FROM THE EDITOR

1 Preventing the Utter Chaos: The Russian Way – Vladimir Orlov

“Syria was the litmus test, the moment of truth. The Americans have played a wicked trick in Iraq. They then repeated it in Libya. And they were not allowed to pull off another such stunt in the Middle East. And who has stopped them? Russia has finally found its strength, and its mission: to stand in the way of utter chaos in the Middle East, and to prevent a complete collapse of the principles of international law on a global scale,” – writes the Editor-in-Chief of the Security Index journal.

INTERVIEW

3 Russia as a Balancing Force in International Affairs – Aleksey Pushkov

Whether and to what extent Russian foreign policy has been a success is a subject of heated debates both in Russia and abroad. Russian policy is being enacted amid a wide range of international challenges and problems, from the situation in Syria to the erosion of the global world order. Reacting to these challenges and problems requires a well-balanced and firm approach, as well as initiative. The Chairman of the Russian State Duma Foreign Affairs Committee Aleksey Pushkov in his interview speaks about Russia’s practical efforts to pursue its national interests and priorities.

9 A Global Power that Has no Global Goals – Vyacheslav Nikonov

In 2013 the new Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation was issued, which aims to achieve new development and security goals. The Chairman of the Committee for Education of the Russian State Duma, a historian and foreign policy expert Vyacheslav Nikonov in his interview covers the questions of Russia’s foreign policy priorities, the prospects and problems of cooperation with the U.S. and China, and the future of security and economic integration in the Asia Pacific region.

15 Arab Spring Turns Islamic World into Battlefield between Iran and Turkey – Mikhail Margelov

From the military coup in Egypt to the protracted civil war in Syria, which has broken all possible rules and required direct intervention by the leading world powers, pressing political crises have created a tangle of problems and contradictions all over the Muslim world. The causes and essence of the transformations taking place are covered in the interview with the Chairman of the Committee for Foreign Affairs at Council of Federation of the Federal
Assembly the Russian Federation, the Special Representative of the President for Russia’s cooperation with the African countries, Mikhail Margelov

ANALYSIS

21 Militarization of the Middle East: Dynamics and Risks (Article I) – Natalia Kalinina

The crisis in Syria and the long-standing general tensions in the Middle East, compounded by the Arab Spring, draw attention to the region’s conventional weapons market, which has been growing rapidly in recent years. The link between the region’s militarization and the ongoing fundamental political shifts could cause unpredictable consequences for the entire planet. The author offers an analytical review of the ongoing Middle Eastern conflicts in connection with the conventional arms market.

37 The Evolving U.S. Cybersecurity Doctrine – Derek Johanson

Since the 2010 public discovery of the Stuxnet virus, cybersecurity has continued to vie for center stage in the global international security dialogue. For the first time in history, in March 2013 cybersecurity risks were declared the leading threat against the United States. However, the legal, military, and international understanding of cybersecurity developed in the U.S. has been anything but unified, and continues to send mixed messages to the global community.

ROUND TABLE


The establishment of a WMD-free zone in the Middle East is a key international challenge that will largely determine the outcome of the NPT Review Conference in 2015. In addition to the traditional differences, the situation is currently being compounded by the events in Egypt and Syria. The conference could become the first real step towards implementing the decision of the 1995 NPT Review Conference, and strengthen the NPT and the entire nuclear nonproliferation regime. Otherwise, all the achievements of the past 18 years in this area may be called into question.

COMMENTARY


The signing by the nuclear-weapon states of the Protocol that completes the establishment of a nuclear-weapons free zone in Southeast Asia—a region where the United States, Russia, China and India all have major interests—has run up against a host of international political contentions. These include economic and political control over resource-rich offshore areas, disputed territories, and varied approaches to military security.

67 How to Create a World Financial Community Resilient to Cyber-Espionage and Hacking? – William Foster, Hannah Thoreson

What are the actual financial losses suffered by the world financial community
from hacking? How much of this was due to the Russian cyber-mafia? Are there really cyberwars between the U.S. and Iran or U.S. and China? And what might be the potential financial impact? The authors comment on the STIX system for automatic structured threat information developed by the U.S. government think tank MITRE and its prospects for U.S.-Russia-China cooperation in cybersecurity.

71 **Iranian Election Results: Change on Horizon?** – Yulia Sveshnikova, Amir Roknifard

The Iranian presidential election held in June 2013 was won by the moderate candidate, Hassan Rouhani; his victory came as something of a surprise even for his own team. The authors analyze the factors that have brought the centrist candidate to power in Iran, won him the support of ordinary Iranians, and secured his backing by the country’s Supreme Leader. The question is, will the new Iranian president prove capable of justifying the expectations of his supporters, and of conducting reforms.

**REVIEW OF RECENT WORLD EVENTS**

77 **International Security Index in June–September 2013: A Season of Political Storms** – Galiya Ibragimova

The international security situation took a sharp turn for the worse in the summer of 2013 due to the increasingly deadly civil war in Syria and the threat of U.S. intervention in the conflict. The military coup in Egypt has also contributed to growing instability in the region. The security situation has remained unchanged or even showed some improvement in other parts of the world (North Korea, Mali, Afghanistan) — but that was not enough to outweigh the deterioration elsewhere. Members of the PIR Center International Expert Group – Evgeny Buzhinsky, Sergio Duarte, Pal Dunay, Dayan Jayatilleka, Andrey Kortunov, Abdulaziz Sager, Evgeny Satanovsky, Farkhod Tolipov Mustafa Fetouri, and Konstantin von Eggert – comment on these recent world events.

82 **A New Cold War?** – Yury Fedorov

Right up to the day when the Russian-U.S. arrangement on Syrian chemical weapons known as “Kerry-Lavrov pact” was settled, relations between Moscow and Washington were progressively degrading into a bitter political confrontation. Many observers opined that President Obama’s refusal to meet Vladimir Putin in September 2013 marked the beginning of a new Cold War. The author comments on recent activity in Russian-U.S. relations.

85 **Institutional Challenges to Global Stability** – Dmitry Evstafiev

Global stability is institutional phenomena. International consensus on key issues is formed in international institutions. These institutions also constitute the foundation of international law, and they underpin the implementation of international norms. The author argues that the world has clearly entered a period of a fatal crisis of post-bipolar institutions which was entirely predictable, as a natural consequence of the wave of transformations that began years ago.

**LIBRARY**

87 **BRICS as an Alternative to Western Hegemony** – Anastasia Kovaleva

The BRICS are being closely watched, as growing political players, both by developed countries and the developing nations which pin their hopes on multi-vector diplomacy. The article reviews a collection of research papers entitled “Rising BRICS Giants: Their Role in Global Politics and Modernization
Strategies” presenting a detailed statistical analysis of the BRICS countries’ shared problems, their international positioning, the distinctive features of their foreign policy, and modernization strategies.

LETTERS TO THE EDITOR

89 More than Just a Game: Impact of the Ingress Project on the Internet and Security – Vitaly Kabernik

91 ABOUT THE AUTHORS

95 SECURITY INDEX ARTICLES IN 2013

99 PIR CENTER’S EXPERT GROUPS

FINAL QUOTES

On Modern Philosophy
To the Editor-in-Chief:

Dear Sir,

In November 2012 Niantic Labs, a division of Google, launched a new project called Ingress, an augmented reality game for smartphones and tablets running the Android operating system.

Before Ingress, Niantic Labs was mostly known as the developer of the now-defunct Field Trip project, which offered local business search capability using Google maps. Essentially, the division’s main goal was to improve Google’s mapping services. It is said that the main purpose of launching Ingress was to improve algorithms for walking navigation using Google maps. But the project is much more than that. It would be no exaggeration to describe it as a harbinger of change that will transform the Internet and open up new ways of using integrated geo-location services.

Ingress has two separate parts. The first is a field game. The mobile phone application displays a map of the city, which is full of various objects visible only to those who play the game. The most important of those objects are “portals,” which are linked to various landmarks. It is these portals, and concomitant control of the surrounding area, that the players fight for. Teams playing for one of the two factions in the game try to seize and hold these portals.

The portals can be used to establish “control fields.” Such a field can be set up by linking three different portals, thereby enclosing a triangular area between them. Linking the portals requires portal keys, which can be obtained, with a varying degree of probability, by interacting with the key points. In practice, if a player wants to create a field, he needs either to use the links established by other players or physically visit at least two landmarks required for that field.

The need for the physical presence of the player at the portals is the key difference of the Ingress project from all the other computer games. The game creates an incentive for the player to visit the same locations regularly as part of a virtual struggle for control of the city. Ingress continually monitors the players’ movements using satellite navigation; the information is continuously fed to Google servers.

There is one other aspect of the field game. The players are encouraged to create their own portals, to which end they need to take a photo of the corresponding landmark (the photo must contain a geo tag) and submit it to the company that runs the game. Several thousand new portals have been registered in Moscow since the beginning of this year, and the process is only just gaining momentum. The landmarks used as the new portals are often unconventional: graffiti, derelict buildings, rooftops, clubs, etc. One example is the Great Wall of Los Angeles, a long mural with dozens of portals along its entire length. Google does not make a secret of the fact that it wants players to use local commercial outfits and businesses as portal locations.

The second part of the game is a secret plotline, with a virtual investigation. Every day the players are asked to solve fairly complex puzzles, which usually require an impressive degree of
proficiency in computer technologies and cryptography. Solving the puzzles is rewarded by virtual bonuses. On several occasions the puzzles were provided by Google’s commercial partners, in an apparent attempt to create a new way of advertising in the nascent market segment of augmented reality.

Interestingly, Ingress is not a free-for-all game; those who wish to take part must first request an individual invitation, or receive such an invitation from friends who have already become players. In early 2013 the invites were issued only by Niantic Labs, and it could take up to several months for invitation requests to be processed. At present, existing players have the right to invite a limited number of their friends (one or two), bypassing the formal procedure. As a result, the number of Ingress players is not large, which gives the whole thing a certain air of exclusivity. For example, the community of Ingress players in Moscow is estimated at only 1,500–2,000 people, of which only a few hundred are active. Nevertheless, the community is growing steadily. They keep creating new social networks and groups to discuss tactics, coordinate their work, and use the opportunities offered by the game in new creative ways.

It is claimed that the information about the users’ movements and their other personal data are being used mostly to improve Google’s mapping services, including algorithms for creating walking routes. But that is not the whole truth. The key word here is augmented reality, which is a new area of Internet technologies.

The emergence of Ingress has inevitably caused some alarmist statements. Many point out that the game essentially conducts continuous surveillance over its players, who often happen to be citizens of foreign countries. The players’ movements can be tracked for intelligence-gathering purposes. The locations most frequently visited by the player can be used to determine where he/she works, or what his/her personal habits are. All this information can then be used for innocent as well as nefarious purposes, especially if it falls into the wrong hands. There are plenty of legal implications, both domestically and internationally, for such games and services to attract the attention of the authorities.

In practice, however, most of these alarmist statements are groundless. It is highly unlikely that Ingress was created to monitor the movements of foreign citizens. After all, such monitoring can be done using other means, just as effectively and also without the knowledge of the people being monitored. Modern mobile devices use a lot of geo-location data and an always-on Internet connection, primarily to achieve various business goals, promote new products, and improve the convenience of using distributed information.

In this context, Ingress is just a harbinger of the augmented reality applications to come. Almost every single one of these applications will rely on user location information. All of them will feed vast amounts of data to the central servers. Theoretically, all those data can be processed. But the sheer volume of data will require such an amount of resources to process that the situation can hardly be considered as a new challenge.

Nevertheless, legal questions are already being asked. Ways of resolving these potential legal problems have yet to be developed, and the appearance of new augmented reality products is inevitable. Perhaps we should start looking for solutions right now, instead of trying to catch up with what will by then have become well-established Internet practices several years down the line. This revolution is not a matter of the future—it is already happening.

Best Regards,

**Vitaly Kabernik**
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MGIMO University
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Moscow, 119454, Russia

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**MORE THAN JUST A GAME: IMPACT OF THE INGRESS PROJECT ON THE INTERNET AND SECURITY**
Since the 2010 public discovery of the Stuxnet virus, cybersecurity has continued to vie for a place at center stage in the global dialogue on international security. For the first time in American history, on March 12, 2013 during the U.S. intelligence community’s Annual Worldwide Threat Assessment before Congress, Director of U.S. National Intelligence James Clapper declared cybersecurity risks the leading threat against the United States and echoed President Obama’s increasing requests for unified action to secure the interests of the United States and its allies in cyberspace.

Despite these entreaties to come to a consensus on the rules and definitions of U.S. cyber operations and objectives, however, the legal, military, and international understanding of cybersecurity developed in the United States has been anything but unified, and continues to send mixed messages to the global community. Legislation has been too contested to be enacted into law, precise military strategy remains shrouded in secrecy, and international bodies have struggled to present their members with binding agreements on anything but the most basic issues. Nevertheless, the evolution of developments in each of these strategic spheres indicates that these fragmented approaches to cybersecurity are gradually acquiring similarities. Though incomplete in scope, a more certain understanding of cybersecurity in the United States is emerging—a position that the international community can begin to take into account as cyber-threats and deterrents become increasingly unavoidable considerations in international affairs.

To comprehend this developing understanding of cybersecurity, the trends in formal definitions of cybersecurity terminology will be presented as far as they are available in the legal, military, and international context. These terminological trends, informed by the context in which they were developed, will then serve to inform the evolving strategic understanding of cybersecurity in the United States.

**DOMESTIC LEGISLATION**

U.S. legislation regarding cybersecurity has reflected to the fullest extent the difficulties of coming to a unified understanding of cybersecurity. Although hundreds of cybersecurity-related bills have been presented in Congress, no laws have been enacted that provide a comprehensive cybersecurity framework. Legislation that has been passed tends to be conceptually vague and industry specific, including the 1996 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, the 1999 Gramm–Leach–Bililey Act and the 2002 Homeland Security Act, which included the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA). Since that time, other bills introduced in Congress, such as the Stop Online Piracy Act of 2011, the Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Information Protection Act of 2011 and the Cybersecurity Act of 2012 have described a more comprehensive vision of cybersecurity, but all have failed to be agreed upon. Despite the lack of a formal result, however, the exchanges in Congress have nevertheless changed the American understanding of cybersecurity, as evident in the terminology used in cybersecurity bills.

To understand the nature of the changing legal climate surrounding the cybersecurity discussion in the United States, a lexical analysis of the frequency of cybersecurity terminology in...
congressional legislation identifies some interesting trends. Figure 1 identifies how many different pieces of legislation were introduced in either house of Congress in a given year containing a particular term related to cybersecurity. These terms were selected from the legislation itself (including those mentioned above), those used in international forums and independent research, as well as executive orders on cybersecurity including President Obama’s February 2012 declaration, although word counts for 2013 are not included in order to preserve the integrity of the data (see Table 1).

Although the pertinence of cyber-related topics certainly varies throughout the years, the trend line indicates that, on average, each year merits 15 to 16 more mentions than the previous year for these terms in aggregate—some terms becoming more frequently mentioned at higher rates than others. Thus, despite there being no widely accepted definitions of the term “cybersecurity” in U.S. legislation, the fact that there are fewer than 10 mentions a year until 2004 and 185 mentions in 2011 certainly attests to changes in the perceived seriousness of the dialogue. It is important to note, however, that as the world becomes more networked it is expected that terminology related to the cyber world and information infrastructure will become more prevalent independently of policy changes. To isolate the relative frequency of cybersecurity and cyber warfare terminology from simply cyber terminology, the words were classified into each of these categories based on the strategic context surrounding each term (Table 2). The classification “Information Infrastructure” refers to the essential terminology necessary for discussing the cyber world generally, such as “cyberspace” and “information infrastructure.” The classification “Cybersecurity” includes terms related to assessing and ensuring the safety of the “cyber environment,” such as “cyber risk” and “cybersecurity” itself. “Cyber Warfare” as a category, contains cyber terminology that has been applied to the traditionally military understanding of operations, and includes terms such as “cyber defense” and “cyber war.” These three classifications were considered in aggregate from 2000 to 2012.

Although Figure 2 shows that cybersecurity terminology is by far the most frequently mentioned of the three groups, frequency alone is not the basis on which a comparison can be made because the categories by nature contain neither the same number of terms nor equally significant terms. Relative rates of change in frequency, however, can be used to gauge emerging topics of interest, however. By comparing the average frequency with which each category was discussed during
### Table 1. Key Cybersecurity Terminology in Congressional Legislation, 2000–2012

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the first five years of the millennium relative to the last five years, it is easy to see that although legislators discuss information infrastructure twice as much (2.1) in the last five years as they did between the years 2000 and 2005, the group of terms representing cyber security are mentioned 4.4 times as often and terms relating to cyber warfare 9.7 times—nearly a factor of 10 relative to the past (Table 3). The final column normalizes these multipliers as a percentage relative to the increase in total cyber terminology. This figure is generated only within the framework of the selected terms and cannot be relied upon to compare the relative importance of these categories to other topics of interest, such as preventing identity theft or copyright fraud, for example, but within the context of the cybersecurity discussion it is useful for understanding how the distribution of attention to each category has been changing. For example, cyber infrastructure, though it is discussed more than twice as much in the last five years as it was between 2000 and 2005, stands at only 57% of the increase seen by all the terms in aggregate.

The discussion on cybersecurity, however, saw more growth within the context of the cyber debate, standing at 122% of the increase in all terms, and cyber warfare, though itself a small category, over the last five years has been discussed at 267% of the increase in frequency observed across all categories; again, more than twice that of the rate of increase in cybersecurity generally, which, in turn, itself is discussed more than twice as frequently as defining contextual terms dealing with information infrastructure. This is expected, since there is little need to redefine the context of the discussion (that is, to redefine information infrastructure); however, this natural process does not negate the fact that there has been a monumental effort in recent years to explore particular topics within that context.

Figure 2. Mentions of Classifications of Cyber Terminology in Congressional Legislation, 2000–2012
Undoubtedly, then, cybersecurity is not only becoming more pertinent a topic in current legislation, it is apparently becoming more militarized. It would be unwise, however, to ignore the particularities of where these changes have been occurring. Table 3 has been expended to isolate these particular terms with their relative growth multipliers between the last five and the first five years of the century, the difference in the average number of mentions per year over these two time periods, and the ratio of discussion frequency relative to that of all terms combined.

The fact that the term “cybersecurity” is discussed about 15 times more frequently since 2008 than between 2000 and 2005 and appears in about 45 more bills of legislation a year now than at the beginning of the last decade is truly a testament to the shift in attention to this topic. The specifics, however, provide additional insight. “Cyber Threat” as a term saw by far the most growth, not nominally (“cybersecurity” holds that position) but relative to the past frequency of discussion. Likewise, “cybersecurity threat,” a less frequently used synonym, experienced similar, rapid growth of 14 times the original average mentions. “Cyber Attack,” a more militaristic term, also increased by 14 times between the two time periods and appears in twice as much legislation as “cybersecurity threat.”

Other terms with extraordinary increases in frequency include “cyberspace” at 10.5 times the original average, “cyber crime,” at 9.5, and “cyber defense,” at 8.0 times the original frequency of mentions (see Table 4). Many terms, likewise, have appeared in the last several years that were not mentioned once between 2000 and 2005, and therefore cannot have a multiplier. These include the cybersecurity terms “cyber risk,” “cyber incident,” and “cyber intrusions,” and the cyber warfare terms “cyber warfare,” “cyber warrior,” and “cyber sabotage.” Although these terms are still not used with particular frequency, they, too, represent a shift in mentality and attention.

### Table 3. Relative Frequency of Cyber Terminology Categories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>38.8</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>57%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>95.6</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>122%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Warfare</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>19.4</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>267%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>42.4</td>
<td>153.8</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>100%</td>
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</table>

### Table 4. Relative Frequency of Cyber Terminology Categories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Terms</th>
<th>Multiplier</th>
<th>Difference</th>
<th>Ratio to Total (%)</th>
<th>Category</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cyber Threat</td>
<td>18.7</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td>515</td>
<td>W</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cybersecurity</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>44.6</td>
<td>412</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cybersecurity Threat</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>386</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyber Attack</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>386</td>
<td>W</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyberspace</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cybercrime or Cyber Crime</td>
<td>9.5</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>262</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyber Defense</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>W</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Critical Infrastructure</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>13.4</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information Sharing</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyber Risk</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyber Incident</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyber Intrusions</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>S</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyber Warfare</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>W</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyber or Cyberspace Warrior</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>W</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyber Sabotage</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>W</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyber Environment</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyber War</td>
<td>NA</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>W</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information Warfare</td>
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<td>–0.8</td>
<td>–22</td>
<td>W</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information Infrastructure</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>–1.0</td>
<td>–23</td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>111.4</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Although an exploration of terminology frequency provides some insight, it does little to explain the strategic position of the United States with regard to cybersecurity. For this purpose an actual study of particular congressional legislation is necessary. As previously alluded to, one of the fundamental challenges with understanding cybersecurity in the United States is seen in reality that legislation more often deals with particularities of certain problems rather than the global principles defining them. For this reason, the few pieces of legislation that actually regulate cybersecurity contain few if any useful definitions that can be applied to concepts broader than the law’s original intent. While this prevents overregulation and limits unintentional fall-out with voters, this tendency is one of the key reasons why there is no developed understanding of cybersecurity from a U.S. legislative standpoint. The term “cybersecurity” in fact, to this day, has not been defined in law. The context of cybersecurity, however, has been addressed at various times, and the vocabulary of this contextual framework can identify the skeleton of the more general legislative understanding of the subject.

The first instance of specific cybersecurity regulation was the 1996 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, which did not mention cybersecurity in any form, but defined “Health Information” and “Individually Identifiable Health Information” and required that “Standards” be met to “protect against any reasonably anticipated threats or hazards to the security or integrity of the information … unauthorized uses or disclosures of the information.”1

The 1999 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act followed a nearly identical format, except that it defined “Non Public Personal Information” as relating to financial institutions, and defined “Standards” that, in addition to those principles mentioned above, added the imperative to “protect against unauthorized access to or use of such records or information which could result in substantial harm or inconvenience to any customer.”2

It was not until 2002, when the Department of Homeland Security was created, that there was a meaningful attempt to define the broader context of cybersecurity. The Homeland Security Act of 2002 contained the Federal Information Security Management Act, in which the following key terms were defined as described in Table 5.

The definition of “information security” as “protecting information and information systems from unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction” is the first and closest equivalent to “cybersecurity” in the legislative history of the United States. The term “cybersecurity” itself does appear in the text three times, each time as a title rather than in a definition or exposition. Strategically, the document outlines some interesting priorities of U.S. national security initiatives as related to the cyber world. Although the act does little by way of regulating cybersecurity practices beyond policy within federal agencies, it created the NET GUARD, or commission of cybersecurity experts and volunteers, as a gesture that that the issue was going to be studied more thoroughly and that a future response would be developed. It also appointed an “Under Secretary of Information Analysis” with particular responsibilities:

[The Secretary] shall carry out comprehensive assessments of the vulnerabilities of the key resources and critical infrastructure [and] ... integrate relevant information, analyses, and vulnerability assessments ... to develop a comprehensive national plan for securing the key resources and critical infrastructure of the United States, including power production, generation, and distribution systems, information technology and telecommunications systems (including satellites), electronic financial and property record storage and transmission systems, emergency preparedness communications systems, and the physical and technological assets that support such systems.3

Strategically, then, U.S. policy regarding information security was established to protect critical infrastructure, that is, as stated earlier, resources that, if harmed, would “have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters.”4

This strategic understanding of cybersecurity has continued to remain the foundation of cybersecurity policy in the United States, although, as previously mentioned, additional significant legislation has failed to be accepted since the signing of the Homeland Security Act into law. There have been several attempts, however, to further regulate cybersecurity—the most significant of which was the Cybersecurity Act of 2012, which failed to be signed into law in August of 2012. The Act had the support of the White House and had passed the Senate, and would have represented the most sweeping reform of U.S. cybersecurity law to date. The understanding represented therein is useful, therefore, for understanding the legal position of the nation. The terms defined in the Act are given in Table 6.
### Table 5. Key Cybersecurity Definitions from the Homeland Security Act of 2002

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Terms</th>
<th>Reference</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Information Security</td>
<td>Definitions</td>
<td>Protecting information and information systems from unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction in order to provide: (A) integrity, which means guarding against improper information modification or destruction, and includes ensuring information nonrepudiation and authenticity; (B) confidentiality, which means preserving authorized restrictions on access and disclosure, including means for protecting personal privacy and proprietary information; (C) availability, which means ensuring timely and reliable access to and use of information; and (D) authentication, which means utilizing digital credentials to assure the identity of users and validate their access;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information Technology</td>
<td>Title 40</td>
<td>(A) Any equipment or interconnected system or subsystem of equipment, used in the automatic acquisition, storage, analysis, evaluation, manipulation, management, movement, control, display, switching, interchange, transmission, or reception of data or information by the executive agency, if the equipment is used by the executive agency directly or is used by a contractor under a contract with the executive agency that requires the use: (i) of that equipment; or (ii) of that equipment to a significant extent in the performance of a service or the furnishing of a product; (B) includes computers, ancillary equipment (including imaging peripherals, input, output, and storage devices necessary for security and surveillance), peripheral equipment designed to be controlled by the central processing unit of a computer, software, firmware and similar procedures, services (including support services), and related resources; but (C) does not include any equipment acquired by a federal contractor incidental to a federal contract.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information System</td>
<td>Definitions</td>
<td>Any equipment or interconnected system or subsystems of equipment that is used in the automatic acquisition, storage, manipulation, management, movement, control, display, switching, interchange, transmission, or reception of data or information, and includes: (A) computers and computer networks; (B) ancillary equipment; (C) software, firmware, and related procedures; (D) services, including support services; and (E) related resources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NET GUARD</td>
<td>Sec 223 Enhancement of non-federal Cybersecurity</td>
<td>The term “critical infrastructure” has the meaning given that term in section 1016(e) of the USA PATRIOT Act (42 U.S.C. 5195c(e)). Systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The definitions occupy pages of material and can be found in Appendix A. Some interesting observations, however, include the following. First, that the definitions of “Critical Infrastructure,” “Information Security,” and “Information System” have remained essentially the same, and new terms directly related to cybersecurity are built upon this established foundation. The term “Cyber Risk,” for example, is one that could compromise “the operation of information infrastructure essential to the reliable operation of covered critical infrastructure.” In addition, a concrete understanding of a cybersecurity threat was identified as “any action that may result in unauthorized access to, exfiltration of, manipulation of, or impairment to the integrity, confidentiality, or availability of an information system or information that is stored on, processed by, or transiting an information system”—terminology which directly employs the terminology from the definition of cybersecurity adopted in 2002 and confirmed in 2012. The Act would have created a secretary to create concrete classifications of critical infrastructure and information resource systems in both the public and private sector, after which the organizations or individuals responsible for such infrastructure would be held to standards of information sharing and the maintenance of “adequate security.”

The act recognized that there was still much research to be done before measures could be further tailored, and included the expectation to develop a concrete “Cybersecurity Mission,” or “activities that encompass the full range of threat reduction, vulnerability reduction, deterrence, international engagement, incident response, resiliency, and recovery policies and activities, including computer network operations, information assurance, law enforcement, diplomacy, military, and intelligence missions as such activities relate to the security and stability of cyberspace.” This implied a more detailed understanding of activities that indicated a threat, such as malicious reconnaissance, the loss of technical control of a system, etc., as well as the expectation that the United States should be able to respond with “countermeasures” as against any physical strike. Finally, the act stipulated that a cybersecurity “incident” includes occurrences that “actually or imminently jeopardize” the foundations of information security as explained in its definition—indicating that the United States may be prepared to be the first actor when a threat is characterized by such imminence (Section 201). As the terminology becomes more militarized, such an understanding could have significant ramifications on the international stage if developed strategically. These principles seem to represent the most developed legal understanding of cybersecurity in the United States—namely, that the United States must protect its critical infrastructure, that this requires both a public and a private effort, that the United States must continue to develop a more militarized response to such threats and will be prepared to act in advance, if necessary, to protect these systems. Though the law was not passed, these

Table 6. List of Terms from the Cybersecurity Act of 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Critical Infrastructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Covered Critical Infrastructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyber Risk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information Infrastructure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incident</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information Security</td>
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<tr>
<td>Information Technology</td>
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<tr>
<td>Adequate Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continuous Monitoring</td>
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<tr>
<td>National Security System</td>
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<td>Threat Assessment</td>
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<td>Cybersecurity Mission</td>
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<td>Certified Entity</td>
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<td>Countermeasure</td>
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<td>Cybersecurity Threat</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cybersecurity Threat Indicator</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protect</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cybercrime</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information Sharing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Information Sharing Program (Private sector, state and local governments, and International partners)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
objectives were preserved in President Obama’s executive order on cybersecurity in February of 2013, and continue to be included in the 2013 Cybersecurity Act currently in development.

MILITARY UNDERSTANDING

The military understanding of cybersecurity in the United States is by far the most clearly defined, both literally and strategically. This understanding is identified in both statements of joint doctrine and in individual documents describing the cybersecurity policy of particular branches of the military.

Joint Doctrine Definitions

Although the military includes many different bodies with their own codes, policies, and doctrines, the joint chiefs of staff of the army, navy, marines, and air force maintain an updated joint publication of military definitions. This document, entitled *Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military Operations*, is intended to provide a current update of common doctrine, using the latest material from individual chiefs of staff as the source. Whereas a study of every strategic document would be impractical, this document provides a year-by-year record of the doctrinal place occupied by particular terminology in the context of U.S. military operations.

Table 7 indicates key cybersecurity terminology that has been included in U.S. military doctrine since the year 2000. Note that to highlight only the most important changes, only significant years related to the evolution of the understanding of cybersecurity are included.

The table reveals several interesting trends and adjustments in the evolution of the U.S. military’s cybersecurity position. First, that in the year 2000 the doctrine is defined by an understanding of “Information Warfare,” which includes the closely related terms “information operations,” “offensive information operations,” and “defensive information operations.” Information Warfare is vaguely defined as being “Information operations conducted during time of crisis or conflict to achieve or promote specific objectives over a specific adversary or adversaries,” and Information Operations being “Actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one’s own information and information systems.”

By 2006, however, this strict understanding was no longer part of military doctrine. The idea of information warfare and offensive information operations was discarded and replaced with an expanded definition of information operations: “The integrated employment of the core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own.” In other words, information operations is considered an active struggle for influence over an enemy’s decision-making ability and is prepared to employ any means to that end. In fact, in 2012 the definition was expanded to include any information-related resource as a possible means to carry out information operations. Thus, the military understanding of cybersecurity is one that falls within the understanding of information operations. International debates and misunderstandings about the scope of cybersecurity are addressed in this definition. Some organizations have advocated an understanding of cybersecurity that entails, among other things, control over physiological and information-content-related resources and have incurred the criticism of nations and organizations with a more confined understanding of cybersecurity. “Information operations” is the equivalent of these broad cybersecurity definitions found elsewhere, but does not draw the same attention and subsequent criticism in the cybersecurity debate, although it is similar in force and scope to broader, disputed definitions.

Within the scope of cybersecurity itself, the military, like congress, does not maintain a definition of cybersecurity. Although the terms “communication security” and “computer security” have been defined since 2000, they addressed narrower aspects of the discussion. In 2006 the military had an incomplete definition of cyberspace as a generic medium of communication. In 2009, however, there was a dramatic change in cybersecurity policy. Cyberspace was defined as a domain of warfare as operationally palpable as the land, air, sea, and space domains. It was at this time that the doctrine accordingly defined terms such as “cyberspace operations,” “cyber counterintelligence,” and “full-spectrum superiority.” Cyberspace Operations became the
means of military action and is defined, simply, as “the employment of cyber capabilities where
the primary purpose is to achieve objectives in or through cyberspace.”

As the global situation in the cyberspace domain became more complicated, however, this
understanding continued to become even more militarized in response to the increase in
perceived threats. “Critical infrastructure protection” was an idea defined in 2006, and carries
the same understanding conveyed in the legal context of preventing disruption to vital U.S.
systems. In 2011, however, the military defined the term “catastrophic event” as “any natural or
man-made incident, including terrorism, which results in extraordinary levels of mass casualties,
damage, or disruption severely affecting the population, infrastructure, environment, economy,
national morale, and/or government functions.” Accompanying this sense of vulnerability was a
massive effort to develop concrete responses to threats to critical infrastructure and those of a
catastrophic nature. To this end, new definitions were created that began to demonstrate the
sophistication in cyberspace operations that was expected in the other domains, including terms
such as “cyberspace superiority,” “offensive cyberspace operations,” “defensive cyberspace
operations,” “defensive cyberspace operations response action.” As part of this shift, terms that

Table 7. Cybersecurity Terminology in Joint Military Doctrine

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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>Catastrophic Event</td>
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<td>Critical Infrastructure Protection</td>
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<td>Cyberspace Operations</td>
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<td>Full Spectrum Superiority</td>
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<td>Cyberspace Superiority</td>
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<td>Defensive Cyberspace Operation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Defensive Cyberspace Operation</td>
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<td>Dynamic Threat Assessment</td>
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<td>Electronic Attack</td>
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<td>Electronic Warfare</td>
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<tr>
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<td>XX</td>
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<tr>
<td>Information-related Capability</td>
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<tr>
<td>National Critical Infrastructure</td>
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<td>Network Operations</td>
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<td>Attack the Network Operations</td>
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<td>Computer Intrusion</td>
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<tr>
<td>Computer Intrusion Detection</td>
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<tr>
<td>Computer Network Attack</td>
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<td>Computer Network Exploitation</td>
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<td>Computer Network Operations</td>
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<td>Defensive Information Operations</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Information Infrastructure</td>
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<td>Offensive Information Operations</td>
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Notes: Three dashes (—) indicate an undefined term, one cross (X) indicates a definition that is later altered
by future doctrine, and two crosses (XX) indicate a definition that matches the 2013 understanding of the
concept.
had been relied on in recent years such as “computer network operations,” “computer network exploitations,” “computer network defense,” “information security,” “information system,” and “global information infrastructure” were all removed from military doctrine—falling either under “information operations,” “cyberspace operations,” or the new term, “information-related capability,” which is defined as “a tool, technique, or activity employed within a dimension of the information environment that can be used to create effects and operationally desirable conditions.”

The implications of these new definitions are further reaching than ever before and not entirely understood by global actors. “Offensive cyberspace operations,” which are “intended to project power by the application of force in or through cyberspace” follow currently unknown rules of engagement. “Defensive cyberspace operations response action,” for example, demonstrates another controversial right—to exercise “deliberate, authorized defensive measures or activities taken outside of the defended network to protect and defend Department of Defense cyberspace capabilities or other designated systems,” the object of controversy being “actions take outside of the defended network” as a defensive measure. Finally, the creation of the term “information-related capability” as any tool to create effects and conditions in the information environment is expansive and ambiguous in what the military considers to be within the fair realm of its operations, both domestically and internationally.

**Strategic Documents**

From simply a terminology standpoint, it is obvious that this understanding is not only developing but has very concrete intentions. These changes are accompanying rapid changes in military organization, focus, and recent legislation pushes by President Obama. Clearly, the United States means to play an active role in defending its critical infrastructure and has no intention of passively waiting for threats to be acted upon before eliminating them. The exact nature of these changes remains to be seen, however, as the policy in question is not fully available to the public. There are, however, publicly available strategic documents that outline key military principles in cybersecurity. These are not all of military origin, but they have been accepted as containing guiding principles for informing doctrine and policy. Three in particular are broad in scope and extremely clear in this regard, namely, the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI), the National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, and the National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations (NMS-CO).

The Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative is a series of recommendations compiled after President George W. Bush launched the program in 2008. They include the following points:

- To establish a front line of defense against today’s immediate threats by creating or enhancing shared situational awareness of network vulnerabilities, threats, and events within the Federal Government—and ultimately with state, local, and tribal governments and private sector partners—and the ability to act quickly to reduce our current vulnerabilities and prevent intrusions.

- To defend against the full spectrum of threats by enhancing U.S. counterintelligence capabilities and increasing the security of the supply chain for key information technologies.

- To strengthen the future cybersecurity environment by expanding cyber education; coordinating and redirecting research and development efforts across the Federal Government; and working to define and develop strategies to deter hostile or malicious activity in cyberspace.

The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace (2003) was a direct result of the Homeland Security Act, which mandated that an assessment of vulnerabilities in critical infrastructure be conducted and recommendations provided. The three guiding principles outlined are simple, and are reflected in the terminology used by the military:

- Prevent cyber attacks against America’s critical infrastructure;

- Reduce national vulnerability to cyber attacks;

- Minimize damage and recovery time from cyber attacks.
Finally, the National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations, a 2005 military initiative, highlights four strategic priorities that have remained at the center of U.S. cybersecurity doctrine, although only recently has the implementation been approaching the scale mentioned:

- gain and maintain initiative to operate within adversary decision cycles;
- integrate cyberspace capabilities across the range of military operations (ROMO);
- build capacity for cyberspace operations;
- manage risk for operations in cyberspace.11

These documents together do not conflict with the observed priorities in the doctrines as revealed in textual definitions. The focus remains on protecting critical infrastructure, increasing power and ability with the domain known as cyberspace, and developing capabilities not only to defend, but to employ cyberspace operations on the world stage. What is not revealed in the public documents that is alluded to in the joint doctrines is the intentions of the United States not only to protect critical infrastructure, but to attain “cyberspace superiority,” not only to “prevent cyber attacks against America’s critical infrastructure,” but to disable potential threats beyond America’s networks before an attack takes place, and finally, not only to “build capacity for operations in cyberspace,” but to “project power by the application of force in or through cyberspace.” Time will tell where these initiatives will lead and what the global implications will be.

INTERNATIONAL UNDERSTANDING

The relationship between the United States and the rest of the world with regard to cybersecurity has been somewhat of an enigma, and suffers many of the effects that prevent congress domestically from passing cybersecurity legislation. The problem is universally recognized, but few organizations have taken any concrete action to enlighten the discussion or make the world more secure.

Table 8. Computer Data and Systems Offences: 2001 Convention on Cybercrime

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Offence</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Illegal Access</strong></td>
<td>Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law, when committed intentionally, the access to the whole or any part of a computer system without right. A Party may require that the offence be committed by infringing security measures, with the intent of obtaining computer data or other dishonest intent, or in relation to a computer system that is connected to another computer system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Illegal Interception</strong></td>
<td>Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law, when committed intentionally, the interception without right, made by technical means, of non-public transmissions of computer data to, from or within a computer system, including electromagnetic emissions from a computer system carrying such computer data. A Party may require that the offence be committed with dishonest intent, or in relation to a computer system that is connected to another computer system.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Data Interference</strong></td>
<td>Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law, when committed intentionally, the damaging, deletion, deterioration, alteration or suppression of computer data without right. A Party may reserve the right to require that the conduct described in paragraph 1 result in serious harm.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>System Interference</strong></td>
<td>Each Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to establish as criminal offences under its domestic law, when committed intentionally, the serious hindering without right of the functioning of a computer system by inputting, transmitting, damaging, deleting, deteriorating, altering or suppressing computer data.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The United States has only formally signed one international treaty directly relating to cybersecurity, the Treaty of the Convention on Cybercrime (2001), signed by 38 other countries. Although the treaty did not establish a unified understanding of cybersecurity, there were implied principles that were upheld as international standards, particularly in Title 1, “Offences against the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of computer data and systems.” Articles 2–4 outline the offences listed in Table 8.

The document continues to list other kinds of fraud and crime that can be enabled through cyberspace, including copyright violation, fraud, child pornography, and others, and each agreeing state accepts the responsibility to impose sanctions on violators, although the scope of such measures is not specifically discussed. Although the document does not address most current issues it reflects a willingness to discuss such problems in the international arena and solicit the help of other developed nations in securing safety and protection against non-governmental and state threats alike. Detailed questions of national security are not addressed in the document. It is nevertheless an indicator that the United States is open to international discussion in deciding such problems and that where there are reasonable, mutually beneficial proposals for action, the United States will not stand aloof. It is difficult to say whether the lack of agreement since has stemmed from a lack of understanding of the topic, the extent of international disagreement in coming to a mutual understanding of cybersecurity, or a desire to wait until the U.S. position in cyberspace is dominant enough to confidently enter negotiations.

Other international organizations, including the United Nations, NATO, and the Organization of American States, have not yet succeeded in producing binding agreements. They have, however, committed to the general principles of openness and hope that there will eventually be standards on which all can agree. This is particularly the case with the United Nations, which, although key players have expressed interest in pursuing binding agreements, has not yet seen specific measures. The Organization of American States, though without any specific doctrine on cybersecurity, has doubled its efforts against cybercrime. NATO approved a revised policy for cyber defense which outlines the expectation that systems that are used in the work of NATO meet minimum defense requirements and that the organization is committed to aiding member states in the case of a cyber-attack, with the eventual goal of offering some form of centralized protection under the NATO Cyber Defense Management Board.

GET READY TO “CYBER PEARL HARBOR”

By first appearances, it might seem that the disorganization accompanying the cyber discussion in the United States is a stumbling block that will continue to prevent an organized response to the problem for some time. The evidence of conceptual convergence, however, is growing increasingly stronger. President Obama has been advocating a strong hand in Congress in cybersecurity since 2009, a changing global situation increasingly reveals insecurities, and while U.S. Defense Secretary Leon E. Panetta warns of a “Cyber Pearl Harbor” the rapidity with which the situation can change may be astounding. As such calls to action continue, a reflection on the content on which the U.S. decision-making process is based may unearth a state of affairs that is not as unorganized as it now appears.

Legislative terminology indicates the general militarization of the cybersecurity debate, and proposed legislation would grant more power to U.S. defensive bodies than ever before. As the same time, the military continues to refine its understanding of information and cyber operations, introducing radical changes within even the last year to expand its capabilities in the cyber domain to match its striving for dominance in all others.

Thus, although Congress continues to debate, international agreements continue to flail, and many questions still remain, including even a general definition of cybersecurity, the reality holds that in terms of executive effort the United States is doing more than ever before to protect its critical infrastructure, develop cyber defensive and offensive protocols, and aim for superiority in the cyber domain, with or without the blessing of Congress or international allies. As threats...
become more common in their frequency and scope, the merit of such action and its impact on international affairs will become apparent.

NOTES

1 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act; Pub.L. 104–191, 110 Stat. 1936, enacted August 21, 1996, Sec. 1172


6 Ibid. Sec. 201.

7 Ibid. Sec. 401.


Alexander Kolbin

THE BANGKOK TREATY PROTOCOL: WHY STILL NOT SIGNED BY P5?

The establishment of nuclear weapon-free zones (NWFZ) demonstrates governments’ commitment to strengthening the nuclear nonproliferation regime by minimizing the risks of nuclear weapons acquisition, use, or threat of use. That is why regional treaties that establish such zones are important international instruments of the nonproliferation regime, along with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty itself. Another thing to take into account is that for the non-nuclear weapon states, establishing NWFZs is an important way of regulating the policies of the nuclear-weapon states in this area.

Especially important for the nuclear nonproliferation regime in this regard is the establishment of a NWFZ in Southeast Asia, a region where the United States, Russia, China, and also India all have major interests. Problems related to the establishment of a Southeast Asian NWFZ have long remained one of the central issues on the regional nuclear nonproliferation agenda.

THE LEGAL FOUNDATION OF THE SOUTHEAST ASIA NWFZ

Discussions of the proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Southeast Asia began in the early 1970s, when ASEAN discussed possible ways of establishing a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) in the region. Initially, a NWFZ was seen by ASEAN as a staging post on the way to the establishment of ZOPFAN. In 1984 ASEAN foreign ministers discussed prospects for establishing a NWFZ in Southeast Asia during a meeting in Jakarta. They reiterated their commitment to the ZOPFAN cause at the 26th Ministerial Meeting in Singapore in 1993. It was decided that a NWFZ should be set up in the region as an integral component of the future ZOPFAN. These efforts came to fruition with the signing of the Bangkok Treaty in 1995.

The treaty was opened for signature on December 15, 1995. It has now been signed by all 10 of the region’s non-nuclear weapon states whose territory lies within the document’s geographic scope (Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam). The term of the treaty is indefinite.

The treaty covers the entire range of measures required for the establishment of a NWFZ. These include a ban on the development, manufacture, and acquisition of nuclear weapons, and a ban on burial of radioactive substances by the participating states on their territory, regardless of the technology of that burial. They also include an obligation by the member states to sign a safeguards agreement with the IAEA. The treaty stipulates that allowing the transit of foreign ships or aircraft for any purposes other than peaceful passage is left to the discretion of the member states.

The verification mechanism of the treaty relies on regular reports by the member states and information exchange, as well as the use of IAEA safeguards. It does not, however, include the possibility of inspections upon request, offering instead rather vague phrases about “fact-finding missions.” Every member state has the right to demand that a fact-finding mission be sent to another country in order to resolve any doubts about compliance.
The Bangkok Treaty also contains a provision to set up a special commission to monitor the implementation of the treaty and ensure compliance.

**THE DETERMINING ROLE OF THE P5**

Like all other NWFZ treaties, the Bangkok Treaty contains a Protocol (of January 1, 1998) under which all the official nuclear-weapon states undertake a commitment not to use, or threaten to use, nuclear weapons against the member states. The P5 must also reiterate their commitment to work towards “universal and complete nuclear disarmament.” Failure to sign that protocol by the P5 is the main reason why the establishment of a NWFZ in Southeast Asia has stalled.

To understand the motives of the P5, one must take into account the distinctive features of the Bangkok Treaty that make it something of a special case among all other attempts to establish NWFZs. This is the first treaty of its kind whose geographic scope includes not only the territory of the member states, but also their territorial waters, their 200-mile special economic zone, and their continental shelf. The member states say such a broad scope is needed to protect them from environmental fallout in the event of a nuclear conflict. Also, this is the first treaty of its kind whose protocol obliges the nuclear-weapon state not to use (or threaten to use) nuclear weapons not just against the member states, but also within the boundaries of the NWFZ zone.

The reasons why the P5 are refusing to sign the protocol boil down to the restrictions at sea within the boundaries of the zone imposed on them under that document. The inclusion of the continental shelf and exclusive economic zones in the geographic scope of the treaty makes the boundaries of the NWFZ too extensive and too blurred. Also, in the opinion of the P5 (especially the United States, Russia, and China), the rights given by the treaty to the member states with regard to the territory of the NWFZ may undermine the ability of the P5 nations to move their warships and submarines freely in the waters covered by the NWFZ.

To summarize, the official nuclear-weapon states are not against the establishment of a NWFZ in the region as such—but they have certain reservations about the specific terms of such an arrangement.

Washington has proposed two ways of resolving the problem with the Protocol. The first way is to remove from the text of the Treaty all the clauses about the continental shelf and special economic zones. That would be the preferred option for the United States. The second option, which is less desirable, in Washington’s opinion, would be for the member states of the Treaty to make an interpretation statement. The statement should make it clear that the clauses of the Treaty dealing with the continental shelf and special economic zones apply only to the member states themselves, but not to the countries that sign the Protocol. The proposed statement should also remove Paragraph 2 Article 2 of the Protocol, which currently reads as follows: “[Each State Party] undertakes not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons within the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone.”

During its talks with ASEAN the United States has stressed that the paragraph effectively bans the Americans from launching nuclear missiles from their ships and submarines within the zone against targets outside the zone. In Washington’s opinion, a revised Article 2 of the Treaty should consist only of its present first paragraph, which reads, “Each State Party undertakes not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any State Party to the Treaty.”

China has indicated that it supports the overall goals and objectives of the Treaty, but it has a problem with the document’s territorial scope. The reasons for China’s objections become very clear after analyzing the text of the Treaty. The document reads that its territorial scope includes parts of the South China Sea that remain a subject of territorial disputes between China and several Southeast Asian countries.

France and Britain, meanwhile, have particularly strong objections against the clauses of the Treaty that deal with the continental shelf and special economic zones. From Paris’s point of view, these clauses are in breach of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. That convention allows littoral states to explore natural resources within their special economic zone and on the continental shelf, but it does not give them the right to assert any political control over these waters. Such political controls are implied by the nuclear restrictions stipulated in the Bangkok Treaty.
THE OUTLOOK

At the 20th session of the Asia Pacific Parliamentary Forum in January 2012 some participants predicted that the Protocol would be signed and ratified before the 2012 year’s end. Russian representatives said at the time that there could be no simultaneous ratification. In January, Russia proposed that in parallel to this process the participants should set up a future security arrangement in Asia Pacific that would be based on a network of bilateral and multilateral partnerships between the existing dialogue platforms (such as ASEAN, SCO, APEC, ARF, CICMA, and ADMM-plus).

The signing of the protocol was expected on July 10, 2012 at the ministerial meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum. All P5 states were expected to sign—but at the last moment some of them said they would not sign after all, citing various reasons. Initially all five of the nuclear-weapon states verbally agreed to sign the protocol—but shortly before the ARF ministerial meetings reports came in almost all of them had changed their mind.

As a result, the commission for the Southeast Asian NWFZ decided to postpone the signing of the Protocol because of the objections voiced by Russia, France, the United States, and Britain (China was no longer raising any objections against the Protocol in July 2012).

France said it would not sign, citing its right to defend itself. Britain said it would not sign, citing new security challenges in the region. The United States said it would not state its objections before the signing of the protocol, and that it would do so only during the ratification process.

Since 2012 Russia has insisted on specific reservations, which it traditionally makes when signing such documents. These reservations have to do with scenarios that involve an attack against Russian territory or armed forces. On July 26, 2012, when many observers were expecting the Protocol to be signed by the nuclear-weapon states, President Vladimir Putin issued a resolution “On the signing of the Protocol to the Treaty on the Establishment of a Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone in Southeast Asia.” He instructed the Russian Foreign Ministry to make sure that Russia will be released from any commitments under that Treaty in the event of attack against Russian territory or the Russian armed forces, as well as attack against any other allied government or country that has signed a defense alliance with Moscow or received security guarantees from Russia.

The presidential resolution also emphasized that in the event of transit of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices via the territory of the Treaty member states, Russia will consider itself free of any commitments under the Protocol.

At the 20th session of the Asia Pacific parliamentary forum some participants predicted that all the necessary signatures would be received in November 2012 during the 21st ASEAN summit—but that did not happen.

As a result, the final declaration of the 21st summit contained only vague phrases on this issue, suggesting that as of late 2012 the situation had reached a dead end. The nuclear-weapon states expected the ASEAN forum members to respond to their reservations about the Protocol, whereas the ASEAN countries expected the Protocol to be signed as it stands. The final document of the November 18, 2012 summit reads that the participants expect the Protocol to the Treaty, and all related documents, to be signed without reservations as soon as possible.

The summit also extended for another five years (until 2017) the so-called Action Plan on the implementation of the Southeast Asian NWFZ Treaty, which was originally approved for the 2007–2012 period. That decision, along with the ASEAN countries’ determined refusal to take into account the nuclear-weapon states’ reservations and revise the text of the Protocol, made it clear that as of early 2013 there was little chance of the Protocol being signed by the P5 in 2013.

HOPES AND LESSONS

Some commentators pinned their hopes with regard to the signing of the Protocol on the second session of the NPT Preparatory Committee, which took place in Geneva on April 22–May 3, 2013.

But the statements made by the P5 delegations only expressed “hope that the Protocol to the Bangkok Treaty will be signed as soon as possible.” Only the head of the Russian delegation, Mikhail Ulyanov, said quite clearly that Russia had completed all the internal procedures
necessary for the country to join the Protocol. Ulyanov also voiced the Russian Foreign Ministry’s opinion to the effect that the Protocol is ready for signature by the nuclear-weapon states.¹

One must remember, however, the aforementioned resolution by the Russian president, and take into account that Mr Ulyanov was speaking about internal procedures. His statement may therefore mean that Russia has merely finalized its position based on the president’s instructions—but not necessarily that the Bangkok Treaty members have accepted that position.

Nevertheless, these statements were probably made in the context of consultations between the P5 and the ASEAN states mentioned on May 7, 2013 by the organization’s secretary-general Le Luong Minh at the seventh meeting of ASEAN defense ministers. He confirmed that some progress had been achieved on the signing of the Protocol during those consultations.

Let us hope, therefore, that the new ASEAN Secretary-General, who took office on January 1, 2013, was not merely indulging in wishful thinking, as his predecessor did in the summer of 2012.

NOTE


For more analytics on disarmament, please visit the section “Ways towards Nuclear Disarmament” on the PIR Center website: disarmament.eng.pircenter.org
Hassan Rouhani’s victory in the June 14, 2013 presidential elections in Iran—especially with such a substantial margin, and in the very first round of the poll—came as a surprise even for his own team. Analysts had predicted that he would probably scrape through to the run-off, where he was supposed to be defeated either by the Iranian nuclear negotiator, Saeed Jalili, or by Tehran mayor Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf.

The turnout at the latest Iranian presidential election was unprecedented; according to the interior minister, Mostafa Mohammad Najjar, some 36.7 million people cast their vote, out of the total of 50.5 million Iranian voters. The only other time such a large turnout was reported was during the 10th presidential election, when many people came to the polling stations in an effort to prevent Mahmoud Ahmadinejad from being reelected for a second term.

Those who backed Rouhani’s election campaign hoped that he would be able to make substantial adjustments to the existing model of the Iranian regime, while also winning the support of the moderate opposition led by the reformist Khatami and the centrist Rafsanjani. The two were instrumental in persuading another reformist, Mohammad Reza Aref (who served as vice-president in the Khatami administration but lacked any charisma), to withdraw his candidacy so that the protest electorate did not have to split their vote between him and Rouhani.

What, then, were the factors that led to the victory of the candidate who was closer to the center of the Iranian political spectrum? The most important of those factors was the need to prop up the legitimacy of the existing theocratic regime. Amid growing international pressure on Iran, there was an obvious need for change; any attempts by the government to subvert or rig the vote would have been too risky amid growing popular discontent. Tehran also needed to overcome the lingering negative effects of the 2009 election, when the Supreme Leader opened a Pandora’s box by clearly siding with one of the candidates, thereby making his victory all but certain. According to the Iranian political principles, the Supreme Leader is supposed to be above the fray; he is expected to uphold the balance of the political system as a whole, rather than throw his weight behind one of the candidates (i.e. Ahmadinejad). That is why this time around, Ali Khamenei urged even those who do not trust the regime to take part in the vote, and kept his preferences regarding the candidates to himself.

It would certainly be a stretch to describe the Iranian presidential election as democratic. Only eight candidates had passed the vetting of the Guardian Council, which is controlled by the Supreme Leader; two of those eight later withdrew from the race. Nevertheless, high turnout ensured the necessary degree of legitimacy, and Rouhani has secured a clear mandate from the Iranian people (Figure 1).

**WHY DID THE IRANIANS BACK ROUHANI?**

Strictly speaking, Hassan Rouhani was not the candidate of the reformists, who are not even represented in the Iranian parliament; nevertheless, he had secured their support. He was probably seen as the most moderate candidate among the eight conservatives who were allowed
to make their bid for the presidency. Amid the ongoing economic difficulties, even those Iranians who do not belong to the upper or middle classes realize that those difficulties have been brought about by sanctions, and by the government’s inability to reach compromise with the so-called international community.

The international crisis over the Iranian nuclear program has been compounded by the Iranian government’s own mismanagement of the economy. Even before the European Union stopped buying Iranian oil on July 1, 2012, Royal Dutch Shell owed Tehran about 1 billion dollars in outstanding debts. Those debts have yet to be collected, and the money is being sorely missed by the Iranian treasury. Inflation has accelerated to 30 percent (Figure 2); the country is facing a shortage of medical supplies; and prices for food staples keep rising. In addition, it has become even more difficult for Iranians to travel abroad, and they are feeling increasingly isolated.

This is probably why the Iranians voted for the candidate who demonstrated a serious intention to improve the situation regarding the Iranian nuclear program. Rouhani, however, was not the only one making such promises. The Supreme Leader’s advisor for international affairs, Ali Akbar Velayati, said during the presidential debates that when Jalili was in charge of the nuclear talks, those talks failed to yield any results. He accused his colleague of making empty promises, and said that the only outcome of those talks was new crippling sanctions imposed on Iran. Voiced by the Supreme Leader’s advisor, such comments surely reflect Khamenei’s own opinion.

Besides, Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Mohsen Rezaee, and Mohammad Gharazi also promised to change the situation. But the first two are true-blue conservatives, burdened by their past conservative jobs, and Gharazi simply lacked any charisma. As for Velayati, he did criticize Jalili’s performance—but he also insisted on continuing the confrontation with the West. Rouhani, meanwhile, made an emphasis on the social repercussions of the nuclear program: “It is a good thing that our centrifuges are spinning; we now need to make sure that our people’s lives can spin just as merrily.” His sensible rhetoric gave the electorate some hope that things would change for the better.

There is one particular episode in Rouhani’s political career that makes observers optimistic about the possible outcome of future talks. At the time when he led the Iranian nuclear negotiators, Tehran managed (with some assistance from Germany, Britain, and France) to soften the position of Washington, which insisted that the Iranian dossier should be handed over to the UN Security Council, and that the country should face sanctions. Back then, Rouhani was given some freedom of maneuver by then president Khatami, who promised to secure Ayatollah Khameini’s consent for any nuclear-related moves proposed by Rouhani. That is when Iran signed the Additional Protocol to the NPT, and the handover of the Iranian case from the IAEA to the UN was suspended. Later on, however, owing to U.S. pressure the dossier was transferred to the UN

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**Figure 1. Results of the Presidential Election in Iran, June 14, 2013**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ghalibaf</td>
<td>16.56%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rezaei</td>
<td>10.58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Velayati</td>
<td>6.18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revoked</td>
<td>3.39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gharazi</td>
<td>1.22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rouhani</td>
<td>50.71%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Iranian Ministry of the Interior, www.moi.ir

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IRANIAN ELECTION RESULTS: CHANGE ON THE HORIZON?
Security Council after all. That new pressure on Iran eventually brought to power the conservative and rhetorically uncompromising Mahmoud Ahmadinejad—this was later confirmed, with obvious regret, by then British foreign minister Jack Straw in his memoirs, as well as by Rouhani himself.

In addition, the Iranians have clearly grown tired of international isolation, economic woes, and the oppressive political climate in the country. They believed that Jalili would be the Supreme Leader’s favorite to win the vote and become another Ahmadinejad; instead, they preferred to cast their votes for Rouhani, who had the backing of Khatami and Rafsanjani.

WHY DID KHAMENEI LET ROUHANI WIN?

In the run-up to the elections Khamenei was looking for a way out of the ongoing crisis; the poll was to become a turning point in that search. That is why Rafsanjani was disqualified from running for the presidency. As a longstanding hidden political opponent of Khamenei (who also happened to be instrumental in Khamenei’s own appointment as Supreme Leader following Ayatollah Khomeini’s death), Rafsanjani could not be allowed to become the hero of the negotiating process. Credit for Rouhani’s possible success in the talks on the Iranian nuclear program will go to the entire Iranian leadership, and not just to the negotiator himself, as would be the case with Rafsanjani.

What is the evidence in favor of the suggestion that Khamenei has decided to shift Iran’s course? Speaking on the occasion of Iranian New Year celebrations in March 2013, the Supreme Leader made a very important pronouncement: he said he was not against talks with the United States, even though he was not optimistic about their outcome. Such phrasing was clearly designed to give the Supreme Leader some wiggle room. If the talks fail, Khamenei will always be able to say that he had warned of their possible failure all along. If, however, they succeed, he can claim credit for not opposing them. Such statements contrast sharply with the situation several years ago, when Ahmadinejad was making plans for talks with Washington following Barack Obama’s reelection for a second term. At that time, the Iranian foreign minister, Ali Akbar Salehi, said that talks could begin if John Kerry was willing. The reaction from Khamenei came two days later; he said that negotiations with the United States were out of the question, and the matter was closed.

Sources: Statistical Centre of Iran, Central Bank of Iran, IMF, BP, OPEC
Was Rouhani chosen to become president from the very beginning, among the hundreds of potential candidates who applied for permission to run for the office? Or was he merely picked as the most suitable of the candidates at some later stage? Ultimately, that may be irrelevant. The important thing is that Rafsanjani, who had a good chance of winning the election, was not allowed to run. This means that the ruling Iranian elite want the talks to yield some tangible results during the current presidential cycle. This suggestion is also borne out by the fact that the information minister, who is also in charge of the Ministry of Intelligence and National Security, also spoke against Rafsanjani’s candidacy during the qualification hearings. This could be very significant, given that in Iran candidates for the job of information minister are proposed by the president but require the approval of the Supreme Leader.

Some analysts also say that the election of Rouhani is further evidence of a crisis amid the conservatives. After all, Rouhani was the only moderate candidate; all the others represented the various hues and stripes of the conservative camp. Amid the ongoing political and economic turbulence, the conservatives continued to place an emphasis on ideology instead of offering a sensible economic program. Besides, they had proved unable to agree on a single candidate so as not to split the conservative vote. Even the three who had agreed to withdraw from the race—Ghalibaf, Velayati, and Haddad-Adel—eventually failed to put their ambitions aside and pool their efforts. Only the latter of the three withdrew at the very last moment; the names of the other two appeared on the ballot papers.

Another possibility is that Rouhani is expected to perform a balancing act not only between the Iranian state and Iranian society, but also between the various factions of the ruling elite. There is an obvious need for some kind of a counterbalance to the un-pragmatic ultraconservatives, led by Ayatollah Mohammad-Taqi Mesbah-Yasdi. Be that as it may, the Iranian conservatives have suffered an electoral defeat. But looking at the situation more broadly—and more optimistically—the election outcome is a victory for the Iranian system as a whole, albeit in the short term.

### Rouhani’s Political Career and Program

Hassan Rouhani did not really focus on foreign politics during the election campaign. At the same time, the Iranian public is increasingly demanding comprehensive changes, the most important of which have to do with resolving the nuclear problem. It is a commonly held belief that the period when Rouhani led the nuclear talks was the most successful in terms of achieving results and improving relations with the United States.

During the election campaign Rouhani criticized Iran’s failure to prevent its nuclear dossier from being transferred to the UN Security Council. He also spoke of the need for reconciliation with the West and for returning the Iranian case from the Security Council back to the IAEA. His two key foreign-policy promises are greater transparency with regard to the nuclear program, and restoring trust in relations with the other countries. Rouhani has described these two priorities as the main instruments of lifting the sanctions; he insists that the West, which has imposed those sanctions, is not actually getting any benefit out of them.

The nuclear issue also figured prominently in Rouhani’s economic and social strategies; he argued that political problems were among the main causes of the ongoing economic crisis. On the whole, the central plank of his policy for the next four years is to improve the plight of ordinary Iranians, and to reduce inequality.

Summing up the election results, Khamenei said that the Iranians had turned out to vote in very large numbers, including those who did not support the regime. That is why, the Supreme Leader said, everyone must now give their support to the president-elect, while at the same time reigning in their expectations. Such statements about the moderate candidate backed by the reformists are fairly unusual for Khamenei. They contrast sharply with his usual rhetoric about putting up fierce resistance to America’s hostile plans. His style of addressing the Iranian public has become notably softer as well.

Judging from all these indicators, the Iranian ruling elite, led by Ayatollah Khamenei, is shifting its course; it would not be unreasonable to expect some progress on the Iranian nuclear problem. Nevertheless, two important questions remain. First, could this apparent softening of Tehran’s stance be merely a short-term reaction to tougher sanctions? And second, can Rouhani be
trusted to represent the interests of all those who wanted change? His political past suggests that any optimism should be fairly cautious.

Born in Semnan 65 years ago, Hassan Rouhani began campaigning in support of Imam Khomeini and against the Shah’s regime at the age of 17. He was granted the title of Imam after delivering a speech on the occasion of the death of Khomeini’s son, who was allegedly poisoned by the Shah’s agents. Immediately after the Islamic revolution Rouhani was involved in the reorganization of the armed forces. Later he was elected as a member of the Iranian parliament. In 1980–1983 he led the administration of the Iranian state TV and radio. During the Iran–Iraq war he was a member of the Supreme Defense Council, serving as a deputy commander-in-chief; president of the Khatam ol-Anbia, an engineering company controlled by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps; and commander of Iranian air defense. In 1988–1989 he was a deputy to Iran’s acting commander-in-chief.

After the adoption of the new constitution of the Islamic Republic and the formation of new Iranian institutions Rouhani became the Supreme Leader’s representative at the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC). He also led the SNSC Secretariat for 16 years. He spent 13 years as presidential advisor for national security, including eight years under Khatami and five under Rafsanjani. He served as a member of the Guardian Council and led the Council’s Center for Strategic Studies. In 1989 he was elected as a member of the Council of Experts, and led the commission for political and public affairs. He is rumored to have been involved in the Iran Contra affair, which caused a huge scandal in the United States when it was discovered that U.S. officials had secretly facilitated weapons sales to Tehran during the Iran–Iraq war.

Given his career background, Rouhani could well prove capable of bringing about some of the necessary changes. But it remains to be seen whether he can navigate between the conflicting goals of fulfilling his election promises (such as releasing the Iranian political prisoners) while at the same time preserving good relations with the Supreme Leader so as to be able to pursue his course on the nuclear issue. When Ahmadinejad was elected president, Rouhani faced criticism from Ayatollah Khamenei for his previous security policies, in an apparent attempt by the Supreme Leader to discredit Khatami’s entire political heritage. Now, however, Khamenei has backed the people’s choice of Rouhani; the president-elect must now preserve the credit of trust he has received from both sides.

ROUHANI ENTERS OFFICE: PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE

Rouhani has begun to fulfill his presidential duties since his inauguration on August 3, 2013. Iranian analysts say that his arrival is bringing us back to the level of positive expectations last seen during the Khatami era, so this is a big chance; the West must not miss it.

After a period of staying on the political sidelines, Rouhani began to criticize Ahmadinejad about a year ago, essentially signaling the start of his election campaign. One of his biggest selling points was his successful record as a nuclear negotiator. During the election campaign, Rouhani often made references to the policies of Rafsanjani and Khatami, who were clearly more liberal than the majority of the Iranian political establishment. Rouhani’s victory suggests that the influence of ultra-conservatives such as Mohammad-Taqi Mesbah-Yazdi is waning, contrary to the predictions made after the 2010 parliamentary elections. This is also demonstrated by the defeat of Mohammad Ghalibaf, member of the conservative Stability Front.

After Rouhani’s election victory five members of the Iranian parliament predicted that the country’s foreign policy, including its stance on the nuclear issue, would remain unchanged. Given that conservatives currently occupy all seats in the country’s legislature, such an opinion is probably shared by the rest of the parliamentarians. Sharif Hosseini has said, for example, that Iran is consistently implementing its 20-year development strategy for the period until 2025. That is why he believes that Rouhani should stand up for the Iranian nuclear plans in the ongoing confrontation with the oppressors, i.e. the Europeans and the United States. Ahmad Tavakkoli argues, however, that the 20-year development plan and the Fifth Development Program are framework documents, and every successive government has the right to choose its own ways of implementing the principles outlined in those documents. This will be possible in the event of serious reshuffles in the Iranian Foreign Ministry and the Supreme National Security Council.
Clearly, if Rouhani intends to pursue serious political changes, he will face the resistance of the conservative parliament. But on the other hand, if the Supreme Leader understands the need for change so as to preserve the entire Iranian system, the resistance of some individual members of parliament probably will not matter.

According to the Iranian foreign minister, Ali Akbar Salehi, Rouhani has already formed an expert group that will set out Iran’s nuclear policy under the new president. But the actual nuclear talks have been postponed until after the transitional period and the presidential inauguration.

**EFFECTS FOR RUSSIA**

On June 18, 2013 Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said that Iran was willing to stop enriching uranium to more than 20 percent in return for reciprocal steps by the Group of Six. It would be in Russia’s best interests to achieve a settlement of this conflict based on step-by-step, reciprocal principles outlined in the Lavrov Plan—especially since nobody wants an influx of refugees or a disruption of shipping via the Strait of Hormuz, the world’s most important oil shipping route. In addition, Russia wants to avoid any upsurge in tensions on its southern borders. If the Iranian regime finds itself completely cornered, it will become even more unpredictable; for the moment, Tehran’s policies actually remain fairly pragmatic. Analysts sometimes point out, however, that the dangers of such a scenario must be weighed against one clear advantage: namely, isolation of energy-rich Iran from the European markets, which Russia wants to dominate.

Any settlement of the Iranian nuclear issue is unrealistic without some degree of normalization between Iran and the United States. Such normalization remains a very difficult proposition so long as there is a powerful Israeli-Evangelical lobby in Washington. But, if that normalization does happen, Russia will be faced with its own unenviable situation with regard to Iran. Its bilateral trade with Iran is not very significant. It is not regarded as a long-term partner by Tehran. To be perfectly frank, Russia is not seen as a cultural magnet by the Iranians, or as an attractive destination for Iranian migrants. If relations between Tehran and Washington improve, Russia will even lose its role as a mediator between Iran and the West. Naturally, none of this is going to happen any time soon. Nevertheless, it would be useful to start modeling the different scenarios for the situation with Iran.

As for the prospects for settlement of the nuclear problem during Iran’s 11th presidential cycle, we should not be overly optimistic. Iran’s increasingly desperate citizens certainly need such optimism. But analysts around the world, as well as Rouhani himself, need a healthy dose of pragmatism—that is, of course, if the new Iranian president genuinely intends to bring about some change.

For more analytics on the Iranian nuclear issue, please visit the “Iranian Nuclear Program: Russia’s Interests” project section on the PIR Center website at: iran.eng.pircenter.org
The Middle East has long been one of the most neurotic parts of our planet, with an explosive combination of general tension and a deadly civil war in Syria, which could well spiral into a full-scale regional war. There is also the simmering Arab–Israeli conflict, domestic political tensions in some of the region’s countries, and constant meddling by foreign powers.

Meanwhile, Israel is pressing ahead with missile defense testing and deployment; every now and then the country also launches air raids against targets in neighboring Lebanon and Syria. Such behavior predictably creates a political incentive for other players in the region to equip their armed forces with advanced new weaponry.

All these factors combine to create an intricate and constantly changing political kaleidoscope, keeping the world’s attention fixed on the Middle East.

THE CONFLICT POTENTIAL

Since 2011, political regimes have been toppled in Tunisia, Egypt (twice), Libya, and Yemen. There have been civilian uprisings of varying intensity—some of which are still ongoing—in Bahrain, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia. Syria has been plunged into a bloody civil war.1 The Arab Spring has yet to run its course; indeed, it is gradually degenerating into an Islamist Winter. In countries where the revolutions have won, initial euphoria is giving way to squabbles between the various actors that had united to topple the previous governments.

Measures to reduce the risk of conflict that have been undertaken by the UN—including arms embargoes on the warring factions—are failing.2 As of mid-2013, there were full or partial UN embargoes in place against arms deliveries to Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, as well as the governments of Iraq, Iran, Lebanon, and Libya.3 That, however, has failed to reduce the military-political tensions; in some parts of the region those tensions not only persist but actually continue to grow.

Analysis of reports by the UN sanctions committees indicates that arms embargoes are ineffective as an instrument for ending military conflicts. These conflicts usually continue either through weapons being seized by one of the warring factions from the other, or through illegal arms supplies via third countries, as well as other smuggling routes. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI),4 arms embargoes yield some tangible results in only about 25 percent of cases.

Middle Eastern leaders, meanwhile, conduct their defense policies in such a way as to ensure the preservation of the political regime if things take a turn for the worse. These policies usually include channeling a large proportion of defense spending towards buying new military hardware or upgrading existing weaponry. These trends were especially obvious ahead of the latest bout of tensions in the region.
Witness, for example, the statistics for military spending in the Middle East, which reached an accumulated 796.53 billion dollars in the period 2004–2011, and continues to rise (see Table 1).

Table 1 demonstrates that Saudi Arabia is the regional leader in terms of defense spending. According to SIPRI, in 2012 the Middle Eastern countries once again showed a large growth in defense spending (by 8.3 percent). The fastest growth has been recorded in Oman (51 percent), Saudi Arabia (12 percent), and Kuwait (10 percent).

Escalation of violence in the Middle East and North Africa is usually viewed from two angles:

- prolongation of the protest movement (i.e. repeat bouts of popular uprisings seen in Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya);
- rapid stockpiling of weapons in the region via legal supplies (including arms deliveries to the Syrian government and opposition) and illicit transfers (such as arms deliveries to HAMAS from the Libyan arsenals).

Be that as it may, the Middle East remains the most militarized region in the world. The risks that will remain for the foreseeable future include an escalation of instability in the Middle East (Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Turkey) and North Africa (Egypt, Libya); as well as possible unrest in Pakistan following the pullout of U.S. troops from neighboring Afghanistan.

The conflict potential of the Middle East has turned the region into the world’s largest defense market, with obvious consequences for global security.

### MAIN ARMS IMPORTERS IN THE MIDDLE EAST

In terms of the combined value of the arms contracts signed over the past decade, the Middle East is second only to Asia Pacific, and the gap is gradually closing. In 2004–2011 the figure for Asia Pacific was 155.488 billion dollars, and for the Middle East 142.592 billion (which constitutes 30.9 percent of the global arms market). In 2011 various Middle Eastern countries placed a total of 33.275 billion dollars’ worth of orders for weaponry.

In fact, for the past three years the Middle East has been the global leader in terms of newly signed contracts for military hardware imports. Asia Pacific and the Middle East are the two undisputed leaders in that regard; the rest of the pack are far behind. In terms of spending on weaponry they outstrip Western Europe by a factor of almost 3; North America by a factor of

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**Table 1. Breakdown of Total Defense Spending in the Middle East (by country)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Share of total regional spending, %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>8.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oman</td>
<td>7.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>7.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>7.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>5.48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>4.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>4.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>4.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>3.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>3.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td>3.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iran</td>
<td>2.83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>2.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>2.04</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
almost 5; Eastern Europe by a factor of more than 25; and Central America and the Caribbean by a factor of more than 150.10

Actual deliveries of conventional weapons to the Middle Eastern states in 2005–2012 are estimated at 96.414 dollars. The annual figure has risen by more than 50 percent from 11.103 billion in 2005 to 16.848 billion dollars in 2012.11

The Middle East also accounts for some of the biggest deals on the global arms market. On the global scale, the biggest deals in 2012 included:

- **Algeria**: An Algerian order for two MEKO A-200 frigates placed with Germany’s ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems. The deal, which includes an option for another two ships, is estimated at 2.176 billion euros (2.886 billion dollars). The relatively high price includes a full complement of weapons systems for the four ships, six Super Lynx helicopters (AgustaWestland), maintenance of the ships, and the training of their crews.

- **Egypt**: Germany has agreed to supply two Type 209 non-nuclear submarines to Egypt, despite sharp criticism of the decision by Israel. The contract is worth an estimated 700 million euros (913 dollars).

- **Israel**: Italy’s Alenia Aermacchi has signed a contract with Israel to supply 30 M-346 Master trainer aircraft and a set of related training equipment. The deal is worth an estimated 1 billion dollars. The contract was signed as part of a bilateral agreement between the Israeli and Italian governments, which includes aircraft, engines and simulators, maintenance services, various supplies, and the training of personnel. Deliveries of the trainers are expected to commence by mid-2014.

- **Iraq**: The United States has signed a contract with Iraq for a second batch of F-16 fighters (18 aircraft worth 3 billion dollars) by 2018. Final deliveries from the first batch of 18 aircraft under a 2011 contract are scheduled for September 2014.

- **Qatar**: Switzerland’s Pilatus Aircraft has signed a contract with Qatar to supply 24 PC-21 trainers, along with a set of training equipment and maintenance services. The first aircraft is to be delivered by mid-2014.

- **Oman**: Oman has signed a package of contracts with Britain’s BAE Systems to supply 12 EF-2000 Typhoon multirole fighters and eight Hawk Mk.128 combat trainers. The first fighters are to be delivered in 2017. The value of the contract for the fighter jets, which includes various auxiliary hardware and weapons systems, is 2.5 billion pounds (over 4 billion dollars). The value of the contract for the Hawk combat trainers and the delivery deadlines have not been disclosed.

- **Saudi Arabia**:
  - Britain’s BAE Systems has signed a contract with Saudi Arabia for the manufacture of 48 EF-2000 Typhoon fighter jets (Tranche 3 modification) at UK facilities. Under an earlier framework contract the 48 aircraft were to be assembled in Saudi Arabia. The two parties are still in talks about setting up an aircraft maintenance facility in Saudi Arabia and increasing the price agreed in the framework contract owing to the new terms. The price Saudi Arabia will pay for the second batch of 48 EF-2000 Typhoon fighters to be delivered under a previously agreed deal for a total of 72 aircraft will become clear later this year once the talks have reached a conclusion.
  - Britain has also signed a contract with Saudi Arabia for 22 Hawk combat trainer jets and 55 PC-21 turboprop trainers (made by Switzerland’s Pilatus), worth a total of 1.6 billion pounds (2.5 billion dollars). The aircraft have been bought to train pilots
for the previously ordered EF-2000 Typhoon and F-15SA Eagle jets. Deliveries of the PC-21 trainers are due to commence in 2014, and of the Hawk jets in 2016. The deal also includes various attendant hardware, including training simulators, as well as personnel training.

- The United States has signed a contract with Riyadh for 36 Boeing AH-6i Little Bird light attack helicopters. Deliveries of the AH-6i will be made as part of an earlier Saudi Arabian order (placed in late 2010) for about 60 billion dollars’ worth of U.S. weaponry, including 84 new F-15SA fighters; 70 AH-64D Block III Apache attack helicopters; 72 UH-60M Black Hawk multirole helicopters; 12 MD-530F light helicopters; ammunition; communication systems; and other hardware. Some of these contracts were signed in 2011, including the 30 billion-dollar deal with Boeing for 84 new F-15SA fighters, and for the upgrade of 70 F-15 fighters already in service with the Saudi air force.\textsuperscript{12}

More than half of the largest international weapons deals signed in the reported period were contracts with various Middle Eastern states, and the trend looks set to continue.

**STRUCTURE OF THE MIDDLE EASTERN ARMS IMPORTS**

Table 2 contains a breakdown of the Middle Eastern arms imports in 2005–2012 by weapons category\textsuperscript{13} and dollar value.\textsuperscript{14}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Arms category, ranged by dollar value</th>
<th>Contracts signed</th>
<th>2012 deliveries</th>
<th>Trends</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Combat aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)\textsuperscript{36}</td>
<td>71.84 billion dollars (45.3%)</td>
<td>5.321 billion dollars (31.6%)</td>
<td>Maximum: 2011—6.021 billion dollars Minimum: 2008—1.795 billion dollars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armored vehicles\textsuperscript{38}</td>
<td>16.039 billion dollars (16.64%)</td>
<td>2.28 billion dollars (13.53%)</td>
<td>Maximum: 2008—2.676 billion dollars Average: 2.3–2.5 billion dollars Maximum: 2010—3.242 billion dollars Minimum: 2006—637 million dollars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other weaponry\textsuperscript{39}</td>
<td>12.044 billion dollars (12.5%)</td>
<td>1.462 billion dollars (8.68%)</td>
<td>Minimum: 2006—637 million dollars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air defense systems\textsuperscript{43}</td>
<td>11.138 billion dollars (11.55%)</td>
<td>2.158 billion dollars (12.8%)</td>
<td>Maximum: 2011—2.385 billion dollars Minimum: 2005—197 million dollars Average (2010–2012): over 2 billion dollars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval weaponry\textsuperscript{45}</td>
<td>7.06 billion dollars (7.32%)</td>
<td>2.135 billion dollars (12.67%)</td>
<td>Maximum: 2012—2.135 billion dollars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missiles and artillery\textsuperscript{47}</td>
<td>6.92 billion dollars (7.18%)</td>
<td>1.657 billion dollars (9.84%)</td>
<td>Maximum: 2011—1.739 billion dollars Minimum: 2006—145 million dollars</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Combat Aircraft and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs)**

*Exporters*: The Top 10 exporters in the combat aircraft and UAVs category, in terms of the contracts signed, comprise the United States, Britain, France, Russia, Switzerland, Italy, South Korea, Spain, Israel, and Canada. A total of 24 countries signed arms contracts with the Middle Eastern states in this category in the reported period, including six countries in 2012. In 2012 the biggest exporter to the Middle East was Britain (5.9 billion dollars), followed by the United States (2.725 billion dollars) and Switzerland (1.5 billion dollars).

In terms of actual deliveries in the aircraft and UAVs category to the Middle East, the Top 10 includes: the United States, Britain, France, Switzerland, South Korea, Russia, China, Israel, Canada, and Italy. A total of 25 countries made deliveries to the region in the reported period. In 2012 the largest deliveries were made by the United States (2.682 billion dollars), followed by France (1.68 billion) and Britain (264 million dollars).

*Importers*: In terms of the contracts signed, the biggest Middle Eastern importer in this category in 2012 was Oman (5.025 billion dollars), followed by Saudi Arabia (2.757 billion dollars), and Iraq (2.3 billion dollars).

In terms of actual deliveries in 2012, the leaders were the UAE (1.628 billion dollars), followed by Turkey (1.595bn), and Saudi Arabia (1.21 billion). These three countries accounted for 83.3 percent of the Middle Eastern conventional arms imports in this category in 2012. They were followed by Qatar (425 million dollars), Iraq (286 million), Oman (80 million), Yemen (38 million), Egypt (36 million), and Jordan (22.5 million).

**Armored Vehicles**

*Exporters*: The Top 10 of the countries that signed contracts for armored vehicles with Middle Eastern states in 2005–2012 includes: the United States (11.01 billion dollars), Canada (1,008 billion dollars), Turkey (741 million dollars), Germany (735 million dollars), Russia (654 million dollars), Ukraine (620 million dollars), South Korea (404 million dollars), South Africa (394 million dollars), the Netherlands (260 million dollars), and Bulgaria (188 million dollars). They are followed by: France (168.5 million dollars), Britain (163 million dollars), Belarus (120 million dollars), Serbia (112 million dollars), Belgium (93.8 million dollars), Poland (30.5 million dollars), Italy (20 million dollars), Greece (10 million dollars), the Czech Republic (5 million dollars), and Oman (1 million dollars).

In terms of contracts signed in this weapons category in 2012 the leader was the United States (632 million dollars), followed by Bulgaria with 188 million and France with 125 million.

In terms of actual deliveries in 2012, the leader, predictably, was the United States (1.605 billion dollars), followed by Ukraine (216 million) and Canada (138 million).

The figures above illustrate that Russia’s positions in the Middle Eastern market in this category leave something to be desired. Incidentally, Ukraine is increasingly becoming a strong competitor to Russian armor suppliers not only in the Middle East but in other parts of the world as well.

*Importers*: The biggest Middle Eastern importers of armored vehicles in 2005–2012 were Iraq (5.631 billion dollars), Saudi Arabia (4.953 billion dollars), and Egypt (2.386 billion dollars).

In 2012 the leader was Oman (400 million dollars), followed by Iraq (220 million dollars) and Israel (200 million dollars). These three countries accounted for just under 73 percent of the Middle Eastern imports in this weapons category.

**Other Weapons Systems**

For a number of reasons, there are no sufficiently accurate global figures for the SALW (small arms and light weapons) category.
To begin with, only a few exporters report these figures. Second, it is next to impossible to account for SALW weaponry leaking from legitimate to illicit circulation. Neither are there any figures for SALW deliveries via the black or grey channels, including exports via third countries or transfers from legitimate end users to rebels, gangsters, or terrorists.

A 2008 UN report put global circulation of weapons in the SALW category at 870 million units.¹⁹ The UN estimates that SALW weapons kill 740,000 people every year.²⁰ In one of his 2011 reports, the UN secretary-general estimated the value of the legal SALW market on a global scale at 7 billion dollars.²¹ According to the Small Arms Survey report,²² a total of at least 875 million units of small arms and light weapons had been accumulated on the planet as of 2012, and the figure continues to rise by 8 million every year.

Approximately 14 billion rounds of small arms ammunition are made every year. About 1 million small arms are lost or stolen every year.²³ The Middle Eastern and North African states are the largest importers of SALW weapons and ammunition, which undoubtedly increases the risk of armed conflicts in the region.

A total of about 1,200 private-sector companies in more than 90 countries currently offer products in the SALW category. The leading SALW exporters, with at least 100 million dollars’ worth of annual exports, include, in descending order, the United States, Italy, Germany, Austria, Japan, Switzerland, Russia, China, France, South Korea, Belgium, and Spain.

The United States and Russia do not release their SALW exports statistics. It is believed, however, that the United States accounts for about 40 percent of the global figure, and Russia 7 percent. The European Union as a block is the world’s largest SALW exporter.

The SALW transfers data contained in the UN Register of Conventional Arms are incomplete—but provide enough information to make some conclusions about SALW exports to various Middle Eastern and North African states in the past three years (see Table 3).

A closer analysis of SALW exports over the reported period reveals a significant rise in the deliveries of man-portable SAM systems and anti-tank guided missiles. Man-portable SAM

Table 3. Exports of Small Arms and Light Weapons to the Middle East

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>2009⁴⁸</th>
<th>2010⁴⁹</th>
<th>2011⁵⁰</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria, Jordan, Iraq, Egypt, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman, UAE, Saudi Arabia</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>Yemen, Ethiopia, Iraq</td>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Algeria, Yemen, Ethiopia</td>
<td>Egypt, Algeria, Iraq, Ethiopia, UAE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia Herzegovina</td>
<td>Bahrain, Qatar, Lebanon</td>
<td>Jordan, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, UAE, Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>Bahrain, Djibouti, Oman, UAE, Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Bahrain, Chad, Qatar</td>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman, UAE, Saudi Arabia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td></td>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Saudi Arabia, Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serbia</td>
<td>Bahrain</td>
<td></td>
<td>Egypt</td>
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<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Lebanon, Chad</td>
<td></td>
<td>Iran, Egypt, Syria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ukraine</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Qatar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Qatar, Lebanon, Kuwait</td>
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<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
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systems are increasingly being used in armed conflicts; their legal transfers as well as illegal proliferation are becoming a major problem for the international community.24

Based on incomplete information from various sources, it can be assumed that Russia exports about 150–300 million dollars’ worth of small arms and light weapons every year. Man-portable SAM systems and anti-tank guided weapons, which are the two most expensive weapons types in this category, account for the bulk of that figure. The main buyers of these Russian-made systems are the Middle Eastern countries (Algeria, Libya, Ethiopia, Jordan, Eritrea, Oman, and others); Asia; Latin America; and some CIS states.

A total of about 200 U.S. companies are involved in the manufacture of small arms. Annual U.S. exports in the SALW category are estimated at about 1.2 billion dollars, on average (i.e. four or five times the Russian figure). Exports of American anti-tank missiles are worth about 775 million dollars, man-portable SAM systems 102 million dollars, and all other SALW types 275 million dollars. Annual U.S. production of all weapons in the SALW category is estimated at 4 million units, which is about half of the global figure. The main buyers of U.S.-made SALW are Western Europe, Japan, Israel, Taiwan, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt.

The global black market for small arms and light weapons is estimated at 3–4 billion dollars at the very least. Only about 50–60 percent of international SALW transfers are actually legal; the rest are made via various illegal or semi-legal mechanisms,25 making the proliferation of SALW very difficult to keep track of. That proliferation is increasingly becoming a major threat to international security.

**Helicopters**

*Exporters*: The leaders in this category over the reported period were the United States with 15.108 billion dollars’ worth of exports to the Middle East (72.8 percent), Russia with 2.646 billion dollars (12.75 percent, if a large contract with Iraq is confirmed), Italy with 2.22 billion dollars (10.7 percent), France (611 million dollars), UAE (101 million dollars), Jordan (32 million dollars), Poland (6 million dollars), and Ukraine (6 million dollars).

*Importers*: The biggest Middle Eastern importers in this category in 2005–2012 were Saudi Arabia (10.885 billion dollars, 52.45 percent), followed by Iraq (3.049 billion dollars, 14.65 percent), Turkey (2.524 billion dollars, 12.16 percent), the UAE (1.965 billion dollars), Egypt (1.159 billion dollars), Qatar (548 million dollars), Bahrain (302 million dollars), Jordan (84.6 million dollars), Lebanon (81.1 million dollars), Israel (80 million dollars), Iran (45 million dollars), Yemen (27 million dollars), and Oman (10 million dollars). Iraq led the league table in 2012 with about 2 billion dollars, followed by the UAE with 400 million dollars, and Lebanon with 69 million dollars.

In terms of actual deliveries, the leader in the 2005-2012 period was the UAE with 3.013 billion dollars (26.86 percent of the total), followed by Kuwait with 1.25 billion dollars (11.14 percent), Saudi Arabia with 1.215 billion dollars (10.83 percent), Egypt (1.075 billion dollars), Iraq (1.048 billion dollars), Turkey (785 million dollars), Israel (720 million dollars), Oman (665 million dollars), Qatar (578 million dollars), Bahrain (352 million dollars), Jordan (305 million dollars), Yemen (77 million dollars), Lebanon (71 million dollars), and Iran (65 million dollars).

**Air Defense Systems**

*Exporters*: The biggest exporter of air defense systems to the Middle East in the 2005–2012 period was the United States with 5.504 billion dollars (49.4 percent of the total), followed by Russia with 4.776 billion dollars (42.9 percent) and Switzerland with 307 million dollars (2.76 percent). The Top 10 also includes France (166 million dollars), Britain (165.3 million dollars), Egypt (130 million dollars), Italy (85 million dollars), and the Czech Republic (4 million dollars).26 Only three countries exported air defense systems to the Middle East in 2012: the United States (1.644 billion dollars), Russia (413 million dollars), and France (100 million dollars).
**Importers** The biggest Middle Eastern importer in this category in 2005–2012 was the UAE with 4.247 billion dollars’ worth of imports (38.1 percent of the total). Over the past five years the country has ramped up its spending on air defense systems by a factor of more than 100.

Other major buyers were Egypt with 1.994 billion dollars (17.9 percent), Iran (1.4 billion dollars, 12.57 percent), Kuwait (1.193 billion dollars), Syria (776 million dollars), Turkey (510 million dollars), Saudi Arabia (373 million dollars), Israel (340 million dollars), Jordan (200 million dollars), and Oman (100 million dollars).

The 2012 ranking is led by the UAE with 1.121 billion dollars (51.95 percent), followed by Kuwait with 524 million dollars (24.3 percent), and Egypt with 300 million dollars (13.9 percent). The three countries accounted for 90.1 percent of Middle Eastern imports in this category in 2012. Other buyers included Syria (113 million dollars) and Oman (100 million dollars).

**Naval Weaponry**

**Exporters** The biggest exporters of naval weaponry to the Middle East in 2005–2012 were Germany (2.2 billion dollars, 31.15 percent of the total), followed by France (1.629 billion, 23.1 percent), the United States (1.369 billion dollars, 19.4 percent), Italy (645 million dollars), Britain (437 million dollars), Sweden (171 million dollars), Turkey (160 million dollars), the UAE (156 million dollars), Russia (120 million dollars), and Australia (71 million dollars).

Nine countries exported naval weaponry to the Middle East in 2012, led by Germany with 635 million dollars, the United States (494 million dollars), and Britain (327 million dollars). Russia did not report any exports to the Middle East in this category in 2012.

**Importers** The biggest Middle Eastern importer of naval weaponry in 2012 was Turkey (2.179 billion dollars, 30.87 percent of the total), although its annual imports figure fluctuated widely from 105 million to 656 million dollars. Turkey was followed by Saudi Arabia with 1.3 billion dollars’ worth of imports (18.4 percent), Kuwait (713 million dollars, 10.1 percent), Israel (635 million dollars), Iraq (622 million dollars), the UAE (616 million dollars), Egypt (344 million dollars), Oman (322.5 million dollars), Bahrain (84.5 million dollars), Yemen (71 million dollars), Qatar (43.6 million dollars), Iran (40 million dollars), Lebanon (39 million dollars), Syria (30 million dollars), and Jordan (20 million dollars).

The 2012 ranking in this category is led by Israel with 635 million dollars’ worth of imports (29.74 percent), followed by the UAE (256 million dollars, 12 percent) and Oman (252 million dollars, 11.8 percent). The three countries accounted for 53.3 percent of the total figure. Other importers included Iraq (246.2 million dollars), Turkey (240 million dollars), Egypt (215 million dollars), Kuwait (138.5 million dollars), Saudi Arabia (75 million dollars), Lebanon (29 million dollars), Qatar (28.3 million dollars), and Iran (20 million dollars).

**Missiles and Artillery**

**Exporters** The largest exporter of missiles and artillery systems to the Middle East was the United States with 4.424 billion dollars’ worth of sales (63.9 percent), followed by South Korea with 700 million dollars (10.1 percent) and France (500 million dollars 7.23 percent). The ranking also includes China (485 million dollars), Serbia (195 million dollars), Russia (145 million dollars), Turkey (140 million dollars), Finland (86.7 million dollars), Singapore (80 million dollars), Italy (53.6 million dollars), the Netherlands (45 million dollars), Sweden (12.5 million dollars), Belgium (11 million dollars), Bulgaria (10.5 million dollars), Austria (10 million dollars), Slovenia (6.4 million dollars), Bosnia (5 million dollars), the Czech Republic (5 million dollars), Ukraine (3 million dollars), and Romania (2 million dollars).

In 2012 the leader, by a very large margin, was the United States with 1.267 billion dollars’ worth of exports in this category, followed by France with 150 million dollars, and South Korea with 140 million.

**Importers** The biggest Middle Eastern importer in this category was the UAE with 1.975 billion dollars’ worth of imports (28.54 percent of the total), followed by Jordan (1.048 billion dollars, 15.15 percent), Saudi Arabia (922 million dollars, 13.32 percent). Egypt (829 million
dollars), Turkey (764 million dollars), Iraq (454 million dollars), Israel (354.5 million dollars),
Kuwait (347 million dollars), Bahrain (138 million dollars), Oman (48 million dollars), Iran
(25.1 million dollars), and Yemen (16 million dollars).

In 2012 the leaders in this ranking were the UAE with 859 million dollars (51.84 percent),
Jordan (379 million dollars, 22.87 percent), and Saudi Arabia (233 million dollars, 14.06
percent). The three countries accounted for 88.8 percent of Middle Eastern imports in this
category in 2012. They were followed by Turkey (97.9 million dollars) and Egypt (87.8 million
dollars).31

FORECAST FOR 2013–2016

The military-political situation in the Middle East remains extremely volatile, so projections
for the regional arms market can be made only for the short term. Based on the early 2013
figures and information about the contracts that have already been signed, as well as reports
about new contract announcements and intentions by various buyers, some projections can
be made for the 2013–2016 period (see Table 4).

The forecast includes two key projections: the ranking of the Middle Eastern countries in
terms of expected arms imports, and the ranking of global arms exporters to the Middle East.

In the near time frame (i.e. for the rest of 2013) Saudi Arabia is expected to remain the
largest arms importer in the Middle East with 5.183 billion dollars’ worth of imports, followed
by the UAE (3.441 billion) and Egypt (2.597 billion)32—see Table 5.

The Middle Eastern states are expected to continue to increase their weapons stockpiles,
and almost double their defense procurement spending over the next four years. This is a
fairly safe assumption because the figures given above reflect only known weapons
contracts; the overall imports figure will be pushed up by new orders placed for weapons
systems that do not take long to manufacture (such as SALW, missile and artillery systems,
etc.). As a result, the military potential of the Middle East will continue to increase at a rapid
pace, which could well lead to an increase in the region’s conflict potential as well.

The ranking of the top weapons exporters is fairly predictable; it is based on figures for the
eight years to 2012, existing information about new contracts, and extrapolation of the
current trends.33

The United States is expected to retain its position as the top arms exporter to the Middle
East over the coming three or four years. It will account for more than 70 percent (72–75
percent) of exports to the region across all weapons categories, up from about 55 percent in
2003–2010. In other words, the United States will strengthen its dominant role in the Middle
Eastern defense market.

Speaking of the geography of U.S. arms exports, the Middle East has been one of the top
destinations for many decades. In 2004–2011 the United States sold about 50 billion dollars’
worth of various items of weaponry to the region, which is about 37 percent of U.S. defense
exports. Starting from 2012 the share of the Middle East in these exports is expected to rise
sharply. By 2016 the absolute figure will reach about 72 billion dollars, out of the projected
total of 120.3 billion. That growth will largely be driven by new orders for American weapons
placed by Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

Most of the large contracts were signed after the outbreak of the Arab Spring in the Middle
East and North Africa. The ongoing civil war in Syria has also spurred the placement of new
orders for American weapons. Meanwhile, Russia and the leading Western European
defense suppliers are losing their share of the Middle Eastern market.

Britain is expected to come second in the ranking of the leading arms suppliers to the Middle
East, with at least 9 percent (9.2–9.5 percent) of the total. It will be followed by France, with
5.7–5.9 percent of the Middle Eastern market.

In terms of geographic destinations, Britain and France have the most evenly balanced
structure of arms exports among the leading global suppliers. The Middle East, Asia Pacific,
and North America account for roughly equal proportions of these two countries’ exports. For
example, in 2004–2011 the Middle East was the third-largest destination of French defense

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Table 4. Projection for Middle Eastern Imports of Conventional Weapons (By Category), in 2013–2016.51

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weapons category</th>
<th>Trends</th>
<th>Imports, billion dollars</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat aircraft and UAVs</td>
<td>The current trends will continue throughout this period; combat aircraft and UAVs will remain the biggest category of arms exports to the Middle East, in dollar terms. An estimated 41 billion dollars’ worth of weaponry will be bought in this category, which represents 40 percent of the total figure of arms exports to the region. As a proportion of arms exports to the region, exports in this category will increase from 33.2 percent in 2005–2012 to 38.27 percent in 2013–2016.</td>
<td>7.466</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armored vehicles</td>
<td>Armored vehicles as a category are expected to slip from second to fourth place; the value of the armor contracts expected to be signed in 2013–2016 is estimated at 8.594 billion dollars (about 8 percent of the projected total).</td>
<td>2.056</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other weapons systems</td>
<td>The “Other weapons” category is expected to slip to sixth place. The time between the signing of the contract and actual deliveries is usually much shorter for this category compared with other categories. That is why many contracts for weaponry to be delivered in 2013–2016 have yet to be signed, so the data in this table are preliminary.</td>
<td>1.346</td>
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<tr>
<td>Helicopters</td>
<td>Helicopters as a category are expected to rise from fourth to second place; with 27.721 billion dollars’ worth of contracts expected to be signed in the indicated period (26 percent of the total). The share of this category in arms exports to the Middle East is expected to rise by 14.25 percentage points, from 11.64 percent in 2005–2012 to 25.89 percent in 2013–2016. In other words, this category is expected to show the fastest growth.</td>
<td>2.707</td>
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<tr>
<td>Air defense systems</td>
<td>This category is expected to rise from fifth to third place. A total of 17.249 billion dollars’ worth of sales to the Middle East are expected to be made in this category during the reported period, which constitutes 16.1 percent of the total. As a share of the total, exports in this category are expected to increase from 11.5 percent in 2005–2012 to 16.1 percent in 2013–2016.</td>
<td>0.772</td>
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<tr>
<td>Naval weapons</td>
<td>Some 6.18 billion dollars’ worth of exports are expected in this category, which represents 5.77 percent of the total. As a proportion of the overall arms exports to the Middle East, this category is expected to shrink by 1.55 percentage points from 7.32 percent. Nevertheless, in the ranking of weapons categories, naval weapons are expected to rise from sixth to fifth place due to even bigger changes in other categories.</td>
<td>2.383</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missiles and artillery</td>
<td>The Missiles and Artillery category is expected to remain in seventh place. A total of 2.61 billion dollars’ worth of contracts are expected to be signed in this category, which represents 2.44 percent of the total. As a share of the total, the category is expected to show an increase of 4.74 percentage points to 7.18 percent.</td>
<td>1.312</td>
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<tr>
<td>Entire Middle East</td>
<td>107.084 billion dollars</td>
<td>18.042 billion dollars</td>
<td>21.478 billion dollars</td>
<td>32.522 billion dollars</td>
<td>35.041 billion dollars</td>
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<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>40.827 billion dollars (38.1 percent of the total for the Middle East)</td>
<td>5.183 billion dollars</td>
<td>8.223 billion dollars</td>
<td>14.018 billion dollars</td>
<td>13.403 billion dollars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>15.417 billion dollars (14.4 percent of the total for the region)</td>
<td>3.441 billion dollars</td>
<td>2.737 billion dollars</td>
<td>4.93 billion dollars</td>
<td>4.309 billion dollars</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatar</td>
<td>11.302 billion dollars (10.55 percent)</td>
<td>13 million dollars</td>
<td>198 million dollars</td>
<td>4.682 billion dollars</td>
<td>6.409 billion dollars</td>
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<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>10.697 billion dollars</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>7.079 billion dollars</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>6.797 billion dollars</td>
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<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>4.997 billion dollars</td>
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<td>Oman</td>
<td>4.57 billion dollars</td>
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<tr>
<td>Israel</td>
<td>3.069 billion dollars</td>
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<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>2.105 billion dollars, if contacts already signed with Russia are fulfilled</td>
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exports, with 7.681 billion dollars’ worth of sales (24.58 percent of the total). In 2013–2016 the region will account for about 26.5 percent of French arms exports.

In the ranking of the top weapons exporters to the Middle East, the United States, Britain, and France will likely be followed by Germany, Italy, Russia, Canada, South Korea, Switzerland, and Ukraine.

Each of these countries will control a relatively small share of the Middle Eastern market. For Germany, the figure will be about 2.2 percent, for Italy 2.13 percent, and for Russia 2.05 percent. If the contracts already signed between Russia and Syria are actually fulfilled, Russia will rise from sixth to fifth place in the ranking—but such a scenario is unlikely. The rest of the countries in the Top 10 will control less than 3 percent of the Middle Eastern defense market between them; the share of each individual country will be in the region of 0.6–0.78 percent.

Positions from 11 to 20 in the ranking of arms exporters to the Middle East will be held, in descending order, by Sweden, Israel, the Netherlands, Turkey, Serbia, Spain, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, and South Africa. Each will control from 0.35 to 0.05 percent of the Middle Eastern market. Belgium, Norway, Portugal, and Austria are also expected to make some sales, but their share of the market will be miniscule.

FURTHER INTO CONFLICT

Trends in the Middle Eastern market for conventional arms fully reflect the ongoing process of the region’s militarization, which has already led to tectonic shifts in the Arab world, with spiraling tensions and unpredictable consequences for the rest of the world.

Changes in the global economy and politics, internal transformations in the Middle East, and actions (or inaction) of the great powers make it almost inevitable that the region will plunge further into conflict. The outcomes of these fundamental and irreversible changes are impossible to predict. Another important thing to understand is that the indicators of possible catastrophe include not only the uncontrolled events of the Arab Spring, but also the policies of the arms exporters—who are trying to prevent an escalation of violence in the Middle East, but continue to arm the entire region.

Until the international community comes to realize that arms supplies and the fate of the protest movement in the countries affected by the Arab Spring are tightly intertwined, there is no reason at all to expect peace in the Middle East.

NOTES

1 For more details about the causes and the progress of these conflicts, please see materials of the Institute for Middle East Studies: <http://www.iimes.ru/index.html>, last accessed July 26, 2013.

2 The decision to impose an embargo on arms supplies is made in accordance with Article 41 Chapter VII of the UN Charter; such a decision requires the approval of 9 UN Security Council members out of 15, including all five permanent members.


5 In the period between 2004 and 2011 global defense spending rose in nominal figures from 994.965 billion dollars to 1,639.972 billion—an increase of 65 percent.


13 The ranking includes seven expanded weapons categories included in the UN Register: armored vehicles; military aircraft and UAVs; helicopters; naval weaponry; missiles and artillery; air defense systems; and other weapons systems.


15 Ranked in descending order hereafter.

16 For reference, actual deliveries of U.S.-made weapons in the “Armored vehicles” category to the Middle East reached 10.033 billion dollars over the same period.


18 Ibid.

19 Speaking at a UN conference to review progress achieved in implementing the program of preventing and eradicating illegal trade in small arms and light weapons (August 27–September 7, 2012), deputy UN secretary-general Jan Eliasson announced another figure: bullets kill about 500,000 people every year.


24 A distinctive feature of man-portable SAM systems is that they can be used to take out not only civilian but also military planes at a distance of 5–7km. Most of the missiles of this type,
including the Soviet (Russian) SA, the U.S.-made Stinger, and the Chinese-made Vanguard, are very light and use infrared homing heads. The Middle Eastern and North African countries demonstrate growing interest in such systems.

25 For more details, see: N.I. Kalinina, ed., Russia’s Military and Technical Cooperation with Other Countries: Current State, Problems, and Outlook (Moscow: IMEMO RAN, 2010), pp. 70–77.

26 Ibid.

27 For more detailed statistics on the Middle Eastern defense market, see: Mirovaya torgovlya oruzhiem. 2013, No. 2.

28 Ibid.

29 Ibid.


31 Mirovaya torgovlya oruzhiem. 2013, No. 2.

32 Mirovaya torgovlya oruzhiem. 2013, No. 2.


34 In the ranking of top importers of German weaponry, the Middle East is third; in the coming years the region will account for about 4 billion dollars (25.5 percent) of German arms exports.


36 The military aircraft and UAVs category includes multirole fighters, ground attack aircraft; refueling aircraft, patrol aircraft, military transports, AWACS planes, reconnaissance planes, radioelectronic reconnaissance planes, communications planes, combat trainer jets, turboprop trainer aircraft, and all types of UAVs.


38 The “Armored vehicles” category includes main battle tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, heavily armed fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers, armored reconnaissance vehicles, armored trucks, and repair and evacuation vehicles.

39 The “Other weapons” category includes all the types of weapons not covered by other main categories, including: small arms, fighting compartments for armored vehicles, ammunition, radios, engines of all types, dynamic protection systems for armor, targets, helmet-mounted systems, communications systems, target designation systems, thermal imagers, simulators, and other hardware.


41 The “Helicopters” category includes attack helicopters, AWACS helicopters, anti-submarine and naval patrol helicopters, heavy transport helicopters, and multirole medium and light helicopters.

43 The “Air defense systems” category includes long, medium, and short-range anti-aircraft missile systems, man-portable SAM systems, and anti-aircraft artillery.

44 “Breakdown of Arms Exports to the Middle East by Weapons Categories in 2005–2012.”

45 The “Naval weapons” category includes the main types of warships (aircraft carriers, destroyers, frigates, corvettes, minesweepers, and amphibious assault ships), submarines, and boats (missile, artillery, patrol, amphibious assault, coastal and sea-going boats).


47 The “Missiles and artillery” category includes anti-tank missile systems (anti-tank guided missiles), MLR systems, all types of artillery (field artillery and self-propelled artillery systems), tactical and operational-tactical missile launchers, and mortars.

48 For numbers and categories of small arms and light weapons sold to the aforementioned and other countries not categorized as unstable, See UN GA document A/65/113 of June 15, 2010.


53 The figure includes expected deliveries of new weapons; weapons from MoD surplus of the exporter countries; and repair and upgrades programs.
Whether and to what extent Russian foreign policy has been a success is a subject of heated debates both in Russia itself and abroad. That policy is being pursued amid a wide range of international challenges and problems, from the situation in Syria to the erosion of the global world order. Reacting to these challenges and problems requires a well-balanced and firm approach, as well as initiative. At the same time, the initiatives being proposed by Russia in the international arena need to be continuously reviewed and analyzed to make sure they remain effective and fit for purpose in the long run.

We have discussed Russia’s practical efforts to pursue its national interests and priorities with Aleksey Pushkov, Chairman of the Russian State Duma Foreign Affairs Committee.

SECURITY INDEX: You have been the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee in the Russian Duma for one and a half years. It has also been just over a year since Vladimir Putin was once again put at the helm of Russia and its foreign policy. What have been Russia’s biggest foreign-policy achievements and failures over that period?

PUSHKOV: To begin with, I don’t think there have been any major failures. In my view, the steadfastness and success of Russia’s foreign policy should be measured against the first post-Soviet years, not against some non-existent ideal. Those years really were a time of a total foreign-policy failure in every single respect.

Since then, Russian foreign policy has become much more consistent, and achieved some tangible results. The last time we made a serious mistake—which we have now fully realized, and which has already led to grave consequences—was back when Russia abstained during the vote on UN Security Council Resolution 1973 concerning the situation in Libya. It has become perfectly clear that by acquiescing in Washington’s policy of interventions, Russia will lose out, just as it did back in 1999, when it eventually backed NATO during the war in Yugoslavia. That is why Russia has voted down the resolutions on Syria on three separate occasions, because those resolutions would have provided a pretext for a military operation against the legitimate Syrian government.

In my opinion, our determination to stick to our position on Syria, and to say no to any UN Security Council resolution authorizing any foreign intervention in Syria—let alone a military intervention—has been a major achievement of Russian foreign policy. On this issue we also have China’s backing. Moscow and Beijing both realize that the issue at stake in Syria is not just the future of the country or the Middle East region, but the entire world order for the next 10 or 15 years.

The world order that was established after the bombing of Belgrade in 1999 was extremely destructive and damaging. It was a world order that made possible the aggression against Iraq based on false information about the country’s alleged possession of WMD. That world order had made possible secret prisons, abductions, people being kept without trial at
Guantanamo, and torture, which the George W. Bush administration tried to turn into a perfectly ordinary thing.

At the same time, U.S. policies have led to a rapid degradation of the entire system of international law, the whole system of international relations. The system of checks and balances built over the previous years has been jeopardized. And if there are no checks and balances, Russia will not benefit from such a situation. The only countries that can benefit are the United States and its allies; despite its relative weakening, the United States still aspires to global hegemony. That is why the greatest achievement of our foreign policy is that as of the autumn of 2013 we have managed to forestall direct intervention in Syria by foreign powers. We have also managed to prevent the UN Security Council from passing a resolution that would legitimize intervention in Syria.

Another of our major foreign-policy achievements is the establishment of the Customs Union. This is a radical shift in the state of affairs in the former Soviet republics. This is the beginning of real integration, with Russia playing the leading role. For all the difficulties of that process, we are also making progress towards the establishment of the Eurasian Union. It is not a mere coincidence that shortly before her departure from the post, former U.S. secretary of state Hillary Clinton blurted out that these integration projects were an attempt to restore the Soviet Union, and that the Americans would do all in their power to prevent it. This in itself is a good demonstration of the importance and seriousness of our project. If the Eurasian Union is giving geopolitical shivers to people who have very little liking for our country, it means that the establishment of such a union should be regarded as a genuine achievement on our part.

Yet another of our achievements, in my view, is deeper cooperation in the BRICS format. Our Western friends keep telling everyone who would listen that the BRICS countries have very little in common, and that the organization has no real reason for being. In actual fact, this is a club of nations which are unhappy with the dominant role of a single country in international affairs, and which believe that the world should be genuinely multipolar. These countries believe that they should rightly play a more prominent role in determining the future global course of events. At some point, other emerging economic leaders, such as Indonesia, may join BRICS. I am confident that the outlook for BRICS is bright. So far, this is more of a consultative body—but it can play an important role, given that the unipolar world order is clearly doomed.

Much will depend on how many more upheavals and convulsions the United States must go through before it finally realizes that it cannot rule this world on its own. In the past, something similar happened to the Roman Empire; to Darius’s empire; to Spain, which was the leading European power in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; to France, Britain, and Germany. The new hegemon, the United States, cannot avoid that fate either. The United States can certainly retain its position as one of two or three leading global powers—that is a realistic objective which the Americans can achieve. But if they continue their struggle to retain their hegemony, this could end very badly for them. The law of imperial overreach, which Prof. Paul Kennedy outlined in the book “The Rise and Fall of Great Powers,” cannot be just ignored.

The world is now undergoing a transition from a unipolar to a multipolar set-up. That transition will not be easy. The United States will try to maintain its dominant role, because for the foreseeable future it will retain its superiority over other countries in many respects, including military, information, scientific, and technological capability. The U.S. economy still remains the largest in the world. U.S. GDP is 14.5 trillion dollars, while Chinese GDP is only 6.5 trillion. That is why the United States will remain the leading world power for a long time—but its leadership will gradually be eroded. That is why we are now in a transitional stage.

Of course, these will still be situations when it will feel as though the United States is successfully maintaining its global hegemony. But the Americans have already demonstrated their inability to cope with the most worrying global crises, such as the North Korean nuclear program. The only response to the possible Iranian nuclear program Washington has managed to come up with is a military scenario, because it cannot solve this problem in any other way—but the military solution is not guaranteed to succeed. What is more, in terms of soft power the United States is rapidly losing its clout. It has already lost the aura of a country that fights for the ideals of democracy, liberty, and human rights.
SECURITY INDEX: Let us move on to the Middle East. Syria is now becoming a litmus test of America’s capability. How Russia will behave in this situation is interesting, because the country can take two possible approaches to this region. The first approach is to demonstrate some initiative, because, as you have just said, the whole world’s future is at stake in Syria. The second approach would be to sit back and watch events unfold, because actively intervening could drain us of our resources; the regional players will all try to manipulate us, and play us off against the Americans in pursuit of their own agenda, so we won’t see any real benefits for ourselves. So which of the two approaches should Russia take?

PUSHKOV: First of all, we should abandon the concept that has long been advocated by the liberal wing of the Russian political class, and which is often described as the last lines of defense doctrine. According to that doctrine, Russia should only worry about these last lines of defense, i.e. the CIS countries, especially Ukraine and Belarus, which lie close to our geographical and strategic borders. It is these lines we should defend; the rest is not our problem—that’s the basic idea.

The problem is, however, that when you abandon any attempts to defend your interests far away from your national borders, this gradually turns into a general retreat in the direct vicinity of your borders as well. First we were told that we should not worry about Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic joining NATO. But then the Baltic states also joined. And then Ukrainian and Georgian membership was put on the agenda. Mikheil Saakashvili even started a war against us, hoping that the Americans and NATO would help him. So the last lines of defense doctrine is merely a disguise for foreign-policy impotence.

As soon as we abandon the doctrine of subordinating Russian national interests to U.S. national interests—or, even more broadly, to the interests of the Euro-Atlantic community—it will turn out that Syria is actually very important for us. A regime change in Syria by military means, following the example of Yugoslavia, Iraq, or Libya, would not be in our national interests. And we have a choice of several methods of defending our interests.

I don’t believe that Russia should fight a war in Syria. We already have the experience of being dragged into such wars, especially the extremely negative experience in Afghanistan. We must not send our soldiers to fight wars in other countries. But we must send our soldiers as peacekeepers, to keep the hostilities at bay, especially if there is a UN mandate for such an operation. We have played that role in South Ossetia, and in my view, we should have played a similar role in Kyrgyzstan in 2010, when deadly ethnic clashes broke out in that country.

We must give the Syrian government the degree of military-technical and military-political support that we can realistically provide. It is entirely obvious that the struggle in Syria is not about democracy and human rights. It is perfectly clear that the armed opposition and rebels are backed by the forces of international terrorism, including al-Qaida and the organizations that blow things up in Iraq, in Tripoli, and Benghazi, and that are fighting a war in Mali. Right now they are marching on Damascus under the slogan of “Alawites to graves, Christians to Beirut.” After Damascus, they believe their next target should be Baghdad, where they also want to remove Shia Muslims from power.

Nevertheless, the United States, Britain, and France have made a definitive choice in favor of supporting the rebels. This demonstrates that their goal is not freedom, democracy, or prosperity for Syria. Their goal is to depose the legitimate Syrian government and to provide support to the radical Sunni movement. I don’t really care whether that support is willing or unwilling. The fact is, they are deliberately supporting radical Sunnis; it appears that the United States hopes to control those Sunnis.

I think the Americans will fail in that, just like they failed back at the time to control the Taliban or the militants in Libya. I believe this American policy to be not just wrong, but actually damaging for America itself. They are trying to depose regimes on the assumption that any new regime will be better than the old one it replaces. They are also trying to create a security cocoon around Israel. These attempts have already made the situation worse. When the Saddam Hussein regime, which acted as a counterbalance to Iran, was deposed, the most anti-Israeli state in the region became a regional superpower. The same thing then happened again with the elections in the Gaza Strip, and with Egypt, which has become a greater danger to Israel after Hosni Mubarak was deposed. These are all negative consequences of the American
approach. In Syria, too, the results will be exactly the opposite of what they are hoping to achieve.

I believe that the Americans, along with the French and the British, are pursuing a policy that is driven solely by ideology, and fails to take into account the actual situation on the ground. It is important to understand that we are not talking about democracy, freedom, or some such political model in Syria. We are talking about a violent power grab. That is why I am confident that Russia should provide as much military-technical and military-political support to the government in Damascus as it is capable of providing, without being dragged directly into a war.

SECURITY INDEX: Let us move on from the Middle East to the CIS. You say that there have not been any major failures in our foreign policy. The Customs Union really is a step in the right direction. But the CIS is much larger than the Customs Union membership. There is also the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO): we say the CSTO should become NATO’s equal, but we don’t really believe it ourselves. That project is Russia’s responsibility. What can you say about it?

PUSHKOV: I think that Russia and the other CSTO members have different ideas about their reasons for membership. For Russia, this is a regional security organization that was born largely because we needed to react to NATO’s enlargement. It was also born because we understood that unless some security arrangements involving Russia and led by Russia are established in the former Soviet space, other arrangements will be established here, led by NATO.

As for the Central Asian leaders, many of them view the CSTO as an organization that can give them some assurances in the event of large domestic upheavals, i.e. in the event of a Central Asian Spring, as it were. They view the CSTO as a possible instrument for protecting themselves against radical opposition movements in their own countries. And since these radical movements in Central Asia have always had an Islamist basis, we are essentially talking about protection against militant Islam.

That, essentially, is why Uzbekistan joined the CSTO some years ago, and why it has now pulled out. The Uzbek leadership seems to believe that there is no direct threat of militant Islam at this time, and so it’s a good time to try to establish closer cooperation with the United States. Past experience suggests, however, that the Americans will probably try to replace President Islam Karimov with someone closer to themselves. They will want a person representing a new generation of politicians, someone like Mikheil Saakashvili, whom they used to replace Eduard Shevardnadze in Georgia.

So the fact of the matter is, for Russia there is no alternative to the CSTO. But for the other CSTO members, with the possible exception of Belarus and Armenia, there is an alternative in the form of military-political ties with the United States. That alternative is based on fears of being dictated to by Russia. Besides, it does not make much sense for these countries to invest any great efforts in strengthening the CSTO. They know that if the real need arises, Russia will come to their aid, CSTO or no CSTO.

As a result, the CSTO is not based on a clear and solid basis of regional security. It is based on a game. These other members want their main alliance to be with Russia— but they also want to pursue military-political cooperation with the United States and NATO to gain some extra material advantages for themselves. Such an approach inevitably undermines these countries’ readiness to strengthen the CSTO. They know that if the real need arises, Russia will come to their aid, CSTO or no CSTO.

Russia itself, however, is also fairly ambiguous on the CSTO. On the one hand, we say that we need that organization. But on the other, it does not feel as though we are really treating it as an important priority. So the CSTO remains a symbolic political alliance, which provides the other CSTO members with a pretext for asking Russia for assistance and preferential treatment, while at the same time pursuing closer partnership with the United States. I am not at all sure, however, that Russia is making the best possible use of its role as the leading power in the CSTO, and as a country that can provide some assistance. To an outside
observer it may well appear that Russia needs the CSTO simply because the very existence of that alliance makes Russia feel better about itself.

But if we really want to build a military-political alliance, we must invest money in it, and foster the elites in other countries that are genuinely interested in having that military-political alliance. There are such elites in countries like Armenia—but in many countries they simply don’t exist. We will also have to equip the armed forces in these countries with Russian weaponry, even if we have to shoulder some financial losses in the process.

In other words, a market approach to the CSTO is not realistic. The United States pays for all its military-political alliances. France also pays for all of its military-political alliances with the African countries. The returns on that investment come in the form of stronger economic positions achieved as a result of being the leader of a military-political alliance. For example, the United States has invested huge sums of money in South Korean defense. But it has also obtained access to the South Korean economy, and as a result, it is getting good returns on its investment.

If we can build a similar arrangement, the CSTO will be worth its keep. But first we must invest in it. First we must make it part of the political psychology of the elites in the other member states. And that is what we have not quite managed to achieve so far.

SECURITY INDEX: So in order to wield hard power, a country also needs soft power. You have said that American soft power is not as great as they like to pretend. What about Russian soft power?

PUSHKOV: The Soviet approach used to be very different from the American approach. The Soviet Union fostered pro-Soviet elites by using two instruments: ideology and profit. The pro-Soviet financial elites were business elites. They consisted of people who came to the Soviet Union because it was trendy and very profitable. Large European companies were also able to find a niche in the Soviet system. As a result, we had a pro-Soviet lobby in Western Europe that worked to improve Europe’s relations with the Soviet Union.

Russia doesn’t have that kind of lobby in the United States at this time. Nevertheless, when Obama was pushing for the adoption of the Magnitsky Act, 350 U.S. companies kept lobbying for repealing the Jackson-Vanik amendment, regardless of the future of the Magnitsky Act. There are many more companies like these in Europe. I suspect that our relations with Germany would have already gone to the dogs over Pussy Riot and gay rights, were it not for the strong anchor of Russian–German economic ties.

But the situation is compounded by the fact that we have lost our natural allies in the Western world. We used to have such allies in the form of peace movements and leftist communist movements. The question is, what kind of ideology can we now offer to those movements in Europe that are seeking an alternative to U.S. dominance, political liberalism, and economic liberalism? We don’t have any such ideology we could offer at the moment. Half of the Russian economic policymakers happen to be pro-Western liberals; that was true under President Yeltsin, and that remains true under President Putin. As a result, in this particular respect we are just a pale shadow of the Western liberal elite; we are simply repeating all their motions, without offering any alternatives.

Does Russia have any soft-power reserves in the area of ideology? Ideology plays a definitive role in this day and age. We are now entering a very serious conflict with Europe over values. That conflict is an ideological conflict, in a new form. Nevertheless, I think that even in this difficult situation we still have some power reserves. The question is, can we put them to good use?

Our first reserve is based on the fact that the world needs balance. America’s dominant position in the world has upset that balance. This is felt by many countries, including such American allies as Pakistan.

Russia is a country that can be a counterbalance to the most aggressive U.S. policies. Russia has already demonstrated that in Syria, and that is why we have a lot of international support. The importance of Russia’s role has increased very significantly. Half of Europe actually agrees with us on the Syrian issue. Our alliance with China on that issue is not a coincidence, either. The Chinese enter such alliances only after meticulous calculations, and only with partners that deserve it. The Chinese are very aware of their new-found power. If they enter a
strategic alliance with Russia on Syria, it means that they believe we are strong enough to hold our position. Russia can be a balancing force in international affairs; we are already demonstrating that capability.

Our second soft-power reserve is in the area of morals. Russia is now becoming a bastion of heterosexual marriage, and that must not be underestimated. The liberal revolution that has engulfed the West will carry on. Fourteen countries have already legitimized same-sex marriage. Israel and Mexico do not recognize same-sex marriages, except if the marriage took place in another country. Britain and Germany are next. As soon as same-sex marriage is recognized in Germany, such marriages will be proclaimed as a European value, and they will start promoting that value at the Council of Europe. In the United States, 13 states have now recognized same-sex marriages. Many others will follow suit, I believe.

In this new situation, the world has become divided. There is a part of it that is undergoing a liberal revolution, de-Christianizing, and moving towards liberal neo-Paganism. And there is another part of it, the part that is sticking to traditional values. Numerically, the world of traditional values is bigger. Of course, it will suffer some losses. Uruguay and Argentina have now recognized same-sex marriage, and some other Latin American countries will probably follow suit. But Russia will stand firm, because this is not so much a matter of government policy as a matter of Russian society’s traditional values.

In the West, meanwhile, supporting same-sex marriage is state policy rather than a matter of free choice. You cannot speak up against same-sex marriage in France any more—you can be fired for that. In my view, this is unacceptable. This is a new liberal dictatorship.

I believe that such an approach will be rejected by a vast swathe of countries, from China to Turkey. Russia must stand very firm as a bastion of traditional values. This is a colossal soft-power reserve for us. As a defender of traditional values, Russia will win the support of a huge number of people in Europe and farther afield.

SECURITY INDEX: How do traditional values sit with the formation of civil society? Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are an important element of civil society. That includes the NGOs that act as important conduits of Russian soft power. But the Russian legislators continue to pursue a confrontational approach rather than dialogue in this area.

PUSHKOV: The vast majority of American and European NGOs are conduits of the interests and ideologies of their home countries. In Russia, however, NGOs tend to act as conduits for other countries’ interests and positions. That is the reason why Russian society and politicians are wary of NGOs. According to various surveys, 61 percent of those polled don’t believe there is any need for NGOs. They believe that NGOs are actually damaging. NGOs have been strongly discredited in Russia. But that does not mean that we should abandon that instrument of spreading our influence, culture, and intellectual presence.

I strongly believe in supporting the kind of NGOs that do not position themselves as an alternative to Russian society and the Russian state. I support the NGOs that do not essentially act as foreign agents, but work as a humanitarian extension of our society and state beyond our borders. I think we should do all we can to support such organizations.

We are only just learning to be a new country; that learning is a long and painful process. The U.S. political machine has been developing and perfecting its soft-power mechanisms ever since the United States became a global empire in 1945. Russia has only had two decades to do the same. I think that, as a country, we have yet to achieve an understanding of the importance of non-governmental forms of wielding our influence. This will take time. I would like that to happen sooner rather than later.
BRICS has become one of the most promising groups in recent years. This new political player is being watched very closely by the developed countries and the developing nations which pin their hopes on multi-vector diplomacy.

The collection of research papers entitled “Rising BRICS Giants” consists of materials published following a large science conference held by the MGIMO-University in Moscow in 2011. The authors offer a detailed statistical analysis of the BRICS countries’ shared problems, and discuss their international positioning, the distinctive features of their foreign policy, and their modernization strategies. They place particular emphasis on the foreign strategies of the BRICS nations, and on multilateral relations within the RIC subgroup and BRICS as a whole. The experts also try to find an answer to the two questions that are the most pressing for Russia: what is the country’s role in that group, and how will it continue to position itself?

The book reflects the authors’ hypothesis that the role of BRICS in this day and age is to offer an alternative to the emerging Western hegemony. It is an attempt to create a multi-polar world based on mutually complementary cooperation and shared security. Exactly how complementary that cooperation is going to be is still a subject of debate, as different authors offer different views. Some believe that China stands out from among the BRICS states; through its sheer weight, the country is shifting the balance of power, and using its participation in the organization to lobby its economic interests in Africa. That is why they argue that the BRICS group is not an effective mechanism for resolving global problems.

Other experts, however, offer persuasive arguments in favor of integration in the BRICS format. They stress that the participating countries have shared political and economic interests. According to this view, the founding members of the organization are not simply developing economies, but rising emerging-market giants which have many shared goals, such as combating terrorism and piracy, multilateral cooperation, similar views on decision-making within NATO, and the need to achieve the Millennium Development Goals.

At the same time, BRICS is primarily a forum for dialogue, as opposed to a new form of economic integration, let alone a military-political union. But it is also a model of redistribution of influence in the world, which represents a transition from a unipolar world to a new and more just world order. In this context, BRICS is also a kind of answer to the crisis of political identity.

Speaking of the problems and prospects for cooperation, the authors highlight that not only China, but India as well, is gaining international clout; they also draw attention to the BRICS countries’ work within the G20 format. A large section of the book is devoted to analyzing relations between the BRICS states, and to answering the important question of whose interests the BRICS group really represents, and what makes it different from the G8 or the G20.
The key idea for all the member states is the strategy of modernization. Each state has its own strategy, but a particular focus is placed on a comparative analysis of Chinese modernization and Russian reforms.

On the whole, the book covers in great detail the entire range of BRICS-related issues, and systematizes the contradictory views regarding the organization’s future. The analysis is backed by an impressive amount of statistical data, enabling readers to make their own assessment of the role of each BRICS country in the formation of a new world order.
A SEASON OF POLITICAL STORMS

The International Security Index (iSi) showed a lot of volatility in the summer of 2013. It stood at 2803 points on June 1, up slightly from the previous few months, to reflect subsiding political tensions on the Korean peninsula. In mid-June, however, the domestic political situation began to deteriorate in Turkey, Egypt, and Tunisia. There were also sharp falls

Konstantin von Eggert (Russia), Member of the Royal Institute of International Relations – by phone from Moscow: There has been a significant deterioration in the international security situation. The main reasons for that are the latest events in the Middle East and the Mediterranean, which have deepened the divisions between Russia and the West; and growing tensions between Moscow and Kiev over the Customs Union. There are deep concerns over Egypt and Syria. I don’t think that any simple solutions to the crises in these two countries. A foreign military intervention in Syria would only make things worse. Egypt may well plunge into a civil war, unless the generals manage to restore some degree of stability. I would like to hope that the military-led government will do everything it can to make sure that the inevitable future transition to civilian rule marginalizes the Islamist radicals to the greatest possible extent. Positive developments over the period include the resumption of talks between Israel and the Palestinians in August. There is a feeling, however, that the two sides have been forced into these talks by an external third party, and that these talks will end in failure. The combination of all these events has created an extreme degree of instability in the region, which is especially worrying because it lies close to the Russian borders.
on the global stock markets. As a result, by July 1 the iSi index reversed its previous gains, falling 21 points to 2782. The civil war in Syria, which has turned from an international conflict; the military coup in Egypt; and growing popular discontent in Latin America over the governments’ economic and social policies depressed the index even further. It had fallen to 2763 points by August 1, and to 2756 by September 1.

**Africa and the Middle East.** The summer of 2013 did not bring any degree of political calm to the Middle East and Africa. In Syria, fighting continued between government troops and the rebels in the towns of Aleppo, Homs, and Damascus. There were also clashes on the Syrian border with Jordan, and near the Syrian–Turkish border. The worst fighting raged in the town of Al Quasayr, on the border with Lebanon. Most of the town is now controlled by government forces.

Syrian rebels seized four peacekeepers in the demilitarized Golan Heights zone. The EU lifted its embargo on weapons supplies to the Syrian opposition. On July 10 Russia submitted to the UN the results of an investigation confirming the use of chemical weapons by the rebels in Syria.

In August the opposition once again accused the government of chemical weapons use in a suburb of Damascus. At an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council, Moscow blocked a resolution urging the Syrian leadership to allow international inspectors to the site of the suspected chemical attack. Barack Obama announced that Bashar al-Assad had crossed the red line, and asked the U.S. Congress to authorize a strike against the Syrian regime’s military targets without a UN Security Council resolution. The absence of unity among America’s allies has significantly complicated the political steps Washington would have to take after strikes against the Syrian government’s military targets.

**Dayan Jayatilleka (Sri Lanka),** Ambassador, former Sri Lanka’s Permanent Representative to the UN in Geneva, Senior Lecturer in Politics at the University of Colombo – by e-mail from Colombo: The situation in Egypt after the removal from power President Mohammed Morsi by the military is complex and fraught with danger. On the one hand, this is an anti-democratic coup but on the other it is a step forward in the process of development of the Egyptian democratic revolution taken in its broader sense. There is a clash of visions of the future of Egypt which is also a clash of cultures.

In Lebanon, there were clashes in June between the Sunni Muslims and the Alawite minority. Several people were killed. On June 25 the army fought off an attack by armed extremists in the town of Sidon. The threat of terrorist attacks rose sharply.

In Iraq, a large group of jihadists escaped from Abu Ghrabi prison on July 24 to join the rebels fighting the Bashar al-Assad government in Syria.

**Mustafa Fetouri (Libya),** Independent Libyan Academic, Journalist – by e-mail from Tripoli: We have seen terrible increase in violence in the ongoing attacks on the Syrian state by the armed groups – most of whom are none Syrians – and in particular the attacks on the Kurdish areas of Syria. The most recent developments came during the second week of August in what appeared to be some sort of chemical material used to wipe out hundreds of civilians. While the regime is accused that heinous crime there is every indication that it is the armed groups or other outsiders who are to blame. It is very unlikely that the Syrian government could have carried out such attack at the time when it has accepted the UN investigation team and stated its willingness to cooperate.
In **Egypt** the army deposed President Mohammed Morsi on July 3, and formed a transitional government led by Prime Minister Hazem el-Beblawi. The Muslim Brotherhood refused to take part in the newly formed government. Fierce clashes continued throughout the country between the Islamists’ supporters and opponents; there were many casualties. On July 27 the Egyptian army began an operation against armed rebels in the north of the Sinai Peninsula.

Angry anti-government protests broke out in **Turkey** in June after the government approved plans to build a shopping mall at Gezi Park in Istanbul; there were several casualties. The authorities said they had no intention of seeking a compromise with the protesters. In July there were new protests demanding the resignation of Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s government.

In **Libya**, there were clashes in June between government troops and armed militias. In **Bahrain**, the opposition held protests in July, demanding an end to the use of torture against political prisoners. In **Tunisia**, opposition leader Mohamed al-Brahmi was assassinated in mid-July. His killing triggered mass protests calling on the government to step down. The confrontation between the government and the opposition has turned into a protracted political crisis.

In **Iran**, Hassan Rouhani won the presidential election held on June 15. Speaking after his inauguration, Rouhani said he was ready to cooperate with the international community on the nuclear issue. The Bushehr nuclear power plant began commercial operation on June 28.

**Israel and Palestine.** Negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians resumed in July for the first time since 2010. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu agreed to release more than 100 Palestinian prisoners ahead of the talks. There were three rounds of direct talks in August; details of the negotiations and the results achieved have not been disclosed. The fourth round, originally scheduled for August 27, was called off after the Palestinian

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**Abdulaziz Sager, Chairman of the Gulf Research Center (Saudi Arabia)** – by e-mail from Dubai: The victory of Hassan Rouhani at the presidential elections in Iran was a surprise to many. Politicians and experts have started to talk about the possible liberalization of certain sectors of life in Iranian societies with new president-pragmatist. But predictions about the development of the situation in Iran with the arrival of Rouhani would be unrealistic if not take into account a deep essence of the processes occurring in the country. The bottom line is that Hassan Rouhani is part of the system of the Islamic Republic and that no matter what he has to work within its limits. He can possibly steer debate but the final decisions remains with the Supreme Leader. Rouhani wants to limit Iran’s isolation by softening the rhetoric but this is not a change in substance. Plus, there are clear limits in place as to the steps the West in ready to take in return for vague promises from the Iranian side.

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**Evgeny Satanovsky (Russia)**, President of the Institute of Middle East Studies – by phone from Moscow: I would describe the direct talks between Israel and the Palestinians that took place in August as a product of blackmail by the Americans. For Israel, the talks came at the cost of basic security precautions (several terrorists had to be released before the negotiations could begin). For the Palestinian National Administration, the talks were an obvious bluff. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry needed these talks as a political show to boost his personal career. The talks had nothing to do whatsoever with normalizing the situation; they have also driven the final nail into the coffin of the peace process delusion; the vast majority of the Israelis (about 80 percent) no longer believe in that process.
National Administration refused to take part. The move came as a reaction to new clashes between the Israelis and the Palestinians in the West Bank.

In Mali, the government and the Tuareg tribes, which control the north of the country, reached a ceasefire agreement. The state of emergency in the country was lifted ahead of the presidential elections held in July–August. Ibrahim Boubacar Kenta was elected the new president.

In Sudan, more than 60 people were killed in ethnic clashes in Darfur province. In DR Congo, fighting broke out once again between government troops and the March 23 Movement rebels. In Guinea, more than 50 people were killed in ethnic clashes. In Nigeria the Islamists made several raids against civilian targets throughout the summer; there were many casualties. In August the army launched a counterterrorism operation against the Boko Haram extremists.

- The Korean peninsula. Military-political tensions eased slightly on the Korean peninsula in early summer. In June North Korea halted preparations for a ballistic missile launch, and urged South Korea to conclude a peace treaty instead of the truce signed at the end of the 1950–1953 Korean War. On June 9 the two countries held working-level talks, and expressed their readiness to continue dialogue. They also declared their intention to resume the work of the Kaesong industrial zone. In August the government in Pyongyang agreed to hold talks with Seoul on reuniting the families split by the Korean War.

- Afghanistan–Pakistan. The Taliban stepped up their attacks in summer. In June they attacked the U.S. airbase in Bagram. Talks between the United States and the Taliban scheduled for June in Qatar fell through after President Hamid Karzai refused to take part. In August the ISAF command said that foreign troops had been pulled out from more than 700 military bases (90 percent of the total number) in Afghanistan.

In Pakistan, the local Taliban leader, Wali ur Rehman, was killed in a U.S. drone strike in June.

- South, East, and Southeast Asia. Tensions persisted on the Chinese–Indian border. On July 25 Chinese soldiers crossed the border and made an incursion into the Indian state of Uttarakhand. In August the two sides managed to defuse the situation; the governments announced their intention to sign a military cooperation treaty in October 2013, which would include security measures along the so-called Line of Actual Control.

There were mounting tensions on the Indian–Pakistani border along the line of control in Kashmir. There was a shootout between Indian and Pakistani soldiers in August, with several casualties. The incident took place after Islamabad sent an official proposal to resume settlement talks on the Jammu and Kashmir problem.

In the Philippines, there were clashes between the army and extremists during the summer.

- The European Union. The parliament in Kosovo ratified the bill on the normalization of relations with Serbia on June 27, triggering a wave of protests in Pristina. There were rallies in support of Kosovan Serbs in Serbia.

In Bulgaria, anti-government protests were held in June and July. Mass protests continued in Spain, Portugal, and Greece over the three governments’ economic policies. Global stock markets recorded their biggest falls in the last 18 months.

Northern Ireland hosted a G8 summit on June 17–18. A meeting of the EU Economic and Financial Affairs Council (ECOFIN) on June 27 agreed to set up a common system of bank restructuring and bankruptcies.

- Former Soviet states. On June 14 the unrecognized Dniester Republic passed a bill on the national border in response to the Moldovan government’s decision to strengthen immigration controls on the border with its breakaway province.
There were violent clashes between the police and local residents in the northeast of Kyrgyzstan, near the Kumtor gold ore field. The locals were demanding the cancellation of an investment agreement with Canada’s Centerra Gold Inc.

Russia and Ukraine. On August 14 the Russian customs service introduced more stringent controls for cargos arriving from Ukraine. Russia’s actions were based on the notion that Ukraine cannot be a participant in the Customs Union and sign a free trade agreement with the EU at the same time.

Latin America. Mass protests broke out in Brazil in mid-June amid public discontent over the government’s spending on preparations for the 2014 Football World Cup.
In Bolivia, miners’ strikes over pensions turned into clashes with the police. There were protests over the government’s economic policies in Chile.

- **Strategic stability and nuclear security.** On June 14 Russia and the United States signed a new framework agreement on nuclear threat reduction. The new document is based on the successful implementation of the 1992 Nunn-Lugar Program to reduce the WMD threat, which expired on June 17.

On August 7 President Barack Obama cancelled a meeting with President Putin that was due to take place in Moscow ahead of the G20 summit in St Petersburg. The reason for Obama’s decision boiled down to tensions between the two countries over the affair of fugitive former intelligence analyst Edward Snowden, who has received temporary asylum in Moscow.

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**Sergio Duarte (Brazil), Ambassador (ret.), High Representative of the United Nations for Disarmament Affairs (2007–2012) – by e-mail from Brasilia:** South America remains one of the least unstable parts of the world. Important political events in the region over the reported period included the inauguration of the new president of Paraguay, Horacio Cartes. This should foster positive political trends in the country and stabilize the situation in the Mercosur trading bloc.

- **Natural and manmade disasters.** The United States was struck by a powerful tornado in early June; about 20 people were killed. More than 100 died as a result of torrential rains and floods in China. A train crash in Spain on July 24 killed 80 people.

The Russian Far East was hit by the worst floods on record in August and September. The damage is estimated at billions of roubles. The situation is compounded by the fact that the cold season is nearing. The floods caused serious disruption in some of largest cities in the region, including Blagoveshchensk, Khabarovsk, and Komsomolsk-on-Amur. There were floods in Europe, an epidemic of cholera in Congo, an outbreak of a coronavirus infection in Saudi Arabia, and an earthquake in Indonesia.

There were terrorist attacks in Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Turkey, Thailand, Niger, India, Egypt, and Somalia.

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**Galia Ibragimova**

A NEW COLD WAR?

Right up to September 14, the day when the Russian–U.S. arrangement on Syrian chemical weapons known as the “Kerry-Lavrov pact” was achieved, relations between Moscow and Washington were progressively degrading into a bitter political confrontation. Many observers opined that President Obama’s refusal to meet Vladimir Putin in September 2013 marked the beginning of a new Cold War. Whether or not that was true depends on the precise definition of the Cold War. The cancellation of a summit is an extraordinary step in diplomatic practice. In essence, the White House has declared that it doesn’t see the point of discussing anything with the Russian president; that Washington has no more patience left for Moscow’s antics; and that a pause in relations with Moscow is necessary “to reassess where it is that Russia is going” and produce a new policy on Russia.

The U.S. experts and politicians who had been advocating a reset in relations with Russia over the past few years have found themselves in a difficult situation. In their efforts to save face, they are putting all the blame on anti-Russian forces in the United States and anti-American forces in Russia. They continue to insist that mounting confrontation is not in the long-term interests of either side. The pro-Kremlin analysts and propaganda experts in Russia and abroad were trying to put up a brave front. They argued that nothing out of the ordinary had actually happened; that the cancelled Russian–U.S. summit would not have produced any results anyway; and that the blame lies with Washington for “not being ready to
treat Russia as an equal.” They also said that Washington’s decision to cancel the summit has demonstrated that Russia was pursuing an independent foreign policy, and refusing to yield to American pressure. Both groups regarded the White House’s decision as an overblown reaction to the Kremlin’s decision to grant political asylum to Edward Snowden.

The only thing all these commentators were right about was that in all likelihood the summit would not have produced any tangible results had it gone ahead as planned in September. But 90 per cent of such meetings usually end up without any tangible results. Their objective is to demonstrate that even if the leaders of the participating countries have different opinions or even personal dislike for each other, they can still earnestly discuss serious issues and look for solutions to their differences.

Washington’s decision was quite understandable, however. For the first five years of Barack Obama’s presidency, the United States did everything it could to establish at least some limited cooperation with Moscow on those international problems which Washington is particularly concerned about. These include the Iranian and North Korean nuclear programs; the Arab Spring; nuclear disarmament; and, in the past year or two, Syria. In order to reach mutual understanding on these issues, the White House had made some serious concessions to the Kremlin. It had cancelled the decision to deploy heavy ground-based interceptors (GBI) in Poland and missile defense radar in the Czech Republic. It had essentially taken the question of Ukrainian and Georgian accession to NATO off the agenda. It had let it be understood that growing authoritarian trends in Russia were not seen as a particular cause for alarm in Washington. After the second inauguration of President Obama, it was announced that the entry into service of the SM-3 Block IIB interceptors, which the Russian generals were especially worried about, would be postponed indefinitely. Washington had also invited Russia to begin talks on increasing the transparency of the two countries’ missile defense programs, and reducing the strategic offensive arms ceilings by another 30 percent. Both proposals were perfectly in line with Russia’s own strategic interests.

Nevertheless, Russia rejected all these proposals, and the reasons it gave for doing so did not sound very persuasive for the most part. In particular, Russian officials insist that the two countries should first implement the terms of the New START treaty currently in force before discussing any new reductions. They also argue that any further reductions must be linked to such issues as missile defense, weapons in space, non-nuclear strategic weapons, conventional weapons imbalances, and the French and British nuclear arsenals. Making such preconditions for discussing further strategic reductions has the sole purpose of blocking any new strategic arms reduction talks, thereby putting the Obama administration in an uncomfortable position. Besides, the Russian stance on several of the issues Moscow has set out as preconditions sounds rather unreasonable.

For example, Russian generals and diplomats have lately been talking up the dangers of non-nuclear strategic weapons. But the problem of such weapons has already been addressed in the New START treaty signed in Prague in 2010. The treaty limits the total number of warheads mounted on strategic delivery systems. It makes a reference to nuclear warheads only with regard to long-range bombers. As for the warheads mounted on ICBMs and SLBMs, the treaty does not make a distinction between nuclear and conventional warheads.

This means that Russia and the United States are free to mount nuclear as well as conventional warheads on their strategic ballistic missiles; both types will be counted towards the overall ceiling agreed in the treaty. That ceiling determines the maximum damage that can be inflicted in the event of an attack, regardless of whether the missile that has reached the territory of the potential adversary is armed with nuclear or conventional warheads. It is not at all clear why a missile armed with a conventional weapon should be any more dangerous for Russia than a nuclear-armed missile.

Unlike the question of non-nuclear strategic weapons, preventing an armed race in space has the potential to become a real problem at some point. But the most dangerous types of military activities in space, including the deployment of nuclear weapons in space and the testing of such weapons, are already banned. No one is calling for an outright ban on using space for military purposes, including such instruments as reconnaissance, communication, targeting, and other satellites. That is why the only proposal that can be put on the table is to determine the kinds of military activities which all the countries possessing advanced space
programs would like to be banned, without affecting other programs regarded as important for the provision of security. This is an exceptionally challenging task.

Besides, we still do not have any acceptable definitions for some of the key terms pertaining to the subject of any future negotiations. For example, it is not clear where exactly the Earth’s atmosphere ends, and outer space begins. It will also be very difficult to agree verification procedures. One of the inevitable issues is how to determine whether any individual spacecraft carries weapons. The only plausible way of doing that would be to have a team of foreign inspectors monitoring the assembly of every spacecraft. That would hardly be acceptable to Russia, the United States, or indeed the majority of the space-faring nations.

Also, the issue of conventional weapons and forces in Europe deserves our attention, and an imbalance between Russia and NATO in this area does exist. But Moscow prefers to ignore the fact that the likelihood of a continent-wide armed conflict in Europe has now been reduced to zero. That is why there is simply no point in comparing the military capability of Russia and all the NATO countries as a bloc.

At the same time, we need to look for solutions to those conventional arms problems that are relevant to the specific regions where military confrontation between Russia and NATO could conceivably break out. There are two such regions: the South Baltic, and the Black Sea region—including the western part of the South Caucasus. The geopolitical situation and the balance of power in each of these two regions are unique. In the most general sense, it is safe to assume that reducing the risk of a military confrontation there would require a combination of various measures, including confidence-building; establishing low-weapons zones, including in Russia; agreeing not to deploy destabilizing weapons systems in such zones, etc.

In other words, the need to prevent an arms race in space and a conventional arms race in Europe is a real military-strategic problem. Resolving that problem, now or at some later point, could strengthen international security.

Finally, one of the reasons for the deadlock in Russian–U.S. relations is Russian demands with regard to the missile defense program. In the spring of 2013 Washington invited Russia to sign a new agreement on transparency and confidence-building measures in this area. The White House hoped to persuade Russian diplomats and generals that their concerns regarding the U.S. missile defense system are groundless by giving them more information about that system. The plan was to remove these concerns, and then move on to issues seen as really important by Washington: namely, strategic nuclear reductions, and non-strategic nuclear reductions in Europe. But that proposal was rejected by Moscow as well.

The inevitable question is, why does Russian diplomacy pursue such a confrontational course? There are several possible answers. One possibility is that Moscow has some very wrong ideas about the intentions and capabilities of the United States and other NATO countries, while at the same time overestimating its own capabilities. Russia has mistaken Washington’s determination to seek a compromise and pursue cooperation as a sign of weakness. Another possibility is that politicians in Moscow have been deliberately stoking up tensions in order to use these tensions for their own domestic-policy purposes, including an increase in defense spending. But regardless of the reasons for Moscow’s obstructionism with regard to the United States, if this strategy triggers a new Cold War the results of that war for Russia will be even direr than the outcome of the first Cold War has been for the Soviet Union.

Now, at the time of writing this essay, it is too early to judge whether the “Kerry–Lavrov pact” has started a new period in the Russia–United States relationship. Yet it looks quite probable that the Kremlin perceived the Obama administration’s refusal to attack the Assad regime as clear evidence of an imminent weakness of Washington, D.C. In this light one may suppose that Moscow is intensifying its pressure on the United States for new concessions rather than turning to cooperation with the United States in fighting actual strategic threats and challenges.
INSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE TO GLOBAL STABILITY

Whether we like it or not, global politics and global stability (which is the product of a certain state of global politics) are, first and foremost, institutional phenomena. International consensus on key issues is formed of international institutions. These institutions also constitute the foundation of international law, and they underpin the implementation of international norms. Over the past three or four months, however, there has been a clear institutional crisis in global politics. I have already focused on this subject in previous articles. The current situation, however, is not merely symptomatic, but clearly dangerous.

- The UN is still in the grip of the identity crisis of its secretary-general, which began following the Russian operation in Georgia in August 2008. The impotence and bias of the United Nations have reached monumental proportions. The latest anti-Syrian resolutions have made the UN look more than a bit silly—but, in truth, they have not added any genuinely new strokes to the already unappealing image of that organization. For many years now, people have not really understood what it is exactly that the UN does; what is more, people do not seem to care.

- The UN Security Council is not merely divided (it is, after all, the purpose of such bodies to identify and overcome differences). It has recently become an object of manipulation by the Western countries, which get very upset when someone points out their mistakes. It is not even just a matter of Syria—although Syria is an important element. It is more a matter of the general mood. The UN Security Council has become a place where telling lies is not simply allowed but actually encouraged.

- The G8 will be the subject of a separate discussion—but it too is showing signs of decline and losing a proper strategic agenda.

- The European Union has turned into a kind of mutual aid fund—or, in the words of the famous Russian comedy character Ostap Bender, into a League of Sexual Reforms. It is not exactly clear what the EU does these days, apart from trying to save the euro and hold a gay pride rally in Moscow. The latest pronouncements by Jose Manuel Barroso concerning the budget suggest that the budget process is already bypassing the European Commission, which has been relegated to a technical role, and which does not seem very pleased at such a turn of events. The chairman of the European Council too is giving off rather alarming signals.

- The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is still showing some signs of vitality, but here is the question: What would the numerous IAEA officials busy themselves with, were it not for the deeply confrontational and ambiguous situation with the Iranian nuclear program? Let us not even mention the situation with the North Korean nuclear program, in which the IAEA has long been playing second fiddle (even though it has helped to stabilize the situation on several occasions).

- As for the World Trade Organization (WTO), it is not entirely clear whether that organization is still alive, even in the formal sense.

The crisis of global institutions (including such institutions as the EU) was entirely predictable, being a natural consequence of the wave of transformations that began four years ago. But the situation is compounded by a similar crisis of regional institutions.

- The Customs Union and the Eurasian Economic Union are trying to drag Ukraine, kicking and screaming, into their fold. It seems that without Ukraine they do not see any future for themselves. It is not clear why. Could it be because Russia and Kazakhstan do not regard themselves as geopolitically self-sufficient? Or because they cannot function without Ukraine, that famous economic powerhouse? Compared with the graveyard silence on the CIS front, all the fuss over Ukraine’s membership of the Customs Union may look like energetic activity—but in actual fact, it has no bearing whatsoever on the global processes.

- BRICS, too has gone strangely quiet. Of course, it has not yet become a proper institution—but it has come to occupy some institutional space. It must be said that Russia has done quite a lot to make sure that BRICS never becomes a real institution. On the whole, however, BRICS used to be an extremely interesting phenomenon of a potentially global nature.

- The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), meanwhile, is showing signs of life. It looks as though the organization’s members will soon realize that they need to...
move on from all the talk of free trade and economic cooperation to discussing collective security. Incidentally, Russia should work more energetically with ASEAN. This organization is far more promising than cooperation with the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), which has so far yielded only a few criminal prosecutions following the APEC summit in Vladivostok, and several crumbling edifices built in that city ahead of the summit.

The Arab League has essentially been privatized by Saudi Arabia and Qatar. But the body is clearly failing to produce a decent return on the investment. As they watch the events in Syria on TV, most of the Arab leaders (except for the deposed Morsi, who had taken too much money from the Saudis) have decided to sit it out until the situation becomes clearer.

Interestingly, over the past six months the word NATO, which used to be the subject of heated political discussions, has all but vanished from the Russian headlines. Clearly, it is too early to say that the NATO bloc has ceased to be an important actor in various military and political processes—that would be wishful thinking. After all, when the Syrian bloodbath was only just starting, Western politicians discussed the possibility of using NATO’s command structure for a military intervention. Indeed, if an intervention does happen, there will probably be no alternative to using that mechanism. But the issue of NATO’s global role has not been raised at any important political gatherings for a very long time now—and that is quite telling in itself.

The only thing that keeps NATO on the agenda is the ongoing discussions about Georgia’s accession to the alliance, and various grand ideas being voiced by the Ukrainian establishment from time to time. It would be easy to put all the blame on NATO’s incumbent secretary-general, who is a rather bland figure lacking any independent role. The problem is, however, that NATO’s internal principles and organizational structure make it ill-suited for addressing modern international challenges, and attempts by the organization to adapt itself to these new challenges as they emerge have not been very successful so far.

To summarize, we have clearly entered a period of a fatal crisis of post-bipolar institutions. No wonder, then, that various ad hoc coalitions and informal partnerships have now become all the rage. In other words, we are going through a period of ad-hoc foreign-policy constructs—and the precise configuration of these coalitions is sometimes nothing short of astounding.

For example, what are we supposed to think of the global alliance between the French government, which is busily promoting gay marriages all across the world, and Saudi Arabia’s Salafists, who still doubt the universal human value of such marriages? Such an alliance, however, is a very real political factor, as Bashar al-Assad would readily attest.

Strategic partnership between the United States and al-Qaida, however, does not seem quite as shocking. This is, after all, merely a return to the old strategy that was last used to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, that partnership is unusual inasmuch as it comes after 10 years of demonizing the Taliban and trying to wipe it off the face of the Earth.

The problem here is that such ad-hoc alliances are sometimes an effective instrument for addressing tactical problems—but they cannot form a long-term system of mutual obligations or mutual political dependence. In other words, the world of global institutions is a world of constant restraints (sometimes unspoken) on the actions of states or groups of states. Such a world is based on instruments for implementing international norms. The world of ad hoc coalitions does not have any such restraints. As a result it is far more dangerous, since it does not offer governments any platforms for resolving international problems through arbitration rather than more violent means.

Of course, some countries—such as North Korea, Turkmenistan, or Salafi-ruled Libya—do not need any such platforms. But even Iran and Venezuela would probably have preferred to make use of international institutions, had there been any confidence in the impartiality and effectiveness of such institutions. As a result, the crisis of international political institutions has left many countries without any hope of resolving various differences through means other than force. The consequence of that is a steady growth in global instability. Very soon this will become a very real and tangible factor in practical foreign politics as well.

Dmitry Evstafiev

REVIEW OF RECENT WORLD EVENTS: JUNE–SEPTEMBER 2013
The military coup in Egypt; the protracted civil war in Syria, which has broken all possible rules and required direct intervention by the leading world powers; and other pressing political crises have created a tangle of problems and contradictions all over the Muslim world, from the Persian Gulf to the Eastern Mediterranean, and from the Maghreb to the Sahel. This directly impinges on Russia’s interests.

Regarding the causes and the essence of the transformations taking place we have spoken with the Chairman of the Committee for Foreign Affairs at Council of the Federation of the Federal Assembly the Russian Federation and the Special Representative of the President for Russia’s cooperation with the African countries, Mikhail Margelov.1

SECURITY INDEX: What were the reasons for the escalation of the political situation in Egypt in summer 2013 and how will this instability develop?

MARGELOV: In 2011, when an unsuccessful Tunisian fruit seller, whose fruits were not of good quality, felt offended, and people started protecting him, nobody thought that it would trigger the situation that would later be called the “Arab Spring.” And when in Tunisia representatives of trade unions, representatives of leftist groups, supporters of Che Guevara took to the streets, nobody thought that later they would be substituted by Islamist leaders that came to power as the result of free democratic elections in those countries.

However, in archaic societies such as those, as a result of free elections it is not the representatives of modernization forces who win, but representatives of an archaic approach. Algeria was the first Arab country that wanted to organize free democratic elections, and actually Islamist forces won them, and that forced the army to take the situation under control, which led to years of bloodshed. And we do remember what happened as the result of free democratic elections on Palestinian autonomy, when HAMAS came to power.

What happened in Algeria and Palestine was long before the Arab Spring and that’s why the feeling of some kind of discovery of what happened seems very strange. The Muslim Brothers won the elections in Egypt, but who else could have won there?

Since the summer 2013 events in Egypt people started talking about a re-run of the Tahrir revolution. It’s quite an interesting phenomenon. The Muslim Brothers actually won in free democratic elections. And what happened after that? The society was split. Those people who were actually doing the revolution on Tahrir Square were cut out of the results of the revolution.

I would like to remind you that those people who were at Tahrir Square were liberal people, they were oriented at modernization, they wanted to stop that 40-year rule of Mubarak and
lead to some democratic secular free development of the country. But it happened that most of the well-disciplined voting population of Egypt are people with archaic minds.

And thus the Muslim Brothers could practically create a one-party cabinet. They cut off all potential allies: liberals as well as radical Islamists. And the situation evolved in such a way that by the day before yesterday even the Salafi, radical Islamist movement, said that they are against Mohammed Mursi and they brought people to the square.

The army played the role that it traditionally plays in Arab countries and Muslim societies. For instance, in Turkey the army and the General Headquarters of the army for a long time were the force supporting the secular development of Turkish society. And now the Turkish constitution has changed in accordance with the norms of European law, which naturally influences the development of the political situation in Turkey.

But talking about Egypt, the Muslim Brothers are not just political party, they are also an organization with a branched network of cells, with experience of years of legitimate and illegitimate struggle. Regarding those who are against Muslim Brothers cabinet, the opposition is fragmented and is represented by different political forces.

That’s why the fact that the army took the situation under control does not mean an end to political crisis in Egypt. The fact that the President of Al-Azhar university and also the copt patriarch supported the actions of the military does not mean that in the society there’s a consensus regarding the actions of the military.

That’s why, with great concern, I can say that now Egypt is on the brink of civil war. The worst thing that can happen in Egypt is the development of events according to the Syrian scenario.

SECURITY INDEX: What would be the possible reaction of the Russian government towards the events in Egypt?

MARGELOV: We want political processes in Egypt to develop in a legitimate political way. At the same time we understand the mood which is expressed by a large group of people in Egypt. We do understand this feeling of responsibility that the military in Egypt have for their country. For us Egypt is one of the cornerstones of peace and stability in the Middle East. Egypt is the country that should follow its international obligations, first of all those with the State of Israel. For us peace in the Middle East is one of the values. That’s why we have a dialogue with all the political forces of Egypt.

SECURITY INDEX: How does the balance of power look inside the Middle East region? What country is meant to be the leader?

MARGELOV: When the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq was removed, the only secular counterbalance to the Islamic regime in Iran was destroyed. For quite a long period of time Iran became the strongest Muslim state. And Iran started to claim leadership not just in the Shia Muslim world, but in the whole Muslim world.

The background for the situation was the fact that the political leadership of traditional leaders such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt was not evident. Also the claims of Qatar to be political leader for that moment were not well articulated.

Then Turkey decided to revise its position in the world and to look at the Muslim world. If we look at the research works of Mr Davutoglu, the Foreign Affairs Minister of Turkey, everything is going to be clear. Turkey also started claiming leadership, and objectively it turned the situation into rivalry with Iranian claims to leadership. It is not just political rivalry; it is economic rivalry (first of all, between the companies working in Sudan).

SECURITY INDEX: How could the civil war in Syria be assessed in this context?
MARGELOV: In the conditions of the Arab Spring the Islamic world became some kind of a battlefield for Turkish and Iranian claims. And the most tragic example of this battlefield is Syria.

There are some hopes regarding resolving this situation because of the election of the new Iranian president Hassan Rouhani. We are trying to explain to our partners in the United States that Iran should participate in the Geneva-2 conference regarding peaceful regulations in Syria; president Rouhani should be given this chance to show that he is a liberal leader and he is quite different from his political predecessor.

SECURITY INDEX: The Syrian President Bashar al-Assad has proved himself to be an effective manager. Even if there were proposals for the transition of Assad we should take into consideration that he is a mighty player in the area. Moreover, the Syrian society could not be divided into just two parts—Alawite minorities and rebels—things are more complicated. So, any possible solution will be based on the fact that Bashar al-Assad stays in office. What is your opinion on that?

MARGELOV: The Arab Spring taught Arab leaders that they can trust no one. Even when they get promises that when they retire everything is going to be OK, the opposite happens. When you have personal discussion with African leaders, Arab leaders, they said the following: “Gaddafi said no to a nuclear program, and he got destroyed!” “Well, he showed some weakness, he decided to cooperate with the European Union, he came to Brussels with his tent, and they devoured him.”

And now, when even Senegal has given away Hesen Habre, former dictator of Chad, it shows that there is nowhere to run. Maybe only to Mr Mugabe in Zimbabwe like Mengistu Haile Mariam once did, and he now lives in a villa in Harare and lives quite well.

The situation of Bashar al-Assad is such that he can trust only himself. He doesn’t trust the West, he doesn’t trust us, and he doesn’t trust the Arabs. The Alawites got together and they are struggling for their survival, not just political but physical survival. And this battle is becoming more and more the great battle between Shia and Sunni for them. And for many of them this battle is becoming sacred.

And we should not forget that Syria since the time of Hafiz Al-Asad, Bashar’s father, positioned itself as a regime of minorities in Syria. And of course, when rebels murder Christian priests, this only strengthens the position of the regime, which is protecting all the minorities in the country.

The fact that people from Hezbollah and Iran are fighting for the regime is a secret to no one, but also among the forces of opposition we can see a lot of representatives of the international Muslim world. Every civil war is an international matter, there is no secret regarding this issue. Now the radicalization of the moods of the opposition and the government is growing. And that’s why we insist on having Geneva-2 as soon as possible so the situation doesn’t develop in such a way that parties refuse to talk to each other.

SECURITY INDEX: Let’s look at the Sahel countries and the countries above Sahel from the point of view of the political situation. What positive political changes are taking place in the region’s countries?

MARGELOV: We can see quite successful examples of reforms made “from above,” such as the reforms conducted by King Mohamed VI in Morocco, which helped to prevent the Arab Spring situation in that country.

Those reforms “from above” made by the monarchs in such countries as Morocco, Jordan, and recently Qatar show that wise rulers try to take the initiative and start the reforms before the streets demand it. It’s quite strange that none of the commentators compared this situation with the transfer of power to the young generation by royal families in the Netherlands or Belgium.
However, those examples of reforms “from above” are exceptions in the countries of the Arab Spring. The real Pandora’s Box is Saudi Arabia. It’s clear that Algeria is on the verge of some changes; it is not really clear what kind of changes.

The processes that are going on in the region are not going on just in the Sahel zone. And now the Sahel zone events also touch upon Algeria, Libya, Burkina Faso, Senegal, Nigeria. And the Sahel zone is not just territory which is not stable, is not just territory which is dangerous; this is just out-of-control territory, which is spreading through the whole of Africa, dividing it into two parts.

And it is also clear that the situation in Sudan is balancing between stability and instability, and it’s not just the relationship of Sudan and South Sudan, it is not just Darfur, but the thing is that president Omar Al-Bashir is asked a lot of questions by political opponents in Hartum.

Such countries as Chad, Niger, and Mauritania are set up in such a way that stability in the capitals does not mean anything. At any moment any force can come from the desert and we know of examples when the capital could be snatched in the space of several hours. I would like to remind you that the desert is full of free or cheap arms and weapons. And the number of so called Land Cruiser-based movements, gangster political groups, is simply uncountable.

SECURITY INDEX: What are the main challenges for international security that already exist or are just emerging in the Sahel zone?

MARGELOV: In 2011 just before the Mali events I spent the whole day in Timbuktu discussing different issues with the local tribal and religious leaders. And one of the Touareg tribal chiefs was very sad. He said sadly: “What happened in Libya, all that flow of arms—it destroyed my whole business.” MANPADS became the same prize as two used Kalashnikovs.

At that time people were cautious towards the news about the danger of the Libyan weapons, but then everybody realized that the flow of weapons coming to Sahel and out of Sahel, all those weapons that were stolen from Gaddafi’s arsenals, that’s a really serious issue, that’s why a lot of attention was paid to it at the meeting of the G-8 at Camp David. And now Libyan weapons are being intercepted on the border of Egypt and Gaza, also in Syria, and who knows where else they could surface.

Apart from just illegal arms trafficking, the slave trade is also quite a characteristic feature of the Sahel zone, and it is also stimulating illegal migration processes. Also hostage taking is quite customary in this zone. Besides we are going to talk about a new phenomenon, such as drug trafficking from Latin America through Guinea-Bissau and Sahel to the Middle East and Europe.

And actually the situation in the Sahel zone is interconnected in different countries. We shouldn’t forget about the migration of tribes, and if we find something that happens in Northern Mali and then in Darfur is connected, we shouldn’t be surprised by these similarities, because for hundreds of years Touareg tribes were coming—doing hadj—to Saudi Arabia and they started settling, or trespassing in neighboring territories, so there is nothing surprising here.

When we are talking about migration, we shouldn’t forget that it is not just migration of a potential workforce for European countries, but it is also migration of warlords and rebels, getting their training, and then they disseminate all over the greater Middle East.

Nobody should be surprised by the fact that hundreds of people from Morocco and Libya are fighting in the ranks of the Syrian opposition. In summer 2013 the Foreign Affairs Minister of Morocco was in Moscow and we discussed that, regarding Syria, the government cannot really control the situation of those young people who are going to different countries where they participate in certain events.

SECURITY INDEX: What are the influencing tools of the international community to put some order in this arch of instability?

MARGELOV: The main tool that should be used here is the African Union. The African Union is emerging from the post-Gaddafi crisis. The fact that, after electing Ms Dlamini-Zuma,
South Africa has strengthened its position in the African Union is for today good news. The African Union is organized in such a way that without a leading country or a group of countries it cannot work efficiently. On a certain stage Muammar Gaddafi claimed to be such a leader; now South Africa is claiming such leadership.

Why the African Union? The events of the latest decades showed that only Africans could actually solve African problems. The UN can provide assistance, can provide a certain platform, but the actual everyday work is to be done by Africans. That’s why Russia as a country is supporting the strengthening of the African Union and therefore it’s becoming a real working international body.

We have to say that together with the African Union we tried to solve the Libyan crisis. But unfortunately asking us and the African Union to solve the Libyan crisis (at the G-8 summit in Deauville), our Western partners asked the Libyan rebels about something totally different. That’s why now Russia’s position regarding Syria is so different from our position regarding Libya—we take into consideration past events.

SECURITY INDEX: What are the tools that Russia can use to influence the situation in Sahel?

MARGELOV: First, our main tool is our membership of the UN Security Council. Second, we also provide financial support to the African Union, and also to the Peace and Security Council of the African Union. Quite a substantial tranche was transferred to Addis Ababa in December 2012; partly it was used to stabilize the situation in Somalia, partly to stabilize the situation in Mali. Third, direct funding is also one of our tools of influence. We provide the government of Bamako with ammunition, weapons, and financial support.

There are also indirect means of influence. In the last four years in Mali, Niger, Chad, and Sudan—also in bordering countries—Russian companies and also government companies arrived for geological surveys.

In Eastern politics, in African politics, and in the Muslim world political chess is much more effective than political rugby.

NOTE

1 The text of this interview is based on remarks by Mikhail Margelov at the Trialogue Club International meeting held by the PIR Center on July 4, 2013 in Moscow.
A GLOBAL POWER THAT HAS NO GLOBAL GOALS

In 2013 the new Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation was issued. Russian foreign policy aims to achieve development and security goals. At the same time, there are differences on the main foreign-policy fronts, such as the CIS, the CSTO, the European Union, the United States, and the Asia Pacific.

Russia’s foreign policy priorities, the prospects and the main problems of Russia’s cooperation with the United States and China, the future of the security and economic integration in the Asia Pacific region, Russia’s nuclear energy collaboration with non-nuclear countries—all these questions are addressed in an interview with the Chairman of the Committee for Education of the Russian State Duma, historian and foreign policy expert Vyacheslav Nikonov.

SECURITY INDEX: How would you access the current foreign policy of Russia?

NIKONOV: Russia is today as weak as it has never been over the past 500 years in geopolitical terms vis-a-vis various currently existing centers of power. Never before has Russia been surrounded on all sides by centers of power that are either bigger than Russia or are developing more dynamically. On the one hand there is the European Union, on the other China; the growing Islamic world in the south; and numerous hotbeds of tension along the perimeter of Russia.

On the other hand, Russia remains a center of power. In this respect, the positioning of Russia becomes a very important issue, and Moscow believes that Russia will virtually remain an independent and sovereign center of power. Does Russia possess the essential prerequisites to be equal to this task, in view of its current weakness? The prevailing view is considered to be directed towards a “yes” answer, while it is also understood that Russia is much weaker than its predecessor the Soviet Union. Russia does remain a superpower in such matters as being a nuclear power, in matters of energy, in matters of resources, in space exploration, and Russia remains a permanent member of the UN Security Council.

Russia is strengthening its economic stance in the world. In terms of purchasing power parity, Russia ranks number six, and if such comparisons are based on the rate of exchange, Russia ranks number nine. Russia has no global foreign policy ambitions, and Russia is not implementing any global geopolitical project at this time. Russia’s current policies are being pursued in a very pragmatic way, concentrating on Russia’s development and security.

There are four Russian foreign policy priorities. The first is the maintenance of conditions that are favorable to the country’s economic development and external trade. The second priority is advancement of the prevalence of international law and the UN framework. The third priority is multilateral diplomacy, in which in the most recent edition of BRICS is ahead of the G20 and the G8. And the fourth priority is countering global challenges that are represented by weapons of mass destruction, by terrorism, by Islamic extremism, and by the entire range
of non-traditional threats. The role of the self-sustained center of power presupposes an equidistant kind of relationship with all major centers of power existing today.

The geography of Russian priorities has seen certain changes over the past few years. As in the 2008 Foreign Policy Concept, cooperation with CIS countries occupies first place, second to which is relations with the European Union. In the 2008 concept, the number three and number four priorities were occupied respectively by the United States and NATO. However, in the 2012 Concept, third place is given firmly to countries of the Asia-Pacific region, followed by Latin American countries as in the past.

The CIS countries are an obvious priority and we have witnessed certain steps toward progress over the past few years. First of all, we’re talking about the Customs Union, and the movement toward creating a single economic zone with Kazakhstan and Belarus. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are also expressing an interest in this format of cooperation. The CIS is an international entity whose members are going there at various speeds. There are various internal clubs based on specific interests, particularly in matters such as the single Eurasian economic space.

The Customs Union of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia came into existence on January 1, 2010 between the states of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia.

**SECURITY INDEX:** What are the prospects of Russia’s collaboration with those groups of countries? What are the main problems of cooperation within each priority?

**NIKONOV:** Let us start with CIS countries. The future of the CIS will depend on which way Ukraine goes. It is obvious today that the Ukrainian elites are predominantly looking toward the West, while on the other hand the population at large is going through a period of heightened interest toward Russia. For Ukraine, it would make a lot of economic sense to join the Customs Union and the Common Economic Space.

**SECURITY INDEX:** What about military cooperation and interaction between CIS countries? Did the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) achieve its potential?

**NIKONOV:** The brief answer would be that CSTO is not proving equal to its declared tasks. The military cooperation and interaction amongst CIS countries takes a backseat to what is being done in economic areas, such as a Customs Union or Common Economic Space. The major problem is that for all those countries it is hard to realize a common external enemy. The problems facing Tajikistan are different from those facing Belarus. Our partners are fearful of Russia’s military domination, and Russia’s military terms are obviously much stronger than the rest of them.

**SECURITY INDEX:** What should be done to strengthen the CSTO?

**NIKONOV:** I have always held a lot of belief in bureaucracy. Where would the European Union be without the bureaucracy in Brussels? For the security organization, it’s the money and personnel that are really decisive. There’s not enough bureaucracy there, there’s no meaningful military staff or anything. And if more funding was provided, more personnel assigned for military analysis and such like, it would go a long ways toward strengthening the organization.

Of course, the organization would “benefit” from a war somewhere, within the CIS, and it would seriously promote arms control, military and political cooperation, but this is an option that one should best avoid. Let us place our hopes with peaceful prospects, with a peaceful course of development. However, the events in Afghanistan and what might happen there in the post-2014 period raises serious concerns and makes it imperative that we do something about strengthening the security organization within the CIS.
Let us speak about the other priorities—the European Union, the United States, and Asia. What are the prospects of cooperation with these groups?

NIKONOV: The European Union is a complicated partner, and not easy to deal with. On the one hand, there is an agreement on strategic partnership and a joint effort toward modernization, but, in strategic terms, very little positive is taking place. The EU remains Russia’s number one trading partner, and Russia is the European Union’s number three partner. Yet all those relations are based on the arrangements that were formalized in 1994, in the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, and it is a standard non-preferential.

In view of the current situation in Cyprus, there are quite serious contradictions that are becoming obvious in relations with the EU. The EU has decided that deposits by Russian individuals and corporations in Cyprus can be confiscated, something that does not evoke any enthusiasm in Russia. The decision drives Moscow doubt about the EU’s ability to take meaningful and reasonable decisions in such situations. Understandably, Russia is not particularly willing to invest in Cyprus when Russia’s money is being confiscated.

Another point of contention is the visa issue, rather, the need for Russians to have a visa in order to enter the EU. My impression is that this situation will continue to be as it is, i.e. visas will still be required for Russians, and the situation is likely to persist until members of the eastern partnership get visa-free access to the EU. EU membership for Russia is a non-issue—Russia is too big and too Russian. But at the same time, Russia is very willing to do business with the EU to the extent that the EU is willing to do the same with Russia. Still on the table are proposals for a security treaty in Europe that have been suggested by then-Russian president Dmitry Medvedev.

By and large, the EU and the countries thereof are more concerned with internal issues today than with their relationship with Russia. The EU–Russia summits are becoming less interesting substantively, and even the media seem to be losing interest. All in all, however, Russia is willing to cooperate with the EU and wishes the EU every success in overcoming its current problems.

Russian–American relations are small-scale, shallow you might say, because the agenda is very short. The basic framework, however, of Russian–American interaction remains in place and involves such subjects as nonproliferation, counterterrorism, the Afghan transit, and cooperation on regional issues. At the same time, Russia and the United States will have a priority in each other’s relationships in that each country represents for the other what you might refer to as an existential threat. Security issues will continue to be at the top of Russian–American relations.

At the same time, prospects of progress in reducing strategic offensive weapons are very problematic. Of course, Russia is very concerned with the continued developments in ballistic missile defense by the United States, something that is definitely a negative factor for Russian forces to potentially restrain. At the same time the United States is far ahead of the rest of the world in terms of conventional weapons, therefore Russia will continue to rely heavily on nuclear weapons as a guarantee of security. The United States is what you might call an indispensable partner for every country.

However, the United States will remain in the shady segment of perception in Russia in terms of foreign policy. Russia is one of the four targets for a nuclear attack from the United States, the other three being Iran, China, and North Korea. And of late, the United States has been seen as creating many problems for Russia on its periphery. Russia’s leaders were perplexed by the statement by then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, who said the United States would continue to act against any integration efforts in the post-soviet space. It looks like such integration is welcome elsewhere, but not within the former Soviet Union. In my opinion, the Magnitsky Act is a serious step toward ranking Russia much closer to rogue countries. Such legislative efforts are made normally with respect to rogue countries.

The Asia Pacific region is gaining as a priority area for Russia. Russia is addressing a three-in-one task there. Number one is modernization of Russia’s Far East. Number two is integration of Russia into the Asia-Pacific economic structure so that Russia can become part of it. Number three is for Russia to become integrated into the architecture of Asia-Pacific organizations.
Modernization in Russia’s Far East is slow, but still the rate of growth exceeds that in the rest of the country. Economic relations with the countries in the Asia-Pacific are also on the up and up, but at this point they still count for little more than 25 percent of the total.

Russia is becoming more visible in the Asia-Pacific energy market. While three years ago its profile there accounted for 0.1 percent, currently it stands at 3 percent and the task for the next 10 years is to assume a 15 percent share of the Asia-Pacific market. Russia is also becoming a growing player in the East Asian market for nuclear power stations, space launches, and defense products. The countries of East Asia in recent years have become more important as investors in Russia compared with countries of the EU. At any rate, the most important Japanese companies, South Korean companies, and many Chinese companies are investing in Russia.

China is becoming Russia’s key partner in the region, and relations between the two countries have reached their highest ever point. China is the largest trade partner and, for the first time in thousands of years, its northern border is such that China does not have to build another Great Wall to protect itself. In view of the current state of U.S.–China relations, Russia is gaining in terms of priority in Chinese foreign policy, and it is no accident that Xi Jinping has made his first foreign visit to the Russian Federation. The issues in Russia–China relations are still there, but they do not in any way preclude bilateral or multilateral interaction under the auspices of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and BRICS.

SECURITY INDEX: How would you access Russia’s contribution to the development of security and economic structures in Asia-Pacific region?

NIKONOV: The architecture of public institutions in the Asia-Pacific area is still developing. It is becoming a more clearly delineated hierarchy enabling observers to understand what they actually do. Clearly, the key element in that architecture will be summit meetings in the format of East Asian summits (ASEAN+8), which has been joined by Russia and the United States as of 2011. Economic cooperation will proceed under the umbrella of the Asia-Pacific Economic Council, security cooperation in the ASEAN+8 format of ministry of defense meetings, and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).

SECURITY INDEX: Describing the Russian foreign policy concept, you said that Russia today should be equidistant from other centers of power. However, Russia is closer with China, but more distant from the United States. How would you comment on that?

NIKONOV: If one speaks very briefly, it takes two to tango. When you have the freshly nominated leader of a country making his first state visit to Russia, I guess the backdrop of a Magnitsky Act being adopted in another country ensures a kind of a symmetry, doesn’t it?

And, going back, there’s a lot of history with relations with other countries. With some they have been more problematic than with others. For example, our relations with India—there’s never been a conflict between us. On the other hand, with the United States we had decades of relations that were based on confrontation.

In many ways, the confrontation still persists. Therefore, it is difficult to be really equidistant from the other centers of power. However, it is indisputable that Russia does want to have good relations with other countries.

Russia today is looking ahead with quite a bit of certitude. It knows its stronger points, its weaknesses. It certainly knows that it needs to be at peace with its neighbors and the rest of the world.

SECURITY INDEX: What is your perception of the prospects for strategic dialogue between the United States and Russia after the announcement of the cancellation of Phase IV of the European Phased Adaptive Approach Missile Defense in March 2013?

A GLOBAL POWER THAT HAS NO GLOBAL GOALS
NIKONOV: I don’t think that the new configuration of the ABM arrangements drastically changes anything. Anyway, Alaska is no further away from Russia than Romania. So if the components relating to Phase IV of the planned arrangements should be located not in Romania but in Alaska, this will not change anything drastically for Russia. The preceding Phase III was threatening enough for Russia, Phase IV even more so. But Phase III as it exists is but enough. I think that strategic dialogue would be much better served by the current financial problems the United States and some other countries are facing. Plus, the defense cuts that are being experienced in the United States will most certainly affect funding. It’s against that backdrop that strategic dialogue may proceed.

SECURITY INDEX: How about Iran? Iran is definitely part of the picture of original preferences. How does Russia go about building relations with Iran? Is Iran a factor that may help, or is that an impediment?

NIKONOV: Iran is no enemy of Russia. And that is a main contrast to Iran’s relations with many countries, including most Western countries. Relations have traditionally been far from bright and sunny, but there is quite a lot of common agenda between Iran and Russia. We by and large are of the same view as Iran, and we concur with Iran on radical Sunni Islamism. We have some similar views with respect to the situation in Syria, with respect to the problem of the Caspian Sea and a few other regional issues.

As far as Iran’s nuclear program is concerned, Russia does not need a nuclear Iran. On the other hand, bets still continue within Russia as to whether or not Iran does intend to have nuclear weapons or only wants to come close to the threshold of being able to do so.

I have a feeling that Iran has the capacity to stop right on the brink of creating a bomb but not creating it. There are proposals on the table for Russia independently, or Russia plus France, to help Iran with creating a safe fuel cycle and to have nuclear waste exported, etc. Those proposals are on the table.

Whatever Russia is offering by way of proposals to Iran is realistic and doable. As far as any potential strike against Iran is concerned, this is a sure way towards Iran’s creation of a nuclear bomb.

SECURITY INDEX: As a new Chairman of the Committee for Education of the State Duma do you have any perspectives on how Russia’s interests can be better served by international cooperation in the educational sphere?

NIKONOV: I am a great enthusiast of international cooperation in education. I studied and taught in the United States. I’m particularly inspired by the prospects of close cooperation with Russian diasporas of researchers who reside outside Russia, and their number is going up to the extent of equaling that in Russia. Of course, CERN in Geneva and Silicon Valley in California are quite Russian-speaking entities, but to draw those Russian speakers back to involvement with Russian research is a very great task.

Inviting or indeed involving scientists and other researchers from outside Russia is a problematic issue in that it is not only money, but the availability of the appropriate environment. Environment again is not only money, but also traffic and availability of equipment, etc. Many Western professors, be they of Russian origin or otherwise, do want to come to Russia essentially to teach, to engage in research projects that have appropriate grounds, and are temporary in that sense, or to cooperate from a distance—remote cooperation.

There is a program, however, that involves large grounds to be used to invite professors from the West to Russia. Quite a big number of Russian undergraduates are attending universities outside of Russia. On the other hand, quite a few non-Russian students are attending Russian universities, though not quite as many as during Soviet times.

It is also important that we have introduced in our country the system that has been around for many years in Europe—the two-level Bachelors–Masters system. This makes life easier
for us. A revolutionary event—we began to recognize the validity of non-Russian educational credentials, diplomas, etc.

Until last year, Harvard graduates for instance were not regarded as persons who have completed university studies. To recognize a non-Russian PhD, it had to be translated into Russian and sent to the Higher Attestation Committee. And persons who officially did not hold any officially recognized higher education credentials or PhD credentials had no right to teach at Russian universities. At this point, there is a list of 228 non-Russian universities whose graduates are recognized as legitimate holders of university credentials. As regards multitudes of others, the matter still needs to be addressed.

SECURITY INDEX: Russia has nuclear energy agreements with many countries, and it is currently training new contingents of students from countries that are beginning to develop nuclear energy. France and the United States are also setting up international universities for the same purpose. However, the education has no borders: each professor decides for himself what to teach. What could be done in Russia in this area?

NIKONOV: The problem is definitely quite fascinating. It isn’t a trivial problem, it is very much a real one. I’m not expecting to set any law to the effect that students should learn certain formulas but not others. It should be something one would expect to hear from experts in the field, and should be something that should be formalized in applicable executive documents in the relative industries.

Lawmakers should be responsible for developing laws that would definitely define responsibility and, indeed, liability ministries and relevant institutions for teaching what they should and knowing very well what they shouldn’t. The current situation puts into focus nonproliferation issues, how to really ensure implementation of the NPT, how to prevent proliferation. All these things need to be looked at in a fresh manner.

NOTES
2 The text of the interview is based on remarks by Vyacheslav Nikonov at the Trialogue Club International meeting held by the PIR Center on March 27, 2013 in Moscow.
The establishment of a weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-free zone in the Middle East is a key international problem that will largely determine the outcome of the NPT Review Conference in 2015. The second attempt to convene a conference on the Middle Eastern WMD-free zone may be undertaken in December 2013. In addition to the traditional differences, the situation is currently being compounded by the events in Egypt and Syria. The conference could become the first real step towards implementing the decision of the 1995 NPT Review Conference, and strengthen the NPT and the entire nuclear nonproliferation regime. Otherwise, all the achievements of the past 18 years in this area may be called into question.

What could be assessed as a success of the conference on the Middle Eastern WMD-free zone? What is the mechanism of the WMD-free zone establishment in this region and what countries will it have to include? How will it be possible to harmonize the attitudes of Israel, Iran, and Arab states concerning the WMD-free zone establishment? What is the link between the WMD-free zone issue and nuclear energy development in the Middle East region?

All these questions were addressed within a set of expert discussions on the future of the WMD-free zone in the Middle East held by the PIR Center during the years 2012–2013. The list of participants included: Deputy Assistant Foreign Minister of Egypt Sameh Aboul-Enein; Director of Disarmament and Multilateral Relations od the League of Arab States Wael Al-Assad; U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation Thomas Countryman; Acting Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security at the U.S. Department of State Rose Gottemoeller; Research Fellow of the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique (France) Benjamin Hautecouverture; Deputy Director General for Strategic Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Israel Jeremy Issacharoff; Director of the Arab Institute for Security Studies (Jordan) Ayman Khalil; Facilitator of the Middle East Conference Jaakko Laajava; PIR Center President Vladimir Orlov; Director of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS) at the Monterey Institute of International Studies William Potter; Deputy Foreign Minister of Russia Sergey Ryabkov; Chairman of the Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs Mohamed Shaker; Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the UN and other International Organizations in Vienna Ali Asghar Soltanieh; Director-General of the UN Office in Geneva, UN Under Secretary-General and Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament Kassym-Jomart Tokayev; Director of the Department for Security Affairs and Disarmament in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Mikhail Ulyanov.1

ORLOV: Rapidly unfolding, controversial developments in the Middle East and North Africa seem to be sideling the search for responses to some fundamental security challenges in the region. Thus the discussion of the steps needed to be taken for preparation and successful conduct of the conference on the WMD-free zone in the Middle East was overshadowed. Furthermore, the environment for such a conference now and in the foreseeable future is not there.

It should be recalled that the decision to hold a conference on the creation of a Middle East nuclear-weapon-free zone was made through consensus at the NPT Review Conference of
2010. Without this decision, it would have been impossible to adopt the Final Document of that conference and the result of a fragile but viable compromise that helped preserve and even strengthen somewhat the architecture of international nuclear nonproliferation regime at a difficult point in time. Equally important is that the aim of establishing a zone free from nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East was recorded in the NPT Review Conference decision in 1995 when the treaty’s future including its extension was discussed. There should be no false hopes without the obligation to move forward with freeing the Middle East of nuclear weapons. There would not have been an indefinite extension of the treaty that four decades after it entered into force remains a cornerstone of global stability.

MIDDLE EAST CONFERENCE: LOOKING FOR AN APPROACH

LAAJAVA: Let me introduce 10 conceptual ideas regarding the Middle East WMD-free zone Conference that I use in my activity as conference facilitator.

First, global interconnectedness, the growth of mutual interdependence, and the need to find answers to problems of a global nature call upon all states and regions to engage in peaceful cooperation.

Second, the Middle East region has a vast potential, but faces significant challenges; persistent conflicts, confrontation, and unresolved issues have for a long time characterized many parts of the region. Realities today are equally challenging.

Third, in order to reach its full potential, the region should be perceived as an attractive, increasingly prosperous, and dynamic partner. Therefore the region should experience a gradual movement from confrontation towards dialogue and cooperation, whilst solutions to its problems should be sought urgently. The most straightforward way to achieve progress would of course be direct bilateral talks, but sometimes larger frameworks may be helpful.

Fourth, while much remains to be done in other areas of security as well, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction remain core objectives in the region shared by all.

Fifth, the goal of a Middle East zone free of all of these weapons and their means of delivery enjoys the support of all states in the region. All agree that this is a long-term goal, which cannot be achieved overnight. However, views differ as to how to achieve it, and in what sequence. Some see the need to first achieve peace as a prerequisite to the establishment of the zone. Others emphasize the primacy of the latter as paving the way for peace.

Sixth, the solution to this dilemma in the Middle East circumstances can only be found through the recognition of the intertwined nature of progress in both areas. While arms control in itself seeks to strengthen conditions for peace, it cannot take place in a vacuum and requires a remarkable degree of cooperation between parties. This in turn can only materialize if there is confidence between parties as well as an environment conducive to cooperation.

Seventh, the envisioned conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free from nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction seeks to build on the willingness of the parties to work together towards their shared goal of achieving such a zone. It is to be attended by all states of the region as well as the nuclear-weapon states, and be based on arrangements freely arrived at by the participating regional states. The way forward can only be decided upon by the participants themselves.

Eighth, viewed in a larger perspective, the conference could gradually evolve into a more comprehensive framework for improved security and stability in the whole region and provide an important vehicle for dialogue and cooperation regarding these issues. At the same time, the conference is not supposed to replace any other forum nor substitute for any negotiations, bilateral or multilateral, regarding the region’s unresolved problems.

Ninth, the upcoming session of the conference is supposed to mark the beginning of such a longer-term development. It should, at the minimum, provide reaffirmation of the shared goal and for an understanding regarding areas of further work as follow-on steps.
Tenth, while nothing in the realm of security can be posed from the outside, and any change must emanate from the region itself, the conference project could be viewed as an important opportunity for all in the region to engage in a new longer term endeavor in the field of security.

All steps involving commitments in the area of security are risky by nature, but risks can certainly abound if no efforts at all in this direction are being made in the region of the Middle East. As elsewhere the primary responsibility rests at all times with the states of the region themselves who will need to have full control of the steps to be taken at the conference and in the follow-up. At the same time there has to be full support of their efforts by the entire international community.

**TOKAYEV:** The success of the historic 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference was made possible by a whole package of decisions. An important part of that package was a resolution drafted by the three NPT depository states, i.e. Russia, Britain, and the United States, calling for the establishment of a WMD-free zone in the Middle East.

Today, despite the long delay in that process, we must focus on how we can move forward. The overall goal is a world free of nuclear weapons. A strong NPT is part of the efforts to achieve that goal. A prolonged deadlock over the Conference is simply unacceptable to the international community.

**RYABKOV:** Russian foreign policy supports initiatives which help implement international tasks and multilateral projects that are designed to strengthen regional and global security. The project to establish a WMD-free zone is undoubtedly one in this class. That is why Russia is actively assisting in establishing the WMD-free zone in the Middle East.

There are still states in the region which have not put their nuclear activities under IAEA safeguards that are not part of the NPT. Some countries remain outside the chemical and biological weapons conventions. The IAEA still has questions as to some countries of the region that are party to the NPT regarding the nature of their nuclear activities.

The prospect for establishing this zone is inseparably linked to the peace process in the Middle East. And there is also the reverse relation—the establishment of such a zone may help achieve a Middle East settlement and create a more favorable atmosphere for that. We do admit that regional security aspects could become the subject of discussion during the conference and during the post-conference period, with the understanding, of course, that the main focus should be on the problems of the zone.

**ORLOV:** If we procrastinate with the conference on the Middle East this will mean we will put a large question mark over the nonproliferation regime. A lot has been done, especially at the beginning of the 1990s. We should amass everything that was important at that time to implement it, taking into consideration the political climate in the region.

In 1993, Israel and Jordan adopted a declaration on normalizing bilateral relations and they said that they were ready to start establishing a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East in a peaceful environment in the region that will be done under a regime of transparency. As Israel was apprehensive about this, they decided to give an extended definition of the WMD including some traditional weapons in this category. Besides there are UN Security Council resolutions on Iran including sanctions. Moreover, those resolutions bind “a solution to the Iranian nuclear issue” with “the objective of a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction, including their means of delivery.”

To speed up this process of bringing in new ideas related to the conference on the Middle East the participants will have to decide to limit the scope of the topics. Many diplomats and experts are apprehensive lest they will have to talk about not only nuclear weapons but about other WMDs and means of their delivery.

Ideally I would like to see this conference taking several decisions that when combined will make it possible for us to introduce measures of trust or at least start creating a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East.

The first decision could be a joint statement by all participants not to attack declared nuclear facilities and not to threaten such attacks. Events around the Iranian nuclear program show us that this is a very urgent issue.
The second decision is to establish a permanent regional confidence-building mechanism in the nuclear area and in the area of chemical and biological weapons and means of their delivery.

The third step should be a road map pointing the way to gradually placing all nuclear facilities in the region under IAEA safeguards. Without Israel it will be impossible. If Israel does not let us put under nuclear safeguards its facility in Dimona, the conference might recommend that all the countries of the region immediately ratify the Additional Protocol to the safeguards in agreement with the IAEA. And Iran could start doing this first.

Step number four, unilateral simultaneous statements by Israel, Egypt, and Iran about their readiness to ratify the CTBT in the near future with practical steps to follow.

The conference could decide, and this is the fifth step, the establishment of an intergovernmental group on drafting a text for the treatment of a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East. When developing this agreement all these countries in the region could also sign the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention.

All these steps would be a great basis for the 2015 NPT Review Conference. To support this process the PIR Center has prepared and published in March 2013 the White Paper “Ten Steps to a Weapons of Mass Destruction-Free-Zone in the Middle East.”

ULYANOV: Frankly, the ideas expressed by Vladimir Orlov are somewhat ambitious and difficult to implement. I think in Helsinki one should aim for a very brave Final Document that would not be ambitious and would contain two main provisions.

First, to confirm the readiness to work towards achieving the long-term objective of establishing a zone. And, second, to establish a relevant mechanism, a committee, or several working groups so that the process could be launched.

All substantive issues could be left until later so that they could be looked into at the expert level and at the conference itself. The main objective is to launch the working process.

GOTTEMOELLER: The United States stands by its commitment to convene the Helsinki conference. We view it as a unique opportunity to foster official dialogue on regional security issues where none currently exists. Since 2010, we have worked and continue to work hand in hand with the United Kingdom, the Russian Federation, and the United Nations to make the conference possible.

The U.S. approach to this conference is based on an objective assessment of the obstacles that must be overcome to make real progress toward ridding the region of weapons of mass destruction. If states approach the conference in a way that hinders the region’s ability to address the underlying and evolving security realities in a consensual way, we will have diminished prospects for a constructive dialogue in Helsinki and will ensure that our shared objectives of a Middle East free of weapons of mass destruction remains an elusive goal.

First, a conference can only take place if all countries feel confident that it will be carried out in a constructive and balanced manner. They also must know they can attend on an equal basis, regardless of political recognition or their status vis-à-vis the various international arms control treaties. Only the regional parties themselves can provide such confidence. It cannot be granted by conveners or by a facilitator.

Second, for the conference to be constructive, it should set realistic goals and not overreach. Its purpose should not be to start a negotiation but to exchange views on a broad agenda including both regional security and weapons of mass destruction issues such as adherence, verification, compliance, and all categories of weapons of mass destruction and systems for their delivery.

Third, the conference must draw its mandate from the countries in the region in keeping with internationally recognized principles that the region must be based on agreements freely arrived at by the states in the region and should originate from the region itself. Unlike the
zones that are currently in existence, we must acknowledge that the zone in the Middle East will require a level of cooperation, understanding, and mutual confidence that is unparalleled in recent history. A zone cannot be imposed from the outside or mandated by the decision of the NPT Review Conference.

Finally, to ensure the conference takes into account the views of all regional participants, the conference must operate by consensus of the regional participants to include agreement on any further discussions or follow-up actions which logically can only take place with the consent of those countries.

Prospects for a successful and meaningful conference depend on the ability and willingness of the states of the Middle East to lay the groundwork for full participation and a consensus-based approach. That starts by establishing a certain level of trust and credibility, which does not currently exist. This requires direct engagement at official levels, which frankly has been lacking since the 2010 NPT Review Conference closed.

POTTER: I would like to share some observations related to the current WMD Free Zone in the Middle East situation.

First of all, notwithstanding the current controversy surrounding the 2010 NPT RevCon mandated by the Middle East Conference, all of the major parties in the region at one time or another have declared their support for such a WMD-free zone, and also have endorsed the concept that it must be verifiable by means of a regional mechanism.

Second, the consensus Final Document from the 2010 Review Conference is much more fragile than generally appreciated, and may well unravel unless headway is made very soon in implementing the recommendations related to the Middle East. Among other things, this will mean far more pressure being applied by many NNWS [Nonnuclear Weapon States]—and especially those from NAM [the Non Aligned Movement]—who generally held their fire in 2010 on disarmament in deference to the emphasis the NAM Chair Egypt gave to the Middle East.

As such, this is precisely the wrong moment for the P-5 to rest on their laurels, and to congratulate themselves on the progress they are making in their intra-P-5 consultations, at the same time as they collectively boycott the Oslo Conference on Humanitarian Consequences and the organizational meeting of the Open-Ended Working Group. Under these circumstances, they should not be surprised if they get little credit for their work on disarmament at the PrepCom.

Third, unless the P-5 and other members of the international community are prepared to speak out about the failure of a number of members of existing NWFZs to honor fully their legally binding commitments under those zones with respect to prohibition of nuclear trade with countries lacking full-scope safeguards (FSS) or the Additional Protocol (AP), one may ask why one should create additional NWFZs, including one in the Middle East. Zonal members—without exception—must adhere to all provisions of existing zones or be held accountable for noncompliance. Otherwise, the entire NWFZ approach becomes a meaningless exercise.

Fourth, I would like to suggest that we explore new approaches for finding common ground related to the Middle East Conference. That leads us to the topic of disarmament and nonproliferation education and in particular the use of simulations for the purpose of better seeing with the eyes of others, as well as exploring the practicality of alternative solutions to “real world” problems.

The most promising scenario I can imagine is that the delayed Middle East Conference is held in 2013, and everyone comes because no one wants to be held responsible for the chaos likely to infect other international fora if the current stalemate persists. If the conference materializes, realistically the best that we can expect—and not an insignificant achievement—would be for a brief meeting to be held that is devoted mainly to arranging a follow-up mechanism for the next two years before the 2015 NPT Review Conference, along with a reiterated mandate for this extended process. Unfortunately, what may be good in the long term for the region may not be good in the short term for the NPT and its review process, which undoubtedly will suffer significantly if it proves impossible to convene a conference in 2013.
WMD FREE ZONE AND REGIONAL SECURITY

GOTTEMOELLER: Despite the ongoing efforts of Undersecretary Laajava and the conveners, there remain serious divisions in the Middle East region on how to start a constructive dialogue that we hope will begin in Helsinki. These divisions cannot be bridged by any means imposed from outside of the region. The United States cannot guarantee the Conference will happen or that it will be a success, however, we can guarantee that we will continue to work with Undersecretary Laajava and the other conveners to urge the states of the region to engage each other directly, to create the political conditions necessary for a successful meeting.

COUNTRYMAN: The main difficulty is that no one has ever established a zone like this one. In a region where there are always conflicts, where some of the countries do not recognize the existence of their neighbor, this is a very difficult task. It requires a great transparency and communication, which the Middle Eastern states have so far proved unable to provide.

POTTER: A WMD-Free Zone in the Middle East, like NWFZs in other regions, will only be possible if it reflects the perceived national security interests of all of the states in the region to which the zone applies. The zone simply can’t be imposed from outside—a principle embodied in the consensus Disarmament Commission Guidelines for NWFZs.

ORLOV: At the beginning of the 1990s an Egyptian expert Nabil Fahmy [from July 2013 the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Egypt—Ed.] prepared the proposals of Egypt for a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East. He wanted the Conference to concentrate on nuclear weapons, focusing on establishing a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East. At some stage, when the nuclear-free zone agreement becomes a reality, the countries that will not have signed it will have to sign the chemical weapons convention, which has verification mechanisms. The same applies to the biological convention but there we will have to establish a regional verification mechanism.

The Middle East Conference, even if everyone prepares well, even if everyone participates, will not become a panacea. At maximum it will become a mechanism to implement the decisions of 1995.

HAUTECOUVERTURE: A zone free of WMD in the Middle East can only be the result of a long-term process. This idea often appears to be the way to provide an advance justification to a short-term failure but it simply cannot be different. There are some challenges within this process.

First, unlike existing nuclear-free zones, a Middle East zone would also involve chemical and biological weapons along with means of delivery. That is the scope.

Second, a zone would have to be negotiated where WMD are in place or where acquisition programs are suspected of being developed.

Third, there is no verification protocol for the BWC.

Fourth, several countries within a “would be” zone suffer from historic enmities involving de facto security dilemmas.

Fifth, the Iranian nuclear crisis has become a new factor to take into account in the prospect for a zone in the region since the beginning of this century and events in Syria. The situation in Syria shows us that chemical weapons are neither a fantasy, nor a taboo. Chemical weapons and programs must be erased from the region and this is a matter of urgency, whatever the nuclear issue.

The EU involvement in the WMDFZ in the Middle East project comes within two different and complementary frameworks: the Mediterranean and the Middle East zone of cooperation and dialogue and the NPT framework.

The conference on a WMD Free Zone in the Middle East is definitely a challenge for the 2015 NPT Review Conference. It has to be held as soon as possible, but it is a challenge among others within that framework. The real challenge is the regional security realm beyond the NPT cycle of review conferences. The Helsinki Conference will be one piece of a bigger picture then. It is obviously important to stay focused on this goal as an interim step and as a
confidence-building measure per se. But maybe shouldn’t we dramatize too much the fact that a conference has not taken place yet.

ISSACHAROFF: In the Middle East there have been two schools of thought. One that you can promote disarmament measures without comprehensive regional peace or other regional security architecture of focus primarily on the nuclear dimension. The second school of thought supports establishing a comprehensive peace in the region, adopting a step-by-step confidence-building measures, and eventually agreeing upon regional security measures based on arrangements freely arrived at by the states in the region. Israel supports the second view because there is no viable alternative in the reality of the Middle East. We cannot talk about putting aside arms and making a zone free of any sort of weapons until you make it a zone that is full of peace, regional security, and stability for all countries. Peace is a vital precursor to any regional strategic reality.

I do not know of any precedent of a WMD free zone in the world. There are precedents of nuclear-weapon-free zones in different areas but these are areas which have far fewer structural problems and problems of stability than the Middle East. We have to remember that the Middle East has been an area where the regional actors have used chemical weapons. Four members of the NPT that have breached the treaty have come from the area. And missiles and rockets were used against Israeli civilians.

The issue of the regional security agenda that we need to focus on is very much wider than what was posited in the 2010 Final Document. How does the idea of the WMDFZ reduce regional tensions and the chances of conventional war and even a low-intensity conflict with high strategic impact? This is the key question that we need to answer. When we talk of war and peace I can’t help quoting the Russian writer Leo Tolstoy who said that the strongest of all warriors are these two, time and patience. I would very much urge all to take this into account and to factor this into our consideration.

AL-ASSAD: In 1974, the idea of the WMDFZ in Middle East was first presented to the General Assembly by Iran, and then adopted by Egypt and the Arab States. And after 40 years we are still in the pre-negotiation phase. We have enough good ideas on the issue of the zone. The problem is that they are not being implemented. All we have to do is seriously negotiate the different options we have and agree on it on a political level. Even in the Arab League, in 1996, we established a committee that was specifically assigned to draft a treaty for the zone in the Middle East from an Arab perspective. This committee over the years discussed all the technical and political ideas related to the zone. Of course this separation between the technical and political is always a bit artificial. And we came to the conclusion that it is doable if there is political will behind the idea.

That conference should be the beginning of a process that leads to the creation of the zone. The outcome of the conference should be a road map. The time will never be right, so we have to start now.

A regional, comprehensive approach is the best solution to the problems of the region regarding the nonproliferation issue and it is much better than dealing with those issues on a state-by-state basis. Now the idea of the zone provides the same rules and equal security for everybody, at least this is how we perceived it in the Arab world. The success of the Conference will open doors for other issues related to security in the region.

ABOUL-ENEIN: I would like to say that I agree with many of the points highlighted by the PIR Center in its White Paper headlined “Ten Steps to a Weapons of Mass Destruction-Free-Zone in the Middle East.” This primarily concerns the proposals about the need to place all the nuclear infrastructure facilities in the region under IAEA safeguards; about the need for closer institutional cooperation between the region’s countries to build confidence between the states; and about the need to negotiate a treaty that would serve as the basis of the future WMD-free zone. It is important to make sure that the Conference on the Middle East NWFZ is held under UN auspices, because the role of that organization cannot be ignored.

Neither should we forget about the implementation mechanisms of any agreements that will become elements of the future zone. We have repeatedly faced situations whereby the same treaty is signed and/or ratified by some countries, but not signed and/or ratified by others. Today there is a feeling of disappointment and anger in the Arab world that the process initiated in 1995 has ground to a halt.
SHAKER: For 13 years the technical aspects of the zone were negotiated within a special committee in the Arab League. I hope one day the Arab League will bring out all the travaux préparatoires.

At the same time the representatives of Israel made a statement that the time is not right and, moreover, the zone does not fit the culture of the Middle East. It is not only the timing; it is also a substantive objection that the culture of a nuclear weapons-free zone, and that in Africa, Central Asia, and other parts of the world, is not the right culture for the Middle East. This is a very dangerous aspect that has to be dealt with very quickly because it is really a new view on this issue.

First of all, talking about the zone, as Ambassador Al-Assad said, we have to pay attention to technical issues. The policy issues are very important but I think the technical issues may also have an effect on the policy to be adopted.

Then we need to decide who should be in the zone. Are we talking about the Middle East or the Greater Middle East? This is a very important and thorny question, and this was one of the questions that were not settled in the Arab League negotiations and in the Arab League technical committee before it suspended its work since the Riyadh summit in Saudi Arabia.

There was some talk about Turkey, but certainly Turkey is a very active member of the Middle East, plays a very important role, and has very good relations with most of the countries of the region. Now there are problems between Turkey and Syria for obvious reasons. Also, because of Turkey’s NATO membership and the presence of the U.S. missile defense system in Turkey, there might be impediments to Turkey’s participation in the zone.

There is a question about the status of India and Pakistan within the zone. They are nuclear-weapon powers. We should guarantee that nuclear-weapon powers in Asia would not affect the establishment of a zone or weaken the importance of a zone. Should we have India and Pakistan as participants, or provide them with a special status, maybe offering nuclear limited guarantees to the zone? It is a question to be studied.

We should not forget the CTBT, and it still has a long way to go to become effective. The Chemical Weapons Convention works very well and there are no problems and it is a universal convention. The Biological Weapons Convention has no verification system and that’s why in negotiating the treaty for a WMD-free zone we have to discuss the issue of verification for this convention. The success of the negotiations in devising a verification system for the region should help us devise a system worldwide. Achieving a first step in the Middle East in devising a verification system may lead to a universal system of verification of biological weapons.

We will need to create security assurances in the treaty similar to those given by the Security Council in relation to the renewal and extension of the treaty in 1995. A treaty will have to facilitate cooperation between its members and the export control regimes. The treaty should instigate the possibility of a systematic and timely consultation between the export control regime and the parties to the treaty.

If we succeed in having this conference, this will be a breakthrough not only with regard to WMDs but also to peace in the region. It will be the first time when Israelis, Iranians, and Arabs are sitting at one table and negotiating a treaty.

KHALIL: The proliferation of nuclear weapons represents an essential challenge facing the fragile security system of the Middle East. The possession, development, production, deployment, and stockpiling of nuclear weapons would have grave security, political, and environmental consequences.

The process of creation of a WMDFZ in the Middle East is in great need of a non-conventional proposal, creative reasoning, and thinking outside the box. Obviously Israeli accession to the NPT is not going to be a quick process. And of course the prevailing political circumstances in the Arab world currently prevent any imminent re-launch of security talks.

The condition calling for all states of the region to join treaties prohibiting WMDs is neither mandatory nor necessary. Moreover, when it comes to creating the zone, membership of the NPT should not be an impediment against countries wishing to join the zone.
Innovative technical building measures, innovative technical confidence-building measures are highly needed. For example the exchange of environmental samples is a measure that we foresee, initiation of joint inspections of nuclear facilities, or cooperating and establishing a regional network for airborne radioactive contamination.

No doubt the creation of a WMD-free zone is an important prerequisite to achieving regional stability.

TANGLE OF CONTRADICTIONS: ISRAEL—IRAN—ARAB COUNTRIES

ULYANOV: Iran and Israel are two key countries whose participation in the Middle East Conference is most important. And I would like to hope that both countries will send their delegations to Helsinki. If both Israel and Iran thoroughly analyze the existing situation, they will make the right decisions, because refusal to take part in the conference would hold some unpleasant implications for both countries and some loss of their image will be serious.

Iran’s active participation in the conference would meet the interests of Tehran itself. It will be recalled that Iran is one of the authors of the idea of establishing a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East. And if Iran refuses to take part in the conference, this would be viewed and probably would be used as evidence that Iran’s nuclear program is not exactly peaceful. So, I think that we might count on Iran’s participation.

Much more complicated is the situation with Israel. Israel has a fairly serious argument: the Israeli colleagues have been saying they were not part of the NPT Review Conference, and the decision to convene this proposed conference is not binding. But on the other hand, Israel has an incentive to participate. Tel Aviv, as we know, is concerned very much with the situation in the nuclear nonproliferation sphere. If the proposed conference fails to be convened it will be more difficult to work in this direction. There will be more problems and this will directly and indirectly affect the security of Israel. Participation in the conference would mean for Israel that it could become an insider of the process, that it could have a say in the development of the concept of dealing with WMD, that all decisions are to be made on the basis of a consensus with the participation of all countries in the region.

In addition, for Israel, it would be a good opportunity to promote and advance its own agenda on biological and chemical weapons issues, and missiles capable of delivering both conventional and WMD. And finally, Israel has been complaining that it does not have a channel for dialogue with the region. So, Israel has two options. It can isolate itself, or it can actively promote through diplomatic means its ideas for security in the region.

By and large, Israel has only one serious argument against participation—the risk that the conference may turn into a propaganda forum or a battlefield for propagandistic rhetoric and exchange of mutual allegations. This is not to be ruled out. This is a possibility. But there are other platforms for propaganda, like the UN General Assembly or the IAEA. And one would not like to think that such a unique opportunity as the original conference on the Middle East would become yet another platform for propaganda.

It would be important for the Arab countries to send a positive, practical signal that the conference will be conducted in a business-like manner based on mutual respect. How this signal could be sent is up to the Arab states to decide. It would be equally good if Arab and Israeli representatives could establish informal contacts on WMD issues.

ORLOV: Israel is the only country inside the region that has nuclear armaments and in the past 15 years has not come closer to nuclear-free status within the NPT. Moreover, it has not been verifying in any way its nuclear activities. And it is Israel that remains the key destabilizer when we talk about a possible nuclear-free zone in the Middle East.

COUNTRYMAN: It is important to recognize that Israel does not feel obliged to comply with the decisions of the 2010 NPT Review Conference because it is not a member of the NPT. But this remains Israel’s right, and its perceptions are not going to change simply because some NGO or some foreign government says that it’s in Israel’s own interests. Perceptions change when there are efforts to engage and persuade. So far, no such efforts have been undertaken at the official level.
Of course, other regional actors are not ready to make the necessary efforts, either. They say that the only security problem in the Middle East is Israel’s arsenals. They don’t say anything about the Iranian nuclear program, which violates the NPT, or about the Syrian chemical weapons. Such rhetoric is used for domestic consumption, but it cannot persuade Israel to take part in this process. Furthermore, let us be frank: the United States cannot force Israel to take part in the conference.

**HAUTECOUVERTURE:** In this context it must be recognized that the 2010 commitment suffers from two fundamental weaknesses: it was formulated in the absence of one major stakeholder in the region; it appears that regional crises have been directly linked to its purpose, which is the final prohibition of WMDs in the region.

Whenever the conference takes place, diplomatic progress in the resolution of the Iranian nuclear crisis is still one of the two keys in order to keep the NPT as the cornerstone of the nuclear nonproliferation regime, the DPRK [Democratic People’s Republic of Korea] crisis being the second one.

The Syrian civil war must come to an end. Paradoxically, these two crises demonstrate to what extent a WMD Free Zone in the Middle East is a compelling need whereas absence of progress in their resolution has made the revival of the process about a zone impossible so far.

Everything appears as if the purpose of a conference has become a poor bargaining chip in regional relations between Israel and the Arab States: “give up your nuclear weapons, we will join the CWC.” But it cannot work that way. And this brings us to the agenda of the Helsinki conference. Confidence-building measures, technical measures, cooperation on the ground between scientists, implementation of Resolution 1540 and assistance in law enforcement, export control improvements, nuclear safety and security, multilayered approaches, thematic working groups, etc. The substance of the conference is an issue per se. It needs to be negotiated amongst all the parties.

**POTTER:** The key players remain conspicuously out of sync. The United States was comfortable with a 2012 date for the conference at the 2010 Review Conference, although a 2013 date reportedly had been proposed by Egypt. Israel condemned the 2012 Middle East Conference the moment the 2010 NPT Review Conference concluded—well before the emergence of the so-called Arab Spring. Nevertheless, it agreed to attend the 2011 IAEA Forum on the Middle East, a meeting Iran chose to boycott. Israel refused to indicate its readiness to attend the Middle East Conference in Helsinki in 2012, a situation that probably was responsible for the last-minute announcement by Iran that it was prepared to attend. Israel agreed to the multilateral consultations in Geneva earlier in 2013 proposed by Mr. Laajava—and Iran also signaled its readiness to attend, but this time Egypt and the other Arab League states refused to participate. Even the three conveners were unable to coordinate their responses to the failure to hold the Helsinki conference in 2012 and hardly conveyed a coordinated approach likely to encourage other key states to defer to their wishes.

Most observers outside of the region do not fully appreciate the frustration on the part of the Arab States, who not only believe correctly that prior promises have not been met, but that the enormous time and energy invested in preparations for the 2012 Conference were largely wasted due to an obstructionist position taken by the one state in the region known to have nuclear weapons. One should not underestimate the changing political dynamic in which Egypt and a number of other key Arab States will be increasingly unresponsive to appeals for patience. As such, although a boycott of the 2013 NPT PrepCom appears to have been avoided, it would be foolhardy to assume that one may not well materialize in 2014 or at the 2015 Review Conference unless a date for the Middle East Conference is set and the meeting actually takes place.

**ISSACHAROFF:** Transformational changes throughout the Middle East in the Arab world and Iran’s nuclear program are going ahead in parallel and have put very great strains on every country’s strategic interests in the area. At the same time the 2010 Final Document did not reflect Israel’s policy for this regional security approach that we have adopted over the years. In our experience all genuine diplomatic breakthroughs—peace treaties with Egypt, Jordan, and other initiatives—have always emanated from direct consultations between Israel and all the parties. And these contacts have always been the main path to breakthroughs on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at. We need to talk face to face with our Arab neighbors and discuss it.
How do you factor the Iranian situation onto the table? The situation in Syria is equally of great concern to us and I think that it will also be of concern to our Arab neighbors as well. And indeed our very great lack of ability to assess not only what the future is in the long or even medium term but what the future is over the next months.

SOLTANIEH: I am of the strong belief that dialogue and talks in a very open-minded manner and an exchange of views is very essential because we have to learn from each other, to listen to each other. But how can you expect a place like the Middle East to establish a WMD-free zone when Israel says continuously that it is not committed to the NPT, even questions the NPT? At the same time, Iran is in fact a regional proponent of a WMD-free zone since 1974.

Israel keeps thinking that it can resolve the situation by establishing direct contact with a couple of Arab countries. The Middle East issue would be resolved if all the countries were to be directly involved in this matter. This is not the issue of a couple of Arab countries just having informal contacts here and there. Now we have an opportunity of a meeting under the auspices of the UN. If you talk about other things, you jeopardize this new trend.

KHALIL: Despite the declared willingness of all actors in the region, including Iran and Israel, to initiate a WMDFZ, the Middle East is nevertheless far from achieving this goal. Among the obstacles encountered is a geographic definition of the region; of course another obstacle is basically the scope of prohibition. But the major obstacle is Israel’s possession of nuclear capabilities and its strict refusal to sign the NPT. Deterrence has been the driving force and the main motivation for the acquisition of nuclear capabilities. This argument is neither realistic nor logical.

NUCLEAR ENERGY DEVELOPMENT

KHALIL: An important priority facing any country is the development of a sustainable energy supply. Countries in the Middle East are no exception. They are facing the challenge of improving energy security by developing and introducing non-conventional energy sources. In Jordan developing nuclear energy resources would mean sustainable energy resources at lower cost, water security, and overall sustainable development.

ORLOV: The Middle East countries should pay attention to the advantages provided by internationalization of the nuclear fuel cycle. Moreover, the countries in the region need to come up with a mechanism for early warning of a nuclear incident for a region. A regional energy organization without ousting the IAEA could gradually become a conduit for a number of measures necessary in a WMD-free zone.

The experience of the Bangkok Treaty and other nuclear-free zones and regional structures from the European Atomic Energy Community to the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials could be used in establishing a so-called Middle Eastern IAEA.

SHAKER: The establishment of the Middle East WMD-free zone may open up opportunities for intensive cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. A possible outcome could be the establishment of a regional nuclear fuel cycle, one of the options alluded to by the IAEA expert group report of 2005 on multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle. The other way around, regionalization of the nuclear fuel cycle may facilitate the establishment of the zone.

Why don’t we internationalize, regionalize the Iranian sensitive technologies, and bring in Arab stakeholders? Iran will keep its initial facilities, but will have partners that will overlook the process and will be there on the board, like in the case of Urenco. This will have the advantage that we will be all watching each other but it will also imply an economy of scale and there will be no need for other countries to develop things that are already there.

Read the interview “Nuclear Energy as a Tool to Promote Peace and Security in the Middle East” with Nikolay Spassky, Deputy Director General of Russia’s Rosatom State Corporation, in Security Index, No 2, Spring 2013, pp. 5-8.
ORLOV: In conclusion let me mention that no efforts on the part of Russia or other sponsoring states will be crowned with success unless the countries of the region themselves show the will. Cooperation on nuclear energy requires a will for peace in the region and a willingness to rid it of weapons of mass destruction.

TEN STEPS TOWARDS ESTABLISHING A WMD-FREE ZONE IN THE MIDDLE EAST

1) Joint statements by all countries in the region undertaking a commitment not to attack, or to threaten with an attack against each other’s declared nuclear facilities placed under the IAEA safeguards.

2) Road Map on the gradual placement of all nuclear infrastructure facilities in the Middle East under IAEA safeguards.

3) Ratification by all Middle Eastern states of the Additional Protocol to the IAEA Safeguards Agreement.

4) Formation of a standing regional mechanism for confidence-building measures with regard to nuclear programs, as well as chemical and biological weapons and some types of delivery systems.

5) Ratification by all countries in the region of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

6) An agreement by all Middle Eastern states to ban missiles with a range of more than 3,500 km.

7) Formation of an intergovernmental commission to draft the text of the treaty establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. During the drafting of the treaty all countries in the region must join the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.

8) Internationalization and regionalization of the nuclear fuel cycle.

9) Institutionalization of nuclear cooperation, and establishment of a universal regional body to facilitate such cooperation.

10) Establishment of effective regional mechanisms for early warning in the event of a nuclear accident.

The White Paper “Ten Steps to a Weapons of Mass Destruction-Free-Zone in the Middle East”, PIR Center, 2013, 10steps.eng.pircenter.org

NOTES


2 UN SC Resolution 1803 (2008).

3 IAEA Doc. INFCIRC 1646, February 22, 2005.
During recent months Syria has been at the center of everyone’s attention. Syria was the litmus test, the moment of truth. The Americans played a wicked trick in Iraq. They then repeated it in Libya. And they were not allowed to pull off another such stunt in the Middle East.

And who has stopped them? Russia has finally found its strength, and its mission: to stand in the way of utter chaos in the Middle East, and to prevent a complete collapse of the principles of international law on a global scale.

The next few months will show whether Russia is up to such a monumental task.

The problem is, Russia is a lone warrior on this battlefield. Its Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) allies rubberstamped some declarations at the summit in Sochi in September 2013—but they did it so very quietly that no one seems to have noticed in the outside world. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) has not been much of a help either—excepting of course one not-quite-member, Iran (and it is high time Iran did become a full member!). The BRICS club members seem to approve of Russia’s position (well, frankly, not all of them: look at India)—but none of them is taking any action. Everyone seems to prefer the wait-and-see approach.

Everyone is awaiting a definitive outcome. It would have been naive to expect any different sort of behavior. But, as a result, the stakes in the Syrian game have become even higher for Russia than Syria itself is worth, however cynical that may sound.

There are now three key aspects to the Syrian crisis. The first aspect is chemical weapons. Predictably, it is also the most pressing. The Americans had spent a whole year preparing to play the chemical trump card. They had even discussed it quietly with Russia, dropping heavy hints about the upcoming rendezvous when the cherry trees in Washington would begin to bloom. Their message was, be prepared. Everything will pan out according to the rules of a Chekhov play: if there is a Syrian chemical rifle on the wall, that rifle will be fired in the final act.

There is no doubt that sarin was used in Guta. But whose sarin was it? Are Assad’s troops so inexplicably dumb as to use sarin? Especially against civilians? The much more dangerous and plausible version is that, by drawing his red lines, President Obama had prodded the Islamist rebels into providing him with his carefully planned excuse. And, incidentally, did these rebels manufacture the toxic agent themselves? Be that as it may, Russian diplomacy has identified the only possible way out of this situation. Instead of apportioning blame, it has proposed to cut this Gordian knot by destroying all Syrian chemical weapons.

The second aspect of the Syrian crisis is reconciliation. Let us be frank: chemical weapons were just a convenient excuse to invade Syria and depose Assad. That plan has not worked (for now). But what do you think about the scenario whereby a legitimately elected president voluntarily and verifiably destroys his chemical weapons stockpiles—but then faces charges of crimes against his own people? Will that president prefer to be convicted by a court and hanged, or to be tortured and shot as he attempts to flee? What kind of president would ever...
contemplate such options, even under the pressure of U.S. forces poised to attack Syria? If we genuinely want (a) the destruction of Syrian chemical weapons, which have become a source of increased tensions, and (b) a peaceful settlement, then Assad must be given safety and security guarantees, as well as guarantees that foreign powers will stop meddling in Syrian affairs. Geneva 2, if it ever takes place, must set in motion the process of domestic Syrian reconciliation. After years of civil war in Syria it has become clear that such a process would be impossible without Assad’s participation. What is more, without his participation, there can be no guarantees of Syria becoming free of chemical weapons.

The third aspect of the Syrian crisis is external. First Qatar, and then, when the new emir turned out to be less activist than his father, Saudi Arabia generously paid for Assad’s head to be brought to them on a plate. They had paid upfront—and now Riyadh is disappointed. Riyadh is furious. It cannot understand why, on this occasion, its hard cash has failed to play the decisive role. But Riyadh has not accepted defeat. On the contrary, it seems to be trying to raise the bets even further—in the Middle East itself, in Paris, in Washington, and also in Tel Aviv. The Saudi royal family and the Netanyahu group have shared anti-Syrian and anti-Iranian interests. They have therefore pooled their capital, stepped up their sharing of intelligence, and ramped up their military coordination.

This petulant belief in the all-conquering power of hard cash (which obviously stems from how things had panned out in Libya), this influx of cash and weapons into the region—all of this is extremely dangerous. Has Saudi Arabia learnt nothing from the 1980s, when its lifeline to the Afghan mujahedeen gave rise to Osama bin Laden? The West is still reeling from the financial crisis, and lives in fear of a new bout of economic malaise; it is not in a position to argue with the rich Arab monarchies. That is a serious challenge for Russia, as well as a chance for its diplomats to shine.

Has Russia won? Is Russia holding all the trump cards in the Middle Eastern game? These are the questions foreign journalists have been asking these days. Yes, Russian diplomats have made a brilliant move on the Syrian chemical weapons. But the game is not over yet. Numerous pitfalls await the Lavrov–Kerry plan and implementation of the UN SC resolution over the coming months.

The Syrian connection is obvious in most of the articles in this issue of Security Index. Mikhail Margelov analyses Syrian events—and, in the broader context, events in the Middle East, North Africa, and the Sahel, from the point of view of the non-Arab actors, including the West, Iran, and Turkey. Aleksey Pushkov offers recommendations for the Russian policy on Syria. Natalia Kalinina paints a grim picture of the militarization of the Middle East in recent years. Looking at the impressive figures on arms exports to the region, one is left wondering why Russia has been so unforgivably reluctant to meet Syria’s and Iran’s requests for the latest defensive missile systems—or perhaps these contracts will actually be fulfilled any time now?

Members of the PIR Center International Expert Group could not ignore Syria in their comments either. Incidentally, the group now includes a new expert from Libya. Born in Tripoli, political analyst Mustafa Fetouri knows from his own experience that “the strength of modern philosophy…lies in air support,” as the modern Russian writer Viktor Pelevin puts it in his S.N.U.F.F novel, arguably the most impressive anti-utopian work in Russia of recent years (see inside back cover).

Syria also comes to mind as one reads another article in this issue, the round table discussions focusing on the WMD-free zone in the Middle East. The problem of Syrian WMD is now being resolved without any such zone. In that sense, the United States has implemented its own long-prepared combination no less elegantly than Moscow has. Could it truly be the case that only force, threat of force, or acts of provocation are the sole recipe for ridding the Middle East of WMD? I doubt it.
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LETTERS TO THE EDITOR


What are the actual financial losses suffered by the world financial community in 2012 from hacking? How much of this was due to the Russian cyber-mafia? Are we on the verge of cyber-wars between the United States and Iran or United States and China? And what might be the potential dollar impact?

Effective cyber-defenses require trust between governments and business. More effective defenses assume higher levels of trust for automated threat sharing, but increased threat sharing also increases one’s vulnerability to new kinds of targeted threats from those with whom one has learned about one’s weaknesses.

We have moved from a simple world where a threat could be detected by a signature downloaded from an anti-virus firm like Macafee or Symantec and neutralized. Now attackers will probe thousands of networks simultaneously with thousands of different attacks per second looking for exploitable vulnerabilities. It is far beyond the capability of human operators to identify, isolate, and respond to such attacks or to let those they trust in government and industry know about the attack in a timely (sub-second) window.

The first step in building an automated defense to current threats is to make the threat information software and hardware independent. The U.S. government think tank MITRE, under contract to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, has developed an XML-based system for automatic structured threat information called STIX (Figure 1).1

MITRE has a long history of developing sophisticated security technology, which though technically sophisticated is often never fully adopted by industry. We believe that our society faces a major cyber-security challenge, a challenge that US policymakers cannot address by focusing on U.S. cyber-infrastructure. For example, the world’s financial community is under widespread cyber-attacks that come from all over the world and require a global response.

FUNCTIONALITY OF STIX

STIX, or the Structured Threat Information eXpression, is a language “meant to convey the full range of cyber threat information and strives to be fully expressive, flexible, extensible, automatable, and as human-readable as possible.”2 At least at this point, STIX currently exists as a programming language within a programming language. It is a specialized XML schema that has been developed with the primary purpose of “tagging” various aspects of a successful or attempted exploit. The data can then be collected, shared, and used by systems or organizations using a common standard for formatting the information. STIX is practical, because it leverages existing standardized language where appropriate; for example, in its representation of observables, it leverages the CybOX standardization effort. It also is designed such that everything in STIX is optional for the end user.

STIX “is intended to provide full expressivity for all relevant information within the cyber threat domain.” As such, it is designed to be helpful when performing a wide range of tasks, as opposed
to emphasizing only a narrow band of the cybersecurity realm (see Figure 2). For instance, STIX is useful for analyzing cyber threats, because it has a structured, standardized way to find and collect the data on an attack. It is also helpful in specifying indicator patterns for cyber threats, taking preventative courses of action for relevant threats, monitoring cyber operations, and responding to incidents. STIX is also extensible in case a user finds its toolbox to be incomplete.

The way STIX achieves these goals is by identifying the data objects that could be collected about an attack, and then fleshing out those constructs in detail within the XML schema housing the language. The eight "core constructs" that MITRE identified when developing STIX are the Observable, Indicator, Incident, TTP (Tactics, Techniques, & Procedures), ExploitTarget, CourseOfAction, Campaign, and ThreatActor. STIX leverages existing standards when defining observables and indicators. However, it develops its own language for all or part of the other core constructs as no adequate standards currently exist.

STIX AND TRUSTED RELATIONSHIPS

Trust is extremely important in cybersecurity in order to enable sharing of information about threats and security breaches between institutions. Unfortunately, there is a major lack of trust between corporations, between the private sector and government, and between U.S. organizations and those belonging to countries outside the West. Companies often like to keep security information private, as making their vulnerabilities known may cause them to lose customers. There are also legal concerns surrounding information sharing in the United States. Data must be handled in a way that respects consumers’ privacy and civil liberties. Companies are also often loath to collaborate with the government, which makes it difficult for security agencies to develop practical strategies for protecting U.S. infrastructure. All of this is to say nothing of the borderline-hostile relationship between U.S. cybersecurity agencies and their foreign counterparts, which creates an environment that is not at all conducive to sharing information on threats and attacks.

These drawbacks are some of the reasons why, in the past, MITRE has developed other cybersecurity products which never saw much practical use. These products may be very technologically advanced but are ignored by private industry. Part of the reason for this may also be that private industry is often reluctant to inorganically adopt a new standard. The most popular languages in private-sector software development are still C++ and Java. Since so many programmers learn and are trained in the most popular languages and procedures, there has been a surprising resistance to moving to an XML-orientated strategy for ensuring that data are hardware and software independent.

PRESIDENT OBAMA — PRESIDENT PUTIN — PRESIDENT XI JINPING

Given the present risk that the world’s financial industry faces, one would think there would be a lot of interest in deploying STIX. However, we have interviewed four cyber security experts in the Chinese financial industry. All agreed that they had no interest in a cybersecurity solution like STIX that was developed by the U.S. government. We were told that only if President Obama approached President Xi Jinping about working together on a global cyber-security solution for the world’s financial community would China implement STIX.
Figure 2. Structured Threat Information eXpression (STIX). Architecture v0.3

Source: Sean Barnum, "Standardizing Cyber Threat Intelligence Information with the Structured Threat Information eXpression (STIX™)," The MITRE Corporation, July 2012
Though Americans deeply distrust Chinese hackers, it must be remembered that Chinese hackers are not allowed to hack "credit card information from the West," because credit card information is the turf of the People’s Bank of China. Through its sophisticated firewalls, the Ministry of State security tracks every international hacker in China.

The Chinese government has the technical ability to stop all attacks against the world’s financial community and if President Obama asked in the right way, the PRC government could take a lead in building "trust" relationships between Chinese financial institutions and the rest of the world.

The Russian cyber-mafia is one of the greatest threats to both the American and world banking systems and takes advantage of the lack of automated threat-sharing in the community. With the support of President Putin, President Obama and President Xi Jinping could drive the leaders of the world’s financial industries to engage in trust-building exercises that would lead to the worldwide implementation of STIX and artificial intelligence systems built on top of STIX. Though such an effort requires a baseline of trust, the worldwide implementation of STIX would greatly strengthen relationships within the world financial community and the degree of trust in the community.

More importantly if the United States, China, and Russia invest heavily in the resilience of the world’s financial community they can come to a common agreement to make sure that any of their cyber-war attacks do not touch the world’s financial system.

The Obama Administration should take the lead and have the U.S. Department of the Treasury reach out to the Chinese Banking and Regulatory Commission and the People’s Bank of China to work together to make the world’s financial systems more resilient. The U.S. government has funded the development by MITRE of a system for automated threat exchange to support critical U.S. infrastructure. This XML-based system was presented to the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) at their fall meeting in 2012, and should be implemented quickly at a global level by building on and contributing to "trust" relationships in the world financial community, particularly the relationships between U.S. and Chinese financial leaders.

NOTES
1 See: Sean Barnum, "Standardizing Cyber Threat Intelligence Information with the Structured Threat Information eXpression (STIX™)," MITRE Corporation, July 2012.
3 Ibid, p. 11.
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