Roland Timerbaev

ON LIBYA, ANTIMISSILE DEFENSE, AS WELL AS OTHER AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL EVENTS

In September 2007, Ambassador Roland Timerbaev, Russia's most eminent specialist in the area of the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and one of the authors of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), celebrated his 80th birthday. To honor this milestone, the PIR Center published the memoirs of one of the founders of our organization, our teacher, and our long-time comrade. Selected excerpts from this book appear below.

On many occasions my friends have asked me to write down my recollections of my experiences through the years, in particular about my participation in efforts to further nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament, about my role both as an observer and as a participant, yet I demurred.

But then some time ago, telling a good friend yet another *anecdote* from my life experiences and hearing yet again the suggestion that I write down my recollections, I finally decided to put pen to paper.

My *anecdotes* are, chiefly, not about myself but unavoidably, through my participation in the events described, I am a key part of the background and am a figure in the stories since I was an observer, an eyewitness to one event or another involving important or interesting individuals, and I believe that these events are worthy of being recorded. Those events and experiences which are reflected in my writings will not be arranged in chronological or some other particular order, but instead presented as they float into my consciousness. But on the whole the scraps or building blocks together create a mosaic that gives a general impression of the pulse of the bygone era.

For nearly my entire professional life I dealt with issues of international security and the activity of international organizations, in particular problems of arms control and the nonproliferation of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction. Working for the Soviet/Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Moscow and foreign offices, I represented the country at the United Nations and other international organizations (in particular, the International Atomic Energy Agency), and also participated in bilateral (mainly with the United States) and multilateral negotiations in the area of arms control and the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This included taking part in the 1966–1968 talks on the conclusion of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In more recent years, I have mainly been occupied with research, teaching, and writing–again in the sphere of international security, nuclear nonproliferation, and disarmament.

HOW ABM BEGAN

Kirill Vasilyevich Novikov, Head of the International Organizations Division of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) from 1964 all the way until his resignation in 1973, was the teacher and supporter of an entire generation of young diplomats. He was professional to the utmost degree, and had a profound, nonstandard, and–most importantly–non-ideological understanding of the national interest and knew how to defend it well. He was an innate teacher, which allowed him successfully to ingrain these qualities of his in many of our generation of young diplomats.

Kirill Vasilyevich was one of the first in the MFA seriously to become interested in the problem of limiting anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems, knowing full well that it was virtually impossible to design and build an effective ABM system to cover all of our territory, or even a more limited system, and that attempts to develop one would only serve to provoke the other side into a further escalation of offensive strategic weapons in order to overcome this system. The Soviet Union was the first to carry out an intercept of a ballistic missile, already in 1961, and the first A-35 anti-missile defense system began to be built around Moscow, a system the Americans dubbed *Galosh*. The position of the Soviet leadership was naively simple: defense is good, offense is evil. But the United States had already created intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) that could easily overcome our ABM system. It goes without saying that building an ABM system would mean multi-billion ruble, and moreover futile, expenditures. The United States itself carried out its first missile intercept much later, and began to create an ABM defense system near Grand Forks (North Dakota) but then, understanding the uselessness of the project, cancelled it. Nor did the United States build the *Safeguard* ABM system.

From some time around the beginning of 1964 influential representatives of the U.S. administration began to «approach» responsible Soviet representatives with proposals to come to an agreement on a mutual repudiation of the construction of ABM systems. It seems that the first such appeal came in a conversation between William (Bill) Foster, Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), and his close friend Defense Secretary Robert (Bob) McNamara with Soviet Ambassador in Washington Anatoly Dobrynin on January 16, 1964.[1] Moscow also received news of appeals to Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Valerian Zorin, as well as to some well-known scholars, participants in the Pugwash movement, and other official and unofficial persons.

Novikov gave me the task of carefully gathering together all of these communications, and in time I had gathered a *critical mass* of them. As I recall, it was in late 1965 or early 1966 that Kirill Vasilyevich, leaving for a vacation, gave me instructions to inform the minister at an opportune moment, and ask him to transmit a proposal to the Politburo to task the appropriate agencies to examine this entire problem thoroughly and work out a position on ABM for use in our foreign policy. Gromyko, who instantly grasped the essence of the problem, instructed us to prepare a note of instruction for the Central Committee, which I brought him literally almost the next day. He signed it there and then, but used his typically dull blue pencil to cross out the words «within three months time» in the draft Politburo decree attached to it (that is, the Central Committee decree should not establish the period of time for the fulfillment of the instruction) and said: quickly retype the draft decree and send it.

A brouhaha then erupted. After a little time had passed, I was called on the government telephone (the so-called «hot line») by the Chairman of the Scientific and Technical Council of the Soviet Council of Ministers Military Industrial Commission, one of the main ideologists of the Soviet ABM system, Academician Aleksandr Nikolayevich Shchukin, who invited me to visit him in the Kremlin. I visited him there several times and each time, not without sarcasm, he tried to instruct me (of course, there was a large difference in our ages): how can one forbid defense?

But on March 18, 1966, Amb. Dobrynin nevertheless was told to take the first soundings on the possibility of attaining an agreement on limiting ABM systems, though *packaged together* with limitations on offensive strategic weapons. The ambassador met with Foster, who reacted unenthusiastically to the idea of a package solution to this problem.[2]

In public, the Soviet leadership continued to speak out against the idea of limiting ABM systems, including during Aleksey Kosygin's famous meeting with President Lyndon Johnson and Defense Secretary Robert McNamara in Glassboro (New Jersey) in June 1967.

It was only just before the NPT was opened for signature on July 1, 1968 that an exchange of messages between Johnson and Kosygin occurred, at the initiative of the Americans, in the course of which it was agreed that on the day the Treaty was signed there would be an announcement that the two parties had agreed to «enter in the nearest future into negotiations on the *comprehensive* (emphasis added by the author) limitation and reduction of both offensive strategic nuclear weapon delivery systems and systems of defense against ballistic missiles.» However, due to political differences (in particular, the entry of Warsaw Pact troops into Czechoslovakia), the talks only began in late 1969 and ended with the conclusion of the ABM Treaty and Interim Agreement on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms in May 1972.

THE LIBYAN UNDERTAKING AND LESSONS LEARNED

The Tajoura Nuclear Research Center, located not far from Libya's capital, Tripoli, was created with the full assistance of the Soviet Union. One of the aims of the nuclear center was research on low-power nuclear reactors that used highly enriched uranium (HEU). Although the Tajoura reactor was put under IAEA safeguards, due to its use of HEU the Soviets insisted on and obtained an agreement that Soviet specialists constantly be present in Tajoura–in order to be confident that the nuclear reactor and other installations in the nuclear center were being used for peaceful purposes only and, most importantly, to supervise the use of the HEU. The Libyans did not voice any objections to the presence of our specialists since, of course, they simply needed their assistance.

During the second half of the 1970s, Libyan leader Colonel Muammar Gaddafi sent a delegation to Moscow led by the country's second-in-command, Abdel Salam Jalloud, with the secret mission of obtaining, for a large sum of money, help in the development of a nuclear program, which would include the construction of a natural uranium-fueled reactor moderated by heavy water, a heavy water plant, facilities for spent fuel reprocessing and plutonium separation, as well as other related facilities. That is to say, we are talking about a military nuclear program, for the construction of which Libya offered $10 billion. At the time Gaddafi had the money, since the global oil crisis had pushed prices to record levels.

In the talks with Jalloud, the Soviet side was represented by First Deputy Premier Nikolay Tikhonov (in place of Chairman of the Council of Ministers Kosygin, who was absent) and First Deputy Minister of Medium Machine-Building (that is, the nuclear ministry) Andronik Petrosyants. The Soviet contingent agreed in principle with the Libyan proposal, guided both by their wish to support the Arabs in their conflict with Israel and by the attractiveness of the sum proposed. I remember my telephone conversation with Boris Batsanov, head of the premier's secretariat, who, after hearing of my sincere doubts that this was the correct decision, said: does the MFA really not understand that we are talking about the Soviet Union receiving $10 billion? During the course of the negotiations a memorandum of intent was agreed to, as I later learned, without the agreement of the MFA leadership.

But several days later the MFA received a note for the signature of Minister Andrey Gromyko, to be sent to the Central Committee Politburo, that had been signed by Defense Minister Ustinov, KGB Chairman Andropov, Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers Military-Industrial Commission Smirnov, and State Planning (Gosplan) Chairman Baybakov. The note proposed measures to actualize our promise to create, as it is called by technical specialists, a complete nuclear fuel cycle in Libya. Moreover, Gosplan and several industrial ministries and agencies were charged with the task of fulfilling this government decree.

The MFA had serious objections to this entire undertaking–first and foremost due to the unacceptability of the further spread of nuclear weapons, but also due to doubts that Libya could pay for the construction expenditures. By this time the global energy crisis was coming to an

end and world oil prices were beginning to stabilize. As I recall, the Defense Ministry had some specific objections as well. It's worth noting that on questions of nuclear nonproliferation the MFA and the military stood together and often jointly opposed the Medium Machine-Building Ministry.

In order to discuss what we should do with regards to the «note to the Central Committee,» Deputy Minister Georgiy Korniyenko called me to his office and we began to discuss what could be done. As a result, Korniyenko proposed the following to Minister Gromyko: he should sign the note to the Central Committee nevertheless, but include a reservation that expressed his doubts about the advisability of the enterprise given its possible negative consequences for nonproliferation. Gromyko agreed and charged us with formulating the MFA position in one short phrase, made up of literally just a few words, and printing it under his signature on the first copy of the note to the Politburo.

We spent a considerable amount of time on doing this, and I was again impressed by Georgiy Markovich Korniyenko's breathtaking ability to formulate a thought briefly and clearly. Subsequently, long meetings began at Gosplan on concrete measures for the fulfillment of the Central Committee decision, work headed by Gosplan Deputy Chairman Nikolay Ryzhkov himself (who later became Premier), who held several meetings with the participation of representatives from other government agencies. Deputy Minister Korniyenko was supposed to participate on behalf of the MFA, but he nonetheless usually sent me to these meetings at Gosplan with, as I understood it, the mission of hindering the entire affair as much as possible. I remember that there were major difficulties with the construction of a heavy water plant. In the end, the Libyan project did not come to fruition, most likely because the Libyan treasury was empty.

Now that Libya, under U.S. pressure, has rejected publicly its secret nuclear program – and its dismantlement has been witnessed and confirmed by IAEA inspectors – it has become widely known that both in the 1980s and 1990s Gaddafi tried to undertake measures to create such a program, but became convinced that he would not be capable of doing it. Moreover, the pressure from the U.S. and other western states turned out to be insurmountable.

The Libyan episode presented above, which took place in the latter half of the 1970s, was a big lesson for the MFA, which took measures to ensure that nothing similar ever happened again. As a result of an MFA initiative, a Politburo decision was taken to establish an Interagency Commission on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons at the level of deputy heads of government agencies and headed by the MFA (concretely, by Korniyenko), which was tasked with giving preliminary approval for all of our international activities in order to prevent nuclear proliferation.

The formation of this commission made it possible quickly to bring order to the work of those organizations that exported nuclear materials, equipment, and technology. This beneficial activity, which was of great national importance, was very much helped by the fact that the MFA, Defense Ministry, and KGB, as a rule, held similar positions on nonproliferation issues, which helped in making export decisions on the basis of the national interest and reduced the possibility of a more bureaucratic approach to the minimum.

One of the first important decisions was the agreement on the government decree of January 13, 1982 on nuclear export controls. The document was called «Statute on the Export of Nuclear Materials, Technologies, Equipment, Installations, and Special Non-nuclear Materials and Services.» The Statute was based on the *Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers* adopted by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in 1977 and officially transmitted to the IAEA in early 1978.[3] As an appendix to the Statute, the agreed NSG Trigger List on nuclear export items subject to control was confirmed and published in the same journal. This was the first legal act that our country adopted on export controls.

It is worth noting the important fact that the Statute affirmed by the USSR Council of Ministers went even farther than the NSG Guidelines in that they not only affirmed that Soviet nuclear exports should not be used for the production of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices, as required by the Guidelines, but also that they should not be used «to contribute to

attaining any military objective.» Thus, for instance, they could not be used as fuel for nuclear-powered submarines.

Furthermore, the Statute included the very important requirement that «as a condition for nuclear exports, draft agreements and (or) contracts with foreign contractors must be agreed with the USSR State Committee on the Use of Atomic Energy and the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs.» Thus, not one transaction in the sphere of nuclear exports could take place without the agreement of the MFA. In practice, this function was fulfilled by the MFA International Organizations Department.

At the suggestion of the Interagency Commission (the initiative was brought by the MFA and Defense Ministry), work was also started on preparing legislation on the use of atomic energy. For this purpose, a special group was formed under the leadership of the famous jurist Abram Ioyrysh within the framework of the Academy of Sciences Institute of State and Law. This work bore fruit. Already in the post-Soviet era, the State Duma adopted important laws that established the legislative basis for the use of atomic energy, including issues related to nuclear exports. The experiences of the Interagency Committee could be valuable if used today as well.

GAMES AT THE UNITED NATIONS

I met with Andrey Yanuaryevich Vyshinskiy many times in 1949–1952, when he was the Minister of Foreign Affairs. The minister paid a great deal of attention to UN activities and regularly participated in meetings of the General Assembly as head of the Soviet delegation. Understandably, in Moscow too he took a great deal of interest in the activities of the Department on UN Affairs, the predecessor to the International Organizations Department, and even led departmental staff meetings himself, calling everyone, even me – the youngest staff member – into his ministerial office.

I witnessed the minister's participation in the General Assembly sessions of 1950 and 1952 in New York. Apparently, Vyshinskiy noticed me, since I was assigned to head the group of written translators, which also included diplomats from Washington and Ottawa who knew English very well. Several of them were a good deal older than I.

We were tasked with translating the texts of the speeches by various countries' representatives so that the minister might familiarize himself with them and, when necessary, answer them. He really loved to do just that. He was generally a great orator and polemicist. Here is but one example. Once, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Lebanon, Charles Malik, whose earliest work was as a philosophy professor, attacked the Soviet Union with accusations. Vyshinskiy immediately asked for the floor and, to a thunder of applause, cited, in German, the following famous lines of Heinrich Heine:

Seventy-seven professors,
Fatherland, You are lost![4]

The translators usually worked evenings, and even into the night, so that Vyshinskiy could familiarize himself with translations of the speeches in time. I was responsible for the correctness of the translations, and there was once when I was awakened in the middle of the night and told: the minister is calling you. I hastily dressed and went to him, and he lectured me about a part of a speech by the Yugoslav representative, which he thought was translated incorrectly. And he was right. The minister chided me in a relatively soft manner, and I promised him that this sort of oversight would not happen again. I was already getting ready to leave, when he held me back and called in another subordinate who was waiting in the reception room for his turn.

It turned out to be Yuriy (Georgiy) Pavlovich Frantsev, head of the MFA Press Department, who had previously been the director of MGIMO when I was a student at the institute. Yuriy was deeply respected by the students and all who knew him, but behind his back we all called him

papa Yura. In my presence, Vyshinskiy began to scold him in the crudest way, even shouting at him. Then he grabbed a report prepared by Frantsev that was lying on his desk and forcefully threw it across the entire office, and Yuriy had to run after it. The office was large, some 20 meters long. It was the biggest room in the villa that housed our mission in Glen Cove.

I'd like to relate one more episode from my life that was connected with Vyshinskiy. In June 1950 the Korean War was beginning. Of course, as it is well known, it was started by North Korean leader Kim Il Sung, who had invaded South Korea with the agreement of Stalin and Mao Zedong. But our diplomacy and propaganda machine was trying, with all of its might, to prove that the war was provoked by Syngman Rhee, the South Korean leader, who supposedly had invaded North Korea.

I was the person at the mission responsible for Korea at the time, and it was my responsibility to gather materials and create a dossier that showed that South Korea was responsible for everything. Of course, this was not an easy task, but I still managed to gather quite a variety of materials. When a delegation arrived from Moscow in the fall for the UN session, they gave me the materials that had been prepared by the MFA as well. I duly organized all of these materials, filling over 30 folders.

U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson spoke first. His speech, which lasted for two hours and 40 minutes–I kept careful track of the time–hammered North Korea with accusations, directing some at the Soviet Union and People's Republic of China as well. Vyshinskiy kept silent, and upon our return to Glen Cove directed me to spread out my dossier on the Korean question in a particular order in his office, directly on the carpet lying on the floor, which I did. The minister locked himself in for two or three days, then personally dictated his speech to his stenographer.

After the speech was ready, my only job was to verify the accuracy of concrete numbers, dates, and facts. He gave his speech at the United Nations with some brilliance, and spoke for exactly one hour more than Acheson had: three hours and 40 minutes.

One more anecdote about my contact with Vyshinskiy that took place in Glen Cove. He played a strong game of Russian billiards, and late one evening when he had some free time suggested that we play one or two rounds. But the first round did not go in his favor. I unexpectedly had amazingly good luck, and the score soon reached a critical point. But just at that point the minister's personal physician came up to me and whispered in my ear that I absolutely had to lose or Vyshinskiy might grow ill, as defeats distressed him a great deal and he – the doctor – would end up spending a long time that night tending to him. I don't know how, but I somehow managed to lose the round. Of course, I also lost the second round to the minister.

The final episode came after Stalin's death, when Vyacheslav Molotov once again became Minister of Foreign Affairs and Vyshinskiy's rank was reduced to First Deputy Minister and Permanent UN Representative. In late 1954 he unexpectedly passed away in New York; his body was taken to Moscow and a fairly magnificent burial arranged. His coffin, and later the urn with his ashes, was placed in the House of Unions (Dom Soyuzov) for mourners to pay their respects, after which the urn was buried in the Kremlin wall. By this time I had already returned to Moscow and was working at the MFA. I was given the honor, together with one other person, of carrying an enormous wreath honoring Vyshinskiy from the House of Unions to Red Square.

THE SHEVCHENKO AFFAIR

Much has been said and written about Arkadiy Nikolayevich Shevchenko; there have even been programs about him on Russian television. Yes, he was a «defector,» a traitor to his country, and cannot but provoke contempt. But the public knows little about how everything really happened; it hardly needs saying that the authenticity of the story presented in the media is highly questionable. I will describe what happened to Shevchenko as I personally witnessed the events.

Representatives of our intelligence services, even high-ranking members, have tried to depict Shevchenko as a man who supposedly was an American spy (long before he went over to the U.S. side), giving the CIA «important state secrets.» Russian television, a show broadcast on the *Rossiya* channel on December 14, 2004, in particular, reported that Shevchenko had informed the CIA how Moscow made decisions at the highest levels, and that this had supposedly been extremely important information to Washington. Could it really be that without Arkadiy, the Americans could have had no idea how the Politburo and other top national government bodies functioned? I have strong doubts about stories of Shevchenko spying before his «break with Moscow,» because they immediately raise the natural question of why a person in such a promising position in the Soviet hierarchy would have needed to do so. This question remains unanswered. In reality, everything was much simpler, more banal, and very *typical* of the Soviet Union.

I knew Arkadiy well. He came straight from graduate school at MGIMO to the disarmament desk at the International Organizations Department, which I then basically headed, in about 1956 or 1957. He recommended himself immediately as a capable and diligent colleague. It was very easy to work with him, and the two of us prepared quite a few documents together. For all practical purposes, he soon became my deputy, although officially no such position existed. In 1958 I was sent to work in our New York mission, and we interacted relatively rarely after that point, basically just when he attended sessions of the UN General Assembly, but we always saw ourselves as friends.

Soon it became quite clear that Arkadiy was an extremely ambitious person, a careerist to the bone, completely absorbed in making money. In addition, he had another great *sin*: he drank heavily and over time became a habitual drunkard. I think this played a decisive role in his fall.

Furthermore, he developed the notion that for him, everything was permitted–an idea for which Andrey Gromyko, and particularly his wife Lidiya Dmitriyevna, are largely to blame. Knowing Gromyko's wife's predilection for expensive gifts, Arkadiy and his wife Lina invariably made large gifts–even jewels–to the minister and his wife whenever they came to New York. I had known Gromyko well over the course of many decades, and I knew that he always became very close to people who were personally devoted to him. I might add that Shevchenko graduated from MGIMO at the same time as Gromyko's son Anatoliy. They were friends and co-authored several articles together. It was through his personal contacts with Gromyko and his family that Arkadiy very quickly was able to obtain ambassadorial rank and become Deputy UN Secretary General, a post he prized most highly.

Well I recall that when visiting him in his office as Deputy Secretary General of the United Nations, each time I came for UN sessions, he was invariably quite inebriated. Even in the morning, before talking to me, he would open a filing cabinet in his office–one he used as a bar–and pour himself a fair amount of whisky, offer me wine, and only then begin a conversation.

At Geneva, in 1975, the first Review Conference on the Nonproliferation Treaty took place, the point of which was to examine the progress in fulfilling the agreement, draw the necessary conclusions, and agree on recommendations for the future. Arkadiy flew to Geneva from New York as a representative of the UN Secretary General, and at the first session of the conference, as is customary, read a message from him addressed to conference participants. Then he disappeared. The first week of the conference passed, during which I was incredibly busy and did not notice Shevchenko's absence from the podium in the conference hall at Geneva's Palace of Nations.

After some time had passed, one of Arkadiy's colleagues–my old friend Rolf Bjernerstedt, a Swede who was Head of the UN Secretariat's Division for Disarmament Affairs–reported that Shevchenko had disappeared, and that he had already been missing an entire week. Everyone became concerned about what might have happened, since he had not warned anybody but disappeared without a trace. Perhaps he had fallen seriously ill?

Ascertaining quickly through friends where Arkadiy was staying (at the apartment of some friends who had gone back to the USSR on vacation), I asked the delegation's advisor, Boris Krasulin, to accompany me to Shevchenko's apartment. Boris and I rang the doorbell for a long time and knocked on the door, asking Arkadiy to open it, but to no avail until we both heard a movement or rustling. Saying hardly a word to each other, without even an exchange of gestures, we both agreed that Shevchenko was on another «bender.» When I returned to the conference, I told Rolf that Arkadiy had fallen a bit sick, but would soon turn up.

Indeed, he turned up at the conference the following day, but his bright red, swollen face made it clear to all what he'd been up to the entire week. Arkadiy suddenly became extremely attentive in his dealings with me, emphasizing the special nature of our relationship, promising the Soviet delegation all possible assistance, telling us about the trends that were already become clear during the conference, and so on and so forth.

There is yet one more case indicating what Arkadiy was like. This «anecdote» occurred before the 1975 conference–probably some time in 1967 or 1968. Shevchenko was already working at our UN mission as a senior advisor and, returning home on vacation, invited me to the Khrustalnyy restaurant, which is on the corner of Kutuzovskiy Prospekt and Bolshaya Dorogomilovskaya Street. After we'd had our very first drinks he suddenly asked if I wouldn't like to become a member of the minister's «inner circle,» since it would open up many prospects for my future career. If I wanted, he'd take me to Gromyko's dacha on the following Sunday. Of course, I found an excuse to decline, without revealing to him my views concerning the establishment of careers on the basis of personal contacts.

Now I will turn to the main point that I have been saving to disclose: how it is that Shevchenko betrayed his country and went over to the U.S. side. The appropriate Soviet agencies knew well, of course, what Arkadiy's particular «weakness» was and were worried about it–as can easily be understood and is completely explainable–fearing U.S. intelligence could use this «weakness» to recruit him. As far as I am aware, they asked Moscow on multiple occasions if he shouldn't be recalled home to the Soviet Union. I am certain that the question of his recall was discussed at the highest levels: I was told that KGB Chief Andropov and Gromyko discussed it. Finally, the decision was made to recall him, but it was done in such an unskillful and clumsy way that it could not but have led to Arkadiy Shevchenko's departure.

In late March or very early April, Arkadiy was sent a telegram signed by First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Georgiy Korniyenko with the order to return to Moscow immediately in order to consult on the initiatives that the Soviet Union should put forward at the UN Special Session on Disarmament.

The fact that Gromyko did not want to sign the encoded message himself but charged his deputy with doing so was, to my mind, a mistake. While this sort of telegram is usually not sent by a minister but by one of his deputies, Shevchenko's case was special. If Gromyko had personally signed the telegram or, at least, if it had indicated that it was being sent at the personal behest of the minister, then Shevchenko, taking into account the special nature of his relationship with Gromyko, may not have made the break with his homeland. Moreover, the *reason* chosen to explain why Arkadiy had to return to Moscow was also a mistake. The *fundamental* Soviet position on disarmament was absolutely clear and of long standing: i.e., general and complete disarmament and a ban on nuclear weapons. Various concrete «innovations» could be proposed within this position, but they required special professional knowledge that Shevchenko did not possess. He had an excellent grasp of the problem as a whole, having devoted many years to it, and wrote an outstanding book about disarmament, but at the time the Disarmament Committee in Geneva was where the disarmament issue was hot. This committee was served by a small secretariat under Shevchenko, but its staff was only working on providing technical assistance for the work of the larger Geneva committee. If Moscow had needed information about proposals other delegations might make at the UN special session, then he would not have had to go to Moscow–that sort of information could well have been sent via telegraph or diplomatic pouch. Moreover, the plan included sending a qualified delegation, headed by Stashevskiy, to the Preparatory Committee session.

Yet one more oversight by Moscow: before his trip to New York Stashevskiy spoke to Gromyko's senior aide, Vasiliy Makarov, who told Gennadiy to advise Arkadiy «to moderate his libations,» since there was «already talk in Moscow» about his predilection for wine. This was a mistake too. I do not know if Makarov told Stashevskiy to do this of his own accord or the minister had instructed him to, but I suspect that probably Makarov had made this decision himself.

Upon receiving his instructions, Shevchenko ordered a plane ticket and began to get ready for his departure. Then Gennadiy Stashevskiy arrived in New York. Gennadiy's relationship with Arkadiy was particularly close, and on the very day of his arrival in New York Arkadiy invited his friend to a restaurant where they had the fateful conversation that led to Shevchenko's decision to defect to the United States. During the conversation, Arkadiy asked Gennadiy how preparations for the UN session were going, and whether the proposals the delegation would bring to the session had already been decided. Stashevskiy, knowing nothing of Korniyenko's telegram and not suspecting that Shevchenko had been recalled, told his comrade that our position had been worked out already and that everything was ready for the session. In the course of the conversation, he also carried out Makarov's instructions. Shevchenko, of course, quickly understood the trap into which he would fall if he were to return to Moscow, and apparently decided then and there to get in touch with U.S. special services, which was, so to speak, just a matter of technique, since he could not fail to know *who's who* in his own department of the UN Secretariat, as well as those working outside of it.

As soon as the MFA learned that Shevchenko was not returning, the decision was made to recall Stashevskiy to Moscow. And this is how it occurred. On Saturday morning, April 8, 1978, I was urgently called to the MFA to see First Deputy Minister Viktor Maltsev, who was acting minister in Gromyko's absence. Korniyenko was in Maltsev's office. They asked me if our delegation to the Preparatory Committee could make do without Stashevskiy. I answered that it could, since there was other qualified staff in it too. But since it was easy to see the bewilderment I felt at the question I had been asked, Maltsev and Korniyenko decided to tell me what was going on. A telegram was sent to recall Stashevskiy then and there, and I was told *delicately* to organize the recall to Moscow of Shevchenko's son Gennadiy from Geneva, where he was serving as a member of our delegation to the Committee on Disarmament.

This was done as follows. I sent an order to Geneva telling them immediately to send delegation staff member Gennadiy Shevchenko as a diplomatic courier with a particularly urgent document, and upon his arrival in Moscow bring it immediately to the International Organizations Department. Gennadiy conscientiously carried out the order. (In reality, of course, the package–closed with wax seals–just contained a typical official UN document.)

As is well known, Shevchenko published a book about his defection to the United States. The book (*Breaking with Moscow*[5]) came out in 1985. In it, the author asserts, and describes in detail on many pages, that he was working for the U.S. for nearly two and a half years before he left. The U.S. media wrote about this in the obituaries that came out after his death in February 1998. However, the book's appearance in bookstores only with long delay after the announcement that it would be published, and the fact that the date was moved more than once, draws attention to itself. This raises a valid question: couldn't this be due to the fact that CIA «editors» were rewriting the descriptions of Arkadiy's «espionage» activities for a long time, in order to give them some semblance of authenticity?

Some of the facts in the book are distorted by the author in order to slander one individual or another, even those who helped him in his meteoric rise up the career ladder. I was particularly surprised by his description of one absolutely insignificant event of which I was an eyewitness, for the sole purpose of slighting his benefactor, Andrey Gromyko. The Soviet delegation had arrived at a session of the UN General Assembly right after our UN mission had moved into a new building, which I had been responsible for buying and setting up. Naturally, some problems were discovered after we moved in–a problem that happens not just in Russia, but in the U.S. too. It was just about on the first day that Gromyko got stuck in the elevator (installed by an American firm) for half an hour. Gromyko was very understanding and quite calmly ordered us to get everything fixed as it ought to be, which we did. However, Shevchenko gave this event

his own twist, stating that the minister had unjustifiably castigated me and punished me severely, which is completely untrue. Clearly, Arkadiy included this insignificant event in the book in order to slander Gromyko in order to please his new masters.

Much was written in the media about Shevchenko's relationship with some woman who supposedly was introduced to him by American special agents. I don't intend to dispute this fact (if it is indeed a fact), but I do have my doubts, and they are rather large. Only a crazy person would start this sort of relationship, since it could not fail to be discovered over the course of time. I spent many years living in America, and I know that it is impossible for our countrymen to hide these sorts of ties from the relevant Soviet agencies for a prolonged period. Arkadiy valued his career too highly and could count on advancing further in the diplomatic service, which would have prevented him from getting involved in such a foolish thing. He was always very prudent, particularly if his career were at stake. And of course, Shevchenko did have a relationship with an American woman to whom he was introduced by the CIA or FBI, but after «breaking with Moscow.» Still later, Arkadiy was married twice again: to an American and to a Russian.

There is just one more episode related to the «Shevchenko affair» that I view as significant. More than 15 years after the events described above, in 1993 or 1994, I was visiting my friend, former U.S. Ambassador James (Jim) Leonard, at his home in Virginia. Reminiscing about the past, we happened to start analyzing the circumstances under which Shevchenko had left. Jim knew about the events in detail, since in 1978 he was the first deputy permanent representative of the U.S. to the United Nations and was in contact with the Soviet representative, Oleg Troyanovskiy, now deceased, when our side made the unsuccessful attempts to recall Shevchenko home. Jim assured me that both then and now there was and continues to be a strict injunction against trying to recruit those who hold top posts, particularly foreign ambassadors and others holding jobs of similar or higher rank. The reason for this, as Jim explained to me, is that important individuals are assigned to these posts, people the foreign state fully trusts. Thus we believe, he said, that an attempt to recruit them might turn into a big international scandal. I won't try to judge whether this is true or not, but I'd like to emphasize that I've knows Leonard for several dozen years and we have complete confidence in each other. By the time of our conversation we were both retired, and I cannot believe that Jim would try to mislead me in a conversation of this kind.

Here is what I know about the circumstances surrounding the «Shevchenko affair;» I have written about them for the benefit of our descendants, so that my future readers will better understand the morals of the past era, which are clearly portrayed by the circumstances in this «affair.»

ON MOROKHOV'S UNFINISHED CAREER

The complicated fate of Igor Dmitriyevich Morokhov, an outstanding individual, is quite remarkable and characteristic of many, both the very gifted and those less gifted, particularly in our country. My close friendship with him continued over the course of more than ten years, from the late 1960s to the late 1970s. We continued to be in sporadic contact after that time as well. Here are the circumstances under which we met.

The first Soviet Governor of the IAEA Board of Governors was Vasiliy Semenovich Yemelyanov. Vasiliy Semenovich, the Deputy Minister of Medium Machine-Building and Chairman of the State Committee on the Use of Atomic Energy, held the IAEA post from 1957 to 1965. To the surprise of the MFA, in late 1965 or early 1966 a note for the Communist Party Central Committee arrived at the MFA for the Foreign Minister's signature from the Ministry of Medium Machine-Building, signed by Minister Yefim Slavskiy. The note proposed removing Yemelyanov from the Soviet post on the IAEA Board of Governors and appointing someone named Igor Morokhov in his place. First Deputy Minister Vasiliy Kuznetsov called me to his office and asked why they were dismissing Yemelyanov and appointing, without consulting with the MFA, a person nobody knew. I shrugged my shoulders and said that I did not know a thing. I should point

out that Yemelyanov was well known and respected within the MFA, and he and Kuznetsov had known each other since before the war and had a good personal relationship. Kuznetsov handed me Slavskiy's note and instructed me to keep it in my safe without showing it to anyone until further notice.

About two months went by before Kuznetsov again called me to his office and asked me to endorse one of the copies of the note and then signed the original, saying that it had to be sent off to the Central Committee right away. In answer to my puzzlement Vasiliy said, without any explanation, that it had been decided that Morokhov would be nominated as governor. Later I learned that Kuznetsov had tried to defend Yemelyanov but had not succeeded.

I soon met Igor Morokhov, and we began to meet frequently and go on foreign business trips together, as well as share the inevitable celebratory meals, bringing us close together. He was a great lover of life and, to put it mildly, did not avoid women at all. Igor turned out to be very smart and, most importantly, energetic and full of initiative. Over time we became friends.

Our close ties helped us to come to agreement on many very complex questions regarding our policy in the nuclear sphere, issues over which MFA and the Medium Machine-Building Ministry (Minsredmash) often diverged due to our different approaches to some problems. For example, the MFA might believe, due to our understanding of foreign policy and the national interest, that we should come to an agreement on a particular issue, for example, on limiting or stopping nuclear tests, while our nuclear colleagues might see this as unfavorable to them for bureaucratic reasons. Thanks to my good ties both to Yemelyanov and to Morokhov, I and some of my other MFA colleagues were often able to find points of agreement with Minsredmash and eventually the MFA leadership began to charge me with negotiating with Minsredmash leadership, including Minister Slavskiy.

Morokhov's life really was remarkable. He was less than 30 years old when be became general foreman of a large aircraft plant in Moscow, and in 1948 he was sent to the Urals to take part in the building and setting up of our first gaseous diffusion plant at Combine 813 in Sverdlovsk-44. It was at this very plant, still far from proper production levels, that the highly enriched uranium was obtained for the first Soviet uranium bomb, which was tested in 1951. It's true that Plant D-1 at Combine 813, where Morokhov worked, only produced 75 % enriched uranium at that time, material that was then enriched to over 90 % through the electromagnetic method at Combine 418 in Sverdlovsk-45.[6]

Morokhov's career progressed quickly in the Urals and in 1957 he became, before turning 40, the director of Combine 813 (now called the Urals Electromechanical Plant). He remained there until 1960 when he was called back to Moscow and transferred to a higher post in the central Minsredmash apparatus. In September 2004 I went to Novouralsk to give some lectures for staff from closed cities in the Urals and Siberia and was pleased to learn that they still remembered Igor Dmitriyevich there, and held him in high esteem.

He had told me a lot about the beauty of the nature there and the captivating life in the Urals. I remember his story about a visit to the combine by Lavrentiy Beria, who was the chairman of the Special Committee on the Creation of Atomic Weapons. The influential top official arrived in Sverdlovsk-44 by special train in the fall of 1949, when set-up operations were still under way. Boris Vannikov, Mikhail Pervukhin, Igor Kurchatov, and others accompanied him. However, set-up had yet to be completed due to problems creating porous membranes (filters) for the gaseous diffusion machines.

Morokhov and the rest of the plant leadership accompanied Beria through the plant facility, which was no less than a kilometer in length. At the plant entrance, where it was fairly warm, Igor Dmitriyevich told me, Beria threw down his coat and when the important guest had reached the facility's exit, they had to send a car through the entire facility in order to retrieve the coat. Beria was not satisfied by the visit and censured everyone for the fact that the plant, which had been under construction since 1946, still was not producing a quality product. Petrosyants has testified to this as well, writing that Beria said before his departure: «I give to you three months to finish everything, but if you do not manage everything that is required of

you in time, you'll only have yourselves to blame, and I warn you: start storing up biscuits.» It was clear to all what penalties might follow. But at the same time Beria took a number of necessary organizational measures to render real assistance to the plant, among them ordering several important scientists to help solve the problems that were arising, including Academicians Aleksandr Frumkin and Aleksandr Vinogradov, as well as German specialists. Production began as soon as 1950.[7]

Igor Dmitriyevich played a big role in pushing through the plans to convert the combine from the production of enriched uranium through gaseous diffusion, to the use of a more modern and high-tech method: gas centrifuges. The prototype centrifuge plant at Combine 813 began functioning in normal mode in January 1958, under the directorship of Morokhov. This was the first large-scale use of gas centrifuges in the world.

Based on the experience they obtained, the Combine leadership became convinced of the prospects for the industrial application of the gas centrifuge method and began to promote the construction of a full-scale industrial plant. At the time Minsredmash had not yet decided where the first plant should be built–in the Urals or in Siberia. In January 1960 Morokhov sent Minister Slavskiy a letter stating that any delay in the construction of an industrial gas centrifuge plant at Combine 813 was impermissible. And in August 1960 the ministry confirmed the order to build the world's first industrial gas centrifuge plant at this combine.[8]

Morokhov's initiative was highly valued, and he was transferred to a very important post in the ministry's central apparatus. Soon after his return to Moscow in 1960, Igor Dmitriyevich headed up Minsredmash's Scientific Research Department and did a great deal to develop scientific research institutes and design bureaus; he was soon called upon to handle international scientific relations, and then international cooperation. That is when we met.

We developed complete confidence in each other, and it was very easy for my colleagues and me to work with Morokhov. In 1970 we closely collaborated in the development of the system of IAEA comprehensive safeguards required of Non-Nuclear Weapons States Parties to the NPT (INFCIRC/153). This work was undertaken in Vienna over the course of several months in the fall of 1970 and beginning of 1971. The greatest difficulties were caused by the West Germans, but the joint actions of the U.S. and Soviet delegations made it possible to develop a solid safeguards system.

Morokhov, Defense Ministry representatives, and I worked out our position on the threshold limitation of underground nuclear tests and conducted negotiations that concluded with Richard Nixon and Leonid Brezhnev signing the Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests on July 3, 1974. In 1975–1976 Igor Dmitriyevich and I conducted negotiations on underground nuclear tests for peaceful purposes–the relevant treaty was signed by Brezhnev and Gerald Ford on May 28, 1976. Finally, in 1977 talks were initiated in Washington on a comprehensive nuclear test ban, talks that continued in Geneva in a trilateral format, with the participation of the United Kingdom. Morokhov headed the delegation at these talks until 1978.

But that is when dark clouds began to appear over his head. My own observations and those of some of friends we had in common suggested that Morokhov had good prospects to land an even higher ranking post in the nuclear branch. He was energetic, had an excellent knowledge of the nuclear industry, had proved himself to be a strong manager–having led an enormous combine in the Urals with thousands of employees–and was involved in government activity with access to the international arena. Moreover, he was relatively young, fairly healthy (although he had once suffered a severe heart attack), and had access to the country's top leadership, which knew him well.

Gradually, however, we began to note that he seemed to be overreaching; that, of course, could not have pleased Minister Slavskiy. They say that at Politburo meetings he would allow himself independently to express opinions in the presence of his own minister, which was not supposed to be done. I know for a fact that in 1974, when a narrow circle (Brezhnev, Kosygin, Podgornyy, Gromyko, and Slavskiy) were deciding the threshold for the limitation of under-

ground nuclear tests, Morokhov, who was present at the meeting, allowed himself to express the Minsredmash position, though Slavskiy was also present; Igor Dmitriyevich later told me proudly about his active participation in the discussion of this question. Apparently, he thought that his time would be coming very soon. But Slavskiy, despite his advanced age (he was then 75), would continue in the ministerial post another 10 years or more.

The end of Morokhov's career was both sad and utterly commonplace. Igor Dmitriyevich started to permit himself many excesses: girls, wine, and all of it in the open, in the presence of others among whom, at times, were those who were required attentively to follow the «dependability» and «character» of our workers, particularly when they were abroad. Those in Minsredmash who were not his friends used this behavior against him. So it all ended with his removal, in early 1978, from the post of head of our delegation to the nuclear test ban talks, and a little while later he also had to leave the post of Deputy Minister of Medium Machine-Building. Unfortunately, he did not really understand why this had occurred, apparently deciding that someone had «knifed him in the back.» As I learned later, Morokhov even believed that people in the Foreign Ministry were involved in this too. After a time I tried to explain to him what I thought had actually happened, but we failed to have a frank conversation and we gradually fell out of contact; then he became seriously ill. It's a pity that this man, who truly was outstanding, did not become the head of this important area, so critical to the nation, and perhaps an even more significant government actor, since he had all of the necessary capabilities except one: the ability to gradually, without jumping ahead or anticipating events, move towards his goal.

DIRECTOR GENERAL

Over the nearly 50 years of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the appointment of its Directors General has often caused problems and led to disputes.

In 1981, the Western countries proposed a representative of the Federal Republic of Germany as a candidate–the State Secretary of the Ministry of Research and Technology, Hans Haunschild. To compensate, the developing countries proposed the candidacy of Domingo Siazon, the representative of the Philippines. The Soviet Union did not like either candidate. When the matter came to a vote, neither of the candidates, despite a series of repeated votes, could obtain the necessary number of votes. With the situation deadlocked, the candidacy of Swedish MFA state secretary and former Minister of Foreign Affairs Hans Blix, a prominent international lawyer and experienced and well-known diplomat, was proposed. He was confirmed by the IAEA General Conference on its following work day, September 26, 1981, and remained in the post of Director General for 16 years–until 1997, when the current Director General, Mohamed ElBaradei (Egypt), was appointed.

I also established a relationship of trust with Blix; we met many times *tête-a-tête* either at my house or at his. We conferred with each other particularly frequently during crises, for example during the 1991 events in Iraq or in connection with the situation in North Korea in 1993–1994. Blix invited me to become one of his outside advisors, a position I served in for 10 years, including during the tenure of his successor, ElBaradei.

I remember a conversation with Blix during which we told each other of our doubts and worries about the number and character of the IAEA safeguards related to the so-called Agreed Framework between the United States and North Korea of October 1994. The thing is that under this agreement IAEA safeguards in North Korea would be introduced in stages, beginning with observing the process of freezing the graphite-moderated plutonium production reactor, and later along with the construction and commissioning in North Korea of a nuclear power plant (NPP), which was supposed to be built by KEDO, an international consortium. Further, not all of the suspected nuclear facilities would be safeguarded. This procedure did not correspond either to the letter or to the spirit of the current safeguards system. Nonetheless, at the time this alternative was probably the only way to get out of the situation that had arisen, since the most important task was to keep the DPRK within the NPT and the

international nuclear nonproliferation regime. After lengthy discussions we came to the conclusion that in reality there simply was no other solution. The agreement with North Korea lasted about 10 years, which is not bad. Of course, afterwards North Korea left the NPT anyway, but that is another story. 

Notes

[1] Anatoly Dobrynin, *In Confidence: Moscow's Ambassador to America's Six Cold War Presidents*. (New York: Random House, 1995), p. 149.

[2] Ibid, pp. 150–51.

[3] IAEA document INFCIRC/254. On the development of guidelines for the export of nuclear material, equipment and technology, see: Roland Timerbaev, *Nuclear Suppliers Group: the history of its creation (1974–78)* (Moscow: PIR Center, 2000).

[4] Sieben und Siebzig Professoren, Vaterland, du bist Verloren! German was not then and is not now an official UN language. However, one of the interpreters sitting in one of the booths translated into one of the official languages, and the other translators from that language into the other official languages.

[5] Arkady Shevchenko, *Breaking With Moscow* (New York: Knopf, 1985). A Russian translation of this book was published in 2004.

[6] It is interesting that the Americans followed the same route. They obtained enriched uranium through gaseous diffusion and used a cyclotron to obtain a higher level of enrichment. The Hiroshima bomb was 84 % enriched. My American friend Herbert York told me that in 1944–1945, when he was still a young specialist, he was involved with re-enriching uranium in a cyclotron (the Americans called it a «Calutron,» after the state of California, since it was designed by Nobel laureate Ernest Lawrence at the University of California at Berkeley, not far from San Francisco). According to Herbert, in June 1945 they received instructions to halt re-enrichment, and he understood that enough weapons material had been accumulated for the first uranium bomb.

[7] E.T. Artemov and A. E. Bedel, *Taming Uranium: Pages from the History of the Urals Electromechanical Combine* (Novouralsk, 1999), pp. 55–60.

[8] Ibid., pp. 137–38.