International Security
Nonproliferation
Arms Control

DIGEST OF THE RUSSIAN JOURNAL

YADERNY KONTROL

(NUCLEAR CONTROL)

Volume 7, № 1

Winter 2002

PUBLISHER: PIR CENTER FOR POLICY STUDIES IN RUSSIA

Moscow, 2002

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YADERNY KONTROL
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International Security. Nonproliferation. Arms Control.

Volume 7

N 1 (21)

Winter 2002

Published four times a year since 1996

Contains selected analytical articles from *Yaderny Kontrol*, a journal published in Russian six times a year

Printed in Russia

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Subscriptions worldwide (Russian and English editions): please, send requests to fax +7+503-234-9558 or e-mail: info@pircenter.org. Checks or wire transfers. Express mail delivery.

Circulation:
Russian journal: 2,000 copies
English Digest: 800 copies
Signed for printing
on October 20, 2001

- The editors wish to express special thanks to the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies for making this publication possible through its support of the PIR Center for Policy Studies in Russia

Publisher: PIR Center for Policy Studies in Russia
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Editorial

COUNTER-TERRORIST OPERATION OR THE THIRD WORLD WAR?

Terrorist attacks against the United States have proved that genuine global conflict is a growing uncompromising ideological, political and military confrontation between the extremists of the South and the liberal anthropocentric civilization of the West. This has repeatedly been recognized by the leaders of anti-Western states and movements. For instance, President of Iran Mohammad Khatami, who is regarded to be a *moderate* leader, wrote once that Islam challenged, '[…] the entire ideological and value system of the Western civilization […] Political motto of the West is to protect freedom, human rights, democracy and nation states. Our war against the West in this sphere is a matter of life and death. And any compromise, any our concession […] will not bring about any result, except oppression, humiliation, and the loss of our individuality and fame.'

The events of September 11, 2001 demonstrated that World War III had broken out. Enormous gap in the amount and quality of military arsenals of the extremist states and movements and the leading nations of the West makes this to be a *strange war*. So far the major weapons that are used are terrorist acts, whose scale is increasing. Tomorrow it may turn into massive urban guerrilla war. The day after tomorrow terrorists may resort to nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons.

The terrorist attacks in New York and Washington have indicated that "a good terrorist is a dead terrorist" and have awoken US political will. However, it is much easier to declare war against the international terrorism, than to win such war. Missile strikes and bombings, destruction of Osama bin Laden's bases and elimination of his allies make sense. They will help some state leaders, who made advances to terrorists, to come back down to earth, but will not eliminate terrorism as such. Moreover, the retaliation strike by the United States is likely to result in the outburst of terrorist acts in the West. Combat against terrorism is mainly a long international police operation implying penetration into terrorist networks in the Middle East, Europe, the USA and Russia, discovery of their plans, search for leaders, clandestine branches and financial flows, etc.

Moscow has to face a number of difficult issues after the September terrorist attacks in the USA. Should Russia join the United States in the military operation against Afghanistan, or in any broader campaign? What would the form of this participation be? How may this affect Russia's relations with Central Asia and Islamic states neighboring the FSU borders? What would the reaction of the Russian public be? What kind of strategic situation will emerge in Central Asia if the US operation in Afghanistan succeeds or fails?

It took the Russian leadership nearly two weeks to lay down its position – a compromise of different views within the military and political Establishment. Moscow's message, in brief, is the following: Russia endorses politically the counter-terrorist operation; is ready for practical and broad cooperation with the West, as far as secret services are concerned; will provide military support to the anti-Talib Northern Alliance in Afghanistan; will open its airspace for transit flights of aircraft with humanitarian cargoes to the area of operation. President Putin also hinted that, 'Other deeper forms of cooperation between Russia and other parties to the counter-terrorist operation are possible. The depth and the character of such cooperation will directly depend on the general level and quality of our relations with these states and of mutual understanding concerning the struggle against international terrorism.'

In other words, Moscow fairly strives for equal participation in planning of the war against terrorism and calls for abandoning double standards in this area. What is even more important, the Russian elite has managed to overcome anti-Western bias and to find its place in the common global front against terrorism.

Hot Topic

AMERICA'S WORST NIGHTMARE? OSAMA BIN LADEN AND WMD

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[This article was originally published in Russian in *Yaderny Kontrol*, No. 4, Vol. 7, June-July, 2001]

In 2001, Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet stated in front of Congress that 'Osama bin Laden and his network (*al Qaeda*) are the nation's most immediate and serious transnational threat.'[1] He specified that this assessment was primarily based on bin Laden's interest in weapons of mass destruction. The importance of an accurate assessment lies in the fact that if real, the threat would require a significant transformation of national security strategy. Further, the perceived threat is one of the arguments presented by the US government for building a national missile defense (NMD), a decision that is currently a source of tension between the US and the rest of the world.

The assessment is based on an analysis of bin Laden's WMD capability in combination with the possible motivation to inflict mass casualties. Capability is evaluated in terms of actual possession of WMD agents and the means to deliver them. Financial resources needed to acquire such capability are also examined. In evaluation of bin Laden's motivation to use WMD, an analysis of his belief system is used to assess whether inflicting mass casualties would be consistent with his goals.

Background

Osama bin Laden comes from a high profile Saudi family. His father Mohammed Awad bin Laden came to Saudi Arabia from Hadramout (South Yemen) as a poor manual worker, but later managed to start a successful construction business. His performance and loyalty helped him to establish a close relationship with the royal family. During a financial crisis he paid the wages of all civil servants in the kingdom for six months. King Faisal then issued a decree that all construction projects should go to bin Laden. For a brief period, he was also named the minister for public works[2]. He died when Osama was 13 years old.

Osama bin Laden grew up and attended primary and secondary school in Jiddah, Saudi Arabia. Upon graduation in 1973 he left for Beirut for 'rest and recreation'. At that time, the Lebanese capital was an exciting westernized city, and bin Laden fully enjoyed its pleasures. He drank in bars and was allegedly involved in at least three fights over a prostitute[3].

In 1975 he started studying civil engineering (some sources say public administration) at the King Abdul Aziz University in Jiddah. The events that took place in Lebanon that year began a debate among Muslim scholars about the civil war being God's punishment for the corruption of Beirut. Through contacts with the Muslim Brotherhood at the University, bin Laden transformed into a hard line Islamist. It is likely that the self-imposed guilt of his Beirut life style contributed to the radicalization process. Frustrated with his lack of status in the family and being overshadowed by his elder half-brother Salim, Osama eagerly looked for a purpose.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 provided bin Laden with an opportunity. He went there for a month on an exploratory trip that apparently made quite an impression on him. Upon his return he set up recruiting offices around the world, financed the transportation of some 10,000 Muslim warriors from Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Pakistan, Sudan, Yemen and Algeria to Afghanistan. He set up training facilities, brought in experts on guerilla warfare, sabotage and covert operations, paid for training of troops and provided them with modern equipment. The United States also supported these troops by the CIA's *Operation Cyclone*, a $500 million per-year campaign to help the

guerillas fight the Soviet Union[4]. It is estimated that a significant quantity of high-tech American weapons, including Stinger ground-to-air heat-seeking missiles made their way into the Mujahedeen's arsenal. Some sources even suggest the US emissaries met directly with bin Laden, and that it was bin Laden, acting on advice from his friends in Saudi intelligence, who first suggested the Mujahedeen should be given Stingers. The majority of them are reported to still be in their possession.

The guerillas were quite successful. What had begun as a fragmented army of tribal warriors ended up being a modern army capable of defeating a superpower. The departing Soviet troops left behind an Afghanistan with a huge arsenal of sophisticated weapons (including Scud B missiles) and thousands of experienced Islamic warriors from a variety of countries[5]. This Afghan episode is quite significant as it enabled bin Laden to experience a triumphant Jihad. 'One day in Afghanistan was like one thousand days of praying in an ordinary mosque,' he later said[6]. It also provided bin Laden with contacts to Muslim fighters from a variety of countries, fighters who are very dedicated to him. Most of them returned to their home countries to fight against Western-influenced governments in favor of Islamic regimes.

Bin Laden returned to Saudi Arabia as a popular figure. He received many invitations from mosques to speak about his adventures. 250,000 audiotapes of his speeches were produced and sold in shops and market stalls. These tapes also included bin Laden's feelings about the Saudi Arabia he found upon return. He spoke furiously of American imperialism in the Middle East and of the American support of Israel. After these statements he was instructed by the Saudi regime to stop his public speeches and was banned from traveling. His relationship with the royal family finally reached a critical point during the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Bin Laden prepared a plan to defend the kingdom against potentially invading Iraqi forces. He even offered to bring in the Arab Mujahedeen to defend the kingdom. While he was waiting for response, he found out that the Americans were coming[7]. This moment is seen as the turning point toward his radical anti-American orientation.

In 1994 his Saudi citizenship was revoked and bin Laden moved to Sudan, where he worked closely with the local government to provide jobs for the Afghan veterans. However, the Sudanese government was not able to resist the ongoing US sanctions and as a sign of good will, asked bin Laden to depart. In May 1996 he moved to Afghanistan, leaving behind him a network of Afghan veterans and several successful factories and corporations (i.e. a factory to process goatskins, a construction company, a bank, a sunflower plantation, and an import-export operation). Several major companies in Sudan are linked to him, and are believed to be doing double-duty as logistics support for his network.

On August 23, 1996, two months before having to leave Sudan, bin Laden first stated his *fatwa* (a religiously sanctioned opinion on religious or civil matters), which stated that it was an individual duty of every Muslim to kill American military personnel abroad[8].

On May 28, 1998 Osama bin Laden announced the formation of an international ***Islamic Front for Jihad against the Jews and the Crusaders***, an umbrella organization for groups that perceive the western democracies - and first and foremost the United States - as their primary ideological rival. For them this contest is a zero-sum game. Their violent activity is directed against an existing world order in which Islam is in a position of inferiority. They deny the legitimacy of the secular regimes ruling Islamic countries. The ultimate goal is to defeat of the United States in the same manner that the Soviet Union had been defeated in Afghanistan. Several Islamic movements had joined this organization, among them the notorious Egyptian *al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya* and the Egyptian *al-Jihad*.

The Islamic Front for Jihad Against the Jews and the Crusaders is probably nothing more than a loose alliance of Islamic terrorist groups. Another much more frequently used term for bin Laden's support group is *al Qaeda* (The Base). The relationship between the two organizations is unclear. The name *al Qaeda* dates back to 1988 and supposedly originated

from the term used in reference to one of bin Laden's guesthouses, where all the Mujahedeen that came to Afghanistan were required to register. These records later provided bin Laden with extensive contacts to Islamic warriors around the world. While *al Qaeda* is often cited as his own terrorist group, which belongs to the broader alliance, it is interesting to note that bin Laden himself has never publicly used the term. Further, *al Qaeda* does not have any known organizational structure or insignia and some of its alleged members are also associated with other terrorist organization (i.e. Ayman Al Zawahiri, the leader of the Egyptian *Islamic Jihad*). These indicators suggest that *al Qaeda* and the *Islamic Front for Jihad Against the Jews and the Crusaders* may be the same umbrella organization. This would mean that bin Laden is not directly associated with any particular terrorist group.

Osama bin Laden has declared a 'holy war against the United States and its followers.' He urged Islamic governments to perform the duty of 'armed *jihad* against the enemies of Islam.' The justification refers to 'occupation of the Arabian Peninsula, plundering its riches, dictating to its rulers, humiliating its people, terrorizing its neighbors, and turning its bases in the Peninsula into a spearhead through which to fight the neighboring Muslim peoples.'[9] The other reason stated is the support of Israel. His second *fatwa* (1998) states that 'the ruling to kill the Americans and their allies - civilian and military - is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it.'[10]

Although Osama bin Laden's name is being linked to most terrorist attacks executed in the recent years against the US interests around the world, his direct involvement is difficult to prove. On the one hand, he expresses support and praise for acts of terror, referring to them as righteous and just acts, while at the same time not claiming direct responsibility for their execution. This kind of double talk is characteristic for state sponsors of terrorism. In this respect, bin Laden is a unique phenomenon of international terrorism. His strategy is similar to that of state sponsors, but bin Laden enjoys some significant advantages over them. While state sponsors can be pressured by a combination of economic sanctions, political isolation and military force, he is not permanently tied to any territory and does not have political constituents, which makes it very difficult to coerce him. Bin Laden represents a new type of supporter of terrorism - the wealthy individual who places his extensive resources at the disposal of terrorist organizations. The alliance of such an individual with a group of trained and experienced fighters, strengthened by Islamic indoctrination, is potentially deadly; especially when these fighters are veterans of a victorious religious war. This combination of wealth and extremism gives the Afghan Veteran's association a place among the most dangerous organizations on the stage of international terrorism today.

The US State Department currently links Osama bin Laden to many recent terrorist activities, among them the World Trade Center bombing (February 1993) that killed 6 and injured hundreds; the attacks in Riyadh (November 95) which killed seven, and Dhahran (June 1996) in which 19 people died. He is also implicated in the attacks on a Yemenite hotel (December 1992) that killed two tourists; the assassination attempt on Egyptian president Mubarak in Ethiopia (June 1995); and the Somali attack on American forces that left hundreds wounded. The most notorious is the bombing of the American embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam (August 1998), which killed almost 300 people and injured many more. Finally, the investigation of the USS *Cole* bombing in Yemen (November 2000) is also pointing to bin Laden[11].

Although Osama bin Laden has been suspected of involvement in all of the terrorist attacks mentioned above, it is interesting to note that no one has, until recently, been able to produce incontrovertible proof that he was anything more than an inspiration for the perpetrators. Only several days after the embassy bombings, the testimony of bin Laden's close associate Mohammed Sadiq Odeh provided the intelligence community with the description of bin Laden's international network that finally brought some evidence

of the extent of bin Laden's activities. The trial of bin Laden's associates, which is now taking place in New York revealed even more information about the organizational dimensions of *al Qaeda*. The prosecution's key witness Jamal Ahmad al-Fadl, was a part of the network for several years before he defected with $110,000 of bin Laden's assets[12].

Terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

Terrorists may be attracted to the idea of possessing WMD for two principal reasons: to inflict mass casualties or to use them for blackmail purposes.

In order to successfully use WMD for mass destruction, terrorists must acquire the weapons and the means to deliver them. Another necessary component for this utilization of WMD is the psychological readiness to kill thousands of people.

In the case of using WMD as a threat, the traditional deterrence principle can be applied (*deterrence = credibility x capability*). If either capability or credibility is missing, the threat will be ineffective. In order to be successful, terrorists must convince the general audience that they have acquired WMD and that they are ready to use them. Prior use of WMD is not a necessary precondition of a successful threat.

As has been mentioned above, WMD capability is one logical element necessary to launch a mass casualty attack. I define WMD capability as the possession of nuclear, chemical, biological or radiological weapons along with the means to deliver them, or the financial resources needed to acquire the above.

Due to the fact that Osama bin Laden's wealth is a much-discussed topic, many opposing estimates of his assets can be found. The figures range from less than $100 million to more than $5 billion[13]. Besides the money bin Laden inherited from his father, he is believed to receive continuous funding from his few remaining friends in the Saudi government as well as many Arab businessman and senior politicians from Kuwait and Qatar[14]. He is also the owner of many different businesses around the world, among them the *Sudanese Gum Arabic Company Limited*, which produces over 80% of world supply of this product[15]. Most of his money is deposited in accounts under non-Arab names in Western Europe and it is also hidden among the funds of several charitable organizations such as the *Muslim World League* (M.W.L.), the *International Islamic Relief Organization* (I.I.R.O.) and Islamic cultural centers in Europe, such as the center in Milan[16]. Most importantly, bin Laden is believed to benefit from the drug trade in Afghanistan, the world's leading exporter of heroin. He is understood to have helped the *Taliban* arrange money-laundering facilities through the Russian and Chechen Mafia. In exchange he is allegedly taking a cut of between 2 and 10 percent from all Afghan drug sales ($133-$1,000 million a year)[17].

Regardless of the exact figure deposited in bin Laden's accounts, it seems safe to conclude that his resources are large enough to enable him to acquire WMD capability.

Bin Laden's possesion of WMD is generally considerd to be a given. Plenty of evidence exists that his group has actively sought nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. The intelligence community believes that some of these attepmts were successful. This has been demonstrated on several occasions, when bin Laden's WMD threats were taken very seriously. The only missing link to having 100% confidence about *al Qaeda's* capabilities is actual WMD use. Bin Laden is deliberately vague when asked whether WMD are in his arsenal and under what circumstances he would use it. 'We cannot confirm or deny whether we possess such weapons or not,' he says.[18]

Bin Laden's attempts to acquire WMD capability reportedly began around the year 1991. It is interesting to note that his initial attempts concentrated on the nuclear weapons option, which is generally considered to be the terrorists' least likely weapon of choice. Bin Laden's original plan was to build his own tactical nuke. His emissaries have reportedly conducted several missions to Europe in an attempt to bring back enriched uranium.

At the recent trial in New York, the government witness Jamal Ahmed Fadl

testified that he was ordered in 1993 by one of bin Laden's top lieutenants to buy uranium from a former Sudanese military officer named Allah Abdel Moburuk. Fadl said an associate of Mobruk had offered to sell some uranium for $1.5 million. At one point, he said, the associate showed bin Laden's agents a bag containing a two to three-foot cylinder that purportedly contained uranium, along with documents saying the material came from South Africa[19]. Fadl said he didn't know whether the sale had been completed.

Bin Laden has reportedly also made attempts to obtain ready-made nuclear warheads from Kazakhstan, Russia, Turkmenistan, and the Ukraine; they were to be dismantled and used to build small tactical *suitcase* bombs[20]. It is very unlikely however, that bin Laden would try to bring in warheads for dismantlement if the fissile material was their only contribution. Due to the size of warhead, it would be more logical to import the fissile material itself. But it seems equally unlikely that he would want a working missile - the sophisticated technology needed to launch it is not presently within his reach.

Perhaps of most concern is the allegation that *al Qaeda* succeeded in obtaining a nuclear *suitcase* bomb. This small tactical nuclear weapon is a source of much controversy. The Russian leadership denies the existence of such weapons, but some officials are in opposition of such statements[21]. Reports emerging from Israel and Russia suggest that bin Laden gave his contacts in the Chechen mafia several million dollars in cash and heroin with a street value of more than $500 million - in exchange the Chechens launched an all-out campaign to obtain 'nuclear suitcase' bombs for *al Qaeda*.[22] Some sources claim, that since bin Laden represents an important contact for the Chechens in the drug trade, it is unlikely that they would accept the money without having 100% confidence that the suitcase nuke exists and that they can obtain it[23]. One source even suggests that bin Laden obtained several of the nuclear suitcase bombs in the autumn of 1998 and transferred them into storage in the *Taliban*'s main secure complex near Kandahar. The same source also claims that the weapons have not yet been used, because they are still programmed with a Soviet-era coding system that requires a signal from Moscow before detonation is possible[24]. Another source confirms this information and even specifies that the number of tactical nuclear weapons acquired by bin Laden is close to 20[25].

The problem with above stated information is that it often originates from 'anonymous intelligence sources'. The reliability of such reports is questionable, as the room for misinformation and exaggeration is enormous. In reality, *al Qaeda's* overall nuclear capability is probably low. The group's most likely use of nuclear material would be a nuclear-enriched conventional explosion that would disperse radiological material. Such an attack would not cause mass casualties, but would involve great costs in decontamination of the area surrounding the explosion.

CBW is generally considered to be a more likely choice for terrorists than nuclear weapons. They are easier to obtain since many CW precursors are of dual use and can be purchased on the open market; biological toxins are also easily obtainable from culture collections around the world. However, the likelihood of terrorist use of CBW is still fairly low since it would present a significant risk to terrorists themselves, resulting from toxic nature of the materials being handled[26]. And even though some Islamic fundamentalists demonstrate their willingness to die during delivering their weapons, it does not necessarily mean that they would be equally willing to die during their production.

The US intelligence community is convinced that the *al Qaeda* organization has already acquired both chemical and biological capability.

The network's members have allegedly purchased pedals of anthrax from an East Asian country for $3,695 and the lethal viral agent botulinum from a laboratory in the Czech Republic for $7,500 a sample[27]. Representatives of the *Moro National Liberation Front* in the Philippines, which has close links to *al Qaeda*, are also understood to have obtained anthrax from an Indonesian pharmaceutical company. Plague and

anthrax viruses have also been bought from arms dealers in Kazakhstan[28].

It remains unspecified in open sources, what kinds of chemical weapons are believed to be at bin Laden's disposal. On the other hand, it has been confirmed by the intelligence community that *al Qaeda* does possess chemical agents. The government reactions to bin Laden's threats with chemical weapons also suggest that they are real. An attack against bin Laden that was supposed to take place during his son's wedding in January 2001 was reportedly aborted because of bin Laden's threat to retaliate with chemical weapons against US military bases in the Gulf[29]. Perhaps, even more alarming than the chemical weapons capability is that bin Laden actually knew about the operation in advance.

The acquisition of WMD is not the only element necessary for their successful use. Most WMD require sophisticated methods of delivery in order to produce mass casualties. Even though bin Laden might have succeeded in obtaining WMD, delivering them may still be his major weakness. While intelligence sources admit the presence of WMD in bin Laden's arsenal, they do not have evidence that he has succeeded in their weaponization[30]. The problem with delivery can be overcome through either recruiting independent scientists or by receiving state support. The first option is definitely within bin Laden's reach. He has allegedly already used his vast financial resources to recruit Russian scientists and Special Forces members to help him decode and use the *suitcase* bombs[31]. The second option is also relevant. The Iraqi intelligence service has repeatedly offered assistance to bin Laden, along with giving him a list of desired targets (among them *Radio Free Europe* in Prague)[32]. Bin Laden has also been offered asylum and has been given a collection of blank Yemeni diplomatic passports, as a sign of good faith[33]. But bin Laden's envoys reportedly did not give much thought to this offer and were content to request Iraq to help them obtain chemical and biological weapons, expressing readiness to use them against US troops and interests[34]. The Iraqis have extensive WMD research experience and they are alleged to have chemical weapons stockpiles in Sudan. Were bin Laden in fact receiving their assistance, the weaponization of CBW by his network would only be a matter of time.

As of today, *al Qaeda* has most likely not acquired a full-scale capability that would allow them to cause mass casualties. A small or medium scale attack using WMD is thus a more likely scenario for the near future. However, the psychological effects of such an attack should not be underestimated. If *al Qaeda* were able to provide evidence of their capabilities through actual WMD use, it would probably have a devastating impact on the public morale.

Most advocates of the inevitability of WMD use by non-state actors point to the escalating trends in international terrorism. While the number of incidents is steadily declining, the number of casualties is increasing. But contrary to popular belief, not all groups seek to achieve mass casualties. The motivation of a terrorist group to use WMD is closely associated with its goals. Nationalist and separatist terrorist groups have political goals and a constituency. Their general goal is to attract public attention to their cause and to get a place at the negotiating table. They are, therefore, not likely to resort to WMD, because mass casualties would be counterproductive to their goals. Widespread attention would certainly be attracted, but public opinion would likely turn against them and afflicted states would severely retaliate as opposed to evaluating the merit of the group's grievances. Small or medium scale violence therefore seems to be a more productive choice for political terrorists.

Conversely, religious groups are considered to possess the motivation required for resorting to WMD. They are generally not interested in negotiations and their only real constituency is God. Their unconditional beliefs are thought to provide them with the means necessary for a complete dehumanization of their enemy, an essential step before launching a mass casualty attack. In the case of Islamic fundamentalist groups, the institution of martyrdom is yet another strengthening factor that arms the perpetrators with the motivation to sacrifice their life and thus decreases the fear of capture or retaliation.

Based on these observations it seems crucial to determine the nature of bin Laden's belief system in order to assess the extent of his motivation to use WMD. Content analysis of his statements as well as the use of *fatwas* (religious rulings) seems to point to religious motivation. Bin Laden declares his struggle against the United States to be a *jihad*, or holy war. He has also repeatedly used Allah's name to justify his activities. The transition from the military targeting called for in the first *fatwa* to the civilian targeting in the later one could be seen as another step toward religiously defensible dehumanization of enemy. Bin Laden has also repeatedly declared that he considers his efforts to obtain WMD to be legitimate. 'We do not consider it a crime if we tried to have nuclear, chemical, biological weapons. If I have indeed acquired these weapons, then I thank God for enabling me to do so,' he said in an interview for the *Time* magazine in 1998[35]. Further, in 1999, Osama bin Laden started publicizing draft copies of his book, in which he sets out his vision of the future. Sources in Pakistan who claim to have seen copies report that it bears the title *America and the Third World War* and consists of a lengthy exhortation to Muslims to rise up and destroy the United States[36].

But despite all these indications, it is not exactly accurate to simply label bin Laden as a religious fanatic. The goals that he has set for himself are of a primarily political nature. He wants to run the Americans out of the Middle East, to overthrow the western-influenced Arab governments and to establish an international organization or government uniting all Muslims supporting the rule of the Khalifa. The means bin Laden uses to achieve his goals also cast some doubt about the absolute nature of his religious devotion. If it is true that members of his organization received training from *Hezbollah*, the Iranian-backed Shiite group that operates in Lebanon, bin Laden has established an unprecedented Shiite-Sunni connection (probability of such alliance is questionable, taking into consideration the extreme rivalry between the Wahhabis and Shiias). He has also extensively collaborated with Saddam Hussein's secular regime in Iraq. This type of pragmatic alliance building is hardly characteristic for typical Islamic radicals.

The problem with categorizing the nature of Osama bin Laden's motivation lies in the fact that Islam is a political religion: it awakes no distinction between religion and state, and covers every aspect of life. It may be, thus, more appropriate to examine individual factors outside of the traditional bipolar framework.

The institution of martyrdom characteristic for some Islamic fundamentalists does not apply in the case of bin Laden. His cautious planning, hesitance to accept responsibility for acts of violence and extensive personal security arrangements are all indicators of his desire to live. The use of WMD would probably shift the public opinion toward a massive retaliation regardless of the costs of such an operation. Bin Laden knows he would not escape alive and his willingness to take the risk is questionable.

Even though bin Laden does not strive for political power, he does have a constituency. Many people in the region have named their sons Osama; he is a romantically popular figure. The use of WMD would generate bad press even in the Muslim world and bin Laden knows this. His ambiguous answers about possession of WMD are also consistent with this explanation. On one hand, he likes the idea of generating fear among the American public while on the other hand, he tries to avoid bad press.

Another important factor is the psychological dimension of experiencing a victorious war. Some theories about the causes of war suggest that people fight because it is psychologically rewarding. The Mujahedeen have won what they perceived to be a just war against the Soviets. One must take into account the complexity of returning to normal life after such an experience. From this perspective, the Mujahedeen's reorientation towards a new enemy is not surprising. Further, it is important to consider this perspective in assessing possible interest in WMD. The use of conventional weapons has a different rewarding power than WMD. Successful WMD use may be gratifying for a scientist who has successfully overcome the technical

difficulties of such attack. Not so for a guerilla fighter who has experienced tremendous success with conventional weapons. This success is likely to enhance conservative tendencies in terms of weapons selection.

The CIA's assessment is based on the assumption that bin Laden will do anything to defeat the United States. But that may not necessarily be the case, since realization of bin Laden's goals may be life threatening to the network itself, as the legitimacy of their very existence would be jeopardized. Bin Laden and his men want to fight; the experience from the Afghan war is apparently addictive. After unsuccessfully attempting to get involved in fighting Saddam Hussein during the Gulf War, they turned against America. In the hypothetical event of winning even this struggle, finding the next enemy would be difficult. The process of fighting is more important to *al Qaeda* than an overall victory; their desire to escalate is therefore debatable.

Based on these findings I conclude that bin Laden does not possess the motivation to use WMD, since the infliction of mass casualties is not his number one priority. Taking down targets of symbolic value is more important than maximizing the number of dead.

Countering the Threat

Even though Osama bin Laden was already a living legend, the US government had not identified him to be a major problem until the investigation of the 1993 World Trade Center bombing[37]. Since then, the intelligence community has invested a lot of effort to try to eliminate this problem.

At first, the US government used the traditional diplomatic approach. Sanctions were imposed on Sudan and Afghanistan for sheltering bin Laden. While the Sudanese government was not able to withstand the pressure and in 1996 asked bin Laden to leave, Afghanistan still refuses to give in. Despite the occasional Pakistani report that the *Taliban* has agreed to turn bin Laden over in exchange for international recognition, he is still in Afghanistan. The fact that bin Laden has recently married his oldest daughter to the *Taliban*'s leader Mullah Muhammad Omar makes his expulsion from Afghanistan even less likely. Since he is now related to the Pashtun elite by blood, he is protected by the *Pashtunwali* (dominant code of behavior among the Pashtun tribes)[38]. In this context, the international recognition of *Taliban* is irrelevant. Summed up in the words of Omar: 'Even if half of Afghanistan were destroyed, we would not hand [bin Laden] over.'[39]

Several attempts have also been made to eliminate bin Laden completely. Since the US intelligence community is forbidden from participating in assassinations by an executive order, it is not surprising that no evidence of their involvement in these attempts exists. Some sources speculate however, that the operation against bin Laden that took place in November 1998, might have incorporated American technology and finance in concert with Saudi manpower. The attack involved an assassin called Siddiq Ahmed who was paid $267,000 to poison bin Laden. The operation failed as the target survived an acute kidney failure.

The CIA has also tried many disruptive tactics, ranging from hacking into bin Laden's accounts and deleting and shifting funds to jamming and blocking *al Qaeda's* cellular and satellite phones. President Clinton signed an executive order freezing any American assets owned by bin Laden, and experts visited the offices of the Treasury Department's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network to study his holdings. While these efforts did not make bin Laden's life easier, they have not significantly decreased his operational capability.

Several days after the 1998 embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania the US launched the *Operation Infinite Reach*, a Tomahawk cruise missile attack against a number of facilities associated with bin Laden's network. The targets included six training camps belonging to his organization and the *al-Shifa* pharmaceuticals factory in Khartoum, which the intelligence sources suspected of producing VX nerve gas for bin Laden. The operation was a failure for two principal reasons. First, the evidence of *al-Shifa's* involvement in chemical weapons production was weak; the fact that the whole country of Sudan was dependent on this

plant for antibiotics also undermined the legitimacy of the attack. Second, bin Laden escaped unharmed. Just before the attack, bin Laden had been warned that America was tracking him via his phone (allegedly by supporters working for Pakistani intelligence), he switched it off and escaped from the camp.

From the perspective of law enforcement, bin Laden should be arrested and brought to justice. Even though a Manuel Noriega style *snatch* operation had been planned and US secret agencies and rapid intervention teams, such as the *Delta Force* and the *Green Berets,* were ready to strike, President Clinton decided not to peruse this option due to the risks involved. The danger of such an operation was clearly demonstrated by an incident from 1986, when three elite battalions of Soviet commandos fought their way into Zhawar Kili, the same area where bin Laden's training camps were located in 1998. In a fierce battle that lasted three weeks, several hundred Soviet troops were killed.

The *Heroes Program* has been established by the State Department in 1984 in a desperate attempt to combat terrorist attacks in Beirut. This rewards scheme offered up to $500,000 along with an offer of American citizenship, the change of identity and placement in the federal witness protection program, in exchange for information leading to capture and conviction of designated terrorists. Information was printed on matchboxes and leaflets in 15 languages and was distributed around the world. The program had not produced any results, until it yielded in the capture of Ramzi Yousef in 1996. A similar campaign has been conducted in an attempt to capture bin Laden, except the reward money was boosted to $5 million.

Based on the list of attempts that have been made to deal with bin Laden, it seems like there are not many realistic measures that the US government has not tried. However, the previous attempts show signs of incoherent planning and strategy that rests on some dubious premises.

Above all, it is important to realize that the problem goes beyond the scope of one person. By concentrating their efforts solely on Osama bin Laden, the USA has transformed him into a hero in the eyes the Muslim world. And even though his elimination is desirable, it represents only the first step in countering the *Afghan Alumni* phenomenon. The United States should adopt a more consistent and pro-active approach.

This comprehensive strategy should incorporate some of the measures already undertaken, such as the disruptive attacks on *al Qaeda's* logistics and funds. The United States government should also refrain from exaggerating the threat, since a frightened public is precisely what the terrorists are seeking. If the intelligence community does in fact have classified evidence of an imminent WMD threat posed by bin Laden, the administration should possibly explore ways of eliminating bin Laden and his designated successors. Such measures are controversial, but they may represent the only way to take the network apart. Besides serving as punishment, assassinations can create tension among heirs. Even though bin Laden has designated Ayman Al Zawahiri and Muhammad Atef as his successors (bin Laden's son Muhammad is also in the picture), a rivalry between them could possibly arise upon bin Laden's demise. Going a step further in order to really cripple the network's command, the designated successors should be eliminated as well.

Besides offensive tactics, better defensive measures should also be emphasized. The stress on symbolic value in the network's target selection is clear. This consistent pattern makes it easier to identify potential targets and to prevent attacks by increasing their protection.

At the level of states, increased cooperation should be underlined. In the fight against terrorism, the main source of crucial information is human intelligence. Obtaining human intelligence is very difficult and the effective cooperation and intelligence sharing is therefore essential.

The US government should also reevaluate the systemic causes of *al Qaeda's* terrorist attacks. The value of keeping US troops in the region should be reviewed and their

exposure should be limited to a necessary minimum.

Another step at the political level should involve the de-emphasis of the role Islam plays in bin Laden's motivations. By simply assuming a more favorable approach toward Islam through separating criminals from the general population could alienate *al Qaeda* from the Muslim people.

Conclusion

Osama bin Laden and his network represent a threat that the USA does not currently know how to counter. The risk assessment presented by George Tenet in Congress is based on vulnerability, rather than a prudent evaluation of motivations and capabilities.

Bin Laden and his network might possess WMD agents and the financial resources that could result in their weaponization. But despite the often-cited radical rhetoric, bin Laden and his network do not strive to inflict mass causalities. The number of people killed is secondary to the symbolic value of the selected target; maximizing casualties is not the main goal. *Al Qaeda's* attack with WMD cannot be completely ruled out, but if it does occur, it will not take the form of a full-scale attack that would cause mass destruction. The most likely scenario for the near future seems to be a small scale chemical weapons attack against US targets in the Middle Eastern region. But even such assault could create significant psychological damages.

The US government's plan to counter the threat by deploying national missile defense is inadequate. Instead, a comprehensive strategy that would incorporate preemptive and defensive military measures, increased international cooperation, as well as evaluation of systemic causes, needs to be adopted.

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Interview

IGOR SERGEYEV: *'DESTABILIZING PROCESSES MAY INTENSIFY IF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION IS NOT IMPAIRED'*

[This article was originally published in Russian in *Yaderny Kontrol*, No. 3, Vol. 7, May-June, 2001]

Nonproliferation issues are the key element of modern international affairs and an essential component of international security and stability.

The NPT is a core of the international system of legal regulations concerning nonproliferation. 187 states are parties to the NPT. The treaty has endured Cold War and post-Cold War developments and proved its significance in curbing international nuclear proliferation. In 1995 indefinite extension of the treaty was declared. However, 'there is a need for some measures to enhance the nonproliferation efforts,' believes Marshal Igor Sergeyev, Presidential Advisor for Strategic Stability Matters, in his interview with Yaderny Kontrol's Editor-in-Chief Vladimir Orlov and Correspondent Marsalina Tsyrenzhapova.

***YADERNY KONTROL*: Igor Dmitrievich, how would you assess the role of nuclear factor in global politics?**

IGOR SERGEYEV: Sudden ending of the Cold War in the early 1990s led to general and unjustified (as it seems now) optimism concerning dramatic decline in nuclear confrontation and proliferation. It seemed that the end of bipolar confrontation would result in radical cuts in nuclear arsenals and delivery systems, whereas the nuclear factor would be removed from global international security agenda.

Nonetheless, the outcome of post-Cold War developments is different – the nuclear factor preserves its important role in the world politics, albeit its role has slightly changed.

The optimism concerning indefinite extension of the NPT dissipated after the nuclear tests in South Asia. The situation with nuclear nonproliferation is graver than ever before. The world may enter a new nuclear age, when the use of nuclear weapons will be more probable than in the past.

Q.: What do you think about the capability of the so called threshold states to develop or acquire nuclear weapons and delivery systems?

A.: Firstly, it is necessary to identify the threshold states. I believe that these are nations that do not rule out the objective of acquiring nuclear and missile weapons and have economic and technological capability to develop, acquire, or operate such weapons.

Many state-run and non-governmental agencies in Russia, the United States and other countries try to follow and predict the trends in nuclear arms proliferation. This work also involves intelligence communities. The results of this research indicate that in 2010-2015 a number of states, beside India and Pakistan, may possess WMD and delivery systems.

The threshold states develop, produce or deploy about 12 types of ballistic missiles, which may also hit the Russian territory.

Meanwhile, Russia may be more vulnerable to such attacks than the United States because of the proximity of deployed missiles to the Russian borders and high possibility of unauthorized or accidental launch, theft, or environmental disaster.

At present, some nations in the aforementioned regions possess not only surplus power-grade plutonium, but also have technological capacity to fabricate weapon-grade plutonium.

As far as the delivery systems are concerned, these are mostly short-range and medium-range missiles purchased or developed on the basis of SCUD technology with the range of 150-2,000 km.

Q.: What is your opinion about possible upgrading of missiles without SCUD technologies?

A.: The analysis made by our missile officers indicates that such missile may have limited

capabilities in delivering appropriate payload. As the payload increases, it would be difficult to extend the range of these missiles. Anyway, this would hardly be possible until 2010-2015 and it would be impossible to upgrade such systems and to avoid detection with the national technical means of developed nations.

Q.: Could you identify the incentives for the acquisition of nuclear weapons in different states?

A.: For some states, it may be a compensation for their low geopolitical status and for potential conventional superiority of their neighbors. Others seek the means to confront a nuclear weapon state in the region. Certain countries regard nuclear weapons as a tool to increase their political status in the region and in the world, to have the economic sanctions lifted, etc.

Q.: Igor Dmitrievich, what do you think about sustainability of the WMD nonproliferation regimes in general?

A.: I would say that the trends are quite negative. It is too early to speak about the regional nuclear and missile arms race, but we are approaching this phase and will be unable to prevent such race if appropriate measures are not taken.

Q.: What are the major reasons for the lack of sustainability of the NPT and other nonproliferation regimes?

A: Firstly, one may note the growing self-consciousness and anti-Western sentiments in the majority of Asian states in combination with the Gulf *syndrome* and with the eloquent example of Western actions in Yugoslavia. All this makes such nations believe that nuclear weapons may become the only remedy against such attacks in the future.

Secondly, another important reason for procuring WMD and delivery systems is a copying of the example of N-5 members, whose doctrines still regard the nuclear weapons as the major factor for maintaining military security.

Thirdly, I have to emphasize the slow process of strategic offensive arms reduction, above all by Russia and the USA, within the legal-binding framework, as provided for in the NPT.

The maximum we have achieved in the last 10 years is the reduction to 6,000 warheads for each party. The efforts aimed at reducing this level to 3,000-3,500 or even 2,000-2.500 warheads have been impeded by vague prospects of START II entry into force and commencement of START III talks.

The United States has also failed to give a positive response to President Putin's proposal to cut the strategic offensive arms of two nuclear superpowers to 1,500 warheads.

In this connection, one may only rest hopes on US-Russian willingness to reduce their strategic offensive arms. The parties should immediately start the consultations on the format of such negotiations. Russia has conveyed its proposals to the United States.

Another positive change would be the implementation of the UK and French plans to *freeze* the ceilings of their nuclear arsenals.

It would be useful if these states and China give a legal-binding commitment not to increase their national nuclear arsenals in the future. A strong incentive for such developments would be the preserved ABM Treaty.

However, all these positive trends are still more virtual than real, whereas the reasons for low sustainability of nonproliferation regimes are real and effective. One may hardly expect any changes to the better, unless these reasons are, at least, partly eliminated.

Q.: What are the major directions of international activities to prevent WMD proliferation and proliferation of delivery systems?

A.: In fact, these measures are targeted at eliminating the aforementioned proliferation challenges.

Political, diplomatic and economic endeavors should be undertaken to stabilize the situation in the conflict regions. Much has already been done by the UN Secretary General, by special representatives of the Russian and US presidents, etc. The

international community should intensify the activities in this sphere.

It is important to help the non-nuclear weapon states to get rid of the Yugoslavian *syndrome* and, therefore, to ban any actions against such states that are not authorized by the UN.

Russia and the United States should intensify the deep cuts in the strategic offensive arms in traditional, modified, or new bilateral format. There are some new approaches and ideas in this sphere, including the measures to de-alert the fixed number of strategic offensive arms and to carry out some other confidence-building measures.

To curb the proliferation, the international community should have a common vision of possible challenges and nowadays views differ. Russia has long been ready for such work. In 1993 during my first visit to the United States, we conveyed to the US Strategic Command our vision of possible threats and suggested a regular exchange of opinions on these matters. There has been no answer so far. Perhaps, the command is not to blame and not everything depends on the command.

I think it is a fundamental issue. Above all, we should distinguish among risks, threats, and real actions. Risks have always been existing, but they do not always transform into the threats, let alone real actions.

This is also true with respect to the development of US NMD system. Risks are being regarded not only as threats, but as real actions, without any appropriate arguments in favor.

In this connection, it would be useful to note that the world history knows the examples of real missile attacks – thousands of FAU-2 ballistic missiles were launched against the UK. However, this did not impede the conclusion of the ABM Treaty, albeit nuclear weapons existed by that time and missile defense technologies were quite developed.

At the same time, SCUD technologies are very similar to those developed in Germany for FAU-2 missiles. This is why experts are so skeptical about the possibility of using such technologies for making intercontinental missiles.

I believe that it is quite significant to undertake joint efforts and to analyze the challenges related to WMD proliferation and proliferation of delivery systems. This should be a highly professional work involving intelligence communities; it should be free from political considerations and military-industrial lobbying. Otherwise individual states will hardly cope with this problem.

Q.: What should be done to tighten nonproliferation controls?

A.: A sound system of monitoring should be established to oversee the storage and transportation of nuclear materials. Russian and US scientists have already developed advanced systems for such control.

Our scientists are far quicker to find common language and to unite for common activities. One has to regret that the time and quality are lost, due to other factors.

The work to establish the US-Russian Joint Data Exchange Center in Moscow is under way and in the future it would be advisable to transform it into the multilateral body for global monitoring of missile nonproliferation.

Finally, it would be reasonable to devise an agreed set of measures to tighten WMD and missile nonproliferation regimes. These steps should be based on the profound analysis of existing and potential threats and should include pre-emptive measures by the international community authorized by the UN Security Council.

If this is not enough, some counter-proliferation measures may be carried out, including political, diplomatic, economic and other sanctions against the states, whose activities may pose an internationally recognized threat to regional and global security. It would be important to avoid double standards in this area.

Analysis

THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION AND NONPROLIFERATION: SKEPTICS AT THE HELM

by Matthew Bunn
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[This article was originally published in Russian in *Yaderny Kontrol*, No. 3, Vol. 7, May-June, 2001]

Nine months in, it is still early to summarize the Bush Administration's approach to nonproliferation, for several reasons.

First, many of the key people are not yet in place, due to the long US nomination and confirmation process. It may be the end of the year before all of the assistant secretaries and deputy assistant secretaries – often the real shapers of day-to-day nonproliferation policy – are in office.

Second, every administration's approach evolves after it comes to office. What makes sense in the heat of the campaign trail may not mesh with the realities of international politics. President Reagan, after all, came to office attacking past arms control agreements and proposing defenses, and ended up negotiating START I and being forced by the Senate to leave the ABM Treaty largely intact. From Russia to North Korea, the Bush team is already smoothing off the sharp edges of their early rhetoric, and putting more emphasis on engagement. We are not likely to hear again accusations that Russia is 'willing to sell anything to anyone for money' – however much many on the Bush team may be thinking it.

Third, nonproliferation policy (as opposed to arms control policy) has not been a major focus of the Bush administration's first months in office. Though the Bush team now takes pains to say that missile defense is one of the elements in a comprehensive strategy to deal with the spread of weapons of mass destruction, its place at the top of the priority list is obvious. President Bush and his team have focused countless statements on missile defense and their desire to get 'beyond' the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. A substantial number of statements can be found expressing their disdain for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, and their desire to pursue further nuclear arms reductions through unilateral steps more than negotiated, verified treaties[1]. But when it comes to their nonproliferation approach, there are far fewer actions and official statements available from which to shape a cogent description.

Fourth, proliferation issues inevitably compete with other foreign policy considerations – from promoting trade to building strategic relationships – in relations with other major powers. As the specific competing issues change, the resulting balance with nonproliferation priorities will change as well. To take just one example, debates over whether to impose or continue sanctions against particular countries or entities within countries – India over its nuclear tests, Iraq over its refusal to comply with the Gulf War cease-fire resolutions, Russian entities over sensitive technology cooperation with Iran and others, Chinese entities over their sensitive technology exports, and so on – inevitably bring in a host of other factors, specific to the state of relations with the particular country involved at a particular time[2].

Fifth, changes in nonproliferation approaches from one US administration to the next are inevitably more a matter of shifts in emphasis than of radical U-turns. Continuity and change coexist. Every administration has its nonproliferation pessimists and optimists, and its proponents and skeptics of each of the particular approaches and proposals that arise – from strengthened safeguards, to expanded export controls, to regional deals to address particular nonproliferation problems, to various kinds of offensive and defensive forces to respond to the proliferation that does occur. Continuity is reinforced by the vast infrastructure of permanent civil servants responsible for

carrying out much of the government's nonproliferation activities, all of whom remain in place, with their pre-existing policy preferences, even as the thin layer of political appointees at the top changes hands. Thus, the broadest strokes of US nonproliferation policy – support for the Nonproliferation Treaty and the safeguards system; the focus on key regional proliferators as the central aspect of the problem (with the exclusion of Israel as a topic for concern or discussion); the desire to convince all the other suppliers to enforce export controls comparable to those of the United States; support for regional nonproliferation arrangements as long as they do not unduly constrain US options – tend to remain unchanged from one administration to the next.

Sixth, because the approach is still being shaped, it is potentially still subject to influence. Officials newly in office, with a 'clean sheet of paper' to start from, tend to be far more willing to entertain new ideas and proposals that may come in from outside the government, from other governments, or from within the government bureaucracy. If Russia, to take but one example, were to make use of the good feeling generated by the Bush-Putin summit to put forward specific proposals for rebuilding the US-Soviet nonproliferation partnership that existed for much of the Cold War, the Bush administration might well be eager to accept. Thus, a variety of influences could still shift the priority the new administration attaches to nonproliferation and the specific approaches they focus on.

Nevertheless, it is very clear that the new administration of George W. Bush brings with it a new nonproliferation team with a new approach. The Republican Party has effectively two camps on foreign policy. The *engagement* advocates emphasize the importance of building strong alliances, working with potential adversaries to lessen threats and the risks of conflict, and even, for some purposes, relying on international institutions such as the United Nations. This is the wing of the party that negotiated the SALT, START, and ABM treaties, the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention, and other important arms accords (President Bush's father and Senator Richard Lugar are prominent current members of the engagement group within the party). The *unilateralist* camp, by contrast, emphasizes the preeminent importance of American military strength, is deeply suspicious of attempts to engage and improve relations with likely adversaries, and is particularly suspicious of treaties or international institutions that might limit American strength or freedom of action (Senators Jesse Helms and Jon Kyl, among many others in the current Senate, are prominent proponents of this school of thought). Of course, a wide range of positions exist between these two extremes (The term "unilateralist" has become a negative epithet, and one the Bush team is now quick to deny – so the remainder of this article will describe this latter camp as the "American preeminence" school of thinking).

So far, while the engagement camp clearly has the upper hand on some issues in the new Administration – such as trade – there is a continuing tug-of-war between the American preeminence school and the engagement advocates on nonproliferation policy. A clear majority of the key nonproliferation appointees named so far are committed members of the American preeminence school. Key nonproliferation officials of the new team bring to their new posts a belief that proliferation is inevitable, and can only be managed and defended against; a deep skepticism over the value of negotiated agreements representing compromises with states such as North Korea; and an even deeper skepticism about the ability of global regimes and norms to contain the most dangerous proliferation threats (Interestingly enough, when it comes to the balance between proliferation and other economic and strategic interests with a particular country, it is typically the engagement camp that nonproliferation advocates find themselves arguing against; the American preeminence advocates typically argue for taking a tough line against any proliferation activity, even if it means interfering with trade or other interests). What all this will mean for the various aspects of nonproliferation cooperation with Russia in particular is still being decided – but after the Bush-Putin summit in Slovenia,

the signs offer significantly more reason for hope than they did even a few weeks before.

Proliferation Pessimism: The New Team's Proliferation Beliefs and Prescriptions

For the reasons just noted, actions officials take in office may differ from those they recommended previously. Nevertheless, it is instructive to examine the nonproliferation prescriptions the Bush team offered before coming to power.

Consider, for example, Robert Joseph, the Senior Director for Proliferation Strategy, Counterproliferation, and Homeland Defense on the National Security Council staff – the top official specifically charged with nonproliferation in the White House. A strong proponent of missile defenses[3], Joseph previously directed the Center for Counterproliferation Research at the National Defense University[4], served as the US Commissioner to the ABM Treaty Standing Consultative Commission, and was a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense charged with policy on US nuclear forces and arms control in the Reagan years (Service in the Weinberger Pentagon is a common item on the resumes of Bush administration national security officials). Given that Joseph is charged with coordinating all nonproliferation policy, that his views are roughly in the center of the spectrum of Bush administration thinking on nonproliferation (or even somewhat to the left of that spectrum), and that he has been unusually articulate and specific in public testimony outlining his judgments and policy prescriptions, his statements to Congress in the couple of years before taking office provide a useful starting point for describing the basic approach of the new team.

In testimony in early 1999, Joseph outlined six key conclusions about proliferation[5]:

1. 'Nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons are a permanent feature of the international environment,' which 'cannot be disinvented' or eliminated.
2. Further proliferation of these weapons is inevitable, and cannot be stopped. 'The knowledge and the technology to build them will spread even further […] barriers to both acquisition and use have actually eroded in recent years […] we live in a world in which additional states will seek these weapons. Experience suggests that they will be successful.' Even for 'terrorists and other transnational groups,' 'obstacles to acquisition and use of these weapons' are 'eroding,' while 'growing numbers' of these groups are seeking nuclear, chemical and biological weapons 'to kill large numbers of people'.
3. 'NBC [nuclear, chemical, and biological] weapons have substantial utility. They are seen as valuable tools by state and non-state actors alike,' and in particular as 'effective instruments to overcome the conventional superiority of the United States'.
4. 'The threat of retaliation or punishment that formed the basis for our deterrent policy in the Cold War is not likely to be sufficient.' Deterrence of regional adversaries armed with weapons of mass destruction will be 'less stable and more likely to fail' than in the Cold War context because factors, such as 'mutual understandings, effective communications, and symmetrical interests and risks […] simply do not pertain with states like North Korea.'
5. Given that proliferation is inevitable and deterrence may fail, 'it is essential that the United States acquire the capabilities to deny an enemy the benefits of these weapons,' including 'passive and active defenses as well as improved counterforce means.'
6. At the same time, 'an overwhelming retaliatory capability remains critical to US security policy.' 'Our nuclear weapons are the single most important instrument we have for deterring NBC use against us by rogue states.' (Joseph has long advocated maintaining a threat to retaliate against chemical or biological attacks with nuclear weapons, which would require dropping or modifying political commitments the United States has made to negative security assurances).

While this statement did not discuss any steps that might be taken to slow or stop proliferation, Joseph explored those possibilities in some detail in testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in early 2000[6]. In those remarks, Joseph argued that 'we must re-double our efforts' to stop or even reverse proliferation – but warned that it was important to 'establish realistic goals' for what such efforts could achieve,

and argued again that states that sought to acquire weapons of mass destruction were likely to succeed. He argued that:

1. 'The first line of defense is preventing proliferation at its source,' through 'denying access to sensitive technologies, materials, and expertise.' He identified 'national and international export controls and cooperative threat reduction programs such as with Russia', as the key tools in this highest-priority area. On export controls in particular, he urged 'a concerted effort, at the highest levels' to organize tighter and more comprehensive controls both nationally and internationally.
2. Controlling international exports of sensitive technologies is likely to require both 'leading by example' and 'more direct means'. In particular, 'the application of sanctions will be required to deal with supplier countries like Russia and China, both of whom have dismal records in assisting nuclear weapon and missile programs of other states.'
3. Arms control agreements have a much more limited role in nonproliferation, and 'early nonproliferation arms control treaties were comprised of at least three parts idealism for every part realism'. Joseph lumped the NPT with the BWC among treaties 'without effective verification and enforcement provisions', implicitly condemning the IAEA safeguards system as ineffective[7].
4. The global norms represented by treaties such as the NPT, BWC, and CWC 'continue to make an important contribution', by providing most states with a framework and incentives to stay within the regimes, and 'these norms should be maintained and strengthened'. But 'these treaties have little impact on those states that do not respect international norms […] States like North Korea and Iraq have a demonstrated record of flaunting norms and manipulating verification measures, such as IAEA safeguards.' 'International unwillingness to 'confront the limitations of norm-building as a basis for policy' has caused 'harm to the cause of nonproliferation' [8].
5. There is no need for the United States to accept additional constraints on its own forces and freedom of action to strengthen these norms; to move in that direction would be to allow 'the lure of arms control idealism' to prevail over 'hard-nosed security judgments'. In particular, the United States already has 'an outstanding record' in meeting its Article VI obligation to negotiate in good faith toward disarmament, and has 'no apologies to make'. 'Proposals for elimination or radical reductions in nuclear weapons would undermine our national security and international stability in a way that would likely fuel proliferation,' because states that once relied on the US nuclear deterrent might be tempted to acquire nuclear weapons of their own. Such proposals 'must be resisted and their underlying arguments must be refuted'. Similarly, as noted earlier, his arguments for relying on threats of nuclear use to deter chemical or biological attack would require modifying (or ignoring) past US negative security assurances, made in an attempt to strengthen global nonproliferation norms.
6. In particular, 'there is no evidence that the Test Ban Treaty will reduce proliferation.' None of the key regional proliferators' programs would be significantly restrained by the treaty. To the contrary, 'the CTBT could actually lead to more proliferation' because it would undermine the credibility of the US deterrent umbrella.
7. Finally, Joseph argued, 'Because membership in these international conventions bestows legitimacy and, at least for the NPT, access to sensitive materials and technologies, my recommendation for dealing with states such as North Korea, Iraq, and Iran is not to seek their participation in these conventions but rather to keep them out.' On Iran in particular, Joseph complained that 'there is no more bitter irony than to listen to Russian officials tell us that Iran, as a member in good standing of the NPT, is not only deserving but entitled to the dual use technology that Moscow has contracted to sell it, and that we know will be helpful to further Iran's nuclear weapons program.'

A key element here is that in the balance between the supply side and the demand side of nonproliferation policy – between attempting to deny potential proliferators access to critical technologies, and attempting to build security and political conditions that reduce the number of countries that want weapons of mass destruction – Joseph effectively takes the existence of widespread

demand as an unchangeable fact of international life, and thus the focus of his recommendations is entirely on the supply side (One senior administration official, in an off-the-record briefing on the Bush administration's nonproliferation policy, mentioned the need to focus on 'demand side' measures – but then went on to specify that what he meant by that was efforts to interdict shipments of sensitive technologies and materials after they had left the country of origin).

The basic beliefs reflected in these statements about the inevitability of proliferation, and many of the resulting policy prescriptions, are widely shared among senior Bush administration national security and nonproliferation officials. Joseph and these other officials agree that it is important to try to stop proliferation where that is possible, but their deep pessimism over the prospects for doing so inevitably leads them to a shift in relative emphasis from preventing proliferation to greater focus on responding to it and managing its consequences.

Nevertheless, as the administration has had more time in office to get its people in place and its feet on the ground, and especially since President Bush's May 1 speech on missile defense, there has been a marked shift toward a more nuanced tone on nonproliferation and missile defense. Administration officials now emphasize that they want to carry out a more comprehensive and integrated strategy to deal with the spread of weapons of mass destruction, combining strengthened nonproliferation efforts with counterproliferation and missile defense – with missile defense only one element of that comprehensive approach. The relative emphasis on the pieces of the individual elements of such a comprehensive strategy, however, remains clear: in Bush's May 1 speech itself, there is a total of one sentence on nonproliferation, surrounded by pages of material on missile defense.

But it is not at all obvious that the nonproliferation presumptions and prescriptions shared by Joseph and the other members of the new team are correct. The evidence of the last five decades of nonproliferation efforts suggests that Joseph's overwhelming proliferation pessimism is misplaced[9]. There are today well over a dozen countries that have embarked on nuclear weapons programs and then stopped them – successes of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. Indeed, depending on whether one believes that North Korea succeeded in acquiring nuclear weapons before its plutonium production was frozen, the world today has either the same number of states with nuclear weapons capability as the world of 15 years ago, or one fewer (since South Africa dismantled its bombs). Today there are only a tiny number of countries that do not already have nuclear weapons capabilities that have both a potential capability and an interest in acquiring nuclear weapons. With hard work (especially in ensuring that nuclear weapons materials remain under control) and some luck (especially changes in the governments and policies of Iraq, North Korea, and Iran) the international community can hope that this number will still be unchanged 15 years from now[10]. If it has increased 15 years from now, it will likely be by one or two. In short, there is no uncontrollable tide of nuclear proliferation. Similarly, while it is undeniably true that there are a substantial number of states working on chemical and biological weapons, and there are certainly states that have made significant progress in their chemical and biological programs in recent years, overall the lists of states with such programs today are surprisingly similar to the lists of 15 years ago – and the CWC has brought at least some states to commit to dismantle their chemical stockpiles and open themselves to far-reaching inspections.

Nor is there any compelling reason to believe that 'the threat of retaliation' will not be effective in deterring regional actors from using weapons of mass destruction against the United States and its forces and allies[11]. While the leaders of some states may not be *rational* in US eyes, it is difficult to imagine a leader sane enough to be able to seize and maintain power in a major state who would not be deterred by the prospect of having himself, his regime, and all of his regime's sources of power destroyed – the certain result of an attack on the United States with a missile armed with weapons of mass destruction. Adolf Hitler is the archetype of the irrational, insanely aggressive dictator – yet though the Nazis invented nerve gas, Hitler never used it. He was deterred by the

threat of retaliation – even before nuclear weapons existed.

With respect to norms, few analysts ever argued that Saddam Hussein or Kim Jong Il would be deterred from attempting to acquire nuclear weapons by the existence of a global norm. Rather, as Joseph agrees, such norms help reinforce the restraint of the vast majority of states. Just as crucially, they make it possible to build coalitions to oppose the efforts of states such as Iraq and North Korea that attempt to violate generally agreed norms. Keeping such states out of the regimes would mean that they were violating no commitments in pursuing their weapons programs, which would probably make it impossible to build an effective international coalition to oppose those programs.

A final point where many nonproliferation advocates and Joseph would part company is on what the United States needs to do to maintain and strengthen these norms. The nonproliferation regime is fundamentally based on the consent of the governed: to strengthen safeguards, improve export controls, or confront a violator requires the support of a large fraction of the parties to the regime (most of whom are non-nuclear-weapon states), and that support will only be forthcoming if they see there is something in it for them. In particular, if the United States is unwilling to accept any constraints on its own power and freedom of action, it is hard to see how other parties can be convinced to accept more stringent constraints on their own. The Director-General of the IAEA, for example, has described the US Senate's rejection of the constraints on future US nuclear weapons development represented by the CTBT as a 'devastating blow' to efforts to convince non-nuclear weapon states to sign up to expanded inspections [12]. The Bush administration appears to want to have it both ways – to assert that they support maintaining and strengthening the NPT regime, while opposing many of the steps that have made its maintenance and strengthening possible. In the NATO communiqué issued during Bush's trip to Europe, for example, the administration expressed its 'determination to contribute to the implementation of the conclusions of the 2000 NPT Review Conference'[13] – yet the reality is that the administration has specifically rejected virtually all of the specific points in that document that would constrain the United States, including the unequivocal commitment to eliminating nuclear weapons, ratification of the CTBT, preservation and strengthening of the ABM Treaty, ratification of the New York ABM Treaty protocols, completion of ratification and entry into force of START II, negotiation of START III, and ensuring the irreversibility of nuclear arms reductions[14]. This approach makes it significantly more difficult to challenge other states over their questionable compliance with NPT requirements.

Organizations and People

As the saying goes, 'the people make the policy'. The people chosen for key nonproliferation positions in the Bush administration so far generally share a deep skepticism over what efforts to stop the spread of weapons of mass destruction can accomplish[15]. The organizational structures in which those people work also have an important effect on which policies will end up getting top priority. Here too, the new approach is evident: the Bush administration has sought to reorganize in order to better integrate efforts to prevent proliferation with efforts to respond to proliferation once it occurs, but in the process has created structures that inevitably will place more emphasis on missile defense and other responses than on the first line of defense – stopping the spread of weapons of mass destruction before it occurs.

The White House. President George W. Bush appears to have had few deeply ingrained foreign policy beliefs prior to running for office, and in areas such as nonproliferation, he relies heavily on his foreign policy advisers. On nuclear security, he has made it clear that his first priority is missile defense, but has also said positive words about engagement with Russia and others to prevent proliferation. He has leaned in both the engagement and American preeminence directions at different times, on different subjects. His summer trip to Europe and meetings with President Putin seem to have helped move him toward more emphasis on nonproliferation engagement – while maintaining the core priority on missile defense. So far, on issues ranging from missile defense to global warming, Bush appears to be willing to spend time listening, but not to actually change US positions: it is not yet clear whether this is just unilateralism 'wrapped in conciliatory rhetoric,' as Senator Carl Levin (D-MI) put it, or represents a genuine willingness

to adapt US approaches to accommodate the security needs of other states.

Vice President Dick Cheney, by contrast, is clearly a committed member of the American preeminence camp – and has played a key role in choosing hawkish members of that camp for critical national security positions elsewhere in the government, especially in the Department of Defense. Cheney's chief of staff, Lewis *Scooter* Libby, is also his national security adviser, and was chief counsel for the congressional Cox committee that charged China with large-scale nuclear espionage. A former senior official at both Defense and State whose career was originally launched in part by Paul Wolfowitz (now Deputy Secretary of Defense), Libby's views closely parallel Cheney's. Libby is pulling together a substantial team for the Vice President, whose daily work is closely integrated with the President's people, including the National Security Council (NSC) staff. Eric Edelman, in particular – an aide to Strobe Talbott and an ambassador to Finland in the Clinton administration – handles a broad range of national security issues, including matters relating to nonproliferation.

At the NSC, the locus for coordinating security policy throughout the government, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice and Deputy National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley appear to fall between the engagement and American preeminence camps. Rice is a Russia expert who served on the NSC staff in the first Bush administration and played a key role in US policy toward the reunification of Germany, among other matters. She was Bush's principal foreign policy adviser during the campaign, and he relies on her very heavily – though she has emphasized that the NSC's role should be to coordinate policy, and that the country 'cannot have two Secretaries of State'. Hadley was an Assistant Secretary of Defense in the first Bush administration, who played a leading part in discussions in US-Russian discussions of missile defenses at that time. Rice has a daily discussion of key international issues with Secretary of State Colin Powell and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, and chairs the meetings of the *principals committee* – the group of cabinet secretaries in national security areas that meet as needed to make top-level policy decisions. Hadley chairs the *deputies committee* – the next step down from the principals. Of all the senior Bush administration appointees, Hadley appears to be among the most committed to a strong nonproliferation policy going beyond just missile defense – but it is clear that he, too, places much higher emphasis and priority on negotiating a deal on missile defense. Gary Edson, who handles international economic issues as both a deputy national security adviser and a deputy economic adviser, has been playing an important role on export control policy.

Joseph, whose views were outlined above, is the senior White House official focused specifically on proliferation issues. Joseph's directorate, known as Nonproliferation and Export Controls in the Clinton administration, is now Proliferation Strategy, Counterproliferation, and Homeland Defense. Substantively, this means that missile defense has been added to this directorate's purview – in part because of Joseph's personal interest in and expertise on missile defense[16]. What this means, in effect, is that the attention of the senior director and some of the directorate's staff will be focused primarily on missile defense -- along with that of the President and the rest of the senior White House staff. The total available person-power to focus on all nonproliferation issues worldwide – nuclear, biological, chemical, missile – is effectively down to three people (two on general nonproliferation issues and one on export controls). Similarly, policy on Russia and the other states of the former Soviet Union, once handled by another senior directorate with a similar staff, has been given to a single director for Russia and another for the rest of the former Soviet Union under the Eurasian directorate (cutting the available person-power by perhaps 60%). In short, after years of complaining (correctly) that there was too little leadership from the White House on nonproliferation in the Clinton administration, especially on *loose nukes*, the Republicans have created a structure that will ensure that there will be less in their administration.

Under Joseph, the two key people who are handling nonproliferation issues that affect Russia are Thomas Maertens and Richard Falkenrath. Maertens, a foreign service officer once posted in the science section of the US embassy in Moscow, is a hold-over from the Clinton years, but is nonetheless somewhat skeptical of the management and

approaches taken in many of the US-Russian cooperative nuclear security programs built up during those years. He has been given overall charge of the ongoing NSC review of these programs (about which more below). Falkenrath, previously an assistant professor at Harvard University, is more enthusiastic about the need to work with Russia to control proliferation threats, and co-authored a book on that subject[17] – but the only part of that agenda for which Falkenrath has responsibility is oversight of the HEU Purchase Agreement. Maertens and Falkenrath also have a wide range of responsibilities for nonproliferation issues elsewhere in the world. Export control issues are handled by Maureen Tucker, a career Department of Commerce official who is a holdover from the Clinton administration.

The State Department. Secretary of State Colin Powell, a former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is the senior Bush administration official who most clearly represents the engagement camp – as befits a Secretary of State (before the campaign was in full swing, Powell had even endorsed the CTBT[18]). Despite holding what appears to be a minority view in the Bush administration on some key nonproliferation issues, Powell appears to have been quite successful in getting State's approach on regional nonproliferation problems such as Iraq and North Korea approved, over initial opposition from the American preeminence school (both issues are described below). Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, also in the engagement camp[19], is very close to the Secretary and seems to be shouldering an array of high-profile roles, including on nonproliferation matters. It was Armitage, for example, on a trip to Korea, who announced that talks with North Korea would restart within a matter of weeks – even before the President's official statement on that subject.

Nonetheless, the usual press caricature of State Department doves at war with Defense Department hawks paints far too simplistic a picture[20]. In particular, the new Undersecretary of State for International Security and Arms Control, John Bolton, is a hawk who has rarely (if ever) seen an arms control or nonproliferation agreement he liked. Bolton, who has also advocated refusing to pay the US dues to the United Nations and recognizing Taiwan as an independent state, is a close ally of Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC), who described him as 'the kind of man with whom I would want to stand at Armageddon.'[21] Until the shift of control of the US Senate to the Democrats, Helms, as chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, had enormous power over the State Department, controlling its budget, the confirmation of its senior officials, and consideration of all international treaties, and he used that leverage to ensure a senior slot for Bolton. Helms reportedly attempted to get Bolton appointed as Ambassador to the United Nations – despite Bolton's repeated dismissal of the organization and opposition to meeting US legal obligations to pay its dues – but settled for the appointment as Undersecretary. Although Bolton had what Senator John Kerry (D-MA) described as a 'confirmation conversion', describing himself as a moderate on arms control issues in his confirmation hearings, his nomination was intensely controversial, with Senate Democrats opposing his anti-arms control record; the 43 votes against his confirmation in the Senate were more than were cast against either John Ashcroft for Attorney General or Gale Norton for Secretary of the Interior, both of whom were cast by opponents as right-wing ideologues.

During the Clinton administration, Helms succeeded in forcing the abolishment of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, whose functions were folded in to the State Department -- reducing the total person-power devoted to nonproliferation, and the access of nonproliferation advocates to the top levels of government. In principle, therefore, the whole arms control and nonproliferation policy operation at State is under Bolton. In the Powell-Armitage State Department, however, the assistant secretaries generally report directly to them, somewhat reducing the control of the Undersecretaries. Currently, the Assistant Secretary of State for Nonproliferation, Robert Einhorn, and the Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, Avis Bohlen, are still holdovers from the Clinton administration, and no names of replacements have been put forward. But now that Bolton has been confirmed, it seems clear that these officials' days in office are numbered. As at the NSC, the bureau responsible for Russia and the other former Soviet states has been folded into the Europe desk, reducing its relative importance and priority.

The Defense Department. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has been a dedicated hawk, opposed to virtually all arms control and nonproliferation agreements, throughout his national security career, and he has put

together a remarkably hard-line team at the Pentagon. In his first tour as Secretary of Defense during the Ford Administration, Rumsfeld managed to sabotage Henry Kissinger's effort to complete the SALT II treaty (by convincing the Joint Chiefs of Staff to withdraw their support when Kissinger was already in Moscow)[22]. Rumsfeld's deputy, Paul Wolfowitz, has also been a hawkish arms control critic for many years -- though a major part of his early government career was four years at the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in the 1970s, working on arms control and nonproliferation negotiations. Cheney, Rumsfeld, and Wolfowitz have reportedly formed a team to manage defense policy – and, presumably, to oppose any new agreements that would unduly constrain US forces and freedom of action. The three have worked together extensively in the past: Rumsfeld was Cheney's boss as White House chief of staff in the Ford administration and picked Cheney to succeed him when he went to the Pentagon, and Wolfowitz served as Undersecretary of Defense in Cheney's Pentagon in the first Bush administration.

The nominee for Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Douglas Feith, is still more hawkish and opposed to agreements that constrain the United States or compromise with potential adversaries. During the Reagan years, he served as a deputy to Richard Perle, the renowned *prince of darkness* of the Reagan Pentagon (who remains an influential outside adviser to the Bush administration, though not a government official). Since then, while working in his private law practice, Feith played a key role in the opposition to the Chemical Weapons Convention, and has been a principal proponent of the legally absurd argument that there is no need to withdraw from the ABM Treaty because the treaty ceased to exist when the Soviet Union ceased to exist, and has been serving on the board of Frank Gaffney's Center for Security Policy, an organization dedicated to opposing virtually every arms control and nonproliferation initiative proposed. The nominee to be Feith's deputy, Stephen A. Cambone, is a strong missile defense advocate who served as director of strategic defense policy in the Pentagon during the first Bush administration.

Further down the chain, the key position related to nonproliferation policy is the newly re-created job of Assistant Secretary for International Security Policy – in charge of dealing with arms control and nonproliferation negotiations, among other matters – for which the nominee is J.D. Crouch II. Crouch served for several years as an aide to Senator Malcolm Wallop (R-WY), who at the time was among the most hawkish members of the US Senate, an intense advocate of abrogating the ABM Treaty and most other major agreements with the Soviet Union. Like Feith, Crouch until recently served on the board of Gaffney's Center for Security Policy, and strongly opposed the Chemical Weapons Convention, along with most other arms control and nonproliferation agreements of recent times. Crouch is known, among other things, for criticizing the first President Bush's decision to withdraw US nuclear weapons from South Korea, and recommending that the United States begin bombing North Korea by a date certain if North Korea did not completely and verifiably dismantle its WMD infrastructure[23]. Peter Rodman, the nominee for Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs – a post that deals with regional conflicts and regional security issues – will likely be an important player in dealing with the various regional proliferation *hard cases*, and has a more moderate record.

While the American preeminence advocates at the Pentagon take a hard line on arms control, they are likely also to support hard lines that might be endorsed by nonproliferation advocates. They are likely to favor the imposition of sanctions on countries or entities accused of proliferation wrongdoing, and the maintenance of stringent export controls on a wide range of high-technology items. Similarly, on the matter of US opposition to reprocessing weapons-usable plutonium in various countries – modified in the Bush administration's energy policy, as discussed below – the view of many on the Republican right is as anti-plutonium as the view of the Democratic left, suggesting that Defense may take a hard line against any suggestion, for example, that South Korea or Taiwan be allowed to reprocess US-origin spent fuel. This anti-plutonium view is not universal on the Republican right, however, as there are others who are so enthusiastic about the future of nuclear energy that they are happy to endorse reprocessing.

The Department of Energy. Perennially dysfunctional, and with foreign affairs as only one of its many missions, the Department of Energy is always the weak sister of each administration's national security team, and the Bush administration is no exception (For example, as was also true in the Clinton Administration, the regular consultations between the National Security Adviser and the Secretaries of State and Defense on the national security issues of the day do not include the Secretary of Energy).

In the wake of spy scandals at the end of the Clinton administration, Congress forced a reorganization of DOE in which the weapons complex and the nonproliferation efforts were pulled out as a separate National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) within the DOE structure. Congress' hope was that this would lead to more effective management of the US nuclear weapons stockpile, and a better ability to protect critical secrets. Nonproliferation, while included in NNSA's mission, was clearly a distant third priority, and has remained so. Gen. John Gordon, previously the deputy director of the CIA, became the first head of NNSA, and there was bipartisan agreement that he should stay on for several years to get the new agency launched, regardless of who won the election. As a result, there has been less change from the latter part of the Clinton years in key nonproliferation policies and personnel at DOE than elsewhere in the government.

Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham, a former Senator, has had very little prior experience in nonproliferation, but has indicated some interest in promoting DOE's nonproliferation programs. So far, however, Abraham has few staff outside the NNSA to help him work through this agenda – the main exception being Paul Longsworth, previously a Republican staffer for the Senate Armed Services Committee. The Deputy Secretary of Energy, Francis Blake, was vice president of General Electric and has little experience in national security and foreign affairs matters. The Undersecretary of Energy, Robert Card, was previously the president of the company managing the cleanup of the Rocky Flats plutonium site, and is expected to focus primarily on the civilian side of DOE – though he has been a key player in the administration's review of policy on the HEU Purchase Agreement.

That leaves the main action on nonproliferation with Gordon and his team at NNSA. Gordon supports DOE's nonproliferation programs, including the cooperative efforts with Russia, but it is clear that strengthening the US weapons complex and keeping the secrets are far higher on his agenda; Congress has made it clear that if NNSA does not perform those missions well, DOE will lose its management of the weapons complex entirely, having it shifted to the Defense Department or an entirely independent agency. Within NNSA, there are deputy administrators for both the defense program and the nonproliferation effort (with the same rank as assistant secretaries in other departments). The Deputy Administrator for Nonproliferation and National Security has not yet been officially named, but former START negotiator Linton Brooks is widely reported to be in line for the job. Brooks has long experience in US-Soviet negotiations during the Cold War, remains a believer in negotiated arms control agreements (a minority view on the Bush team), and appears to lean more toward the engagement than the American preeminence camp. Gordon's special assistant for nonproliferation matters, Steve Aoki, is a former State Department and National Security Council official with long experience in international nuclear nonproliferation efforts. In addition, Gordon has now established a strategic planning group for NNSA, under John Harvey, a former Pentagon weapons official, which is working with the nonproliferation programs and other efforts within NNSA to prepare an overall plan for NNSA's activities for the next several years.

The Department of Commerce. The Commerce Department has an important nonproliferation role because it plays a key part in administering export controls. Secretary of Commerce Donald Evans was Bush's campaign chairman and is a personal friend of the President's, which will give Commerce extra clout in the inevitable interagency export control disputes. The new Undersecretary of Commerce for Export Administration, Kenneth Juster, was a senior State Department official in the first Bush administration, and has a reputation for pragmatism. While Juster does not have an extensive export control background, his law practice has involved a wide range of international business issues. Beneath Juster,

the Assistant Secretary for Export Administration is James J. Jochum – formerly Republican counsel to the Senate Banking Committee, where Jochum played a major role in drafting new export control legislation that was attacked as unduly loosening a broad range of controls in an effort to promote US exports, and was ultimately blocked by the chairmen of four different Senate committees[24]. This suggests that in the new Bush administration, the Commerce Department, as is traditional, will represent a pro-business, pro-export point of view.

The Intelligence Agencies. While President Bush has kept George Tenet as Director of Central Intelligence for the time being, the CIA has reorganized its proliferation-tracking effort. The new Weapons Intelligence, Nonproliferation, and Arms Control Center, established in March of this year, combined previous centers focusing on nonproliferation, on arms control verification, and on intelligence on foreign weapons systems, for a total of some 500 analysts – potentially a substantial increase in the person-power available for tracking proliferation, if they are deployed more for that purpose than for arms control verification[25]. The new center is headed by Alan Foley, a long-time Soviet weapons analyst who had directed the Arms Control Intelligence Staff – a group renowned in recent years for raising concerns over whether Russia was complying with the test ban and whether the test ban could be verified.

A New Nonproliferation Approach Unfolds

Actions, as the saying goes, speak louder than words. The key policy nonproliferation-related policy issues the Bush administration has acted on so far have included arms control and nonproliferation agreements, export control legislation, particular regional proliferators, the nuclear fuel cycle and its contribution to proliferation, and cooperation with other major nuclear weapon states, such as Russia and China.

Arms control and nonproliferation agreements. Arms control and nonproliferation are inextricably linked through Article VI of the NPT, which makes progress toward arms reductions and nuclear disarmament a nonproliferation obligation of the nuclear weapon states. For a Russian audience, there is no need to repeat the basic outlines of the Bush team's approach to US-Russian arms control -- missile defenses going far beyond the ABM Treaty (with Russian agreement if possible, and without Russian agreement if necessary), and further reductions in nuclear forces through unilateral and reciprocal steps more than through negotiated and verified treaties. This approach was clearly stated even before the Bush team took office – though it is notable that Bush's May 1 speech on missile defense included far more emphasis on consultation with Russia and US allies than had been present before. How real this focus on consultation will be remains to be seen, but it is clear that for the moment at least, those who advocated abrogating the ABM Treaty immediately have not won the day. The shift in control of the Senate to the Democrats, and the almost universally negative reaction around the world to the consultations following Bush's May 1 speech, will make unilateral abrogation of the ABM Treaty more politically difficult. And there are some within the administration who are quietly suggesting that the current emphasis on unilateral steps on nuclear forces might be supplemented in the future with a return to negotiated and verified agreements to confirm some of those unilateral steps.

Nonetheless, as Joseph noted in the testimony quote above, the Bush team believes the United States should adopt whatever nuclear posture best serves its security, without reference to Article VI obligations, as the United States, in their view, has already fully met its Article VI commitments. Certainly there appears to be little chance the United States will ratify the CTBT during this Presidency, whatever the pressure may be from other participants in the nonproliferation regime. Even more certainly, the statement of all 5 nuclear-weapon-states at the last NPT review conference, which expressed their 'unequivocal commitment' to achieving complete nuclear disarmament, and their support for the CTBT, the ABM Treaty, and START III, among other items, no longer reflects the policy of the US government.

Similarly, in the area of biological weapons, the Bush administration has undertaken a prolonged review of policy toward the proposed compliance protocol for the

Biological Weapons Convention, and has reportedly concluded that the United States cannot support the current protocol. There is now too little time to negotiate the substantial changes the Bush adminstration's review would seem to call for before the current November deadline. The reported results of the review seem to lean in the direction of simply walking away from the effort to create verification mechanisms for the BWC, but such a step would come at a considerable political cost, among US allies in Europe and elsewhere[26].

Export control legislation. The key export control issue the Administration has faced so far is the new post-Cold War version of the Export Administration Act, now being debated in Congress. The existing Export Administration Act, which provides the statutory authority for US export controls, is outdated and will expire this year unless extended. On January 23, 2001, a group of Senators reintroduced the new version of the law that had been drafted in the previous Congress. This version attempted to focus controls more narrowly on those technologies whose exports could most threaten international security, while also increasing penalties for violations. Critics charged, however, that the Senate Banking Committee, with its pro-business bent, had gone too far in loosening controls and making it difficult for those within the government who might oppose an export to stop it[27]. The Bush administration had to scramble to come up with a position on the legislation before its key export control appointees were all in place. Ultimately, the Administration insisted on three key changes: (1) giving the Defense Department a greater role in export control decision-making (including a requirement that the Secretary of Commerce refer all license applications to the Secretaries of Defense and State, and that the Department of Defense be notified of any proposed changes in the classification of controlled commodities); (2) the creation of a process allowing any department that opposes an export to escalate the issue to an interagency panel and ultimately to the President; and (3) giving the President authority to continue controls over key items whose export would undermine US national security, even if these would otherwise be subject to the law's requirement that any technology that a sensitive country could easily buy from other sources, or is available on the mass market in the United States, be decontrolled. With these amendments, President Bush called the legislation 'a good bill' and urged that it be passed and sent to him for signature[28]. This episode suggests that on export controls, while the pro-business, pro-export forces within the administration are quite strong, the advocates of stringent controls over key technologies related to WMD can win some important battles.

North Korea. Engagement with North Korea is one policy arena where Powell appears initially to have been more forward-leaning than the President's early inclinations, but then to have won at least a limited victory in the end. On March 6, just as South Korean President Kim Dae Jung was arriving in Washington, Powell remarked that the administration planned to 'pick up where President Clinton and his administration left off' with the negotiations to freeze North Korea's missile and weapons of mass destruction programs[29]. This was exactly what Kim, who has staked the future of his government on an effort to warm relations with North Korea that depends on US help, wanted to hear. In a press conference the next day after meeting with Kim, however, President Bush expressed skepticism over whether North Korea was abiding by agreements already reached, warned of the difficulties of verifying any deal with North Korea, and pointedly did *not* indicate that talks would continue any time soon[30]. Pyongyang, in its own inimitable style, responded by canceling reconciliation talks with Seoul and describing the United States as 'a cannibals' nation'[31].

But then, after a quiet period of internal policy review and behind-the-scenes infighting, it was announced that talks would indeed resume. This was first announced by Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, who also indicated that Washington would strongly support Kim Dae Jung's *sunshine policy*[32]. In the days before the announcement that talks would resume, Pyongyang had begun to send conciliatory signals again, with Kim Jong Il telling a visiting European Union delegation that he would unilaterally extend the missile testing moratorium at least through 2003, and suggesting that he would be prepared to travel to South Korea if the conclusion of the US policy review was

favorable. But after the announcement, displaying Pyongyang's usual desire to tack back and forth between accommodation and threat, the North threatened to withdraw from the Agreed Framework over delays in building the promised reactors – though a closer reading of the statement suggested that the withdrawal and resumption of the previous nuclear program was only threatened years in the future *if* at that time sufficient progress had not been made, in essence a reminder to the United States of what North Korea could do if the United States did not live up to its obligations[33].

President Bush's own statement on the results of the administration's review of policy on North Korea did not come until June 6[34]. While the statement called for renewed discussions, it was heavily influenced by the American preeminence advocates, who had fiercely opposed the Clinton administration's approach of using positive financial incentives to *buy out* the North Korean nuclear and missile programs. The statement listed a series of US demands:

- 'improved implementation' of the 1994 Agreed Framework (which administration officials explained referred in part to convincing North Korea to open its facilities to full IAEA inspections sooner rather than later);
- 'verifiable constraints on North Korea's missile programs and a ban on its missile exports';
- 'a less threatening conventional military posture'.

But the statement offered little in the way of specific incentives for North Korea to agree, indicating only that North Korean agreement would result in expanded 'efforts to help the North Korean people', an easing of sanctions, and unspecified 'other political steps'. No specific mention was made of compensating North Korea for the lost revenue from halting its missile exports, or of launching its civilian satellites in return for a halt to its indigenous missile program, as had been discussed in the Clinton administration – or of diplomatic recognition, another key item on the North Korean agenda. Predictably, while North Korea did agree to resume discussions, it attacked Bush's list of agenda items, adamantly refused any discussion on limiting its conventional forces until all US forces withdrew from the peninsula, and proposed instead that the talks should focus on US compensation to North Korea for delays in the reactor construction project[35].

Ultimately, restarting the nuclear and missile talks was not a very difficult choice. Three tougher calls await the Bush team down the road: how much to offer the North Koreans in return for a verified end to their missile program and exports; whether to agree to step-by-step accords on specific issues given the North Korean rejection of their proposed comprehensive approach including conventional forces; and what to do when, as seems nearly inevitable, the Agreed Framework runs into trouble (Construction delays and North Korean foot-dragging over opening the suspect sites to inspections and removing the plutonium-bearing spent fuel – both required before the reactors are built – both seem virtually certain[36]). If the approach to the talks continues to be focused mainly on sticks and not carrots, the engagement advocates' victory in restarting discussions may come to naught.

Iraq. Iraq is another case where a nonproliferation approach first launched by Powell came under sharp criticism from more hawkish factions in the administration and Congress, but then, after a period of quiet, re-emerged as the official policy. Powell's February trip to the Middle East focused on a plan for easing sanctions on Iraqi trade in civilian goods, while strengthening controls over transfers of military-related goods, in an effort to rebuild international support for the sanctions regime[37]. Although Powell's suggestions received a positive reception in Middle Eastern capitals, hawks at home criticized Powell's plan as weakening the sanctions against Iraq without getting anything in return. A variety of factions continued to call for renewed efforts to help the Iraqi opposition overthrow Saddam Hussein, despite the disorganization and ineffectiveness of the Iraqi opposition forces. But by May, Iraq policy had re-emerged on the front pages, with Powell's approach being negotiated as a joint British-American proposal to the Security Council[38]. It appears that Powell's initiative may be enough to

save what had been a collapsing sanctions regime – and may help plug what had become a gaping oil-smuggling loophole providing huge unmonitored revenues to the Iraqi regime – but whether any of this will result in the return of UN weapons inspectors in the foreseeable future remains very much in doubt.

Iran. With Iran, even more than with Iraq and North Korea, US policy is focused on much more than just weapons of mass destruction – issues from oil to terrorism to the Middle East peace process are also prominent on the agenda. While the Iranian presidential campaign was underway, the Bush administration largely took a wait-and-see approach – but no major initiatives seem to have resulted from Khatami's overwhelming reelection victory. The big debate in the United States (and within the Bush administration) was over whether to drop the unilateral sanctions against Iran and Libya imposed in the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act. Congressional Republicans were sponsoring a five-year renewal of the sanctions, but the major oil companies were lobbying furiously to oppose the renewal – under the banner of an organization called *USA Engage*, with Clinton-era Commerce Department export control chief William Reinsch as one of its top officials[39]. Many of the senior officials of the Bush administration have close ties to these companies. Brent Scowcroft, Bush's father's national security adviser, also weighed in advocating an end to sanctions and an opening to Iran[40]. Nevertheless, with Iran topping the State Department's most recent list of state sponsors of terrorism, Bush said he had no plans to lift sanctions anytime soon[41]. The Bush administration appears to be just as concerned as the Clinton administration over Russian entities' nuclear and missile cooperation with Iran – a topic Bush raised in his summit with President Putin.

South Asia. On South Asia, the advocates of engagement – especially with India – are in the driver's seat within the Bush administration. The US tilt toward India – already manifest in the Clinton administration – has become even more palpable. For an administration that prides itself on being balance-of-power realists, the choice between a country of over a billion people with a thriving economy and a huge military machine, or a tiny country with a collapsing economy and a modest military force, is effectively no choice at all (Indeed, Deputy Secretary of State Armitage has described the administration's foreign policy as being focused on managing the rise of two great powers – China and India – and the decline, at least for the near term, of another – Russia[42]). Pakistan's status as a military dictatorship, its support for Afghanistan's *Taliban*, and its role as a breeding ground for jihadist terrorism offer additional rationales for the pro-India tilt, though the United States had little trouble supporting Pakistani dictatorships when it served US interests to do so. The nominee for Ambassador to India, Robert Blackwill, was one of Bush's senior foreign policy advisers during the campaign, and is a seasoned pro-engagement hand; the nominee for Ambassador to Pakistan, Wendy Chamberlain, by contrast, is a knowledgeable expert on both terrorism and narcotics, with a relatively low political profile. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage flew to India shortly after President Bush's May 1 missile defense speech to consult on US missile defense plans; Pakistan was prominently not on the agenda.

Nuclear energy and the nuclear fuel cycle. During the Clinton administration, the United States had been quite critical of the proliferation hazards of reprocessing and recycling plutonium in the nuclear fuel cycle, announcing that it would not itself reprocess for either nuclear power or nuclear explosive purposes, and would oppose reprocessing in regions of proliferation concern. The Clinton team attempted to negotiate a 20-year moratorium on plutonium reprocessing with Russia, though time ran out before the deal was cut.

The Bush team brings a much more enthusiastic attitude toward the future of nuclear energy, and the Bush Administration's energy policy statement, released in mid-May, includes a recommendation that 'the United States should reexamine its policies to allow for research, development and deployment of fuel conditioning methods (such as pyroprocessing) that reduce waste streams and enhance proliferation resistance,' and should collaborate with countries that have 'highly developed fuel cycles and a record of close cooperation' to 'develop reprocessing and fuel treatment

technologies that are cleaner, more efficient, less waste-intensive, and more proliferation-resistant,' while continuing to 'discourage the accumulation of separated plutonium, worldwide'[43]. This language was apparently included after only the briefest discussions with the nonproliferation and fuel cycle experts within the government. While the new language is more positive toward reprocessing than the Clinton Administration's take on the subject, it appears to maintain a requirement that only those reprocessing approaches that might be more proliferation-resistant than the traditional PUREX technology, and would not lead to additional accumulation of separated plutonium, would be pursued[44]. A wide range of issues about what this new approach will mean in practice remain to be resolved – in particular, whether Russia counts among the countries with 'a record of close cooperation' with whom joint R&D should be pursued, and whether the opposition to accumulation of separated plutonium will include a continued effort to get Russian agreement to a reprocessing moratorium.

Nonproliferation cooperation with China. During its eight years in office, the Clinton team succeeded in extracting from China a wide range of new nonproliferation commitments, ranging from not exporting missile technology going beyond the Missile Technology Control Regime guidelines to cutting off assistance to unsafeguarded nuclear facilities and strengthening China's domestic controls over sensitive exports. Implementation of these commitments, however, was an ongoing issue requiring regular discussions and continuing cooperation. Unfortunately, the poor state of US-Chinese relations since the Bush team came to office – with the spy-plane incident, fierce disagreements over missile defenses, and arms to Taiwan – combined with the relatively low priority the Bush administration has assigned to the detailed work of nonproliferation regime-building, has resulted in a substantial gap in the discussions, raising new questions over whether China will continue to implement its commitments. It is not clear, in particular, whether the Bush team has fully considered the implications for Chinese supplies to Pakistan of a situation in which both the United States and Russia are palpably leaning toward India, with Russia supplying a wide range of military and nuclear technologies. Some Chinese officials are asking why, if the United States feels free to go back on commitments it finds inconvenient (such as the ABM Treaty), China should not do the same. Nevertheless, ultimately both China and the United States see a substantial interest in improving relations, and it appears likely that down the road, renewed cooperation on nonproliferation will be one part of that agenda.

Nonproliferation cooperation with Russia. It is fair to say that US-Russian nonproliferation cooperation under the Bush administration did not get off to an auspicious start. During the campaign, Bush had emphasized the importance of the Nunn-Lugar cooperative threat reduction programs, and pledged that 'I'll ask the Congress to increase substantially our assistance'[45]. This campaign promise was immediately broken, however, when Bush proposed a budget for fiscal year 2002 that cut funding for the most urgent programs to ensure that potential bomb material was secure and accounted for[46]. The announcement of a far-reaching review of these programs was widely interpreted as directed toward canceling or scaling back key efforts in line with the budget cuts. NNSA chief Gordon was forbidden from traveling to Russia in February to coordinate next steps on key programs with Russian officials, as the new administration had not yet settled on a policy with respect to these efforts.

Worse, top administration officials immediately began to attack Russia's nonproliferation record, with CIA Director Tenet describing Russia as among the world's worst proliferators of sensitive technologies[47], Rumsfeld calling Russia an 'active proliferator', Wolfowitz warning that Russia seems 'willing to sell anything to anyone for money'[48], and even Powell saying that US policy toward Russia 'shouldn't be terribly different than the very realistic approach we had to the old Soviet Union in the late 1980s'.[49] These statements came despite Russia having given the new administration a substantial nonproliferation gift just as the Bush team came to office – the decision to suspend the deal to send isotope-separation lasers to Iran. Later, President Putin's decision to fire Minister of Atomic Energy Yevgeny Adamov – who had come to be seen as public enemy number one by many US nonproliferation officials – and to replace him with Alexander Rumyantsev

could also be read as a substantial step toward addressing US concerns[50]. Contrary to the advice of some engagement advocates within the administration, however, the Bush administration failed to seize that opportunity to engage with Rumyantsev on a renewed agenda of nuclear security cooperation.

But after this rocky start, matters have improved substantially in the lead-up to and aftermath of the Bush-Putin summit. Bush's May 1 speech marked a sharp shift toward the language of conciliation. The Bush team has clearly judged that with the Senate now in Democratic hands and the Europeans skeptical, the best road to their objective of missile defense lies through agreement and cooperation with Moscow. Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, and the others have clearly been told to rein in their tongues. The summit built a renewed spirit of cooperation that appeared to exceed either side's expectations, and laid a positive foundation for moving forward with a nonproliferation cooperation agenda. The attitude of some Bush administration officials, in effect, is: if Russia and the Europeans are so concerned about a US missile defense, they had better offer more help in forestalling the threats such a defense would be needed to address. Putin's suggestion that the two sides' security services should work together to interdict illicit shipments of missile technology, to take just one example, is potentially a positive idea that could be further developed[51].

Moreover, contrary to initial expectations, the review of threat reduction programs appears to be endorsing most of them to continue largely as before, and even considering some new initiatives. Administration officials have indicated privately, for example, that a new initiative on joint research and development of proliferation-resistant nuclear energy systems – much along the lines President Putin suggested in his Millennium Summit speech – will be among the new initiatives proposed. At the same time, Congress appears to be on a path toward correcting many of the worst mistakes made in the Bush administration's initial budget proposal: the House Appropriations Committee, for example, has voted to increase funding for both the material protection, control, and accounting (MPC&A) program and the *Nuclear Cities Initiative* compared to the Bush administration's request[52].

A number of key nonproliferation issues of special interest to Russia remain to be decided. Now that the Duma has approved the law on import of spent nuclear fuel, the only thing standing between Minatom and billions of dollars of revenue is the US government – because nearly all the fuel that countries might be interested in shipping to Russia has US obligations attached to it, meaning it cannot be shipped to Russia without US approval and a US-Russian agreement for nuclear cooperation. Such an agreement will certainly require a deal of some kind on Russia's nuclear cooperation with Iran – but the Bush administration has only begun to consider what specific deal it will want, and what else it might demand in these negotiations. The administration has officially stated that it will oppose any reprocessing of US-obligated fuel imported into Russia. Similarly, the Bush administration is still considering whether to approve the new contract approach for the HEU purchase agreement the *US Enrichment Corporation* has proposed, or some other concept for stabilizing that crucial agreement. What approach the Bush team will take to working with Russia to retool the closed nuclear cities is still being hotly debated; the existing *Nuclear Cities Initiative* has made only modest progress to date, and in its current form seems to have little political support in either Washington or Moscow. And no one has yet figured out what to do about the failure of the G-8 to come up with sufficient funding to implement the recent agreement on disposition of excess plutonium.

If both sides move forward with nonproliferation cooperation in the aftermath of the Bush-Putin summit, there is much to be done. The several US-Russian groups that had been discussing steps to strengthen export controls have not met since the Clinton administration. The two sides need detailed discussions to come to a better common understanding of where the most serious proliferation threats lie and what can be done to address them. More could be done to accelerate efforts to secure and account for nuclear materials; to dismantle excess nuclear weapons; to stabilize, accelerate, and expand the HEU purchase agreement; to build a better joint approach to downsizing the nuclear weapons complexes and providing alternative employment for nuclear weapon workers who are no longer needed; to put the agreement on reducing

excess plutonium stockpiles on a firm financial and technical footing; to reduce chemical weapons stockpiles and convert chemical and biological infrastructure; and more[53].

At the height of the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union built an extensive partnership to pursue their common interest in preventing proliferation – working together to forge the Nonproliferation Treaty and the IAEA safeguards regime, and to stop the nuclear weapons programs of key regional states. With compromises on both sides, such an active, constructive nonproliferation partnership could be rebuilt, much to the benefit of the security of both countries and the world.

Looking Toward the Future

What we have in the Bush administration's nonproliferation team is *not* a case of the fox guarding the chicken coop – it is more a case of a chicken-coop guard who doubts whether chicken coops really have much value, and expects the chickens will ultimately get eaten by foxes in any case. The new team – still being assembled – brings a new approach to the nonproliferation problem, and a new skepticism regarding what can be done to stem the spread of weapons of mass destruction. It is an approach based more on technology denial, and on preparing US military forces to respond to proliferation after it occurs, than on regime-building and negotiation toward common security. It is one piece of a foreign policy approach based on balance-of-power realism, not on liberal institutionalism. But it is also an approach that is still evolving, and will continue to do so for some time to come. There remains a substantial chance to build a serious US-Russian nonproliferation partnership, working to address both sides' security interest in preventing proliferation.

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[1] The best available description of the underlying intellectual rationale for rejecting all future negotiated, verified constraints on US nuclear forces is in a report signed by several senior Bush administration security officials before they took office: *Rationale and Requirements for US Nuclear Forces and Arms Control* (Fairfax, VA: National Institute for Public Policy, January 2001, available at http://www.ceip.org/files/projects/npp/pdf/nippnukes.pdf). For a useful summary and critique of the Bush administration's approach to arms reductions, see J. Mendelsohn, "Is Arms Control Dead?". *Issues in Science and Technology,* Spring 2001.

[2] For a good discussion of the history of this inevitable tension between proliferation policy and other factors, see P. Clausen, *Nonproliferation and the National Interest: America's Response to the Spread of Nuclear Weapons.* NY, HarperCollins, 1993.

[3] See, for example, R. Joseph, "The Case for National Missile Defense," *Journal of Homeland Defense,* October 2000.

[4] See the Center's web page, at http://www.ndu.edu/ndu/centercounter/index.htm.

[5] R. Joseph, testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities, March 23, 1999. Joseph numbered these as five conclusions; I have separated the first two (that weapons of mass destruction are here to stay, and that they will inevitably proliferate) into two separate conclusions for clarity.

[6] R. Joseph, testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, March 21, 2000.

[7] Fortunately, this appears to be one area where the Bush administration's approach already appears to be at variance with the impression one would draw from Joseph's testimony. Rather than lumping the IAEA safeguards system with the verification-free BWC, the administration has made a strong statement to the IAEA Board of Governors expressing its support for the safeguards system and efforts to strengthen it.

[8] The idea of global nonproliferation norms is a particular focus of the new team's skepticism. For example, Steven A. Cambone, a long-time missile defense advocate who is the nominee for Principal Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, devoted nearly his entire statement at the same hearing to a critique of norm-building as a focus for nonproliferation policy. See S. Cambone, "Elements of a Modern Non-Proliferation Policy," testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, March 21, 2000.

[9] For a quite different Republican perspective, see L. Dunn, "On Proliferation Watch: Some Reflections on the Past Quarter Century," *Nonproliferation Review*, Spring/Summer 1998.

[10] For an interesting argument along these lines, see T. Graham, "Nonproliferation: The Case for a Theory of Victory," *Arms Control Today*, September 1991; an updated version is in available in T. Graham, "Proliferation Threats: Growing, Shrinking, or Changing?". 2001, June 18.

[11] For a useful critique of the idea of the undeterrable *rogue* state, see R. Litwak, *Rogue States and US Foreign Policy: Containment After the Cold War*. Washington, Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2000.

[12] *Washington Post,* 2000, June 15.

[13] Final Communiqué: Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council Held in Budapest, Press Release M-NAC-1(2001)77, May 29, 2001.

[14] See 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Final Document, NPT/CONF.2000/28, May, 2000.

[15] For a useful updated list of those with jobs subject to Senate confirmation, see "Confirmation Status of Presidential Appointees to Nonproliferation-Related

Positions," Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies.

[16] Oddly, though the title is "Homeland Defense" and not just "Missile Defense," defense against mass-destruction terrorism is *not* under Joseph's directorate, but under Richard Clarke's directorate with other terrorism issues.

[17] G. Allison, O. Coté, Jr., R. Falkenrath, and S. Miller, *Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy: Containing the Threat of Loose Russian Nuclear Weapons and Fissile Material.* Cambridge, MIT Press, 1996.

[18] The statement that Powell signed, along with fellow former Chairmen John Shalikashvili, William Crowe, and David Jones, is available at http://www.clw.org/coalition/jcs0198.htm.

[19] Unlike his boss, however, Armitage opposed the CTBT, telling an official US Information Agency interviewer on behalf of the Bush campaign, 'we're not in the business of ratifying treaties that are unverifiable.' Unlike many other senior Bush administration national security officials, however, Armitage did not rule out a modified test ban in the future, saying 'a Republican administration would be much more inclined to negotiate a treaty that actually would hold water and might have verification measures that would withstand scrutiny.' See "From the Campaigns: A Republican View: Managing Relations with Russia, China, India: An Interview with Ambassador Richard Armitage," US Information Agency, 2000.

[20] *New York Times,* 2001, March 26.

[21] See "Council for a Livable World Opposes the John Bolton Nomination," Council for a Livable World, 2001, April 11.

[22] *New York Times*, 2001, January 8.

[23] For a summary of positions and quotes from Feith and Crouch, see "Bush Pentagon Nominees: Feith and Crouch," Council for a Livable World, May 2001.

[24] Jochum's profile on the Bureau of Export Administration's website describes him as having played 'a significant role in drafting and negotiating' S. 1712, the revised version of the Export Administration Act. For a critique of the bill by a hard-line export control advocate, see G. Milhollin, "The Export Administration Act in 2000," testimony to the Senate Committee on Armed Services, March 23, 2000.

[25] *Washington Post*, 2001, March 12.

[26] *New York Times*, 2001, May 20. See also Barbara Hatch Rosenberg, "US Policy and the BWC Protocol". *The CBW Conventions Bulletin,* June 2001.

[27] See, for example, G. Milhollin, op. cit., and *Los Angeles Times*, 2001, March 4.

[28] See, for example, discussion in R. Shelby, "Additional Views," in *The Export Administration Act of 2001*, Report of the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, United States Senate to Accompany S. 149, Senate Report 107-10, 107th Congress, April 2001; and Kenneth I. Juster, Undersecretary of Commerce for Export Administration, House Committee on International Relations, May 23, 2001. For a non-partisan summary of the bill and associated issues, see I. Ferguson, "The Export Administration Act: Controversy and Prospects". Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 2001, March 26.

[29] *Washington Post,* 2001, March 7.

[30] *New York Times*, 2001, March 8.

[31] *New York Times*, 2001, March 15.

[32] *New York Times*, 2001, May 10.

[33] The full text of the North Korean statement of May 16, 2001 can be found at the Korean Central News Agency website, http://www.kcna.co.jp/calendar/frame.htm.

[34] "Statement by the President," June 6, 2001.

[35] This statement of June 18, 2001, is also available at http://www.kcna.co.jp/calendar/frame.htm.

[36] For a useful discussion of what exactly the Agreed Framework requires over the next few years, and scenarios for its future, see M. May, ed., *Verifying the Agreed Framework*, UCRL-ID-142036, CGSR-2001-001 (Stanford, CA: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Center for Global Security Research and Stanford University Center for International Security and Cooperation, 2001).

[37] *New York Times*, 2001, February 27.

[38] *Los Angeles Times,* 2001*,* May 17.

[39] *Financial Times,* 2001*,* May 23.

[40] *Washington Post*, 2001, May 11.

[41] *Washington Post*, 2001, April 20.

[42] See "From the Campaigns," Armitage interview, op. cit.

[43] National Energy Policy Development Group, *National Energy Policy.* Washington, DC: Executive Office of the President, May 2001, p. 5-17.

[44] Further muddying the water, the Clinton administration's policy was enshrined in a Presidential Decision Directive, and such directives remain in force unless specifically revoked – meaning that the old policy is also still in force.

[45] George W. Bush, speech at the Reagan Library, November 19, 1999.

[46] For a detailed analysis of the budget cuts for nuclear security programs, see W. Hoehn, "Analysis of the Bush Administration's Fiscal Year 2002 Budget Requests for US-Former Soviet Union Nuclear Security: Department of Energy Programs". Washington, DC: Russian-American Nuclear Security Advisory Council, 2001, April 18.

[47] G. Tenet, "Worldwide Threat 2001: National Security in a Changing World," testimony to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, February 7, 2001.

[48] *Sunday Telegraph (London),* 2001*,* March 18.

[49] *New York Times,* 2001*,* March 15.

[50] *Moscow Times*, 2001, April 2.

[51] *New York Times,* 2001*,* June 19.

[52] Budget documents released by the House Appropriations Committee, June 2001.

[53] For an extensive discussion of what more should be done to secure, monitor, and reduce stockpiles of plutonium and HEU, see M. Bunn, *The Next Wave: Urgently Needed New Steps to Control Warheads and Fissile Material.* Washington DC: Nonproliferation Project, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Managing the Atom Project, Harvard University, 2000.

Commentary

CTBT VERIFICATION MECHANISM: EMERGENCE AND EVOLUTION

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[This article was originally published in Russian in *Yaderny Kontrol*, No. 4, Vol. 7, July-August, 2001]

It would be difficult to realize the true value of the CTBT without analyzing the international verification mechanism provided by the treaty. For the first time in the history of multilateral arms control agreements the global verification system is being established. It comprises modern and world-wide monitoring systems, political and diplomatic activities, on-site inspections, etc. It is important that an international organization is charged with operating this system. The agreement on the establishment of such verification mechanism results from dramatic changes in the world after the end of the Cold War, as well as political will of all the parties that have negotiated the treaty.

The history of test ban negotiations indicates that among the most complicated issues was the problem of ensuring politically acceptable verification procedures.

In February 1994 the specialized committee of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament commenced multilateral negotiations on the CTBT. The mandate of the committee provided for negotiations on universal treaty subject to multilateral and efficient verification. Bearing in mind this task, the parties devised the respective system to verify compliance with the CTBT. The verification issues turned out to be the most difficult to resolve during the talks. There was a certain contradiction between the comprehensive and no-threshold character of the ban to be negotiated and the limited (although more sophisticated than in the 1950s and 1960s) capabilities of any existing verification technology. The verification mechanism should be global and cover all media, be cost-effective, provide for the possibility of revealing hidden violations, and hence, contain potential violators. On the other hand, the procedures should be politically acceptable (minimal intrusiveness) and should not infringe the legitimate security interests (not related to the scope of the treaty) of the parties.

As a result of complex negotiations, the parties agreed on the verification mechanism, whose core is the International Monitoring System (IMS). It brings together 321 facility for seismological, radionuclide, infrasound and hydroacoustic monitoring, as well as 16 certified laboratories for additional analysis of samples from radionuclide monitoring stations, the International Data Center (to collect, process, archive and present to the States Parties all information received from the IMS facilities). The verification system also provides for political and diplomatic consultations and clarifications (concerning apprehensions of the breach of the CTBT), confidence-building measures (voluntary submission of data on large-scale conventional explosions, mostly industrial explosions in mining), on-site inspections that cannot be rejected.

During the Geneva talks the participants set forth many more proposals on measures and amount of verification. For instance, India insisted on special transparency measures to verify the activities of existing nuclear test ranges. This idea was rejected, for it ran counter to the non-discriminatory and universal character of the CTBT and implied that the nuclear weapon states were guilty *by definition* and only their activities should have been under permanent control. Some non-nuclear weapon states (Germany, Indonesia, Sweden) insisted on the ban on preparation of nuclear tests and, hence, argued that the treaty should provide for appropriate verification of these activities. Nuclear weapon states were strongly against such approach. Firstly, the activities similar to preparations may have nothing to do with the intent to breach the CTBT (e.g. drilling for geological surveys). Secondly, this would have complicated the verification mechanism, enhance intrusiveness of on-site inspections, whose objectives would have

been not only to state the fact of explosion (as provided for in the treaty), but to confirm the conduct of preparatory activities and their true goals.

China proposed to include satellite monitoring and electromagnetic pulse monitoring, as the means of verification. However, technical experts referred to these methods, as excessive, for if applied together with other mechanisms of the IMS, they would not have significantly improved capabilities of the verification mechanism. On the other hand, these two technologies are quite costly and their introduction would have raised the costs of verification in general. The final text of the CTBT nonetheless contains the possibility of future use of new monitoring technologies, such as satellite monitoring and electromagnetic pulse monitoring, after studying their potential impact on enhancing efficiency and cost-effectiveness of the verification system.

During the debate on the composition and configuration of the major technical component of the verification mechanism – the IMS – Russia managed to solve the problem of equal transparency of existing nuclear test ranges for technical means of the IMS. Historically, after decades of nuclear testing the Russian test facility was better monitored by numerous seismological stations in Scandinavia, which could provide accurate data on Novaya Zemlya even with the low threshold of detection. The test range in Nevada could be monitored only with teleseismological systems. This led to lower transparency of the test range, bearing in mind geological characteristics of this site. These arguments were taken into account and the IMS comprised stations (such as *Mina* in the United States) that provided for equal transparency of the test ranges.

Due to the scope of the CTBT (the treaty bans *any* [*italicized by us* – Auth.] our nuclear explosions), the parties did not have to seek any solution to the problem of verification of peaceful nuclear explosions, for they were also prohibited. At the same time, China insisted on preserving the provision that the parties might return to the issue of allowing peaceful nuclear explosions. This decision may be taken by the Review Conference to be convened 10 years after the treaty's entry into force.

The CTBT maintains that its verification mechanism should be ready to become operational by the time of its entry into force. However, the CTBT will become effective only after ratification by 44 states possessing the nuclear weapon capabilities. To verify the compliance and to ensure the implementation of the treaty, the parties agreed to establish in Vienna the CTBTO – the organization that would be in charge of implementing the verification.

The CTBT was open for signature on September 24, 1996. On November 19, 1996 the signatories held a meeting in New York and adopted the document establishing the Preparatory Commission for the CTBTO. The commission will exist until the treaty's entry into force and its major objective will be development and provisional operation of the verification mechanism. The commission and its provisional Technical Secretariat started their activities in March 1997.

The IMS is a technical basis for the verification regime. As we have mentioned above, the system comprises 321 stations of four types – seismological, radionuclide, hydroacoustic, infrasound – situated in more than 90 countries and in the Antarctic.

The network of seismological stations makes the core of the IMS. These are 50 primary stations and 120 auxiliary ones, which register seismic waves generated by vibration of the Earth, including underground nuclear tests. The primary stations are mainly the so called seismological groups. Each group contains up to 20 sensors. Primary seismological stations should permanently transmit data to the International Data Center – IDC - nearly in the online mode. It is assumed (although there is no specification in the treaty) that the primary network should detect nuclear explosions with the yield of one kiloton and more conducted without using covering technologies. The auxiliary stations should specify the data of primary stations, as far as the place and the character of the registered event is concerned. The data of auxiliary stations is transmitted to the IDC only after its request, albeit their activities are constant, as well.

Thus, the auxiliary stations were selected from a number of existing stations that do no require or require minimal modernization. As far as the primary network is concerned, about half of it had not existed or had required substantial modernization by the time the Preparatory Commission was established.

The radionuclide network comprises 80 stations that detect the presence of relevant particulate matter in the atmosphere (resulting from atmospheric or underground explosions). Half of this stations should be reequipped with the devices for detection of radioactive noble gases, such as argon-37, xenon-133, crypton-85, which may penetrate into atmosphere after the conduct of underground nuclear explosions. The radionuclide stations are supposed to perform initial analysis and daily results are conveyed to the IDC. If there is a need for deeper analysis, e.g. if specific radionuclides are detected, the CTBT provides for the establishment of 16 radionuclide laboratories. They may study the samples obtained at the stations. Key mission of the radionuclide monitoring network is to define the origin of the event (nuclear explosion or not) detected with other monitoring technologies. Meanwhile, the radionuclide network is capable of registering atmospheric nuclear explosions with the yield not exceeding one kiloton and may detect their location. Although many nations of the world possess radionuclide stations, the IMS facilities have to be set up anew, bearing in mind the specific tasks of monitoring nuclear tests.

The least developed technology by the time of signature of the CTBT was the infrasound monitoring network. Only nuclear weapon states had limited experience of its use, mostly in the 1950s and 1960s, when numerous tests were conducted in the atmosphere. The treaty envisages the establishment of 60 infrasound stations capable of registering low-frequency fluctuations in the atmosphere all over the world. In principle, an infrasound station can detect and define with the accuracy of 1,000-10,000 m^2 the location of atmospheric nuclear tests with the yield of one kiloton and more within the distance of several thousand kilometers.

To detect underwater nuclear explosions and low-altitude explosions over the ocean, the IMS contains 11 hydroacoustic stations. Six of them are situated in the Southern hemisphere and are hydrophones located under water and connected by a cable with the registering equipment deployed mostly on the islands. Five other stations are T-phase stations along the coastline of some islands in the Northern hemisphere. They detect surface seismic waves generated by the blast of the hydroacoustic wave against the seabed. The hydroacoustic network enables the IMS to detect and define with the accuracy of 1,000 m^2 the location of any nuclear explosion even with the yield not exceeding one kiloton conducted at any place in the ocean.

All information obtained by the IMS facilities is transferred to the IDC. The center collects this data, process it with computers and specialized software and its experts make additional analysis. The idea is to select from the large amount of monitoring data the events, whose parameters are similar to nuclear explosions. The outcome of this work is published in the bulletins of the IDC. All member states enjoy the equal right to get free raw data from the IDC (up to one megabyte per day) and to receive a standard set of IDC's products. Besides, under request of a member state, the IDC may perform a specialized data processing in accordance with pre-set parameters, but for additional payment. According to the treaty, the mission of the Technical Secretariat and the IDC is to ensure uninterrupted and reliable technical data flow concerning all events similar to nuclear tests and registered by verification means. The final decision concerning the identification of the event is taken by the States Parties.

Beside the IMS stations, the CTBT provides for the opportunity to supply the IDC with the data of the collaborating national facilities. These are stations using one of four technologies, but not included in the IMS. Such facilities are voluntarily offered by a State Party, are constructed and operated at the expense of this State Party and should comply with all technical requirements of the IMS. The data of these national facilities may significantly contribute to the work of the IMS.

The most efficient and the most intrusive element of the verification mechanism is on-site inspections. The only objective of the inspection, according to the CTBT, is to find out whether the nuclear test or any other nuclear explosion has occurred. The request for on-site inspection may be based on the IMS data, or on technical information obtained with national technical means. The decision on the on-site inspection is taken by the Executive Council of the CTBTO, if 31 out of 51 of its members vote for it. The state to be inspected cannot reject the inspection, if the decision has been adopted. The area of inspection is no more than 1,000 km^2, whereas the group should not contain more than 40 inspectors. The Director General appoints the group from the list of inspectors devised after the entry into force of the treaty. The list comprises candidates of the States Parties and officials of the Secretariat nominated by the Director General. The on-site inspection consists of several phases (total duration – up to 130 days); each stage provides for different technologies and methods, such as overflights, measurements of levels of radioactivity, seismological monitoring, geophysical activities, and even drilling to obtain radioactive samples. On-site inspections should be used in exceptional cases. To avoid the abuses, the CTBT maintains that the state that has requested an inspection should cover the costs, if the inspection does not prove the non-compliance with the CTBT.

Consultations and clarifications make a separate component of the verification system and should help to reduce the number of arbitrary requests for on-site inspections. The States Parties are welcomed to hold direct or indirect (via the Technical Secretariat or the Executive Council of the CTBTO) consultations before making the request for an inspection. These consultations should dissipate their suspicions of non-compliance. They also have to provide appropriate clarifications within the term specified in the treaty if they receive such request for clarification. The Director General should also provide all available information to clear up the issues pertaining to the compliance.

The verification mechanism of the CTBT contains additional component – confidence-building measures concerning large-scale explosions with the use of conventional explosives. Many countries make a substantial number of such explosions every year, normally in mining. It is sometimes difficult to distinguish between the seismic signals of nuclear tests and such explosions. So, to avoid uncertainty and requests for inspections, the States Parties are asked to provide on the voluntary basis and in advance relevant information (yield, location, objective) of the large explosions (more than 300 tons of TNT equivalent). In some cases, the parties may invite representatives of the Technical Secretariat to monitor such explosions.

These are major elements of the verification mechanism, whose development started in 1997 by the Preparatory Commission. It is obvious that the task is quite complicated and requires perfect organization and enormous financial and material resources. In 1997 the commission had nothing, except the text of the CTBT and some national technical means that were not always used to monitor nuclear explosions.

The uncertainty concerning the CTBT's entry into force and hence, the lack of specific deadline for completion of the development of the verification mechanism stimulated discussion within the Preparatory Commission concerning the pace of establishing such mechanism and, therefore, the amount of annual funding for such activities (this funding accounts for 80% of the commission's annual budget).

Western nations (Europe, Canada, Australia, even until recently the United States) insist on accelerated pace of development of such mechanism and are ready to support considerable (up to 20%) annual growth of the budget for this purpose. They maintain that the *de facto* verification mechanism will be a serious argument proving that the CTBT is ready for implementation, demonstrating the efficiency of the verification regime (naturally, without using on-site inspections yet) and will be an additional political impetus for non-signatories and non-ratifiers. This argument became even stronger after

the 1999 US Senate's refusal to ratify the CTBT harshly criticized non-verifiability during the hearings.

On the other hand, the majority of developing nations insist on more balanced and pragmatic approach, bearing in mind realistic prospect for the CTBT's entry into force. They stand for gradually increasing efforts and expenditure on verification. Moreover, one has to take into account the capabilities of the relatively small provisional Technical Secretariat (about 300 people) to expend the authorized funds (in 1998 about 40% of funds were not spent, in 2000 – 15%). There are also legal and political difficulties that have to be resolved with many countries in order to build the IMS facilities. Positions of China, Japan and Russia are close to the views of the developing countries.

The aforementioned uncertainty pertaining to the entry into force raises the urgent issue of defining status, functions and acceptable funding of the verification mechanism in the preparatory period. Nowadays it is clear that the mechanism may be operational before the CTBT becomes effective. The CTBT says nothing about this, the document establishing the Preparatory Commission entrusts it with provisional operation of the verification mechanism. The question is: does it make sense for the verification system to exist, if the CTBT cannot be implemented? Is it useful to maintain such expensive mechanism merely for testing it and make it wait the treaty's entry into force? The commission and its secretariat try to balance between these two approaches.

The most complicated job is to develop the IMS. These activities may be divided into three stages. The first phase is exploration of the site for a station. The second phase is to design and build the station, purchase and install equipment. The third phase implies testing and certification. In accordance with the treaty, these activities should be financed from the commission's budget and should be carried out by the provisional Technical Secretariat or its contractors. The exception is work funded by a State Party at its own expense or for further compensation (in the form of reduced donation to the commission's budget). Operations of the IMS stations should also be funded from the budget of the CTBTO (except auxiliary seismological network). On the other hand, in accordance with the treaty, all IMS facilities should be a property of the state, on whose territory they are deployed. Hence, the States Parties have to ensure and facilitate the development and functioning of such facilities. In May 1997 the commission approved the draft of the model bilateral agreement between the commission and the States Parties concerning the work to build, modernize and operate the IMS facilities before the CTBT's entry into force. At present, the provisional Technical Secretariat signed only 17 such agreements. The major problem is that legislation of many states does not recognize the Preparatory Commission to be a fully-fledged international organization unless the CTBT becomes effective. Therefore, there are problems with the tax exempt status of the commission and the secretariat, as far as the import of equipment and services is concerned, and the difficulties with granting privileges and immunities to the personnel of the Technical Secretariat. Under these circumstances, the provisional Technical Secretariat has chosen a pragmatic option – to conduct appropriate activities on the basis of exchange of letters with the member states of the commission. The letters contain fewer commitments than model agreements and enable the secretariat to perform its duties and to build the IMS stations.

Today about 250 sites for the IMS facilities have been examined (about 80%), 101 stations have been built, 13 of them have been certified and comply with technical requirements of the commission; they already transmit data to the IDC. In 1997-2001 the commission spent $126.7 million on the development of the IMS and about $180 million will be required to complete the construction.

The IDC has the highest level of readiness. It is equipped with computers, all latest software has nearly been installed and will enable the IDC to process and integrate data of four monitoring technologies. In 2000 the IDC started to publish the bulletins and to disseminate them and raw data among the States Parties to the commission. By 2002 the IDC is expected to be ready for large-scale pre-operational tests.

Immediately after the commencement of activities related to the IMS and the IDC it turned out that the communication issue requires urgent solution. Taking into account the global character of the IMS, it is necessary to establish a reliable global communication system to ensure quick data transmission from facilities to the IDC and back, as well as to secure transfer of data and products of the IDC to the national data centers of the States Parties. In 1998 the provisional Technical Secretariat concluded the contract on building the global communication system with *HOT Telecommunications* for 10 years. The architecture of the system implies that each IMS station will send information to the IDC and receive signals from the center via satellite channels. Besides, national data centers will be equipped with satellite or surface communication channels to ensure exchange of information between them and the IDC. Seven nations, including Russia, have chosen a different option – information from the IMS facilities on their territories goes to the national center and then to the IDC. Such option is not covered with basic topology devised by *HOT Telecommunications* and the secretariat, so these states have been asked to develop their own independent (beyond the *HOT* infrastructure) subsystems to be connected with the global system via national data centers. The organization will pay for the channel between the IDC and the national data center and will pay annual compensation to the state (calculated on the basis of expenses required to build a segment of basic topology on its territory). Hence, the costs of construction and operation of additional channels between the IMS station and the national data center are not covered. In 2000 the Preparatory Commission approved the draft of the model agreement regulating relations with the States Parties constructing independent subsystems. Nowadays, only two out of seven states have signed such agreements. As far as the global system is concerned, all satellite channels are operational, as well as three regional communication points that distribute information sent to the IDC and from the IDC. 86 satellite communication terminals have been built at the IMS facilities and in national data centers. The construction of the communication system is closely connected with the construction of the IMS, so the process will be completed, as soon as the IMS becomes operational.

The commission faces the following tasks pertaining to on-site inspections before the treaty's entry into force:

- elaborating the guidelines for on-site inspections and related documentation covering all legal, technical and administrative procedures;
- drafting the list of inspection equipment, approval of its characteristics, acquisition and testing;
- devising the training program for inspectors and its implementation.

The commission follows all three directions. It turned out from the very beginning that on-site inspection technologies were less developed than the IMS techniques. A special seminar was held six times (during the last four years) to discuss the methodology, technologies and equipment of on-site inspections.

Guidelines for inspections make one of the principal documents to be negotiated by the treaty's entry into force. This is natural, for the inspections are the most intrusive element of the verification mechanism. Israel, for instance, stipulated its ratification of the CTBT with the successful elaboration of such guidelines. Nowadays the initial draft of the provisional guidelines is ready. It has been compiled of national contributions and concepts of the Technical Secretariat. The editorial panel (mostly nuclear weapon states) has worked for about 18 months to prepare the draft. In June 2001 the negotiations commenced – the States Parties officially devise the text of the guidelines on the basis of the draft. This process is quite complicated and long and will last for several years.

As far as inspection equipment is concerned, the list and specifications for passive seismological monitoring, gamma radiation monitoring and visual observation have been agreed upon. The samples of equipment for passive seismological monitoring have been acquired for testing. In principle, the parties agreed upon the infrastructure of storage and movements of inspection equipment.

In 1998 the Technical Secretariat held introductory training course for potential inspectors. It also maintains the roster of future inspectors. In 2000 Russia held the first experimental course of profound training of future inspectors. The aim of this course to launch the process of training specialists in specific technologies of on-site inspections. The second course will be held in fall 2001 in France.

Field experiments and exercises of the Technical Secretariat contribute significantly to the development of on-site inspection guidelines and techniques.

One has to bear in mind that on-site inspections may take place only after the treaty's entry into force, i.e. in the unknown future. Procurement of full sets of inspection equipment, completion of other elements of the infrastructure (storage facilities, operational center) will occur immediately before the CTBT's entry into force for the reasons of cost-effectiveness. Hence, the Technical Secretariat plans to defer the expenditure ($21-35 million) for indefinite time. In the near future, it will continue to devise the guidelines, to train potential inspectors, to elaborate documentation for future inspections, to purchase samples of equipment for training and testing. According to the secretariat's estimates, this will require about $13.5 million in 2002-2005.

As far as two other elements of verification are concerned – consultations and clarifications and confidence-building measures – the Preparatory Commission has to face quite limited tasks. The provisions of the treaty contain detailed specification of these components and they do not practically require any additional documentation. The commission has prepared special forms for voluntary notifications of large-scale conventional explosions and is completing the process of devising standard forms for requests and answers concerning consultations and clarifications.

In general, according to the assessment of the provisional Technical Secretariat, the verification mechanism may be set up by late 2005. In 1997-2001, $255 million have been appropriated for this purpose and in the next four years the commission will require $391 million (capital investments, maintenance of completed components of verification, personnel expenditure). Starting from 2006 the annual maintenance costs of the verification mechanism may amount to $73 million.

Russia makes a significant contribution to the CTBT's verification – not only as a contributor to the commission's budget (regular payments in full), but also in practical terms. The Russian segment of the verification system contains 31 IMS station (six seismological stations of the primary network, 13 stations of the auxiliary network, eight radionuclide stations, and four infrasound stations), the central laboratory of the radiation control of the MOD, the National Data Center in Dubna, and the independent subsystem of the global communication system (equipment, communication channels), which is supposed to connect IMS facilities and the national data center, ensure data transfer to the IDC and secure reception of data and products from the IDC.

The activities pertaining to Russian IMS facilities are funded from the commission's budget and are implemented under the aegis of the provisional Technical Secretariat, which signs appropriate contracts with the Russian prime contractor – NIIIT (Research Institute of Pulse Engineering of the Minatom). This pattern covers 23 Russian IMS facilities. As far as eight seismological stations of the auxiliary network are concerned, they are managed by the Geophysical Service of the Russian Academy of Sciences and the Technical Secretariat cooperates directly with the Academy.

The construction of IMS facilities on the Russian territory began in late 1998, when Russia and the Technical Secretariat exchanged letters for the first time. This exchange of letters founded the basis for such activities in Russia and for conclusion of respective contracts between the Technical Secretariat and the NIIIT. In 1999 the parties exchanged letters again and these documents covered all activities pertaining to construction and modernization of all Russian IMS facilities.

By mid-2001 the examination of 29 out of 31 sites has been completed. Contracts have been signed, construction of seven IMS stations has started (two seismological, three infrasound, and two radionuclide) and should be finished in 2002-2004. The Technical Secretariat drafts contracts for other eight stations.

As we have mentioned above, Russia has chosen the option of independent communication subsystem. Moscow committed to connect its IMS facilities to the IDC in Vienna via the national data center in Dubna. The mission of the Technical Secretariat is to ensure connection of Russian center to the global communication system by building a communication channel with the IDC. This was done in 2000. The secretariat supplied the center in Dubna with interface equipment and connected it to the existing Moscow-Vienna fiber-optic channel.

Moreover, Russia's contribution to the verification system is involvement of Russian organizations in holding different training courses under the secretariat's auspices and in technical experiments to test the verification equipment.

For instance, in accordance with the contract between the NIIIT and the Technical Secretariat ($60,000), the secretariat's training course for operators of IMS facilities from Central and Eastern Europe was held in Dubna in June 1999. In November 2000 the Federal Nuclear Center in Snezhinsk conducted in collaboration with the Technical Secretariat the experimental training course for potential inspectors.

Since 2000 the Technical Secretariat has been conducting comparative assessment of equipment for detecting radioactive noble gases. This experiment involves the Khlopin Radium Institute (St. Petersburg), which has received $260,000 from the Technical Secretariat. In 2001 the experiment was continued in the field. Russian equipment should be tested at the radionuclide station in Rio de Janeiro (Brazil).

In December 2000 the secretariat signed the contract with the NIIIT to calibrate Russian seismological monitoring stations in the European part of Russia.

In conclusion one has to note that the fate of the CTBT becomes a matter of grave concern for its proponents. One of the serious blows to the treaty was the 1999 US Senate's refusal to ratify the CTBT. The Bush administration pursues the same negative course. During the hearings in the US Senate the CTBT was criticized for low credibility of its verification mechanism – allegedly inefficient and incapable of detecting all possible (including low-yield hidden nuclear tests) violations. It was concluded that the system could not deter against potential non-compliance.

The report to Bill Clinton by the Presidential Advisor on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, Gen. John Shalikashvili, published in January 2001 rejects these arguments. Gen. Shalikashvili also suggested that the system of unilateral or bilateral transparency and confidence-building measures be devised with respect to nuclear test ranges. This idea is actively promoted by Mr. Hoffman, Executive Secretary of the Preparatory Commission, who assumes that he may also take part in this process. In early 2000, Hoffman visited the French test facility in the Pacific (shut down) and operational US test range in Nevada. He expressed the intention to continue such visits, emphasizing that such activities demonstrated openness and commitment to the CTBT of the States Parties.

The conclusions of Shalikashvili were also proved by the independent commission on CTBT verification, which comprised competent diplomats and prominent experts on monitoring technologies.

The history of negotiations on the CTBT and current debate on the verification mechanism indicate that the verification regime was a maximum achievement at the time of treaty's adoption. Another proving for this is that some delegations to the Preparatory Commission have recently been attempting to revise the provisions of the CTBT (especially as far as on-site inspections are concerned).

Russia ratified the CTBT in 2000 and stands for its earliest entry into force and for completion of the establishment of efficient verification mechanism.

Commentary

THE RUSSIAN NGO COMMUNITY: A NEW PLAYER ON THE RUSSIAN NONPROLIFERATION AND ARMS CONTROL SCENE

by Dr. Vladimir Orlov,
PIR Director

In the early 1990s the phrase "a *Russian non-governmental organization in the area of international security, arms control and nonproliferation*" sounded, like an oxymoron. Russia inherited from the Soviet Union quite a sensitive attitude towards security, which had always been the domain of the state and its institutions, rather than of NGOs. For a long time many Russian officials could not believe that any organization or institution that was not officially controlled would be *allowed* to address such *sensitive* issues.

Fighting for the Independence and the Right to Exist

However, liberalization of social life during Boris Yeltsin's era and some democratization empowered Russians (both legally and practically) to establish independent research institutions, to set up academic media, including the field of WMD nonproliferation.

For instance, in January 1996 the Russian Federation adopted the *Law on Non-Profit Organizations*. This law has been effective and provides a fair legal basis for the activities of Russian NGOs (although, as it happened, the legal acts, instructions and clarifications approved later did not improve, but worsened, the situation). Publishing and work of the mass media are regulated by one of the most liberal (at least so far) Russian laws.

Obviously, any *complacency* would be *dangerous*. Under the current domestic political circumstances in Russia, it is no longer fashionable to speak about democracy; indeed, some regard this word as nearly obscene. Though it is not a matter of returning to a totalitarian regime, the society is undergoing a long transition. It is not clear yet whether the principles of freedom of speech and expression which were laid down in the late 1980s and early 1990s will endure throughout this transition, for nowadays some people consider them to be *unnecessary*.

In this context, NGOs are regarded with a certain ambivalence, or even suspicion. Sometimes the nature of the third sector is not understood, and its existence is called into question. Attacks against NGOs in Russia sometimes turn into a kind of organized defamation, whose objective may be to destroy, to shut down, to place under control, to transform into go-NGOs (governmentally controlled NGOs), or to oversee financial flows under the guise of granting formal independence. Therefore, Russian NGOs attempting to promote public awareness of nuclear safety and security issues and environmental problems, and/or to perform *independent* analysis of the Kremlin's activities (domestic and foreign policy, defense and security matters) find themselves in quite a difficult situation.

There is a saying, "Not all criticism is a thought, but any thought is criticism." Evidently, in accordance with this saying, if NGOs refrain from *critical* analysis, their intellectual activities will hardly make any sense. What Russia now needs is not more NGOs (several hundreds of thousands of NGOs have already been founded and incorporated), but *critical* and *analytical* NGOs.

I often have to answer the question posed by Western colleagues, "How do you manage to preserve and develop a nonproliferation NGO in Russia at present?" To be honest, it is a difficult task. We manage it, thanks to the enthusiasm of the people who work hard, regardless of the external situation and likely pressure, even when it seems to them that they cannot bear such pressure.

It would be a mistake, however, to go to the other extreme and to claim that NGOs in Russia cannot survive at all. This would simply not be true. NGOs successfully act in various spheres, including nonproliferation and arms control. They implement research projects, work as activists, convene conferences, freely disseminate their publications, have access to the major mass

media, educate the younger generation and influence the opinions of the executive and legislative branch through a wide variety of educational efforts.

Moreover, it may seem paradoxical, but more and more government officials, Duma deputies, and parliamentary staff are opening their minds to new ideas and the independent assessments provided by NGOs. It is no secret that the authorities are overburdened with information and analysis which is produced within the government and is not always unbiased. Large academic institutions – the once powerful think tanks of the Soviet political science – are losing their positions.

Most likely, over the last decade we have succeeded in convincing many government officials of our usefulness. Thanks to our persistency and the quality of our analysis, we have managed to make them *respect* us and *sympathize* with us, sometimes contrary to the sentiments of their *superiors*.

Thus, one may assume that despite numerous obstacles and challenges, *NGOs in Russia will continue to exist, are developing, and have impressive prospects for the future.*

My organization – the PIR Center – was founded in 1994, like many other organizations, by a small group of enthusiasts with varying professional and life experiences, ages, and political beliefs, but with a common view on how to develop of the organization in a way that would give special emphasis to the adjective "nongovernmental". Some of my colleagues had worked for the state and now sought freedom of expression. Others, who were younger, were inspired by the opportunity to build something new that went beyond traditional patterns. Now, in the next few weeks we will celebrate the seventh anniversary of *Yaderny Kontrol Journal* – the first major project of the PIR Center. When we started the journal had a few hundred readers; nowadays we have thousands. We began with a single project; today we have seven different periodicals and two dozen research projects. The number of our personnel has increased tenfold. Our progress has been truly significant.

Nonproliferation Watchdogs

What are the major present-day tasks for Russian NGOs working in the area of security, nonproliferation, and arms control?

First, NGOs should, and are able to, participate in *formulating Russia's nonproliferation policy*. We should not wait for the authorities to seek to work with us, to restrain our activities and to cut the opportunities for independent research. We should take the initiative in working with the authorities and convey our position and our concerns – through conferences and seminars, through dissemination of our publications, and through direct interpersonal communication.

Secondly, NGOs should contribute to *shaping public opinion* and hence, to affecting the ideas and actions that lead to WMD proliferation in Russia. It is quite difficult to influence Russian public opinion, but this is not a reason to abandon education and training efforts aimed at wider audiences, those that attempt to reach the public through educational projects, the press, and the Internet.

Thirdly, NGOs should continue to provide *independent expertise* in the area of nonproliferation and arms control (especially with respect to nuclear weapons), to draw the public's attention to urgent nuclear safety and security matters, to the shortcomings of MPC&A, to the brain drain and illicit trafficking in nuclear material and to violations of export control regimes. Investigations and research are somewhat impaired, however, for although we enjoy the legally binding right of access to information, the authorities give us the information we seek very reluctantly. We need to be persistent.

Fourthly, NGOs should not forget that any debate about "strategic stability," "balance of interests," etc. cannot overshadow Russia's (and the P-5's) *unequivocal commitment* to move towards general and complete nuclear disarmament. When we say "security" we mean "disarmament." This is why our key mission is to facilitate US-Russian dialogue in the area of strategic and tactical nuclear arms control, so that the nuclear arsenals of the

parties keep diminishing and other nations may join the disarmament process.

Ten Conditions of NGO Survival and Progress

Although the third sector in Russia survives and hopes for the best, no one can guarantee the sustainability of its development. Clearly, certain conditions are critical to NGOs' success in such spheres as international security (including arms control and nonproliferation). What are these conditions?

(1) Above all, an organization should be incorporated and should conduct its activities on *Russian territory*. This is a crucial factor for success, as it facilitates the accomplishment of many of the aforementioned tasks. In the future, this factor will probably remain to be crucial.

(2) Such an organization *should be completely independent* of the Government, lobbyist groups associated with the Government, and of political parties. This independence should be both legal and financial. Now that the authorities (and large political players as well as big businesses) feel the temptation to *control everything that is controllable*, it would be a big mistake to seek favors from the authorities (in the form of their being founders or *funders*), since such relationships are fraught with political entanglements. In addition, it would be difficult for the organization to ensure unbiased analysis under these conditions. NGOs should avoid two extremes – groundless criticism and appeasement. They should strive to achieve independence and to provide high-quality analysis and a critical appraisal of developments.

Meanwhile, the degree of influence of NGOs on decision-making depends on their ability to maintain fruitful contacts with the branches of power and to affect their policy.

(3) Such organization clearly should evidently be *non-profit*. It is known that the Russian legislation does not prohibit NGOs from engaging in commercial activities, unless these activities run counter to the objectives and tasks stated in their statutes or founding charters. Russian NGOs should strictly comply with the letter of the law.

(4) The organization should be financed *from more than one source*. It is better to secure grants from several foundations than to have one large grant from a single donor. Although it is more complicated to administer several grants from different sources, it is worth the trouble, as multiple sources of support help to avoid the danger of over-dependence on one source.

For mature Russian NGOs with sound financial track records, it is important to *obtain two- or three-year grants*, since multi-year grants facilitate strategic planning and personnel management.

(5) In the long run, *people,* with their intellectual abilities, enthusiasm and devotion to the organization, are *more decisive* to an organization's success than other factors. There is no standard way to attract good people and build a sound staff, but it seems helpful to bring together people of different generations. This creates an excellent combination of experience and practice and energy and fresh concepts. It would be useful also to encourage an inflow of young specialists and university graduates from the regions (including from the closed nuclear cities). There are many problems in this sphere, but some of them can be solved if a system of fellowships and internships in nonproliferation for young Russian specialists is set up, as I have proposed.

(6) To carry out high-quality analysis, an NGO must have *a combination of social science and technical expertise*. Arms control, nonproliferation, or projects aimed at reducing threats of international terrorism are inter-disciplinary subjects, and political scientists, military personnel, or physicists by themselves cannot give a comprehensive and balanced picture. Moreover, not all NGOs can afford to recruit specialists in different areas. In this event, it is important to maintain close ties with the university community and to turn to it for consultation. We often underestimate the academic capabilities of universities and other Russian institutions of higher education, although they may in time become true partners of NGOs both in Moscow and in the regions without affecting their independence, contributing rich expertise and paving the

way for NGO-conceived or run educational programs within the universities.

It is noteworthy that a Moscow-based technical university (MEPhI), in cooperation with the PIR Center, has become an educational pioneer. Their combined efforts resulted in a new educational program in Russia – "Security and Nonproliferation of Nuclear Materials"– which has now become the model for similar programs in a number of other universities, including several regional ones.

However, NGOs in Russia can hardly afford such a luxury as pure research and analysis. They need an activist and outreach component to their work.

(7) This is why research activities should be combined with a *wide outreach* – in the form of publishing (journals, newsletters); work with the mass media (the latter often prefer to do without expert assessments, but the situation has begun to change slightly for the better); and finally, through Web sites and electronic newsletters.

A number of target audiences (such as government officials and legislators) still require traditional methods of outreach, education, and interaction – conferences, seminars, and round tables. However, for other audiences, cheaper and more efficient options are available, thanks to technological progress, and should be widely used. These more efficient options include online conferences, video conferences, CD-ROMs, Internet libraries, etc.

(8) An indispensable element of outreach is well-planned *feedback*, which enables the organization to evaluate its effectiveness.

(9) NGOs should *strictly comply with Russian legislation*. I could say a lot about attempts of the Russian bureaucracy to diminish the effects of the equality granted by the law to the third sectors. There are also dozens of examples of the inefficiency of the laws. My colleagues from other NGOs could add dozens of their own examples, and finally, we would have a picture of Russian practices with respect to the NGOs. These practices are far from the norms of a state governed by the rule of law. We express our discontent. A number of lawyers have made recommendations to the legislators, detailing these practices and demanding their abrogation. Nevertheless, it will presumably be a long process before Russian NGOs are able to defend themselves from the arbitrary actions of the officials, from ignorant or corrupt tax collectors, etc.

Nonetheless, the existing laws should be observed, otherwise we will never achieve the rule of law.

This situation indicates that Russian NGOs need *constantly available legal assistance*. To a certain extent, the role of a law clinic in Russia has been played by the Charities Aid Foundation (CAF). But Russian NGOs have more questions and concerns than the small number of CAF lawyers can physically handle. But even the most successful NGOs cannot afford to have professional and skillful lawyers on their staffs. Therefore, this situation is one of the most urgent ones to address. It also relates to the problem of accounting accusations in the non-profit sector. The risk of falling victim to arbitrary actions by officials is high, while experience with defending one's rights and freedoms is still limited.

(10) An indispensable condition for sustainable development of the third sector in Russia is *interaction and mutual assistance among NGOs, including both research and activist organizations*. We are fighting for a common cause. We have nothing to quarrel about. With trends toward *control* of human rights and freedoms and *controllable democracy* growing in Russia, the Russian NGOs working in the area of nonproliferation and arms control should coordinate their efforts. They should jointly resist all attempts of the Russian authorities to guide the activities of the NGOs and to stimulate public distrust of *NGOs*. Such coordination should begin with regular exchanges of information about activities and projects, exchanges about legal experiences, and implementation of joint projects and eventually lead to the establishment of a Russian Nonproliferation and Arms Control NGO Network.

As the first step, I would support the proposal of my senior colleague Amb. Roland Timerbaev that before the end of 2002

a collection of articles by the leaders of Russian NGOs active in this sphere should be published. The articles may be devoted to their vision of the role and prospects for the third sector and their organizations in present-day Russia and in Russia of tomorrow. The PIR Center could coordinate the editorial process. I would like to invite to participate my highly respected colleagues from the Center for Disarmament, Energy and Environment (Anatoly Dyakov), the Center for War and Peace Journalism (Mikhail Pogorely), the Committee of Scientists for Global Security (Mikhail Vinogradov), the Center for Political and International Studies (Alexander Nikitin), the Movement for Nuclear Safety (Natalya Mironova), and others.

Russian NGOs and the West

Now-a-days I often hear the following question asked, "Does partnership with Western NGOs hamper the activities of Russian NGOs, given the growing suspicion of the Kremlin regarding NGOs?" There are even rumors that some Russian NGOs are already curbing such cooperation.

I feel strongly that such contacts are absolutely necessary. Nor has anyone actually curtailed such interaction. On the contrary, now that Russian NGOs have passed through their period of adolescence, we have a unique opportunity to collaborate with Western NGOs as true and equal partners, which may enhance mutual respect and the efficiency of such cooperation.

Russia is a part of the Western world. At present, one can feel a trend towards more integration with the civilized world, and this course is of strategic importance.

In this connection, the experience of the West's third sector is particularly valuable for us. Cooperation with US partners was the key element of the activities of Russian NGOs at the dawn of this movement in Russia, and it is still a key element. Meanwhile, Russian institutions are working to expand their ties with other western countries – the UK, Germany, Italy, Norway, France, etc.

In this context, one cannot help mentioning the contribution since 1991 of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies of the Monterey Institute of International Studies to nonproliferation training and to forming the present community of nuclear nonproliferation experts in Russia and the CIS.

To date, many Russian and US NGOs have established long and sustained cooperation and continue to carry out joint projects and to hold joint seminars and conferences. Such joint projects have been launched by the PIR Center and CNS, the Center for War and Peace Journalism and the Center for War, Peace and News Media at New York University, the Committee of Scientists for Global Security and Stanford University, by the Center for Export Controls and the Center for International Trade and Security at the University of Georgia, etc. RANSAC comprises representatives from both countries. The Carnegie Moscow Center is a representative office of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, but it might well be regarded as a Russian-US "joint venture".

Thus, a channel for bilateral nonproliferation dialogue at the expert, non-governmental level has been established. This dialogue is not sensitive to changes in official bilateral relations. On the contrary, when these relations deteriorate, when diplomats do not hear one another or receive distorted information, contacts among the NGOs enable the countries to exchange more accurate information, to perform a calm analysis, and to find ways out of the stalemate.

Joint activities of the Russian and US NGOs in the area of nuclear nonproliferation resulted in the establishment of the Moscow Forum for Nuclear Nonproliferation. This forum emerged during the Moscow International Nonproliferation Conference held jointly by the PIR Center and the Carnegie Moscow Center in October 2000. The conference brought together more than 200 representatives of 24 states. It provided an opportunity to share ideas not only for experts from North America and Europe, who normally dominate such international forums, but for specialists from Iran, Pakistan, India, Israel, and Cuba as well.

The Moscow International Nonproliferation Conference played an important role in shaping an international environment conducive to promoting nonproliferation values. Besides, it was the first time that Russian NGOs working in this field were united within one forum.

It is common knowledge that Western nations (notably the United States) are not only a source of strong contacts with research partners, but also the major (and sometimes the only) source of funding.

The generally negative attitude of the Russian authorities towards the fact that the third sector in Russia is mostly financed by US foundations is well known. However, there is a lot of myth-making about it, too. Even when such a negative attitude is present, it is mitigated by the fact that even some important programs of such sensitive state structures as the MOD, the Minatom, Gosatomnadzor, depend on foreign (above all US) assistance.

In any case, we do not have to be embarrassed about the sources of our funding, regardless of the location of the *funders'* headquarters. We are proud of the list of our donors and display it prominently in our publications.

We would be happy to add to this list some Russian foundations. But new Russian entrepreneurs have not yet been inspired by the example of US donors and prefer to immortalize their names by building palaces for themselves rather than by supporting Russian nonprofit activities. I still hope that the situation will change one day for the better. Going forward, we will try to include in our educational programs training programs for businesses, which claim to be interested in strengthening peace and promoting disarmament, as well as for other sectors.

The involvement of big and respectful Russian business in supporting the third sector is the matter for the future. Nowadays it is important to preserve the financial independence of Russian NGOs, to strengthen it without dubious commercialization. Perhaps, in the future one may think about forming an endowment for leading Russian NGOs in the area of nonproliferation. Anyway without attention and backing of large US foundations, the self-confidence and dynamism of NGOs will suffer. We count on this support.

For this reason, many in Russia follow the developing activities of the newly established foundation – the Nuclear Threat Initiative. The leaders of Russian NGOs keep in mind Vladimir Putin's letter to Sam Nunn and Ted Turner stating that, *"Russia is open for broad cooperation with the United States" in the area of nonproliferation and further arms reduction "both at the governmental and non-governmental levels. I assume that there are good prospects for your work with Russian partners."*

Obviously, the development of cooperation between Russian NGOs and Western partners requires *equality and transparency*. The nonproliferation community is a small village. There should be no rivalry and no attempts to distinguish between big brothers and younger brothers, even though the financial capability of US NGOs clearly differs from that of Russian NGOs, since the economies of the two nations differ. It is important to ensure that foundations encourage such equal and transparent cooperation.

Hopefully, this interaction will have a bright future. Many NGOs working in this area are mature and competent organizations, so we assume that they will be able to protect their independence, their freedom of analysis and expression, and their opportunities for broad dissemination of information, for nonproliferation's sake.