

strategic submarines to fulfil our commitments under START I and START II. I hope that the United States will support our proposals concerning dismantlement of multipurpose nuclear-powered submarines.

Q.: However, if the USA refuses to assist Russia in dismantlement, have you already calculated the funds to be invested?

A.: I have already said that to facilitate the process we will have to invest about 2 billion rubles per year (in current prices). This funding provides for annual dismantlement of 25 submarines. Meanwhile, there is one more "but". All these calculations were made before increase in oil prices. The latter will result in growing costs of transportation. Shipbuilding plants will have to pay more for dismantlement, for transportation of irradiated nuclear fuel to *Mayak*. This may significantly affect our plans.

Q.: Is there any final decision concerning the future of cut-out reactor compartments of the submarines? At first, it was planned to build a storage facility near Murmansk, then - on Novaya Zemlya...

A.: So far we have been working at this problem and have several possible solutions, including construction of storage facility near Murmansk. Managers of *Zvezdochka* plant have already made technical assessment, got approval of administration of Arkhangelskaya oblast for installation of interim storage facility to store reactor compartments on the territory of the enterprise. We looked at this place, it is situated quite conveniently and it is profitable because the plant will have to spend less on maintenance and storage of reactor compartments.

Nonetheless, it is too early to speak about general solution to this problem. This is a new task for us and we have to conduct a number of research activities. We have to envisage all possible developments, which may happen to these compartments, so that in the long run we may say that our decision will ensure environmentally-safe long-term storage of reactor compartments. Nowadays, we can speak about safe storage of reactor compartments for 50 years only.

Analysis

NEARLY MORTAL DILEMMA: THE EUROPEANS AND THE US PLANS FOR NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE

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There are essentially three ways to approach the issue of missile defenses:

- To argue that some basic pattern of the Cold War relationship are still intact and missile defense has thus to be discussed essentially within the same framework as before 1989;
- To argue that the conditions of the Cold War no longer exist and missile defense must be inquired for their potential to help with the transition to a nuclear-weapon-free world;
- To argue that the conditions of the Cold War are no longer applicable and missile defense is necessary as a complement to nuclear deterrence as part of national (or alliance) security policy.

All three lines of argument are encountered in the present global debate on the issue, though with a fairly unequal geographical distribution. The first one is prevailing in Russia, China, most quarters in Western Europe, and across the nonaligned world; it has staunch adherents in the US arms control community. The second one has supporters in the US arms control community, and in small minorities in Western Europe. The third one dominates in the US debate and has a small number of followers in Western European strategic communities and defense ministries.

'The Cold War Is Over, but Its Strategic Conditions Remain Partially Intact'

It would be wrong to read the first view as seeing the world largely unchanged as compared to the era of the East-West conflict.

The growth in institutions serving security cooperation in Europe and globally is, to the contrary, recognized and welcomed. The shift in security assessments from 'threats' to 'risks', that is from consciously conceived capabilities for military pressures and threat if not attack to constellations where things could go wrong, or where shifts in stability may lead to new threats in the future where none exist today, is appreciated. This view endorses a strategy that would use and enhance chances to intensify security cooperation and strengthen the respective institutions or to create new ones where none do exist today.

Nevertheless, proponents of this view would point to the fact that the relationship between major powers, including nuclear weapon states, while not hostile and by and large cooperative, are not that those of stable friendship. Conflict of interest and ensuing tensions do still remain. They range from disagreement about how to handle the conflicts on the Balkans to competing interests in oil resources in the Caucasus and Central Asia, from disagreement about claims in the South Chinese Sea to the issue of Taiwan and the general order and balance that should prevail in Asia. Perceptions of potential conflicts are there. Military capabilities of the *other side* are seen as a potential, though not necessarily clear and present, challenge.

In this context, it is obvious that there is still a residual element of nuclear deterrence prevailing in the security relationship between these countries, notably the United States, Russia, and China. This element does not dominate present relations that are much more differentiated and complex than during the Cold War, mixing a much larger cooperative element with this residual factor of deterrence. But the latter is not yet completely absent; and it is made essential to the perceived national security of the less powerful two by the sheer superiority the United States commands in both military technology and conventional military capabilities.

In this specific context, missile defenses, if put up unilaterally or asymmetrically, contain still risks that motivated the two

protagonists of the East-West conflict to negotiate the ABM Treaty. It could even be argued that the risks are more pronounced because the – real or perceived – balance that reigned during the Cold War has given way to the unchallenged superiority of one nuclear weapon state over the others. National missile defense in the old days were thought to be capable of creating profound doubts on either side in the validity of the deterrent, leading to risky and destabilizing moves in doctrine, strategy, deployment and operational modes. Under the assumption of asymmetry and one-sidedness these risks must be rated as fairly high. As even the US negotiator suggested to his Russian counterpart during the efforts to find suitable changes in the ABM Treaty, redundant nuclear weapons holdings (which would run counter to obligations under the NPT) and high alert status and launch-on-warning postures (which would keep nuclear forces in a rather unstable, risky and dangerous condition) would help to counter the detrimental effects on the Russian nuclear deterrent of the US national missile defense system as presently conceived. For China commensurate arguments apply. It goes without saying that the situation would become more and more acute the denser the planned defense system would be deployed.

As a consequence of that reasoning, the holders of that view plead for the preservation of the ABM Treaty in its present substance; that means that the erection of effective missile defenses covering the whole national territory of a nuclear weapon state should remain prohibited. Adherents of this view may make an allowance for such changes in the Treaty that can be negotiated between the Treaty party and silently agreed to by the relevant non-parties, most prominently China. In other words, the standard objective for a Treaty change is not to accommodate national plans adopted unilaterally by one state, but the preservation or even strengthening of an agreed, cooperative security system in which all major players view their interests as accommodated. One may be skeptical if such a system is achievable in the foreseeable future. The US administration plans to introduce NMD in three phases. The first two phases would mount a system too limited to

pose a serious threat against the Russian deterrent, but possibly strong enough to jeopardize the Chinese deterrent in worst case scenarios (starting with a surprise first strike) The third phase system would already muster considerable capabilities that might look threatening to Russian planners under worst-case considerations. Republicans have declared it their solemn objective to move to much more powerful and effective systems, compounding the concerns in Moscow and Beijing. Admitting initial changes in the ABM Treaty that would eliminate its basic goal – the prohibition of all types of NMD, however weak or strong, could be interpreted from this perspective as enabling the United States to lay the groundwork for an infrastructure that would, later on, permit a relatively rapid breakout towards a system such as preferred by the Republicans. Should, on these grounds, agreement on ABM Treaty amendments not be possible, the proponents of this view would rather leave things as they are.

'Managed Transition to a Defense-Dominated, Non-Nuclear World'

Trying to make a virtue out of necessity, some have proposed to work actively towards an agreed, thoroughly managed transition towards a defense-dominated global security system. This should provide favorable conditions for drastic reductions in offensive nuclear weaponry, eventually paving the way to complete nuclear disarmament. First amendments to the ABM Treaty are seen as the initial steps for such a transition.

The starting point here is that, given the dominant mood in the USA, the move towards missile defense is irrevocable. Fully aware of the dangers which this move engenders, as discussed in the previous chapter, the arms controllers promoting this strategy try to catch this move with a cooperative, multilateral net. The transition is to be made cooperatively. The partners shall be encouraged to develop their own defense systems; in order to assist them in their endeavors, available technology should be shared, joint research and development projects initiated. Eventually, a global system covering all states should be installed.

Protected effectively by a reliable system, the fear of nuclear attacks would subside universally. Fears of disarming surprise attacks or uncontrolled *rogue state* strikes would cease to exist. Consequently, nuclear deterrence would lose its mission. With nuclear weapons becoming obsolete – the old Ronald Reagan dream – radical deep cuts in nuclear arms would be possible that are presently resisted by military leaderships. With defense replacing deterrence as dominant strategy, residual deterrence against an outbreak from a nuclear disarmament treaty would disappear as the prohibitive threat scenario in a non-nuclear world: complete nuclear disarmament would become possible.

This optimistic scenario is not without inherent plausibility. If achievable among the leading powers, this might considerably brighten the prospect to nuclear disarmament, providing an answer to the main, security-based counter-argument that this objective is not achievable. However, it rests on three truly heroic assumptions.

- First, given its technological and financial superiority, it would require the United States to share and transfer cutting-edge technology with countries its military elite still regards as rivals and potential enemies. Over the last years, the American inclination to transfer sensitive technologies has diminished rather than grown, even within the Western Alliance. The strongest supporters of an extensive and dense defense system are least likely to consent to such a transfer. The prospects to persuade Congress to acquiesce in what many lawmakers would see as compromising national security are dim at best.
- Second, conflicts of interest among the US, Russia and China would have to shrink to a very low level. This means that viable consensual regimes would have to exist about the Balkans, the Caucasus and Central Asia, and a common understanding where NATO's expansion will stop; the Taiwan issue and the distribution of territory in the South Chinese Sea would have to be settled. Nothing of these requirements is likely to be fulfilled in the near future.

- Lastly, a formula for the common management of the global defense system would have to be established. National systems are unlikely to do the job. They would most likely still suffer from asymmetries in quality and instigate fears of inferiority in the leaderships of anybody else but the USA. A common management for the system is not completely out of reach once the political issues are settled. We can see some faint first traces in the agreement to share early-warning data between the USA and Russia, and the US readiness to help with improving early-warning radars in Russia. But it requires solutions for difficult political, legal, operational and technical issues that will take quite a while to negotiate and to test in practice. The timeframe in which such agreements could be reached – goodwill provided – is certain to overtax the patience of the ardent NMD pundits on the Republican side.

The main problem with this approach is that in its zeal to bridge the gap between the first and the next alternative strategy, it papers over the grave differences in their underlying political philosophies. The US approach to NMD is largely dictated by a strictly unilateralist philosophy of security policy. The multilateralism required to implement strategy two goes way beyond the one that informs strategy one. Yet the arguments of strategy two supporters can be misused as a welcome veil to conceal the strict unilateralism of present NMD policies and to present this unilateralism as aiming at a cooperative security system. The blame is then laid on the partners that fail to accept the allegedly cooperative offers from Washington. The good will of strategy two supporters is thus turned into its contrary: a handy instrument to push forward with a policy that is certain to destroy the traces of cooperative security that were the hard won results of thirty years of arms control. The proposal does not reflect sufficiently upon the very conditions on which its realization would have to be based and thus risks to engender quite counterintuitive political consequences.

'To go it alone' – Protecting America in an Uncertain World

Some things about the third view have already been said. It starts from the assumption that security conditions have drastically changed since the Cold War. Rather than keeping the balance of terror against a menacing Soviet Union, a global rival with equal or even superior military power, the United States is now confronted with serious threats in asymmetrical conflict, emerging from the spread of weapons of mass destruction and missiles, combined with indigenous missile programs in *countries of concern*. These programs progress and will lead inevitably to weapons of a range and quality as to threaten US territory. The threat is seen to be relevant in one scenario in particular: The leadership of a *state of concern* could be tempted to trust that a nuclear threat against the US homeland could prevent the United States from defending its vital interests in the region concerned and could thus begin a military adventure with a view to challenge the balance of power in that region. NMD would add an element of *deterrence by denial* to the already existing *deterrence by retaliation* which, in the US view, might be not sufficient to prevent the *state of concern* from considering such adventures due to a less prudent and more sinister, though not entirely irrational, strategic calculus.

The scenario appears implausible, to say the least, even if we accept for a moment that the feared capability – reliable intercontinental-ballistic missiles – will indeed be in the hands of countries like North Korea, Iran, Iraq or Libya in the foreseeable future (i.e. in a time horizon of 10-15 years). Given the overwhelming means of retaliation by the United States, it is more than unlikely that a nuclear counter-threat would be used for anything else than the preservation and survival of the regime in question. Even Adolf Hitler did not use chemical weapons in World War II; Germany came close to endeavor a chemical attack during the siege of Leningrad, but abstained when it became clear that allied airforces had superiority over the German airspace. Saddam Hussein did not employ chemical or biological weapons against allied forces in the Gulf War, and chose to attack Israel with conventional

missiles only. It can be surmised that this might have changed had allied forces continued their offensive to Baghdad. But the United States has shown a remarkable reluctance to fight its major post-World War II military engagements *à l'outrance*, that is up to the unconditional surrender of the enemy. Neither Korea nor Vietnam, neither the Gulf, Somalia nor Balkan interventions were pressed to the elimination of the enemy's leadership. Rather, the US stopped when the immediate war aims were achieved (or, in the case of the most peripheral engagement, Somalia, not even that). The only interventions which were conducted to the end was against *dwarf states* in the *US backyard*, namely Panama and Grenada. In other words, the contingency in which *deterrence by denial* would really become relevant is just unreal. Furthermore, all regimes in question, and North Korea in the last few years in particular, have shown a remarkable degree of strategic rationality. Their verbal expressions may sound alien at times, and their bargaining behavior is unorthodox, but irrational it is not; it is thus certainly susceptible to notions of deterrence by overwhelming forces.

In the American discussion, it appears clear that a part of the most ardent supporters of NMD looks rather at China than at *countries of concern* as the strategic target of missile defense. China is seen as a global rival of the United States in the long-term, and NMD is viewed as a welcome *trump card* in this coming competition. Since these views are articulated in the US debate, it is understandable that Beijing is highly concerned about the interests underlying US plans.

Russia features in pro-NMD arguments mainly as source of accidental or unauthorized single launches for which the system, even in its first phases, would be configured. However, given the overall strategic context within which NMD is embedded, Russia may be more of a target than it appears.

For the idea to go forward with NMD no matter what is firmly grounded in a unilateralist understanding of national security. National security is not meant to

contribute to a common good, but to preserve the security, including the wider interests, of one's own nation. Since the international system is competitive in this understanding, security is best achieved when all options of all potential enemies can be denied, and oneself is in possession of optimal freedom of action. Screening through the various speeches of Republican senators, but equally through Pentagon planning documents, one gets the firm impression that this is what US defense policy is aiming at. It is not coincidental that 'full spectrum dominance' has become the keyword in strategic considerations of the US Air Force, for example.

This view betrays disdain for the ideas of cooperative, common or collective security that is at the heart of the two alternative styles of thinking. Multilateral or bilateral arms control and disarmament agreements are acceptable if they enhance the opportunities to achieve superiority, assist in preserving it, or are at least neutral in their effects. Where options have to be sacrificed and freedom of action has to be constrained, arms control becomes unacceptable.

The West European Position: Arms Control Aspects

It is at this point that West European concerns about US plans are anchored. Western Europe has embraced multilateralism as an inevitable part of its own security policy. It may be that the embedment of Western Europe's nation states in two intense multilateral structures (NATO and the EU) has affected their individual security identity, and they're thinking thereupon, to a far higher degree than the lonely leader of the Western Alliance. In other words, Western European security philosophy is rooted very much in the concepts underlying the first view of NMD discussed above. It is clear, therefore, that the main concern in Western Europe is that the whole fabric of international arms control and disarmament agreements may tumble under the weight of NMD. Western Europe also sees in all clarity that the three-phase plan that the present administration intends to realize is most likely to mark the beginning, but not the final point, of the

process of NMD development and deployment.

There is hope that maybe an agreement between Russia and the USA on some amendments of the ABM Treaties can be negotiated. It would be exaggerated to say that these hopes are high. If not, what Europeans expect is that Russia will turn to MIRVing the Topol as the main weapon system of the next generation of its nuclear deterrent, thereby invalidating one key stipulation of the START II Treaty. Western European capitals have observed and analyzed with great interest the controversy between Defense Minister Marshal Igor Sergeev and Chief of the General Staff Anatoly Kvashnin. The general conclusion is that Russian strategic forces are headed towards much less overall systems than exist at present. Even though, for the moment, a compromise between Sergeev's and Kvashnin's preferences appears to have defined by President Putin himself, the tendency towards a minimum deterrence posture is noted with interest. What minimum means, however, is clearly understood to depend on the validity of the ABM Treaty as opposed to the unfettered deployment of an NMD system by the United States. MIRVs as well as highly alert forces and a launch-on-warning doctrine are obvious responses to the latter alternative if defense policy preferences lead Russian considerations in the direction of lower nuclear system numbers, as appears plausible. This would not only mean an undesirable return to a generally more unstable posture, it would not only force Russia to withdraw from (or, in a reciprocal move to US efforts on the ABM Treaty, amend) the START II Treaty, but would put a ceiling under the START process, since an NMD system would certainly force up the minimum numbers the Russian military would see as necessary to guarantee the survivability and effectiveness of its deterrent.

This is the main concern of the Europeans on the arms control front. They are much less taken by hints that Russia may withdraw from the INF Treaty. In fact, these hints are working out in a direction rather counterproductive to Russian interests.

European opposition to NMD is almost uniform and – measured by historical NATO standards – strong in the light of the broad US consensus to pursue the project. Threatening withdrawal from the INF Treaty, which is very important and dear to the Europeans, will not have the effect to enhance their opposition, but rather induce them to rally around the NATO leader in seeking for a response. The effect would be similar to the one engendered by then Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko's threatening rhetoric during the INF controversy in the early eighties. While his pronouncements made antinuclear protesters more nervous for sure, they hardened the determination of even wavering Western European Alliance members to press forward with the deployment. In the current case, apart from the two countries immediately concerned with aspects of the NMD project (see below), European populations are rather unlikely to be mobilized. Touching the INF Treaty would thus not be prudent Russian policy.

The Role of Tactical Missile Defense

The Chinese angle is less frequently explored in the European debate, because security interests are so much focussed on Europe. However, possible Chinese reactions will have a heavy bearing on the arms control consequences. The direction of the Chinese modernization program for the nuclear forces is not exactly known. What is obvious is that China strives to establish a survivable deterrent which it presently does not dispose of. Size (number of systems and warheads) and structure (MIRVed or not) has not been made transparent so far; we don't even know for sure whether the Chinese leadership has finally decided what the force should look like in the end. US NMD deployment make it much more likely that the force will be larger rather than smaller, and carry multiple rather than single warheads. If the modernization program accelerates and enhances, this will inevitably affect Indian, and, by consequence, Pakistani plans. It is also far from clear whether such a development can leave Russian defense planning unaffected. For all the strategic rapprochement between Beijing and Moscow, there remains a residual element of deterrence in their relationship as between the two and the USA. If the Chinese nuclear arsenal grows beyond expectations,

Russia's military leadership may wish at one point to reconsider its own understanding of what minimum deterrence may mean under the circumstances.

Even less attention has been paid to the Chinese concerns about tactical missile defense. There are several reasons for this neglect. First, European security interests are thought to be concentrated in Europe itself and the regions at its periphery. East Asia is far away and perceived much more in economic than in security or military terms.

Second, European defense establishments have themselves a certain interest in exploring tactical, as opposed to strategic, missile defenses. The governments have by now all accepted the possibility of out-of-area missions for international peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and humanitarian intervention (though with different degrees of commitment to undertake such missions under a UN mandate only). This raises the possibility that their forces might be deployed in areas where short-range ballistic missiles pose a real risk. To dispose of mobile defenses against this risk is of interest to military planners. Several European countries are exploring possibilities in this direction and/or have ordered the US Patriot PAC III system that possesses enhanced air defense capabilities against short-range missiles. It should also be noted that countries in the South and Southwest of Europe are presently within the reach of such missiles owned by non-European countries. Their interest in tactical missile defenses is understandably also higher than that of countries in the more benign regions of Northern and Northwestern Europe.

The third reason for the lesser role of the tactical missile defense issue in the European debate is that it is much less controversial between the West and Russia than that of strategic defenses. President Putin himself has proposed collaboration in such a project, and it is obvious that Russia herself may have a security interest to develop a defensive counter to tactical missiles deployed at its periphery. With Russia being a much stronger factor in European security calculations than China, the Europeans are

less compelled to be concerned about that issue.

Deterrence Considerations from a European Perspective

One of the arguments frequently heard in the European NMD debate is that extended deterrence by the United States for its European allies might be weakened by creating zones of unequal security within the Atlantic Alliance, with the US safely protected by its missile defense system, and the Europeans out in the cold. Javier Solana, EU spokesman for foreign and defense policy, has made this point repeatedly. Of course, this line of thinking assumes both the continued relevance of extended deterrence in an age with no obvious threats that would provoke a nuclear response, and the functioning of NMD. Neither of these prerequisites can be assumed undisputedly. Nevertheless, it appears to be unconvincing that a US guarantee should be weakened by the protector becoming more invulnerable. In fact, some forty years of NATO nuclear strategy had struggled with the problem of US vulnerability; the problematic of extended deterrence was epitomized in the question whether the USA would 'risk New York for Hamburg'. In other words, extended deterrence should become even stronger if the USA takes lower risks in granting it.

There is a second side of the coin, however. The geopolitical interests of the USA and Europe are not exactly the same. While there is a strong overlap, there are also differences. The Middle East conflict is interpreted differently, and the relationship to Iran, for example, is distinctly different, the Europeans promoting a 'constructive dialogue', and the USA much more skeptical and confrontational. If the USA is isolated from military risks and the Europeans are not, the USA might be tempted to pursue confrontational policies which the Europeans resent, but for which they - as allies - would bear the major risk, if they are within the reach of ballistic missiles of the confronted adversary of the USA. In this sense, unequal security may indeed present risks both for Europeans and for the cohesion of the Atlantic Alliance.

It goes without saying that the two European nuclear weapon states have additional, national concerns about US missile defense plans. The fear that in the long run, a response in kind by Russia and China might devalue their own, relatively small nuclear deterrents. Of course, given resource asymmetries, it might take a long time for these two countries to erect the equivalent of the planned US NMD. Nevertheless, once the ABM Treaty would be relegated to the *ash heap* of history, the *Damocles Sword* of a Russian or Chinese NMD would hang forever over the French and British nuclear arsenals.

In addition, a shift of the balance from nuclear offense to anti-ballistic missile defense, thought not envisaged by most of the NMD pundits in the USA, might engender the counter-intentional consequence of de-legitimizing nuclear weapons altogether (to recall, this is the hope of the second school of thought that looks at NMD as an instrument of transition into a nuclear-weapon-free world). Legitimizing a nuclear deterrent in the absence of a clear and present threat is difficult enough for French and British nuclear strategists. They do not need at all the additional burden of a defense-dominated strategic discourse.

The European Countries Involved in the First Phases of NMD

Two European countries bear a particularly grave responsibility in the light of current US plans: the United Kingdom and Denmark. For the initial phase of the NMD system, the upgrading of the radar stations at Fylingdales (UK) and Thule (Greenland, belonging to Denmark) are said to be indispensable. The US has already stepped up its efforts to persuade the two partners to go along with Washington's wishes.

Great Britain has a tradition of being very closely allied to the United States. Even with the enhanced willingness by the Labor government to envisage Britain as a real *European power* and its inclination to take the notion of a European defense identity seriously, the *special relationship* with the United States is still appreciated as part of British identity. A London government that would jeopardize this relationship would be under considerable domestic criticism for

risking one of the main achievements of the 20th century. On the other hand, there is a strong, though not unanimous, presumption in the government that NMD might not be in the best British interest. Parts of the Ministry of Defense endorse the US plans and the threat assessment behind it; other forces within that ministry believe that, whatever the merits of the project are, keeping close to the USA should override all misgivings the government might have with NMD. The Foreign Office and, it appears, Downing Street see NMD far more critical but wish to escape the hard decision whether or not to permit work at Fylingdales as long as possible. The best hope is still an agreement between the USA and Russia that would make the Fylingdales upgrade palatable to the Russians and thereby save the British government the trouble to be involved in the destruction of the ABM Treaty. There is some fear among Labor Party strategists that the case may lead to a revival of the disarmament movement of the early eighties. Mass demonstration of disarmers directed against governmental policy would not be welcome for the Prime Minister in an upcoming election year.

For Denmark, the situation is equally, if not even more intricate. Greenland is under autonomy, self-administration rule with the exception of foreign and defense policy. There is still the old memory of the nuclear bombs lost over the island in an accident in the sixties, and fresher memories of more recent revelations that – against the express guarantee of the Copenhagen government – US nuclear weapons were stored at the Thule base for many years. The US base there is not the most popular thing in Greenland. Greenlanders, it appears, are in their majority opposed to being implicated in a program that would be damaging to nuclear arms control and disarmament. If the Danish government gives its nod to US plans, a deep rift between Greenland and Denmark must be expected, to the point of mass protests on the island and, possibly, a move towards complete separation.

On the other hand, Denmark is one of the most Atlantist countries in the Western alliance, a fact rarely noted by outside observers. The Danish political elite and the population value the ties to the United States very highly, and would be loathe to take decisions that would

endanger these ties. But on the other hand, the Danes are quite supportive of arms control and disarmament. Denmark is thus in a triple dilemma from which it will not be rescued easily if no agreement between the USA and Russia emerges and the US government presses forward with its NMD project.

The European Dilemma

The British and Danish problems are an exacerbated version of the dilemma all European governments are facing. It is the very fundamental discrepancy between their preferred mode to arrange security relations – by and large the philosophy underlying the first version of thinking about NMD – and the robust rooting of US policy in the third one. This difference, looked upon in a cool mind, appears almost as unbridgeable as the approaches to European security in the pre-1985 East-West conflict. Yet the ideal of a multilateral network of institutions in which the Europeans have invested so much does in fact include the transatlantic ties to the United States as an indispensable ingredient. To find ways to overcome this difference or to go along without hurting one of the two horns of the dilemma much more than anybody in Europe would wish looks almost hopeless. The second NMD view – agreements between Russia and the USA to lead the way to a better and defense-dominant world – supplies elements of hope for a postponing of the moment of truth, a momentary bailing-out from undesirable decisions, but finds very few true believers as a viable long-range strategy.

That the dilemma is acutely felt is shown by some unusual events. That France is very outspoken in its criticism of US plans is almost habitual in matters of security and defense and thus not really new. But that the German Chancellor used the unconventional occasion of his laudation for President Clinton, when the latter was awarded the prestigious Charlemagne Prize in the city of Aachen in 2000, to pronounce his serious concerns about NMD was, even in terms of protocol, rather unusual. And that a Select Committee of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the British House of Commons (in which the Prime Minister's party commands a strong majority) issued a report with an unprecedented critical tone of the US project shows how seriously the issue is seen not only on the Continent, but on the Island as well. The Europeans are stuck in their dilemma: the concerns are voiced, but a way out has not yet been found.

Analysis

INTERNET TECHNOLOGIES AND GEOPOLITICS

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The concept of the technological security of society has not found a lasting place in literature or general public discussion. The need for such a concept originates from the accelerating pace of technological progress and the unprecedented flow of new technology, which have global effects and significantly complicate the task of defining the place of technology in the modern world. Moreover, the globalization of international processes and the inability to control or, at least, to isolate external influences make it even more critical to clearly understand the role of advanced technology in society, including Russian society.

Today, Internet Technology (IT) presents itself as being endowed with great significance. The breathtaking expansion of computer networks in the last three to four years forces us to stand back and merely watch the speed with which the internet is expanding and conquering new spheres of social life. Thanks to the mass media's attention to this problem, many experts tend to trivialize the essence and importance of the Internet. This trivialization is, in fact, a sort of cognitive and psychological compensation for a lack of understanding of the consequences of this phenomenon. It would be a mistake to limit the Internet to its more well-known capabilities, such as e-mail, network games, personal Web-sites, or the ability to buy books over the Internet.

From the very beginning, the Internet has united two major elements of modern technology: the Net as a global communication infrastructure and the World Wide Web as information cyberspace. It is crucial to realize that the Internet contains