (Article 108), piracy (Articles 100-107), or unauthorized broadcast from the open sea (Article 108). Article 110 of the Convention permits the inspection of vessels if there are “reasonable grounds” to suspect that the vessel is engaged in piracy, the slave trade, or is illegally broadcasting from the open sea. In other words, the UN Convention contains a principle, according to which the right of “free passage” does not extend to vessels, suspected or proven to be engaged in dangerous activities.

Neither must we fail to consider that the UN Convention was passed more than 20 years ago, when the threat of proliferation was not so acute. New global realities, as they arise, demand the corresponding adjustment of legislation. This is justifiable, especially in light of the growing threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. It is difficult to imagine that unauthorized broadcasting is more dangerous than the proliferation of nuclear, chemical or biological weapons. In other words, the need arises to review and expand the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. This is an isolated case, which illustrates a broader problem: the need to bring international law in line with the appearance and escalation of non-traditional threats: proliferation, terrorism, organized crime, and so forth. The question is—which international institutions and procedures are needed to execute the necessary modernization of international law.

This is an extremely complex issue, as the key international institution—the UN and its Security Council—is in a deep crisis, and is often in no position to take effective decisions regarding sanctions, coercive measures in counterproliferation, and in countering other threats to international and national security. In this context, our attention is drawn to the G8. In essence, there is no other institution capable of—even theoretically—taking the necessary decisions. This body is made up of eight economically and militarily strong world powers. If they demonstrate the necessary political will, the spread of weapons of mass destruction will be halted.

This is becoming an ever more urgent issue. We are faced with an escalating nonproliferation crisis. The facts are as follows: existing nonproliferation regimes are ineffec-
tive. India and Pakistan, having become de facto nuclear powers, have dealt a powerful blow to the nonproliferation regime. They have demonstrated that one can become a nuclear power with impunity, and the international community will be completely powerless. Another example is North Korea, whose actions can be described as flagrant derision of the nonproliferation regime. Pyongyang's goals are quite transparent: to use nuclear blackmail to win a guarantee that the regime will continue to exist, proving its total impotence in solving the most acute economic and social problems of the country. If North Korea tests, or pretends to have tested nuclear weapons, then we will face an extremely unpleasant situation. On our very borders, there will be a state with a completely unpredictable regime that possesses nuclear weapons.

The G8 may become an initiator of important amendments to international law, without which it will be difficult to resist the proliferation of WMD, international terrorism and other dangers of our times. But the question now is—what should be the main principles of these amendments; the main areas and directions. In my opinion, it is most important to first overcome the weaknesses and failures of existing nonproliferation regimes. These are linked to the following:

- The voluntary nature of participation in a regime; in other words, a state may accept the obligations of nonproliferation, or it may decline them;
- The absence of a mechanism, ensuring that sanctions are applied automatically;
- The introduction of sanctions only by resolution of the UN Security Council, which in many cases is simply incapable of taking the appropriate decisions;
- The principle of absolute sovereignty of states, throwing a challenge to the international community, in part supporting terrorist groups and movements.

In order to overcome these weaknesses, member states of the G8 must, in essence, do one simple thing: declare the proliferation of nuclear weapons a serious international crime, and develop clear and effective procedures for automatically introducing sanctions against those states or non-state actors found to be engaged in proliferation.

Mikhail Vinogradov (Committee of Scientists for Global Security)

I had the opportunity to work with our American counterparts for two years on counterproliferation issues, between 1995 and 1997, when a group of experts was convened. The US was represented by the Public Policy Institute, and we worked together on the counterproliferation problem. For over two years, we regularly exchanged materials on this topic.

America understands counterproliferation to consist of the following sets of measures. The first group involves non-military measures; while the second was called deterrence (crossing a threshold was forbidden). The third is offensive military action, and the fourth element is military defense (missile defense systems). Why did they raise the question of missile defense? It later turned out that it was precisely the problem of missile defense that led to our subsequent work being broken off. It has to be said that in the nonproliferation movement approximately 75% of efforts are spent not on the prevention of proliferation of WMD themselves, but on the means of their delivery. What is understood by “non-military measures”? In America they had a straightforward vision of this: diplomacy on the one hand and export controls on the other.

The missile defense system was a sort of idée fixe for America. They thought that it would influence nonproliferation. The military, offensive element included the following areas; the first was what we now call PSI: the prevention of transport, and seizure of vessels. The second was preventive strikes.

As regards the prevention of transport, America recalled Soviet-Cuban relations at the beginning of the Cuban Missile Crisis. At that time, the US was unable to prevent and cut off the delivery of Soviet ballistic missiles to Cuban territory, but they later stated that “we got involved just in time”. Soviet submarines were unable to break through, and did not hinder the blockade of Cuba. America used this as a positive example of how the given measure can be used. Preventive strikes are another clear example: remember the Iraqi reactor that was destroyed by Israel.
In my opinion, there will be better times ahead, if the proposals mentioned above are accepted. I agree with them: we need to find means of cooperation, but also conduct politics in a careful and restrained fashion. I think that this topic deserves greater attention, and the participation of Russia. Naturally, it is a good thing that this topic has moved from a public arena, to be handled by state structures.

Gennady Yevstafiev (PIR Center)

I have no negative attitude toward the term “counterproliferation” itself; it is no better or different than the accepted term “prevention of WMD proliferation.” The key issue is the concept’s actual meaning. We have yet to see which is more intimidating. It has to be said, that, as usual, American practices get the ball rolling.

Let’s remember the document prepared by then US Defense Minister Dick Cheney in the early 1990s, just before the retirement of the first Bush administration. This document was called the Defense Planning Guidance. It contained the main premises and positions. And who prepared the document together with Dick Cheney, Paul Wolfowitz, Lewis Libby and Condoleezza Rice consulted. Let’s look at the list of key leaders of the current administration. Here, we can speak of a very clear dominance in political thinking about nonproliferation. During the period of Clinton’s efforts, this was evaluated differently and given a different interpretation. With Yevgeniy Maslin, I personally participated in the Russia-NATO summit in 1995; we were invited prior to the passage of the Founding Act, and the British and Americans read papers on counterproliferation, in which they advocated not only prevention, but also preemption. I should say that it was immediately clear the other participants had no sympathy for them.

I would like to review one other detail: there was a certain conceptual subtlety that appeared during this conference. After all, there are two terms within counterproliferation: prevention and preemption. And these are very different. When we got down to details, it became clear that we have straightforward, acceptable prevention, whereas preemption means preventive strikes, and not even strikes against a fully-deployed enemy. Then, for a long time, they couldn’t or didn’t want to formulate this. And we have to watch very carefully, because later on, when George W. Bush took Cheney’s lead and renewed this concept in full, preemption was one of its key elements—although they do not accentuate this fact. Prevention is straightforward and acceptable, and it is clear how we can assess it, but it is not yet clear how to resist the American version of preemption. Already, hopes were being pinned on military might. And to this end, the document stipulated that there was no need to convene formal coalitions, approved by the international community to fight the proliferation of WMD. It is enough to bring together an “assembly of nations”—this was the term used by like-minded thinkers—and, in doing so, not have to deal with the international community and its opinions; and this is just what happened in practice. The reasons for this are clear: in relation to the rest of the world, the US has made a gigantic leap forward militarily in the past years, and it would be foolish not to renew the idea of counterproliferation. It is illustrative that we have seen a similar development, in parallel, of the inability of the international community to find alternative means and methods to stop proliferation and the spread of nuclear weapons and other WMD.

During the last presidential election campaign in the US this term, as we know, was not used extensively, but I would like to draw your attention to the fact that Condoleezza Rice did once express herself fairly clearly in this respect. She stated that if “axis of evil” states do obtain nuclear weapons, then such weapons will be immediately rendered unusable, otherwise they will face national ruination, disappearance. It is clear that in foreign policy, Bush and his team have a preference not for warm diplomatic actions and negotiations, but for the use of force.

Russia, as we know, rejects the unilateral use of force, and will never give Washington a carte blanche to use punitive operations at its discretion and choice but, nevertheless, we have encountered a situation where we much choose our form of action. It should be mentioned here, that in 2002 George W. Bush began to formulate a fairly clear position on the use of force in the...
fight against WMD proliferation, and for this reason he gave the proposed idea a very stringent review in a key document. I am very reluctant to think of considering the current administration as a team of “frightening” people, who have emerged from some dark forest. They use for their own purposes public sympathies towards those who are really engaged in fighting WMD proliferation. Following September 11, 2001, there has been a greater understanding of the use of forcible solutions in a number of cases. I would like to posit that in this issue, there are just two clearly-demarcated issues.

The first of these concerns proliferator countries. The second is the problem of transferring technology, and perhaps certain WMD samples, into the hands of terrorists. This is a very serious problem, which has brought us all closer together in this effort. The Americans claim: the epic events in Iraq cannot be seen as the practical application of preemption policy in counterproliferation. But I think that we have no doubt that this is exactly the case.

In my opinion, this speaks to the essence of the problem: wide-scale invasion in the form of fairly dubious military coalitions, without the approval of international institutions and the Security Council.

The occupation of an entire country—with what we can now see are unpredictable consequences for the region—and its influence on the international situation, shows us the range of tools that the US administration possesses. Until recently, this was a convenient method to use, and they did not notice how their actions had undermined the credibility of the Security Council, as the central body for ensuring world security.

The US, in my opinion, found itself in a foolish situation, when they were trying to convince everyone that there was something in Iraq, and Tony Blair even spoke about the deployment of WMD at five-minute readiness. But whether we want it or not, over the past decade the problems of proliferation have become more clearly defined, work on them has become more precise and, perhaps slowly, the international community has been moving in the right direction, improving the instruments in its possession. It is a different question that not everyone has seen the US in the right light but, nevertheless, this was progress in the right direction.

What is the situation that we have now? The problem, in my opinion, is that we must not allow nonproliferation to become a hostage of coercive methods alone. This must not be allowed, otherwise many achievements of the last 15 years will be lost. There are experts who cast doubt over the NPT and consider that it has to be replaced with new agreements, because, de facto, we have three nuclear states and we don't know what to do with them. NPT has to become universal; otherwise we are faced with a path to its gradual collapse.

As we know, North Korea has already left the treaty and if any other countries follow, this will mean a collapse of the greatest achievement, which we worked hard for, and for which Russia worked hand-in-hand with America during the signing. I think that one of the highest-priority tasks is to find a solution to bring India and Pakistan into the process. Indecisiveness in this issue is fraught with consequences. Both America and Russia are guilty of this, because this is a direct result of the Cold War, when we did not pay attention to signals which appeared well in advance, showing the interest of these countries in nuclear weapons and other forms of WMD and means of their delivery. What ground do we have to act?

I would like to mention several thoughts. It seems to me that one cannot destroy all these mechanisms, or diminish the role of the Security Council. Conversely, they need to be reinforced. I think that George W. Bush and his team really burnt their fingers in Iraq. And this is a blow to the concept of proliferation, in the form that America understands it. And we must not forget this. I think that they will approach the use of coercive methods with greater caution and, in my opinion, we need to support them however possible in this respect.

Condoleezza Rice stated that preemption may be applied only with extreme care. She noted that the number of cases where it may be used is extremely low. So there has been a degree of withdrawal. I think that this is what we need to bear in mind. More clearly expressed in America, is the idea that
there must be a fairly long list of measures preceding preemption, which must be applied prior to the application of coercive measures. In my opinion, there is some room here for the work of diplomats—all the more so now, when nobody will believe any unilateral statements about the existence of data which unambiguously indicate the presence of WMD.

It seems to me that all of PSI stems from that particular understanding. PSI, although it is in essence aggressive—although not to the degree that all the measures were conceived in Washington—and despite its problems, I do think that it will be met with strong resistance, including resistance from NATO allies. As I see it, only Poland and the Czech Republic will actively support it, and the others will take a more balanced approach and will "smooth down the edges"—especially the legal aspects. The implementation of the idea of PSI is not particularly new, as the issue of "transshipment points" has already been developed under the Missile Technology Control Regime. On the other hand, almost all countries that were listed under PSI have entered into bilateral agreements with America. The second reason why this does not surprise me is that NATO is executing operation "Enduring Freedom" in the context of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. This operation has no direct bearing on the prevention of proliferation; it is being conducted in the context of resisting terrorist threats. The Mediterranean Sea, adjacent regions of the Atlantic and the sea off the African coast are being patrolled, and almost every day vessels, suspected of shipping weapons and other material for al-Qa'ida, are being seized. But the commanders of NATO ships are given an additional instruction to check for materials, which could be used to create WMD. This is the continuation of an old policy, commenced some time ago. So, what should we do? I think that there is an opportunity to engage in this process, under certain conditions.

As regards the G8, I think that that organization is playing the role of moral authority in this situation, and if one were to delegate to the G8 mechanisms for solving the tasks of counterproliferation, this could only create a sort of condominium of great powers, which will ultimately be rejected by the international community. The moral strength of the G8, meanwhile, consists in the ability to identify the problem and obtain a solution via the UN. That is the overriding mission that the G8 must coordinate to fulfill. Moreover, for Kofi Annan this is a question of life and death, after such a heavy blow to the UN. Kofi Annan understands that the UN is falling heavily behind in the field of nonproliferation. It cannot be ruled out that a special subdivision will have to be created to prevent the monopolization by the special services of the G8 countries of all data—even indirect information—concerning WMD and means of their delivery falling into the hands of terrorist organizations. This is a problem for everyone, and I think that many players possess certain information, but some will not share it with the US, while others refuse to share with us. Here we need a global approach. Just as each of these problems has two sides: one is activating information, while the other is rendering assistance. If something happens in these countries, and they have no structure for neutralizing a leak of radioactive material, or dangerous viral pathogens, then weeks will pass before the population of these countries will be given useful assistance. The UN must have access to collectively-registered capabilities. If we manage to achieve a good level of cooperation, then in a number of cases we will manage to reach an agreement about the use of force. Certain universally-accepted approaches will be created. Then, I think, the states will furnish the UN with their forces to conduct such coercive measures, and we will lay out a conception of counterproliferation within the acceptable framework of international cooperation.
Summary

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The editorial "Urgent Tasks for the Development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation: Are We In Step With the Times?" analyzes the advantages and disadvantages of Russia's recent "White Book on Defense."

This essay assesses the state of the Russian armed forces, surveys possible threats, and reviews the nature of modern wars and conflicts. It indicates that the Russian leadership shares the principles of U.S. military policy, which recognizes the unpredictability of the global military and political situation since the end of the bipolar system.

At the same time, the article notes that the new doctrine espoused by the Ministry of Defense raises several questions. First of all, it proclaims the end of military reform, even though a mismatch between declared aims and available resources remains. Furthermore, there is no real difference between the principles underlying the new doctrine and the military doctrine of 2000.

In an interview of Sergey Antipov by Yaderny Kontrol editor in chief Vladimir Orlov, called "Nuclear Submarine Dismantlement: No One Has Yet Crossed the Finish Line," the Russian Deputy Minister of Atomic Energy speaks out on a number of critical issues, such as Minatom's role as a coordinator of programs related to the MNEPR agreement, and various aspects of nuclear submarine dismantlement in light of cooperation under the framework of the Global Partnership as well as the recent loss of the K-159 submarine.

Giving his estimation of MNEPR, Antipov notes that "if MNEPR overcomes all of the difficulties related to ratification, it could become the universal organizational and legal basis for the realization of many different types of cooperation, from Global Partnership to bilateral projects."

Concerning the question of financing nuclear submarine dismantlement, Antipov noted that "at present Russian financing is not sufficient to undertake the tasks we find before us. Therefore we have turned the attention of the world community to this problem and are waiting for assistance, particularly of a financial nature. Unfortunately, we have not received a sufficient quantity to date."

In his article "The Global Partnership at a Crossroads," Anatoliy Anin examines the prospects for the development of the Global Partnership program, from Kananaskis to Sea Island. The author notes that clear successes include the disposition of chemical weapons and dismantlement of nuclear-powered submarines.

In Anin's opinion, "one of the most important tasks in the coming year is the continuation of work on the establishment of the legal basis needed for Global Partnership cooperation. Current bilateral agreements with the United States, Japan, Germany, and the United Kingdom make progress possible. Similar agreements must be worked out with Italy and Canada. Questions regarding interaction in the field of chemical weapons destruction remain with France."

Roland Timerbayev's article "On the Role of the United Nations Today" analyzes the reasons for the crisis in which the UN finds itself at present. Timerbayev focuses particular attention on the negative consequences of U.S. policy towards the United Nations.

The senior PIR Center adviser examines the UN's ability to regulate conflicts, evaluates different methods for reforming the organization in order for it to avoid the fate of the League of Nations, and examines in detail the positions of UN Security Council permanent members toward reform of this body.

In the article "The Reform of Ministry of Internal Affairs Detachments Guarding Russian Nuclear Facilities," Deputy Director of the Siberian Chemical Combine Igor Goloskokov examines the developments that have resulted in the need for a revision of current Minatom facility protection practices. The author notes that in view of the great potential danger emanating from these facilities, the consequences of inadequate protection could be catastrophic.

Using the Siberian Chemical Combine's physical protection system as an example, the author analyzes the advantages and disadvantages of the two prevailing security systems: the practice of using Internal Ministry troops to protect facilities and the use of Minatom's own detachments.

Iranian Institute for Political and International Studies (IPIS) researcher Heidar Ali Balouji, in his article "On Iran's Nuclear Choice," presents the Iranian position regarding charges concerning the Iranian nuclear program, and also the motives that lie behind such charges. The Iranian expert notes that hypothetically "Iran's poor nuclear arsenal would be useless against weak neighbors and ineffective against the large nuclear arsenal of such powerful enemies as the
United States. Moreover, any Iranian attempt to get nuclear weapons could provoke a preemptive attack." The author devotes considerable attention to Iran's position with regards to its nuclear program, and also discusses nuclear disarmament and Iran's national interests.

In materials on a round table, entitled "International Terrorism Using Weapons of Mass Destruction," that occurred at the Russian Federal Assembly Federation Council with the participation of PIR Center Director Vladimir Orlov; Federation Council International Affairs Committee Expert Council Chairman Anatoly Korobeynikov; Vladimir Melnikov, Deputy Chairman of the Federation Council Committee on Defense and Security; Leonid Bindar, member of the Federation Council Committee on Constitutional Legislation; Fedor Ladygin, East*West Energy Dialogue Institute advisor; Oleg Nepochirenko, General Director of the National Anticriminal and Antiterrorist Foundation; Nikolay Ponomarev-Stepnoy, Russian Academy of Science academian and Vice President of the Kurchatov Institute (Russian Research Center) and others, the opinions of Russian experts on urgent questions related to WMD terrorism are presented, including the vulnerability of state and megalopolis infrastructure to terrorism, and measures to fight terrorism.

In PIR Center Executive Board member Colonel General Viktor Yesin's article "Ways to Counter International Terrorism," the author analyzes the social and ideological reasons for the rise of international terrorism. Yesin believes that international terrorism is begetting new and serious threats to the security of both individual states and the world community as a whole. In the article he argues that "the use of armed methods (force) alone to combat terrorism leads to a dead end: violence generates violence." The author proposes several ways to fight the escalation of international terrorism, as well as to restrain it, based first and foremost on the establishment of a consolidated international system for combating terrorism.

In his article "Nuclear Security and the Human Factor," the senior PIR Center adviser Vasily Lata examines one of the most important factors in ensuring the security of nuclear missiles: the psychological state of the soldiers operating them.

The author analyzes the foundations of the psychological component of the security system in military units that handle nuclear missiles, such as educational and psychological work with personnel. The results of sociological studies carried out among the troops were widely used in this analysis.

In the beginning of 2003, Brazil's new Minister of Science and Technology, Roberto Amaral, stated that his country should obtain nuclear weapon technology. However, is Brazil capable of building these deadly weapons? In his article "Nuclear Dreams of Brazil," Ilya Fabrichnikov answers this question through an analysis of the current state of Brazil's nuclear industry, and also the Brazilian political leadership's intentions in the development of peaceful atomic power engineering and the national economy in pursuit of this task.

National security can be strengthened not only through an increase in armaments, but also via the mutual reduction of armed forces, all types of military equipment, and weapons on the basis of international agreements, writes Vasily Lata in his article "Strategic Nuclear Forces and the Provision of National Security."

In the author's opinion, it was precisely the excessive militarization of the economy that destroyed the Soviet economy and national security. Examining the process of reducing strategic armaments in the USSR, the author comes to the conclusion that a reduction in strategic nuclear forces does not automatically lead to a reduction of security, and that the ability to cause unacceptable damage to an aggressor can be maintained.

In an article by Bakhtiyar Tuzmukhamedov, Counselor in the Department of International Law of the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation, entitled "Russian Soldiers in International Joint Operations: Constitutional Legal Procedures and Practices," the author examines both Soviet and Russian legal regulations governing procedures for making the decision to dispatch military contingents abroad, as well as current arrangements and their application in practice. The transformation of the relationship of the executive branch towards the use of our armed forces abroad and the application of existing procedures in practice is demonstrated. A little-known Russian Constitutional Court resolution relating directly to this subject is described in detail.

Ilya Fabrichnikov and Andrey Frolov, in their article "Counterproliferation: There's Nothing New Under the Sun," examine the first practical example of counterproliferation: Israel's 1979-1981 actions to sabotage the Iraqi nuclear program. The authors examine Israeli actions in France and Iraq, as a result of which the Iraqi nuclear program was stopped. The article also analyzes possible scenarios for the destruction of Iranian nuclear facilities.
Libya's recent decision to cut short its WMD programs is an important step in the strengthening of the nonproliferation regime. In the editorial “What Does Colonel Qaddafi's Admission Mean?” Libya's motivations for taking this decision are considered and the international implications of this step analyzed.

The article notes that if the December statements of intent by Libya take the form of concrete agreements on the dismantlement of existing arsenals and those in the process of being created, we will witness an unprecedented step, by which a state ends all its military programs in the sphere of WMD and means of their delivery, and places their dismantlement under international control.

Pakistan is the main proliferating state in the world today. Traces of its nuclear technologies can be found in North Korea, Iran, and now Libya. Who else has benefited from its nuclear brains still has to be determined. Pakistan's last deliveries to Libya, it appears, occurred after September 11, 2001, when the United States strongly warned President Musharraf about the inadmissibility of sharing nuclear technologies and received the appropriate promise from him. Pakistan is an unstable and weak state, where the central government does not control significant swaths of territory and where international terrorist organizations find sympathy. Can the international community continue to be reconciled to a nuclear Pakistan that is a proliferator?

And finally article notes, the Libyan decision, or, more exactly, the way it came to that decision, is a lesson for Russia as well. Russia cannot remain outside of the process of deciding the vital, concrete questions relating to the struggle against global WMD proliferation. This would contradict our declared foreign policy. We should more actively make use of the traditional ties and levers of influence that remain to us. A successful example of Russia's involvement in the solution of a critical proliferation problem was the painstaking work with Iran in the past few years and particularly past few months, in large part thanks to Moscow, and already subsequently through the efforts of Berlin, Paris, and London, leading to Iran's signing of the Additional Protocol in the same days last December when Libya was opening up information on its nuclear program. It does not make sense for us to remove ourselves from the dialogue with our traditional partners, like Syria.

But if in certain situations Russia would be better off acting alone, in most cases we would work more fruitfully in concert with the United States. The best example of this sort of concrete cooperation in the past few months is the removal of spent nuclear fuel from research reactors in Central and Eastern Europe (Serbia, Bulgaria, and Romania). The geography of this cooperation has now been extended to the former Soviet states.

Perhaps if the removal of nuclear components from Libya becomes necessary Russia and the United States could do it together, under the aegis of the IAEA? The slight softening in Washington's tone with regard to Iran lets us look into the distant future and - although today this still seems a fantasy - suggest that we consider the possibility of joint Russian-U.S. projects to develop peaceful nuclear energy in Iran. This is precisely the sort of cooperation that could serve as a guarantee against mutual suspicion, and against the emergence of secret nuclear weapon programs.

In PIR Center Executive Council Chairman Roland Timerbaev's interview of Mohamed El Baradei “The Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime in Hard Times,” the IAEA Director General speaks of the current shortcomings of and challenges to the regime. In El Baradei's opinion, to maintain regime effectiveness one must periodically adapt it to new realities and emerging threats. In the 1990s, one such "modernization" was successfully carried out when a new mechanism, the so called "Additional Protocol," was created.

Concerning questions regarding the role of the IAEA in the advancement of the Global Partnership programs, the Director General noted the following areas of possible collaboration: IAEA assistance in missions to inspect various sites, in the development and adoption of general standards in the area of physical security in the nuclear sphere, and others.

El Baradei also believes that the G_8 might finance IAEA projects, such as those focused on increasing the security of nuclear materials and highly radioactive materials.

In his interview “The Nuclear Industry is One of the Most Important National Exporters” with Yaderny Kontrol editor-in-chief Vladimir Orlov, Minister of Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation Aleksandr Rumyantsev discusses the future of nuclear power engineering in detail,
and examines the prospects for the development of nuclear power engineering in Russia.

The head of Minatom notes that “nuclear energy production using fast-neutron reactors is virtually limitless as far as fuel is concerned, and can provide humanity with energy. Furthermore, new generation fast reactors also solve the problem of radioactive wastes, minimizing both their quantity and activity. If we add to this the organization of international nuclear fuel cycle centers, then the nonproliferation problem is reduced as well.”

As for Russian-American cooperation in the sphere of weapons plutonium disposition, Rumyantsev notes that “a site for the construction of a mixed uranium and plutonium oxide fuel (MOX fuel) plant has already been selected, and a decision on the use of French technology for MOX fuel production made.”

In his article “On the Way to Strategic Stability,” Igor Sergeev, the Russian president's aide on strategic stability issues, analyzes contemporary global security issues. The author notes that “nuclear deterrence no longer serves as the basis for strategic interactions between states. The world community widely subscribes to the idea that using nuclear weapons in armed conflict is both inadmissible and inexpedient.”

However “the strategic concepts and plans of nearly every nuclear power include the principle of the first use of nuclear weapons.”

As for counterproliferation, the president's aide notes that “the use of counterproliferation to resuscitate power politics could become a delayed action mine, blessing the arrogant plans of an array of regional leaders.”

In addition, Sergeev opines, “nonproliferation, like the war on terror, must not become an end in itself or the vision of any one state. It is in the interests of the entire global community not to tolerate emerging threats, but this must be by legitimate means, and the goal of joint efforts must be the security of all countries.”

Yuri Baluyevsky, first deputy chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, in his article “Nuclear Deterrence and Strategic Offensive Reductions,” evaluates the role and place of nuclear deterrence policy in the contemporary world, and uses the SORT treaty as the basis for an examination of its future role in Russian-American relations.

The author notes that “today we are participants in a sort of 'qualitative jump' in both the theory and practice of nuclear deterrence. New forms of nuclear deterrence are appearing, such as deterrence by threatening not use, but merely acquisition of nuclear weapons.” However, in Baluyevsky's opinion, “we will not part with nuclear weapons in the foreseeable future.”

As for the SORT treaty, the author observes that “the new SORT treaty is unique in that it answers basic questions about the future development of strategic weapons, determining their levels and the terms for the further reduction of both parties' nuclear forces.”

The deputy chief of the General Staff comes to the conclusion that a “peculiar paradox” has been formed at present. “The nuclear factor, which for a long time led to confrontation and to a worsening in relations, mutual suspicion and distrust, is now working in exactly the opposite direction.”

In an article by President of the Institute on the Study of Israel and the Middle East Yevgeny Satanovskiy entitled “Power Centers: a Forecast of the Geopolitical Situation after the War in Iraq,” a prognosis of the strategy of contemporary global power centers is presented. The war in Iraq is used as the starting point for the analysis.

The author argues that “heterogeneous in their levels of economic development, political consolidation and possibilities for influencing the outside world, these centers will become the source of political and military initiatives, which, in the final analysis, will determine the hierarchical structure of international relations in the near future.”

Senior PIR Center Adviser Gennady Yevstafiev, in his article “WMD Nonproliferation: Several Problems and Risks,” sums up the successes and failures in the area of nonproliferation in the year 2003, and it also analyzes possible challenges to the nonproliferation regime. The author pays special attention to questions of the legitimacy of the use of force, and to the circumstances under which one might initiate a preventive war. Yevstafiev also examines challenges to the NPT in detail: North Korea’s withdrawal from the agreement, and the existence of the de facto nuclear powers of India, Pakistan and Israel in the absence of mechanisms to deter them. In the article he notes that in the immediate future the major “new challenge” in the area of nuclear nonproliferation may be the threat of the use of a “dirty bomb” or analogous surrogate device using other WMD technology and diverse possible means of their delivery.

In the article “The NPT and the NATO Concept of 'Joint Control' of Nuclear Weapons,” Anatoly Anin looks at the NATO concept for the “joint control” of nuclear weapons, or
“nuclear sharing.” The author analyzes the compatibility of this concept with the letter and the spirit of the NPT, the problem of the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe, and new NATO members’ adoption of “nuclear sharing” and NATO nuclear policy as a whole. In Anin's opinion, “NATO's use of the ‘nuclear sharing' concept creates a sort of loophole in the NPT, which can be used by other states as well.”

In the article by Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs staffer Vladimir Khlebnikov “Urgent Nonproliferation Issues and the Role of the IAEA,” the author presents his views on the reasons for the growth of the IAEA's political role not only in the area of nonproliferation, but also in promoting atomic energy. Khlebnikov examines in detail the various ways the IAEA carries out its basic functions of monitoring and cooperation, how the Agency reacts to new challenges and threats, and the potential directions of future IAEA activity. In addition, he examines the Agency's work in the “problem” countries of Iraq, North Korea and Iran.

In the article by Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs Department on Security and Disarmament Issues expert Victor Lichayev “Libya’s Choice: Consequences for Global WMD Counterproliferation,”” the political consequences of Libya’s decision to forego the development of WMD programs are analyzed. The author notes that in the Arab world they consider Tripoli's decision to be a responsible step, confirming its efforts to make a real contribution to improving the peace and security of the region. At the same time, the Russian diplomat notes, “the intriguing aspect of the situation consists in the fact that Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi, the leader of a country that up until very recently has been among the most active in the Arab states to subject the Israeli nuclear program to sharp criticism, challenged Syria and Iran to follow the Libyan example and forego the development of WMD programs, without mentioning Israel!”

Anna Abayeva, in her article “Russia and the Countries of Scandinavia: the Expansion of the Global Partnership Program,” examines the contributions of Norway, Sweden, and Finland to cooperative programs with Russia to liquidate its “Cold War heritage!” Her article notes that “Russia's priorities within the framework of cooperation are the dismantlement of Russian nuclear-powered submarines and the destruction of chemical weapons.” In the opinion of the author, “the accession of these countries to the Global Partnership should make it possible to enlarge the framework of this program as well as foreign capital investment. There are already a number of multinational and bilateral agreements that have been concluded with the countries of Scandinavia on rendering aid to Russia for the nonproliferation of WMD and materials. These agreements have already showed their effectiveness in practice.

In an article by Marat Kenzhetaev, an independent expert on military-technical cooperation, entitled “Russian Military and Technical Cooperation with Countries in the Middle East,” military imports by countries in the Middle East and Russian military-technical collaboration with Middle Eastern countries are considered.

The author notes that the countries of the region are world leaders in the import of armaments, due to the high rate of conflict in the region. However, the expert continues, “in spite of the enormous volume of the Middle Eastern arms market, its importance in the arms trade will gradually decline in future.”

Russia is one of the largest exporters of weapons to the region, and, given Russia's dependence on India and the P.R.C. for its arms exports, the author argues that military-technical collaboration with the countries of the Middle East is very important for Russia both to diversify arms exports and for financial reasons.

The majority of the article is dedicated to Russia's military-technical cooperation with countries in the Middle East, and goes into great detail in its survey of contracts and deliveries of Russian weapons and military equipment to these countries. It also examines the prospects and possible alternatives for the development of Russian military and technical collaboration.

Russian Academy of Sciences Nuclear Safety Institute (IBRAE) Deputy Division Head Remos Kalinin, in “The Construction of the First Nuclear-Powered Submarine in the Russian Far East,”” uses the recollections of participants to describe the difficulties of building the Project 659 nuclear submarine K_45 at the shipyard in the Far East's Komsomolsk-na-Amure. He also relates episodes connected with the difficult testing of the first nuclear submarine built in Komsomolsk.
The editorial “Ten Years Later: Ten Results and Ten Tasks” sums up the PIR Center’s achievements during its 10-year history and lays down guidelines for the future.

The essay assesses that PIR Center has maintained its independence and PIR Center’s very existence disproves the thesis that under Russian conditions a non-governmental organization in the international security sphere is an oxymoron. Moreover, PIR Center has become the sole Russian center providing educational programs in the field of WMD nonproliferation and international security in the whole of Russia. PIR Center is an energetic participant in partnerships with other Russian non-governmental organizations, in international cooperation, and in all kinds of exchanges.

The editorial notes that the results PIR Center has achieved are an object of pride, but by no means a reason to rest on our laurels and PIR Center intends to pursue the following principal goals: the first is to conduct a comprehensive study of the threats and challenges to the international regime for the nonproliferation of WMD and means of their delivery, to achieve sustainable growth and concrete, practical results from PIR Center’s educational programs, and to improve the quality of scientific research.

And finally, PIR Center’s goals are: to support the Council on a Sustainable Partnership for Russia (SUPR), to prepare and participate in side events for experts during the G8 summit to be held in Russia in 2006 and to promote PIR Center’s programs beyond Russia’s borders.

In an interview of Andrey Malyshev by Yaderny Kontrol correspondent Andrey Frolov entitled “The International SNF Market is Shrinking,” the head of the Federal Nuclear Inspectorate talks about various aspects of nuclear safety in Russia. In Malyshev’s opinion, “safety levels at Russian NPPs satisfy the recommendations of international organizations (such as the IAEA) and are no worse than in the United States, France, or Germany, since not one western project has undergone as thorough an appraisal by international expert groups.”

Concerning questions about the theft of nuclear materials, the Federal Nuclear Inspectorate head notes that “in 2000 there were six cases of theft of radioactive sources, in 2001 – six cases, in 2002 – four cases, and in the first 10 months of 2003 – four cases as well. There were no thefts of sources at former Minatom enterprises.”

The participation of U.S. private business in Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) programs is examined by Roman Popov in the article “The Role of American Business in the Implementation of Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs.” The author notes that the success of the programs to assist Russia in the dismantlement of weapons of mass destruction and means of their delivery would have been impossible without the active participation of U.S. business, especially if we consider the fact that 84% of the expenditures to assist Russia have been made not through direct financing but by attracting American companies that receive contracts to realize concrete projects in Russia. In the expert’s opinion, CTR projects require significant experience in concrete, narrowly specialized areas. And private American companies that are active in CTR programs possess just such long-term experience, having fulfilled defense orders for the United States and other countries for many years.

Irina Kupriyanova, of Obninsk’s Institute of Physics and Power Engineering, analyzes the interrelationship between nuclear facility security and “safety culture” in her article “Nuclear Facility Safety Culture: Criterion for Evaluation and Methods for its Increase.” In the opinion of the author, one must seriously consider the problem of familiarizing personnel with the culture of working with nuclear materials and installations. Kupriyanova notes that “through the present time, there is no clear reason for the differences between the safety cultures of the nuclear powers.”

She observes that “the majority of incidents at NPPs occurred precisely because of inattention to the so-called human factor, i.e. to safety culture.”

The analysis of Russian foreign policy under President Vladimir Putin is the subject of Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO) professor Yuri Fedorov’s “Does Russia’s Foreign Policy Need Reforming?” The author contends that the strategic direction of Russian foreign policy is not irreversible. Thus, in the beginning of 2004 there was a caesura, or possibly even a retreat,
with respect to Russia's relations with the leading democratic states.

Yuri Fedorov notes that Moscow's support of American anti-terrorist operations in Afghanistan was the most important, but not only, formative event shaping the new U.S.-Russian relationship. This was followed by the Kremlin's calm reaction, very unlike the hysteria of the second half of the 1990s, to the U.S. withdrawal from the ABM treaty, which made possible the conclusion of the Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions, a very important agreement for Russia. Its signing confirmed that the factors bringing Russia and America together were stronger than those leading to divergent political positions.

The author notes that in 2001-2002, preventing a severe crisis in Russia's relations with western countries was critical. This required, first and foremost, political will. But the tasks before us today involve the deepening and institutionalization of Russia's relations with its western partners, a considerably more complex undertaking. Not only must we reject obsolete approaches, but also come to agreement on a wide range of issues, and, most importantly, develop operational procedures, mechanisms, and institutions for cooperation.

The article by Institute of Europe graduate student Natalya Tuzovskaya "Russia and NATO: A New Type of Relationship," examines Russia's cooperation with the North Atlantic alliance since the creation of the NATO-Russia Council on May 28, 2002. The author notes that from an institutional standpoint the creation of the Council was a breakthrough in the relationship.

However, a qualitatively new level of interaction has yet to be achieved in practice. Concerning Russia-NATO relations, the author notes that Russia is not yet ready for a new level of cooperation with the alliance, mainly due to the complexities of conducting its own internal reforms. The relationship with NATO is developing quite dynamically, and very serious potential for cooperation has been accumulated within the framework of the alliance's work with Russia "at twenty," as equal partners. But on the whole, relations are of a rather "technical character," and are far from the level of a strategic partnership, the goal that was set in 1997.

The materials from the round table "Counterproliferation: An Answer to New Challenges?" that took place at the PIR Center with the participation of PIR Center Director Vladimir Orlov, Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs official Yevgeny Zvedre, MGIMO Professor Yuri Fedorov, Senior PIR Center Advisor Gennady Yevstafiev, Senior PIR Center Advisor Vladimir Dvorkin, Committee of Scientists for Global Security Chairman Mikhail Vinogradov, Russian Federation Ministry of Foreign Affairs official Viktor Lichayev and others include a presentation of the basic provisions of the Proliferation Security Initiative, as well as a discussion of the situation in Iran and the DPRK in the context of counterproliferation measures. The Russian point of view is presented in detail, as are the legal deficiencies of the PSI.

The article by well-known Russian nonproliferation expert Vladimir Novikov "Leakages of Nuclear Technology from Pakistan - A Confirmation of the Crisis of the Global Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime" analyzes the circumstances surrounding the transfer of nuclear technologies from Pakistan to third countries, the reasons that compelled Iran and Libya to divulge information about illegal imports of nuclear technologies from Pakistan, and also the course of and prospects for the investigation of the leakages of critical technologies.

The author suggests that high ranking IAEA members could use the fact of the illegal export of nuclear technology from Pakistan to strengthen the IAEAs ability to control nuclear exports, and obtain new confirmation of the need for the prompt signing of the Additional Protocol by all IAEA members.

Furthermore, in the opinion of Vladimir Novikov, the leakages of technologies that have been unveiled confirm that the main reason for the continued spread of nuclear weapons is the anxiety the leaders of a number of countries feel regarding questions of national security. Without security guarantees the illegal transfer of sensitive nuclear technology to other countries and, possibly, non-governmental actors may be repeated (or at least attempted).

In Andrey Grebenschikov's article "The Problem of the North Korean 'Challenge': the View from Russia," the problems of regulating the crisis surrounding the nuclear program of the DPRK are investigated. The author argues that the North Korean "challenge" is ambiguous in nature, since from the legal point of view the fact of the DPRK's violation of international legal norms is clear, but on the other hand, if we judge by the statements of the North Korean authorities, Pyongyang's development of a nuclear program is an answer to
threats to regime security emanating from the United States.

The author avers that Russia's position is special because the Russian Federation is the only member of the "six" that has not been affected by North Korean blackmail. The latter has impinged upon all of the other states to one extent or another. The current Russian position on the negotiations is that a package solution is necessary. On the one hand, the solution must guarantee the nonnuclear status of the Korean peninsula, the return of the DPRK into the NPT, and the renewal of cooperation with the IAEA, and on the other hand satisfy or resolve North Korea's legitimate concerns about its own security. Yet, in Andrey Grebenshchikov's opinion, Russia's current political leverage over DPRK behavior is extremely limited.

In an article by Scientific Adviser to the President of the Council of State Fidel Castro Diaz-Balart "Cuba = the New Member of the NPT" author analyzes different issues of Cuba's nuclear program and the causes of its decision to join NPT. Author notes that Cuba became the first non-signatory to the NPT to accede to the Additional Protocol. In summary, Cuba's commitment to strengthened safeguards underlined its abiding interest in securing the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Commenting on the situation around the construction the nuclear facility near Juragua Cuban expert notes that Cuba entertained a number of prospective suitors in its efforts to complete the nuclear program, and for a time after its signature of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, it appeared that perhaps a Russian firm or some other similarly interested company might be willing to assist the Cuban effort. But disappointingly, Cuba found little real interest in the project but continued to seek investment. So, in December 2000, Cuban officials announced that it made no sense for Cuba to try to continue to complete the plant, and officially ended the 18-year effort at Juragua to develop a nuclear energy capability for the island.

"Nuclear energy remains a likely future alternative for Cuba. Cuba has continued to maintain close ties to the IAEA and the international nuclear science community. It continues to educate and train engineers, scientists and technicians in both the theoretical and applied aspects of nuclear science" - concluded Scientific Adviser to the President of the Council of State Fidel Castro Diaz-Balart

In Russian naval armaments expert Mikhail Barabanov's article "Prospects for Nuclear Submarine Construction in the Twenty-First Century," the history, current state, and future prospects for the development of global nuclear submarine construction are considered.

The author examines the changes in the function and composition of the U.S. submarine forces since the end of the Cold War and elucidates current development programs, from the construction of Virginia-class attack submarines to the reequipping of SSBNs as SSGNs, as well as future trends in nuclear submarine development.

In his examination of the nuclear submarine fleet of the USSR and Russia, Barabanov pays particular attention to the construction of effective third-generation nuclear submarines, both before and especially after the collapse of the USSR. He also looks at the current composition and actual technical state of Russia's nuclear submarine forces, as well as the present state of nuclear submarine construction. The article also analyzes the beginning of the implementation of the program to construct fourth-generation Project 885 and Project 955 nuclear-powered submarines and SSBNs.

Lev Kochetkov's article "The Creation of the First NPP" provides little-known facts about the history of the creation of the world's first nuclear power plant. The author observes that after the successful testing of the nation's nuclear weapons, work on the peaceful application of nuclear energy received powerful state support. During the construction of the NPP many very complex problems had to be solved for the first time, such as the physical basis for installation security, the development of reliable fuel elements and fuel channels, systems to monitor, manage, and protect the reactor, and equipment that worked reliably. All of the work, from project launch to installation, was completed in just four years. On June 26, 1954 the NPP's generating unit was connected to the Moscow power grid.