Analysis

ON THE ROLE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN PROVIDING FOR RUSSIAN SECURITY IN THE 21st CENTURY

By Alexander Saveliev,
Director of the Department for Strategic Analysis, Center for International Security Studies of the Institute of World Economy and International Relations

[This article was originally published in Russian in *Yaderny Kontrol*, No.3, Volume 11, Fall 2005]

"The art of war is a matter of national importance, a life and death situation, the way (Dao) either to safety or to ruin. Hence it is a subject of inquiry that can on no account be neglected."

Sunzi, 6th century B.C.[1]

At the present time, the global community, military, diplomats, and politicians are focusing on the issues of international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and how to design and agree upon the ways and means to fight this evil. Issues of nuclear policy and nuclear strategy, by contrast, have been given less attention. Where Russia is concerned, practically all of the questions related to these latter issues have been discussed, decisions have been made, and the formulation of these decisions in official documents is now being completed. Thus one might consider that this article is simply "catching up" to the decisions that have already been made.

However, this author is certain that the discussions that have occurred have in no way influenced decisionmaking in the area of Russia's nuclear arms procurement, policy, and strategy. This is confirmed when one looks at the long-standing debates in the open press on the issues mentioned above, and notes that they chiefly involve experts who do not represent official executive branch agencies. The periodic speeches by top-ranking military officials only confirm the unfortunate conclusion that those in power are not ready for an open dialogue on these questions and do not want even to discuss the many and often quite well-founded proposals put forward by the independent scientific community.

Therefore, the thoughts and reflections related below should not be viewed as yet another attempt to bring the attention of the powers that be to this issue or make relevant recommendations, to say nothing of an authorial hope for the practical realization of such recommendations. Instead, this is simply an essay that attempts to "measure" the strategic ideas of the past (primarily those of ancient Chinese strategists) against the realities of the current nuclear age.

Why are we so interested in the views of the authors of ancient texts on strategy? Clearly, they are attractive thanks to the clarity and completeness of thoughts therein, the elegance of their logical constructs, and the simplicity of their articulation of the most complex issues. In addition, a close reading of these works amazes the reader by their continued relevancy, which is why they are of everlasting significance. The author hopes that this article will have at least some success in confirming this conclusion.

"...he who defends his home will long endure..."

Laozi, 4th century B.C.

Do We Believe in the Possibility of Nuclear War?

Even within Russia's community of experts one can find dramatically opposed answers to this fairly rhetorical question: from a complete denial of the possibility that a nuclear conflict could arise that might involve our country to the proposition that the likelihood of just such a conflict has increased in recent years.

There is an even more fundamental contradiction involving the assessment of the nature of nuclear weapons. Some contend that these weapons are in actuality not really weapons, since they cannot be used in battle. According to this logic, they can only fulfill the function of "deterring" a probable

enemy from attack but cannot be used as instruments to achieve victory in battle.

The other point of view is that a nuclear weapon is truly a weapon in the full meaning of that term. The application of nuclear weapons is determined by the relevant conditions; they are maintained in a battle-ready state, they are capable of fulfilling concrete tasks during the course of an armed conflict, and in the final analysis, they have been and continue to be the foundation of our country's national security, today as in the past, precisely because they could indeed be employed. And if nuclear weapons were not really weapons, then they would not be able to deter an enemy or prevent war.

Without taking up either of these points of view, we would simply like to emphasize that even though the majority of those researching this issue do not see any rational uses of nuclear weapons, this does not mean that such uses are completely nonexistent. In order to find them, we must carefully consider this question, if only to substantiate or invalidate the mostly intuitive deductions of various authors who have discussed the practical possibilities for or impossibility of implementing a "functioning" nuclear strategy and a nuclear doctrine to undergird it.

Today it is fairly clear that the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the end of the bipolar international system, *inter alia*, made it far more complicated to ensure Russia's national security. On the one hand, the end of the confrontation with the principle potential adversary–the United States and NATO–sharply reduced the likelihood of a global conflict involving the use of weapons of mass destruction and opened the way to broad reductions in the arsenals of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons that had accumulated during the Cold War years. On the other hand, a range of new threats arose, demanding an adequate response throughout the government in order to guarantee the peaceful and secure life of its citizens.

It is also clear that nuclear weapons often cannot contribute to the fulfillment of these tasks. Thus we must recognize that nuclear weapons are not a universal means for providing security. Furthermore, Russian use of these weapons is extremely unlikely, since the scenarios involving large-scale aggression against our country that might lead to a situation in which a decision on employing nuclear weapons must be made are extremely unlikely today.

Nevertheless, Russia cannot completely ignore these extremely adverse scenarios of possible military developments. As the ancients repeated in one military tract after another, "he who forgets about war will be doomed to danger" (Sima's Art of War – "Sima Fa" – 4th century B.C.) and "the true Way (Dao) of providing for national security is foresight. He who worries can avoid misfortune." (Wuzi, 5th–4th century B.C.) Laozi, cited in the epigraph at the beginning of this section, shares a similar view. It follows (though axiomatic, it is nonetheless true) that Russia probably will have to maintain and support its nuclear deterrent capability for the foreseeable future, while simultaneously trying to adapt it to changing world conditions as much as possible, on the basis of its economic capabilities and force development priorities. Thus "faith" in the impossibility of the emergence of a nuclear conflict does not outweigh the necessity of "foresight" where questions of security and perfecting one's defense are concerned. This accords with yet one more principle, put forward by the great ancient Chinese general and strategist Sunzi: "do not rely on the enemy's not coming, but on our own readiness to receive him."

One should note that Russia's approach to issues of nuclear policy has already undergone conceptual changes and will continue to adapt in the foreseeable future. Thus, during the Cold War one of the main principles upon which development of Soviet nuclear forces was based was the principle of "equal security," which required an accounting of all factors influencing the strategic situation. In practice, this meant that not only did parity (equality) with U.S. nuclear forces have to be maintained, but also that additional forces had to be fielded to "compensate" for the nuclear arms of the United Kingdom and France as well as nonstrategic weapons at U.S. forward bases that could reach Soviet territory. Furthermore, maintaining a certain "reserve" of strategic forces that took into account China's nuclear capabilities was also regarded as well-founded.

All of this led to a significant overestimation of the demand for Soviet nuclear forces. It also created serious obstacles during negotiations with the United States, which maintained the principle of strategic

"parity" and did not recognize the Soviet Union's right to additional "compensation," described above.

Furthermore, maintaining the Soviet strategic nuclear capability at an extremely high level was also dictated by political concerns. The Soviet leadership believed that it was extremely important to demonstrate to the world that it was capable of competing with the West on an equal footing in the military sphere. The presence of an enormous nuclear arsenal was the clearest illustration of Soviet military might.

Today, due to a whole range of external factors, Russia will have to let go of the principle of parity, not just with the nuclear states as a group, but even with the United States separately. Particularly since the political value of a nuclear arsenal, if not nonexistent, now plays a far smaller role than it did in the period of global confrontation. Today the idea of strengthening strategic stability on the basis of supporting nuclear deterrence has come to the fore. This issue requires a separate analysis.

"In order to prevent
the enemy from engaging us,
show him the (possible) harm
this might bring."

Sunzi

Nuclear Deterrence

It is amazing how modern some of the statements by ancient Chinese strategists sound today. The quotation used as an epigraph for this section expresses the essence of the strategy of nuclear deterrence in a concentrated form. Indeed, in order to *prevent* an attack by a potential enemy, it is necessary to *show* (demonstrate) that retribution is inevitable, that is, the *harm* that will befall him as a result of response actions.

Sunzi also believed that an attack on the enemy's walled cities (fortresses) was the "very last" act in the chain of escalating confrontation *("…the highest form of generalship is to destroy the enemy's plans; the next best is to prevent the junction of the enemy's forces; the next in order is to attack the enemy's army in the field; and the worst policy of all is to besiege walled cities")*. And although these "recommendations" naturally relate to wars in earlier times, attacking the enemy's cities, from the point of view of contemporary nuclear strategy, is indeed the final step that a party to a nuclear conflict can undertake.

The concept of nuclear deterrence has been well studied both by both Russian and foreign researchers. Therefore we will only touch upon one of the key aspects of this issue: how much force is needed to make deterrence "work," that is, to have complete confidence that a potential enemy will not dare to use his nuclear weapons due to the threat of inevitable retribution.

The most interesting aspect of this question is that, in our view, the long-standing debates and study of this issue have not resulted in a concrete recommendation regarding the size of nuclear arsenal that would provide such a guarantee. As a rule, the quantity of forces needed effectively to deter an opponent is thought to be relative. Most analysts believe that it depends upon the composition, quantitative and qualitative characteristics of both one's own forces and the forces of the potential enemy. Furthermore, the question of the effectiveness (credibility) of nuclear deterrence is very frequently reduced to an estimate of the number of nuclear armaments that are capable of surviving an enemy's first strike. Both the Soviet Union (Russia) and the United States developed computer programs to model the various possible scenarios involving strategic forces. Sometimes attempts were made to introduce the factor of the survivability of the combat control and communications system into these equations, but this factor did not easily yield to quantitative or other concrete analyses.

Russia's official approach to nuclear deterrence is built on these theses. Thus, the Russian military doctrine demands that Russia maintain a nuclear capability that can guarantee the infliction of "predetermined damage" on any aggressor "under any circumstances." The worst such circumstances, evidently, is the scenario of an unexpected mass attack on Russia's strategic nuclear forces. In other words, Russia's nuclear forces should be able to "survive" this sort of unexpected attack and respond by inflicting "predetermined damage" on an aggressor (either an individual state or a coalition of states). But it is not entirely clear who "determines" the value of this "damage" and according to what criteria the corresponding calculations are to be

made. However, this article is not being written in order to criticize Russia's official approach to nuclear deterrence.

Despite all of the possible evidence supporting this approach, the author cannot help feeling that it is somewhat detached from reality. Thus, in calculating the effectiveness of first and retaliatory strikes, the experts manipulate hundreds and even thousands of high-yield nuclear warheads, which are needed to neutralize the enemy's offensive capabilities. The first strike is supposed to weaken the enemy's capability of launching a retaliatory attack as much as possible, to a level that is "acceptable" to the aggressor. The theory of nuclear deterrence in practice, strategic nuclear arms procurement decisions, and evaluations of the possible effectiveness of antimissile defense systems are all based on these calculations.

But almost no one thinks about the consequences–both for victims of the attack and for the aggressor himself–of such a massive use of nuclear weapons. Indeed, in the 1980s environmental scientists fairly convincingly showed that the consequences of the simultaneous explosion of dozens, to say nothing of hundreds or thousands, of high-yield nuclear warheads would be a global catastrophe. Nevertheless we continue to use the hopelessly out-of-date "MacNamara criteria" that each side in a nuclear conflict needs about 400 megaton-class nuclear warheads to inflict "unacceptable damage." But this level of damage would be unacceptable on a global scale for all of the world's states, just as a nuclear strike on a much smaller scale would be (some scientists speak of just 100-150 simultaneous explosions as resulting in irreversible environmental consequences and "nuclear winter").

Therefore, it would seem that it is high time to consider the question of adopting more realistic criteria for unacceptable (or "predetermined") damage. These criteria, even when a "safety margin" is included, should not exceed a simultaneous impact of over 200 strategic nuclear warheads, or 300 such warheads in a nuclear exchange (150-200 explosives launched by one party in a first strike and 100-150 explosives launched in a retaliatory strike by the opposing party). Those who disagree should look at the record of nuclear tests, particularly of hydrogen bombs, and imagine the effect of several hundred flashes and "atomic mushrooms" covering the territory of any country or continent.

This means that first-strike plans that involve more than 200 strategic nuclear warheads are not just irrational, but suicidal, in the literal sense of the term. A number of important conclusions follow, concerning the formation of one's own forces on the basis of their survivability, estimates of the threat of a first strike, nuclear operations planning, prospects for future nuclear arms reductions in connection with a revised understanding of needs, as well as other key aspects of nuclear policy and strategy. But as was stated above, this paper is not attempting to make practical recommendations. Instead, let us continue our discourse.

"Military matters are not determined by the ruler's commands; they all proceed from the commanding general."

The Six Secret Teachings of Jiang Taigong, approximately 11th century B.C.

"The important thing is: do not think!"

Famous answer of the commanders of Japanese army units to the shogun's question regarding the major principle of successful military strategy, 17th century.

Nuclear Strategy and Nuclear Tactics

Evidently the use of nuclear weapons is considered to be "strategic" due to their enormous destructive power, the possibility of their mass use, and their rapid and terrifying effects. Indeed, the forces themselves as well as the individual weapon systems are called by corresponding names: "strategic rocket forces," "strategic weapons platforms," etc. Nonetheless, nothing prevents us from splitting up strategy and tactics, in accordance with classical definitions, in order to conduct a more thorough analysis.

Thus, according to von Clausewitz, "tactics is the art of using troops in battle; strategy is the art of using battles to win the war." The aim of war is to use "force to compel our enemy to do our will." In today's context, this aim can be seen as compelling our enemy to cease hostilities on conditions acceptable to Russia.[2] This

"compelling" of the enemy, even in the official policy of Russia's military leadership, is by no means a one-time engagement of the enemy but consists of several stages, including the stages of the employment of strategic nuclear weapons–from "demonstrational" strikes to inflicting "predetermined damage" on the enemy. In other words, the tactics of conducting a nuclear war, if not entirely developed, have at least not been rejected on the level of Russian official military thought.

The formulation of tasks for the strategic nuclear forces should hold one of the central places in this sphere. Proceeding from official documents and the statements of military representatives, these tasks can be reduced to three basic categories:

- rebuffing an aerospace attack;
- crushing enemy forces; and
- suppressing (destroying) enemy military capacity.

In Russian military doctrine, the aim of using the armed forces and other troops is formulated as "the rebuffing of aggression, inflicting defeat on the aggressor, coercing it to stop military actions on conditions that meet the interests of Russia and its allies." It is not difficult to ascertain that Russia's military doctrine provides for the use of nuclear weapons in order to solve the same tasks that must be solved in a nonnuclear war, whether regional or large-scale.

But if the strategic nuclear forces are called upon to undertake these tasks, the risk of universal destruction is considerably increased. To see this, one must simply recognize that in certain circumstances the Russian president will decide to make use of nuclear weapons and delegate power over them to the country's military leadership, through the use of the "nuclear suitcase." The military, in order to fulfill the tasks it has been assigned, will have to act with maximum effectiveness and speed, that is, "not think," and fulfill the order it has been given. But this means that the targets of the first strikes will be the opponent's means of delivery of nuclear arms, its armed forces, and its control system and military capacity.

It is absolutely clear that the attempt to fulfill these tasks will bring utterly catastrophic consequences both for the aggressor state and the defending state. And it is probably unnecessary to repeat once again that this sort of scenario will likely lead to the uncontrolled escalation of the nuclear conflict to a global scale, even if Russia's initial nuclear strike is aimed at a nonnuclear "aggressor state" or one of the "tertiary" nuclear powers that is significantly weaker than Russia in this type of armament.

The political decision to make use of nuclear weapons and to transfer full control over their use (delegation of powers) to the military is extremely risky, particularly when it comes to fulfilling the tasks that Russia's strategic forces are supposed to fulfill after receiving such orders together with the codes to unlock the strategic weapon systems.

Therefore, it is worth thinking about whether the strategic nuclear forces, and nuclear weapons more generally, should carry out the same combat missions to rebuff aggression that are assigned to the armed forces as a whole, particularly when there is the "temptation" to obtain tactical superiority and quickly complete the "traditional" tasks assigned them. Is it possible (and necessary) that the political leadership could retain control over the actions of the military after the decision has been made to use nuclear arms? The answers to these questions remain open to date.

"Wenhou asked,
'What determines victory?'

Wuzi answered,
'Management of the army
is the basis of victory in war.'

Wenhou again asked, '
'Is it not the number of soldiers?'"

Wuzi, 5th-4th century B.C.

Management and Decisionmaking

A rapid response to arising situations is one of the distinguishing features of the current operationalization of nuclear deterrence. Thus, an alert from an early-warning system or a confirmation of a signal indicating a nuclear missile attack means that the country's president must make a decision on actions in response to these threats within a very limited time period (calculated in minutes)–that is, whether to use the "nuclear suitcase" and delegate power over the use of nuclear weapons to the military. These procedures were worked

out over the years in both the Soviet Union and the United States. They remain in force today. The fact that the U.S. and Russian presidents (wherever they are–at home or abroad) are accompanied constantly by an officer who has this device with him, allowing for immediate contact with the appropriate parties and the transmission of codes to permit the launch of nuclear missiles, is not even kept secret.

The decisionmaking procedures that would come into play were a country to be unexpectedly subject to a mass attack using hundreds of warheads are similar. However, here the leadership also faces the question of whether or not to launch its missiles before they are destroyed in their silos, or risk the sharp (if not complete) decrease in its own abilities to launch a retaliatory attack as a result of the loss of a significant number of its weapons and, possibly, control over its remaining forces.

But under any other scenarios–such as a gradual escalation of conflict, a warning about the launch of a limited number of missiles, or a single launch–an immediate decision regarding response is not required. Moreover, a quick decision without seriously analyzing the situation can have catastrophic consequences for national security, since the probability of errors in this case is quite high.

One can imagine a whole range of scenarios no less likely than an unexpected mass attack on Russian strategic forces by the United States (since only the United States has the theoretical ability to destroy a significant number of Russian strategic systems on their launch pads), where an immediate decision regarding the employment of nuclear weapons is not necessary. As mentioned above, even planning for an unexpected mass counterforce strike numbering over 200 nuclear warheads is irrational and suicidal.

But the fact of the matter is that the system for deciding whether or not to launch nuclear weapons is based on precisely this least probable scenario. Even if the course of events does not fit this scenario, the president's decisionmaking procedures remain the same: he is given only a few minutes to delegate power over the use of Russia's nuclear system to the military, after which time he loses all control over these weapons (and, possibly, over the entire strategic situation).

It should be noted that both Russian and Western researchers have proposed a way to solve this problem–reducing the combat readiness of strategic systems. Without going into detail, we note that theoretically this could contribute to increased stability and give the leadership of the opposing states more time to consider their decisions. In any event, they would first have to decide to reestablish the combat readiness of their strategic forces and only subsequently decide to employ them.

Nevertheless, it would seem that reducing combat readiness would not completely solve the problem of increasing security, since the time factor would continue to play a decisive role. After all, the party able to reestablish the combat readiness of its forces more quickly would have a powerful incentive to launch a preventive attack against its unprepared enemy. In other words, it would be as though the decision on the use of one's strategic forces was "pre-programmed" in this scenario. The decision to make forces combat ready would be equivalent to a declaration of mobilization, which, in the words of the famous Soviet military strategist Boris Shaposhnikov, is not simply the run-up to war, but war itself.

* * *

In ancient China, martial activities were clearly separated from civilian activities. After appointing a commander and performing the relevant ritual in the ancestral temple with the presentation of the *fu* (short-handled ax) and the *yue* (long-handled ax) to the commander, the civilian authority not only gave up all responsibility for waging war, but also the right to interfere in decisions made by the army authority vested with military leadership.

Today we see a similar ritual, in which the role of the sacred axes is played by the "nuclear suitcase" and the codes to unblock the nuclear weapons systems. After the president (of Russia or the United States) transfers these codes to the military, he will hardly be able to interfere in the subsequent course of events. One should contemplate how "good" this procedure remains in the 21st century, when war is truly a "way either to safety or to ruin" not just for a single state, but for the entire planet.

"...the use of physical power to the utmost extent by no means excludes the cooperation of the intelligence..."

Carl von Clausewitz

The Limits of "Rationality"

The rationality of the leader who has at his disposal weapons as powerful and double-edged as nuclear weapons, and who, in addition, declares that under certain circumstances he is prepared to launch them first, should consist in the ability to calculate his actions several steps ahead under crisis conditions and foresee the likely response to these actions by the probable enemy. Therefore, reducing all possible scenarios to the decision of launching or not launching nuclear weapons is simply unwise. A decision to launch carries too great a risk of complete destruction; a decision not to launch demonstrates one's indecisiveness and "paralysis of will" to one's opponent, which might strengthen his confidence that he can continue his aggression with impunity.

Russia's military leadership appears to have fully recognized this, and therefore has proposed the possibility of inflicting "demonstrational" nuclear strikes that would precede a higher level of escalation. Some analysts have proposed a system of "pre-nuclear deterrence,"[3] which would be based on high-precision long-range weaponry used to destroy "high-value targets" on enemy territory in order to demonstrate one's own determination to escalate the situation.

We believe that in this case military thought is moving in the right direction, although the proposed solutions result in more questions than answers. It would seem that the "technical" development of the tactics of strategic deterrence or, more accurately, controlling escalation, cannot have positive results unless moral and psychological factors are given serious consideration.

The country's leader, put in the position of having to decide whether to escalate, should not have to act according to current procedures. In our opinion, the worst possible solution to this problem is the surrender of responsibility by delegating power over the use of nuclear weapons to the military.

Here we should particularly emphasize that strengthening control of Russia's political leadership over the country's strategic weapons does not mean that the military can not be trusted. The military, no worse than civilians (and perhaps far better), understands all of the consequences of the use of weapons of mass destruction. At the same time, after receiving the relevant order it will be obliged fully to carry out the military duties with which it has been entrusted.

But the heart of the matter is that nuclear weapons are not simply more powerful "traditional" weapons. Therefore, as mentioned above, they cannot be used for the same ("traditional") tasks as conventional armaments and the armed forces as a whole. Furthermore, in a crisis it is extremely important to "draw out" the time period during which a decision must be made on whether or not to employ nuclear weapons. Thus the development of a "pre-nuclear deterrence" strategy could play an important and, we hope, positive role.

It would seem that a "pre-nuclear deterrence" strategy could consist of the following.[4] Were a serious international crisis to arise that involved our country, including limited military actions that threatened to escalate into a more serious conflict, Russia's leadership would engage in a logical series of military actions in order to force the enemy (the aggressor) to cease actions against our country and accept conditions that are advantageous or acceptable to us.

Moreover, the Russian leadership must demonstrate its willingness to escalate up to the level of using nuclear weapons, while at the same time firmly grasping that this point cannot be crossed. Here one can fully use Sunzi's "precepts," where he stated that preserving the enemy's state capital is best, destroying their state capital second-best; preserving their army is best, destroying their army second-best: "…to win one hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill." One can also refer to many of the other precepts of the *Art of War*, which continue to be very relevant today.

The above actions should not aim to or even involve any physical damage to one's enemy. Moreover, this should be avoided in every way possible. Otherwise a powerful incentive for retaliatory action will be created, leading to an "automatic" increase in the level of conflict escalation. One's deci-

siveness and the unpredictability of one's further actions against the enemy must be demonstrated to him, while he is shown how defenseless he is and how vulnerable he will be if he continues his aggression. The enemy must finally be put in the position of deciding either to escalate (with unpredictable consequences) or to enter into negotiations with his opponent.

One can "devise" a whole "set" of actions that meet these conditions. These include launching a "dark" satellite into space, forcing the enemy to guess about its purpose, or launching a single ICBM or SLBM with a dummy warhead into the ocean. An extreme scenario might include the launch of one single-warhead missile with a dummy warhead at the aggressor's territory, or even at his capital. Of course, such an action would be extremely risky, but the "demonstrational" use of nuclear weapons against a single enemy target is fraught with even greater risk.

In order to have the option of a "flexible response" to the actions of an enemy during a period of crisis, one must have a sufficiently flexible and manageable tool. The Russian leadership already has such a tool at its disposal. It is the strategic rocket forces, the fleet of ballistic missile submarines, and the heavy bombers. They only need to be given the capacity for missions of "pre-nuclear deterrence." Namely, some of these forces must be reequipped with conventional warheads and dummy warheads, and the supreme commander-in-chief must be given reliable negative and positive control over them. This would fulfill one more of the precepts in Sunzi's *Art of War*, which asserts that "in battle, use the normal force to engage; use the extraordinary to win." In this case, "victory" is obtaining the aims of war, as we discussed above.

The supreme commander-in-chief, of course, should maintain negative control over strategic nuclear weapons and the option of transferring power over their use to the military. But this action, which crosses beyond the boundaries of the reasonable, should only be undertaken in the most hopeless situation.

In Lieu of a Conclusion

The absence of large-scale, real threats to Russian security at the present time, which would require making decisions about the application of nuclear weapons, does not free the country's leadership from the responsibility to "not forget about war," including the elaboration and refinement of plans in case such a situation should arise. The widely held argument that nuclear weapons are not "weapons," despite the fact that the adoption of this argument would unavoidably lead to universal destruction, remains just a theory, just as does the opposite assertion, that these weapons essentially remains tools for waging war and ways to continue policy by "other means."

Determining whether the first or second argument is correct can only be done in practice, when the country's leadership is faced with the need to decide whether or not to employ these weapons. In practice, it is one concrete leader that will personally "resolve" this argument by his actions or inaction. In the worst case scenario, the decision will be made in an "automatic" or "pre-programmed" way in a very short period of time.

As we have already repeated more than once, it is not our aim to make practical recommendations. We simply are attempting to show that more possible procedures and scenarios for leadership action in a crisis exist than those provided for in official documents. In any even, we believe that a more detailed analysis of these issues, taking into account humanity's centuries-old experience in conducting wars, will by no means harm the cause of peace.

"Wenhou said, '
'I do not like military affairs'.'

Wuzi answered, '
'... in ancient times the head
of the Cheng Zang clan perfected virtue,
but disregarded military affairs,
and thus ruined his state.'"

Wuzi, 5th-4th century B.C.

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[1] Sunzi, *The Art of War.*

[2] "*Immediate Tasks for the Development of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation*" (Moscow: Russian Ministry of Defense), p. 41.
It is interesting to note that this work, unofficially dubbed the White Paper on Russian Defense Issues in the West, was published by the Russian Ministry of Defense as a separate pamphlet in late 2003 without any information on the imprint or even the date of publication.

[3] This concept was introduced by the well-known Russian scholar Andrei Kokoshin.

[4] Once again we would like to emphasize that this is not a recommendation, but simply an argument being laid out by the author.