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POST-2009 SOA CONTROL IN RUSSIA AND THE UNITED STATES: ROOM FOR A COMPROMISE?¹

Recent developments have proved that control over strategic nuclear weapons is again in the focus of U.S.-Russian relations. It is no secret that a long break in this dialog is primarily explained by the fact that the current U.S. administration would not like to be limited by an agreement aimed at arms reduction opting to have the freedom of unilateral moves. Revitalization of bilateral discussions has been caused by not just new winds with neoconservative Republicans that define the position of George W. Bush's administration. There is a more objective reason: in December 2009 START I is going to expire. As it does so, there will be no mechanism for control, including on-site inspections, notifications, or exchange of data, which ensures transparency and foreseeability of strategic weapons. Most probably, both Russia and the United States would like to keep the mechanism with certain amendments. However, there are some reasons for both sides not to renew START I as is.²

It is well-known that two years ago Vladimir Putin, still holding the president's office back then, proposed «to launch negotiations to replace the START Treaty.»³ Meetings between the U.S. and Russian presidents in Kennenbunkport (July 2007) and Sochi (April 2008) facilitated revitalization of bilateral contacts on START, but at the same time they revealed significant differences in positions of the sides that eventually might be impossible to overcome.

IMPORTANCE OF BILATERAL AGREEMENTS ON STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION

Again, it is no secret that bilateral agreements on reduction of nuclear weapons as well as arms control have been in the focus of Soviet/Russian-U.S. relations for decades. It all started at the time of the Cold War as a means to promote national security for the Soviet Union, the United States, as well as many other countries. Agreements and treaties made back then, as well as negotiations to make them possible, facilitated new channels for communication between the superpowers, established and documented behavior models, restricted the arms race with qualitative and quantitative limitations on development of nuclear weapons. On the whole, this leads to lower potential for a nuclear conflict and better strategic stability. In general, this process added to better relations, and more extensive cooperation between the two powers competing for supremacy in practically every corner of the world.

This also meant an important contribution to nuclear nonproliferation. The fact that the nuclear superpowers complied with bilateral agreements aimed at real and controlled reduction of nuclear weapons was to prove that they also followed their commitments under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).



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However, after George W. Bush's administration took its office in Washington, the talks for controlled bilateral reduction of strategic nuclear weapons seem to have died out. In 2002 the U.S. side decided to withdraw from Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty thus rendering it void. START II signed in 1993 never entered into force. START I, which is definitely the most successful agreement on reduction and control of strategic nuclear weapons both in Russia and the United States, is to expire in December 2009, while renewal or replacement prospects get more and more delusive as the date gets closer. Even though the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) signed in May 2002 remains in force until December 2012, unlike START I it does not provide for irreversible reductions, or a control mechanism, or exchange of data. After START I leaves the scene some vacuum is inevitable in nuclear weapons control, which can increase suspicion aggravated by possibly deeper contradictions between Russia and the United States in the future.⁴

Non-strategic nuclear weapons see no new steps either. After Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNI) adopted in the fall of 1991 that were related to non-strategic nuclear weapons the parties have made no new moves to ensure control over this particular type of arms.⁵

Multilateral treaties on nuclear weapons have no better prospects. Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) signed in 1996 has never entered into force because the United States and some other countries decided not to ratify it. The Conference on Disarmament in Geneva has been in a stall for over a decade trying to agree on a treaty that would ban fissile materials production for nuclear weapons.

The slowdown, if not a complete shutdown of serious disarmament talks has a negative impact over nuclear nonproliferation, which is in a critical position already.

Nuclear tests held by India and Pakistan in spring 1998 lead to a rising number of *de facto* nuclear states. The nuclear club now has Israel and North Korea, which tested a nuclear explosive device in October 2007. The nuclear program of Iran still has serious issues around it. Nonproliferation regime may suffer from nuclear cooperation between India and the United States, which means India is *de facto* recognized as a nuclear state outside the NPT framework.

It is well-known that NPT Article VI provides that nuclear powers should pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to nuclear disarmament. Today's agenda, however, lacks not only nuclear disarmament, but even, as shown above, there are no serious talks about reduction in nuclear arsenals. In view of the NPT Review Conference upcoming in 2010 and given the fact that nonproliferation regime has been facing more and more serious challenges in the recent years, the question of nuclear states complying with their commitments under NPT Article VI is becoming more and more important.

REASONS BEHIND SUSPENSION OF BILATERAL DIALOG ON STRATEGIC ARMS CONTROL

As mentioned above, the current situation in bilateral strategic arms control is explained by the fact that George W. Bush's administration is not inclined to discuss this issue despite efforts of the Russian side, which has been trying to bring the sore point into the limelight for over a decade. In particular, the President of Russia mentioned nuclear disarmament as an important part of Russia's foreign policy in his Annual Address to the Federal Assembly on May 10, 2006. The Russian side proceeds from the following: «Yet it is too early to speak of an end to the arms race. What's more, the arms race has entered a new *spiral* today with the achievement of new levels of technology that raise the danger of the emergence of a whole arsenal of so-called destabilizing weapons.»⁶ At a later date, speaking to Russian ambassadors, the president said that for Russia «the stagnation we see today in the area of disarmament is of particular concern,» while «Russia is not responsible for this situation.»⁷ It is then that President Putin made a proposal to the United States to launch negotiations to replace the START Treaty.

Approach of George W. Bush's administration to nuclear arms reduction is based on the U.S. understanding, as of the late 1990s, that bilateral negotiations on reductions in nuclear arsenals are not up-to-date and are no longer relevant to ensuring strategic stability.⁸ Those who favor this approach believe that arms control developed during the Cold War would freeze up the status of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) and will not let the United States respond to the changing world, as well as it will hinder improvements in U.S.-Russian relations. The United States believes it necessary not to prioritize further talks pursuing agreements setting strict requirements for irreversible reductions of nuclear weapons, but to focus on retaining flexibility of nuclear forces to adapt to quick changes in the strategic situation.

Those views were clearly formulated as early as the Presidential Campaign-2000. Describing his vision of national security, presidential candidate George W. Bush remarked that the United States needed a new approach to negotiations with Russia on nuclear weapons that would not impede U.S. missile defense.⁹ Criticizing traditional theories of arms control, he proposed to consider unilateral reductions in the American nuclear arsenal to do away with the interminable talks trying to balance their level. George W. Bush also mentioned that the size of U.S. nuclear arsenal should no longer depend on the number of warheads Russia has.

The Republicans having taken office, the campaign slogans were now used by George W. Bush's administration to define U.S. nuclear policy for the coming years. Official documents, such as Nuclear Posture Review of 2001, National Security Strategy, and Quadrennial Defense Review no longer define the traditional deterrence of Russia as the main objective of U.S. strategy. The task is no longer relevant after the end of the Cold War, which used to be the cause behind nuclear weapons. In the new circumstances, when sources, scale, and nature of threats are hard to foresee, defense policy would be based on the new triad, composed of offensive strike systems (both nuclear and non-nuclear), defenses (both active and passive), and a revitalized defense infrastructure that will provide new capabilities in a timely fashion to meet emerging threats.¹⁰ The new triad is to provide assurance for supporters, dissuade potential enemies from obtaining WMD, and ensure deterrence that will be wider than just nuclear deterrence, but rather a possibility to defeat decisively any enemy with the help of nuclear and non-nuclear strike systems. In the U.S. national security policy arms control has been superseded by prevention of WMD proliferation, as well as related threats.

It is obvious indeed that the nature of relations between the United States and Russia is different from that between the United States and the Soviet Union. It is also clear that the basic framework for the treaty regime for nuclear weapons reduction and control currently in force was established back at a time when the two superpowers had hostile ideology in mutual relations, were involved in global competition, and were reciprocally suspicious. Nuclear deterrence was in the center of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States, made more material in the idea of mutually assured destruction. As a result, all treaties reflected this, and hence, they were designed to govern relations between the two enemies. However, today, after both Russia and the United States have declared partnership relations, the idea that the mechanisms of nuclear arms control are no longer needed, is more than controversial.

Facts prove it that nuclear deterrence in U.S.-Russian relations is still in place, despite no ideological confrontation¹¹. The most vivid proof is seen in the current practice of nuclear arms deployment, established back during the Cold War. For instance, U.S. strategic submarines still patrol the Pacific and the Atlantic in operational readiness to launch their missiles at targets in Russia. Relations are far from being a partnership if one side forces the other one to keep its Strategic Nuclear Forces (SNF) ready to launch at one-minute signal. It should be noted here that even after the lower levels of strategic offensive arms defined in SORT Treaty have been achieved, there will still be more than enough for mutually assured destruction.

In the meanwhile, nuclear deterrence remains a key element in relations between the two countries, which explains Russia's pained reaction to U.S. plans of anti-missile deployment



in Europe. Interestingly, U.S. political leadership refers to Russian plans of upgrading its nuclear forces to explain the need for combat readiness of their own SNF. For instance, U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates mentioned it in his speech at Langley Air Force Base, Virginia: «It seems clear that the Russians are focused as they look to the future more on strengthening their nuclear capabilities. So to the extent that they rely more and more on their nuclear capabilities as opposed to what historically has been a huge Russian conventional military capability, it seems to me that it underscores the importance of our sustaining a valid nuclear deterrent, a modern nuclear deterrent.»¹²

The new U.S. approach to SNF control is mainly caused by the collapse of the Soviet Union and related global geopolitical changes in the world.¹³ By the end of 1990s many analysts and military experts in the United States decided that having won the Cold War, the United States will take over in any possible competition with any country in the world.¹⁴ This conclusion has defined further actions and approaches of neoconservatives in the current U.S. administration towards agreements on nuclear arms control. They believe that U.S. military power allows it to ensure its security reliably and unilaterally.¹⁵ Having said that, the United States regards negotiations and bilateral arms control as something superfluous, and even limiting their capabilities to ensure national security. It is also important that despite obvious economic successes, Russia still won't be able to compete with the United States in the area of strategic arms in the near future. What is the point then to negotiate with a country incapable of keeping its own inherited SNF, a country that will have to go for reduction with a new treaty in place or without one?

Leon Fuerth, a former National Security Advisor to the U.S. Vice-President, thinks that was the reasoning of the current U.S. administration to define its position on SNF control.¹⁶ Russia is too weak to pose a direct threat to the United States, and hence the two countries are to discontinue SNF control through formal and binding treaties, superseded with a non-binding and informal *understanding*. Thus, each side is to define unilaterally the size of strategic forces it needs, while there is no longer any need to make it into a treaty or ensure the reduction is irreversible.

This approach is reflected in legal papers that define and determine future U.S. nuclear policies. It was also formalized in the new SORT Treaty between Russia and the United States signed in 2002.

On top of that, the United States has come to a point when it does not recognize the importance of treaties with other countries for its national security, thus making it possible to start military operations outside the framework of international law.¹⁷ Having become the only superpower, the United States no longer sees the point of talking or making binding treaties, which would strip its liberty of acting at its discretion. After September 11, 2001 the country finally set up the policy of preemptive and preventive actions, established in the National Security Strategy.¹⁸ Some American experts believe military force can be used to destroy weapons illegally obtained or to remove a regime not quite wanted, while now those changes are more desirable and more practical than ever before.¹⁹

COULD THE UNITED STATES TAKE A NEW TURN TOWARDS SNF CONTROL?

An attempt to look into the future of U.S. policy on SNF control within the context of bilateral relations between our countries would yield controversial results.

On the one hand, arms control has been proved to be of no concern for the U.S. side. Despite vague promises of the current presidential candidates, it is hard to expect a radical turn back to the disarmament initiatives of the 1990s, regardless of whether the new administration will be Democratic, or the Republicans stay in the White House. On the other hand, one can never be sure that the U.S. position on SNF-related treaties with Russia will see some change. Some indications are already in place.

It is obvious that nuclear deterrence will remain an essential element of U.S.-Russian relations in the foreseeable future. Given the fact that those relations can hardly be called a partnership, strategic stability is undermined by no agreed and joint measures to deter-

mine the quality and quantity of nuclear forces with unilateral activities now in place. Here another idea by Leon Fuerth should be noted. Taking into account that strategic expectations will always remain unchanged, as well as the human nature, he believes that unilateral activities of each side to support and develop their nuclear forces can destroy strategic stability.²⁰ So, despite some drastic changes in relations between the two countries, SNF control remains important now for better security of the United States, and will remain such in the future. The same conclusion is made by other American experts, but they allow for evolution of traditional forms of control into other formats and approaches that reflect modern realia.²¹ Interestingly enough, though the experts try to justify the new approach to SNF control, they still underline the importance to preserve and develop not only verification regimes, but also focus on efforts to promote transparency and predictability in U.S. and Russian decision-making concerning nuclear forces,²² including systematic discussions.²³

Another factor that could potentially alter the current U.S. approach to bilateral nuclear arms reduction and control is U.S. strife for a more stringent nonproliferation regime. The United States would like to codify stricter rules for non-nuclear states to control their peaceful nuclear activities, which in practice would mean a limitation of NPT Article IV for non-nuclear states. Pursuing this goal, official representatives of the U.S. administration have traditionally referred to START I and SORT Treaties to prove that the United States has been consistent in following its commitments to nuclear disarmament under NPT Article VI.²⁴ Hence, a complete U.S. withdrawal from nuclear arms reduction treaties with Russia while declaring the freedom of activities in this area would effectively undermine its efforts to strengthen nuclear nonproliferation.

Finally, there are some signs that the current U.S. administration is now rethinking initial approaches to such issues as nonproliferation and nuclear arms control. Naturally, two large military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have brought an understanding that the United States only has a limited political, economic, and military capacity to influence international events. It is clearly demonstrated by U.S. efforts to prevent North Korea and Iran from becoming nuclear states. In their course, the United States have come to an understanding that international efforts are required. There are some indications that the attitude to bilateral talks on nuclear arms reduction might change as well.

Current events seem to prove it to an extent. Presidents of the two countries met in Sochi in April 2008 to sign U.S.-Russia Strategic Framework Declaration, which serves to prove alongside with recent statements from both sides that they are interested in continuing the dialogue on nuclear arms reduction.²⁵

Another fact adds to the cautious optimism: the two recent years have seen more activity of influential NGOs in the United States, which call upon the current U.S. administration to review its policy and continue further reductions of nuclear arms while keeping the level of transparency here. Particularly notable is a publication by a group of prominent U.S. politicians, including George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn, who published two articles in *The Wall Street Journal*, which have caused a lot of both Republican and Democratic support.²⁶ These authors have called upon the U.S. administration to undertake radical measures aimed at complete eventual liquidation of nuclear arms. They propose such steps as continuing nuclear arms reduction and keeping key limitations from START I, as well as its control mechanisms.

This activity is a probable explanation for the fact that both presidential contenders, Barack Obama (D) and John McCain (R) have expressed their resolution in favor of significant reduction of the U.S. nuclear arsenal to its reasonably lowest level and continuing the discussion of this issue with Russia, though this country is not in the focus of their programs.²⁷ In June 2008 Arms Control Association arranged a public discussion involving representatives from the John McCain for President campaign as well as the Barack Obama for President campaign, Stephen Biegun, and John D. Hollum. Both were unanimous in emphasizing that the two candidates would be looking for a new agreement with Russia to reduce nuclear weapons to below SORT levels (1,700–2,200 warheads).²⁸ It was also men-



tioned that both Obama and McCain want the new agreement to retain control measures and to last for a longer time than SORT.²⁹

It is well-known that bilateral discussions over the recent two years have led Russia and the United States to an agreement to continue development of a legally binding post-START arrangement, put on paper in the Sochi declaration.³⁰ However, that arrangement is understood in different ways, which is seen from statements by officials from the two countries.³¹ Americans believe that the new treaty should be based on SORT complemented with transparency and control measures. The U.S. side only agrees to limit deployed nuclear warheads. The Russian side insists that limitations should cover not only warheads, but also strategic delivery missiles, whether deployed or not. Additionally, the Russian side seems to be offering a less intrusive control mechanism.³²

Differences between the parties are better understood in retrospective of the U.S.-Russian dialogue on nuclear reduction: Russia and the United States have tried numerous times, but always failed to agree on a strategic stability arrangement. The Russian side believes that strategic stability includes a wide range of issues related not only to strategic offensive arms, but also missile defense, space-based weapons, anti-submarine warfare, and precision-guided weapons³³—effectively, the whole range of factors that can jeopardize Russian potential for deterrence. Russian position in talks with the United States is defined mainly by the need to keep the capability of its strategic forces to inflict a given damage to its potential enemy in any circumstances, in the gravest situation. That is why Russia prefers to keep the limitations for deployed strategic delivery missiles and expresses concern over U.S. plans to develop its capability for a *prompt global strike*³⁴ and to deploy a third GMD site in Europe.³⁵

The U.S. understanding of strategic stability is totally different from the way Russia sees it. The United States never questions invulnerability of its current and future strategic forces, the backbone of which is represented today in the form of strategic submarines carrying ballistic missiles. It often happens that the country's position during negotiations produces an impression that strategic stability means the United States should have an unquestionable military advantage.

Over recent decades the United States has been trying to limit the talks to nuclear arms only. At the same time, the U.S. side insists that limitations and reductions should only affect missiles with nuclear warheads, thus creating the issue of *breakout potential*. This problem was a major one in discussions over ratification of START II in Russia and in negotiations over START III in the late 1990s. SORT Treaty of 2002 further aggravated the issue of *backout potential* since the sides have totally different interpretations for «strategic nuclear warheads» limited by the Treaty: Russia applies the same definition as in START I, while the U.S. definition is much more narrow, only caring for «deployed» nuclear warheads.

So, the differences in place today regarding the new treaty only reflect a huge gap in defining strategic stability, made only larger with the George W. Bush's administration in power that actually stopped the dialog and search for compromise with the Russian side.

ROOM FOR A COMPROMISE?

It is absolutely obvious that the sides are not ready for a compromise, either politically, or technically. It seems that future discussions can only be successful if the parties involved decide to give up the ambitious goal and agree to a gradual search for solution. With that said, the new treaty could be a combination of a more detailed SORT with an updated verification mechanism for START I.

Apparently, the new treaty could be based on the following basic principles:³⁶

- A lower (than in SORT) level for the total number of warheads with each side. Limits could be set also for the total number of missiles, without further split for warheads for inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBM), submarine-launched ballistic missiles

(SLBM), as well as those on heavy bombers (HB), in the same fashion as there is no split in SORT Treaty. Additionally, some of the stricter limitations could be removed for deployment of non-nuclear ICBMs and SLBMs.

- ❑ Russian agreement to count only deployed nuclear warheads. In turn, the U.S. side, should agree that delivery missiles never cede to remain strategic with conventional warheads in place of nuclear ones.
- ❑ Ban on development of new strategic offensive arms and restriction on their transfer to third countries.
- ❑ More emphasis on trust, transparency, and predictability of new developments in the area of nuclear weapons.
- ❑ A system of control measures to enforce provisions of the new treaty, being simpler and cheaper than that of START I.

The question about how low we can go is surely to become an issue, since it has traditionally been the *face* of disarmament agreements, the utmost essence of commitments made by Russia and the United States not just to each other, but more so to the international community. This indicator shows how well the two nuclear states are doing in implementing NPT Article VI. It is clear now with the NPT Review Conference upcoming in 2010 that the level is to be at least a little lower than 1,700–2,200 warheads set in SORT. The Russian side seems to be ready to go as low as 1,500 and even 1,000 warheads, as mentioned by the Russian president. It is also known that the United States is going further down in cutting its nuclear forces than planned in Nuclear Posture Review of 2001. In particular, in July 2007 reductions started with the missile wing at Malmstrom Air Force Base equipped with Minuteman III ICBMs, 50 of which are to be removed from inventory by mid-2008.³⁷ In December 2007 the White House announced an advance reduction of nuclear stockpile³⁸ earlier scheduled to be done by 2012. A new Nuclear Posture Review to be submitted by the administration to Congress in 2009 will most probably include further reductions of nuclear arsenals, which can be expected from statements by presidential candidates' representatives.³⁹ All the above leads to believe that the U.S. side may agree to compromise at 1,500 warheads.

No further split in limitations by type and delivery vehicles is generally believed to be an advantage of SORT over earlier treaties. Most probably, the approach will stay in the new one. Besides, limitations could possibly be removed for non-nuclear ICBM and SLBM deployment. Thus, the United States could use this cheaper option to make its ballistic missiles into conventional weapons, while Russia could deploy its ICBMs with multiple warheads.

It seems that to come to a new treaty the sides first will have to agree on a matter of principle: how the limitations will be applied. If there is disagreement as to which weapons are subject to limitations and control, it will be impossible to come up with verification mechanisms, which is the point of joint activities of Russian and U.S. negotiators. Please mind, SORT Treaty provides for no control mechanisms, and is a *de facto* declaration, mainly because the above issue remained unresolved.

It is obvious that the U.S. side will no longer be happy with START principles that the Russian side sticks to. As the United States is not going to destroy strategic missiles after removing nuclear warheads and plans to use them as conventional weapons, it clearly will not agree to count the new conventional warheads as part of the 1,500 limit.

Authors of this article believe that a compromise is only possible if Russia agrees to the American principle of counting the warheads. In other words, the limit declared will only include deployed nuclear warheads. In its turn, the United States should agree that delivery missiles will remain strategic even with conventional warheads in place, and hence should also be subject to limitations, control, and transparency measures. Strategic non-nuclear missiles may have a different approach to their control, whether less or more intrusive, but the point is in keeping them within the treaty framework.



Both sides seem to take interest in keeping the ban on developing new types of strategic offensive arms and transferring them to third countries. In particular, there may be some sense in a clearer definition for cooperation between the United States and Great Britain on Trident SLBMs.

As mentioned above, a new verification mechanism could be the main objective for the new treaty. It could be based on that of START I, very familiar after many years, but made simpler. The sides could determine, which data exchanged or inspections conducted are still crucial and which ones could be spared. For instance, baseline data inspections could be retained from START I, while their number could be limited at quite a low level, maybe eight or ten per year. Such inspections could focus on checking updated data, as well as information on elimination of weapons and facilities or conversion of launchers or heavy bombers, number of deployed warheads with certain delivery vehicles. Each of the sides could arrange any type of inspection at its own discretion within the limit set. Whereas such measures as continuous monitoring at production facilities for ICBMs or broadcast of telemetric information are of little use in the current circumstances, and hence could be abandoned.

To upgrade nuclear deterrence, it is very important that the new treaty should strengthen and promote trust, transparency, and predictability in nuclear arms. With that said, it seems reasonable to preserve START I notifications mechanism topping it with exchange of data related to plans and programs in strategic offensive and defensive arms (including long-range sea-launched cruise missiles, SLCM), as well as changes in the nuclear doctrine.

CONDITIONS FOR A COMPROMISE


It is clear that alongside with negotiations on the new reduction treaty other issues will arise, which would be outside its scope. Some could be tackled at an earlier stage, such as creation of Joint Data Exchange Center (JDEC) to share information on ballistic missile launches, which has long been on the agenda. As the United States is hastening its programs to deploy non-nuclear SLBMs and ICBMs, of which the Russian side has expressed its concern, both parties seem to be interested in establishing the center.

The new reduction treaty is sure to depend on finding a solution to the issue of the new European launch site to become part of Global Missile Defense (GMD). It is unlikely that the two sides will manage to keep the two issues separate, as some U.S. experts believe.⁴⁰ There seems to be no reason for the new U.S. administration soon to take office to abandon GMD deployment in Europe. Both presidential contenders, as their representatives say, will further promote missile defense if elected.⁴¹ It is equally unlikely that Russia and the United States could start working together on a global missile defense system, as Russian president Vladimir Putin offered to the U.S. president in Sochi.⁴² A compromise seems possible only if the United States decides to commit not to expand the European GMD site after 2013, when radars will have been put in place in the Czech Republic, and interceptor missiles based in Poland.⁴³ Transparency in these activities will also be an important condition.⁴⁴

Unfortunately, there are more subjective factors impeding a compromise. The U.S. administration is mostly focused now on the presidential elections, the Iraq war, and economic recession threats, while nuclear weapons and missile defense are not on the short list of priorities. After George W. Bush came to power the Department of State seems to have lost nearly all experts who remember how to do nuclear arms reduction and missile defense talks. It is very meaningful that that John Rood, a U.S. Under Secretary of State appointed to this key post in November 2007, heading the U.S. delegation at SOA and GMD discussions mentioned one thing about START: «Not being encumbered with all this baggage from the Cold War is a huge advantage.»⁴⁵

A new U.S. administration to take office early next year, will probably take some time to review strategic goals of the former government and come up with their own. At least Stephen Biegun, a representative from the John McCain for President campaign, men-

tioned that Senator McCain (and that would be the same for Senator Obama as well) would, as a matter of approach, begin preparing for a new round of talks with a Nuclear Posture Review.⁴⁶ It is well-known that George W. Bush administration took a year to come up with this document back in 2002.

That said, it is possible that the parties will agree in the given circumstances to extend START I beyond 2009, at least temporarily, to develop a replacement,⁴⁷ though it has been demonstrated above that neither Russia nor the United States believe it to be the best solution. This option is still available if both sides decide to keep START I while no alternative is ready by the end of 2009. 

Notes

¹ This article follows up on previous works by its authors: Anatoly Diakov, Yevgeny Miasnikov, «ReSTART: The Need for a New U.S.-Russian Strategic Arms Agreement,» *Arms Control Today*, September 2006, pp. 6–11; Anatoly Diakov, Yevgeny Miasnikov, Nikolai Sokov, *Nuclear Weapons Reduction and Control in U.S.-Russian Relations: Overview and Developments*, Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies, Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology, 2006, 42 p.

² The fact that both Russia and the United States would not like to see START I renewed was mentioned, among other things, in a statement made by John Rood, U.S. Under Secretary of State, at the Foreign Relations Committee of the U.S. Senate on May 21, 2008.

³ Speech by President Vladimir Putin at Meeting with the Ambassadors and Permanent Representatives of the Russian Federation. June 27, 2006, http://kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2006/06/27/2040_type82912type82913type84779_107818.shtml (last visited on October 5, 2008).

⁴ Many Russian and U.S. experts support the conclusion that relations between the two countries might get worse in the future. C.f.: Nikolai Zlobin, «United States and Russia: No Friend, No Foe,» *Vedomosti*, June 19, 2008; Marshall Goldman, «New Leaders–New Relations?» *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, June 18, 2008; Ivan Safranchuk, «Just All Set for a Confrontation,» *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, December 12, 2007; Alexey Arbatov, «Is a Cold War Coming?» *Russia in Global Affairs*, No. 2, March–April 2007.

⁵ Anatoly Diakov, Yevgeny Miasnikov, and Timur Kadyshchev, *Non-strategic Nuclear Weapons: Control and Reduction*, Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies, Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology (Dolgoprudny: 2004), 72 p.

⁶ Annual Address by President Vladimir Putin to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, May 10, 2006, http://kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2006/05/10/1823_type70029type82912_105566.shtml (last visited on October 5, 2008).

⁷ Speech by President Vladimir Putin at Meeting with the Ambassadors...

⁸ Condoleezza Rice, «Promoting the National Interests,» *Foreign Affairs*, January–February 2000; *Rational and Requirements for U.S. Nuclear Forces and Arms Control*, National Institute for Public Policy, January 2001, <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20000101faessay5/condoleezza-ric/campaign-2000-promoting-the-national-interest.html?mode=print> (last visited on October 5, 2008).

⁹ George W. Bush's Remarks on National Security, Washington D.C. May 24, 2000; John Broder, «Bush Proposal on Arms: Breaking Cold War Mold,» *New York Times*, May 26, 2000, <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C0CEEDB133DF935A15756C0A9669C8B63> (last visited on October 5, 2008).

¹⁰ Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense. *Nuclear Posture Review Report*. Foreword. January 8, 2002, <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jan2002/d20020109npr.pdf> (last visited on October 5, 2008).

¹¹ The same conclusion is supported by many Russian and American experts. C.f.: Alexei Arbatov and Vladimir Dvorkin (eds.), *Nuclear Weapons after the Cold War*, Carnegie Moscow Center (Moscow: Russian Political Encyclopaedia (ROSSPEN), 2006), 559 p.; *Toward True Security. Ten Steps Next President Should Take to Transform U.S. Nuclear Policy*. Federation of American Scientists, Natural Resources Defense Council, Union of Concerned Scientists, February 2008.

¹² Kristin Roberts, «Pentagon Sees Russia Strengthening Nuclear Arsenal,» Reuters, June 9, 2008.

¹³ See also: Anatoly Diakov, Yugeny Miasnikov, Nikolai Sokov, *Nuclear Weapons Reduction...*; Roland Timerbaev, «Evolution of Arms Control: Current Trends,» *Yaderny Kontrol* (Russian Edition), No. 1, 2005,



pp. 29–43; Gennady Evstafiev, «Disarmament is Back,» *Security Index* (Russian Edition). No. 2, 2007, pp. 41–54.

¹⁴ Harold Brown, «Is Arms Control Dead?» *Washington Quarterly*, Spring 2000.

¹⁵ Jeffrey Larsen, «The Bush Administration's New Approach to Arms Control» in Steven E. Miller and Dmitry Trenin (eds.), *The Russian Military, Power and Policy*, American Academy of Arts and Sciences (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2004), pp. 147–160.

¹⁶ Leon Fuerth, «Return of the Nuclear Debate,» *Washington Quarterly*, Autumn 2001, pp. 97–108.

¹⁷ John Steinbruner, «Can Arms Control Be Revived?» *Arms Control Today*, March 2005.

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