THE TENTH NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE (2022): CHRONICLE OF THE FAILURE FORETOLD
In 2022, the NPT Review Conference was held in harsh geopolitical conditions, against the backdrop of an acute aggravation of the international situation. But was it ever any different? This research paper is a collection of all the materials prepared by PIR Center delegation as part of its participation in the Tenth NPT RevCon: information and analytical notes (section I) and a series of interviews (section II). By publishing it, we want to contribute to the discussion on the progress and outcomes of the Tenth NPT RevCon in order to prevent a systemic crisis in the review process of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), a cornerstone treaty in the field of international security.

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THE TENTH NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE (2022):  
CHRONICLE OF THE FAILURE FORETOLD

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THE TENTH NPT REVIEW CONFERENCE (2022): CHRONICLE OF THE FAILURE FORETOLD

EDITORIAL

The Tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT RevCon) was being held in New York, USA, from August 1-26, 2022. As usual, PIR Center took part in the Conference as a non-governmental organization that has consultative status with ECOSOC since 2010.

PIR Center delegation included Elena Karnaukhova, Deputy Director – Education and Training Program Director; Alexandra Zubenko, Junior Research Fellow, Russia and Nuclear Nonproliferation Program; Alexey Yurk, Junior Research Fellow, Russia and Nuclear Nonproliferation Program; and Member of PIR Alumni Community, graduate of the PIR Center internship program Sofya Shestakova. PIR Center Director Vladimir Orlov took part in the Tenth NPT RevCon as an advisor to the official Russian delegation.

From August 1 to August 15, the work of PIR Center delegation was being carried in remote regime only, and from August 15 it was in a combined format because in August 12-13, Vladimir Orlov, Elena Karnaukhova and Alexandra Zubenko arrived in New York. This year, PIR Center became the only Russian NGO to be represented in person within the framework of the Tenth NPT RevCon.

A joint expert seminar held by PIR Center and the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) set us up for work. On August 15, together we held the IV meeting of the working group of track 2.5 on the topic Russian-US Dialogue on the NPT Review Process and the Role of Youth. The event was held in the format of an expert seminar at the site of Carnegie Corporation of New York. The seminar was attended by experienced and novice experts in the field of nuclear nonproliferation, strategic stability and arms control. Among them, in particular, were researchers from PIR Center and CNS, graduates and students of master’s programs in nonproliferation studies from Russia, USA, France. Ambassador Felix Baumann, Head of the Permanent Mission of Switzerland to the United Nations Office in Geneva, addressed the seminar participants as a special guest.

Within the framework of the Tenth NPT RevCon, representatives of PIR Center delegation attended face-to-face and online side-events organized by the states-parties to the NPT and non-governmental organizations, and prepared informational and
analytical materials. They also managed to hold a series of meetings and consultations on the sidelines of the Conference. The results of some of them were published in interview format in the Notes from the Fields: Tenth NPT Review Conference through the Eyes of Russian Public Diplomacy.

In 2022, the Conference was held in harsh geopolitical conditions, against the backdrop of an acute aggravation of the international situation. But was it ever any different? This research paper is a collection of all the materials prepared by PIR Center delegation as part of its participation for the Tenth NPT RevCon: information and analytical notes (section I) and a series of interviews (section II). By publishing it, we want to contribute to the discussion on the progress and outcomes of the Tenth NPT RevCon in order to prevent a systemic crisis in the review process of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), a cornerstone treaty in the field of international security.
The Tenth NPT RevCon Begins

On August 1, 2022, the long-awaited Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) began its work in New York. Starting with a general debate, including high-level speeches by world leaders, the Conference will move on to thematic issues at the end of the second week. Civil society and representatives of the NGO community are participating in the Conference along with the 191 NPT signatory states. They will address government delegates on August 5. For the first two days, 40 states presented their positions.

PIR Center is a traditional member of the NPT RevCon. Its work on preparing for the Conference began well in advance. In particular, a series of Security Index research papers was prepared:


• Security Index – Occasional Paper №6 (32), 2022 “The Role of Russian Women in the Field of Nuclear Non-proliferation, Disarmament and Global Security” by Elena Karnaukhova.


5 Konstantin Larionov, Elena Zyulina, Sergey Semenov. Coalitions in the NPT Review
The Tenth NPT Review Conference promises to be eventful. From August 1 to 26, 2022, in addition to plenary sessions and consideration of issues by working groups, side-events are to be held daily on various issues of nuclear nonproliferation. They are organized by both NPT signatories and leading think tanks and research institutes: UNIDIR, UNODA, European Leadership Network, BASIC, Arms Control Association, Nuclear Threat Initiative. A full list of field events can be found on the official websites of the UN NPT RevCon and Reaching Critical Will. PIR Center in partnership with the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) in Monterey (USA) will hold an expert seminar on August 15 in New York.

Possible challenges for the review process

It is clear that the Tenth NPT RevCon is taking place at an unprecedentedly difficult geopolitical time. The events of February 24 and the start of the Russian special military operation in Ukraine, are also reflected on the work of the Review Conference. Moreover, they can give carte blanche to those who intend to disrupt the review process. In particular, speculations around the Zaporozhye nuclear power plant do not stop. On the first day of the NPT RevCon, US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken accused Russia of using the Zaporozhye nuclear power plant as a military base by the Russian armed forces. The answer of the Russian delegation was immediate: there are no military troops at the Zaporozhye nuclear power plant, except for a limited number of military personnel necessary to ensure its safety and prevent a possible nuclear provocation.

The issue concerning the Zaporozhye nuclear power plant was raised in his speech by IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi. Despite the fact that Russia has repeatedly stressed that the actions of its armed forces do not damage nuclear safety in Ukraine and do not interfere with the normal operation of the station, Grossi spoke about the danger that the facilities and the population of the Zaporozhye nuclear power plant were exposed to as a result of Russia’s actions.

In this regard, the representation of Switzerland at the 2022 NPT RevCon is noteworthy: the President of the Confederation Ignazio Cassis will personally express the Swiss interests. The Swiss Foreign Ministry says that one of the purposes of President Cassis’ trip is to urge the nuclear powers to take more decisive steps towards disarmament. An important priority of Switzerland’s foreign policy is to reduce nuclear risks, therefore Switzerland will present a specific package of measures at the Conference.
which is coordinated with the Stockholm Initiative. At the same time, Switzerland intends to give impetus to the implementation of existing agreements and negotiations on the conclusion of new ones: in particular, to promote the initiative to protect nuclear infrastructure from nuclear attacks. This fact is quite consistent with Grossi’s statements about the Zaporozhye nuclear power plant.

Another possible stumbling block for the adoption of a consensus document may be the issue of establishing a WMD-free zone in the Middle East. In 2015, this was the alleged reason for the ineffective NPT RevCon. The Nuclear Five diverted attention from the failure to make progress on their disarmament commitments, trying instead to solve the problems facing the Middle East. It is also worth considering the impasse in the negotiation process to restore the provisions of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and the unprecedented level of development of the Iranian nuclear program.

The recent events connected with the visit of a third person of the United States - Speaker of the House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi to Taiwan cannot but attract attention. The Chinese Ministry of Defense announced a series of military exercises in the Taiwan Strait. In turn, the coordinator for strategic communications at the White House National Security Council John Kirby noted that the United States should not be intimidated by Chinese rhetoric or potential actions. Tensions in the Asia-Pacific region increase contradictions in the work of the Nuclear Five process. The greater polarization of the parties was also noticeable on the eve of the Review Conference. July 29 this year France, the United Kingdom and the United States presented a working paper on “Principles and Responsible Practice for Nuclear Weapon States.” In particular, it calls Russian actions in Ukraine irresponsible and dangerous. If we consider the formula of Vladimir Orlov and Sergey Semenov, indicated in the Security Index research paper №15 (41) “NPT Review Conference: Limits of the Possible,” then the key condition for the success of the Review Conference is the coordinated position of all officially recognized nuclear weapons states. The current tension in relations between the Nuclear Five calls into question the prospect of their well-coordinated work.

To be sure, the nonproliferation regime faces numerous problems that have only gotten worse over the years. Nevertheless, the NPT is the cornerstone of international security architecture. One cannot but agree with Nikolai Sokov, Leading Officer of the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation (VCDNP), that “the common goal is to avoid a situation in 2030 or earlier, when we say: it’s a pity that we lost the NPT, we need it. It was a one-time opportunity that will never happen again.” This Review Conference should be a place to discuss pressing nonproliferation issues, not a showdown and advancing one’s interests.
The Issue of Nuclear Terrorism

The Tenth NPT RevCon is gaining momentum in New York. The delegation of PIR Center, whose staff members and interns attend many different events on the side-events of the Conference, also takes an active part in the work of the Tenth NPT RevCon.

The author of this text also participated in one of these events, which took place on August 3. It was organized by the Counter-Terrorism Center of the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT - UNCCT) jointly with the European Union and was dedicated to the issue of nuclear terrorism and the universalization of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT).

The event was held at the high level. During it positions of various international organizations and their divisions were heard. Thus, the head of the Counter-Terrorism Center and the UN Counter-Terrorism Directorate, Jehangir Khan and Vladimir Voronkov (who is also a member of the Advisory Board of PIR Center), respectively, and the EU Special Representative for Nonproliferation and Disarmament Marjolijn van Deelen took part in the event. Representatives of other UN departments on disarmament, drugs and crime, legal issues, as well as Interpol and the IAEA also expressed their positions on the topic concerned. Finally, the points of view of the ICSANT participating countries – Iraq, Tajikistan, Russia and the US were presented.

The opinions of the side-event participants were unanimous: the fight against nuclear terrorism is being carried out quite successfully, and UNOCT - UNCCT has established comprehensive interaction with related bodies on this issue. In addition, during the event, the report of the employees of the relevant department on the success of the ICSANT universalization project was heard. It was noted that workshops, conferences and advanced training on the subject of nuclear terrorism are regularly held by the UNOCT in various countries. The fact of the recent ratification of ICSANT by Tajikistan on June 29, 2022, was especially emphasized as a successful example of the work of UNOCT.

However, almost at the same time, Igor Vishnevetsky, Deputy Head of the Russian delegation to the Tenth NPT RevCon and Deputy Head of the Department for Nonproliferation and Arms Control of the Russian Foreign Ministry, responded to the concerns of some delegations about the situation around nuclear facilities in Ukraine. In his statement, the diplomat immediately denied accusations against Russia regarding alleged damage to nuclear facilities in Ukraine. According to him, “the Russian military guarded the Chernobyl and Zaporozhye nuclear power plants with one sole purpose – to prevent the use by Ukrainian nationalist formations, as well as foreign mercenaries, of the situation in the country for the possible organization of nuclear provocations that would have
Further, Mr. Vyshnevetsky cited a number of situations when the Ukrainian side tried to organize such provocations as an example. Thus, the Russian representative mentioned the exchange of fire during the takeover by the Russian military of the Zaporozhye nuclear power plant on March 4; deprivation of power supply to the spent nuclear fuel (SNF) storage at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant on March 9; attack by Ukrainian UAVs at the Zaporozhye nuclear power plant on July 18 and 20, which “only by a lucky chance did not lead to damage to the plant’s critical equipment and the emergence of a man-made disaster.” All these facts, according to the deputy head of the Russian delegation, confirm “the intention of the Ukrainian authorities to create the prerequisites for a nuclear catastrophe.”

In addition, Mr. Vyshnevetsky noted a provocation involving two Polish-made Warmate air strike systems, which were sent on April 27 towards the Zaporozhye nuclear power plant. One of them was shot down near the city of Energodar, where the personnel of the nuclear power plant live, and the second one was already near the perimeter of the nuclear power plant itself. As the Russian diplomat stated, “in fact, the actions of Warsaw in this case can be classified as complicity in nuclear terrorism.”

Thus, the topic of nuclear terrorism during the third day of the Tenth NPT RevCon was raised in two dimensions at once. In the first case, at the UNOCT - UNCCT and EU event, it was about countering mainly non-state nuclear terrorism. Indeed, in this area, the relevant international and state bodies are working quite productively. At the same time, this event practically did not touch upon the topic of state nuclear terrorism, which was raised only during the general debate, first by some delegations, and then by the Russian one, in order of the right of reply.
5th and 6th Plenary Meetings

“The NPT is the cornerstone of the nonproliferation regime. That is why we emphasize the importance of this universal component of collective security. All States are responsible for the implementation of Article VI of the Treaty on general and complete Disarmament, as well as for the implementation of the decisions of previous conferences, including the 13 practical steps outlined in the outcome document of the 2000 Review Conference,”

- from the statement of the representative of Algeria at the fifth plenary meeting of the Tenth NPT Review Conference.

On August 3, the 5th and 6th plenary meetings were held within Tenth NPT Review Conference. During the meetings, 43 states intervened with their statements, as well as the Stockholm Initiative coalition, represented by Sweden.

Amid the calls for the withdrawal of Russian troops from Ukraine, the state-parties also expressed their readiness for joint efforts to adopt the final document of the Review Conference and the desire to prevent the failure of the 2015 Conference.

Brazil noted that the discriminatory nature of the NPT can only be considered as a temporary concession on the way to achieving the goal of general and complete disarmament.

A number of Middle Eastern States noted the importance of joint efforts to create a WMD-free zone in the Middle East.

Thus, Syria stressed that “the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995 occurred as a result of a set of decisions, including the adoption of a resolution on establishing a WMD-free zone in the Middle East. According to the Syrian representative, “many initiatives on the way to fulfilling this task have been thwarted by the United States, which protects Israel’s interests in the region.” Syria also noted that in 2015 the United States prevented the adoption of the final document despite the efforts and initiatives of some countries, including Russia.

Finland welcomed the extension of New START Treaty by Russia and the United States. The Finnish speaker also stressed that although nonproliferation is not a substitute for disarmament, it can become a building block on the way to it. Finland also called for consideration of the proposals of the Stockholm Initiative to reduce nuclear risks.

Serbia noted its own efforts in the field of nonproliferation, in particular the adoption of a Strategy to counter the proliferation of WMD for the period 2021-2025, as well as a National Action Plan for the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1540 for the period 2018-2022.

In a statement made by the representative of Iran, the intention
was expressed to continue negotiations on the restoration of the JCPOA, “When the United States makes the right decision, Iran, in turn, will stop its remedial actions and resume full implementation of its obligations related to the nuclear program in accordance with the 2015 agreement.”

In the statement of the Stockholm Initiative, particular emphasis was placed on the need to take measures to reduce nuclear risks. Also, the representative outlined the importance of expanding opportunities for the younger generation and women in decision-making in nonproliferation and disarmament.

Results of the First Week

The first week of the Tenth NPT Review Conference was held in New York, during which 9 plenary meetings were held, as well as two meetings in the Main Committee I.

As expected, the first week of the Conference was held amid accusations of violation of the spirit of the Treaty by Russia in connection with its special operation in Ukraine. For example, France has made accusations that Moscow uses nuclear weapons not as a deterrent, but as an instrument of intimidation and coercion. The charges also related to the situation around the Zaporozhye nuclear power plant, as well as the increased level of combat readiness of the Russian strategic nuclear forces.

However, it is worth noting that not all states supported the Western-led cancel culture. Thus, Holy See, as well as representatives of the New Agenda Coalition, called on all nuclear states to lower the level of combat readiness of the deterrent forces (we would like to recall that France also announced an increase in the combat readiness of the naval deterrent forces in March 2022). Representatives of Algeria and Kiribati recalled the consequences of nuclear tests conducted by France, the United Kingdom and the United States on the territory of their countries during the Cold War. The Non-Aligned Movement also noted with regret that some countries have increased their nuclear arsenal since the last NPT Review Conference in 2015.

As for the nuclear weapons states, if we discard the accusations related to Ukraine, it can be noted that the statements of the Nuclear Three (the United States, Great Britain, France) focused on what France called the minimum agenda: the need for the entry into force of the CTBT (although the United States is still one of the states that does not who have ratified the Treaty), the beginning of negotiations on an FMCT, strengthening verification measures and reducing nuclear risks. In addition, the United States expressed readiness to resume a dialogue on strategic stability with Russia. The United Kingdom, whose representative began his statement...
with an appeal to the Ukrainian representative, tried to justify the buildup of its nuclear arsenal by “the deteriorating international environment.”

Russia and China, in turn, drew attention to the unscrupulous compliance with the NPT by the Nuclear Three. Russia called the involvement of Great Britain and France in multilateral disarmament negotiations a priority, and also expressed disagreement that verification of disarmament for some powers is becoming a panacea for all problems: “We are convinced that verification procedures cannot be considered in isolation from specific arms reduction and limitation agreements and must be consistent with the subject matter and scope of the limitations contained therein,” the Russian representative said, speaking at a meeting of the Main Committee I on August 5.

China, in turn, accused Western countries of promoting double standards in the field of nonproliferation, referring to the supply of nuclear submarines to Australia within the framework of AUKUS. China also stated that “any attempt to replicate the NATO’s nuclear sharing model in the Asia-Pacific region would undermine regional strategic stability and would be firmly opposed by the countries in the region and, when necessary, face severe countermeasures.”

All members of the Nuclear Five in their statements confirmed the Gorbachev-Reagan formula that there can be no winners in a nuclear war and it should never be unleashed.

The statements of the coalitions attracted particular attention. The Non-Aligned Movement, ASEAN, and the Nonproliferation and Disarmament Initiative came out with more moderate positions in the field of disarmament, while the African Union openly called on the Conference participants to sign and ratify the TPNW. Traditionally, an important place in the statements of other coalitions was occupied by the issues of the humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons, verification measures, reduction of nuclear risks, and the creation of a nuclear security zone in the Middle East.

A press conference of the CTBTO Executive Secretary Robert Floyd was also held on Friday, August 5. Floyd stressed that despite the fact that the Treaty has not entered into force, it continues to play an important role in the field of nonproliferation and disarmament. “We have gone from more than 2,000 nuclear tests conducted between 1945 and 1996 to less than 12 tests conducted since the signing of the Treaty,” said R. Floyd. Within the framework of the organization, a modern nuclear test monitoring system was created, which includes about 300 new installations. In addition, during the existence of the Treaty, the CTBTO has created a solid data and research base that is available to all parties to the Treaty for civil and scientific purposes, and has also developed a tsunami warning system.
In general, despite the tense international situation, all participants expressed their willingness to cooperate and hope for a success of the Conference. The meetings of the Main Committees II and III are to begin today. PIR Center will continue to monitor the progress of the Conference and publish reviews of plenary meetings and side-events.

The Work of the First Committee

On August 4-5, the Main Committee I of the 2022 NPT Review Conference convened. 44 states, the European Union, the Non-Aligned Movement, the Arab Group and the New Agenda Coalition presented their positions for two days. Cluster 1 focused on nuclear disarmament and the review of the implementation of Articles I, II, VI, and VII, respectively.

In their presentation, the UAE pointed out a number of existing problems in the context of Cluster 1:

- the lack of concrete steps toward disarmament;
- the existence of nuclear weapons states outside the legal framework of the Treaty;
- the joint use of nuclear weapons;
- humanitarian implications;
- the absence of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

State delegates drew attention to earlier working papers containing practical recommendations for further disarmament of nuclear weapons. In particular, Russia pointed to the Russian working paper “Nuclear Disarmament: Area of Common Responsibility” and presented a report on reducing strategic weapons (by 85% from the peak reached in the 1980s) and non-strategic nuclear weapons (by three-quarters of the level the USSR had in 1991). A negative factor affecting international security is the NATO nuclear alliance and the presence of US nuclear weapons on the territories of non-nuclear-weapons states. Russia is open to constructive ideas “on multilateral discussions on nuclear disarmament and strengthening international security and stability”, which should be based on the interests of all states without exception. It would be a priority to include in such discussions France and Great Britain, which possess nuclear arsenals that are not limited by any international agreements.

Iran has pointed out that US nuclear policy increases the importance of nuclear weapons, Britain is increasing its nuclear stockpile by 44%, and France is spending 37 billion euros on a nuclear weapons modernization program in 2019-2025.

The US noted that it systematically publishes numbers of nuclear weapons. Since the 2015 NPT Review Conference, the US has
dismantled “more than 800 nuclear warheads and about 2,000 more are decommissioned and awaiting dismantlement.” As the current chair of the Nuclear Five process, Washington has assured that it will do all it can to translate ideas about strategic risk reduction into real action.

Switzerland has stressed that meetings on strategic stability can be followed by full-fledged negotiations. These efforts should gradually expand in number and scope to address issues such as cyberspace, outer space or hypersonic weapons. Switzerland, like Australia, noted that the PRC’s participation is important for discussions on strategic stability and further disarmament.

The PRC, which has a policy of no first use of nuclear weapons, recommends that the rest of the Nuclear Five countries follow this practice. China also stressed the far-reaching importance of strategic stability and its discussion by nuclear weapons states.

Kiribati and Kazakhstan recommended that the Gorbachev-Reagan principle that there can be no winners in a nuclear war and that it must never be unleashed be reaffirmed at the Tenth NPT RevCon.

In summarizing the recommendations of South Africa, this NPT Review Conference should reaffirm in its outcome document the commitment of the nuclear weapons states to nuclear disarmament. As for the principles of transparency, irreversibility, and verification, they should apply to all nuclear disarmament, nuclear arms reduction, and arms control measures, with clearly defined timelines and benchmarks for fulfilling these obligations.

First Two Meetings Within Main Committee III

On August 8, the first two meetings were held in the Main Committee III of the Tenth NPT Review Conference, which specializes in the use of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. During the meetings, statements were made by 48 States, as well as 4 coalitions and the EU.

Representatives of the Non-Aligned Movement expressed concern about the ability of some States that are not parties to the Treaty to receive nuclear materials, technologies and know-how for the development of nuclear weapons from the Nuclear Non-Aligned Movement.

France noted that nuclear power is one of the most low-carbon sources of electricity and its development meets the goals of the Paris Climate Agreement for the period up to 2030.

In its statement, Russia highlighted a number of Russian achievements in the field of nuclear energy: the construction of nuclear icebreakers using low-power reactors, the creation of advanced fast neutron reactors with an emphasis on the
development of closed fuel cycle technology, the operation of the world’s only floating nuclear power plant in Chukotka. Russia is also helping other states to establish national centers of nuclear science and technology. Such centers are currently being built in Zambia, Rwanda, Serbia, Vietnam.

Iran noted the importance of the IAEA safeguards system in ensuring the nonproliferation regime. However, he stressed that it is necessary to change the policy of financing technical cooperation, which is currently being implemented on the basis of voluntary contributions, “Such contributions are unpredictable, unsecured and depend on the political motives of donors.” A similar criticism was made by South Africa, stating that “it is vital that the IAEA’s Technical Cooperation Programme be strengthened and that the resourcing of the Technical Cooperation Fund be sufficient, assured and predictable.”

South Africa also noted that “any mechanism in the field of guaranteed nuclear fuel supply must be non-politicized and nondiscriminatory. These materials should be available for all states adhering to their safeguards agreements. Our delegation believes that the transfer of nuclear materials should be driven by nonpolitical criteria, and be applied objectively and in compliance with the provisions of the NPT”.

Indonesia called for a complete and unconditional ban, as stipulated in the Treaty, on the transfer of nuclear technologies and materials to States that are not parties to the Treaty.

The UK stressed the importance of projects such as the Marie Skłodowska Curie Fellowship Program, “which is in line with the commitment to ensure that by 2030 women make up 40% of the workforce in the UK nuclear industry.”

China has accused Japan of releasing radiologically contaminated water used in the operation of the Fukushima reactor into the ocean. In response, Japan claimed that the water was discharged under the control of the IAEA and the discharge method was approved by the Agency.

The Committee’s meetings will continue this week. PIR Center will continue to follow the Tenth NPT Review Conference.
Discussion on Disarmament and Arms Control Issues

The start of the Tenth NPT Review Conference inspired limited optimism in the context of disarmament and arms control issues. In his address to the Conference participants on August 1, President of the United States Joe Biden announced the current administration’s readiness to “expeditiously negotiate a new arms control framework to replace New START when it expires in 2026.” At the same time, the American leader did not miss the opportunity to accuse Russia of brutal and unprovoked aggression in Ukraine, which shattered peace in Europe, and, in this regard, said that “should demonstrate that it is ready to resume work on nuclear arms control with the United States.” In addition, in line with the general rhetoric of recent years, Biden also called for China to join negotiations that “reduce the risk of miscalculation and address destabilizing military dynamics.”

Then, on August 4, in his speech at the Main Committee I of the NPT RevCon, Biden’s position was confirmed by the US President’s Special Representative for Nuclear Nonproliferation, Adam Sheinman. The diplomat noted that the United States first contributed to the early extension of the New START for 5 years, and then insisted on the resumption of the US–Russian dialogue on strategic stability aimed at creating the basis for future arms control.

The American representatives also touched upon the problems of nuclear disarmament. Thus, in his August 1 speech, US Secretary of State Anthony Blinken stated that the United States are moving towards disarmament, noting that compared to the peak year of 1967, the American nuclear arsenal was reduced by almost 90%.

However, both Russia and China criticized the American position. On August 2, Deputy Head of the Russian delegation to the Tenth NPT RevCon Igor Vishnevetsky noted that all the positive developments gained as a result of the dialogue on strategic stability turned out to be devalued by the US course of ignoring Russia’s red lines in the field of security, and Washington used Russia’s rebuff to this destructive course as a pretext for freezing the strategic stability dialogue. On the same day, Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying said that China is ready to have close contacts with all interested parties on strategic security issues, but provided that the United States, which has the largest nuclear arsenal in the world, will be the first to comply with strategic arms limitation agreements.

During the work of the Main Committee I, Russia and the United States also expressed support for further nuclear disarmament. US Special Representative Adam Sheinman noted the obvious achievements of the United States on the path of disarmament, such as a consistent reduction in the number of nuclear warheads...
or support for movements like *Creating an Environment for Nuclear Disarmament* or the Stockholm Initiative. On August 5, the Head of the National Nuclear Security Administration at the US Department of Energy, Jill Hruby, speaking at the Tenth NPT RevCon side-event, also stated that the United States are not expanding its nuclear arsenal in the course of modernization.

Deputy Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the UN Office and other international organizations in Geneva and Deputy Head of the Russian delegation to the Tenth NPT RevCon Andrey Belousov directly responded to accusations against nuclear powers, including Russia, in sabotaging the process of nuclear disarmament. According to him, Russia has reduced the total potential of strategic weapons by 85% compared to the peak indicators of the 1980s, and also continues to fulfill its obligations under the New START without any exceptions or reservations. Moreover, the Russian diplomat went further, noting that Russia could not confirm the statements of the American side that some of their strategic offensive weapons had been converted and could no longer be used for the use of nuclear weapons. As a result, “the United States actually possesses a greater number of means intended for the use of nuclear weapons than prescribed by the Treaty,” which “allows the American side to build up the potential of strategic nuclear forces by about 1200 nuclear warheads in the shortest possible time.”

In addition, a number of other issues related to nuclear arms control and the process of nuclear disarmament were raised mainly by Russia and China. Thus, on August 5, a member of the Chinese delegation, Li Song, called on the United States to abandon the deployment of a global missile defense system, as well as the deployment of ground-based medium-range missile systems in the Indo-Pacific region and Europe.

In a similar vein, the Russian representative Andrey Belousov, who called on the United States and its allies to assume obligations not to be the first to deploy intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, the treaty on the elimination and prohibition of which ceased to exist in 2019. On August 6, he noted that the declaration of readiness of the United States to negotiate with Russia to replace New START is not the readiness itself, which should be supported by concrete proposals that we could regard as a firm decision by the United States to resume close cooperation with Russia.

At the end of the first week of the NPT RevCon, the situation seems to have only worsened. At the memorial events in Japan dedicated to the anniversary of the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, UN Secretary General António Guterres stated that the world is watching a new arms race, and the disarmament treaties and agreements that were concluded in the last century are under threat, and some of them were lost. And despite the fact that later the UN Secretary General noted his satisfaction with the movement in the right direction,
expressed in the successful progress of the current NPT RevCon and the work of the NPT states on the roadmap for the gradual implementation of the Treaty, statements of this kind are very symptomatic.

However, the most high-profile event occurred on Monday, August 8, when the Russian Foreign Ministry officially notified the United States of the withdrawal of Russian facilities from New START inspection activities. According to the Russian Foreign Ministry, the measures taken are temporary and aimed at countering “Washington’s stubborn desire to implicitly achieve a restart of inspection activities on terms that do not take into account existing realities, create unilateral advantages for the United States and effectively deprive the Russian Federation of the right to carry out inspections on the American territory.” This situation has developed due to sanctions restrictions, which also included Russian inspectors who are unable to fly to the United States. Subsequently, Deputy Foreign Minister of Russia Sergey Ryabkov commented on the situation, noting that the attempt to carry out an inspection on a whim during the NPT RevCon period adds provocation to the American step and is not dictated by the “good faith goals of strengthening the viability of New START and the NPT.”

The American administration has not yet reacted to Moscow’s statement. English-language media only quote the words of the US State Department spokesman, who said that Washington “maintains the confidentiality of discussions between the parties regarding the implementation of the Treaty.” American experts, for the most part, are of the opinion that nothing catastrophic has happened. Thus, one of the creators of New START, Rose Gottemoeller, in her commentary for The Guardian, noted the importance of maintaining another key part of the New START – US notifications of any movements or changes in the status of its nuclear arsenal. According to her, Russia “is determined to continue the implementation of [New START] for the sake of mutual predictability and trust.” The UN also called on both the United States and Russia to resolve all issues on the New START and allow the inspectors to return to their priceless work.

From the latest speeches within the framework of the work of the NPT RevCon, concerning the issues of disarmament and arms control, we can note the response of the Deputy Head of the Russian delegation Andrey Belousov dated August 10 as part of the work of the Main Committee I. In his speech, the Russian diplomat responded to accusations against Moscow of “degradation of international security, a decrease in trust between states, an increase in tension and, as one of the results of this, a weakening of the NPT regime.” Thus, according to Mr. Belousov, “in the context of arms control and disarmament, the
The statements of the parties are filled with a series of mutual accusations of the degradation of the existing regimes and agreements, as well as the buildup of their nuclear potentials.

**Outcomes of the Second Week**

The Tenth NPT Review Conference is gaining momentum in New York. The three Main Committees of the NPT meet every day. Each of the three Main Committees focuses on one of the so-called pillars of the NPT – nuclear nonproliferation, nuclear disarmament and the right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

The Main Committees II and III met on Monday, 8 August.

**Main Committee II**

Russia drew attention to NATO’s joint nuclear missions, which run counter to Articles I and II of the NPT, not only continue to be a negative factor for international and European security, but also increase the risk of nuclear conflict and hamper nuclear disarmament efforts.

Egypt and other fraternal countries are highlighting the problem – the lack of universalization of the NPT. The Middle East “still looks forward to the implementation of the 1995 and 2010 Review Conference resolutions - the establishment of a zone free of nuclear weapons and all weapons of destruction.”

On Tuesday, 9 August, the Main Committees II and III, which specialize in disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, continued their exchange of general views. In their statements, the NPT signatories underlined the crucial role of the IAEA safeguards regime.
Main Committee III

Thailand emphasized that nuclear nonproliferation faced serious challenges, not only from states, such as the development of new types of nuclear weapons and nuclear-armed cruise and hypersonic missiles, but also from non-state actors, including the threat of nuclear terrorism and cyberwarfare.

Albania attaches great importance to the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1540, as the risk that terrorists or other non-state actors acquire WMD remains a real and serious threat to international security.

On Wednesday, 10 August, all three committees continued their work.

Main Committee I

Japan, speaking on behalf of the so-called Like-Minded Group, which includes virtually all nonnuclear Westerners (in the political sense of the word), called for “pragmatic comprehensive measures” such as: universalization of the NPT, early entry into force of the CTBT, early start and conclusion of negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty, and cooperation on nuclear disarmament verification. The countries also condemned Russia’s actions in Ukraine.

Russia responded in its statement to accusations of undermining international security, including undermining the NPT regime, drawing attention to the actions of the US and its allies and urging them to “analyse their own destructive actions, including violations of international law, which have led to the situation that has become the negative background for the Tenth NPT Review Conference”.

Main Committee II

The PRC has drawn attention to the deteriorating geopolitical situation in the Asia-Pacific region. One of the new challenges currently facing the international nuclear nonproliferation regime is the US, UK and Australian nuclear submarine cooperation (AUKUS) and the nuclear sharing dispute.

Argentina has stressed the importance of maintaining effective and technically sound national and regional systems of accounting for and control of nuclear materials. In this regard, Argentina values and emphasizes, more than 30 years after its establishment, the continuous work of the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC), which is responsible for the administration and implementation of the Common System of Accounting and Control, and its tangible and significant contribution to nuclear nonproliferation.
Main Committee III

Western countries, notably Canada and Estonia, have issued accusations against Russia over the attacks on the Zaporozhye nuclear power plant, thereby disrespecting the seven pillars of nuclear safety put forward by IAEA Director General Raphael Grossi in March 2022.

Luxembourg drew attention to the climate factor. Noting that the issue goes beyond the NPT, Luxembourg proposed a “cautious approach when considering the inclusion of language linking the role of nuclear energy to combating climate change” in the final Conference document.

The Main Committees II and III met on August 11.

Main Committee II

Argentina noted that “a distinction should always be kept in mind between the obligations under Articles 3.1 and 3.4 of the NPT with regard to safeguards and those voluntary measures that should be taken in a sovereign manner to strengthen the application of safeguards”. Its representative pointed out that there is no need to “apply safeguards in a new way for them to be truly effective, since there is a risk of weakening the consolidated and robust system as it exists at present.”

Main Committee III

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Main Committee III

Syria expressed concern over “Israel’s acquisition of nuclear materials, technology and knowledge to develop nuclear weapons with the support of the United States,” especially given the former’s lack of NPT membership and its status as the only country not willing to join the WMD-free zone in the Middle East.

The Philippines, to spite Luxembourg, put forward a proposal to include in the final Conference document a provision recognizing the role of nuclear energy “in both mitigating and adapting to the grave consequences of the climate crisis.” The Philippines also proposed recognizing the important role of peaceful uses of nuclear energy in sustainable development and global economic recovery and “recognizing that there is an urgent need to enhance nuclear technology transfer and nuclear knowledge exchange with developing countries.”

In a similar vein, Argentina called for recognition of “the importance of nuclear energy in contributing to economic and social development. He also called for “emphasizing the importance of actively promoting women’s participation in the Technical Cooperation Programme.”

Finally, all three committees met on Friday, August 12, and the 10th plenary session of the Tenth NPT RevCon was held.

Main Committee I

Germany proposed to the Conference that it should encourage the strengthening of negative security assurances by the nuclear powers, and “call on all states to support the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all regions of the world on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the states in the region concerned.”

Malaysia expressed doubts about the effectiveness of existing NSAs, pointing out that they could easily be withdrawn or modified. The representative described the total elimination of nuclear weapons as the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, but until then suggested that the Conference call for an “effective, universal, unconditional, non-discriminatory, irrevocable and legally binding instrument” on NSAs.

Finally, Austria presented its key elements for an outcome document on the first pillar of the NPT. Through them, dissatisfaction with the behavior of the nuclear weapons states contrary to the spirit of the NPT and, in particular, to Article VI of the Treaty ran through them as a red line. As a member of the NPT, Austria invited the nuclear-weapon states, if they were not yet ready to accede to the Treaty, “to submit a concrete plan for the fulfilment of their obligations and commitments under Article VI.”
Main Committee II

Belgium called for strengthening the export control regime because, despite UN sanctions, the DPRK has managed “in a short time to make a huge technological leap in its nuclear missile programme”.

The Philippines advocated for dialogue and cooperation among nuclear-weapon-free zones in different regions of the world.

Main Committee III

Venezuela proposed that the text of the outcome document should include recognition of “the importance of nuclear energy in promoting economic and social development” and reaffirmed its defense of “the inalienable right of developing countries to strengthen the technological platform and knowledge that enables them to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.”

Analysis of the Draft Report of the Main Committee II

On August 14, 2022, the Main Committee II of the Tenth NPT Review Conference submitted a draft version of its final report. Therefore, it makes sense to analyze its text now, comparing it with the text of the final report of the Main Committee II at the 2015 NPT RevCon that was not adopted.

Changes are already noticeable in the first paragraph (the second for the 2022 text). It notes that the Conference reaffirms the Treaty’s status as “the cornerstone of the global nonproliferation regime, the foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament, and an important element in facilitating the benefits of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.” The inclusion of the last phrase, in all likelihood, was an echo of the energy crisis beginning to gain momentum.

The next important change concerns paragraph 8 in the 2022 document, which is completely absent from the seven-year-old version. It notes the need for “full implementation of articles I and II of the Treaty by all States parties to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.” This change may refer to NATO’s nuclear sharing policy, which was criticized at the very first meeting of the Main Committee II by the Non-Aligned Movement.

By the way, the above change was made by merging into one paragraph and moving to the end of the section the requirement to diplomatically resolve concerns about compliance with the provisions of the Treaty and recognize violations of the Treaty as undermining nuclear disarmament, nonproliferation and the peaceful use of atomic energy. This is interesting if we consider the fact that, in comparison with the 2015 document, the mention of the procedure for expressing concern in connection with suspicions
of non-compliance with safeguards agreements has been removed from paragraph 10, which opens the section on the work and safeguards of the IAEA. In the 2022 text, this wording is retained, but moved to paragraph 13 and merged with paragraph 12 from the 2015 text.

The text proposed on August 14 also provides information on the progress made compared to 2015. Thus, it is noted that since the last, Ninth NPT RevCon, six states have entered into force comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA (paragraph 18), 14 States have entered into force an additional protocol (paragraph 22), 22 states have amended their protocols on small quantities, and another six have canceled their similar protocols (paragraph 26). One can compare these figures with their counterparts in the 2015 paper, where there were six, 23 and 17, respectively. Also, noteworthy here is a never-before-seen urge for states that have not yet amended or repealed their small quantity protocols to do so as soon as possible.

In terms of the provisions introduced in the draft final report, paragraphs 29 and 33 can be noted here mainly. According to paragraph 29, “The Conference emphasizes that naval nuclear propulsion requires the application of the highest standards of nonproliferation and the relevant provisions of the safeguards agreements.” With a high degree of probability, it can be argued that this paragraph was added to the text of the document at the insistence of opponents of the acquisition by Australia, a nonnuclear weapons state, of the technology for building nuclear submarines within the framework of the AUKUS alliance.

With regard to paragraph 33, it reflected “military activities being conducted near or at Zaporozhye nuclear power plant.” According to the proposed text, the Conference should express serious concern, including “impact on the safety and security of that facility”, as well as “loss of control over the plant by the competent authorities of Ukraine”. As can be seen, the text is quite restrained, not accusing Russia, as representatives of many Western countries do, of shelling the Zaporozhye nuclear power plant, while at the same time expressing dissatisfaction with the transition of the nuclear power plant under Russian control.

Of the content, paragraphs 42 can also be noted, calling on “all states to support the IAEA Nuclear Security Plan for 2022-2025”, and 62, by analogy with the 2015 version, emphasizing “the importance of the establishment of nuclear weapon-free zones where they do not exist, especially in the Middle East.”

Finally, paragraph 63 is important, containing suggested recommendations for further action. Of these, sub-items e, f, q and r are of most interest, which, respectively:
e) propose to resolve all cases of non-compliance with safeguards obligations in accordance with the IAEA statute;
f) call for the restoration of the control of the competent authorities of Ukraine over the Zaporozhye nuclear power plant and for the implementation of IAEA control activities at the plant in accordance with the Ukrainian Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement;
q) call for respect for the legitimate right of all participating States, in particular developing States, to full access to nuclear materials, equipment and technological information for peaceful purposes;
r) recommend that states-parties to promote the transfer of nuclear technology and materials and international cooperation with other States Parties and remove in this regard all undue restrictions inconsistent with the Treaty.

WMDFZ’s issue on RevCon 2022: All Quiet on the Mideastern Front?

A traditional topic of discussion at the NPT Review Conferences is the establishment of a WMD-free zone in the Middle East. The most important circumstance for the establishment of a nuclear-free Middle East zone, preceding the 2022 NPT RevCon, are the two sessions of the Conference on the Establishment of a WMD-free zone in the Middle East (hereinafter referred to as the Conference). In his address to the 2022 NPT RevCon, the representative of Kuwait emphasized that the 1995 resolution on the Middle East “remains valid as long as its objectives are not achieved.” Kuwait, as the state chairing the second session of the Conference, noted that it would work with the countries participating in the process of establishing the WMD-free zone in an open and transparent manner. The second session was held from November 29 to December 3, 2021, at the end of which the participating countries adopted the organizational Rules of Procedures and established a working committee to continue discussions between the annual sessions of the Conference.

The UAE representative noted that further efforts and assurances from the cosponsoring countries are needed to make progress toward a WMD-free Middle East. A special responsibility for promoting a nuclear-free Middle East lies with the three cosponsoring states, the United Kingdom, Russia, and the United States.

Calling on advanced countries to provide scientific and technical assistance to developing countries, Qatar stressed that the establishment of the WMD-free zone in the Middle East was a collective decision of regional states. Reaffirming that the responsibility to establish such a zone is a collective one, the representative of Saudi Arabia noted his country’s support for all international efforts that seek to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Jordanian Foreign Minister Ayman Safadi said that Jordan
is the only Middle Eastern country that has joined the Stockholm Initiative because of its support for the NPT and its commitment to ensuring ratification by all states.

The representatives of Syria and Yemen and the Permanent Observer of the State of Palestine expressed support to other delegates that Israel’s refusal to join the NPT is another obstacle to the establishment of a WMD-free zone. Palestine stressed that the use or threatened use of nuclear weapons has always been illegal, given that their nature violates fundamental principles of humanity and difference. Thus, there is no justification for Israeli exceptionalism. The Iranian representative said that because of the double standard in the enforcement of the nonproliferation provisions, the nuclear weapons of the Zionist regime developed with the support of the United States, Israel continues to pose a serious threat to the security of countries in the Middle East.

Regional factors

On the second day of the Tenth NPT Review Conference, CNN ran a piece containing a statement by Israeli Prime Minister Yair Lapid referring to nuclear weapons. Speaking at an event marking the change of leadership at the country’s Atomic Energy Commission, Lapid stated, “The operational arena in the invisible dome above us is built on defensive capabilities and offensive capabilities, and what the foreign media tends to call other capabilities. These other capabilities keep us alive and will keep us alive so long as we and our children are here,” Lapid noted. Given that Israel is the only Middle Eastern state outside the NPT, this statement, in fact, as well as the policy of nuclear opacity, cannot but irritate states that actively advocate a nuclear-free Middle East.

In turn, the emerging progress in resolving the Iranian nuclear issue could ease the tensions around the WMD-free zone. In his August 3 speech at the 2022 NPT RevCon, Iranian Permanent Representative to the UN Majid Takht-Ravanchi said, “When the United States makes the right decision, Iran will in turn stop its corrective actions and resume full implementation of nuclear-related measures in accordance with the 2015 agreement”. On the same day there was news of renewed negotiations to restore the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in Vienna. Based on consultations with the US and Iranian delegations, the European Union presented a compromise version of the nuclear deal document, which the parties went to discuss in their capitals.

Mikhail Ulyanov, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the International Organizations in Vienna, said on August 16 that the Iranians had responded and provided a reaction to the final text of the agreements. Tehran confirms its readiness to make a deal on condition that the Americans accept the 3 amendments. The Permanent Representative added that “now the
ball is on the American side of the field, the US has to respond. If the response is predominantly positive, then that means a ministerial meeting will take place soon where the deal will be concluded and then begin to be implemented.”

What’s the bottom line?

The Permanent Observer of the League of Arab States Maged Abdelfattah Abdelaziz noted that in order for the JCPOA to be considered successful, its outcome document must reflect the need for intensified efforts to establish such a zone and for Israel to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a nonnuclear weapon state. In its working paper of June 2, 2022, Russia believes that the substantial progress achieved in establishing a dialogue at the Conference on the establishment of a WMD-free zone can and should be reflected in the draft outcome document of the current NPT RevCon.

On the one hand, it is not yet clear whether there will be one overall Tenth NPT RevCon outcome document or three separate - by Main Committees - outcome documents. In particular, the draft outcome document of the Main Committee II only mentions the importance of establishing a WMD-free zone in the Middle East. On the other hand, the annual sessions of the Conference on the Establishment of the WMD-free zone, on the other hand, involve the development of specific organizational mechanisms.

On the basis of the analysis of the main statements of the States Parties to the 2022 NPT RevCon, in short, it can be noted that the issue of the WMD-free zone at the current Review Conference is dealt with in a rather constructive way. Of course, the situation may change next week, but there are reasons to believe that the 2022 Review Conference will not repeat the fate of its predecessor, the 2015 NPT RevCon, at which the issue of the WMD-free zone was the key stumbling block. And if the issue of the WMD-free zone does not prevent the adoption of the final document of the current NPT Review Conference, will the decisions adopted at the 2022 NPT RevCon meeting be effective on the way to a nuclear-free Middle East? This question is still open.
Patient in Coma? The Results of the Third Week of the Tenth NPT Review Conference, and How They Are Seen from New York

On August 19, the third week of the Tenth NPT Review Conference of the States-Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty came to an end. This week has been special for PIR Center as on August 12–13 representatives of PIR Center team arrived in New York to participate in the Tenth NPT RevCon: PIR Center Founder and Director Vladimir Orlov as Advisor to the official Russian delegation; PIR Center Deputy Director Elena Karnaukhova and PIR Center Junior Research Fellow Alexandra Zubenko as representatives of the NGOs community. By the way, PIR Center is the only Russian NGO that is represented at the Tenth NPT RevCon in person. The exact details about how surprised and interested are the participants of the Conference when they saw us can be omitted. We are glad that the demand for communication with Russian NGO sector is still in the air. Although there are those who shy away.

While preparing for the Tenth NPT RevCon in person participation, I accidentally recalled Vladimir Orlov’s article “Patient in Coma? The Future of Nonproliferation in the Wake of the Iraqi Crisis” published by Russia in Global Affairs in 2003. In this article the author analyzed the perspectives of the nonproliferation regime against the background of the military operation of the US and the coalition of the willing in Iraq. The question kept going through my head: “What are the positions of the nuclear nonproliferation regime and the NPT after many years of problems and unrest?” It seemed if the Treaty was in coma...

New York welcomed us with warm summer weather and, oddly enough, was very cordial. August in these geographic latitudes is not the best month for the events where the fate of mankind is being decided. However, it was the joint expert seminar held by PIR Center and the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies that tuned us into a working mood. On August 15, the IV meeting of the Track 2.5 working group on the topic “Russian-US Dialogue on the NPT Review Process and the Role of Youth” took place. While Russian and American youth, in the presence of the NPT review process gurus Vladimir Orlov and William Potter, discussed the acute problems of nuclear proliferation, disarmament, strategic stability and the prospects for US-Russian interaction within the Tenth NPT RevCon, the official delegations began discussing the first draft reports prepared as a result of the Main Committees meetings. On Tuesday we saw this

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process firsthand. On Tuesday one of our interlocutors noted on the sidelines of the review process that everyone missed real life, face-to-face communication and this, in turn, contributes to the discussion. After all, by the end of the week we realized that longing for Zoom was not a panacea for contradictions.

Since August 15 the official delegations have moved, in a certain sense, to the negotiation format: the general exchange of views was over. By discussing the Main Committee’s draft reports the delegations started expressing their positions as regards specific provisions of draft reports following the logic of “add here, remove there”. It is quite challenging for NGOs representatives to track every nuance in the work of draft reports: they are not allowed to attend closed meetings of so-called subsidiary bodies. It is difficult to draw objective and reliable conclusions about what exactly the NPT state-parties are discussing there. The meetings of the Main Committees are open to NGOs but some other difficulties stand in your way: a host of states, if not the majority of states, give a superficial assessment of the provisions of draft projects promising to send their positions to the Committee Chair in writing. France is the state that surprises the most as in the majority of cases it “is still waiting for the instructions from Paris”.

By the end of the week none of the three Committees reached consensus on their draft reports. Under these circumstances the Chairs of the Main Committees commit to present their draft reports to Ambassador Gustavo Zlauvinen, the President-designate of the Tenth NPT RevCon, for consideration. Draft projects provide some overview of the statements made by the official delegations and do not include a full account of these statements. As Gustavo Zlauvinen noted at one of the events a final basic document will be prepared on the basis of three projects, and it is imperative to adopt this final consensus document. Starting from August 22-23 the main task of his Secretariat will be to harmonize all the views and positions.

Citing the metaphorical expression of one of the NGO members at the Tenth NPT RevCon, during the third week the states did nothing but blamed the mirror while their faces were crooked. Of course, under these circumstances the role of the Chairs of the Main Committees significantly increases. But by Friday, August 19, the Conference was spiced up: the representatives of the Republic of South Africa and Columbia accused the Chairs represented of Bulgaria and Poland of the lack of neutrality and protection of the Western-oriented approaches.

The greatest frustration (this word is often being heard here) of the official delegations can be observed in the Main Committees I and II, which are in charge of disarmament and nonproliferation issues. The disarmament issues are particularly acute within the Tenth NPT RevCon. Germany, Indonesia, Ireland, Costa Rica, Cuba, Malaysia, Mexico, Salvador, the Philippines, Switzerland, Sri Lanka, the Republic of South Africa are the countries that have not
expressed so much concern but regret over the lack of progress in the field of nuclear disarmament. Paradoxically, even Australia shared its concerns about the process of the reduction of global nuclear arsenals (it seems that the majority of the official delegations consider nuclear disarmament as something so unattainable and distant that the sessions of the profile Committee are often held in a rather humorous way).

The NGO community does not lag behind the official delegations’ members. Thus, on August 17, 2022, on the margins of the Tenth NPT RevCon the event on nuclear disarmament verification took place. It was organized by Brazil, Kazakhstan, Norway and the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs and the analytical centers NPS Global (Argentina) and VERTIC (the UK). The side event was held to highlight and discuss the plans to establish the centers, or hubs, to verify the nuclear disarmament process. Such hubs are planned to be established in Africa, Central Asia and Latin America, with the Republic of South Africa, Kazakhstan and Argentina among the states promoting this initiative. In their statements the representatives of these states described what experience in the field of nonproliferation and disarmament they had to prove that such regional hubs could operate on their territories. A Q&A session should have taken place following the panel statements. However, it did not: no one from the NGO community expressed their willingness to ask questions or make comments. For us it seemed little bit awkward to discuss the verification of the disarmament process amid the arms control regime degradation.

Among other problems are the situation in Ukraine, AUKUS factor and cooperation of Australia, the UK and the US on nuclear submarines. Although some states (mainly European) play the Ukrainian card, we hear more often about the US-Chinese controversies: the veterans of the NPT review process have noted an unprecedented increase in the activeness of Chinese delegation, which started acting more aggressively than in the previous review cycles. This week’s results show that the new Anglo-Saxon defensive pact is perceived by some states more painfully than the situation in Ukraine. Perhaps this happens because everything is clear about the situation in Ukraine: for Russia the inclusion in the final documents of any mention of the special military operation, especially in evaluative tone, would be a red line, something categorically unacceptable. The Russian delegation believes that the NPT Review Conference is not a place for politically motivated stories that hinders the objective review process.

In AUKUS case everything is indeed much more complicated. Firstly, the creation of the new Anglo-Saxon alliance raises the question of universality of the IAEA safeguards and the possibility of their ad hoc application. Secondly, the cooperation on nuclear-powered submarines within AUKUS makes other countries step up. During one of the side-events Sergio Duarte, the UN High Rep--
resentative for Disarmament Affairs (2007-2012) and currently the President of the Pugwash Conference on Science and World Affairs, noted that Brazil also expresses its willingness to develop its own nuclear submarine programs (we can only add that Brazil is already developing one). However, to Duarte’s point of view, it is incorrect to compare Australian and Brazilian nuclear programs because it’s a different thing. Another point he made is even more interesting: if there are nuclear weapons states and nonnuclear weapons states, there should be nuclear submarine states and nonnuclear submarine states. According to the member of PIR Center Advisory Board Tariq Rauf, such ideas lead to a new kind of discrimination and carry the risk of undermining the IAEA safeguards system, which should be universal for all the parties.

North Korea drew special attention at the Tenth NPT RevCon. On behalf of 79 states France delivered a joint statement expressing its concern about the DPRK’s nuclear missile program. In accordance with the document, the DPRK should halt any nuclear missile program activities pursuant to the UN Security Council resolutions and also support every possible peace effort through diplomatic means and negotiations. The North Korean issue also ended up being a stumbling rock. China stated that it is possible to achieve the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula only through dialogue. Russia, in turn, urged to stop demonizing foreign policy opponents — it is incorrect to blame North Korea alone for the complicated geopolitical situation in the region. Kiribati drew France’s attention to the fact that contradictory positions of states cannot be compatible with peace and security: during the third week France too often rejected the proposed wording concerning the key nonproliferation and disarmament problems.

The voices of developing countries are very loud within the Tenth NPT RevCon. Some people think that they are just adding fuel to the fire. But the importance of the review process consists in it — it gives developing states an opportunity to make their voices heard. Is this a way it should be in a polycentric, multipolar world order? Among the loudest voices are Brazil, Kiribati, Mexico. Thus, the representatives of Kiribati call for recalling Chapter VI of the UN Charter, “Pacific Settlement of Disputes”. Pacific, not peaceful. This is exactly what the NPT RevCon now lacks. Developing countries are the most puzzled: why some countries still decide everything for others and impose their views. And we are not talking about the Nuclear Five. That is AUKUS that is the most likely to come to mind in this context. The fact that three Anglo-Saxon states discuss in a narrow circle the security problems in the Asia-Pacific region is incorrect. It should not also be up to them to decide behind the closed doors that someone needs to be protected from someone and how exactly they need to do it. Developing countries also demand more inclusiveness for NGOs: the representative of Costa Rica disagreed that NGOs cannot express their positions at the Main Committees.
meetings.

At the same time NGOs actively hold side-events. The period of time between August 15 and August 19 was not an exception. The third week included the side events on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, impact of AUKUS on the nonproliferation regime, establishment of an international mechanism for multilateral verification of the nuclear disarmament process, role of art in the prohibition of nuclear weapons, behavioral features in nuclear decision-making, nuclear waste, reduction of the nuclear war risks, universalization of the IAEA safeguards system, export control, and factors strengthening the nuclear nonproliferation regime. In the context of the latter the panel discussion on strengthening the three pillars of the NPT organized by the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Kazakhstan to the UN was particularly impressive. The US and the Asia-Pacific region representatives were among panelists. We were not able to get a comment on why Russia as well as two other nuclear weapons states was not present at the panel discussion (especially taking into consideration the fact that the discussion started by mentioning the situation at the Zaporozhye nuclear power plant and how important it is in the context of the review process and the world development as a whole).

Following the third week in the end we had an impression that the P5 at the ongoing RevCon is à la a deeply divided society. The US-Chinese contradictions are strong. On the sidelines of the Conference, it is said that the UK is acting through its European partners to put pressure on Russia. Thus, the Netherlands, Italy, Poland, Austria and etc. keep recalling the Budapest Memorandum. France, as a rule, is waiting for instructions from Paris. We do hope that the behind-the-scenes stories about Russians and Americans working closely within the Tenth NPT RevCon are true.

While the prospects of the Tenth NPT Review Conference in terms of adopting the final document seem to be dim, the state-parties are discussing the dates for the new review cycle. On August 19 the plenary session took place. Three variants of the dates of the Eleventh NPT RevCon are being considered:

1. to maintain the five-year cycle as from the date of the current Conference, to hold the sessions of the Preparatory Committees (PrepComs) in 2024, 2025 and 2026 and the Conference itself in 2027;
2. to hold the Eleventh NPT RevCon in 2025, as it should be if the ongoing event had not been postponed due the coronavirus infection;
3. to hold the PrepComs in 2023, 2024 and 2025 and the Conference itself in 2026. The decision will be made following the consultations during the final week of the Tenth NPT Review Conference.
Will the final document be adopted? In most cases we get either surprised or skeptical answers. It seems that no one believes in the adoption of the final outcome of the Conference. However, the hope still exists. One of our interlocutors said whether the final document is adopted or not, the NPT will stay: the nonproliferation regime is of paramount importance. Of course, it is. And it is also convenient for turning each other into whipping boys when dealing with geopolitical contradictions.

Thus, the patient is not fully in coma but even safe and sound.

In the Wake of Challenges and Contradictions, or the Results of the Work in the Main Committee II

The last day of meetings in the Main Committee II has ended. A total of 11 meetings of the Committee and four meetings of the Subsidiary Body took place. It is no secret that the work in the Main Committee II (as well as in the Main Committee I) is more intense than in the Main Committee III. As the representative of Chile noted, these committees have the largest number of controversial issues and sometimes the committees hang on the discussion of certain topics.

Everyone here is already used to the fact that not Australia, but Brazil is trying to remove any mention of submarines with nuclear installations from the document. The representative of Argentina, in a comment for PIR Center, stated that they are not against Brazil’s plans to acquire boats based on low enriched uranium (LEU), because, firstly, it does not violate the NPT, and secondly, “there is already a strong verification mechanism between Brazil and Argentina”.

As for the DPRK, France is the main accuser here. On Friday, at the plenary session, France made a joint statement on the North Korean nuclear program, which was supported by 79 States. “It all started three years ago, when France sponsored a joint statement at the Preparatory Committee condemning the DPRK’s nuclear program and calling on Pyongyang to disarm. The Republic of Korea and Japan, as the most interested states, have joined this initiative,” the representative of the Republic of Korea commented. “I think in this way France is trying to increase its role in the NPT review process.” Also, over the weekend, France, Japan and the Republic of Korea held consultations on the DPRK’s nuclear program.

Amid the heated discussions over the DPRK, the Russian delegation, as always, calls for “a more balanced language, appealing to all parties.” The Russian representative, noting the uselessness of exclusively accusatory rhetoric in the report of the second subsidiary body, quotes an eastern saying, “No matter how much you say halva, it won’t get sweeter in your mouth.” The delegation of the Netherlands takes the floor immediately after to ask, “Can the
Russian delegation repeat the saying, we did not understand it.” The atmosphere is slightly discharged by friendly laughter. Everything falls into place when the word *halva* is translated as *candy* (although in English the word *halva* also exists). As one of the members of the PIR Center Advisory Board rightly noted, “The whole problem is that you know the East through the West. It is not Yongbyon, but Nyongbyon!” They don’t know about halva here either.

Indeed, a balanced approach is still only vaguely visible in the Committee’s report. Iran on Friday noted that by the end of the Conference, consultations between the countries are still not being held “because of the sensitive issues” that the Committee is discussing, “All the issues that we are discussing are sensitive. We call for consultations to begin.” As a result, over the weekend, the Chairman of the Main Committee II invited only two states, Egypt and the United States, to a consultation on the WMD-free zone in the Middle East. The representative of another Arab country noted with regret that this happens every Conference. This year, only Jordan and the UAE were invited to these bilateral consultations.

As for Ukraine and the Zaporozhye nuclear power plant, paragraph 31 is mentioned almost more often than all the others. As of August 22, paragraph 31 reads, “The Conference expresses its serious concern about the military actions carried out near or at the Zaporozhye nuclear power plant and other facilities and facilities on the territory of Ukraine, the loss of control by the competent authorities of Ukraine over such facilities due to the military actions carried out by the Russian Federation, and the profound negative impact of these events on safety, security, including physical protection of nuclear material, and guarantees. The Conference further notes that the loss of control over nuclear installations and other facilities by the competent authorities of Ukraine does not allow these bodies and the IAEA to ensure the effective and safe implementation of safeguards activities.”

Russia does not agree. “The document covers the situation one-sidedly and does not suit the Russian delegation. Consensus can be found, but not on the basis of a document, but on the basis of two points. Firstly, all countries, without exception, are concerned about the military actions around the Zaporozhye nuclear power plant. Secondly, it is important to state the need to implement the activities of the IAEA on the basis of the Agency’s mandate. The parties are currently negotiating, and many issues are being discussed. The main one is how to ensure the safety of the mission,” says Igor Vishnevetsky, Deputy Head of the Russian delegation to the Tenth NPT RevCon and Deputy Head of the Department for Nonproliferation and Arms Control of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. Australia’s reaction is unexpectedly faster than the reaction of even the Ukrainian delegation - Canberra is against weakening the text of
Further, Ukraine claims allegedly reported data that Russia has taken Ukrainians hostage at the nuclear power plant.

As Tarik Rauf, a member of the PIR Center Advisory Board and adviser to the UAE delegation, noted in an interview with PIR Center [3]: “In fact, no one here knows the truth about what is happening behind the Zaporozhye nuclear power plant. If this is really a territory controlled by Russia, then why would Russia fire at it? On the other hand, Ukraine is also not interested in the neighboring territories to suffer. The main issue on the agenda is how to allow IAEA inspectors to the station. The fact is that inspectors should be provided with guarantees for safe passage. If Russia provides them, it will be de facto recognition of the territory. Ukraine also cannot give guarantees in a place where military operations are being conducted.”

But Russia is not alone. As the director of PIR Center Vladimir Orlov notes, “The leader of everyday and professional wisdom was South Africa today – a country that once renounced nuclear weapons, a champion of nuclear disarmament, which makes it an indisputable authority on the NPT. South Africa has proposed a compromise text and an approach that, in my opinion, does not infringe on anyone’s interests in any way.”

Summing up the work in the Main Committee II, the Chairman gave a parting message in the spirit of Kennedy to all participants, “Ask yourself not whether you are satisfied with the document, but whether the national interests of your country and the security of the entire planet will be harmed if the document is adopted.”

Since the final document of the Main Committee II has not been adopted, the Chairman of the Conference Gustavo Zlauvinen will prepare a consolidated report on all three Committees.

Disarmament Issues in the Tenth NPT Review Conference and During Review Process

The sphere of nuclear disarmament and arms control over the past NPT review process (2015-2022) has undergone significant changes, unfortunately not for the better. In 2019, the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range Missiles (INF Treaty) ceased to exist, in 2020 and 2021 The United States and Russia subsequently withdrew from the Open Skies Treaty (OST). The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) has not yet entered into force, primarily because of the US refusal to ratify it.

Undoubtedly, there have been several bright moments in seven years, such as the entry into force in 2017 of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), as well as the extension of the New START in February 2021 for another five years. However, there is no good without evil – the TPNW is gradually coming into
conflict and even confrontation with the NPT and its Article VI, and the prospects for signing a new treaty which should replace New START in 2026 are still more than vague.

In such difficult circumstances, the Tenth NPT Review Conference started. On the eve of the Conference, it was noted that minimal progress had been made in the field of nuclear disarmament: for example, out of the 22 steps envisaged by the action plan adopted at the 2010 NPT RevCon, significant progress was observed only in five.

Week one, “Too little and never enough”

All the less surprising is the fact that, according to PIR Center director Vladimir Orlov, the fights around the issue of nuclear disarmament which always has been one of the two traditional knots of contradictions about the NPT, began already in the first days of the Conference. The rift in the positions of the parties, as expected, was clearly along the border between states that possess and do not possess nuclear weapons. During the general debate, as well as within the framework of the first meeting of the Main Committee I of the Conference, nonnuclear weapons states, both within the framework of international associations and individually, fiercely criticized their nuclear counterparts for insufficient disarmament rates, setting certain conditions, as well as an attempt to substitute nuclear disarmament measures to reduce nuclear risks. All this, according to the representative of South Africa, is “non-compliance with disarmament obligations under the NPT” and, accordingly, “the most serious threat to the integrity of the Treaty and, equally, to humanity.”

The positions of the member countries of the Nuclear Five on disarmament issues both coincided and conflicted with each other. On the one hand, all countries in their speeches emphasized what they had already done in reducing their nuclear arsenals, presenting this as evidence of their commitment to the cause of nuclear disarmament and the provisions of Article VI. At the same time, counting arms reductions from peak moments as the United States did with reference to 1967 indicators is rather good for creating a historical context, but tells us little about real progress during the period of the review process – after all, 1967 and 2022 is separated by neither more nor less than 55 years.

On the other hand, the nuclear powers could not fail to seize the opportunity and shift the blame for the disarmament that has not yet taken place onto their geopolitical rivals, who are by the will of fate their colleagues by the nuclear club. This was especially evident in the statements of Russia and the United States, which accused each other of disrupting the bilateral dialogue on strategic stability launched in 2021. In addition, Russia called NATO’s nuclear
strategy anti-Russian, while Western countries predictably accused Moscow of waving nuclear club. In doing so, both sides have made each other the reason why they have not yet disarmed.

First draft comedy

During the second week, the participants of the Main Committee I were dealing with disarmament issues held two meetings, on Wednesday and Friday, within which they completed the exchange of views. Nothing out of the ordinary happened there – most non-nuclear countries and associations of such countries, including the African Group and the League of Arab States, noted with regret the lack of progress in nuclear disarmament, called for the full implementation of the provisions of Article VI of the NPT and the obligations they had taken on themselves following the results of the 1995, 2000 and 2010 RevCons, expressed their support for the NPT, and also criticized the policy of the nuclear powers of putting forward conditions under which they would supposedly be ready to disarm.

However, some of the non-nuclear states that use the services of the nuclear umbrella from the nuclear powers of the West and united in the so-called Broadly-Likeminded Group, made its own statement, designed to somewhat soften the position of anti-nuclear radicals. 28 countries noted that their approach takes into account the international security environment, while at the same time recognizes the risks associated with nuclear weapons; reaffirms the desire for the goal of universal nuclear disarmament, while at the same time placing a serious emphasis on measures of nuclear risks reduction. However, the most important point of the statement (at least from the Russian point of view) is the fact that Russia’s brutal, illegal, aggressive war against Ukraine is mentioned as a problem that is getting in the way of achieving our goals. Thus, the responsibility for the nuclear non-disarmament of the West by the Broadly-Likeminded Group was directly assigned to Russia.

The key event of the second week of the 2022 NPT RevCon, related to nuclear disarmament issues, was the release of the first draft reports of the Main Committee I and its subsidiary body on Friday, August 12. According to the text of the first document, the Conference:

- deeply deplored the lack of progress in the implementation of Article VI (para. 9);
- reaffirmed the need for nuclear states to fulfill their commitments to nuclear disarmament, including the 2000 and 2010 consensus decisions. (paras. 10–11);
- recalled the commitment of nuclear states to make further efforts to reduce all types of nuclear weapons (para. 12);
- reaffirmed the importance of steps to reduce the level of combat
readiness of nuclear weapons systems and the importance of confidence-building measures (paras. 14-15);
• reaffirmed that measures to reduce nuclear risks are only a temporary measure (para. 16);
• welcomed the various treaties, events, statements and commitments of the nuclear powers aimed at improving the dialogue between them (paras. 18-21);
• recognized the importance of nonnuclear members of nuclear alliances taking steps to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in national and collective security doctrines (para. 23);
• expressed concern about the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and the development of new types of nuclear weapons (para. 25);
• recognized that the indefinite extension of the NPT did not mean the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons by nuclear states (para. 26);
• recognized the adoption and opening for signature of the TPNW (para. 31);
• referring to the decision of the International Court of Justice of July 8, 1996, noted the existence of obligations to conduct negotiations leading to complete nuclear disarmament (para. 32);
• reaffirmed the importance of the early entry into force of the CTBT (para. 37);
• reaffirmed that the complete elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of its use and recalled the obligations of nuclear powers not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons to peaceful nonnuclear states, including members of nuclear weapon-free zones (para. 41);
• noted the continuing importance of security guarantees under the 1994 Budapest Memorandum (para. 42);
• noted the urgent need for the Conference on Disarmament to consider effective, universal, non-discriminatory, unconditional and legally binding arrangements on security assurances to nonnuclear states (para. 43);
• reaffirmed the need for effective verification of nuclear disarmament (para. 44);
• welcomed the work of the Group of Governmental Experts, various initiatives and civil society in the pursuit of nuclear disarmament (paras. 45-47).

The second document, prepared by the Subsidiary Body, largely duplicated the provisions of the main one. Among the new ones were:

• the obligation of Russia and the US to negotiate the replacement of New START before its expiration in 2026 (para. 3);
• all nuclear states undertake to engage in dialogue on the
establishment of a multilateral arms control framework (para. 4); 
• nuclear weapons states have a special responsibility to reduce nuclear risks, and the fulfillment of the disarmament obligation under Article VI and existing obligations can contribute to risk reduction (para. 19), for which there are prescribed certain measures (para. 20); 
• nuclear weapons states undertake to report at each PrepCom session and at each NPT RevCon on the state of their nuclear forces, their nuclear doctrine and on their progress in implementing the Treaty and the obligations they have assumed (paragraph 27).

The texts of both documents caused a lively discussion, and at the same time – dissatisfaction on both sides. The nuclear powers predictably found the proposed provisions too harsh, the nonnuclear powers too lenient. As the representative of Iran noted, the project generously welcomes the statements and actions of the nuclear states, which are not effective measures for nuclear disarmament, but at the same time hesitates to criticize these states for not fulfilling their disarmament obligations. In addition, Costa Rica called for the next version of the report to “reflect more accurately the positive initiatives of many nonnuclear weapons states to advance disarmament and more strongly condemn the failure of nuclear weapons states to meet previous disarmament commitments.” At the same time, the US representative stated that the complete elimination of nuclear weapons could be ensured and made irreversible only in the context of international peace and security, and proposed in the report to confirm the wording of the 2010 outcomes, which obliges participating States to “strive for a more secure world for all and achieve peace and security in a world without nuclear weapons.”

An interesting exchange of views took place between the representatives of France and the Philippines on the paragraphs relating to the Nuclear Five process (paras. 18-20). The French representative suggested that these paragraphs reflect the efforts made by the five nuclear powers on doctrine and strategic risk, to which the representative of the Philippines stated that it should be clear from these paragraphs that the Nuclear Five process is not a thing in itself but should lead to an inevitable finale of complete nuclear disarmament.

The position of China is also interesting in this regard. Its representative put forward a proposal to include in paragraph 21 a mention that the nuclear states with the largest arsenals bear special responsibility for nuclear disarmament.

Many nonnuclear weapons states also endorsed the reference to the TPNW and the decision of the International Court of Justice, while the nuclear powers either opted not to selectively read the decision (like France) or even refused to recognize part of its
provisions (like the United States). Finally, Western countries could not disregard paragraph 42 and offer to add a clarification to it that it was Russia that violated the provisions of the Budapest Memorandum by attacking Ukraine.

**Working hard to strengthen the language**

As a result of the discussions, on August 15 the Subsidiary Body issued a new version of the report, and the next day the changes were ready for the main document of the Main Committee II. Comparing the new and previous versions of the text, one can confidently speak about the tightening of the language of the report in relation to the nuclear powers. So, the revised main document:

- submitted to a separate paragraph and expanded the provision of deep regret regarding the lack of progress in the implementation of Article VI;
- expressed concern about the rise in nuclear rhetoric and nuclear threats and their impact on international peace and security;
- reaffirmed the importance of the participation of nuclear states in the overall reduction of global stockpiles of all types of nuclear weapons, regardless of their location;
- reaffirmed the need for all States to comply at all times with applicable international law, including international humanitarian law;
- in general, toughened the wording regarding the obligations of nuclear states.

Regarding the updated version of the report of the Subsidiary Body, it also referred to the need to comply with applicable international law; added to paragraph 6 the provisions from paragraph 23 of the Main Committee I document, and, like the new main document of the Main Committee I, proposed to abandon the dangerous nuclear rhetoric.

Of course, such a toughening of the language of the reports could not but provoke a reaction from the nuclear powers. On a concrete note, France, the UK, the US and, most interestingly, Russia unanimously demanded the removal of references to the lack of progress in nuclear disarmament and declared that they were acting in full accordance with the provisions of Article VI. The United States single-handedly continued its fight against the decision of the International Court of Justice and its references in the text of the document, and also objected to the statement of the member countries of the TPNW, which expressed the point of view of a “clear and comprehensive ban on nuclear weapons, enshrined in international law,” noting that the TPNW did not ban nuclear weapons because its provisions apply only to its participants and do not establish a rule of customary international law. France and
the UK also demanded to distinguish between the obligations of the nuclear powers under the NPT and in accordance with the decisions of the NPT RevCon, citing the obvious difference in the weight of these obligations.

As for the nonnuclear weapons states, for the most part they positively perceived the changes introduced to the text. At the same time, some countries continued to propose their own amendments and generally insist on further tightening of the language of the document. Thus, Austria, the recognized leader of the anti-nuclear movement, noted that some changes in the text even reduce the level of its ambition, expressing the hope that in its next iteration the text will be even more strengthened.

A very important point regarding paragraph 9 was made by the representative of Sri Lanka, in response to a proposal by South Africa to add a provision in the paragraph on the need to proceed from the principle of irreversibility. While irreversibility is desirable, he said, knowledge of the production of nuclear weapons will still be preserved for a long time, and the requirement of irreversibility can be seen as an obstacle to nuclear disarmament.

Many nonnuclear weapons states once again spoke negatively about the idea of preconditions necessary for complete nuclear disarmament. In this context, the position of Brazil is indicative, noting that this nuclear disarmament will ensure international peace and security, and not vice versa.

On August 17, the third version of the report of the Subsidiary Body I was released. Its preamble added a call to the nuclear Powers to end the arms race at an early stage and the clarification that the successful conclusion of negotiations on the arms race and nuclear disarmament is essential for the full and effective implementation of the Treaty and underscores the special responsibility of the nuclear weapons states in these connections. The urgent need for the full and effective implementation of the obligations under Article VI has been moved to a separate preambular paragraph. In addition, a new clause was added on the commitment of all States Parties to a policy that is fully compatible with the Treaty and the goal of a world without nuclear weapons.

The content of the document has also changed. Paragraph 3 noted the responsibility of the states with the largest arsenals for leading efforts to reduce nuclear weapons (China clearly managed to achieve its goal). The next paragraph, concerning the Russian-American negotiations on the post-New START future was supplemented by a provision on the need to achieve deeper, verifiable and irreversible reductions in their nuclear arsenals. In paragraph 13, an interesting provision was added on the obligation of nuclear weapons states not only to observe, but also to enforce the existing moratorium on explosive nuclear tests until the entry into force of the CTBT. A new paragraph 16 has been added inviting participating States to exchange information on how they apply the principles of
irreversibility in relation to the fulfillment of their treaty obligations. In general, we can talk about the further tightening of the language of this document.

**Main Committee I final draft: no specifics?**

On the last working day of the third week of the Conference, the final version of the draft Main Committee I report was finally published, this time merged with the document prepared by the Committee’s Subsidiary Body. The document has undergone some significant changes:

- added mention of the lack of meaningful (tangible) progress in the implementation of Article VI of the NPT (para. 10);
- the applicability of the principle of irreversibility to nuclear disarmament and related measures was reaffirmed (para. 13);
- the complete elimination of nuclear weapons is called not the best, but the only way to eliminate nuclear risks (para. 17);
- the need for reporting on concrete progress in the dialogue among nuclear weapons states was reiterated (para. 21);
- added confirmation of the importance of ratifying the CTBT by nuclear weapons states that have not yet done so (para. 43).
- changes followed in the part taken from the report of the Subsidiary Body. In particular, a commitment has been added to further explore practical steps that States can take to narrow and, where possible, close the pathways for the unintentional use of nuclear weapons (para. 27i).

In general, as in previous cases, we can talk about further tightening of the language of the Main Committee I report. However, this text did not include anything that the Chairman of Main Committee I himself, who in 2019 was the head of the PrepCom, proposed as concrete and measurable steps to reduce the level of combat readiness, risks and the role of nuclear weapons, stop the program of modernization of nuclear weapons and start negotiations on the elimination of nuclear weapons.

Not surprisingly, no consensus was eventually reached on its adoption. Thus, the representative of South Africa explicitly stated that the head of the Subsidiary Body consciously chose the elements that she liked, while her tastes coincided with those of NATO and the European Union, which means that the views of 122 members of the Non-Aligned Movement were not adequately reflected in the text. Austria expressed its regret that the nuclear powers had not agreed to take concrete steps to achieve meaningful progress towards nuclear disarmament; The Philippines supported it.

At the same time, the UK did not agree with the language of paragraph 10 about the absence of this meaningful progress and elements of paragraph 16. China, France and the UK did not
agree with a number of paragraphs on reducing nuclear risks; in particular, the representative of Beijing noted that such measures “should be agreed upon by the countries concerned on a voluntary basis through consultations” and should not be presented as a list of necessary measures. China also disagreed with the provisions of paragraph 24 in the sense that other nuclear powers should not be subject to the same requirements as the United States and Russia, which have the largest nuclear arsenals. Finally, Russia and the West entered into a clinch over the mention in the text of the Budapest Memorandum (para. 48).

Thus ended the third week of the Review Conference. But on Monday, August 22, the participants were presented with the first version of the final outcome document of the Tenth NPT RevCon. In terms of nuclear disarmament (the section on Article VI and the relevant preambular paragraphs), it did not contain any significant differences from the final version of the final document prepared by the Main Committee I. However, Monday was also marked by a speech by Costa Rica on behalf of 145 states on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons. The statement noted that the only way to ensure that nuclear weapons will never be used again is their complete elimination. In addition, it is interesting to note the skirmish between the US and Iranian representatives, during which an Iranian diplomat stated that the US delegation was distracting States Parties from the fact that the United States has refused to comply with its obligations under Article VI since 1970. Finally, France distinguished itself by saying that it does not understand what it means to politicize the debate, and also accused some states of being emotional and urged them to be diplomatically smart.

Final document and results of the Conference: the balance is almost invisible

Finally, we should also analyze the final version of the final document of the Conference, which was never adopted. Of the relatively new, it can be noted that in the document:

- deep concern was expressed that the threat of the use of nuclear weapons is greater today than at any time since the Cold War and the deteriorating international security environment (para. 104);
- it also expressed concern that, despite achievements in bilateral and unilateral nuclear arms reductions, the total estimated number of nuclear weapons deployed and in the arsenals of nuclear weapons states still stands at several thousand, and many hundreds remain on high alert (para. 105);
- in general, it can be noted that the language of the final document was changed in a somewhat strange and softened way. Thus, the reference to the harmless and even a catchphrase now that “a
nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought” (paragraph 119 of the first version of the document) has disappeared from it, as if the nuclear weapons states that made this statement, were going to challenge it. Many calls to nuclear states were also excluded, such as “initiating a dialogue on the establishment of a multilateral nuclear arms control system in order to reduce the overall size of nuclear arsenals” (para. 152/14), “to achieve the complete elimination of nuclear weapons as the highest priority in the field of disarmament.” Also, the number of mentions that the States Parties “express deep concern about the lack of tangible progress since the Ninth Review Conference in 2015” was reduced to one. In addition, the report makes almost no reference to the process of modernizing nuclear forces and only calls on nuclear and nonnuclear weapons states to engage in dialogue on this issue (para. 187/19).

Not surprisingly, few of the RevCon participants were satisfied with the text of the final document, especially with regard to nuclear disarmament. Nonnuclear weapons states almost unanimously stated that the report did not spell out any specific measures or time limits for nuclear disarmament. The reaction of nuclear states to these calls of nonnuclear colleagues was very accurately expressed by the representative of the United States in literally three words, “We hear you”.

Thus, the subject of nuclear disarmament, as we have already noted, has become one of the main reasons for the non-adoption of the outcome document of the Tenth NPT RevCon. The right balance between the positions of nuclear and nonnuclear (or rather, even anti-nuclear) weapons states could not be found. Interestingly, no one cares that in fact, even according to public data over the past seven years, both the total number of nuclear warheads and the number of their deployed variation, nevertheless, decreased by 3145 and 568, respectively. Some are not allowed to keep their favorite toy (nuclear weapons), others are not allowed to fully and rightfully play with theirs (general and complete nuclear disarmament). And fights over toys (as we all remember from childish times) sometimes lead to extremely undesirable consequences, which we all would like to avoid.
AUKUS Factor at the Tenth NPT Review Conference

The creation of a tripartite defense alliance between Australia, the UK and the US, acronymically called AUKUS, was announced on September 15, 2021. This pact has one rather weak point in terms of international law and the nuclear nonproliferation regime, since it involves the transfer of Australia, nonnuclear power under the NPT, technologies for the construction of nuclear submarines. Despite the fact that formally naval nuclear propulsion (NNP) is not subject to the NPT, but considering that this removes uranium enriched to a level of over 90% (that is, real weapons-grade uranium) from IAEA inspections, this precedent caused indignation all over the world, even among Western scientists and experts.

However, first of all, the creation of AUKUS and the associated threat of nuclear proliferation in the region caused concern in China, against which, obviously, this alliance is directed. The reaction to the tripartite statement of September 15 was immediate. Already in China’s early statements on the AUKUS issue, there are features of an approach that will continue to continue - indications of creating risks for the nuclear nonproliferation regime, the impossibility of effective control over nuclear materials by the IAEA, as well as a proposal to create a special commission within the Agency on “implementation of safeguards for naval transport reactors and associated nuclear materials held by nonnuclear weapons states.”

Until then, Beijing is proposing to freeze any cooperation within AUKUS regarding the nuclear submarine. The PRC, together with Russia, which is also concerned about the creation of the alliance, tried to get any answers to their questions from its members, but to no avail.

Positions of the parties in the NPT RevCon working papers: first shots

Under such circumstances, it is not surprising that the issue of AUKUS and NNP was raised at the Tenth NPT Review Conference. The struggle of positions and formulations was noticeable already in the working documents submitted by the parties before the start of the RevCon. China raised this topic three times – first in the November documents on nuclear nonproliferation and the WMD-free zone in the Middle East, and also in a special December document dedicated directly to the Australian-British-American cooperation in the field of nuclear submarines. Of the new provisions that appeared in these documents, one can note the threat to the Rarotonga Treaty on a nuclear weapon-free zone in the South Pacific, of which Australia is a member, as well as the Bangkok Treaty on a nuclear weapon-free zone in Southeast Asia. The PRC also accuses the AUKUS countries of double standards on nonproliferation issues, and also believes that this case will open a Pandora’s box and encourage other nonnuclear weapons states to follow their example.
As the beginning of the Conference approached, other countries also prepared their working papers on the problem, primarily members of the AUKUS. In their document of July 22, 2022, they, without any mention of China, denied all of China’s allegations, assuring the world community that all three countries continue to adhere to their obligations under the NPT, that the NNPs comply with Australia’s obligations, and that all three countries closely cooperate with the IAEA on this issue, incl. on further strengthening of the nonproliferation regime. There was also an 18-month consultation period during which optimal routes for the transfer of NNP technology to Australia should be worked out.

It is worth noting that the topic of NNP was touched upon in the documents of several other countries. Indonesia, the largest country in Southeast Asia, in its document dated July 25, took positions close to those of China, in particular, stating that it “considers any cooperation related to the transfer of nuclear materials and technologies for military purposes from nuclear states to any nonnuclear weapons states, as an increase in the associated risks... posed by the potential proliferation and conversion of nuclear material into nuclear weapons, especially highly enriched uranium, in the operational state of nuclear naval propulsion systems. Indonesia also called for “strict compliance with Article III of the Treaty” and the application of additional safeguards-related measures by the IAEA.

Brazil proposed a compromise option by publishing a document on its program to create NNP and bring it into line with the NPT by concluding special safeguards with the IAEA after the Conference began, on August 3. However, it should be noted that a distinguishing feature of the Brazilian program is the potential use of low-enriched uranium in their NNPs, and not highly enriched uranium, as in American and British NNPs.

General debate and Committee work: towards a compromise

The discussion of AUKUS started during the general debate. The positions of the parties were generally the same as previously stated, with the AUKUS countries speaking unitedly and declaring that the nuclear submarine technology transfer process to Australia would be carried out under the Australian Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CAS) and Additional Protocol (AP) and that they were “confident that will be able to provide the IAEA with full confidence at every stage of the life cycle of submarines that no diversion of nuclear materials occurs.” At the same time, China spoke from the usual position of concern about the risks to the nuclear nonproliferation regime, and also noted that any attempt to repeat the NATO policy of nuclear sharing in the Asia-Pacific region “will undermine regional strategic stability, meet strong resistance from the countries of the region and, if necessary, face serious countermeasures.”
It should be noted that most of the participants in the Conference took a position that was more sympathetic to China. IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi noted that although the issue under consideration is provided for by the existing legal framework, it “raises important questions that require appropriate technical answers to protect the integrity of the nonproliferation regime.” On a more worrisome note, representatives from Indonesia, South Africa, Peru and Kiribati, as well as China, spoke about the risks to the nonproliferation regime.

Russian representative Igor Vishnevetsky also noted that “the justification of clarifying reservations to the Protocols to the Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones Treaty is confirmed by the situation around the recently created AUKUS partnership by the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia, within which it is impossible to exclude the appearance on the territory of a state party to the NWFZ Treaty (Rarotonga) of the infrastructure of nuclear states.” At the first meeting of the Main Committee I of the Conference, Russian, Chinese and Syrian representatives also made statements criticizing AUKUS for the possibility of Australia, a member of the Rarotonga Treaty, accepting the military infrastructure of nuclear powers on its territory, the lack of information about the goals of this partnership, as well as the lack of transparency and necessary guarantees. Finally, China raised the topic of AUKUS at one of the meetings of the Main Committee III, saying that the nuclear submarine deal under the pact creates new threats to the safeguards established by the IAEA.

However, the most serious debate on the issue of AUKUS flared up in the Main Committee II, dealing with nuclear nonproliferation issues. As the discussion progressed, the parties developed their arguments, made new proposals and reacted to the proposals of their counterparts. Thus, from the very beginning of the work of the Main Committee II, members of the AUKUS camp of opponents introduced the thesis that the creation of an alliance and the precedent of transferring nuclear submarines to a nonnuclear power could serve as an impetus for an arms race in the Asia-Pacific region; in particular, the representatives of Russia and Malaysia spoke about this. Austria noted that “naval nuclear propulsion goes beyond the scope of CSAs and APs” and welcomed the work of the IAEA and Australia in this area. The United Kingdom, however, rejected China’s proposal to establish an ad hoc committee at the IAEA on this issue, since, in its opinion, this would “undermine the technical authority of the Agency.” It is noteworthy that Australia’s neighbor New Zealand made a rather neutral statement, noting the importance of the current situation serving to strengthen rather than undermine the international system of guarantees and the nonproliferation regime.

A more heated discussion unfolded when the parties moved on to a thematic exchange of views on August 10. China, in addition to the pending proposal to establish an ad hoc committee in the IAEA, also proposed to establish a permanent item on the agenda of the next NPT review cycle on the issue of cooperation in the field of submarines within the framework of AUKUS. The United States noted the speech of Brazil, ...
which emphasized that nothing in the NPT prevents the development of NNPs, since they are not weapons, but are used for energy production and are no different from nuclear power plants, and also stated that the characterization of NNP as illegal or as a violation of the NPT is an attempt to curtail the inalienable right of states to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. In addition, many Western countries opposed the creation of any separate or parallel process on NNPs, and the United Kingdom also opposed the mention of specific NNPs programs in the future text of the report. Also, China and the United States predictably accused each other of applying double standards. Indonesia offered the Conference to provide the IAEA with political guidance that would allow the Agency to work on legal frameworks and technical agreements, Russia and Iran expressed their concern about the potential use of highly enriched uranium in Australian nuclear submarines, and Cuba did stated that NNP violated the first three articles of the NPT, and the risks of proliferation cannot be overlooked.

Report of the Main Committee II: evolution and expansion

At the end of the second week of the Review Conference, on August 14, a zero draft of the Main Committee II report was published. Section 29, consisting of only two and a half lines, was devoted to the problem of NNP. It emphasized that the NNPs require the application of the highest standards of nonproliferation and the relevant provisions of safeguards agreements.

This option did not suit all parties. Australia urged, and the US and the UK agreed, that the text iteration should certainly mention the fact that nonnuclear states are allowed to use NNPs under the NPT. The PRC noted that the text turned out to be very biased (obviously not in favor of China itself). Indonesia, however, proposed the inclusion of paragraph 12 of its aforementioned working paper, which called for a “constructive approach to the verification and control mechanisms” of the NNP program in order to “strengthen safeguards agreements that tighten uranium monitoring measures ... in order to prevent diversion of this material for use in a military nuclear program.”

A number of countries also submitted written proposals to amend the text of the document. China invited the Conference to mention that “participating states have expressed concern about the transfer of nuclear weapons and weapons-grade highly enriched uranium from nuclear weapons states to nonnuclear weapons states,” and also reiterated all of its previous concerns and proposals, albeit replacing the idea of convening a committee with a more general proposal to “begin structured dialogue within the IAEA”. Australia also broadly repeated its oral proposals. South Africa has proposed a more general language applicable to any potential similar situation. Finally, Brazil and Egypt also suggested mentioning that NNPs are permitted under the NPT and also developing specific verification procedures to be applied for this purpose by the IAEA and, as appropriate, by regional
verification agencies (referring to Brazilian–Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials and possibly suggesting creating something similar at the bilateral Australian-Chinese level).

The discussion continued at the meetings of Main Committee II. China made a proposal to add a subparagraph 9bis to the text, which would say that a number of countries have expressed concern about nuclear submarine cooperation under AUKUS, would highlight the fact that the participating countries disagree on whether NNPs are allowed under the NPT or not, and whether existing IAEA safeguards apply here. Western countries predictably rejected these amendments.

On August 18, a new version of the Main Committee II report was released. In the new edition, the paragraph on NNP, which changed its number to 32, has not changed much. He now stressed that naval nuclear propulsion requires the IAEA to review appropriate verification mechanisms in accordance with the relevant provisions of safeguards agreements. It was an improvement that directly called for the development of new mechanisms, but in any case, the text looked like a too compromise answer.

The opinions of the parties on this issue were divided. More neutral countries (such as Brazil and Indonesia) were generally positive about the changes made to the text. China stood its ground and demanded open and inclusive discussions on this matter. Australia reacted positively to the amendments to the text of the paragraph. At the same time, the United States considered the changes as a step back and demanded that a clarification be added that NNPs are permitted by the NPT.

As a result, on August 21, the last version of the Main Committee II report was released. In it, the paragraph concerning the NNPs, which received the number 33, was significantly expanded. It reflected the interest that the parties to the Treaty had aroused the use of nuclear material in non-prohibited military activities, including in terms of agreements on guarantees that such material will not be used for the production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The importance of consultations by the IAEA with interested countries on agreements on NNPs, as well as the continuation of the dialogue, was also noted.

Again, not everyone was satisfied with the new text, albeit seriously improved. In particular, China again called the text biased and demanded to reflect the fact that countries had different views on cooperation in the nuclear submarine. Australia and Brazil actually came out with the same positions, reiterating the need to state explicitly that NNPs are allowed under the NPT. It is interesting to note that the Netherlands made a new proposal on the topic, proposing to wait for the report of the IAEA Director General, which is due in September 2022, before starting a detailed discussion on the issue.
Final document, “in short, Sklifosovsky!”

The paragraph 36 of the final document, devoted to the considered issue of NSNA in nonnuclear weapons states of the NPT, made an interesting evolution during the final week of the RevCon. In the first version, the text remained unchanged, identical to the text of paragraph 33 of the final version of the Main Committee II report.

The second version was somewhat different from its predecessor in the direction of expansion. The changes to the first sentence were more cosmetic. The second sentence changed much more seriously: it recognized that “the States concerned should continue to interact with the IAEA on this matter in accordance with the relevant safeguards agreements”, and that the IAEA Director General should report relevant events to a wider circle of IAEA members in accordance with established practice decision-making bodies of the IAEA. It can be seen from this that the new version of the text actually assigned responsibilities to both the interested parties and the IAEA leadership, which theoretically could work, preventing the AUKUS countries from chatting up the problem.

However, in the last version of the final document, the text of paragraph 33 was significantly reduced. According to it, it was noted that the topic of NNPs was of interest for the States Parties to the Treaty, as well as “the importance of a transparent and open dialogue on this topic.” In fact, all the specifics were removed from the text – why is the topic of NNP “of interest to the parties to the Treaty” at all? The answer to this question remained open.

At the end of the paragraph, it was noted that “nonnuclear states that are engaged in the creation of NNPs should interact with the IAEA in an open and transparent manner.” Thus, of the mandatory branches of interaction, only one remained – between countries planning to get NNPs and the IAEA. In an ideal world, such a state of affairs would be quite acceptable – after all, who, if not these countries, have to interact with the IAEA to develop new norms and guarantees. However, in the real world, where claims are made against international organizations for being biased and giving advantages to Western countries (which are the AUKUS member countries), it would be important to fix the obligatory dialogue with and through the IAEA with the other side – the PRC.

In this situation, the reaction of China itself is also interesting – it actually did not follow. In its final statement at the final plenary session of the Conference, China did not say a word either about the AUKUS problem, or even about the more general problem of NNP.

In its final statement at the final plenary session of the Conference, China did not say a word either about the AUKUS problem, or even about the more general problem of NNP.
Reflecting on the Outcome of the Tenth NPT Review Conference: Establishing a WMD-Free Zone in the Middle East

On August 26, 2022, Tenth NPT Review Conference ended without an outcome document. At two consecutive Review Conferences, the participating states were unable to reach consensus. At the 2015 NPT RevCon, a consensus document was not adopted because of disagreement over language on advancing the goal of establishing a WMD-free zone in the Middle East. Things were different at the 2022 Review Conference: there were many disputes over each of the three pillars of the NPT. The most acute of these was the issue of the Zaporozhye nuclear power plant.

In the course of the Review Conference work, the participating States established specialized subsidiary groups. Subsidiary Body II focused on issues related to the 1995 resolution on the Middle East and nonproliferation issues on the Korean Peninsula. Tariq Rauf, a member of the PIR Center’s Advisory Board, notes that, in practice, irreconcilable negotiations on the WMD-free zone are conducted not in Main Committee II, but in the corridors of Subsidiary Body II, involving mainly Egypt (on behalf of Arab states) and the US (indirectly representing Israeli interests as well, since Israel has refused to join the NPT). If these actors can come up with a definite agreement, it is submitted to Main Committee II, which approves it in advance, possibly with some adjustments to involve Iran. It is then forwarded to the President-designate of the Tenth NPT RevCon for inclusion in the final document for adoption at the Review Conference. On August 21 of this year, the draft report of Subsidiary Body II was published, but no consensus could be reached on its adoption.

“The language in the final draft represents the weakest text on Middle East WMD [free zone] that we have ever seen,” a spokesman for the Iranian delegation said on August 22 of this year. It is hard to disagree, given that the main points of Draft II of the Subsidiary Body were included in the draft of the 2022 NPT RevCon final document. In particular, Lebanon also noted that “on the creation of a weapons of mass destruction-free zone in the Middle East, the language is even weaker.” “The paragraphs of the draft document on the Middle East were weak, especially because they did not include Israel’s obligation to join the NPT and to place all its nuclear facilities under the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement,” Syria clearly stated its position. What is their weakness?

The draft of the final document included the following items:

• the Conference reaffirms its support for the implementation of the Resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and recalls the affirmation of its goals and objectives by the previous Review Conferences;
• the Conference reaffirms that the 1995 Resolution remains valid
until the goals and objectives are achieved. The 1995 Resolution, which was co-sponsored by the three depositary states of the Treaty, is an essential element of the outcome of the 1995 Conference and of the basis on which the Treaty was indefinitely extended without a vote;

• the Review Conference recalls the reaffirmation at the 2010 Review Conference by the five nuclear weapons states of their commitment to a full implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East;

• the Conference recalls the reaffirmation by previous Review Conferences of the importance of achieving universality of the Treaty, including in the Middle East;

• the Conference stresses the necessity of strict adherence by all States Parties to their obligations and commitments under the Treaty. The Conference urges all States in the region to take relevant steps and confidence-building measures to contribute to the realization of the objectives of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East;

• the Conference reaffirms the importance of the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones where they do not exist, including in the Middle East;

• the Conference reaffirms the importance of advancing the full implementation of the Resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference;


In essence, these paragraphs repeat the 2015 draft NPT RevCon final document. Among the new one is mention of the two sessions of the Conference on the establishment of a WMD-free zone in the Middle East and the progress made at them. By the way, the decision to convene and the organizational aspects of such a thematic Conference were reflected in the 2015 draft of the NPT RevCon document. As we have written before, it is the annual sessions of the Conference on the Establishment of the WMD-free zone that are supposed to elaborate specific mechanisms.

In this regard, can we argue that there has been a kind of a transition of responsibilities: now the annual sessions have the main task of working out certain organizational points? Or is it still the failure of the Review Conference to formulate more strong points that would accelerate the process of establishing a WMD-free zone in the Middle East? Apparently, it was not in vain that the Egyptian delegation was indignant that the issue of the WMD-free zone remained in the shadows at the 2022 NPT RevCon.
What’s next?

Despite the disappointment of the frustrating conclusion of work at the Tenth NPT RevCon, work will continue. First, as part of the review process: in the preparatory committees and then at the Eleventh NPT RevCon scheduled for 2026. Second, at the third session of the Conference on the Establishment of a WMD-free zone in the Middle East, November 14–18 this year in New York. More hopes are pinned on the latter format, since one of the key principles for the creation of the WMD-free zone is the initiative of the states in the region themselves.

The key question is with what spirit will the delegates come? Hopefully, in the Syrian delegation’s words, the failure at the 2022 NPT RevCon will be “motivation to work more multilaterally and cooperate seriously to be cautious, transparent and inclusive, avoid politicization, and consider a balanced implementation of the third pillars of the treaty and ensure its implementation without selectivity or discrimination.” We’ll keep an eye out.

Following the Tenth RevCon: Zaporozhye Nuclear Power Plant Factor, or Why the Final Document Failed to be Adopted

Now, when you scroll through the news about the Tenth NPT Review Conference, you mostly come across the headlines, “Russia has disrupted the adoption of the final document of the Tenth NPT Review Conference.” The reason is also well known, Russia opposed the wording of the regulations on Ukraine and the Zaporozhye nuclear power plant in the draft document. The superficial headlines make it at least annoying: even now, when the culprit of the shelling is practically known, Russia continues to be blamed for all the misfortunes. The Ukrainian delegation during the last day of the Conference on August 26 at the plenary session stated, “A member of one delegation said yesterday that the NPT is not about the truth. We disagree.” This statement brought the house down. But everybody preferred to be left with their own truth.

Let’s try to track the dynamics of the situation around the Zaporozhye nuclear power plant at the Conference. The issue of nuclear safety of the plant was raised in one of the working papers submitted to the beginning of the Conference. This document was prepared by the Vienna Group of Ten and it condemned Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine, and also spoke of the need to ensure the nuclear safety of Ukraine’s nuclear facilities located in the combat zone. The Russian delegation was ready for accusations of aggression to become the heavy artillery of the Western countries at the Conference. The only question was whether this offensive
would be so uncompromising as to nullify the adoption of the final
document. Alas, yes, it was.

The Ukrainian attacks on the nuclear power plant began like
clockwork: as one of the participants at the Conference noted,
frequent shelling has become a trend since the end of July, i.e.
before the very beginning of the Conference. The official pretext
for this was that Russia allegedly deployed the BM-30 Smerch
MLRS there and, using the nuclear power plant as a cover, began
shelling Ukrainian cities. Meanwhile, the IAEA mission, which
visited the Zaporozhye nuclear power plant in early September,
did not record the presence of military equipment at the nuclear
power plant, except for a few military vehicles, as was stated in the
report of Director General Rafael Grossi. During the first day of
the Conference, the Ukrainian delegation demanded nothing less
than to close the skies over the nuclear power plant throughout the
country and provide it with air defense systems, as well as “to show
that the aggressor cannot but be punished.” On August 3, Rafael
Grossi stated that “the nuclear power plant is completely out of the
control of the IAEA. “

Then, after the shelling took place on August 5, as a result of
which the nitrogen-oxygen station and the SNF dry storage building
were damaged, the Ukrainians in the Main Committee II changed
their demands: now it was necessary to “withdraw Russian troops
from Europe's largest nuclear facility and ensure its complete
demilitarization.” Then, it seemed, the wording became softer:
“The Conference calls for restoring the control of the competent
authorities of Ukraine over the nuclear power plant.” But it just
seemed that way. In the halls of the Main Committee II and the
Subsidiary Body II, mutual accusations were repeatedly heard and
new cases of shelling and taking hostage of Ukrainian employees
working at the nuclear power plant were discovered.

Unfortunately, the entire Western orchestra amicably falsified
and supported the accusations devoid of constructive approach,
despite the fact that since February 28, the territory of the nuclear
power plant has been under the control of the Russian troops.
After all, there were hopes that everything related to special
military operation would set the tone of the Conference in the
first weeks, and then fade into the background. However, instead,
the latest version of the working paper of the Main Committee II
turned out to be much more biased than the previous two. In fact,
all the blame for what was happening around the nuclear power
plant has been laid on Russia, and Russia had to return the nuclear
power plant has and other nuclear facilities of Ukraine under the
control of the Ukrainian authorities to “ensure their physical and
nuclear safety.” This wording was a setback compared to previous
versions of the document and did not allow the parties to make
even a little progress towards developing a mutually acceptable
text. The Russian side put forward consensus options. Thus,
Deputy Head of the Russian delegation to the Tenth NPT RevCon Igor Vishnevetsky, stated at one of the meetings of the Main Committee II, “The document covers the situation one-sidedly and does not satisfy the Russian delegation. Consensus can be found, but not on the basis of a document, but on the basis of two points. Firstly, it should be noted that all countries, without exception, are concerned about the military actions around the Zaporozhye nuclear power plant has. Secondly, it is important to state the need to carry out the IAEA mission to the plant on the basis of the Agency’s mandate. The parties are currently negotiating and many issues are being discussed. The main one is how to ensure the safety of the mission.” The hail of objections that fell after these words showed that the West did not intend to compromise. And although the draft final document drawn up by the President-designate of the Conference avoided mentioning Russia, the time needed for constructive discussion was missed. After the Russian representative took the floor at the last plenary session and expressed disagreement with the wording of the draft final document, the President-designate of the Conference Ambassador Gustavo Zlauvinen, sadly stated that it would not be possible to find a compromise.

Why might Ukraine have been against the arrival of the IAEA mission to the nuclear power plant and how is this related to the NPT RevCon?

It is no secret that with the arrival of the IAEA mission to the nuclear power plant, they dragged for a long time and the parties accused each other of unwillingness to allow the mission to the facility. There was a lot of speculation in the Russian media about why Kiev did not want the IAEA to arrive at the nuclear power plant. But after the intense shelling in August, it became obvious that Ukraine was afraid that the IAEA would become aware of who carried out the shelling. If this had become exactly known, officially or informally, during the Tenth NPT Review Conference, all the arguments of the Ukrainian delegation would have turned sharp for them.

At the same time, the West could sing along to Ukraine much more calmly, without fear that the truth might become known. The second fiddle in this awkward composition was performed by the French. It was France that on the last day of the Conference presented a joint statement condemning Russian aggression, during which the Russian delegation for the first time during this heated Conference left the hall. At first, it was a little surprising that in between meetings in the Main Committee II, the head of the French delegation most often circled not around Americans, Britons or South Koreans, but around Ukrainians. Ukraine, in its turn, every time after providing accusations against Russia, did not forget to mention the inadmissibility of the DPRK’s nuclear program. Let us explain here that for France, the issue of the North Korean nuclear program is now one of the priorities in the NPT Review Process.
Suffice it to say that the second joint statement, initiated by France, was just on the DPRK. Why? As the South Korean delegate at the Conference explained, there are hardly any specific interests behind this, rather France is trying to “find a niche for itself in the NPT Review process.” Finding your niche turned out to be more important than finding consensus. The French also found a way to atone for their actions – by the end of the Conference, on August 25, French President Emmanuel Macron met with Rafael Grossi to discuss the IAEA mission to the nuclear power plant. The mission of the Ukrainian-French tandem was completed, now it was the turn of the IAEA mission. As it is already known, the report submitted to the IAEA does not indicate from whose side the shelling took place.

Did Ukraine have any other reasons to fear the arrival of the IAEA at the nuclear power plant?

Two more versions have become the most popular on the Internet and Telegram channels: the first is that there is outdated equipment at the nuclear power plant that does not meet nuclear safety standards, and the second is that Ukrainians conducted experiments with SNF stored at the station in order to obtain a dirty or even a nuclear bomb. In our opinion, although both versions may have grounds, they were unlikely to have become the reasons for Kiev’s hidden unwillingness to allow the IAEA to enter the facility. Firstly, because the IAEA relies primarily on documents provided by the national operator (at that time - Energoatom) and does not conduct its own technical inspections at the facility. The agency can only record what it saw when visiting the facility and compare it with the information provided by the national authority – for example, what damage is present at the station. That is why the IAEA report always refers to reports received from the Ukrainian authorities. Secondly, the nuclear power plant is an object that falls under the safeguards agreement between Ukraine and the IAEA. This means that earlier IAEA inspections were regularly carried out on it and the last inspection, conducted in 2020, did not reveal any problems with the equipment or the use of SNF. In addition, the Agency’s cameras work around the clock at the facility.

In short, everything that the IAEA could know about the plant in relation to SNF or the equipment used, it already knew. At the same time, as already mentioned, this cannot serve as an absolute guarantee that problems with the operation of the station really exist.

As for the experiments with SNF at the nuclear power plant, there is the most speculation around this version and the least evidence. Theoretically, a nuclear power plant is an object on which,
of course, experiments can be carried out under the guise of an increased level of radiation background. At the same time, members of the PIR Center Advisory Board, familiar with the problems of the Ukrainian peaceful atom, said that they didn’t know anything about such experiments. There was also no official evidence from the Russian or someone else’s side, although, according to the IAEA report, Rosatom had already inspected the station, “On March 3, Ukraine informed the IAEA that at least 11 representatives of Rosatom State Corporation were present at the site. On April 29, the Ukrainian authorities reported that Rosenergoatom, a division of Rosatom, had sent a group of nuclear specialists to the nuclear power plant. These specialists requested daily reports from the management of the NPP on confidential issues on the operation of the nuclear power plant, including aspects related to administration and management, maintenance and repair work, safety, “as well as the handling of nuclear fuel, spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste.” So far, the accusations of experiments with SNF have not been officially confirmed.

The outdated equipment on the plant is a much more likely problem. It is no secret that the Ukrainian nuclear power industry has been in a state of crisis for the past few years. The equipment fleet has been in need of repair and updating for a long time. There were reports in the press every now and then that the authorities repeatedly extended the life of the reactors without proper repair. The same applied to the Rivne and South Ukrainian nuclear power plants. It is known that the design life of the first unit of the nuclear power plant was completed in 2015, the second – in 2016, the third – in 2017, the fourth – in 2018, the fifth – in 2020. All terms were extended for 10 years. Extending the life of nuclear power plants is a global trend. However, it is still considered that prolongation and repair work should be carried out in close coordination with the contractor of the order (i.e. with Russia). Ukraine, even under the president Yushchenko, switched to a policy of import substitution in the field of nuclear energy, and although cooperation was still ongoing in some areas (for example, the supply of nuclear fuel), there was no dialogue with the Russian side on the safe extension of the operational life of the nuclear power plant. Moreover, there is every reason to believe that Ukraine will continue to operate existing reactors. The energy strategy of Ukraine until 2035 provides for the extension of the operational life of all existing nuclear power plants. Meanwhile, the media has repeatedly received reports that Ukrainian nuclear scientists are calling on the authorities to pay attention to the problem of outdated equipment. So, in 2020, an open letter was published to the President of Ukraine Vladimir Zelensky, signed, among others, by the former director of the Zaporozhye nuclear power plant Vladimir Bronnikov and the former director of the Rivne NPP Vladimir Korovkin. The letter, among other problems, stated that Energoatom does not have enough “financial means to ensure
the safety of nuclear power plants and the purchase of nuclear fuel.”

Dismantling of Soviet reactors, which will become an urgent issue not today, but tomorrow, is also a difficult issue in Ukrainian realities. The fact is that usually funds for the closure of a nuclear power plant are included in the cost of electricity received from it, and are annually allocated to the operator’s fund. Energoatom began to make such deductions only since 2005 (280 million hryvnia per year). Since 2016, this amount has been increased to 780 million. By 2019, it was possible to accumulate only 3.7 billion hryvnias or about $100 million, which is not enough to close even one reactor. According to Energoatom’s optimistic forecasts, the closure of one VVER-440 unit will cost $288 million, and the closure of the same reactors in Bulgaria and Slovakia, according to the European Commission, will cost more than a billion dollars. In total, there are 15 power units in Ukraine. At the same time, nuclear power plants provide about 50% of the country’s total energy consumption. Simple mathematics makes it clear that the only way out today is a competent and safe extension of the life of the nuclear power plant, which, according to Russian experts, is possible only in close coordination with Rosatom and with sufficient funding.

Another issue concerning the nuclear safety of the Ukrainian nuclear power industry is the compatibility of the Soviet VVER-1000 reactors at the nuclear power plant and the American Westinghouse nuclear fuel, which was supposed to replace Russian assemblies. In 2011, the first American fuel assemblies were installed in one of the reactors of the South Ukrainian nuclear power plant, but just a year later, due to breakdowns, their operation was stopped. It is known that at first the fuel did not come up and the Russian TVEL came to the rescue again. In 2016, they have returned to the idea of diversifying fuel supplies, and now six units at the Zaporozhye nuclear power plant and the South Ukrainian nuclear power plant are running on American fuel. At the same time, we emphasize that consultations on the compatibility of the VVER-1000 and American assemblies have not been held with the Russian side.

About nuclear safety at the nuclear power plant at the present time

As one of the members of the PIR Center Advisory Board noted, the situation at the nuclear power plant is unique in the sense that, in fact, different parties are responsible for the nuclear and physical safety of the plant. Energoatom still monitors nuclear safety, and the Russian military monitors physical safety (protection of the plant, prevention of theft of nuclear material). This has already created certain collisions in the operation of the station. So, according to the IAEA report, Ukrainian nuclear scientists are not allowed into the crisis center of the station, which is guarded by the Russian military. Also, special control is established over the SNF storage. As the IAEA noted, such a situation could create obstacles to decision-
making.

As for the most vulnerable objects of the station, thanks to numerous expert analyses and the IAEA report, they have long been known:

1. storage of spent nuclear fuel. According to experts, the containers in which SNF is stored are strong enough, and in general, the nuclear power plant can withstand an airplane crash. However, in case of damage, the scale of infection can be very large – depending on the presence of wind and the ingress of radioactive substances into the Dnieper;

2. the power unit. When a projectile hits the power unit, fuel may overheat, resulting in the release of hydrogen from zirconium rods and the accumulation of inert gases, which, when a certain temperature is reached, cause an explosion;

3. power lines. In total, four 750 kV power lines are connected to the nuclear power plant. Back in early August, the Ukrainian nuclear power company Energoatom announced that two nuclear power plant reactors were disconnected from the power grid of Ukraine due to damage to the power line feeding the station. The company was able to switch to local diesel generators, and then to a nearby geothermal power plant for emergency backup power. This supported the power supply of the reactor cooling systems, which are crucial to prevent the nuclear safety of the plant. If the external cooling disappears, the station will be able to work for some time, because partially the energy will be discharged. Further overheating leads to the fact that the fuel begins to melt, which causes a chain reaction and, consequently, an accident similar to the accidents in Chernobyl or Fukushima.

Unfortunately, due to the fact that the final document of the NPT could not be adopted, the world could not fix a dangerous precedent for all mankind – the conduct of military operations around NPPs. It remains to be hoped that a nuclear catastrophe will be avoided, and the nuclear power industry will respond by increasing the measures of resistance of nuclear power plants to shelling. The Chernobyl syndrome led to an increase in the effectiveness of emergency protection, the Spitak earthquake led to an increase in the seismic stability of nuclear power plants, Fukushima led to the appearance of reactors with a more advanced cooling system. After September 11, nuclear power plants became resistant even to a plane crash. The precedent at the Zaporozhye nuclear power plant is likely to create a demand for reactors that would be invulnerable to shelling. Of course, this will lead to an increase in the cost of the power unit and, consequently, to an increase in the cost of electricity.

In a word, there is undoubtedly a connection between the NPT review process and the situation at the nuclear power plant. Let’s leave aside the question of how specially and artificially it was created.
and who participated in it. The factor of the Zaporozhie nuclear power plant not only blocked the adoption of the final document, but also diverted attention from the discussion of other equally important issues of the Conference – the creation of the WMD-free zone in the Middle East, AUKUS, TPNW. It is regrettable that objectivity and the will to strengthen the nonproliferation regime have been sacrificed to political preferences, to a rules-based order. Doesn’t that mean that diplomacy has lost?

Still a Coma? Results of the Last Week of the Tenth Review Conference through the Eyes of Russian Public Diplomacy

...When you walk through the corridors of the UN, you can’t help but notice a huge number of signs indicating the word Exit. There are so many of them in front of your eyes that at some point you think: there is always exist. It turns out that not…

Consensus could not be reached

On August 26, the Tenth NPT Review Conference came to an end. Due to the onset of COVID times, the review process lasted for a long seven years and ended on a far from a positive note. The Conference was unable to adopt a consensus document, concluded Ambassador Gustavo Zlauvinen, the President-designate of the Tenth NPT RevCon.

We already wrote that when we had been asking participants of the Conference whether the final document would be adopted or not, many reacted with smiles and skepticism. The conclusion that the states-parties to the NPT will not be able to reach consensus was made long before the final plenary session began in the UN General Assembly Hall on August 26.

Arriving at the UN on this day, we unexpectedly found changes in the agenda as the final meeting was postponed from 10:00 am EST to 03:00 pm EST. “In general, we thought that we would quickly scratch each other’s heads and go away all by three o’clock,” a representative of one official delegation told us. At 03:00 pm EST, it was not possible to scratch each other’s heads again: the final plenary meeting was postponed to 04:30 pm EST. This story has been repeated over and over again. Having seen the President-designate of the Conference, at 05:30 pm EST, the states-parties to the NPT, representatives of international organizations and the NGO community finally took their seats in the hall. “The meeting is postponed for another 20 minutes,” Ambassador Gustavo Zlauvinen said in a sad voice. More giggles.

People began to run away, where. Some decided to slowly get out of there. Others began to take pictures together and pose against the background of the podium, where states usually speak at UN General Assembly sessions or behind it. “Some kind of farce, as if you were not taking part in a serious event,” that’s what a vague doubt began to torment us.

Those Russians

The results of the Conference, despite the endless postponements of the final plenary meeting, were obvious to everyone. During the fourth week of the Tenth NPT RevCon, when the meetings were held in a closed format and did not involve the participation of NGOs, the entire focus of attention shifted to Ukraine and the situation around the Zaporozhye nuclear power plant. “It seems to me really that this week the word Ukraine is being mentioned more often than NPT, one of our interlocutors noted only somewhere in the middle of the week. The voice of Western and Western-oriented countries talking about the Russian special military operation in Ukraine sounded too loud. Too many red lines for Russia have been crossed. “You cannot but agree that a dangerous situation is developing around the Zaporozhye nuclear power plant, we cannot but discuss it,” our interlocutors from the UNODA told us. However, they added that it was necessary to discuss this dangerous situation without emotions, without searching for the right side and the guilty one.

The participating states failed to cope with this as the Ukrainian crisis was being discussed one-sidedly, through the prism of the Western view of Russian aggression, ignoring Russian positions. “Some countries want to turn the [Tenth] NPT RevCon into a show trial for Ukraine, which has nothing to do with reality, with the nuclear nonproliferation agenda. And if it does, it is only indirect – in the context of the situation around the Zaporozhye nuclear power plant. No one is telling the truth: Ukraine is shelling nuclear power plant, and no one is talking about it here,” Igor Vishnevetsky, Deputy Head of the Russian delegation to the Tenth NPT RevCon and Deputy Head of the Department for Nonproliferation and Arms Control of the Russian Foreign Ministry.

And where are the allies at all?

Some participants of the Conference who attended the finally plenary meetings as well noted the loneliness of the nuclear giant, namely Russia. In fact, none of Russia’s allies came out in support of its position. This was in sharp contrast to how united the countries of the European

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Union were. Of course, we are talking primarily about the inactivity of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) members.

It cannot be said that the CSTO countries have actively made joint statements on the issues of the NPT review process before. In 2014, the members of the CSTO called for strict compliance with the provisions of the NPT, noting that further steps towards nuclear disarmament require the involvement of all states with nuclear potential in these efforts without any exception. In 2020, the CSTO Permanent Council adopted a Statement on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the entry into force of the NPT and the holding of the anniversary session of the Review Conference on the Treaty. CSTO members reaffirmed that the Treaty “is the cornerstone of the global nuclear nonproliferation regime, a reliable basis for advancing towards nuclear and general and complete disarmament, and an effective instrument for promoting the peaceful application of atomic energy”9. In the statement, they even supported Kazakhstan’s initiative to hold the International Day against Nuclear Tests on August 29. The choice of such a date was a clear reproach to Russia as on August 29, 1949, the USSR conducted the first nuclear weapons test, which, by the way, prevented the implementation of American plans of the 1940s and 1950s for the atomic bombing of Soviet cities.

When discussing the CSTO’s position on nonproliferation and disarmament, we usually recall Kazakhstan’s irreconcilable position on nuclear weapons. When coming to Astana, it seems that the anti-nuclear radicalism of Kazakhstan is an element of the construction of national identity and Kazakh statehood. “Neither Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, nor Armenia cares about problems in the nuclear sphere, it is not a priority for them. Therefore, it is not necessary to make a mountain out of a molehill and talk a lot about the fact that they do not take an active position on these issues,” our colleagues from the Republic of Kazakhstan note. But one can still argue about Kyrgyzstan as well as in September 2021, the Foreign Minister of the Kyrgyz Republic Ruslan Kazakbaev proposed to establish an International Day of Disarmament and Nonproliferation Education under the auspices of the UN.

According to our sources, consultations within the CSTO on the review process are still taking place, but of a closed nature. It is recognized that the points of view on nuclear issues may differ one way or another, but there is consensus on key areas, and that is more important. “The main thing is to have consensus. In addition, each country has the right to its own opinion and its own position, they must be respected,” our interlocutors from Russia say. Some representatives of the allied countries assure that the CSTO is assessed

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as an unconditional union, but its activities may be affected by “the participation and confrontation of third-party structures.” “The CSTO should remain the basic structure for security cooperation in the post-Soviet space. We are actively consulting with Russia and within CSTO on nonproliferation issues and the international agenda in general. It should be noted that our [Belarusian] position is not always taken into account, in particular, on the issue of the final document, which was never adopted at the Review Conference. There is a lack of constructive discussions and polemics. But we believe that the entire UN system and the nuclear nonproliferation regime, in particular, will survive, they must remain unshakable,” representatives of the Republic of Belarus comment on the sidelines.

Belarus, by the way, faced some blame game within the Tenth NPT RevCon as well. The photo of Alexander Lukashenko flaunts on the pages of Nuclear Weapons Ban Monitor (published by the Norwegian human rights organization Norwegian People’s Aid, the issue of which for 2021 was used as handouts). To be more specific, we find the face of the Belarusian president in the section on the prohibition on seeking or receiving assistance. As an American arms control expert noted in an interview with us, the deployment of Russian nuclear weapons on Belarusian territory, as well as the transfer of Russian dual-use complexes to Belarus, will violate the NPT. “Truly, the sins of others to judge you so hard rushes, start with their own and other people do not get” (William Shakespeare).

In fact, Russia’s position was openly supported by Syria, which at the final plenary meeting called for abandoning the politicization of the review process and cynicism in resolving contradictions in the nuclear domain. In addition to Syria, there was also Iran. The fact that they would not support the final document was made by several other countries, for example, Cuba, just because of the insufficiently strong language in the commitments on nuclear disarmament. But more on that later. Russia should pursue a more active coalition formation policy in the context of the NPT review process, one of our interlocutors believes. This also applies to the CSTO states as no one would have remembered about their 2020 Statement here if we hadn’t asked ourselves. But this also applies to interaction with other countries and coalition groups represented at the NPT Review Conferences. “Then there will be a serious Russian response to all the Chamberlains.”

Thunder from not a very clear sky strikes too

The final meeting of the Tenth NPT RevCon began not 20 minutes after Gustavo Zlauvinen’s statement, but closer to 07:30 pm EST. “The review process has taken place. We are absolutely convinced of this. It lasted seven long years. Despite all the difficulties in the international arena, the NPT Review Conference itself took place. You know, the point is not in the final document, but in discussions and exchange of views. The Tenth NPT RevCon has brought many new developments across
all three pillars of the Treaty,” Igor Vishnevetsky told us a few minutes before the start of the long-awaited final plenary meeting. They were not comforting: the states-parties to the NPT failed to develop a consensus document.

The diplomacy of Western countries has done its job - Russia was accused of disrupting the adoption of the final document. Igor Vishnevetsky urged our foreign colleagues: not only Russia opposes this document; we must be honest with ourselves as consensus on such a document could not be reached; let’s continue working on modifying (not deleting) some provisions of the document and clearing it of politicization, if you are ready to work and maintain a balance of interests of different countries. But there were no ready ones. Communicating with representatives of official delegations over the past two weeks, we involuntarily asked ourselves the question, “Do the states-parties to the NPT really want to achieve the adoption of the final document at all?”. Ukraine became a bargaining chip in the current review process for those who wanted to pour another bucket of slop on the Russian Federation.

“As far as I can see, both the Russian delegation and the representatives of the Russian NGO community throughout the entire Conference strove for consensus, for strengthening the Treaty and the entire international nuclear nonproliferation regime. We tirelessly explained to our dialogue partners where there is ground for consensus, and where there is a break, red lines. This was explained, at a very early stage, to the President-designate of the Conference, the Argentine diplomat Ambassador Gustavo Zlauvinen, a real professional who fought to the last yesterday to find mutually acceptable solutions. But his maneuver was limited, because numerous, vociferous Western Europeans sought to hurt Russia, as they say, at any cost. Result: the NPT was hurt. The price was paid. But isn’t it too high?'' - Founding Director of PIR Center Dr. Vladimir Orlov is posing these questions. They are incredibly relevant. But could it have been otherwise at all?

"We believe that the entire UN system and the nuclear nonproliferation regime, in particular, will survive, they must remain unshakable"

After Gustavo Zlauvinen’s speech, some participants of the Conference took the floor. The EU members and the US have once again started talking about the negative impact of the Russian special military operation in Ukraine on the nuclear nonproliferation regime. The EU representative made a statement not only from the member states of the European Union, but also from the candidate states, namely, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. Maybe, this is the kind of European solidarity when you can’t say anything from yourself. There were so many words and expressions that Russian aggression against Ukraine is unacceptable and illegal, that Russia is the reason why there is no consensus, that Russia's goal is to wipe Ukraine off the face of the Earth, and that an attack on a sovereign country is unacceptable. Some of them were said by the United States. Mon Dieu! Quod licet Iovi, non
licet bovi? Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya and others must have been nervously smoking in aside.

“The Conference has become a political hostage for those who have been poisoning the discussions for four weeks with their politicized, biased, groundless and false statements about Ukraine… Their desire to impose unacceptable political formulations on situation over Ukraine is a pure provocation of those who are ready to sacrifice the results of the multi-year review process on the NPT and to use the Conference to settle accounts with Russia, raising topics that are not directly related to the Treaty... These states, namely Ukraine and the curators of the Kiev regime, bear full responsibility for the lack of a final positive result based on the results of the current review process. Anti-Russian statements were made throughout the Conference. They have sounded especially cynical in the last few days. Their background was the barbaric shelling of the Zaporozhye nuclear power plant by Ukrainian troops, which puts the world on the brink of a nuclear catastrophe...” - noted Andrey Belousov, Deputy Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the UN Office and other international organizations in Geneva and Deputy Head of the Russian delegation to the Tenth NPT RevCon10.

Russian delegation left the UN General Assembly Hall in protest during the speech of France. We have already written about how France was always waiting for instructions from Paris. It would have been better if she had not waited for them as instead of bridge-building, this nuclear power decided to engage in bridge-blasting. France initiated a joint statement on behalf of 55 states that condemned Russian actions against Ukraine. Do they think they can get away with it, since the Russian President is answering Macron's calls?

Patience has run

Statements of nonnuclear weapons states were much more interesting than such an exchange of pleasantries. These statements let us assert that this was not about Ukraine at all. The speeches of the nonnuclear weapons states, one way or another, contained three key theses:

1. the draft final document, in general, turned out to be very weak both in language, in content;
2. the nuclear weapons states do not fulfill their obligations on nuclear disarmament in accordance with Article VI of the NPT;
3. the results of the Conference are disappointing, because the states-parties failed to contribute to reducing the nuclear threat in the world.

“This is not a perfect document,” - Gustavo Zlauvinen, President-designate of the Tenth NPT RevCon, found the courage to admit. In the statements of some nonnuclear weapons states, there were notes of regret that the Treaty was extended indefinitely in 1995. Even weaker language on the creation of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East... There are no results on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty... We could hear such ideas from Lebanon. Nuclear disarmament is not only an obligation under international law, but also a moral imperative, the representative of Egypt said. The approach of nuclear powers to nuclear weapons is unacceptable... They didn't do anything... Transparency and accountability on disarmament issues are needed... We heard something of that kind from the representatives of the Philippines. We are disappointed by the lack of consensus... Another unsuccessful Review Conference... The indefinite extension of the NPT did not mean the indefinite possession of nuclear weapons... Nuclear states must recognize the reality of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons... South Africa expressed grievances. Perhaps we were not attentive, but their speeches had other accents and focuses.

Easy as a damn

The Tenth NPT RevCon, like no other international forum, demonstrated the real gap between nuclear and nonnuclear weapons states on nuclear disarmament issues. The nonnuclear weapons states are already fed up. There are too many emotions in the review process as they are already tired of nuclear weapons. At one of the meetings, a representative of Kiribati, once affected by the nuclear tests of the United States and Great Britain, bluntly stated that, perhaps, he would recommend his government to withdraw from the NPT because the Treaty has become useless.

Communicating with anti-nuclear radicals, we concluded that they don’t care what disadvantages the TPNW has. The lack of a sober and objective assessment of the strategic situation in the world, unjustified gender statements about the disproportionate impact of nuclear weapons on girls and women (as if gender differences are important for nuclear weapons), the lack of a clear understanding of the nuclear disarmament process, its timing, oversight bodies, and procedure, the list of TPNW disadvantages goes on. But all this remains aside for nonnuclear weapons states, disappointed by lack of progress in nuclear disarmament. For them, the main value of the TPNW is that the Treaty stigmatizes nuclear weapons. Everything else is not so important. “We are all the products of our history,” high-ranking representatives of Austria, the apologist of the TPNW and the humanitarian initiative, told us.

Looking at everything that has been happening in the world in recent decades, one involuntarily comes to the conclusion: diplomacy...
is degrading, incomprehensible political attitudes and a weak, superficial understanding of the situation are replacing balanced constructive discussions. The Tenth NPT Review Conference only confirmed these views. Are our talks about the effectiveness of education in the field of nuclear nonproliferation, disarmament and global security in general really warranted?

During some sidelines discussions, we directly asked the question: “How can we talk about nuclear disarmament at all, when we are observing a collapse of the arms control regime, the concept of limited nuclear wars is being resurrected in Western countries, and some of them, of course, about Poland, offer the United States to deploy nuclear weapons on their territory too? Why isn’t anyone talking about this here? Why does everyone demand nuclear disarmament, as if it’s something easy as a damn?”. We did not receive an answer that would satisfy us. However, we highly appreciated the concern of our interlocutors about the lack of a strategic dialogue between Russia and the United States on arms control issues. And we were also extremely surprised when a representative of a beautiful Latin American country did not communicate with us under the pretext of the need to get approval of the capital due to the background of deteriorating relations between Russia and the West. Although we have heard opposite points of view. “Only traitors of their country can talk about nuclear disarmament now,” there is, for example, such an opinion of an expert community representative.

And yet the review process took place

Sober-minded participants of the Conference note: all nuclear powers contributed to the nonacceptance of the final document of the Tenth NPT RevCon. They actively prevented the inclusion of clear provisions on nuclear disarmament in the document. The states-parties, primarily nuclear ones, failed to make commitments to reduce nuclear risks. “We have to stop them,” developing countries are already rushing into battle. And Russia, once again in its history, is preparing to take the rap for everyone, bearing responsibility in the media space for the disruption of the Conference. “We got used to being constantly blamed and take it easy. History will judge everyone; you should not worry”, - Igor Vishnevetsky reassured us. We would like to see it.

We regret that it was not possible to reach a consensus... But the nuclear nonproliferation regime does not operate in a vacuum... Everyone expresses their thoughts... A new review cycle is beginning, and we are ready to work... Such words we heard from the representative of China in his final statement. The speech of the Chinese delegation was so sugar-diplomatic, as if there were no three-week offensive actions of Chinese diplomats. “China has tried to put pressure on its foreign policy opponents and has fixed the limits of its capabilities for itself,” one of the Conference participants comments.

The first session of the preparatory committee for the Eleventh

We highly appreciated the concern of our interlocutors about the lack of a strategic dialogue between Russia and the United States on arms control issues
NPT Review Conference will start in Vienna in 2023, the second session of PrepCom will be held in Geneva in 2024, and the third one will be held in New York in 2025. The Eleventh NPT RevCon of the NPT itself is scheduled for 2026. Although the states-parties to the NPT managed to agree on the dates of the next review cycle, it means that the dialogue will continue. Meanwhile, it seems to us that the NPT has been put into a coma after all. Or, maybe, not a coma, but a somme, i.e. from English comma? We hope that the Tenth NPT Review Conference is not a dot, but a comma in the NPT review process. A new round of hard work and coordination of positions is ahead.

...Leaving the UN late on the evening of August 26, around 10:00 pm EST, you unconsciously experience fear. Of course, a few hours of discussions about the incapacity of states, about the crack in relations between nuclear powers, about the risks of nuclear war. You remember how you periodically think about your own family and children and stop yourself every time. But not because of the temptations of a young life, but because of fears and worries that your children will live in an even worse world. Where almost everyone bury their heads in the sand like an ostrich. Leaving the UN on the evening of August 26, around 10:00 pm EST, you react more acutely to the word Exit, located on everywhere hanging signs in front of your eyes. To the left of the main exit doors a monument to Nelson Mandela is located, with his hands raised up. It’s like he’s calling to stop, to settle down. And you, looking at him, keep thinking that you definitely need to find an exit...
Reflections after the Failure of the Tenth NPT Review Conference

The twilight of the NPT? After the failure of the Review Conference yesterday, this issue will certainly be in the air.

On the way home from New York, I will say this. As far as I can see, both the Russian delegation and the representatives of the Russian NGO community throughout the entire Conference strove for consensus, for strengthening the Treaty and the entire international nuclear nonproliferation regime. We tirelessly explained to our dialogue partners where there is ground for consensus, and where there is a break, red lines. This was explained, at a very early stage, to the President-designate of the Conference, the Argentine diplomat Ambassador Gustavo Zlauvinen, a real professional who fought to the last yesterday to find mutually acceptable solutions. But his maneuver was limited, because numerous, vociferous Western Europeans sought to hurt Russia, as they say, at any cost. Result: the NPT was hurt. The price has been paid. But isn’t it too high?

There is a serious crisis in the international nuclear nonproliferation regime. But it is premature to talk about the twilight of the NPT. Difficult moment. Undoubtedly. It happens.

Roland Mikhailovich Timerbaev, when the NPT Review Conference of 2005 failed, and seeing my dullness, cheerfully taught me not to get hung up on cycles. “This is just an overview. No less, but no more. An overview of how the Treaty operates. Did the review take place? It did. Has there been an exchange of views? Yes. Nobody left the Treaty? Nobody. Any new countries with nuclear weapons appeared? No. The minimum task has thus already been completed. The fact that the exchange of views did not lead to a consensus decision is no reason to despair. But this is a serious reason to work hard for the next review cycle, concentrating on the essential, removing the superficial. And it is better to do this primarily at such informal, non-state, but authoritative international expert platforms as PIR Center.”

This is how Timerbaev taught us. This is what has been done in previous difficult moments for the NPT. This is how we will do it now. Today we started preparing a major expert event that reflects on where we are in matters of nuclear nonproliferation and what’s next.
The Post-American World and Nuclear Nonproliferation: 20 Years with no Room for Error

Remember the death of Porthos in the final series of Dumas' epic about the Musketeers? The moment when he held the crumbling rock. He held it powerfully and reliably, without letting his comrades down. But then suddenly his legs failed him – so powerful and reliable. He had suspected for a long time that his legs were his weak point... but he still didn't want to admit the obvious... A rock collapsed. And Porthos was gone. Even rocks are not eternal. Well, porthoses – even more so.

Races through the double solid line

Throughout the existence of the NPT – and this is no less than 52 years – and the nuclear nonproliferation regime based on it, the Treaty was predicted to inevitably collapse. And the number four looks all the more convincing against this background: only four states: Israel, India, Pakistan and the DPRK, have acquired a nuclear arsenal outside or bypassing the NPT. And despite the sharp criticism of the Treaty by a number of nonnuclear weapons states – primarily due to the unsatisfactory, in their opinion, pace of nuclear disarmament – the Treaty remains stable. The balance of benefits and obligations put down in it still meets the interests of the absolute majority of the world's states.

The experience of the last five decades shows that even states with serious scientific and technological potential are not ready to cross the nuclear double solid line, unless this is due to a real and inevitable threat to national security. An example of such a state is the DPRK, which went for the creation of nuclear weapons out of the need to deter the United States.

At the same time, it would be a mistake to take the NPT regime as a constant, which, despite the loud statements of individual states, will forever remain a reality of international life. It is important to remember that the nuclear nonproliferation regime is only one of the supporting structures of the global security architecture, and as its other elements weaken, the NPT regime will inevitably bear an increasing burden.

It cannot be ruled out that against the backdrop of the ongoing degradation of the military-political situation, individual states will start implementing military nuclear programs. In the most unfavorable scenario, this could lead to a domino effect and the end of the nuclear nonproliferation regime in its current form.

Today, such scenarios look alarmist, almost unthinkable. But

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11 The article was originally published in Russia in Global Affairs Journal in January 2023. URL: https://globalaffairs.ru/articles/postamerikanskij-mir/

12 South Africa had its own nuclear weapons without being a party to the NPT; but voluntarily gave it up. North Korea has not formally completed all procedures for withdrawing from the NPT, although there is no doubt that it has nuclear weapons.
in the context of a large-scale and painful reconfiguration of international relations, pacifism and faith in the inviolability of established international norms would be an unaffordable luxury.

Together with ten of our colleagues\(^\text{13}\), we devoted the last year to a comprehensive study of the risks of nuclear proliferation in the world for the next five to twenty years, overcoming some academic narrow-mindedness in this area. As a result, the contour began to be outlined. And the nine started to show up. We are well aware of the traditional, now existing nine states possessing nuclear weapons. Therefore, we were interested in another nuclear nine – a new one: states that could potentially start implementing military nuclear programs in the period from 2027 to 2042.

The main impetus for our research was the fact that much of the existing work on the prospects for nuclear proliferation is focused on threats from developing states. At the same time, the destabilizing role of informal US commitments to ensure the security of its allies, the deployment of nuclear weapons outside the national territory and the supply of the most sensitive nuclear technologies to the closest allies (the case of AUKUS) is not covered in such detail.

So, according to most Western experts, the so-called extended deterrence plays the role of an additional supporting structure of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. At the same time, as the role of the United States in international affairs declines, the effectiveness of these props will inevitably erode. Moreover, the example of AUKUS reveals the features of a conditional proliferation policy, in which the United States will turn a blind eye to the encroachments of its satellites towards a more advanced nuclear missile status. And if so, then it cannot be ruled out that the main threat to the NPT will be not the states of the Axis of Evil and not anti-nuclear radicals, but the closest allies of the United States, who are considered quite respectable members of the NPT.

The fact that such a scenario is not illusory is evidenced, among other things, by an article published in February 2021 by four prominent representatives of the Western military-political establishment\(^\text{14}\). Former US and British defense secretaries, a former Australian prime minister and a former US envoy to NATO are asking the question: when will US allies acquire nuclear weapons? And how can this be prevented?

The recipes offered by the Westerners are, as a rule, consonant with one another: it is necessary to strengthen American leadership in every possible way. And for this it is worth patching up the nuclear umbrella, involving the allies in even closer defense cooperation and strengthening the deterrence of a potential adversary. One of the


\(^\text{14}\) Chuck Hagel, Malcolm Rifkind, Kevin Rudd, and Ivo Daalder. When Allies Go Nuclear: How to Prevent the Next Proliferation Threat // Foreign Affairs. February 12, 2021. URL: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2021-02-12/when-allies-go-nuclear
options is to extend the NATO model of joint nuclear missions to allies in the Asia-Pacific region as well.\(^{15}\)

Let us leave aside the question of how such proposals are in line with the NPT. Restoring and maintaining Washington’s ostensible leadership on nonproliferation issues will only perpetuate the risks associated with shaky security guarantees to US allies.\(^{16}\)

The birth trauma of the US-centric nonproliferation model is that it is based on a non-inclusive security architecture and does not take into account the interests of those who find themselves on the other side of the nuclear umbrellas. In this situation, Russia is assigned, at best, an auxiliary role. In the best days of the Russian-American nonproliferation dialogue, the United States sought to enlist Moscow’s authority in nuclear matters so that it would not be used against the goals of American foreign policy. Now, after the start of a special military operation, the divisive essence of American-style nonproliferation has become especially clear. There are obvious attempts to present us as a scarecrow of nuclear non-proliferation, to reduce the whole complex of problems in the nuclear field to the imaginary sins of the Kremlin. This is what led to the failure of the Tenth NPT Review Conference, which was ingloriously held in August 2022.

The continuation of such a policy, at best, exacerbates the situation under the NPT. At worst, it leads to the dismantling of nonproliferation as such.

In the aforementioned study, we sought to analyze the most radical scenarios for the development of the situation in the field of nuclear nonproliferation, which could lead to the appearance of new nuclear states on the political map of the world. In addition to the obvious Iran, the less obvious Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Turkey, Ukraine, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Brazil were also considered as states and territories ready to play for the increase. It is them, in our opinion, who may be interested in maintaining uncertainty about their nuclear ambitions – either as the last argument of the king or as a bargaining chip.\(^{16}\)

When selecting the list of the new nuclear nine, we proceeded from several criteria: the presence of a military-technical potential, the military-political prerequisites for creating our own deterrence potential, and the presence of public statements about the possibility of creating nuclear weapons. That is, we analyzed both the declarations and the objectives. Below we summarize more than two hundred pages of research completed in November 2022.

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\(^{16}\) In 2019, at a meeting of the International Expert Council of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies Robert Einhorn presented a similar list. Of course, according to our estimates, the list of states with the necessary scientific and technical potential is wider than the nine. Among the next in line can be called the five: Germany, the Netherlands, Australia, Algeria, and Argentina.

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In addition to the obvious Iran, the less obvious Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Turkey, Ukraine, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Brazil were also considered as states and territories ready to play for the increase.
Without anger. And without prejudice

Japan. In the short term, there are no realistic scenarios in which Tokyo would go nuclear. Public opinion is strongly opposed to a military nuclear program. Thus, according to researchers at Harvard University, more than 75% of the Japanese are in favor of a global ban on nuclear weapons and Japan’s accession to the TPNW.

To ensure the security of country, the political elite is determined to maintain sufficient technical capacity to create nuclear weapons, if necessary. At the same time, a consensus has developed among the elites regarding the undesirability of such a scenario, priority is given to maintaining and strengthening the military alliance with the United States as a guarantee of the country’s security. That is why Japan supported Trump’s policy of increasing the role of nuclear weapons to support allies.

In the event of a serious cooling of US-Japanese relations, the loss of Tokyo’s reinforced concrete confidence in the reliability of Washington as an ally and a guarantee of security, we should expect further reformatting of the policy of active pacifism, the emergence of not only defensive, but also offensive means in the Japan Self-Defense Forces. Reports of Tokyo’s readiness to acquire Tomahawk cruise missiles, as well as developments in hypersonic weapons, suggest that such a scenario is already underway.

South Korea. There is an obvious demand for power politics in South Korean society. At the same time, an attempt to openly start a military nuclear program will face obvious opposition from all nuclear powers, and especially China, which is not interested in the emergence of a new pole of power in the immediate vicinity of its borders.

An attempt to create nuclear weapons would also jeopardize the international prestige of the country and, probably, lead to the collapse of the military alliance with the United States, which is not a desirable outcome for the South Korean elites. This policy may be reconsidered if the course of the next American administration again shows a desire for self-withdrawal from international affairs.

The leadership of the Republic of Korea is aware of this risk and is striving to acquire an independent nonnuclear deterrence capability. In particular, thanks to skillful diplomacy, Seoul managed to extricate itself from US-imposed restrictions on the range and launch weight of South Korean missiles, securing a free hand in the development of the missile program.

The next step could be a revision of the unequal provisions of Agreement 123 and the construction of uranium enrichment and spent nuclear fuel reprocessing facilities. South Korea already has relevant technological developments. At the same time, it is not entirely clear how the creation of such capacities is consistent with the declared course towards the gradual abandonment of nuclear
energy.

Access to the most sensitive elements of the nuclear fuel cycle can also be obtained through the creation of nuclear submarines. South Korean politicians have spoken about the desirability of obtaining a nuclear submarine before, but the creation of the tripartite alliance AUKUS, within which it is planned to transfer up to eight nuclear submarines to Australia, gave this discussion an obvious impetus.

Taiwan. Despite having some scientific and technological potential, Taipei is aware that a military nuclear program will provoke a sharp reaction from Beijing and will likely be the end of the Republic of China as an independent territorial entity.

Ukraine. Phantom pains on the issue of renunciation of nuclear weapons persist among the nationalist-minded part of the Ukrainian elite today. Ukraine has some opportunities to create nuclear weapons. Since the times of the USSR, Ukraine has had a developed industrial base, technologies for the production of launch vehicles, personnel, and a resource base. Nevertheless, there are significant gaps in this resource abundance: the absence of enterprises for uranium enrichment, plutonium processing, tritium production, as well as experience in the production of special warheads.

Speaking with manipulative statements, Ukraine, on the one hand, has tried and is trying to pull out financial and military assistance from Western partners. As a result of the special military operation of the Russian Armed Forces, any threats of Ukraine's creation of nuclear weapons, as it seems, should be neutralized.

At the same time, there remains the risk of nuclear blackmail by Ukraine in two formats: firstly, through acts of nuclear terrorism against critical (nuclear) infrastructure facilities located in new territories under Russian sovereignty (primarily the Zaporozh'ye nuclear power plant), including both shelling and impact on personnel; secondly, through provocations to create a dirty bomb, the use of which in the war zone or in civilian areas is unlikely to lead to mass casualties, but will inevitably result in mass panic, catastrophic psychological impact, given that Kiev would be highly tempted to attribute these actions to Russia, since attributing acts of nuclear and radiological terrorism in the context of an acute conflict can be a formidable task.

Turkey. There are no prospects for launching a military-applied nuclear program in Turkey. First of all, due to the fact that Turkey does not face threats of nuclear size. The military-political priorities of the current leadership rather dictate the need for further development of general-purpose forces, equipping them with the most modern conventional means of armed confrontation.

The transfer of nuclear ambitions to a military footing will further deepen contradictions with neighbors and alienation from the United States and other NATO allies, will lead to the diplomatic isolation of the country, and even economic sanctions. Given the dependence on foreign trade and the country's deteriorating socio-
economic situation, the Turkish leadership is hardly ready to take on such risks.

The existing technological potential is not enough for the development of Turkey’s nuclear program. The country lacks the most sensitive elements of the nuclear fuel cycle – uranium enrichment and spent nuclear fuel reprocessing. Given the current Additional Protocol, it is extremely unlikely that Ankara has the ability to create such an infrastructure quietly.

In addition, as mentioned above, the lack of effective means of delivery will not make it possible to quickly consolidate the successes achieved and, in fact, will lead to a manifold increase in pressure on the country.

Egypt. In the medium term, there are no prospects for launching a military nuclear program by Egypt. The existing nuclear infrastructure is insufficient for these purposes.

Currently, Egypt is not facing existential threats that would dictate the need for nuclear weapons. Relations with Israel, the only state in the region believed to possess nuclear weapons, are relatively smooth and pose no military threat. A military atom would not in any way contribute to the consolidation of Cairo as the leader of the Arab world – on the contrary, such a step would probably lead to further fragmentation of the countries of the Middle East, would push a new round of the arms race.

The ratio of benefits and costs from creating one’s own deterrence potential can change only as a result of the emergence of a nuclear potential in another power in the Middle East: Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia. In this case, the Egyptian leadership will be forced to revise its nuclear policy under pressure from inside.

Saudi Arabia. In the coming years, the emergence of nuclear weapons in Saudi Arabia is unlikely. The country lacks or is at a low stage of development the infrastructure, technologies and personnel necessary to start a nuclear program of a military-applied nature. The information that such a program has taken place in the past is speculative and does not correspond to the available data on the stage of development of the nuclear infrastructure in KSA.

There is also no credible evidence that a political decision has been made on the need for such a program. Statements that we periodically hear from the highest political leadership about the need to create a nuclear arsenal in the event of the appearance of nuclear weapons in Iran should be seen as an attempt to draw US attention to the concerns of the kingdom regarding the Iranian nuclear program and its possible military dimension. Saudi nuclear policy appears to be rational, based on a sober analysis of the benefits and costs of acquiring a nuclear arsenal. There are currently no incentives to acquire a nuclear arsenal at any cost: the kingdom’s security is currently ensured by military-technical cooperation with the United States. In the event of a further reduction in the US presence in the Middle East, the diversification of military-technical
ties with other security providers is likely.

The costs currently outweigh the possible incentives. The Kingdom is dependent on energy exports and technology imports: an attempt to start a military nuclear program will cause a wide international response and will lead to increased pressure from the international community. The possibility of imposing economic sanctions will ruin the plans of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman to implement economic reforms and ensure the development of the kingdom on a new technological platform. This, in turn, will weaken his position in the internal political struggle.

As the nuclear energy program develops, the kingdom will be forced to move to more binding forms of interaction with the IAEA and abandon the Small Quantities Protocol. However, it cannot be ruled out that the KSA will be interested in maintaining uncertainty about its real capabilities and intentions. Therefore, the conclusion and ratification of the Additional Protocol seems unlikely in the medium term.

Iran has the technical capability to build nuclear weapons. At the same time, the assessments of the Iranian threshold time existing in the expert community, as a rule, sin with simplification and vary from three months to one and a half years. Such time calculations, as a rule, are based on mathematical modeling of the efficiency of centrifuges and do not take into account the subsequent set of works on the weaponization.

Even if you embrace data from the so-called nuclear archive presented by Prime Minister Netanyahu, as the truth, Iran, although it has some developments in the field of creating NEDs, will not be able to quickly create a NED design suitable for combat use.

The alarmists also do not take into account possible countermeasures by Iran’s opponents, including sabotage and targeted elimination of key scientists. The possibility of using some highly classified infrastructure raises doubts, given the active attention of foreign intelligence services to what is happening in the field of the Iranian atom.

The available data is not enough to conclude with a high degree of certainty that the Iranian leadership has made a political decision to abandon the exclusively peaceful nature of the nuclear program. The ups and downs around the JCPOA, Iran’s reduction of its obligations under the deal, however, blur the line between signs of peace enforcement and signs of the start of a military nuclear program. It is obvious that opposition to IAEA inspection activities fits into the logic of a response to US actions, and the strengthening of measures to protect nuclear physicists is due to the risks of sabotage.

There are no signs of forcing public opinion in favor of the nuclear option to justify the growing economic difficulties in the eyes of the population. There is no reliable data on the creation of some superstructures empowered to coordinate the implementation of a
military-applied nuclear program.

Brazil. Although Brazil has the necessary technological backlog for a possible launch of a military nuclear program, there are no military-political prerequisites for this. The country does not face an existential threat that could require the creation of nuclear weapons. Brazil is already a leading regional power, and its army is among the ten strongest armies in the world.

The development of a nuclear program is associated with significant economic costs that the country cannot afford at the moment and in the near future. A nuclear program will also cause damage to the status positions of the country in the world.

Finally, the idea of creating nuclear weapons does not find unanimous support among the Brazilian elites, including the military, who are determined to develop mutually beneficial cooperation with the widest possible range of international actors.

Neither alarmists, nor ostriches

So: the emergence of new nuclear states on the political map of the world at the moment is not unthinkable, but unlikely. The existing deterrent factors: the stability of the NPT as an international norm, the vulnerability of potential troublemakers to economic sanctions, the high cost of full-fledged nuclear programs and the creation of appropriate delivery vehicles – are still enough to keep the mentioned states on the edge of the abyss.

As the reader could see from the squeeze of our country assessments, we do not belong to the alarmists. Because no solid reason for this was found during our study. But we also deny the pose of an ostrich. Pretending that everything is calm with the nuclear nonproliferation regime would not only be short-sighted. This would be fraught with an increase in vulnerability for Russian national interests: having relaxed, switching attention to other directions, we risk to have the ball... not on our side, but on our gates.

The growing interest of some states of the world in the military atom is a symptom of the crisis in the existing security architecture. The main source of tension is the United States, the attempts of the Western bloc of states to keep the rapidly crumbling Western-centric model of the world order by military force.

At the same time, it would be a mistake to reduce the degradation of the security situation only to US actions. And although American policy is the root cause of the growing instability, the reaction of states included in the US proscription lists is perceived as a threat.

There is a risk that, against the backdrop of a degrading environment, instead of looking for inclusive security solutions, the United States and its allies may switch to a conditional proliferation strategy, supplying sensitive nuclear technologies to allies in exchange for unconditional loyalty to the party line. An example
of this approach is the tripartite military-technical alliance with Australia, under which Canberra is expected to receive nuclear submarines. And while Washington insists that this level of cooperation is only possible because Australia has demonstrated a high commitment to the nuclear nonproliferation regime, it is clear that other US allies can say the same about themselves. AUKUS is setting a dangerous precedent that Tokyo, Seoul, Brasilia would love to take advantage of.

Moreover, the role of US sanctions pressure as the main force restraining the spread of nuclear weapons raises concerns. If we allow the weakening of interest in maintaining the nonproliferation regime in Washington, this could lead to a surge of American clientele’s interest in nuclear weapons.

In this context, the inspection activities of the IAEA aimed at identifying undeclared nuclear programs are extremely important. The politicization of the system of guarantees and the double standards of their application in relation to Western and non-Western states represent particular risks here.

Our analysis leads to the conclusion that Iran and South Korea are closest to the nuclear threshold, both in terms of technical capabilities and in terms of motivation. Iran already has some developments in the field of weaponization, which creates an extremely undesirable precedent for the nuclear nonproliferation regime.

And although South Korea has a less developed nuclear fuel cycle, one can see the desire of the South Korean elite for small steps towards technical containment – a situation in which the capabilities of the South Korean nuclear fuel cycle will at least not be inferior to those of Japan. In the field of delivery vehicles, Seoul is already ahead of Tokyo.

The above does not mean that these countries will acquire nuclear weapons\(^\text{17}\). But such a policy seriously raises the stakes in

\(^{17}\) The methodology and factual material substantiating these conclusions for each of the countries and territories is contained in the forthcoming PIR Center report “New Nuclear Nine? Assessing Nuclear Proliferation Threats in the World” (Moscow, Ves Mir, 2023. 223 p.). A short version of the report will be posted on the global scientific and educational platform of PIR Center: nonproliferation.world. All conclusions are confirmed
the struggle for the survivability of the nuclear nonproliferation regime and the NPT as its main supporting structure.

It must be understood that the policy of small nuclear steps is a symptom of the growing conflict in international affairs against the backdrop of the end of five hundred years of domination of the collective West in international relations. Under these conditions, attempts to patch up the crumbling US-centric security architecture are doomed to failure.

Don't turn into Porthos

The formation of a new world order will take time. The transitional period will inevitably be accompanied by an increase in conflict and with the diffusion of military-technical potentials. From the point of view of Russia's interests for the next 5-20 years, it is important to determine the following:

1. the desired image of the future (no matter how this cliché may impose on some of us), which would help form a circle of like-minded people around our interests, with whom we will jointly shape the military-political aspects of the future world order. Template criticism of the rules-based world order and references to the UN Charter and some fairer world order are not enough here. We need a concept that, as the character of Leonid Bronevoy said in Seventeen Moments of Spring, would not be a shame to believe;

2. the transition risk limits. On the one hand, the diffusion of military-technical potentials is inevitable. You can turn it in your favor by strengthening military-technical cooperation with states with a heightened perception of security threats – including considered in this study. But are we ready for the fact that one or two more nuclear states will appear in the world as a result of this process? Does Russia need to keep nonproliferation at any cost and, if necessary, get involved in the next round of Russian-American cooperation on the Iranian or, say, South Korean dossier? This question requires careful thought.

Russia's role now is to help build a new security architecture with a minimum number of dividing lines in regions where the risks of WMD proliferation are particularly high. In this context, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which has the necessary potential to become the core of a more stable, conflict-free world order in Eurasia, may turn out to be in demand.

No less important is the establishment of a dialogue with those who undermine the nuclear nonproliferation regime from within, the so-called anti-nuclear radicals – supporters of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). The treaty itself (let us recall that, unlike a number of other agreements in the nuclear sphere, it is still in force) remains a thorn in the soft tissues of the

by mathematical calculations of the authors.
nonproliferation regime. Its political effect is an additional split among the states parties to the NPT. The practical danger is the illusion of the possibility of withdrawing from the NPT.

A serious flaw in the prohibition of nuclear weapons remains the issue of verification. Assuming that State N is only a member of the TPNW, it is not entirely clear on what legal basis the IAEA will be able to transfer its file to the UN Security Council in the event of a violation of obligations under the safeguards agreement. This requires appropriate legal calibration in the camp of anti-nuclear radicals. But it is not advisable to force it within the walls of the IAEA: the solution of this issue will only strengthen the positions of the supporters of the TPNW.

At the same time, the nonnuclear weapons states pursuing radical disarmament approaches should be given a credit. They are right: the endless pumping of weapons into the conflict regions of the world, the reliance on military-technical means of ensuring national security is a dead end. Disarmament must return to the international agenda. The new strategic equation proposed by Russia to ensure a conflict-free environment in international relations is a step in the right direction.

In the Middle East, the demand for an equitable architecture of regional security is obvious. Back in the late 1990s in completely different geopolitical realities, Russia began to develop a concept for ensuring collective security in the Persian Gulf zone. The ideas set out in the document have been updated several times, acquiring a new, relevant sound in the current circumstances. The concept assumes gradual progress, based on equal interaction of all regional and other interested parties, towards unblocking conflict situations, developing confidence and control measures, and, ultimately, forming an integral mechanism of collective security and cooperation in this subregion with the creation of appropriate organizational structures. It means that such a system will become a prologue to the construction of a common post-crisis architecture of the Middle East region.

It will be necessary to build such a security architecture in the context of growing conflict in relations between Russia and the countries of the collective West, sometimes in the face of open and stubborn opposition from the United States and its allies. In these conditions, despite the nobility of thoughts, Russia is unlikely to cope with this undertaking alone. China is an obvious partner.

At the same time, it is necessary to understand that the new security architecture is much more difficult than the fight for everything good and against everything bad. Its construction will also require concessions from Russia and China, voluntary acceptance of restrictions. Only a readiness for self-restraint,
confirmed by measures of transparency and trust, will convince our neighbors and partners of the seriousness of Moscow and Beijing’s intentions. Such self-restraint is especially important for China’s neighbors, who are wary of its growing global ambitions.

Not just one action, but a comprehensive, systematic set of steps to get ahead of the curve is the only key for Russian diplomacy so that the legs do not weaken and so that at some point you do not feel, like Porthos, the exorbitant weight of the burden: because, generally speaking, the international nuclear nonproliferation regime that has been created for decades with the active, often leading participation of the USSR (Russia), is not a burden for us. This is the solution. And the price of an error in case of illiterate assessments, in case of incorrectly taken (or not taken) steps will be too expensive for us. After all, all the countries of the potential nuclear nine that we are looking at – they (with the exception of one and only Brazil) – are all along the perimeter of our borders.
SECTION II. EXCLUSIVE INTERVIEWS WITH THE CONFERENCE PARTICIPANTS AND EXPERTS. AUGUST 26 – NOVEMBER 25, 2022

Subsequent interviews within the framework of the Tenth NPT Review Conference were conducted and prepared by PIR Center Deputy Director – Education and Training Program Director Elena Karnaukhova. Within the Tenth NPT Review Conference Elena Karnaukhova coordinated the work of PIR Center team representatives, which participated in the forum given PIR Center consultative status with ECOSOC.

Gustavo Zlauvinen (Argentina)

Interview with H.E. Ambassador Gustavo Zlauvinen, President-designate of the Tenth NPT Review Conference.

How do you access the entire review process within these seven years and Tenth NPT RevCon in particular? How was the preparation of the Tenth NPT RevCon going? What difficulties did you encounter before the Conference started?

We were supposed to hold the Tenth NPT RevCon in April-May 2020, but due to the COVID-2019 pandemic we were forced to postpone it four times. Finally, we were able to hold it in August 2022, two years and 5 months after the original date. During that long hiatus, I asked UNODA to help organize a number of webinars on the different NPT-related matters in order to keep the momentum, so that the delegations and civil society could stay engaged in the process of discussing the most important issues that were going to be crucial at the Conference. In parallel, I held virtual consultations with all states-parties, every 2 months, in order to keep the official delegations informed of the situation and developments regarding the postponement, such as the restrictions imposed by the New York City due to the COVID-2019 pandemic. Such a virtual format for the informal consultations was really important for all delegations because it helped them raise different issues and questions, both on procedures as well as on substance.

We were also discussing the format of the Conference, as there was no clear indication when the UN would go back to an in-person format for the meetings at Headquarters. For example, there was a dilemma on whether to meet as soon as possible, in a virtual or hybrid format, or to keep waiting until we could meet in person. The hybrid format would have meant an in-person participation for those delegations based in NYC and that had access to the UN Headquarters, and an online participation for their colleagues from capitals or based in Geneva and Vienna. But this format was not widely
supported by most delegations. In particular, Russia, Iran, Cuba and other states-parties were against the hybrid format, either because of possible connectivity problems, or because they were of the view that the complexity of the issues to be negotiated at the Conference required a full-fledged in-person format, or because they believed it was essential to have all experts and participants in one room. As we did not achieve consensus on a hybrid format, we decided to keep postponing the Conference.

When the circumstances finally permitted to hold the Conference in-person (August 1–26, 2022), other issues started to get actively discussed. For example, I got many requests from some delegations regarding their US visas. They needed to send large delegations to participate in the intense four-week, parallel meetings process of the Review Conference. In general, such issues are the responsibility of the UN Secretariat, as they are ruled by the host-country agreement between the UN and the US. But as the President-designate of the Conference, I had to actively interact with those governments to make sure that all visas for their delegations would be issued by the US authorities. And I am happy that my team and I managed to resolve this issue and that the American government approved the necessary visas for all participants. But I have to say that I did not know for sure that all visas would be issued until the start of the Conference. I was aware that some states-parties would raise procedural questions at the beginning of the Conference if some of their delegates would not have received their US visas. I really worried about that because it could block all substantive discussions at the Conference. My mind kept remembering what had happened at the 2005 NPT Review Conference, when it was not able to adopt its agenda during the first three weeks, and thus there was almost no substantive work at all. I was afraid that the same situation would happen to the Tenth NPT RevCon. Thus, it was important for me to resolve all the procedural issues before the Conference started.

I remember that on November 1, 2021, PIR also held your public lecture on the prospects of the Tenth NPT RevCon for our students and wider audience. And, also, I remember that you said that the regime of nuclear nonproliferation was going through a challenging time, and that the Conference itself was going to be held in a very tense atmosphere. So, what are the main factors that prevented us from holding the Conference itself and the review process in general effectively with a positive outcome: structural changes in the sphere of international relations, lack of trust between countries, too many emotions in talks, the fall of diplomacy?
We knew beforehand that the Conference would be extremely complex and that it would be difficult to achieve consensus on an outcome document. Basically, the main problem that we faced, and that we are still facing now, was the growing frustration by the large majority of states-parties, those that do not possess nuclear weapons, due to the lack of real progress in the nuclear disarmament front, as they see that the nuclear weapons states are not fulfilling their obligations under Article VI of the NPT. There was also the tension related to the different positions regarding the nonproliferation issues, such as the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the establishment of a nuclear-weapons free zone in the Middle East, the difficult question of North Korea’s withdrawal, the Iranian nuclear program, etc. All these issues were very complex and difficult in themselves, but the conflict in Ukraine just increased the tensions in the context of the NPT. One important aspect was that, after February 24, 2022, the dynamic of the interaction among the five nuclear weapons states changed. In all previous review conferences, the nuclear weapons states coordinated their positions, even if they had different positions and national interests, in the context of the NPT they shared some basic positions regarding their status. But after February 24, 2022, so called P5 coordination process under the NPT stopped to work. The Tenth NPT RevCon was the first one where the Nuclear Five did not coordinate on the NPT-related issues, on how to react to the demands of the great majority of non-nuclear weapons states.

But what can you say about the interaction between groups of states inside Nuclear Five? I mean interaction between Russia and China at one side and coordination between US, France, and the UK at another side.

I understand that right before and during the Conference, the US, France and Great Britain, the so-called P3 group, coordinated their positions. They did not include Russia because of the conflict in Ukraine, and China decided not to take part as long as Russia was not invited. I understand that the Russian and Chinese delegations held meetings during the Conference, but I am not aware if they coordinated their positions as well.

Share your impressions after first days of the Conference. What it was like? How did you consider your own mission?

I was very pleased that we had managed to get to a very good start of the Conference, as I understood that the conflict in Ukraine was going to cast a shadow to the whole Tenth NPT RevCon. I expected many delegations to raise harsh political declarations against Russia, but my position was that all those political issues should be discussed within the first week of the Conference, when the plenary
sessions and the general debates were going to take place. In fact, many delegations raised the conflict in Ukraine in their statements within the first week, in particular the Europeans and American delegations. And Russia, of course, replied to state its position regarding the conflict in Ukraine.

States-parties were discussing the war in Ukraine very actively, as it was a very serious and grave issue. But there were other problems to be raised as well. For example, delegations wanted to discuss nuclear propulsion in nuclear submarines, different proliferation concerns, humanitarian consequences of the use of nuclear weapons, the reasons why we still had not had progress in nuclear disarmament, etc. So, I tried to encapsulate all discussions regarding the situation in Ukraine to those issues directly affecting the NPT, namely the threat of use of nuclear weapons, and the attacks on civilian nuclear power plants in Ukraine. But many delegations kept raising the issue on almost all aspects of the Conference.

What countries were the most active within the Tenth NPT RevCon? Did their activeness have positive or negative influence on the Conference?

I would say that there were many, many delegations that were extremely active during the preparation process, and during the Conference itself. There were about 30 to 40 delegations that were active on most of the issues, and many others that were active of some particular issues. The core group took the floor very often, making proposals, conducting negotiations, organizing side-events, or even discussing in the corridors. I don't want to leave any one aside, but I will mention just a few examples of active delegations, such as Indonesia, Brazil, Mexico, Malaysia, Egypt, Algeria, the Philippines, Iran, Costa-Rica, Colombia, Cuba, Argentina, Canada, Australia, Austria, Switzerland, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Sweden, US, UK, France, Russia, China, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Germany, Finland and Norway, among others. In my view, all delegations, with few exceptions, contributed in a positive way during the discussions and negotiations at the Conference.

If possible, I would like to touch the two following cases. The first one is the Republic of Kiribati. The representative of this state said from the tribune that he would advise his government to withdraw from the NPT. The second case is France. France initiated a joint statement, which just blamed Russia for conducting Special Military Operation. It is quite interesting to discuss the statement itself, as it poses many questions to me regarding the authors, the signers, the format and etc. But I will only ask you to comment whether such actions of nuclear weapon state against another nuclear weapon state can hurt nuclear nonproliferation regime and prevent further review process from getting progress or not.
From my point of view, the case of Kiribati proves the point I have mentioned regarding the growing frustration by the large majority of nonnuclear weapon states as they do not see that the Nuclear Five are really making progress toward nuclear disarmament and thus, not implementing their obligations under the NPT. The nuclear weapons states’ response is that the international security environment is not conducive to such progress. But history has shown that arms control and nuclear disarmament can be achieved even during moments of crisis or tension. For example, at the highest tension between the USSR and the US, they managed to forge important treaties on the limitation and the reduction of nuclear weapons, i.e. SALT, START and New START. But after that process there was no new progress towards nuclear disarmament. And that is why we are observing a growing number of nonnuclear weapon states becoming very frustrated and making strong-worded statements regarding the NPT. I want to believe that the representative of Kiribati just wanted to air his country’s frustration and show it to the nuclear weapons states. I believe it is very important to call on the five nuclear weapons states to do much more on the implementation of Article VI, because the situation could erode the credibility of the NPT regime.

Regarding the statement made by France, let’s clarify that its representative took the floor at the end of the Conference, on August 26, to deliver a joint statement signed by many other delegations, which criticized Russia for invading Ukraine, and also raised the concern regarding the safety and security of nuclear facilities in Ukraine under military attack. France, as any state-party, had the right to deliver such statement. Still, I believe that nuclear weapons states have to talk to each other on matters of such importance as nuclear disarmament, arms control and security of nuclear facilities, even in the current circumstances. It is important for the humanity.

Tell us more about the preparation of the final document of this year. Is it a real tragedy that we do not have a final document of the Conference? Do we need to estimate the success of the review process through the fact of the final document achievement? It’s just a paper or something more...

As I said before, it was expected that it would be very difficult to get a final document by consensus because there were many conflicting views on many relevant issues such as the WMD-free zone in the Middle East, the Iranian nuclear program, the DPRK nuclear arsenal, lack of progress in nuclear disarmament, etc. Previous review conferences had failed to reach consensus on a final document due to one specific issue. For example, the 2015 RevCon failed to reach consensus on its final document due to the diverging positions of some states-parties regarding language on the Middle East. But
ahead of the Tenth NPT RevCon we were facing several complex and difficult issues, not just one. So, I was trying to push delegations to come to a common understanding of the majority of these issues just to prove that we could continue to work together.

During the third week of the Conference we managed, somehow, to begin to find a common understanding of the main NPT-related problems and on how we should reflect them in the final document. At the beginning of the last week of the Conference, when the work of the Main Committees and Subsidiary Bodies were over, I put together all the proposals in a draft final document, and then I started to push delegations to get to a minimum compromise on all the issues we had had discussed. On Friday, August 26, many delegations informed me that their capitals could accept the final document, despite the fact that the document was not perfect. But the situation changed when the Russian delegation informed me that Moscow still had strong reservations regarding the language related to the situation in Ukraine. As it was too late for further negotiations, I kept the text unchanged, and the Russian delegation blocked consensus on the final document of the Tenth NPT RevCon.

What prospects for the future review process do we have? Do we need to and how can we reform NPT review process and review conferences (their agenda, format, goals, etc.)?

Even if we did not manage to get a final document by consensus, I believe that the Tenth NPT RevCon proved that states-parties were still able to discuss all NPT-related issues, to engage and negotiate with each other, and even to agree on some critical issues under the Treaty. I do not think that the success of an NPT Review Conference should be measured only by the fact that a final document is agreed or not. In our case, and for four weeks, delegations from 161 states-parties managed to discuss and negotiate nuclear related issues, agreeing on some of them and disagreeing on others. That’s the way the process work. And it is alright. Last but not least, many delegations which took the floor during the NPT RevCon stressed on the need for their countries to get a better access to peaceful nuclear applications, for example to fight cancer, water management, crop improvement, etc. I am very pleased that, at the Conference, pillar III was discussed at the same level as pillars I and II. I strongly believe that we have to continue with our common work.

Is it possible to make amendments to the NPT? We still have some unofficial nuclear weapons states, and they are involved in too many conflicts. Is it right that we do concentrate too much on relations between US and Russia ignoring nuclear arsenals of other states?
A world free of nuclear weapons will require that all nuclear weapons states, both those five recognized by the NPT, as well as those outside the regime, to get rid of their nuclear arsenals. The NPT calls on those nuclear weapons states to join the Treaty as nonnuclear weapons states. Unfortunately, reality indicates that they don’t have the intention to do so. I do not see any ways to reform the NPT and to even raise such initiative. If we reopen the negotiation of the NPT now, it would be impossible to reach any consensus on how to reinforce it. And it might as well break the entire nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament regime up. The regime is not perfect, but it is the best one we can have. I am sure that, if back in 1995 we had extended the NPT just for another 25 years, and not indefinitely, now it would be near impossible to reach consensus to extend it for another 25 years.

Is it possible that in the future we will see more nuclear weapons states? What can lead to the collapse of the NPT regime?

There are too many challenges to the NPT that can diminish its credibility, or even threaten its survival, and I do not want it to happen. Obviously, the frustration continues to increase and if some nonnuclear weapon states were to withdraw from the NPT, it would be the beginning of the end. And it would be a major blow if one of them were to develop a nuclear weapons program. When North Korea declared its withdrawal from the NPT and conducted its first nuclear explosion, it put the Treaty in a crisis, but it was handled adequately. But if another or several cases were to happen again, I am afraid it would be impossible to maintain the regime without major consequences.

Is nuclear disarmament still possible or is it becoming just a dream?

I think that nuclear disarmament is still possible. I understand and accept that it is a very complex and politically difficult process. But if there is a political will to renew talks on nuclear disarmament, it would be possible to move towards in a tangible manner. The nonnuclear weapons states need to see that there is still hope for the full implementation of Article VI and achieving a world free of nuclear weapons. And only the nuclear weapons states can provide for such a hope.

Do you believe that education in the field of nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament can be an effective tool to reduce nuclear risks and to promote the elimination of nuclear weapons? The situation is getting worse and worse; however, the ideas of nuclear proliferation and disarmament education have been developing and spreading since the beginning of the 2000s.
I believe that the more people are aware of that danger that nuclear weapons cause, the more people express their fears about this danger, the more chance we would have that the governments of the nuclear weapon states would start to reconsider their policies towards nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence. I am sure that civil society does really play a role in pushing authorities to deal with the risks associated to nuclear weapons. Education is the one instrument that helps raise awareness on nuclear weapons issues and to call for their abolition. Granted, nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament education is not enough to resolve all our problems, but it is an important factor among other actions.

**But how can we enhance the effectiveness of the education in the field of nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament?**

We have to get out of our comfort zone. Normally nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament education is being conducted among professionals who are experts on these matters or on international relations, or among people who want to become experts, to study the nuclear issues and to deal with them in the future. I am sure that we should get out of that logic and reach out to a wider public audience. For example, we can promote education in the field of nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament in primary and high schools which do not relate to nuclear and disarmament issues and international relations. Everyone should understand the threat posed by nuclear weapons. So, my advice is the following: “Get out from your comfort zone and go to more challenging audiences”.

**Tell us about your own path towards nuclear issues. Have you always thought that nuclear weapon is an evil of humanity?**

When I was five years old my aunt Betty told me about Hiroshima and Nagasaki. I remember it very clearly. It was August 1965, the twentieth anniversary of the nuclear bombings. I would never forget the pictures of the bombings she showed me in a *Life* magazine. I got deeply shocked by the sheer destruction of the bombings and by the suffering of those who was survived. Since than I have consistently thought that nuclear weapons are awful, immoral, and go against humanity, as Pope Francis says. From that day I have wanted to contribute in the pursuing a world free of nuclear weapons. When later on, I decided to become a diplomat, I hoped to be assigned to deal with these issues. After graduation from the Argentine Diplomatic Academy, I applied to the Nuclear Disarmament and Nonproliferation Division. I was sent to training missions in Geneva, Vienna and New York. My first foreign post was at the Argentine Mission to the IAEA in Vienna. Most of my career path was related to nuclear and disarmament issues, interjected with periods where I was assigned to bilateral relations, from economic to legal to
cultural to political affairs. But later in my career I returned to deal with the issues that are closer to my heart, nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament.

Do you have any life credo? Which philosophy do you follow?

My life credo is “Always say the truth, be fair and transparent to all”. I have always been keen to practice this credo in all spheres of my life, and of course in my work as well. I used it when I became the President-designate of the Tenth NPT RevCon. And I stated it very clearly to all delegations, throughout my presidency: I would tell other delegations what you tell me, and I would tell you what other delegations tell me. I don't hide or twist information, and I expect delegations not to hide or twist information from me.

Is there life after being the President-designate of the Tenth NPT RevCon? What are you going to do? Will your future work relate to nuclear domain?

I hope there is life after the Tenth NPT RevCon! Now, seriously, in December 2021 I run for election as President of the Argentine Foreign Service Association. The decision was taken when the Tenth NPT RevCon was supposed to take place in January 2022. I got elected and then the Conference got postponed until August. Thus, I had to postpone my work in the Association until after the Conference. I am now holding my new position as President of Argentine Foreign Service Association. I have new challenges and responsibilities. But I know that, one way or another, I will continue working on nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation matters all my life.
Igor Vishnevetsky (Russia)

Interview with Igor Vishnevetsky, Deputy Head of the Russian delegation to the Tenth NPT RevCon and Deputy Head of the Department for Nonproliferation and Arms Control of the Russian Foreign Ministry from the closing session of the Conference.

How do you assess the process and possible outcomes of the Tenth NPT Review Conference? Will the consensus final document of the Conference be adopted?

The review process has taken place. We are absolutely convinced of this. It lasted seven long years. Despite all the difficulties in the international arena, the NPT Review Conference itself took place. You know, the point is not in the final document, but in discussions and exchange of views. The Tenth NPT RevCon has brought many new developments across all three pillars of the Treaty. The thought works and beats - this is already a good result. This is the essence of the entire review process of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The RevCon has shown that the NPT is still in existence and functioning successfully. Of course, there are dividing lines. But the review process is exactly what brings us together.

Last week the main focus of the discussions was shifted to the situation over Ukraine. There is an opinion that Russia’s allies in the CSTO did not show proper active support for our position. Do you agree with such assessments?

No, I don’t agree. This is not true. We have a well-established process of coordination through the CSTO. We are on the same page. Of course, there are nuances. The main thing is that all CSTO member states are ready for dialogue on nonproliferation, disarmament and coordination on these issues.

Rumors are circulating behind the scenes that the final document of the Conference will not be adopted. Surely Russia will be blamed for this. What can we say in defense of our position?

We got used to being constantly blamed and take it easy. History will judge everyone; you should not worry. Some countries want to turn the [Tenth] NPT RevCon into a show trial for Ukraine, which has nothing to do with reality, with the nuclear nonproliferation agenda. And if it does, it is only indirect - in the context of the situation around the Zaporozhye nuclear power plant. No one is telling the truth: Ukraine is shelling nuclear power plant, and no one is talking about it here. European countries show no sense of

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Interview taken on August 26, 2022, by Elena Karnaukhova 30-40 minutes before the start of the closing session of the Tenth NPT Review Conference.
self-preservation. They are amazingly carefree. European countries could reason with their so-called Ukrainian partners - stop giving them money and weapons. But they do not do this, and all in the name of a great goal to act as a united front against Russia.

Do Europeans themselves behave, let’s say, not rationally? During our stay in New York, we heard a lot about the fact that the Russian and American delegations were closely cooperating within the framework of the review process. Is it so?

We are talking about the European position. I cannot say that we worked very actively with the American delegation within the framework of the Tenth NPT RevCon. There were contacts, but, as you know, our strategic dialogue has been frozen. In the context of the Ukrainian events, the United States does not show readiness to actively cooperate with Russia, although, of course, there is interest in dialogue.

Tariq Rauf (Canada)\(^{19}\)

Interview with Tariq Rauf, former Head of the IAEA Department for Verification & Security Policy, former Alternate Head of NPT Delegation from IAEA, Member of PIR Center Advisory Board.

Can you tell us about your impressions on the Tenth NPT Review Conference? Are there any chances for the outcome document?

The atmosphere is generally better than was expected. We have disagreements but we can disagree politely, rather than using aggressive language as at the 2019 NPT PrepCom. There are many differences over policies and priorities between the nuclear weapons states and the non-nuclear weapons states. These include nuclear disarmament, [WMD-free zone in] the Middle East, DPRK, Ukraine.

Is it true that the Chinese delegation is unprecedentedly active this year?

Yes, it is widely being discussed here. My experience over the six previous review conferences shows that the NPT RevCon is an intensely political process that brings in all international conflicts and tensions. If there are major divisions between global powers and

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\(^{19}\) This interview was conducted by Elena Karnaukhova together with Alexandra Zubenko, PIR Center Junior Research Fellow, Member of the non-governmental delegation of PIR Center at the Tenth NPT Review Conference
other states or amongst themselves, these influence the discourse and negotiations. This is quite understandable, as the NPT RevCon is at its heart an international security conference. Small countries are vulnerable to the power and influence of big and powerful ones, both in bilateral and plurilateral frameworks. But here they are powerful; they can object to the text and concepts of Main Committee reports and the final declaration. Currently, the relationship between the US and China is quite confrontational and problematic. The US accuses China of expanding its nuclear and military forces and producing more nuclear material for weapons. The US' containment policy against China necessitates a greater forward presence of US forces in the Asia-Pacific region, by the way the concept of the so-called Indo-Pacific is geographically and logically an oxymoron! As the US maintains a forward military presence in the Pacific Ocean and South China Sea; China in turn is responding with a military show of force as was evident recently in the proximity of Taiwan (China). Regarding Russia, its official delegation representatives seem generally to have been somewhat restrained in their interventions on Ukraine-related matters in response to statements from Ukraine and its Western allies, but the discourse remains tense obviously.

Today we attended the session of the Main Committee III and there was a vivid discussion on the need of including the article on assuring nuclear security on Zaporozhye nuclear power plant. Do you think such a provision should be included the Committee report or it is a find of politicized proposal?

I think it is important to talk about the security and safety of nuclear installations in areas of armed conflict – presently, for the first time we have military actions in the proximity of nuclear power plants – such as the Chernobyl and Zaporozhye nuclear power plants. There is also the urgency regarding the visit of IAEA inspectors to the Zaporozhye nuclear power plant. The IAEA inspectors need to be assured of their safety and security.

Chinese delegation also insisted on including the provision concerning contaminated water from Fukushima nuclear power plant. Is it justified from your point of view?

The Fukushima NPP is plagued by water leaking into the site downhill from an underground spring that sends water under the damaged nuclear power plants. This water then becomes radioactively contaminated and is collected and stored onsite in huge tanks to prevent it from running into the sea. Japan has an IAEA validated approach to dealing with the contaminated water and to release it into the sea after removing various harmful isotopes. But tritium ends up remaining in the treated water and will dissolve in sea waters if disposed in an orderly and scientific manner. Nonetheless many in
the Japanese public and China remain concerned about discharges of treated water into the sea. China wants the Review Conference to include this matter in its final report, but Japan is firmly opposed.

**How do you assess the cooperation between the US and Russia at the Conference?**

So far, the exchanges between the US and Russia are pretty civilized and not too confrontational. Many EU and other allied states are making comments critical of Russia; hence the US has refrained from taking the floor too much.

**How do you think the regime will evolve in the current challenging time?**

I think the regime is facing new threats concerning AUKUS and IAEA safeguards application, and also nuclear disarmament and arms control. The New START treaty will expire in 2026, and so if Russia and the US are not even talking to each other that is worrisome. Other challenges relate to emerging technologies, AI and cyber-attacks. The NPT is facing an unprecedented challenge of confidence and relevance.

**What is your attitude towards the critics that it is unfair that only five states have a monopoly on nuclear weapons?**

Yes, the NPT is a discriminatory treaty with two classes of states — five with nuclear weapons states and others without such weapons.

**And are France and the UK active at the Tenth NPT RevCon?**

France tends to be conservative and defensive on nuclear arms control; it rejects the TPNW and actively defends its nuclear policy. France got more than 70 co-sponsors for a statement on denuclearization by the DPRK. This statement was opposed by China and Russia and some Non-Aligned Movement states. The UK tends to show a more progressive attitude, but at this Review Conference the UK is taking the lead in agreeing to any benchmarks, timelines or accountability regarding implementation of Article VI of the NPT. Both France and the UK, supportive by the US and EU States have been quite vocal in their opposition to Russia as regards the situation in Ukraine.
Teburoro Tito (Kiribati)

Interview with Ambassador Teburoro Tito, the fourth President of the Republic of Kiribati (1994–2003), currently the Permanent Representative of the Republic of Kiribati to the UN.

Your Excellency, Ambassador, share with us your impressions about how the Tenth NPT Review Conference is going on. You are actively participating in the sessions of the Main Committees and are speaking at the side-events. How do you assess the atmosphere of the Tenth NPT RevCon? In your opinion, will the final document of the Conference be adopted?

The Conference is going on very actively, but there are so many contradictions between the states that the adoption of the final document is unlikely from my point of view. Most countries do nothing but turn the arrows on each other. So why? Because no one likes to admit their mistakes and prefers to blame the other to seem better. Another problem of the current NPT RevCon is the political bias of some Chairmen of the Main Committees. They do not take a neutral position but protect Western-oriented approaches. This should not happen within an international platform, the purpose of which is to ensure global security. The world has changed, and it is not entirely correct to tell other countries how to be better and what to do in general.

Sounds like the echoes of imperialism. I think Kiribati feels it as well. For a long time, your country was a colony of the British Empire. Tell us how it was. Does your country is still facing any negative consequences from the colonial past?

Yes, Kiribati was a colony of the British Empire. The British came to us and said, “We are here to ensure your security, because otherwise you will fall under the control of the French. We will help you to avoid it and protect you”. So, we became a colony of Great Britain. The British colonial authorities always dictated to us what to do. But we were able to benefit from belonging to the British Empire. Otherwise, we would all have been slaughtered by the Japanese or Koreans. They behaved very aggressively in the XIX-XX centuries. The years of World War II and Japanese aggression only proved this thesis. At the end of the 1970s, we embarked on the path of independent development. But we have been periodically dictated what to do. This should not happen in the modern world.

In the second half of the XX century, the UK and the US conducted nuclear tests on the territory of Kiribati. Tell us about this part of your history in more details. How did the people of Kiribati perceive the nuclear tests? What consequences did they lead to?
I remember when I was small, I was swimming in the sea with friends. And then I noticed a flash of bright light. Nearby, some thousand miles away, the Anglo-Saxons tested nuclear weapons. This outburst really impressed me. The people of Kiribati were calm about nuclear tests as we were told that nuclear weapons were needed to ensure our security. We thought we were contributing to an important cause because for us these times nuclear weapons served as a guarantee of security and protection.

So, you justify the existence of nuclear weapons, am I right to understand you? If someone attacked you now, would it be right to request the use of nuclear weapons against the aggressor?

Americans carried out the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and it helped to stop the Japanese, they were extremely aggressive. But after 1945 the world changed hopefully. The UN appeared; its Charter was adopted. We have Chapter VI of the UN Charter, and it calls on us to solve all international problems by pacific means. In such conditions, there is no sense in the existence of nuclear weapons, and they must be abolished and eliminated. Nuclear powers have always said, “Nuclear weapons are necessary for our security”. But how many nuclear tests were conducted in different parts of the world in XX century! Nuclear testing has to be banned definitively; it is very important to entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Why do you want to test nuclear weapons – for your security or for your own glory and greatness? Or to destroy us all?

You are asking me what we would do if someone attacked us. There are no armed forces in our country, as you know, and in ensuring our security we rely on the gods in whom we believe, and on the forces of nature to whom we trust. We believe that nature itself can protect us. Hurricanes, floods, etc., many things can protect us, most importantly, our faith. Nuclear weapons are evil. We must live in peace, love and harmony. Please note that Chapter VI of the UN Charter uses the word pacific, not peaceful. The Pacific region just gives an example to the global community that we all need peace and calmness. It seems to me that this is our role of the Pacific countries to call for peace, for love, for respect for each other. Now we are facing the lack of all those things.

You support nuclear disarmament and the elimination of nuclear weapons. Many are discussing these issues, but it is not so easy and simple to eliminate nuclear weapons. It seems to me that everyone has somehow forgotten that Article VI of the NPT calls us to complete and general disarmament but not only to nuclear one. So, it is necessary to abandon not only nuclear weapons, but also conventional weapons. But how can we talk about disarmament now at all, if the United States is holding leading position in
spending on military needs and is constantly increasing them, and at the same time China is modernizing and building up its military potential to counterbalance the United States?

This is a very difficult question. Indeed, we should strive to abandon armaments in principle. Kiribati has no armed forces, as I have already said it. I believe that only the UN should have armed forces.

But then we again will touch upon the issue of impartiality and neutrality of positions. Who will these UN international armed forces report to? And what if they are managed by a not politically impartial person?

The UN management should be absolutely neutral. UN is an international organization representing the interests of all the mankind. If such armed forces are created, then they should be led by a neutral person with politically unbiased position who knows how to smooth out contradictions. But we should pay attention to the problem of nuclear disarmament, despite the failure of this process in previous years, we must raise this problem, because otherwise everyone will forget about the obligation to build a world without nuclear weapons. Another problem is that we are unlikely to be able to give up weapons in general because this will harm the interests of corporations which are developing new weapons and earning huge amount of money. Armaments are the most profitable business for those who want to get rich. Would a person refuse money? I am sure the thirst for profit and greed will not allow.

Your country is a state party to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). Do you really believe that it is possible to get rid of nuclear weapons and that this Treaty will help boost and get progress in nuclear disarmament? Could TPNW have a negative impact on the NPT review process?

Sure, we are a state party to the TPNW, and we strongly believe that the international community needs this Treaty. I do not see any prerequisites for the fact that the TPNW will undermine the position of the NPT. The main goal of the TPNW is to show that most countries of the world are ready to say: “That’s enough, that’s it, it's time to give up nuclear weapons”. This is just a way to attract the attention of Nuclear Five. But do not think that TPNW will harm the NPT.

When we were preparing the text of our interview, another representative of the Republic of Kiribati said on August 22 that your country would withdraw from the NPT. How can you comment on it?
The decision to pull out is not mine, it’s the President and the Cabinet of the Republic of Kiribati based on my recommendation which in turn depends on my observations of how committed are the nuclear weapon states to the ultimate goal of a world completely free of nuclear weapons beginning with a sincere acknowledgment in the outcome document of the Tenth NPT RevCon of the nuclear harm inflicted upon human life, health, well-being and on the natural environment upon which humans rely, and the need to address such serious issues.

But don’t you think that TPNW, firstly, is full of idealism, and, secondly, is somewhat incorrect in several provisions. What do you think about the thesis of disproportionate impact of nuclear weapons on girls and women? As a representative of the country where the nuclear tests took place, it does not seem to you that such provisions are incorrect and unfair to men. Firstly, nuclear weapons are gender neutral: if they are used, it will not happen that all women will die, and men will continue to exist. Secondly, the experience of Japan after atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Yugoslavia after the American bombing with depleted uranium and many Pacific countries exposed to nuclear tests demonstrates that men are also exposed to radiation and face negative consequences.

The main idea of the TPNW is to call for the elimination of nuclear weapons. Their existence has no sense, there are only risks from which no one will benefit. I cannot say that I agree with this provision about the disproportionate impact of nuclear weapons on girls and women, but I see no point in arguing about this provision. The main thing is that we have this Treaty. Gender approaches to nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament are very popular. Yes, it is controversial, speculative, and politically biased. We should not forget that there is always a man and a woman, they should be together. If you have other preferences, no problem. But what difference does it make how many genders we have when we discuss certain treaties and international problems? This is all too personal; this is an aspect of private life. For international law, all people are equal.

Of course, not only women suffer from nuclear tests, but all mankind will die from nuclear weapons, your gender will not play any role for nuclear weapons and nuclear wars. I personally faced the consequences of nuclear tests myself: some of my relatives, by the way, men, died of cancer. Many women in Kiribati were unable to give birth to children as they had problems during pregnancy, during the birth of children. Our water and food were also contaminated after the British and American nuclear tests. The mortality rate from cancer was very high.
You told me that it was necessary to create international armed forces under the auspices of the UN, promote nuclear disarmament and abandon nuclear weapons. What do you think about military-political alliances? How will the creation of AUKUS affect the security architecture in the Asia-Pacific region? How does the Pacific region perceive the appearance of this defense pact between the three Anglo-Saxon countries, and can AUKUS negatively affect the Rarotonga Treaty on a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific?

In my view, alliances like NATO are echoes of the past. In my opinion, during the Soviet-American Cold War, NATO had the meaning of its existence. But times are changing, and now such alliances are not needed. As for AUKUS, it is completely unclear to me why three countries decide for others who threatens them and how to ensure their security and protection. This is a kind of new imperialism as we discussed with you previously. Just recall what British colonists used to tell us. Now, fortunately, we live in a different world. You cannot dictate to other countries who to be afraid of and how to deal with threats. We will deal with this by our own.

China is the lion which is not so fierce as it is painted. Now the idea that China is the № 1 threat for everyone is being actively spread in the media. It’s all policy, and for me this view is not correct. We are not afraid of China and do not believe that it behaves aggressively. We are not going to be friends with the Americans against the Chinese or vice versa, we are sort of in the middle, between them, working with both sides, not making preferences, and not giving preferences. Now we are actively consulting with representatives of the Anglo-Saxon countries that are members of AUKUS to better understand this military pact association. But once again, I do not understand why a narrow group of countries gathers in a closed format and decides the fate of our region. If you think that something threatens us, invite us, please, we will discuss everything and figure out what to do. In the modern world, you cannot decide for others and think that only your point of view is the only true one.

It would be interesting to know your opinion on the reform of the UN, in particular, on the expansion of the permanent membership of the Security Council.

I don’t think in such radical categories. For me, the most important thing is that everyone’s interests are taken into account.

I hear from you all the time within the Tenth NPT RevCon that you want to help to ensure peace all over the world and do everything to promote the ideas of humanity, universal love and trust. What exactly are you doing? Is this your personal philosophy or did your ancestors have the same ideas?
I was born and lived all my life in Kiribati. I was the fourth president of the Republic, and I always held such views no matter what I was doing. My country is located in the Pacific region. The very name of our region proves that our countries and territories appeared in this world to promote the ideas of peace. Pacific... Just listen to this word. You have already noticed my tie and what is written on it – Love. I believe that my job now is to promote love. It is necessary to love and respect each other, to be able to hear each other, this is very important.

What do you think about Russia? What prospects do you see for cooperation with our country?

We are cooperating with Russia, but not actively, from my perspective. There is interaction, for example, in the field of fishing. Kiribati is a wonderful country in terms of developing cooperation in the sphere of tourism. But I believe that we need to work closely together to solve burning international problems. There are really few negotiations between us. It would be a good idea to boost dialogue. We would be so happy if Russians will come to Kiribati more often. You should come as well. You personally definitely need to visit our country, maybe with beloved one, just not to discuss global security issues because it is very romantic atmosphere in Kiribati.

Thank you, dear Ambassador. I accept your invitation with pleasure, and it is my dream to visit the Pacific region, Oceania islands. Concluding our interview, I would like to ask you the following group of questions. How do you assess the current development of the world order? We have been talking for several decades about the easternization of our world and about the shift of global power and influence on the Asia-Pacific region. Asian countries are rising. But why do Western-oriented approaches still dominate? Information sphere is the best example of it. Why do some countries allow themselves to impose their will on the majority?

This brings us back to the conversation about imperialism. Western imperialism has not gone anywhere at all, we continue to see it in new forms. Let’s be honest: we still mostly speak English; it remains the lingua franca. Language is a very important resource in terms of possession of minds. Of course, the world is developing, new centers of power are emerging, but the power of the West has been not yet a thing of the past, even if it changes its forms. This is the philosophy of Western, primarily Anglo-Saxon countries to think that they know best what to do and how everyone should develop. I think our world is beautiful, it should be beautiful. All countries, nuclear and nonnuclear, we all need to sit down and think about what is really important in our lives. For me, the most important thing is to work for the benefit of my family, friends and loved ones.
Ambassador Hamad Al Kaabi, the first question I would like to pose is a general one. So, how do you assess the current review process and the Tenth NPT Review Conference in particular? Share with us your predictions... What pressure points are we facing now?

NPT RevCon is an important international forum where member-states can express their views, concerns and general progress and challenges in relation to the implementation of the Treaty in areas of nuclear nonproliferation, disarmament, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The Conference in 2022 took place at a difficult time. The international security situation has gotten worse, and the Tenth Review Conference took place after two years of delay due to the COVID pandemic which affected all nations. The last successful NPT Review Conference to adopt a final document was in 2010, where the parties agreed on a set of actions and views on the way forward. In 2015, there was no outcome document over the lack of agreement on the Middle East language, and in 2022, the parties again failed to agree on an outcome document over the disagreement in relation to the situation in Ukraine.

The Conference failed because the parties were not satisfied with the level of implementation of the Treaty obligations, and they could not agree on specific steps to address the shortcomings. This is particularly true when it comes to nuclear disarmament obligations, but also other issues. Not much progress has been made regarding nuclear disarmament, such as the reduction of nuclear arsenals since the last review cycle. Other examples include modernization of nuclear weapons, fissile material, safety and security of nuclear power plants, and safeguards and the role of the IAEA. Of course, there are also new issues brought into the discussion, for example, the topic of nuclear-powered submarines in the case of AUKUS. The discussion focused on how to handle such technology and material transfers under the NPT framework, as well as how to use the IAEA safeguards system to ensure nonproliferation principles. This is the first time, under the AUKUS pact, a nonnuclear weapon state will be getting nuclear power submarine technology and related material from nuclear weapons states. The idea is to develop a framework that will serve as a reference for any future similar transfer.

Developing countries are focused on cooperation in the sphere of peaceful nuclear technology. Peaceful nuclear technology is an important tool in many fields, supporting the development of countries. The NPT constitutes an important legal framework for international cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear technology. Therefore, we need to ensure that countries can benefit from such a
framework in the most robust way while maintaining safety, security and nonproliferation goals.

Of course, we also discussed the situation in Ukraine this year. This discussion was focused on nuclear safety and security concerns related to nuclear facilities in Ukraine. The question of how to protect nuclear power plants during a military conflict is an important one.

We heard too many times that Chinese had been so active and offensive within the first three weeks of the Tenth NPT RevCon. But they seemed to be calm, patient and flexible within the final stage of the Conference. What happened?

It is important to understand that debates under NPT RevCon can go on in different directions based on the issues under discussion but also the political environment that overshadows the discussion. Countries present their views and statements, but at the end it comes to question if all countries can agree on a specific outcome document reflecting common views and recommendations. This is not easy as you can imagine given the wide gap between countries positions. Regarding AUKUS everyone understands that there is much work to be done, I mean it requires further discussions which will be taken place beyond the NPT review process. AUKUS should be discussed more between countries themselves and with IAEA first to elaborate on the modalities on how such transfer will take place from legal and safeguards prospective.

So, the countries were not able to achieve consensus in 2022 at the end of the day...

Everyone went to the Conference with the understanding that it would be a difficult one, but with little hope that an agreement could be reached. The parties at the end of the day could not reach an agreement on the way forward but, nevertheless, it was a good opportunity for the parties to discuss and elaborate on their views and concerns related to the implementation of all provisions of the Treaty.

Countries were very actively discussing situation in Ukraine, much more than NPT, nonproliferation and disarmament issues themselves. Is it right and does it lead to politicization of review process?

The situation in Ukraine was of high interest to the Conference. First from the prospective of protection of nuclear facilities during a military conflict and secondly in relation to security assurances. It is unusual for an operating nuclear power plant to be under direct shelling with a potential for a large nuclear accident. That's
why the parties to the Conference expressed their concerns in relation to nuclear safety and security at nuclear facilities in Ukraine. Of course, the Conference could not be isolated from the global happenings and the global political and security environment. As a result, there were many confrontations among participation delegations that made the discussion and a potential agreement more difficult. In principle, nuclear facilities should be protected and protocols on assurance for nuclear facility protection should be promoted. It is also very important to promote the important role of IAEA towards this in the areas of armed conflicts. A damage to nuclear facility could lead to catastrophic nuclear accident. We do need to discuss these issues regardless of political views. These are too important questions for global security.

How do you assess the discussion on Zaporozhye nuclear power plant? It seems that they were politicized and rather emotional. Russia was considered to be a terrorist, and it was being said in relation to nuclear weapon state. It seems to me that there could not be any successful outcome of the Conference and future progress in disarmament domain.

Member states joined the Review Conference to discuss many issues within NPT framework. Each state has its own national interests and needs to promote and protect them. Negotiations are affected by these national priorities and in certain cases strong political views. It is true that countries should have possibility to express their views and concerns as well as ideas how to move forward but what is important is to see that such discussions lead to constructive outcome. We can sit down and talk across each other but more important to talk to each other. We all need to find a common ground. There is no doubt that nuclear facility should be protected, its security and safety should be ensured. Situation with Zaporozhye nuclear power station is a unique and special case in a way it’s part of a bigger situation in Ukraine. No doubt, the war in Ukraine is under much attention by politicians and public media, but we are diplomats and we should try to find a common ground even at most difficult arguments.

But do you really believe that nuclear disarmament is possible in the age of global tensions?

Nuclear disarmament is an obligation, and nonnuclear weapons states are concerned about lack of progress. Undoubtedly more dialogue between nuclear weapons states is needed to decide collectively how to promote progress in disarmament. That means we hope to see more de-escalation among nuclear weapons states and more open channels for dialogue. Nonnuclear weapons states should support such efforts. Complete nuclear disarmament may be a far-
fetched goal but there are things we can do to support the process and the promotion of nuclear disarmament goals, for example at the NPT RevCon we have been often discussing nuclear risk reduction, dealerting, and transparency in nuclear disarmament among other issues such education in the field of nuclear disarmament.

You said that nonnuclear weapons states should support dialogue between nuclear weapon states. But sometimes nonnuclear states do their best to prevent such dialogue. The brightest example is Poland. In the context of special military operation of Russia Poland proposed to US to deploy its nuclear bombs in the Polish territory. Did you discuss such case within Tenth NPT RevCon? How should we react to such initiatives?

I do believe that general understanding on the importance of nuclear disarmament is needed. Nuclear disarmament must be in progress. Exactly all the measures and initiatives which block nuclear disarmament should not be promoted. Further spread of nuclear weapons deployment in more countries lead to increase in nuclear risk and counter to the objective of the Treaty. Of course, we are not living in ideal, or perfect world, but we should continue to call for full implementation of international agreements and commitments and avoid any actions that could undermine the NPT objective.

Much attention is paid to WMD-free zone in the Middle East. What should be done to finally create the zone and is it possible in general?

WMD-free zone in the Middle East is what we have been calling for over decades. There are a lot of initiatives on steps how to establish WMD-free zone in the Middle East, but we are not there yet. Unfortunately, past attempts have not led to positive results. The Ninth NPT RevCon in 2015 proved unsuccessful because of this problem. And there are many ongoing challenges in general. For example, one country in the Middle East is developing advanced nuclear sensitive activities, and it is raising many questions regarding their real purposes. Moreover, in the Middle East not all states are states-parties to the NPT, combine with ongoing political and security challenges that made it difficult so far to make real progress on the WMD-free zone in the Middle East. We continue to be committed to the goal and objective of such zone; we believe it is vital for the long-term security of the region to make progress towards this end.

From your point of view, is it fair that no one Arab state possess nuclear weapons? Do Arab states consider nuclear bomb as a kind of symbol of glory and power?
Arab states are all members of the NPT, and therefore they are committed legally not to pursue the development of nuclear weapons.

**How can you comment on JCPOA talks?**

It is very important to understand why the situation with JCPOA is complicated. Since the early 2000s, the international community has been trying to address concerns related to Iran's nuclear program. We are really concerned with the level of the program advancement along the possible undeclared materials and activities. The problem of Iran's nuclear program can and should be solved under the IAEA framework and in accordance with safeguards principles. It should be solved in a high professional and technical level. Iran has an obligation to be transparent and cooperate fully with the agency regarding all current and past activities in the nuclear domain. Iran needs to rebuild confidence in the exclusive peaceful nature of its nuclear program because the history of its nuclear program has not always been peaceful. What Iran is doing now is not helping to build confidence; on one hand the massive expansion of its enrichment program now enriching up 60% with no real civilian purpose and, on the other hand, not cooperating fully with the Agency regarding undeclared sites and material in the so-called safeguards outstanding questions.

We do hope the ongoing negotiations to revive the JCPOA will provide a solid framework that addresses the outstanding concerns, get a better insight into nuclear program of Iran and to create more transparency measures in order to build the required confidence.

**Do you agree that all the situation with Iran nuclear program symbolizes that IAEA safeguards system has been politicized?**

Iran nuclear file traces its origin back to undeclared nuclear activities that were part of a secret nuclear weapon program in Iran and therefore the situation with Iran's nuclear came to the IAEA only after it has been discovered. International community led by IAEA has been trying to resolve Iranian nuclear issue with an objective to ensure there is no more undeclared facilities or material exist in Iran. This requires obviously a lot of cooperation by Iran, and so far, this cooperation has not been great according to the IAEA. I think we should fully support the IAEA independent role and their exclusive authority when it comes to safeguards issues. Agency inspectors should be provided with full support and opportunities to carry out inspections, to reach nuclear sites, and to give creditable assurance for nuclear activities for peaceful purposes.

**Saudi Arabia criticizes JCPOA too much. And it seems to me that from Saudi Arabia perspective, Iran would create nuclear bomb regardless JCPOA or its failure. If Iran creates nuclear bomb, so**
will do Saudi Arabia. But if Saudi Arabia creates nuclear weapons, what other Arab states will do?

We do not have any evidence currently that any Arab country is developing military nuclear program. Regarding Iranian nuclear program, it is raising many questions and is causing many concerns because not everything is clear with it and given its questionable history. For example, the issue of uranium enrichment, it could not be justified that a nonnuclear weapons state develops such massive enrichment program with high enrichment levels, as a mean to develop peaceful nuclear activities. Again, JCPOA is not an ideal document, but we welcomed it with the hope it would help open a new page where Iran would cooperate with the IAEA and be more transparent in relation to its nuclear program. To fully address concerns related to Iran's nuclear program, one should know and understand the context, the history of Iranian nuclear program. Building confidence in Iran's nuclear program along with addressing all outstanding concerns, would help promote dialogue and peaceful relations in the region. My country continues to support engagement and dialogue as ways to resolve differences and concerns.

UAE has already constructed first nuclear power plant Barakah. What plans for the future does UAE have? How does your country ensure the security and safety of nuclear power plant? There are so many conflicts in the Middle East itself...

We first announced our plans back in 2008 by issuing the Government official policy in relation to development of its peaceful nuclear energy program. The policy set a high-level framework for transparency and high standards of safety, security and nonproliferation. The driver for the establishment of UAE nuclear program is generating electricity to address the increase in demand. Today, we have 4 reactors Barakah nuclear power plant, 3 of which are operational, and the 4th is in the final phase of commissioning. Barakah nuclear power plant reactors are built and based on high standards of quality and advance design. Advanced safety and security measures are built in the design taking into consideration all potential threats. Today, UAE nuclear power plant project is considered a good model for many countries including in the region because it is generating clean energy and helps the UAE diversify its energy sources and supply. We have ongoing cooperation with many countries in the region who is looking at our experience as a positive one. Beyond the current Barakah nuclear power plant project, no decision is yet made to expand the current fleet of reactors, but it is an option for the future giving the continues increase of energy demand.

Is UAE developing any projects in the sphere of nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament education?
We are engaged in some nonproliferation and disarmament projects to certain extent. We have held workshops and seminars, for examples. It is very important to develop the education system in the areas of nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament, and much more projects are needed to let young generations understand all the challenges and opportunities in the nuclear domain. As we have discussed already the world is facing many challenges in relation to nonproliferation and nuclear disarmament. Young generation should be able to deal with these issues in the future and to continue the process of disarmament negotiations and cementing nuclear nonproliferation regime. The best way to prepare young generation of experts on nuclear issues, both women and men, is to engage them in specialized training program and to give them the opportunity to engage as much as possible in official meetings and international discussions.

I saw many female diplomates from UAE here, in New York. It seems to me that your country does not have any problems with gender equality what is very popular to discuss. What do you think personally about gender mainstream? Arab states prove to be rather conservative.

We have a very strong policy regarding empowerment of women in the UAE across all sectors. We have many women as governmental officials, many of them are holding high positions, including ministers and ambassadors. Successful professional female officials are a source of pride to my country and a result of long-term policy and strategies for empowerment of women. UAE approach for empowering women is a good example of a successful strategy and can be seen as a model for other countries.

What can you say about cooperation with Russia in nuclear domain?

We have a governmental agreement with Russia on nuclear cooperation and ongoing commercial cooperation in several areas, including the area of provision of nuclear fuel. Russia companies are welcome to expand existing cooperation in the nuclear energy domain. We do not have many young specialists trained in Russia, possibly because of the language difficulties but this could change as young men and women are trained in many foreign languages. UAE has strong and friendly relations with Russia, I think, we should continue to explore possible cooperation in raising generations of young specialists.
Sergio Duarte (Brazil)

Interview with the Ambassador Sergio Duarte, the Brazilian representative to several International organizations, focusing on disarmament issues, the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the IAEA (1999-2000), the UN High Representative for Disarmament Affairs (2007-2012), PIR Center Advisory Board member since 2022, currently President of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs.

Dear Ambassador, what was going on here, in New York, within Tenth NPT RevCon? Share your impressions and concerns with us, please. How do you access all the problems and prospects of the current review process of NPT?

Most problems we are facing now within the current NPT Review Conference stand from the very beginning, from the times when the text of the future NPT was being discussed under the auspices of Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENCD) in the 1960s. I have always hesitated to say that NPT was being negotiated within ENCD at all. I was a junior member of the Brazilian delegation and there were many famous nonproliferation and disarmament diplomats as Ambassador Roland Timerbaev. Many of them already passed away, unfortunately. Perhaps, I am the only one who still alive.

So, I recall this time of the draft NPT very well. The text of the Treaty was first drafted only by two superpowers, namely USA and USSR, especially if we are speaking about articles I and II of the NPT. Together they brought the draft of the treaty to ENCD where articles III, IV and VI were debated and eventually included in the draft. There were common negotiations on the Article X as well. Thus, it was a kind of mixed process, in particular, negotiations between two superpowers and negotiations under the auspices of ENCD.

Basically, the main problem of the review process since the 1970s have been the imbalance between rights and obligations of the parties to NPT, between nuclear weapons states and nonnuclear weapons states for example, nuclear weapons states have always considered their obligations regarding nuclear disarmament in a different way than these obligations have been considered by nonnuclear weapons states. For them obligations regarding nuclear disarmament is a very important part of the NPT. In contrast, nuclear weapons states consider nuclear disarmament as a distant objective for the future to come and they always put conditionality to disarmament issues. “If there are conditions for disarmament”, or “if there is common understanding”, etc. Such differences on attitudes towards nuclear disarmament obligations have existed since 1968. Let me remind you that NPT was not adopted by consensus at the
CD. Instead, the two co-chairs (USSR and US) sent it to the General Assembly on their own authority.

Nowadays we are facing many new problems within nonproliferation, including the situation with Ukraine, nuclear naval propulsions, security assurances, and etc. Security assurances were problematic from the very beginning too. Initiatives to create WMD-free zone in the Middle East has been not implemented so far, and Arab states have been dissatisfied with the lack of progress on this regard for a long period of time. We have now a different world since NPT was being discussed and was opened for signing. We have made some steps to move forward, but some new things are happening.

In 2005, I was a President-designate of the VII NPT RevCon. And there was no outcome. At that time states-parties to the NPT were unable even to agree on the agenda of the Conference. Again, at that time we were observing the deterioration of relations between the US and Russia. The problem with Iranian nuclear program arose. Thus, we started the Conference without agenda, and it took about two weeks to reach agreement on the agenda of the Conference itself. Only after II weeks after Conference started, we could organize the work of Main Committees. In 2000 and 2015, there was no consensus final document after the review process either. So, its absence is not a tragedy, from my point of view. States parties are coming there, they are discussing the problems, they are exchanging their views, they are trying to understand each other, and it’s the most important thing. Everybody here should try to reach consensus. But primarily Review Conferences are a good occasion to determine differences between us and to make attempts to solve the current problems.

Do you agree that nowadays the NPT review process is being politicized, and it prevents from reaching any agreements between states?

NPT review process is a political process, sure. It was politicized from the beginning and will remain politicized in the future.

What can you say about the interaction between the US and Russia within Tenth NPT RevCon? Does it differ from cooperation between the US and the USSR on nonproliferation and disarmament issues during the Cold War?

You know, the atmosphere in US-Russian relations have been changing all the time since the collapse of the USSR. There was a period when their relations were not too bad, but now they are incredibly bed, awful. There are so many contradictions between the two states. But they should work closer and more active together because to save the NPT and current nonproliferation regime are in their interests.
Well, but what about China, Great Britain, and France?

As nuclear weapons states and parties to the NPT they also have rights and obligations. And they are also interested in making the Treaty work. The main objective for all the Nuclear Five is to maintain the current NPT architecture and to keep other states from getting nuclear weapons.

You are considered to be one of the promoters of nuclear disarmament. So, what prospects for nuclear disarmament do we have now? It would be very interesting to know your own opinion, taking into account your previous activities, professional path, and all the thoughts you have already shared with us.

Oh, I do not see any prospects for nuclear disarmament in the nearest future, really. For me, the only prospect to boost nuclear disarmament could be provided with the entry into force of the TPNW.

But TPNW is too idealistic document without any base. How can we promote elimination of nuclear weapons just because TPNW entered into force when the Treaty is not accepted and even not recognized by all Nuclear Five?

TPNW is as idealistic as NPT was in the 1960s before its signing and ratification. Many nuclear weapons states did not sign the NPT for several years. Yes, I think, you should be idealistic, you should have objectives to make the world better and safer.

Is it possible to involve unofficial nuclear weapons states into the process of negotiations on nuclear disarmament? I mean India, Pakistan, Israel and DPRK. If we invite them to take part in talks on nuclear disarmament, we will then officially recognize their nuclear status, and entire architecture of NPT will be ruined. But we could not ignore the existence of their nuclear arsenals for the whole life.

For me, it’s a question of will, first of all. If the nuclear weapons states, I mean both inside and outside NPT regime, want to negotiate on nuclear disarmament they will do it. For now, it is impossible to involve unofficial nuclear weapons states into talks on nuclear disarmament, you are right. They are not parties to the NPT. Thus, we would need to change NPT itself. You are asking me whether it is possible. We can’t say for sure. We need to sit down and to talk, to discuss such prospects. If we do not talk with each other, sure, it would be impossible to change status quo.

Will we see more nuclear weapons states in the future? There is an opinion that TPNW was created to lay the base to weaken NPT
and to destroy the current nuclear nonproliferation regime. For example, state-party to NPT claims that NPT does not work and withdraws from the Treaty protesting against current nuclear order. The Representative of the Republic of Kiribati has already claimed within the Tenth NPT RevCon that his state should leave the NPT, and Kiribati is one of the antinuclear radicals.

These are speculations. The TPNW was not created to ruin the NPT regime. On the contrary, it was adopted to be complementary to the NPT and to offer a path toward nuclear disarmament. Article VI of the NPT says that all the parties to the Treaty have to be engaged in negotiations on nuclear disarmament. And the TPNW can be effective only if all nuclear states will recognize it. There was a special working group created in 2015, and it was open to all UN members. The nuclear weapons states did not come to take part in the sessions of this working group. Yes, some of their allies came. But if the nuclear weapons states would have come to these sessions, it would have been possible to promote the better understanding of how we could and should move forward. We could not have constructive results of negotiations if not all interested parties want to talk.

But may there be more nuclear weapons states in the future? What can happen in the international arena to make nonnuclear weapons states decide to develop their own nuclear weapon program?

Why have nuclear weapons states been developing their nuclear weapon programs so far? Because they think that nuclear weapons will enhance their security. So, if nonnuclear weapons states thought that nuclear weapons could enhance their security, they would start to develop their own military nuclear programs. Thus, security would justify everything. If nuclear weapons are good for security of some, it may become good for security of others too. You are also asking me why we do not have more than nine nuclear weapons states just now. From my point of view, that is because other states are more responding especially regarding implementation of the NPT. They do not want nuclear weapons because they can ensure their security by other means and because nuclear weapons would not enhance their security. That is the logic. But remember that conditions may change.

Article VI of the NPT calls for general and complete disarmament. So, there has always been an interconnection between nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament. But nobody is taking care of general and complete disarmament, neither nuclear weapons states nor nonnuclear weapons states. Which measures should we take to promote the idea of general and complete disarmament as well in order to boost nuclear disarmament?
Nowadays, there are still so many intellectuals and many think tanks who and which promote the idea of general and complete disarmament. Article VI itself was proposed to inspire nonnuclear weapons states adopt the NPT. Otherwise, a number of nonnuclear weapons states would not accept the Treaty. Primarily, when the two co-chairs, namely USA and USSR, presented the draft text of the treaty to ENDC, there were no obligations regarding nuclear disarmament. Article VI was the way to ensure that the Treaty would be accepted by other states. But there have been no obligations for others regarding general and complete disarmament. States-parties just need to make efforts.

That means that general and complete disarmament is more of a dream than an obligation which each state of the world will never implement. So, let’s discuss humanitarian initiative. Do you really believe that humanitarian initiative can solve all the problems within disarmament? It seems that the answer will be completely negative.

The idea that nuclear weapons could cause large devastation in the world is at the base of preambles of many international treaties and agreements including the NPT. The consequence of nuclear weapons use would be terrible. That is why humanitarian initiative has become accepted. Three international conferences under the auspices of humanitarian initiative were held in the previous years. It contributed to accepting the TPNW. And it should be considered as able to put an end to nuclear weapons.

And what do you think about the gender perspective on nuclear disarmament?

I think that everyone should have the right to be involved in discussions on nuclear weapons. I see more and more women participating in discussions and international forums on nuclear nonproliferation and nuclear disarmament. But it should be important not only for women or not only for men but for all of us as humans regardless our gender identity. If we are speaking about participation of women, they should be professional, first of all. It is very important to be a professional in your career path.

Does Brazil promote education on nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament? Tell us more about your projects in these spheres. Do you have specialized educational programs or NGOs?

Basically, young specialists get knowledge on nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament as a part of general educational programs on international relations. Remember that Brazil is still a developing country, and our people are more concerned with social and eco-
nomic problems rather than nuclear ones. There are many pressing questions for them regarding healthcare, unemployment, general conditions of living, etc. Sure, disarmament is very important issue, a vital one. But, for example, if you stopped a young Brazilian in the street and ask him or her about nuclear disarmament, there would be no guarantee that he or she would discuss this problem with you. Citizens of nuclear weapons states are more concerned with nuclear issues. Unfortunately, relatively few people are interested in the nuclear factor in international affairs. I believe that it would be a very good idea if ordinary people, especially youth from all over the world, pay more attention to nuclear weapons, nuclear nonproliferation, and nuclear disarmament.

**Was it right for Brazil and its national interest to cancel its nuclear weapons program?**

Brazil never had a military nuclear program. We have promoted only peaceful nuclear energy program to control the fuel cycle, and this program has never stopped. Brazil is one of few countries that can enrich uranium commercially. There were people in our government who thought that Brazil should have military nuclear program to produce the bomb, but their opinion did not prevail. Once I delivered a lecture before students, and I told them that when I had been a young man, I thought that prestige of Brazil would be much greater if Brazil would have created a nuclear bomb. In the 1950-1960s many young people had the same views as I did in these years. I asked my students in 2010 what they were thinking about nuclear weapons, and only very few of them raised their hands meaning that it would be better to be nuclear weapons states. Nowadays, youth have other priorities.

**What if Brazil and Argentina would return to strong competition with each other?**

Competition between our states has never stopped. It just takes different forms, but it has always been predominantly friendly. We are speaking a lot about the competition between USSR, then Russia and the US. But it is more than just a competition, it is a rivalry. Our competition with Argentina is another story. We have common economic integration structures and groupings, common political institutions, common understanding of human rights, common civilization identity. Of course, we have competed with Argentina so far but not to create a nuclear bomb to deter each other.

**In the context of nuclear factor in international relations, we are always talking primarily about the rivalry between the US and USSR, Russia. But is it not our fault? For example, India and China also possess nuclear weapons, and both states have territorial
claims to each other. In 2020 there were armed clashes along the Sino-Indian border near disputed Pangong Lake in Ladakh and the Tibet Autonomous Region, and near the border between Sikkim and the Tibet Autonomous Region. But there were no serious discussions about the risks of limited or full-scale nuclear war between them. It is not the only one example. Why do we always focus on rivalry between the US and Russia and its possible nuclear dimension, from your point of view?

We are always discussing the risks of nuclear war between the US and Russia just because they have the largest nuclear arsenals in the world. Pay attention that previously Brazil and Argentina also had some territorial disputes, and we settled all of them peacefully. I think that the rivalry between the US and USSR or the US and Russia is a very unique phenomenon per se.

Brazil is a member of uranium club, let me say metaphorically. How do you assess positions of Brazil in international uranium market? What benefits do you have from possessing uranium?

I do not think that Brazil is an active player within international uranium market. It is more important to extract uranium for our own nuclear power plants and facilities. We do not have any private business companies who could extract and enrich uranium, and only our government and governmental agencies can be engaged in activities connected with uranium.

Let me touch upon the factor of AUKUS in international affairs. Some days ago, you said as a participant of side-event on AUKUS that no one should compare Brazilian and Australian nuclear submarine programs. Tell us more about these differences. Can the creation of AUKUS be justified by Chinese activities in the Pacific?

First of all, Brazilian nuclear submarine program is entirely Brazilian. In case of AUKUS, Australia will be getting nuclear propulsions from two nuclear weapons states, namely the US and Great Britain. Nobody provides Brazil with nuclear propulsion or other military-oriented nuclear technologies. Secondly, Brazil will not use highly enriched uranium, and it differs from Australian nuclear submarine program. Remember, that enriched uranium is used to representative of the create a nuclear bomb as well. Finally, third difference is closely related to the issues of regional security. Brazil has 7,000 km of the coast. Our nuclear submarine program is designed to ensure vehicles to patrol the coastline. These nuclear submarines will be armed only with conventional weapons.

You are asking me about threats from China to security of Pacific states. It is up to the states of the Pacific to decide for themselves
which security threats they do have. It is up to them to decide if the AUKUS poses a threat to regional security. I am from another region. Nuclear states sometimes believe they are entitled to decide for others what their security problems are. They say things like, “You do not need to possess nuclear weapons because you do not have serious security threats”.

Speaking about China, I want to point out that China is trying to improve its international standing and to ensure the projection of its power abroad. China is encircled with foreign military bases and ships, and there are really many of them. China does really have reasons to be concerned with security issues. But I believe that search for security of one state should not weaken the security of others. Each can decide by itself how to guarantee its national security, but, anyway, not with such means which could negatively influence the security of others. Returning to China, its positions in global arena are usually defensive and not aggressive.

**Which problems are Latin American states facing now?**

I do not think that our security problems are coming from outside really. All our main problems are developing inside Latin American states. Among them are the high rate of poverty, low standards of living, the problem of functioning strong political institutions, economic crises, unemployment, ecological threats, etc.

**What prospects does BRICS have now in the new era of global tensions?**

We shall understand that the global situation is rather difficult now. Anyway, we should think more about our future and what to do. Within BRICS, we should think about our future plans and goals as well. Upon its creation, BRICS were concentrated on economic rather than on political aims. Nowadays, we are discussing the prospects of enlarging BRICS. But are the criteria of BRICS membership the same? Especially if we want BRICS to have more international value and influence (primarily in economic domain).
SECURITY INDEX

Security Index Occasional Paper Series Global Edition - reports, analytical articles, comments and interviews that reflect the positions of Russian and foreign experts on the current challenges to global security and Russia's policy in this area. The goal of the series is to provide a clear analysis of international security problems and to offer specific and realistic solutions for them. The series replaced the Security Index journal published by PIR Center in 1994-2016.

The authors and editors of the series welcome comments, questions and suggestions, which readers can email: inform@pircenter.org.

FUTURE OF THE NPT & RUSSIA'S INTERESTS

This occasional paper was made within the framework of the project Future of the NPT & Russia’s Interests, which is part of the Nuclear Nonproliferation & Russia Program. The project is aimed to provide a quality expert assessment of the issue, and by arranging various platforms for discussions, to facilitate a more constructive debate of the problems currently facing the nuclear nonproliferation regime.

TEN-YEAR GLOBAL PLAN ON PROMOTING DISARMAMENT AND NONPROLIFERATION EDUCATION: 2018-2027

This occasional paper was made also within the framework of the project Ten-Year Global Plan on Promoting Disarmament and Nonproliferation Education: 2018-2027, which is part of Education & Training Program.

In 2022, the world nonproliferation community celebrated the 20th anniversary of the Report of the UN Secretary-General United Nation study on disarmament and non-proliferation education, which was published on August 30, 2002. The report contained 34 recommendations to promote education and education in the field of nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament. The report was developed by a Group of Governmental Experts, whose members were appointed by a special resolution of the UN General Assembly. It laid the foundation for the education agenda in the field of nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament at the UN level. Among the members of the Group of Governmental Experts was Vladimir Orlov, founder and director of PIR Center, a UN consultant on disarmament and nonproliferation education (2001-2002). The prepared Report of the UN Secretary-General formed the basis of UN General Assembly Resolution 57/60 United Nation study on disarmament and non-proliferation education. The 20th anniversary of the Report and the Resolution itself is a great occasion to take stock.