

I am against placing Russia in opposition to Europe and Asia (Eurasia), but I am also against the imposition of European civilization on Russia, since I am certain that if Russia wants to have a successful future, it must remain Russia. Russia is not Europe, not Asia, and not even Eurasia. I'd like to emphasize, it is Russia!

Russia is the only country which is building nuclear power plants in India. Russia took this very important decision in favor of a non-NPT country because Russia had confidence in India and saw the strategic value of building a partnership in this sensitive area with a major country. If in future the doors open for international cooperation in India's civilian nuclear sector, Russia, with already a foot in the door, is well placed to be the earliest and biggest beneficiary.

Today no one doubts that China is a world power. No one doubts that Europe, having been freed of the need of the U.S. nuclear umbrella, is not always the "obedient" alliance member it was before, and Europe is now the United States' equal in economic terms. I think that no one doubts that Russia will not be a submissive follower of the United States.

Contemporary Russia does not have the wherewithal, or indeed the intention, to spend as much on defense as the United States. But at the same time, the Russian president set the military and the defense industrial complex the task not just of ensuring strategic deterrence, but also of maintaining a sufficient capability to meet any challenge by any potential enemy. This requires not an endless increase in military expenditures but instead the achievement of intellectual superiority.

If Russia were only interested in high oil prices and was generally guided by considerations of *realpolitik* in its most cynical form, then it would in fact try to provoke the United States into military action against Iran. This would surely cause oil prices to rise to unprecedented heights, would get the United States utterly enmeshed in the quagmire of hopeless conflicts in Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan, and would thereby result in the end of the "American century".

The victory of the Democratic Party in the November 2006 congressional elections will not change much in U.S. foreign policy. New actors will simply emerge, who may turn out to be somewhat less pleasant interlocutors than the now comfortably familiar neo-conservatives, who seem almost Russian at times.

Yury Baluyevsky

Kanwal Sibal

Yevgeny Primakov

Viktor Zavarzin

Alexei Arbatov

Dmitry Evstafiev

SECURITY INDEX No. 1 (81), SPRING 2007

The Journal of PIR Center

A Russian Journal on International Security

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
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(1994–2006 under the title
Yaderny Kontrol)

International Edition

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SECURITY

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F R O M T H E E D I T O R

- 7 **The PIR Center Publishes a Russian Journal on International Security.** “Whatever the puzzles in international relations, and no matter how the threats and challenges to Russian security have multiplied, we wish our readers the best as they peruse the pages of our journal. We hope that this journal will help to determine how Russia should answer these challenges and threats, and indicate the new areas that are opening up to Russia as it grows stronger,” notes *Security Index* editor-in-chief **Vladimir Orlov** as he guides the reader through the pages of the first issue of this new journal, while answering questions about how this periodical differs from its predecessor, *Yaderny Kontrol*, and to what degree it will continue that journal’s 12-year tradition.

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Protection, and Sport, Federal Councillor Samuel Schmid, about terrorism and international security issues.

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- 55 **Ekaterina Shadrina, “The Great Caspian Caviar Game.”** The Caspian region is rich in hydrocarbons. An additional wealth of this unique reservoir, its other *black gold*, is caviar. And this wealth is rapidly disappearing. Why? Who unleashed the caviar wars, and can this environmental *bioterrorism* be stopped?
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that the nuclear program is exclusively peaceful. Will the policies of the current Iranian leadership cause the situation in a region that is already unstable to explode, and will this lead to global political catastrophes—these are the questions the two experts argue about in a discussion via e-mail that is published in this issue.

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was the year that a Soviet pilot shot down the Korean Airliner, Flight 007, and the year in which NATO installed the Pershing II and Ground-launched Cruise Missiles in Europe...

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- 147 **“General Vandam: the Forgotten Founder of Russian Geopolitics,” Sergey Ponamarev.** The works of Karl von Clausewitz, Helmuth von Moltke, and Alfred Thayer Mahan are acknowledged as the founders of the science of “geopolitics,” which took its first conscious steps at the turn of the 19th century. However, those who tried during the same period to create a basis for the future science in Russia have been forgotten. One of these forgotten authors is the Russian general Aleksey Vandam (né Edrikhin).
- 151 **“The Roughness of a Flat World,” Mikhail Yakushev.** In several hundred pages of captivating narrative, Thomas Friedman’s *The World Is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-first Century* categorically asserts or proves on the basis of numerous examples that thanks to information technology our world has become “flat.” But is this true for the entire planet?

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THE PIR CENTER PUBLISHES A RUSSIAN JOURNAL ON INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

The 80 issues of *Yaderny Kontrol* are in the past. Twelve years of history, 567 articles, 59 interviews, and a total of 346 authors. “Not many things, but well”—*Non multa, sed multum*—was its motto. Indeed, we have managed to do a lot well in the past few years. The most important success has been attaining authority in the eyes of our readers. *Yaderny Kontrol* was read in 35 Russian cities and 86 other cities throughout the globe.

Beginning in 2007, into uncharted territory! We are launching *Security Index*.

So is this a new journal or an old one?

Well, of course it is a new journal! What could be simpler than looking at the cover: there is a new name there. Is it really that similar to *Yaderny Kontrol* (nuclear control)? Moreover, we are now publishing a *Russian journal on international security*. In other words, the scope of the issues covered has been broadened. The main focus used to be the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and means of their delivery; while questions of WMD nonproliferation will continue to occupy a serious amount of *journalistic space* (consistent with the place the issue occupies in current discussions of international security as a whole), it will share that space with other issues, such as combating international terrorism; protecting critical infrastructure; energy security (including oil and gas as well as nuclear energy); military-technical cooperation; dual use exports and export control; information security, advanced telecommunications, and the new role of the Internet; demographic security and the problem of migration; environmental security and global climate change; biosecurity and the fight against infectious diseases; the struggle for water resources; as well as education and the knowledge economy as the main strategic trump card in the new century...

Not only are the issues the journal will examine expanding, but also their geography. While the majority of the articles and materials in the earlier journal were *about* Russia, the new one will look at what a variety of issues mean *for* Russia. I plan to delve into such regions as the Middle East and Iran, Central Asia and the Caspian, and East Asia particularly closely. Certainly, those regions that have traditionally received the journal’s extra attention—Europe and the United States—will continue to do so. But in setting editorial policy, I am interested in all information related to threats and challenges to Russian security, even those originating in the most distant locations; or, on the other hand, in new options opening up for Russia, for its geopolitical and economic growth, and here we could discuss the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Guinea with equal enthusiasm. Finally, the journal will not limit itself to terrestrial geography: the problems of outer space—both the possibility of military conflict there as well as the prospects for its peaceful use—will also find a place in the pages of *Security Index*.



Not only is the geography of our interests enlarging, but also the geography of our readership. The issue you hold in your hands has also been received by readers in 54 Russian cities and 92 cities outside of Russia. Furthermore, the international edition, published in English, will for the first time in the history of the periodical share the same format as the Russian edition and will be published with the same frequency, three times per year (spring, summer/fall, and winter). Our audience in Russia and North America has traditionally been broad, but now the journal is rapidly and robustly expanding its readership in Western Europe, Central Asia, South Asia, East Asia, the Middle East, and the Persian (Arab) Gulf.

Security Index is becoming a full-fledged *international* publication. Its headquarters in Moscow, *Security Index* has opened representative offices in Geneva, Switzerland, and Monterey, California, in the United States. My daily electronic correspondence with our authors and correspondents comes from addressees in Baku and Novosibirsk, Nizhniy Novgorod and Bishkek, Vienna and Vladivostok, London and St. Petersburg, Stockholm, Tyumen, Riyadh, Washington, and Tokyo... I found the idea that we might examine the world through the eyes of experts in Moscow alone inadmissible. My aim is to provide you a *chorus of expert voices*: a real *polyphony* from throughout today's world, examining the world—and the world order—of tomorrow.

Well, of course it is an old journal! What could be simpler than looking at the cover: it says there that it is the first issue in 2007, but the 81st since the journal began to be published. Could the 81st issue really be an indicator of a *new* journal? This idea informs the first article in this issue, by Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces **Yury Baluyevsky**—certainly, the first article in our journal this year, but also the 568th article since establishing a journal in November 1994. This article does not just recall the earlier articles in our journal on issues related to Russia's decisions regarding its military doctrine, but also previous articles in our journal by Baluyevsky himself.

While adding new sections, I will nevertheless remain conservative: the majority of the sections in *Security Index* and the very structure of the issue itself are easily recognizable to readers of *Yaderny Kontrol*. Does the editor-in-chief really need to guide you, the reader, through the journal, or could you undertake this perusal completely independently? Perhaps, but particularly since with this issue the number of our readers will be increased by more than 2,000 experts, I will take you by the hand for several minutes so that we might trace the logic of the editorial board and editor-in-chief together.

Like *Yaderny Kontrol*, *Security Index* begins with exclusive interviews. We do this because this is a practical policy journal, as well as an academic publication. There has always been and always will be speech "straight from the horse's mouth!" "I cannot exclude the possibility that in the final years of his presidency George Bush, like Bill Clinton before him, will want his place in history to be marked by at least some success, even if it is only partial and preliminary, in finding a solution in the Middle East," said Academician **Yevgeny Primakov** in a conversation with PIR Center Senior Adviser Gennady Yevstafiev. His interview focuses attention on the most acute problems in the Middle East and Iran.

The Iranian problem is widely represented in this issue. Our second interviewee, Azerbaijani President **Ilham Aliiev**, is convinced that the uncontrolled development of the Iranian situation could have "catastrophic consequences" for his country and for the entire region: "Our main goals, in my opinion, must be alleviating tension and developing mechanisms that, on the one hand, calm world community concern about Iran's nuclear program and, on the other, allow Iran to exercise its legitimate right to develop peaceful nuclear energy," the Azerbaijani president believes. In the interview he also speaks in detail about his country's *nonaligned* status, which is particularly interesting to read in tandem with **Ekaterina Shadrina's** article on "The Great Caspian Caviar Game," about which there will be more below.

The topic of Iran also features in the *epistolary duel* between **Alexei Arbatov** and **Andrei Piontkovski**, an exchange of electronic letters made at my request, in which they attempt to find common ground in a discussion of Tehran's nuclear ambitions. Their e-mail correspondence refers to many facts, as well as emotions, but at the end of the day each of the two

experts maintains his opinion: one (Arbatov) that the Iranian situation should and must be decided via diplomacy, on the basis of international law, the other (Piontkovski) that a big stick is needed: "Well-wishers and lawyers for Iran can say that they are not completely convinced of the military nature of the Iranian nuclear program (up to the first nuclear explosion) as much as they like. What is important is that the governments of Israel and the United States, as well as the overwhelming majority of professional military experts, are convinced. And the leaders of Israel and the United States have already been quite clear that if diplomatic efforts fail they will prevent the further development of the Iranian nuclear program through the use of military force," writes the political scientist from his Washington office to Alexei Arbatov, in Moscow.

The topic of Iran, along with other questions involving various states' *perceptions* of nuclear threats and the principles of nuclear nonproliferation, are the subjects of a comprehensive article by the leading nonproliferation experts Dr. **William Potter** and Dr. **Scott Parrish** of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies.

Vyacheslav Nikonov, a Russian political scientist who heads the Russian Public Chamber's International Affairs Commission, also writes about political *perceptions* in his commentary. U.S.-Russian relations recently have fallen to an abysmal level. But how far might they yet fall? And should this worry Russia? Nikonov considers these questions, examining the two St. Petersburg meetings of July 2006: the G8 Summit and the bilateral Putin-Bush Summit.

The material provided by one of the most brilliant pens in contemporary American journalism, **David Hoffman**, allows us to learn some lessons from one of the most dramatic moments in bilateral relations: the coldest of the years in the late Cold War period. The author takes us back to September 26, 1983, when the early missile warning station Serpukhov-15 got a signal indicating a U.S. nuclear attack on the Soviet Union... Hoffman takes us into the offices of Andropov, Reagan, Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, and George Shultz, using documents of the time that have not been published previously. But have we, today, learned the lessons of 1983?

It turns out that a *new great game* is not only unfolding in Central Asia. The Caspian states have already felt the influence of the new geopolitical fissures and games. But if the struggle for one type of black gold—oil—has already been much described, the fight for another black gold—caviar—has only received fragmentary accounts. Astrakhan native **Ekaterina Shadrina** has taken on the issue of the *caviar games* in the Caspian. Her article provides many *tasty* details, for instance: in 2006 Iranian exports of caviar to the United States increased markedly; she also writes about what may happen to the caviar market if the European Union institutes sanctions against Iran. But the most important issue addressed in the article is how to ensure environmental security while defending Russia's economic interests in the Caspian.

Army General Yury Baluyevsky prepared what might truly be called a programmatic article for the first issue of our journal. What is Russia's role, given the current "security index" in this rapidly globalizing world? And how should we react to the behavior of the faltering, but still undoubted, superpower—the United States? General Baluyevsky sees alarming parallels to the *Titanic*: "The danger for Russia and the other passengers on the world *Titanic* is that nobody is asking them which direction they want to sail," he writes.

Yet one more of Baluyevsky's main theses is: "I am against placing Russia in opposition to Europe and Asia (Eurasia), but I am also against the imposition of European civilization on Russia, since I am certain that if Russia wants to have a successful future, it must remain Russia. Russia is not Europe, not Asia, and not even Eurasia. I'd like to emphasize, it is Russia!"

Thus, Russia is not Europe... I do not doubt that with these words the chief of the Russian General Staff has initiated a debate that will be continued on the pages of upcoming issues of our journal.

The problems of globalization and the new world order that is taking shape are also reflected in various other materials in this issue, including the interview of the Indian ambassador to Russia, Mr. **Kanwal Sibal**, as well as in the review of Thomas Friedman's *The World Is Flat*, writ-



ten by the prominent Russian analyst and one of the heads of Russian Microsoft, **Mikhail Yakushev**.

In our interview, Swiss Defense Minister **Samuel Schmid** acknowledges that the tradition of neutrality will not help his country avoid the current global threats, terrorism first and foremost. Developing this topic further, Institute for World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences (IMEMO RAN) and Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) expert (and member of the *Security Index* editorial board) **Ekaterina Stepanova** considers methods to combat Islamist terrorism on the global, as well as the regional and local levels, in detail. Her research particularly focuses on the onset of the *jihadi* movement in the Middle East and Central Asia.


Last, but not least, I would like to present a new section of the journal: the **iSi Index** (pronounced “I-see”), a comprehensive **index of international security** expressed in numerical terms. In this section we will be using a methodology developed by the PIR Center over the course of a year. At present *iSi* is undergoing review both in Russia and in several academic institutes abroad. We at the PIR Center are convinced that with the aid of this index we will be able to ascertain the main global trends in international security. As you can already see from the increase indicated on the journal’s cover, *iSi* grew from July to August (that is, the world became a bit safer during the month), but then a significant drop occurred in October—the international security situation was aggravated. Why? You can read about this in two reviews of world events that accompany the *iSi* Index. Both cover one and the same period: the four months from July through October 2006. But feel the difference! One and the same time period is evaluated by *Russian liberal* **Yury Fedorov** and *Russian conservative* **Dmitry Evstafiev**. Not just their analysis of events, but their very prioritization of events from the point of view of Russian interests is completely different.

In addition to the objective indicators of the index and the very subjective evaluations of our two experts, we have also added the comments of 10 members of the PIR Center **International Expert Group**: what do they think about our *security barometer*? They do trust its indicators? To what degree do the *global security* indicators coincide with developments on their continents and in their regions? The group includes experts from countries ranging from Brazil to China, India to Kazakhstan, and Russia to Saudi Arabia, among others. It is likely no accident that they each feel the “global security temperature” that we are measuring in a different way.

We at the PIR Center are attentively tracking world reaction to the indicators in our *iSi* index. The most interesting result will not be the indicators for one particular month or another, so much as the global security trends that are revealed.

This is an ambitious goal. But would it really be interesting otherwise? 🗨️

Vladimir Orlov



Ilham Aliev

“AZERBAIJAN IS ACCUSTOMED TO RELYING ONLY ON ITS OWN RESOURCES AND THEREFORE DOES NOT JOIN COALITIONS”

Sergey Brilev, the member of Security Index editorial board, talks with President of the Republic of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliev.¹

SECURITY INDEX: Mr. President, 15 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union only a very naïve person or a hopeless dreamer would call the CIS countries “post-Soviet” or “newly independent.” One might, however, ask to what degree they have succeeded in their self-realization. How would you characterize your country today?

ALIEV: It is too late to call the former republics of the Soviet Union “newly independent.” That time is over. The initial formative stage is over, and making the excuse that we are still “new” and “young” and therefore have many flaws is no longer acceptable. Fifteen years is long enough. Today, Azerbaijan is a dynamic, rapidly growing country that is relying exclusively on its own economic and political resources while becoming integrated into the global community. It enjoys excellent relations with its neighbors and has succeeded in raising living standards year after year.

SECURITY INDEX: You even said once that you do not feel comfortable disclosing Azerbaijan’s economic growth rate, for fear of embarrassing your colleagues among other presidents and prime ministers...

ALIEV: (laughing) It’s true. I usually try to avoid the subject when talking to heads of state, because Azerbaijan’s numbers are indeed impressive. Last year the economic growth rate in Azerbaijan was 26%, and through the first half of 2006 it amounted to 35%, while the industrial growth rate in 2006 was in excess of 40%. In the last three years almost 500,000 new jobs were created, mostly in the oil business. The state budget has quadrupled in the last three years. These overall numbers show the country’s economic explosion.

SECURITY INDEX: Have Azerbaijanis started coming back home as a result of this rapid growth? Has the brain drain of professionals out of the country stopped?

ALIEV: Yes, the outflow of professionals has stopped, and signs of new immigration are already visible. It is worth noting, however, that the majority of the Azerbaijanis who sought to earn a living in other countries, with the bulk going to Russia, came from rural areas. And since we launched a comprehensive and specific development program targeting rural regions three years ago, many of those who had departed have come back to their original places of residence. I would also like to point out that while in many cases non-ethnic Azeris holding Azerbaijani passports left the country in the early 1990s due to an unstable political and economic environment, they are coming back now that the situation has stabilized and business conditions have become favorable. Azerbaijan has always been known for its ethnic tolerance and cultural internationalism. The notion of “internationalism” has been undeservedly forgot-



ten, but, in my opinion, it is one of the deciding factors in the country's progress. Azerbaijan is a multinational state and its overall development success will depend on the wellbeing of each of its ethnic groups.

SECURITY INDEX: If you happened to discuss with an ethnic Russian citizen of Azerbaijan the reasons that prompted that individual to stay in the country, or if you were to advertise Azerbaijan to a Russian audience, what would you say?

ALIEV: Not a single Russian school has been closed down. All institutions of higher learning have maintained departments that hold instruction in Russian. The Baku Slavic University is working quite successfully. The number of Russian newspapers, by the way, is now several times higher than during the Soviet Union. And it is no accident that an important event like the first Congress of Russian Compatriots who live beyond Russia's borders was conducted in Azerbaijan. Our aim is that the younger generation growing and maturing in an environment of national independence maintain their Russian language proficiency. Let me give you an example. Since long ago, Russian communities have resided in Azerbaijan in concentrated settlements. I visited one last summer, and the people requested a new school. Relevant instructions were issued right away and now the school is already functioning.

Generally speaking, we do not need any additional propaganda. The state's economic development, its social policies, safe and secure living conditions, in addition to ethnic tolerance and interethnic peace—these factors ensure that all of the nationalities residing in Azerbaijan hold a positive view of their country.

SECURITY INDEX: Do you find it disappointing that so few Russian tourists come to Azerbaijan, even though the country is every bit as attractive as, say, Turkey, which has so captivated the Russians' fancy? One must admit that even with respect to language things are much better off here?

ALIEV: You must not forget that calm was established in Azerbaijan fairly recently. In the early 1990s, a civil war broke out in the country and until 1996-97 the situation remained unstable. If we look at the economic growth dynamics, we see that the economic boom only began in 1996. That is why Azerbaijan at the time had many political, economic, and social problems, the most urgent of which was the matter of a million refugees who had lost their homes as a result of military aggression. In a word, tourism was far from our minds. However, as soon as we became economically solvent and acquired considerable material resources, one of the highest priorities in our economic development became tourism. Today we invest significant amounts into tourism infrastructure. The state subsidizes it and so does private business. Therefore, I believe that in two or three years tourists from Russia will find it more attractive and convenient to vacation here rather than elsewhere.

SECURITY INDEX: Azerbaijan, to use the old political terminology, is a classic nonaligned state. At least, if we compare it with any of your other neighbors in the former Soviet Caucasus: Georgia has unequivocally stated its desire to join NATO; Armenia is a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Why does Azerbaijan adhere to the policy of nonalignment?

ALIEV: Basically, since Azerbaijan acquired independence it differed from other post-Soviet states in that we received practically no assistance from anyone. If you consider the amounts of aid given to all other former Soviet republics by various international organizations and funds, as well as by other countries, we were in last place. This has taught us to rely only on our own resources. And the fact that we *do not join* coalitions is probably also the result of this. I believe that a country should first depend on itself, on its own economic and intellectual capabilities, on competent policies that minimize external risks.

SECURITY INDEX: Azerbaijan is a member of GUAM, which unlike the CIS—unfortunately a rather amorphous organization to date—at least lays claim to becoming a force to reckon with in the post-Soviet realm, as well as overall in southern and southeastern Europe. Do you find cooperation with GUAM rewarding? I know that Azerbaijan is now seriously engaged in military

cooperation with Ukraine, and that it plans new energy corridors not only toward Ceyhan (Turkey), but also through Georgia into Ukraine and Poland. How does Azerbaijan generally manage its cooperation with international organizations?

ALIEV: Every state, including Azerbaijan, joins those organizations with which it finds it comfortable to work. For instance, as far as our membership in GUAM is concerned, one should keep in mind that this organization was founded in 1997, under completely different circumstances. The environment for regional cooperation and relations among states stood in drastic contrast to what we have today. In general, we consider participating in various international organizations (CIS, GUAM, the Council of Europe, and the Organization of the Islamic Conference) from the point of view of making maximum use of the organization's capabilities in the service of our national interests. Participation in one organization does not contravene participating in another.

I think that others may find Azerbaijan's experience useful in this area. We build relations with our neighbors and friends not to the detriment of our relations with other states, but, on the contrary, we strive to utilize our geographic, political, and economic capabilities to our maximum ability.

The energy factor certainly assists us in setting up more effective cooperative efforts.

And when it comes to our energy projects, they are not carried out through some international organization, but rather under bilateral or multilateral agreements. Basically, we have completed all of our energy projects. There are now three major oil pipelines out of Azerbaijan, which are capable of transporting up to 70 million tons of oil and, possibly, even up to a 100 million tons. This should be sufficient for Azerbaijan's oil production levels.

SECURITY INDEX: There is a certain type of state whose government's only thought is oil prices. Russia has seen its share of discussions about a stabilization fund, and about ways to spend its "oil dollars." How does Azerbaijan spend its oil revenues?

ALIEV: Several years ago we established the State Oil Fund of Azerbaijan, in which the bulk of oil revenue is accumulated. The amounts are already substantial: Azerbaijan's gold reserve is now over \$3 billion, which is a significant number given our economic scale. With impending future oil extraction growth, these sums will reach hundreds of billions of dollars. According to World Bank projections, over the next 20 years Azerbaijan stands to make a profit of over \$140 billion from oil projects alone. This is an enormous amount for us and thanks to it we'll be able to do a lot for the country. For the moment, however, the monies are invested primarily in social projects: education, medicine, military, and infrastructure development. For example, in two years we have constructed over 600 new schools, as well as modern hospitals in all of the country's regions. The military is rapidly growing too: next year over a billion dollars will be allocated for our military budget, whereas just a year ago the amount was slightly over one hundred million. The same may be said about infrastructure development projects. Six power plants are currently under construction in Azerbaijan. We are building highways and rural roads. As much as we can, we must use our economic resources to modernize the country. It is essential, however, to find a clear balance between macroeconomic stability and satisfying the needs of the state and its citizens. We are proponents of a cautious policy; therefore, about a third of the oil revenue that does not go into the oil fund is allocated to satisfy various needs of the state.

SECURITY INDEX: Mr. German Gref, Russia's minister of economic development and trade, visited you in October 2006. I understand that you discussed the issue of the diversification of Azerbaijan's economy, possibly with Russian participation. Which branches of industry do you intend to develop now and what is the possible role for Russia in this process?

ALIEV: Despite the very positive investment environment in Azerbaijan, Russian companies—and Russia by now has some major international companies—have not shown much interest in Azerbaijan. This is especially regrettable, since over the past decade almost \$30 billion in mostly foreign investments have poured into our economy.



We now intend to modernize the entire industrial infrastructure, because the infrastructure left since Soviet times has for the most part become obsolete, with the exception, of course, of the oil and heavy industries. We need to develop new branches of industry, create new jobs. That is why we ought to expect that any industrial branch into which we pour investments should bring a positive return.

Consequently, we expect to become less dependent on fluctuations of oil prices. In order not to be worried about oil prices, we need to diversify our economy. Cooperation with Russia in this area may benefit us greatly in the form of exchanging valuable experience, as well as consultations, and cooperation.

SECURITY INDEX: The situation unfolding around Iran's nuclear program has been the most discussed topic in international politics over the past several months. In your opinion, as head of a state that borders Iran, where do the solutions to this complex problem lie?


ALIEV: I'd rather not contemplate the worst-case scenario with Iran. Azerbaijan shares more than 1,000 kilometers of a common border with Iran. We have established active trans-border ties. More than half of ethnic Azeris reside in Iran, the same Azeri people as here. Any escalation of the situation in the region will undoubtedly bear heavy consequences for all local states, since politically, as well as economically and militarily, the countries of the region are fairly interdependent. Destabilization of one of them may have catastrophic consequences that are difficult even to imagine.

Our main goals, in my opinion, must be alleviating tension and developing mechanisms that, on the one hand, calm world community concern about Iran's nuclear program and, on the other, allow Iran to exercise its legitimate right to develop peaceful nuclear energy.

I believe that in such a context a mutually agreeable solution can be found. Of course, it must be based not on political ambitions but on pragmatism, realism, and the pursuit of peace. In other words, if all sides are interested in reaching a peaceful resolution, it could easily be achieved.

Note

¹ Sergey Brilev's interview of President Aliev took place on October 18, 2006.



Yevgeny Primakov

“THE CURRENT SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST IS A GOOD ILLUSTRATION OF WHAT RESULTS FROM THE U.S. EXPORT OF DEMOCRACY”

PIR Center Senior Advisor Gennady Evstafiev spoke with Academician Yevgeny Primakov, President of the Russian Federation Chamber of Commerce and Industry.¹

SECURITY INDEX: Evgeny Maksimovich, given your great experience in the Middle East, we would be very interested in your opinion of the prospects for settling the Middle Eastern conflict in general and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in particular. Do you believe that international mediators working on a settlement can still act as intermediaries?

PRIMAKOV: I think that we should remain cautiously optimistic and, as paradoxical as it may sound, recent events have made it possible to be more hopeful. What I am thinking of is the following. During their operation in Lebanon, the Israelis sensed that they would not be able to solve their problems militarily. Their goal is to designate their borders unilaterally and unconditionally, fence them in with a wall, and receive general recognition of these borders.

However, their action in Lebanon backfired, just as they failed after Hamas came to power (a failure even after the formation of the current, formally independent government). And after the recent events in Lebanon, the tendency for Israeli society to search for a way out of the current situation has strengthened. Moreover, from the Israeli point of view the situation could deteriorate further, given the more and more perplexing Iranian factor. Many in Israel fear that Iran will actively support its enemies; this could even take the form of a nuclear confrontation.

At the same time, the accession of the Democrats to power in the U.S. Congress, in my view, won't block the Middle East peace process. Now George Bush will have to find something to counterbalance his defeat in Iraq, since U.S. authority in the Arab world has fallen sharply since the events in Lebanon. I cannot exclude the possibility that in the final years of his presidency George Bush, like Bill Clinton before him, will want his place in history to be marked by at least some success, even if it is only partial and preliminary, in finding a solution in the Middle East. In saying this, I am not insisting that this scenario will indeed come to pass, but simply that it is not unlikely.

The Palestinians, too, understand that they need to come to an agreement. The creation of the new government and some of the changes that Hamas is undergoing are indications of this. I recently spoke with Hamas leader Khaled Mashaal and several other members of the politburo. It was immediately striking that they said they wanted to establish a Palestinian state within the borders of June 4, 1967, i.e. those from before the Six Day War. And I said, “Add to this, next to Israel. That would be a step towards recognition; after all, sooner or later you will have to recognize Israel.” They agreed with this, but find themselves in a difficult position. To think that Hamas would recognize Israel now, without any stability and without going through certain stages towards this goal, would be naïve. In that case they would lose support. Thus, you see, I do not exclude the possibility that some movement towards a solution may occur.



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SECURITY INDEX: How did the war in Lebanon affect the situation in the region? Don't you expect the domestic political situation in that country to be aggravated further? Do you share the view that as a result of this war Israel has lost the military advantage that it enjoyed for the past several decades over the Arabs? Do the Israelis desire revenge?

PRIMAKOV: I believe that Lebanon's domestic political situation is increasingly strained already. But it is noteworthy that Israel was unable to achieve this aim during the war. Consider the following: Israel began with a bombardment that struck throughout Lebanese territory, and only then initiated its land operation in the south. It is unlikely that this bombing was aimed at Hezbollah's surrender, since Hezbollah is not located throughout Lebanon. I presume that this was done so that a force within Lebanon would arise that would act more forcefully against Hezbollah, since its actions were leading to the country's destruction. Basically that is what happened in 1982, when the Israelis relied on a domestic Lebanese power that spoke out against the military presence of Palestinians in Lebanon. This time this tactic did not succeed, but similar attempts will continue—they are continuing already.

As for the view that the Israelis lost their military advantage over the Arabs thanks to the results of the last war, I do not agree. The military advantage was not lost, but Israel understands more and more clearly that it is no longer capable of occupying Arab countries. You see, they have a military advantage, just as the United States had a military advantage over Iraq—it is ridiculous to argue that they did not. The advantage was quite clear during the military operation, but as for what to do next, in order to maintain control during the occupation, that is an enormous problem, the solution to which does not depend on military advantage. And Israel is beginning to realize this.

SECURITY INDEX: Couldn't the Hezbollah phenomenon and its leader, Sheikh Nasrallah, become very attractive for other Arab countries that are involved in the conflict with Israel?

PRIMAKOV: What countries are we really talking about? Of all of the Arab countries, only Syria is involved in the conflict with Israel. Now there is a rapprochement between Syria and Iran, and from the Syrian point of view this is only natural. Hafez al-Assad, father of the current president, once told me that he would do everything he could not to remain alone against Israel. Therefore they need a rear, and they want Iran to be this rear. However, I do not believe that this makes an independent Syrian policy or its participation in the Middle East peace process impossible. Once again I would like to cite my recent trip to Damascus, where I was able to meet with Bashar al-Assad and spend quite a bit of time discussing this issue. After this meeting I was left with the impression that he understands that they need to find a solution, a way out, but he can not give up the Golan Heights, of that I am certain.

SECURITY INDEX: In the late 1990s you put forward the idea of a Russia-India-China triangle to counter the unipolarity promoted by the United States. Have you remained in favor of this view, and to what extent is it a viable idea today and in the future?

PRIMAKOV: I did not talk about countering unipolarity. One could say that the idea of multipolarity was proposed to counter unipolarity. And that is an actual trend—the world is becoming multipolar. Today no one doubts that China is a world power. No one doubts that Europe, having been freed of the need of the U.S. nuclear umbrella, is not always the “obedient” alliance member it was before, and Europe is now the United States' equal in economic terms. I think that no one doubts that Russia will not be a submissive follower of the United States. And India? Latin America?

Multipolarity is a fact; but as for “geometric figures,” they are needed to maintain the stability of this multipolar world. The multipolar world must not repeat the events that occurred before World War II. In the past, multipolarity led to coalitions—one group of states against another. Today's multipolar world, given globalization, the internationalization of production, and the trans-nationalization of entrepreneurial activity, cannot repeat the past structure. At the same time, some “geometric figures” are needed that, I would like to emphasize, do not result in military blocs but, on the contrary, stabilize the situation by strengthening the ties between the

various sides of this figure—through political and economic ties, military consultation, and so on.

SECURITY INDEX: You know Iraq well. Are you worried by the trend towards the increasing, gradual disintegration of the country, in part through its federalization? We have noted that you do not insist that U.S. troops leave Iraq as soon as possible. Is this a reflection of your concern that Iraq may disintegrate? How will the defeat of the Republicans in the recent mid-term Congressional elections affect Bush's politics in Iraq?

PRIMAKOV: Yes, I am worried by the trend towards the disintegration of Iraq, in part through its federalization. Even as a young journalist I was able to meet repeatedly with Mullah Mustafa al-Barzani, leader of the Kurdish National Liberation Movement in northern Iraq, over the course of four years. And I asked him to his face if he wanted to establish an independent Kurdish state. The prerequisites for such a state appear to exist: we have a dense center where the Kurds (of whom there are about 25 million) reside, albeit divided by several state borders. But the father of the present Kurdish leader told me, "I want to obtain real autonomy, real influence over politics in Baghdad. That is my goal, because if the Kurds leave Iraq, and I proclaim an independent state, then everyone will suffocate me: Iraq, Iran, and Turkey as well." He was right.

Of late, the idea of Kurdish self-determination, the creation of their own state, has been strengthening. But let's examine the Turkish reaction. Turkey is concentrating its troops on its border with Iraqi Kurdistan and has not ruled out the possibility that if an independent Kurdish state is established, the Turks might strike it.

Separatism has grown not only in the north, where for all practical purposes an independent, though undeclared, Kurdish state already exists, but also in the Shi'ite south. Shi'ite autonomy, it seems to me, would strengthen radical rightist forces in Iran. In addition, there is also talk about an Islamic Sunni state with its capital in Baghdad. All of this is a very good illustration of the results of the U.S. export of democracy.

And what will the results of the most recent elections to the U.S. Congress mean for Iraq? The Democrats were able to come out on top by making use of the "Iraqi factor"—they used public dissatisfaction with what is happening in Iraq in their own interests.

However, I do not think that we should overestimate this factor. Why? Because the Democratic Party did not come out with a program of its own on Iraq, it did not demand the immediate withdrawal of troops, or even come up with a timetable for troop withdrawals from Iraq. I believe that U.S. policy will, naturally, be affected, but to believe that it will change radically the way it did in Vietnam, when the United States was defeated and left the country—that won't happen.

And as for the replacement of Donald Rumsfeld by Robert Gates... I remember Robert Gates well, from the time when George Bush senior had him convey to me the news that it was not necessary for me to remain in Washington, although until that point I had been asked to remain in order to discuss possible ways to address issues during the war in the Persian Gulf. But without a military operation against Iraq. Robert Gates made a good impression on me when he came to Moscow as head of the CIA, back when I was the director of the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR).

SECURITY INDEX: The Iranian nuclear crisis was the hottest topic in world politics throughout 2006. How likely do you think it is that Iran will acquire nuclear weapons? Will Iran become a second Iraq?

PRIMAKOV: Back when you, Gennady Mikhailovich, headed one of the SVR's operational analysis directorates, we issued two public reports on the proliferation of nuclear weapons and determined the criteria differentiating actual nuclear states from unofficial, threshold, and pre-threshold nuclear states. At that time we considered Iran to be one of the threshold states: if Iran were to take the political decision to build nuclear weapons it could make advances in this sphere in a number of years. But Iran currently avers that it has not made any such political




decision, that it has no desire to build nuclear weapons, that it is not violating the NPT, and that it is ready to put all of its nuclear programs under IAEA safeguards and conduct negotiations on all nuclear matters, including uranium enrichment. And it seems to me that requiring them to give up uranium enrichment as a prerequisite for such negotiations is not right. Moreover, this violates the NPT.

I cannot agree that the Iranian nuclear crisis was the hottest topic in world politics in 2006. Yes, the situation has become supercharged, you could say, nearly reaching the boiling point, but the crisis itself has not crossed the line beyond which you could say that it really is the greatest threat in 2006. Of course, the statements made by several Iranian leaders, against the backdrop of which Iran's nuclear program—peaceful nuclear program—is being pursued, draw attention and are worrisome. We, of course, are not interested—no state in the world is interested—in Iran acquiring nuclear weapons. Not one state is interested in the proliferation of nuclear weapons other than, perhaps, North Korea. And even in that case, North Korea is already giving this up and is ready to conduct negotiations within the “Six Party” framework.

Note

¹ Gennady Evstafiev's interview of academician Yevgeny Primakov took place on November 14, 2006.



Samuel Schmid

“AGAINST TERRORISM, THERE CAN BE NO NEUTRALITY”

PIR Center Director Vladimir A. Orlov, Editor-in-Chief of Security Index, spoke with Federal Councillor Samuel Schmid, Head of the Swiss Federal Department of Defense, Civil Protection, and Sport during his public conference at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP).

SECURITY INDEX: In Spring 2006, the general public learned about the prevention of a terrorist attack in Geneva, Switzerland—a potential attack against an Israeli airplane—and later on about the arrests of terrorists in Switzerland and other countries who were part of this plot. How do you assess terrorism—in particular, jihadi terrorism—as it threatens Switzerland?

SCHMID: Against terrorism, there can be no neutrality. We must make use of the options our legislation and our state offers us, in order to contribute something to conclude the fight against terrorism. When we have terrorists in Switzerland, I'm sure that we have to arrest them, to take them to prison. When you have terrorists in Swiss regions, you know what can happen and what has already happened: we had the same situation 30 years ago. You remember the attack of Zerqa? A Swissair plane was hijacked and blown up there. Switzerland lost against that threat. The focus of terrorism may very well also be Switzerland. That's one possibility.

The second one: imagine that the danger, the threat like this one was perhaps planned in Geneva or in another airport. In that case, if you increase security standards all over Europe, do you think that Switzerland can say: “No, we are neutral, we are not a possible target of international terrorism?” Here in Switzerland, we have a great international community, and we are proud of it. But even one in a thousand, one in several hundreds is able to compromise the security of a modern society. I read a guidebook by the French government, and I remember them saying that if one in a thousand is active against the state, then it's a war-like situation.

And if you think about the size of the police force—it is conditioned on a normal security status. In a case where you have concrete threats, it's insufficient. To give you an example: every winter I go to a conference in Munich on international security, which takes place at one of Munich's hotels. When I see the security measures employed by the German authorities, I get my defense attachés to analyze them, and with the help of our German friends we have made out that there's a need for 4,000-6,000 policemen to guarantee security in Munich.

Well, it is the same in Geneva, but Switzerland is twelve times smaller than Germany. Germany has police forces for about 80 million people. We face the same issues and the police forces are meant to protect seven million people. Well, how to help the police? We have the same issues. The situation is absolutely similar, and a possibility of a terrorist attack does not depend on the number of a country's inhabitants. That's why we have to find a procedure to allow for better cooperation between police forces and the army in order to guarantee security in this




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special situation. And I'm sure that perhaps for a lot of people such terror scenarios are "thinking the unthinkable," but they are only unthinkable to date. And I hope that we use that, that we take the chance to get ready beforehand. You can't avoid it: it's a problem of asymmetric threats. You can't avoid it completely.

They say they are fighting against the open society. We don't want to lose the values of the open society, but if the signals of such threats become concrete, you can increase the security measures and perhaps you can avoid an attack. You can avoid it, or you can help stop it immediately, or you can fight against the terrorists. That's why even in Switzerland one of the solutions could be securing the borders or the openness of access, and so on. And I'm sure that in Switzerland a lot of people think that a neutral country isn't in the focus of terrorism. For me—please excuse me—but for me that's not the case.

Let's realize that perhaps most terrorists do not know what "neutrality" is.

We want to stay neutral because—I am sure of it—even in the future neutrality will keep a certain value, that we had during the Cold War. I'm sure for the moment it's not so applicable, but that's not a weapon against terrorism.



Kanwal Sibal

“THERE IS DEEP REALIZATION IN INDIAN POLITICAL CIRCLES OF THE ENDURING VALUE OF INDIA’S RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA”

PIR Center Director Vladimir A. Orlov, Editor-in-Chief of Security Index, spoke with Mr. Kanwal Sibal, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of India to Russia. The interview reflects the personal views of the Ambassador, and should not be viewed as a policy statement.¹

SECURITY INDEX: A number of factors at the recent turn of the century have led to the situation where India is considered to be the United States’ main ally in South Asia, replacing Pakistan in this position. Will a U.S.-India alliance counterbalance growing Chinese influence in the world in general and Asia in particular? Is U.S.-Indian cooperation based on a strategic partnership or it is just a tactical union?

SIBAL: The assumption that India is now considered to be the main ally of the United States in South Asia, instead of Pakistan, is questionable. Relations between the United States and India have greatly improved in recent years. During the Cold War, the two countries were, in some ways, in opposite camps. Today, India and the United States are engaging each other seriously and building areas of convergence. The U.S. is India’s single largest trading and investment partner. On issues of international terrorism and global spread of democracy, the two countries have a shared interest. It is this common commitment to democracy that led former Prime Minister Vajpayee to declare that India and US were “natural allies.” The Indo-U.S. nuclear deal is such a departure from previous U.S. positions on India’s nuclear capability that it is understandable that some analysts have begun to see India as the “main ally” of the U.S. in South Asia.

Pakistan has been a military ally of the U.S. since the 1950s, when it joined the Baghdad Pact and SEATO. President Ayub Khan of Pakistan once described his country as the “most allied of the allies” of the United States. Pakistan acted against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan in league with the U.S., which also did not prevent the rise of the Taliban with Pakistan’s connivance. There have been ups and downs in U.S.-Pakistan relations certainly, but the U.S. has now declared Pakistan as its “major non-NATO ally.” President Bush has frequently called Pakistan a key strategic ally in the war against terrorism. Pakistan is today a recipient, as it has been in the past, of massive military aid from the U.S.

The U.S. has multiple interests in South Asia. On some issues (economy, democracy, and non-proliferation) it is closer to India. On other issues (Afghanistan, Central Asia, the Islamic World, combating international terrorism, defense) it leans towards Pakistan. A shift in India-U.S. relations attracts attention as India is a much bigger country, with far greater potential than Pakistan, and because improved Indo-U.S. relations have greater international salience. However, to believe that “the Indo-U.S. alliance” can become a counterbalance to China’s growing regional and global influence is certainly misreading India’s intentions. Some U.S. analysts here and there have made statements suggesting the China factor in the improved



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U.S.-India relationship. I have not, however, seen any authoritative U.S. government statement suggesting this. In our case, our prime minister reiterated only recently in London that the world is big enough to accommodate both a rising India and a rising China. Our political commentators and analysts have frequently rejected the assessment that the improved India-U.S. relationship has a China angle. Our own relations with China, as you know, have greatly improved. China is today our second largest trading partner. The United States' own relations with China are far more intensive and wide-ranging than those India has with China. This would be another argument in favor of caution in making assessments rooted in "balance of power" thinking. The United States is the most powerful country in the world today, politically, economically, and militarily. It would be in the strategic interest of India to build a partnership with the United States. Similarly, the United States cannot ignore the demographic and economic size of India. Common sense would dictate that its relationship with a country like India, which shares with it, besides, the strong bonds of democracy and pluralism, ought not simply to be tactical.

SECURITY INDEX: Energy security issues are among the most crucial ones in international politics nowadays. They were the main item on the St. Petersburg G8 Summit agenda. The struggle over pipeline routes is similar to the struggle over railway routes in the 19th century, there is a gas "dispute" between Russia and Ukraine, and there are many other such examples. What is India's viewpoint on the issue of security of supplies of energy resources (oil and gas)?

SIBAL: Energy security has certainly become a very topical issue in the face of the unprecedented rise in oil prices. Whether or not the rise is justified on the basis of objective factors can be debated. How much this is a result of financial speculation and movement of vast sums of excess funds circulating in the international financial system, only experts know. Conservation, taxation policies, development of new fields, building of reserves, recourse to alternative fuels and renewable—all of this has a bearing on "energy security." At one level one can understand the problem arising from, on the one hand, depletion of fossil fuels and, on the other, expansion of needs worldwide as economic growth touches more and more developing countries and energy consumption levels rise globally. However, at another level, the situation presents itself differently. Much of the world's oil and gas resources are located in countries that are either less developed or with small populations. So "energy security" becomes a competition for access to oil and gas supplies by the principal consumers of the world which, as it happens, until the rise of China and India, have been largely located in the developed world. "Energy security" has, thus, in some ways, become a power game.

The reference to a "struggle" in your question over pipeline routes and the parallel drawn between this and the struggle over railway routes in the 19th century suggests that the issue is being seen largely in the European/Eurasian context, with colonial scrambles as the background. Russia has emerged as a major supplier of oil and gas and its vast territories contain huge untapped reserves of fossil fuels. Russia, as supplier, would naturally like to use its energy resources most advantageously for its national interests. At the consumer end, there is a natural desire to diversify sources of supply, create conditions of competition, and enhance bargaining positions. Which is why some countries are not happy with the North European Gas Pipeline, others seek to route pipelines through territories outside Russia's control for evacuating Caspian Sea oil, etc. The supply of Russian oil and gas resources to Chinese, Japanese, and South Korean markets in the east, and competition between China and Japan in this regard, is another aspect of the politics of pipeline routes.

For India, the issue of energy security is a challenging one. We produce only about 30 percent of our current needs. Already we are one of the largest consumers of oil and gas in the world. With our economy of a billion people growing at over eight percent currently, and with a very low level still of per capita energy consumption, our energy needs are shooting up. Already we are importing 98 million tons of petroleum products per year and this figure will go up in the coming years. We have, of course, stepped up oil and gas exploration in India, both onshore and offshore, and some large deposits have been discovered. We have put a very liberal licensing policy for exploration of hydrocarbons in place and are trying to attract international oil companies to make bids for the blocs on offer. At the same time, we are trying to get access to

equity oil by investing in oil fields in several countries. India, Iran and Pakistan are engaged in complex negotiations on a gas pipeline from Iran to India via Pakistan. We have also shown interest in the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India gas pipeline. We have invested U.S. \$2.7 billion in Sakhalin-I. This is the largest investment India has made in any country so far in the oil and gas sector. We are willing to invest more in Russia's oil and gas sector if opportunities are available. Our national companies are in touch with Gazprom and Rosneft. Some proposals have been made by us, without tangible results so far. We do feel that the India-Russia economic relationship can be transformed through energy cooperation. Russia has an energy surplus, while we have an energy deficit; Russia has the resources and we have the need. President Putin has described energy security not only as security of supply but also security of demand. We can certainly assure security of demand! We are not geographically contiguous to Russia and that is cited as a handicap in the way of our cooperation. But India can be a market for Russian oil and gas from its Far Eastern region. If the project to build a Russia-Bulgaria-Greece pipeline materializes, we could possibly be beneficiaries. Practical swap arrangements with others can also be made for any Indian share of Russian oil and gas which might be expensive to transport to India. In the India-Russia context, "energy security" would mean an imaginative approach by the two countries to strengthen the economic aspect of their strategic relations through an energy partnership.

SECURITY INDEX: When Chinese oil companies enter new markets, a lot of people start talking about the threat of Chinese expansion. However, not much attention is paid to similar cases involving Indian oil companies (in Sudan, for example). In your opinion, why there is such a difference in approaches to the two new world powers?

SIBAL: China has 1.3 billion people and the country has grown at over 10 percent for the last 15 years or so. It is already the third largest economy in the world. Because of such phenomenal growth of such a populated country, with such low per capita consumption to date, it is inevitable that questions of pressure on global resources coming from China's hydrocarbon hunger would arise. As it happens, the West has so far quasi-monopolized world resources for the last couple of centuries, transcending the colonial period. Capital, technology, giant corporations, international financial institutions, banking—all these sectors are dominated by the West and this is key to understanding the present unequal consumption of global resources between developed and developing countries. Naturally, China's emergence on the scene creates the perception of a threat. This is reinforced by the nature of China's political system and the perceived gap between Chinese political and social values and those of the West. India is not perceived in the same way as the Indian economy is not as large as China's and its growth not as spectacular. More importantly, its commercial strategy, unlike that of the Chinese, is not export dominated. When Chinese oil companies invest in countries like Sudan, or those with dictatorial regimes or dubious human rights records, there might be concern that China would develop a vested interest in sustaining or reinforcing such non-democratic governments. Since India is a democracy, with more acceptable political credentials in western eyes, when its companies invest in "difficult countries" the reaction is different. In China's case, the perception could be, rightly or wrongly, that to secure its economic interests it would be prepared to extend support to unsavory regimes. India as a democratic country gets better understanding.

SECURITY INDEX: When we talk about the strengthening of India's influence in the world, we should mention an economic component as well as a political component to that. Mittal Steel's merger with Arcelor turned Indian businessman Lakshmi Mittal into a real steel market monopolist. In this case, can we talk about an emergence of a new type of entrepreneur with a difference managerial culture? And how can you characterize Indian businesses compared to Russian business, if we, for example, draw a parallel between Russian billionaire Roman Abramovich and Lakshmi Mittal?

SIBAL: I think it is wrong to look at the Mittal Steel-Arcelor merger in terms of a steel market monopoly. Throughout the 1990s, the big corporate story has been that of acquisitions and mergers. In a globalized world, with interstate barriers breaking down and competition becoming tougher, leading companies in the western world have tried to restructure their businesses, not only to maximize their profits but simply to survive as global players. We have seen consol-



idations of companies in the defense, communication, and automobile sectors, the entertainment industry, in pharmaceuticals, and information technology. (We see this currently happening in Russia in the oil, gas, and metal sectors and plans in the aeronautical sector.) At the same time, all these acquisitions and mergers have had to satisfy anti-trust and anti-monopoly legislation in the United States and Europe. The Mittal Steel-Arcelor merger obtained the approval of the EU's Anti-Monopoly Commission because the business of the two merged companies was different and non-competing in nature. It is true that the managerial culture in big family-owned businesses, such as Mittal, differs in character from that of big western corporations. But I don't think Lakshmi Mittal represents the emergence of a new type of entrepreneur. It is simply the case of a success story that has caught international attention. I don't think it sets up a new trend.

India has a much larger experience of modern entrepreneurship than Russia. We have had entrepreneurship not only for the last 60 years but even before independence. Russia's new entrepreneurship is about 15-16 years old. Unlike Russian billionaires who have largely emerged from the wreck of the Soviet Union state monopolies, many Indian entrepreneurs have either built up their empires from scratch or have grown in a competitive and entrepreneurial business culture. This perhaps should explain the difference between Abramovich and Lakshmi Mittal. This does not mean that Russians lag behind in entrepreneurship. The Russians are a highly gifted people and now that they have the opportunity to show their entrepreneurial spirit, given Russia's assets, they will demonstrate their talents more and more in the years ahead.

SECURITY INDEX: In March 2006, the United States and India signed an unprecedented agreement, opening up entrance to the nuclear states' club for India. However, there is still no agreement between India and the Nuclear Suppliers Group; the negotiations are still underway. What are the prospects for these negotiations taking into account the Chinese position (in connection with Pakistan)?

SIBAL: While the U.S., Russia, France, and many other countries are in favor of accommodating India, some countries still have reservations. The Nuclear Suppliers Group seems to be awaiting the enactment of the U.S. legislation before taking its own decision. India has been in touch with the Nuclear Suppliers Group, both with individual members as well as with the group as a whole. We are encouraged by the gathering support within the Group in our favor. China, of course, will have its say in the NSG, of which it is a member. The U.S. and other major powers are seeking to open doors for India because India's record of nonproliferation is reassuring. Countries are convinced that India has not been, and will not be, a proliferator. Its democracy gives a sense of confidence. Its government is considered responsible. If China wishes to introduce the Pakistan factor, then it will have to persuade the U.S., Russia, and other NSG countries that they should overlook existing evidence about Pakistan's nuclear proliferation activities (the A.Q. Khan affair), its involvement in the North Korean, Iranian, and Libyan nuclear programs, and also that they should disregard the fact that Pakistan is a military regime and that it is the breeding ground of international terrorism and home to the al-Qa'eda and Taliban leadership. This has salience in the context of WMDs getting into the hands of terrorist groups. The NSG works on the basis of consensus. Objectively, it should be easier to build consensus on India's case than Pakistan's. But we are not in competition with Pakistan in this regard.

SECURITY INDEX: During the last few years, the Kashmir problem is seemingly being solved. In your opinion, is it an example of real inter-civilizational dialogue instead of tensions like Samuel Huntington's *clash of civilizations*? What is the "recipe" for eliminating the tensions among Muslims, Christians, Hindus, Jews, and representatives of other religions and nationalities?

SIBAL: It would be a serious analytical error to look at the recent positive trends in addressing the Kashmir problem as an example of a "real inter-civilizational dialogue." India itself has as many, if not more, Muslims than Pakistan. The state of Jammu and Kashmir is also religiously diverse: Jammu being majority Hindu, Ladakh being majority Buddhist, and the Kashmir valley being majority Muslim. The inter-civilizational dialogue that you are referring to is a fact of

everyday life within our borders, as we are a country of tremendous diversity, with a variety of religions, languages, cultures, and ethnic groups. The root of the Kashmir problem is Pakistan's political claim to the territory of Jammu and Kashmir on religious grounds. Pakistan itself was a creation of religious politics, and the country has never been able to give up mixing religion and politics, despite the havoc that such practice is causing today in the form of international terrorism. The terrorism of Islamic circles flows from mixing radicalized religion with politics. As regards a "recipe" for eliminating tensions among various religions, there is but one, which is adherence to the concept of a secular state and the secularization of politics. Religion should be treated as a personal affair and not become an instrument of state politics. Whereas countries with Christian populations have essentially ceased to act like "Christian" countries at the state level or in international politics, and whereas despite 80 percent of its population being Hindu, India is a secular country and does not project itself internationally as "Hindu," the Muslim countries, by and large, emphasize their Islamic identity both internally and externally. If the creeping trends of intolerance in western liberal democracies are a cause of concern, the failure of Muslim societies to root out religious extremism from their midst is disturbing. To use religious ideology to achieve political ends and to fight perceived injustice by mobilizing cross-national religious fervor unleashes highly dangerous forces within the global system. Faith is often nourished by rigidity of belief whereas politics is nourished by flexibility in thinking. The two must be kept separate. Religion may provide internal peace, but for external peace reason should substitute for it.

SECURITY INDEX: During the Cold War era India was a strategic partner of the USSR. After the Soviet Union's collapse India began searching for a new place in the international system. It seems that India has found a position as a regional (and even global) power with a rapidly growing economy and adherence to democratic values (the latter ensures U.S. support for India). So nowadays who are India's major partners, its allies and friends, and what is the role of Russia for India?

SIBAL: The end of the Cold War has drastically reshaped the international system. Because the end of the Cold War coincided also with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the total effect on the international system was even more drastic. India, which did not wish to be caught in the coils of the Cold War, played a leading role in founding the Non-Aligned Movement. In this way, India wanted to have more liberty of action on the international stage in order to pursue its interests by engaging both the camps. It is true though that in many ways there was a strategic content to India's relations with the USSR. At the same time, links with the United States, especially at the people-to-people level, remained strong. All countries have had to readjust their international relations in the last decade and a half. In this period, with the liberalization of its economy, India has seen its growth rates spurt as never before, giving it more prominence in international economic and political affairs. Its advances in the sphere of the knowledge economy have attracted mounting international attention. With the U.S., the relationship today has never been better. It has become India's largest trading and investment partner and its demonstrated willingness to overcome the deep differences on nonproliferation dividing the two countries, which had badly damaged bilateral relations over the years, has given the relationship a new quality. China, despite certain political and territorial differences, has emerged as India's second largest trading partner, as a result of pragmatic decisions on both sides not to allow these differences to stand in the way of developing an all round mutually beneficial relationship. Having neglected Southeast Asia for many years, the 1990s saw the emergence of a new Indian "Look East" policy which has matured today with India becoming a partner in the ASEAN summit and a participant in the East Asian Summit. India is currently discussing a free trade agreement with ASEAN. With Japan relations are taking new political dimensions. The European Union as an entity is India's largest trading partner, and we now have summit-level dialogue between us based on a strategic partnership. Within the EU, U.K., Germany, and France are India's major political, economic, and technological partners. India has been a major beneficiary of globalization and the lessening of tensions with the end of the Cold War. This has allowed India to build pragmatic relationship with countries in various parts of the world. The IBSA (India-Brazil-South Africa) initiative is another example of an imaginative way of extending India's reach and interests.




With no other country has India maintained a more stable, steady, and strong relationship than the Soviet Union/Russia. There is deep realization in Indian political circles of the enduring value of India's relations with Russia. If our relationship with Russia has not fluctuated, as has been the case in the relationships of India with the U.S. and China, of China with Russia and the U.S., and of the U.S. with Russia and China, from enemy to friend and vice-versa, it is because on a whole host of issues India and Russia think alike and have common interests. I think the India-Soviet Union/Russia relationship over the last 60 years is an emblematic story of how two large countries, which are so different in so many ways, can succeed in forging a strong relationship capable of withstanding the pressures of a changing environment.

SECURITY INDEX: Indian-Russian relations in the nuclear sphere and in military technical cooperation are quite strong and fruitful. Can we consider these successes as examples of a complex and strategic approach in bilateral relations or only as tactical moves from both sides?

SIBAL: I think in the two spheres of nuclear and military technical cooperation, relations cannot be built on tactical moves. In these vital and sensitive areas, enduring relations can be built only with strategic underpinnings. Russia is the only country which is building nuclear power plants in India. Russia took this very important decision in favor of a non-NPT country because Russia had confidence in India and saw the strategic value of building a partnership in this sensitive area with a major country. If in future the doors open for international cooperation in India's civilian nuclear sector, Russia, with already a foot in the door, is well placed to be the earliest and biggest beneficiary. In the military technical sphere, India-Russia relations are outstanding. Most of the equipment used by India's army, navy, and air force is of Russian origin. We would hardly have allowed this dependence to grow to these levels if we did not view our relations with Russia strategically. When, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian arms industry was in dire straits, India relieved pressures by placing huge defence orders. Today Russia is supplying equipment and platforms which as yet are not being used by the Russian armed forces themselves. We have in a way pushed the Russian arms industry to upgrade itself by placing orders for equipment with very advanced specifications. The BrahMos missile is a fine example of a new thrust in our bilateral defence relationship, that of graduating from a buyer-seller relationship to joint research, development, production, and marketing. As arms deals involve enormous amounts of money and the life cycles of equipment are long, the core of decision making has to be essentially strategic, not tactical.

Note

¹ Vladimir Orlov's interview of Kanwal Sibal, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of India to Russia, took place on October 23, 2006.



Ilham Aliev

“AZERBAIJAN IS ACCUSTOMED TO RELYING ONLY ON ITS OWN RESOURCES AND THEREFORE DOES NOT JOIN COALITIONS”

Sergey Brilev, the member of Security Index editorial board, talks with President of the Republic of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliev.¹

SECURITY INDEX: Mr. President, 15 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union only a very naïve person or a hopeless dreamer would call the CIS countries “post-Soviet” or “newly independent.” One might, however, ask to what degree they have succeeded in their self-realization. How would you characterize your country today?

ALIEV: It is too late to call the former republics of the Soviet Union “newly independent.” That time is over. The initial formative stage is over, and making the excuse that we are still “new” and “young” and therefore have many flaws is no longer acceptable. Fifteen years is long enough. Today, Azerbaijan is a dynamic, rapidly growing country that is relying exclusively on its own economic and political resources while becoming integrated into the global community. It enjoys excellent relations with its neighbors and has succeeded in raising living standards year after year.

SECURITY INDEX: You even said once that you do not feel comfortable disclosing Azerbaijan’s economic growth rate, for fear of embarrassing your colleagues among other presidents and prime ministers...

ALIEV: (laughing) It’s true. I usually try to avoid the subject when talking to heads of state, because Azerbaijan’s numbers are indeed impressive. Last year the economic growth rate in Azerbaijan was 26%, and through the first half of 2006 it amounted to 35%, while the industrial growth rate in 2006 was in excess of 40%. In the last three years almost 500,000 new jobs were created, mostly in the oil business. The state budget has quadrupled in the last three years. These overall numbers show the country’s economic explosion.

SECURITY INDEX: Have Azerbaijanis started coming back home as a result of this rapid growth? Has the brain drain of professionals out of the country stopped?

ALIEV: Yes, the outflow of professionals has stopped, and signs of new immigration are already visible. It is worth noting, however, that the majority of the Azerbaijanis who sought to earn a living in other countries, with the bulk going to Russia, came from rural areas. And since we launched a comprehensive and specific development program targeting rural regions three years ago, many of those who had departed have come back to their original places of residence. I would also like to point out that while in many cases non-ethnic Azeris holding Azerbaijani passports left the country in the early 1990s due to an unstable political and economic environment, they are coming back now that the situation has stabilized and business conditions have become favorable. Azerbaijan has always been known for its ethnic tolerance and cultural internationalism. The notion of “internationalism” has been undeservedly forgot-



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ten, but, in my opinion, it is one of the deciding factors in the country's progress. Azerbaijan is a multinational state and its overall development success will depend on the wellbeing of each of its ethnic groups.

SECURITY INDEX: If you happened to discuss with an ethnic Russian citizen of Azerbaijan the reasons that prompted that individual to stay in the country, or if you were to advertise Azerbaijan to a Russian audience, what would you say?

ALIEV: Not a single Russian school has been closed down. All institutions of higher learning have maintained departments that hold instruction in Russian. The Baku Slavic University is working quite successfully. The number of Russian newspapers, by the way, is now several times higher than during the Soviet Union. And it is no accident that an important event like the first Congress of Russian Compatriots who live beyond Russia's borders was conducted in Azerbaijan. Our aim is that the younger generation growing and maturing in an environment of national independence maintain their Russian language proficiency. Let me give you an example. Since long ago, Russian communities have resided in Azerbaijan in concentrated settlements. I visited one last summer, and the people requested a new school. Relevant instructions were issued right away and now the school is already functioning.

Generally speaking, we do not need any additional propaganda. The state's economic development, its social policies, safe and secure living conditions, in addition to ethnic tolerance and interethnic peace—these factors ensure that all of the nationalities residing in Azerbaijan hold a positive view of their country.

SECURITY INDEX: Do you find it disappointing that so few Russian tourists come to Azerbaijan, even though the country is every bit as attractive as, say, Turkey, which has so captivated the Russians' fancy? One must admit that even with respect to language things are much better off here?

ALIEV: You must not forget that calm was established in Azerbaijan fairly recently. In the early 1990s, a civil war broke out in the country and until 1996-97 the situation remained unstable. If we look at the economic growth dynamics, we see that the economic boom only began in 1996. That is why Azerbaijan at the time had many political, economic, and social problems, the most urgent of which was the matter of a million refugees who had lost their homes as a result of military aggression. In a word, tourism was far from our minds. However, as soon as we became economically solvent and acquired considerable material resources, one of the highest priorities in our economic development became tourism. Today we invest significant amounts into tourism infrastructure. The state subsidizes it and so does private business. Therefore, I believe that in two or three years tourists from Russia will find it more attractive and convenient to vacation here rather than elsewhere.

SECURITY INDEX: Azerbaijan, to use the old political terminology, is a classic nonaligned state. At least, if we compare it with any of your other neighbors in the former Soviet Caucasus: Georgia has unequivocally stated its desire to join NATO; Armenia is a member of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO). Why does Azerbaijan adhere to the policy of nonalignment?

ALIEV: Basically, since Azerbaijan acquired independence it differed from other post-Soviet states in that we received practically no assistance from anyone. If you consider the amounts of aid given to all other former Soviet republics by various international organizations and funds, as well as by other countries, we were in last place. This has taught us to rely only on our own resources. And the fact that we *do not join* coalitions is probably also the result of this. I believe that a country should first depend on itself, on its own economic and intellectual capabilities, on competent policies that minimize external risks.

SECURITY INDEX: Azerbaijan is a member of GUAM, which unlike the CIS—unfortunately a rather amorphous organization to date—at least lays claim to becoming a force to reckon with in the post-Soviet realm, as well as overall in southern and southeastern Europe. Do you find cooperation with GUAM rewarding? I know that Azerbaijan is now seriously engaged in military

cooperation with Ukraine, and that it plans new energy corridors not only toward Ceyhan (Turkey), but also through Georgia into Ukraine and Poland. How does Azerbaijan generally manage its cooperation with international organizations?

ALIEV: Every state, including Azerbaijan, joins those organizations with which it finds it comfortable to work. For instance, as far as our membership in GUAM is concerned, one should keep in mind that this organization was founded in 1997, under completely different circumstances. The environment for regional cooperation and relations among states stood in drastic contrast to what we have today. In general, we consider participating in various international organizations (CIS, GUAM, the Council of Europe, and the Organization of the Islamic Conference) from the point of view of making maximum use of the organization's capabilities in the service of our national interests. Participation in one organization does not contravene participating in another.

I think that others may find Azerbaijan's experience useful in this area. We build relations with our neighbors and friends not to the detriment of our relations with other states, but, on the contrary, we strive to utilize our geographic, political, and economic capabilities to our maximum ability.

The energy factor certainly assists us in setting up more effective cooperative efforts.

And when it comes to our energy projects, they are not carried out through some international organization, but rather under bilateral or multilateral agreements. Basically, we have completed all of our energy projects. There are now three major oil pipelines out of Azerbaijan, which are capable of transporting up to 70 million tons of oil and, possibly, even up to a 100 million tons. This should be sufficient for Azerbaijan's oil production levels.

SECURITY INDEX: There is a certain type of state whose government's only thought is oil prices. Russia has seen its share of discussions about a stabilization fund, and about ways to spend its "oil dollars." How does Azerbaijan spend its oil revenues?

ALIEV: Several years ago we established the State Oil Fund of Azerbaijan, in which the bulk of oil revenue is accumulated. The amounts are already substantial: Azerbaijan's gold reserve is now over \$3 billion, which is a significant number given our economic scale. With impending future oil extraction growth, these sums will reach hundreds of billions of dollars. According to World Bank projections, over the next 20 years Azerbaijan stands to make a profit of over \$140 billion from oil projects alone. This is an enormous amount for us and thanks to it we'll be able to do a lot for the country. For the moment, however, the monies are invested primarily in social projects: education, medicine, military, and infrastructure development. For example, in two years we have constructed over 600 new schools, as well as modern hospitals in all of the country's regions. The military is rapidly growing too: next year over a billion dollars will be allocated for our military budget, whereas just a year ago the amount was slightly over one hundred million. The same may be said about infrastructure development projects. Six power plants are currently under construction in Azerbaijan. We are building highways and rural roads. As much as we can, we must use our economic resources to modernize the country. It is essential, however, to find a clear balance between macroeconomic stability and satisfying the needs of the state and its citizens. We are proponents of a cautious policy; therefore, about a third of the oil revenue that does not go into the oil fund is allocated to satisfy various needs of the state.

SECURITY INDEX: Mr. German Gref, Russia's minister of economic development and trade, visited you in October 2006. I understand that you discussed the issue of the diversification of Azerbaijan's economy, possibly with Russian participation. Which branches of industry do you intend to develop now and what is the possible role for Russia in this process?

ALIEV: Despite the very positive investment environment in Azerbaijan, Russian companies—and Russia by now has some major international companies—have not shown much interest in Azerbaijan. This is especially regrettable, since over the past decade almost \$30 billion in mostly foreign investments have poured into our economy.



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We now intend to modernize the entire industrial infrastructure, because the infrastructure left since Soviet times has for the most part become obsolete, with the exception, of course, of the oil and heavy industries. We need to develop new branches of industry, create new jobs. That is why we ought to expect that any industrial branch into which we pour investments should bring a positive return.

Consequently, we expect to become less dependent on fluctuations of oil prices. In order not to be worried about oil prices, we need to diversify our economy. Cooperation with Russia in this area may benefit us greatly in the form of exchanging valuable experience, as well as consultations, and cooperation.

SECURITY INDEX: The situation unfolding around Iran's nuclear program has been the most discussed topic in international politics over the past several months. In your opinion, as head of a state that borders Iran, where do the solutions to this complex problem lie?


ALIEV: I'd rather not contemplate the worst-case scenario with Iran. Azerbaijan shares more than 1,000 kilometers of a common border with Iran. We have established active trans-border ties. More than half of ethnic Azeris reside in Iran, the same Azeri people as here. Any escalation of the situation in the region will undoubtedly bear heavy consequences for all local states, since politically, as well as economically and militarily, the countries of the region are fairly interdependent. Destabilization of one of them may have catastrophic consequences that are difficult even to imagine.

Our main goals, in my opinion, must be alleviating tension and developing mechanisms that, on the one hand, calm world community concern about Iran's nuclear program and, on the other, allow Iran to exercise its legitimate right to develop peaceful nuclear energy.

I believe that in such a context a mutually agreeable solution can be found. Of course, it must be based not on political ambitions but on pragmatism, realism, and the pursuit of peace. In other words, if all sides are interested in reaching a peaceful resolution, it could easily be achieved.

Note

¹ Sergey Brilev's interview of President Aliev took place on October 18, 2006.



Yevgeny Primakov

“THE CURRENT SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST IS A GOOD ILLUSTRATION OF WHAT RESULTS FROM THE U.S. EXPORT OF DEMOCRACY”

PIR Center Senior Advisor Gennady Evstafiev spoke with Academician Yevgeny Primakov, President of the Russian Federation Chamber of Commerce and Industry.¹

SECURITY INDEX: Evgeny Maksimovich, given your great experience in the Middle East, we would be very interested in your opinion of the prospects for settling the Middle Eastern conflict in general and the Palestinian-Israeli conflict in particular. Do you believe that international mediators working on a settlement can still act as intermediaries?

PRIMAKOV: I think that we should remain cautiously optimistic and, as paradoxical as it may sound, recent events have made it possible to be more hopeful. What I am thinking of is the following. During their operation in Lebanon, the Israelis sensed that they would not be able to solve their problems militarily. Their goal is to designate their borders unilaterally and unconditionally, fence them in with a wall, and receive general recognition of these borders.

However, their action in Lebanon backfired, just as they failed after Hamas came to power (a failure even after the formation of the current, formally independent government). And after the recent events in Lebanon, the tendency for Israeli society to search for a way out of the current situation has strengthened. Moreover, from the Israeli point of view the situation could deteriorate further, given the more and more perplexing Iranian factor. Many in Israel fear that Iran will actively support its enemies; this could even take the form of a nuclear confrontation.

At the same time, the accession of the Democrats to power in the U.S. Congress, in my view, won't block the Middle East peace process. Now George Bush will have to find something to counterbalance his defeat in Iraq, since U.S. authority in the Arab world has fallen sharply since the events in Lebanon. I cannot exclude the possibility that in the final years of his presidency George Bush, like Bill Clinton before him, will want his place in history to be marked by at least some success, even if it is only partial and preliminary, in finding a solution in the Middle East. In saying this, I am not insisting that this scenario will indeed come to pass, but simply that it is not unlikely.

The Palestinians, too, understand that they need to come to an agreement. The creation of the new government and some of the changes that Hamas is undergoing are indications of this. I recently spoke with Hamas leader Khaled Mashaal and several other members of the politburo. It was immediately striking that they said they wanted to establish a Palestinian state within the borders of June 4, 1967, i.e. those from before the Six Day War. And I said, “Add to this, next to Israel. That would be a step towards recognition; after all, sooner or later you will have to recognize Israel.” They agreed with this, but find themselves in a difficult position. To think that Hamas would recognize Israel now, without any stability and without going through certain stages towards this goal, would be naïve. In that case they would lose support. Thus, you see, I do not exclude the possibility that some movement towards a solution may occur.



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SECURITY INDEX: How did the war in Lebanon affect the situation in the region? Don't you expect the domestic political situation in that country to be aggravated further? Do you share the view that as a result of this war Israel has lost the military advantage that it enjoyed for the past several decades over the Arabs? Do the Israelis desire revenge?

PRIMAKOV: I believe that Lebanon's domestic political situation is increasingly strained already. But it is noteworthy that Israel was unable to achieve this aim during the war. Consider the following: Israel began with a bombardment that struck throughout Lebanese territory, and only then initiated its land operation in the south. It is unlikely that this bombing was aimed at Hezbollah's surrender, since Hezbollah is not located throughout Lebanon. I presume that this was done so that a force within Lebanon would arise that would act more forcefully against Hezbollah, since its actions were leading to the country's destruction. Basically that is what happened in 1982, when the Israelis relied on a domestic Lebanese power that spoke out against the military presence of Palestinians in Lebanon. This time this tactic did not succeed, but similar attempts will continue—they are continuing already.

As for the view that the Israelis lost their military advantage over the Arabs thanks to the results of the last war, I do not agree. The military advantage was not lost, but Israel understands more and more clearly that it is no longer capable of occupying Arab countries. You see, they have a military advantage, just as the United States had a military advantage over Iraq—it is ridiculous to argue that they did not. The advantage was quite clear during the military operation, but as for what to do next, in order to maintain control during the occupation, that is an enormous problem, the solution to which does not depend on military advantage. And Israel is beginning to realize this.

SECURITY INDEX: Couldn't the Hezbollah phenomenon and its leader, Sheikh Nasrallah, become very attractive for other Arab countries that are involved in the conflict with Israel?

PRIMAKOV: What countries are we really talking about? Of all of the Arab countries, only Syria is involved in the conflict with Israel. Now there is a rapprochement between Syria and Iran, and from the Syrian point of view this is only natural. Hafez al-Assad, father of the current president, once told me that he would do everything he could not to remain alone against Israel. Therefore they need a rear, and they want Iran to be this rear. However, I do not believe that this makes an independent Syrian policy or its participation in the Middle East peace process impossible. Once again I would like to cite my recent trip to Damascus, where I was able to meet with Bashar al-Assad and spend quite a bit of time discussing this issue. After this meeting I was left with the impression that he understands that they need to find a solution, a way out, but he can not give up the Golan Heights, of that I am certain.

SECURITY INDEX: In the late 1990s you put forward the idea of a Russia-India-China triangle to counter the unipolarity promoted by the United States. Have you remained in favor of this view, and to what extent is it a viable idea today and in the future?

PRIMAKOV: I did not talk about countering unipolarity. One could say that the idea of multipolarity was proposed to counter unipolarity. And that is an actual trend—the world is becoming multipolar. Today no one doubts that China is a world power. No one doubts that Europe, having been freed of the need of the U.S. nuclear umbrella, is not always the "obedient" alliance member it was before, and Europe is now the United States' equal in economic terms. I think that no one doubts that Russia will not be a submissive follower of the United States. And India? Latin America?

Multipolarity is a fact; but as for "geometric figures," they are needed to maintain the stability of this multipolar world. The multipolar world must not repeat the events that occurred before World War II. In the past, multipolarity led to coalitions—one group of states against another. Today's multipolar world, given globalization, the internationalization of production, and the trans-nationalization of entrepreneurial activity, cannot repeat the past structure. At the same time, some "geometric figures" are needed that, I would like to emphasize, do not result in military blocs but, on the contrary, stabilize the situation by strengthening the ties between the

various sides of this figure—through political and economic ties, military consultation, and so on.

SECURITY INDEX: You know Iraq well. Are you worried by the trend towards the increasing, gradual disintegration of the country, in part through its federalization? We have noted that you do not insist that U.S. troops leave Iraq as soon as possible. Is this a reflection of your concern that Iraq may disintegrate? How will the defeat of the Republicans in the recent mid-term Congressional elections affect Bush's politics in Iraq?

PRIMAKOV: Yes, I am worried by the trend towards the disintegration of Iraq, in part through its federalization. Even as a young journalist I was able to meet repeatedly with Mullah Mustafa al-Barzani, leader of the Kurdish National Liberation Movement in northern Iraq, over the course of four years. And I asked him to his face if he wanted to establish an independent Kurdish state. The prerequisites for such a state appear to exist: we have a dense center where the Kurds (of whom there are about 25 million) reside, albeit divided by several state borders. But the father of the present Kurdish leader told me, "I want to obtain real autonomy, real influence over politics in Baghdad. That is my goal, because if the Kurds leave Iraq, and I proclaim an independent state, then everyone will suffocate me: Iraq, Iran, and Turkey as well." He was right.

Of late, the idea of Kurdish self-determination, the creation of their own state, has been strengthening. But let's examine the Turkish reaction. Turkey is concentrating its troops on its border with Iraqi Kurdistan and has not ruled out the possibility that if an independent Kurdish state is established, the Turks might strike it.

Separatism has grown not only in the north, where for all practical purposes an independent, though undeclared, Kurdish state already exists, but also in the Shi'ite south. Shi'ite autonomy, it seems to me, would strengthen radical rightist forces in Iran. In addition, there is also talk about an Islamic Sunni state with its capital in Baghdad. All of this is a very good illustration of the results of the U.S. export of democracy.

And what will the results of the most recent elections to the U.S. Congress mean for Iraq? The Democrats were able to come out on top by making use of the "Iraqi factor"—they used public dissatisfaction with what is happening in Iraq in their own interests.

However, I do not think that we should overestimate this factor. Why? Because the Democratic Party did not come out with a program of its own on Iraq, it did not demand the immediate withdrawal of troops, or even come up with a timetable for troop withdrawals from Iraq. I believe that U.S. policy will, naturally, be affected, but to believe that it will change radically the way it did in Vietnam, when the United States was defeated and left the country—that won't happen.

And as for the replacement of Donald Rumsfeld by Robert Gates... I remember Robert Gates well, from the time when George Bush senior had him convey to me the news that it was not necessary for me to remain in Washington, although until that point I had been asked to remain in order to discuss possible ways to address issues during the war in the Persian Gulf. But without a military operation against Iraq. Robert Gates made a good impression on me when he came to Moscow as head of the CIA, back when I was the director of the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR).

SECURITY INDEX: The Iranian nuclear crisis was the hottest topic in world politics throughout 2006. How likely do you think it is that Iran will acquire nuclear weapons? Will Iran become a second Iraq?

PRIMAKOV: Back when you, Gennady Mikhailovich, headed one of the SVR's operational analysis directorates, we issued two public reports on the proliferation of nuclear weapons and determined the criteria differentiating actual nuclear states from unofficial, threshold, and pre-threshold nuclear states. At that time we considered Iran to be one of the threshold states: if Iran were to take the political decision to build nuclear weapons it could make advances in this sphere in a number of years. But Iran currently avers that it has not made any such political




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decision, that it has no desire to build nuclear weapons, that it is not violating the NPT, and that it is ready to put all of its nuclear programs under IAEA safeguards and conduct negotiations on all nuclear matters, including uranium enrichment. And it seems to me that requiring them to give up uranium enrichment as a prerequisite for such negotiations is not right. Moreover, this violates the NPT.

I cannot agree that the Iranian nuclear crisis was the hottest topic in world politics in 2006. Yes, the situation has become supercharged, you could say, nearly reaching the boiling point, but the crisis itself has not crossed the line beyond which you could say that it really is the greatest threat in 2006. Of course, the statements made by several Iranian leaders, against the backdrop of which Iran's nuclear program—peaceful nuclear program—is being pursued, draw attention and are worrisome. We, of course, are not interested—no state in the world is interested—in Iran acquiring nuclear weapons. Not one state is interested in the proliferation of nuclear weapons other than, perhaps, North Korea. And even in that case, North Korea is already giving this up and is ready to conduct negotiations within the “Six Party” framework.

Note

¹ Gennady Evstafiev's interview of academician Yevgeny Primakov took place on November 14, 2006.



Samuel Schmid

“AGAINST TERRORISM, THERE CAN BE NO NEUTRALITY”

PIR Center Director Vladimir A. Orlov, Editor-in-Chief of Security Index, spoke with Federal Councillor Samuel Schmid, Head of the Swiss Federal Department of Defense, Civil Protection, and Sport during his public conference at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP).

SECURITY INDEX: In Spring 2006, the general public learned about the prevention of a terrorist attack in Geneva, Switzerland—a potential attack against an Israeli airplane—and later on about the arrests of terrorists in Switzerland and other countries who were part of this plot. How do you assess terrorism—in particular, jihadi terrorism—as it threatens Switzerland?

SCHMID: Against terrorism, there can be no neutrality. We must make use of the options our legislation and our state offers us, in order to contribute something to conclude the fight against terrorism. When we have terrorists in Switzerland, I'm sure that we have to arrest them, to take them to prison. When you have terrorists in Swiss regions, you know what can happen and what has already happened: we had the same situation 30 years ago. You remember the attack of Zerqa? A Swissair plane was hijacked and blown up there. Switzerland lost against that threat. The focus of terrorism may very well also be Switzerland. That's one possibility.

The second one: imagine that the danger, the threat like this one was perhaps planned in Geneva or in another airport. In that case, if you increase security standards all over Europe, do you think that Switzerland can say: "No, we are neutral, we are not a possible target of international terrorism?" Here in Switzerland, we have a great international community, and we are proud of it. But even one in a thousand, one in several hundreds is able to compromise the security of a modern society. I read a guidebook by the French government, and I remember them saying that if one in a thousand is active against the state, then it's a war-like situation.

And if you think about the size of the police force—it is conditioned on a normal security status. In a case where you have concrete threats, it's insufficient. To give you an example: every winter I go to a conference in Munich on international security, which takes place at one of Munich's hotels. When I see the security measures employed by the German authorities, I get my defense attachés to analyze them, and with the help of our German friends we have made out that there's a need for 4,000-6,000 policemen to guarantee security in Munich.

Well, it is the same in Geneva, but Switzerland is twelve times smaller than Germany. Germany has police forces for about 80 million people. We face the same issues and the police forces are meant to protect seven million people. Well, how to help the police? We have the same issues. The situation is absolutely similar, and a possibility of a terrorist attack does not depend on the number of a country's inhabitants. That's why we have to find a procedure to allow for better cooperation between police forces and the army in order to guarantee security in this




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special situation. And I'm sure that perhaps for a lot of people such terror scenarios are "thinking the unthinkable," but they are only unthinkable to date. And I hope that we use that, that we take the chance to get ready beforehand. You can't avoid it: it's a problem of asymmetric threats. You can't avoid it completely.

They say they are fighting against the open society. We don't want to lose the values of the open society, but if the signals of such threats become concrete, you can increase the security measures and perhaps you can avoid an attack. You can avoid it, or you can help stop it immediately, or you can fight against the terrorists. That's why even in Switzerland one of the solutions could be securing the borders or the openness of access, and so on. And I'm sure that in Switzerland a lot of people think that a neutral country isn't in the focus of terrorism. For me—please excuse me—but for me that's not the case.

Let's realize that perhaps most terrorists do not know what "neutrality" is.

We want to stay neutral because—I am sure of it—even in the future neutrality will keep a certain value, that we had during the Cold War. I'm sure for the moment it's not so applicable, but that's not a weapon against terrorism.



Kanwal Sibal

“THERE IS DEEP REALIZATION IN INDIAN POLITICAL CIRCLES OF THE ENDURING VALUE OF INDIA’S RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA”

PIR Center Director Vladimir A. Orlov, Editor-in-Chief of Security Index, spoke with Mr. Kanwal Sibal, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of India to Russia. The interview reflects the personal views of the Ambassador, and should not be viewed as a policy statement.¹

SECURITY INDEX: A number of factors at the recent turn of the century have led to the situation where India is considered to be the United States’ main ally in South Asia, replacing Pakistan in this position. Will a U.S.-India alliance counterbalance growing Chinese influence in the world in general and Asia in particular? Is U.S.-Indian cooperation based on a strategic partnership or it is just a tactical union?

SIBAL: The assumption that India is now considered to be the main ally of the United States in South Asia, instead of Pakistan, is questionable. Relations between the United States and India have greatly improved in recent years. During the Cold War, the two countries were, in some ways, in opposite camps. Today, India and the United States are engaging each other seriously and building areas of convergence. The U.S. is India’s single largest trading and investment partner. On issues of international terrorism and global spread of democracy, the two countries have a shared interest. It is this common commitment to democracy that led former Prime Minister Vajpayee to declare that India and US were “natural allies.” The Indo-U.S. nuclear deal is such a departure from previous U.S. positions on India’s nuclear capability that it is understandable that some analysts have begun to see India as the “main ally” of the U.S. in South Asia.

Pakistan has been a military ally of the U.S. since the 1950s, when it joined the Baghdad Pact and SEATO. President Ayub Khan of Pakistan once described his country as the “most allied of the allies” of the United States. Pakistan acted against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan in league with the U.S., which also did not prevent the rise of the Taliban with Pakistan’s connivance. There have been ups and downs in U.S.-Pakistan relations certainly, but the U.S. has now declared Pakistan as its “major non-NATO ally.” President Bush has frequently called Pakistan a key strategic ally in the war against terrorism. Pakistan is today a recipient, as it has been in the past, of massive military aid from the U.S.

The U.S. has multiple interests in South Asia. On some issues (economy, democracy, and non-proliferation) it is closer to India. On other issues (Afghanistan, Central Asia, the Islamic World, combating international terrorism, defense) it leans towards Pakistan. A shift in India-U.S. relations attracts attention as India is a much bigger country, with far greater potential than Pakistan, and because improved Indo-U.S. relations have greater international salience. However, to believe that “the Indo-U.S. alliance” can become a counterbalance to China’s growing regional and global influence is certainly misreading India’s intentions. Some U.S. analysts here and there have made statements suggesting the China factor in the improved



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U.S.-India relationship. I have not, however, seen any authoritative U.S. government statement suggesting this. In our case, our prime minister reiterated only recently in London that the world is big enough to accommodate both a rising India and a rising China. Our political commentators and analysts have frequently rejected the assessment that the improved India-U.S. relationship has a China angle. Our own relations with China, as you know, have greatly improved. China is today our second largest trading partner. The United States' own relations with China are far more intensive and wide-ranging than those India has with China. This would be another argument in favor of caution in making assessments rooted in "balance of power" thinking. The United States is the most powerful country in the world today, politically, economically, and militarily. It would be in the strategic interest of India to build a partnership with the United States. Similarly, the United States cannot ignore the demographic and economic size of India. Common sense would dictate that its relationship with a country like India, which shares with it, besides, the strong bonds of democracy and pluralism, ought not simply to be tactical.

SECURITY INDEX: Energy security issues are among the most crucial ones in international politics nowadays. They were the main item on the St. Petersburg G8 Summit agenda. The struggle over pipeline routes is similar to the struggle over railway routes in the 19th century, there is a gas "dispute" between Russia and Ukraine, and there are many other such examples. What is India's viewpoint on the issue of security of supplies of energy resources (oil and gas)?

SIBAL: Energy security has certainly become a very topical issue in the face of the unprecedented rise in oil prices. Whether or not the rise is justified on the basis of objective factors can be debated. How much this is a result of financial speculation and movement of vast sums of excess funds circulating in the international financial system, only experts know. Conservation, taxation policies, development of new fields, building of reserves, recourse to alternative fuels and renewable—all of this has a bearing on "energy security." At one level one can understand the problem arising from, on the one hand, depletion of fossil fuels and, on the other, expansion of needs worldwide as economic growth touches more and more developing countries and energy consumption levels rise globally. However, at another level, the situation presents itself differently. Much of the world's oil and gas resources are located in countries that are either less developed or with small populations. So "energy security" becomes a competition for access to oil and gas supplies by the principal consumers of the world which, as it happens, until the rise of China and India, have been largely located in the developed world. "Energy security" has, thus, in some ways, become a power game.

The reference to a "struggle" in your question over pipeline routes and the parallel drawn between this and the struggle over railway routes in the 19th century suggests that the issue is being seen largely in the European/Eurasian context, with colonial scrambles as the background. Russia has emerged as a major supplier of oil and gas and its vast territories contain huge untapped reserves of fossil fuels. Russia, as supplier, would naturally like to use its energy resources most advantageously for its national interests. At the consumer end, there is a natural desire to diversify sources of supply, create conditions of competition, and enhance bargaining positions. Which is why some countries are not happy with the North European Gas Pipeline, others seek to route pipelines through territories outside Russia's control for evacuating Caspian Sea oil, etc. The supply of Russian oil and gas resources to Chinese, Japanese, and South Korean markets in the east, and competition between China and Japan in this regard, is another aspect of the politics of pipeline routes.

For India, the issue of energy security is a challenging one. We produce only about 30 percent of our current needs. Already we are one of the largest consumers of oil and gas in the world. With our economy of a billion people growing at over eight percent currently, and with a very low level still of per capita energy consumption, our energy needs are shooting up. Already we are importing 98 million tons of petroleum products per year and this figure will go up in the coming years. We have, of course, stepped up oil and gas exploration in India, both onshore and offshore, and some large deposits have been discovered. We have put a very liberal licensing policy for exploration of hydrocarbons in place and are trying to attract international oil companies to make bids for the blocs on offer. At the same time, we are trying to get access to

equity oil by investing in oil fields in several countries. India, Iran and Pakistan are engaged in complex negotiations on a gas pipeline from Iran to India via Pakistan. We have also shown interest in the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India gas pipeline. We have invested U.S. \$2.7 billion in Sakhalin-I. This is the largest investment India has made in any country so far in the oil and gas sector. We are willing to invest more in Russia's oil and gas sector if opportunities are available. Our national companies are in touch with Gazprom and Rosneft. Some proposals have been made by us, without tangible results so far. We do feel that the India-Russia economic relationship can be transformed through energy cooperation. Russia has an energy surplus, while we have an energy deficit; Russia has the resources and we have the need. President Putin has described energy security not only as security of supply but also security of demand. We can certainly assure security of demand! We are not geographically contiguous to Russia and that is cited as a handicap in the way of our cooperation. But India can be a market for Russian oil and gas from its Far Eastern region. If the project to build a Russia-Bulgaria-Greece pipeline materializes, we could possibly be beneficiaries. Practical swap arrangements with others can also be made for any Indian share of Russian oil and gas which might be expensive to transport to India. In the India-Russia context, "energy security" would mean an imaginative approach by the two countries to strengthen the economic aspect of their strategic relations through an energy partnership.

SECURITY INDEX: When Chinese oil companies enter new markets, a lot of people start talking about the threat of Chinese expansion. However, not much attention is paid to similar cases involving Indian oil companies (in Sudan, for example). In your opinion, why there is such a difference in approaches to the two new world powers?

SIBAL: China has 1.3 billion people and the country has grown at over 10 percent for the last 15 years or so. It is already the third largest economy in the world. Because of such phenomenal growth of such a populated country, with such low per capita consumption to date, it is inevitable that questions of pressure on global resources coming from China's hydrocarbon hunger would arise. As it happens, the West has so far quasi-monopolized world resources for the last couple of centuries, transcending the colonial period. Capital, technology, giant corporations, international financial institutions, banking—all these sectors are dominated by the West and this is key to understanding the present unequal consumption of global resources between developed and developing countries. Naturally, China's emergence on the scene creates the perception of a threat. This is reinforced by the nature of China's political system and the perceived gap between Chinese political and social values and those of the West. India is not perceived in the same way as the Indian economy is not as large as China's and its growth not as spectacular. More importantly, its commercial strategy, unlike that of the Chinese, is not export dominated. When Chinese oil companies invest in countries like Sudan, or those with dictatorial regimes or dubious human rights records, there might be concern that China would develop a vested interest in sustaining or reinforcing such non-democratic governments. Since India is a democracy, with more acceptable political credentials in western eyes, when its companies invest in "difficult countries" the reaction is different. In China's case, the perception could be, rightly or wrongly, that to secure its economic interests it would be prepared to extend support to unsavory regimes. India as a democratic country gets better understanding.

SECURITY INDEX: When we talk about the strengthening of India's influence in the world, we should mention an economic component as well as a political component to that. Mittal Steel's merger with Arcelor turned Indian businessman Lakshmi Mittal into a real steel market monopolist. In this case, can we talk about an emergence of a new type of entrepreneur with a difference managerial culture? And how can you characterize Indian businesses compared to Russian business, if we, for example, draw a parallel between Russian billionaire Roman Abramovich and Lakshmi Mittal?

SIBAL: I think it is wrong to look at the Mittal Steel-Arcelor merger in terms of a steel market monopoly. Throughout the 1990s, the big corporate story has been that of acquisitions and mergers. In a globalized world, with interstate barriers breaking down and competition becoming tougher, leading companies in the western world have tried to restructure their businesses, not only to maximize their profits but simply to survive as global players. We have seen consol-



idations of companies in the defense, communication, and automobile sectors, the entertainment industry, in pharmaceuticals, and information technology. (We see this currently happening in Russia in the oil, gas, and metal sectors and plans in the aeronautical sector.) At the same time, all these acquisitions and mergers have had to satisfy anti-trust and anti-monopoly legislation in the United States and Europe. The Mittal Steel-Arcelor merger obtained the approval of the EU's Anti-Monopoly Commission because the business of the two merged companies was different and non-competing in nature. It is true that the managerial culture in big family-owned businesses, such as Mittal, differs in character from that of big western corporations. But I don't think Lakshmi Mittal represents the emergence of a new type of entrepreneur. It is simply the case of a success story that has caught international attention. I don't think it sets up a new trend.

India has a much larger experience of modern entrepreneurship than Russia. We have had entrepreneurship not only for the last 60 years but even before independence. Russia's new entrepreneurship is about 15-16 years old. Unlike Russian billionaires who have largely emerged from the wreck of the Soviet Union state monopolies, many Indian entrepreneurs have either built up their empires from scratch or have grown in a competitive and entrepreneurial business culture. This perhaps should explain the difference between Abramovich and Lakshmi Mittal. This does not mean that Russians lag behind in entrepreneurship. The Russians are a highly gifted people and now that they have the opportunity to show their entrepreneurial spirit, given Russia's assets, they will demonstrate their talents more and more in the years ahead.

SECURITY INDEX: In March 2006, the United States and India signed an unprecedented agreement, opening up entrance to the nuclear states' club for India. However, there is still no agreement between India and the Nuclear Suppliers Group; the negotiations are still underway. What are the prospects for these negotiations taking into account the Chinese position (in connection with Pakistan)?

SIBAL: While the U.S., Russia, France, and many other countries are in favor of accommodating India, some countries still have reservations. The Nuclear Suppliers Group seems to be awaiting the enactment of the U.S. legislation before taking its own decision. India has been in touch with the Nuclear Suppliers Group, both with individual members as well as with the group as a whole. We are encouraged by the gathering support within the Group in our favor. China, of course, will have its say in the NSG, of which it is a member. The U.S. and other major powers are seeking to open doors for India because India's record of nonproliferation is reassuring. Countries are convinced that India has not been, and will not be, a proliferator. Its democracy gives a sense of confidence. Its government is considered responsible. If China wishes to introduce the Pakistan factor, then it will have to persuade the U.S., Russia, and other NSG countries that they should overlook existing evidence about Pakistan's nuclear proliferation activities (the A.Q. Khan affair), its involvement in the North Korean, Iranian, and Libyan nuclear programs, and also that they should disregard the fact that Pakistan is a military regime and that it is the breeding ground of international terrorism and home to the al-Qa'eda and Taliban leadership. This has salience in the context of WMDs getting into the hands of terrorist groups. The NSG works on the basis of consensus. Objectively, it should be easier to build consensus on India's case than Pakistan's. But we are not in competition with Pakistan in this regard.

SECURITY INDEX: During the last few years, the Kashmir problem is seemingly being solved. In your opinion, is it an example of real inter-civilizational dialogue instead of tensions like Samuel Huntington's *clash of civilizations*? What is the "recipe" for eliminating the tensions among Muslims, Christians, Hindus, Jews, and representatives of other religions and nationalities?

SIBAL: It would be a serious analytical error to look at the recent positive trends in addressing the Kashmir problem as an example of a "real inter-civilizational dialogue." India itself has as many, if not more, Muslims than Pakistan. The state of Jammu and Kashmir is also religiously diverse: Jammu being majority Hindu, Ladakh being majority Buddhist, and the Kashmir valley being majority Muslim. The inter-civilizational dialogue that you are referring to is a fact of

everyday life within our borders, as we are a country of tremendous diversity, with a variety of religions, languages, cultures, and ethnic groups. The root of the Kashmir problem is Pakistan's political claim to the territory of Jammu and Kashmir on religious grounds. Pakistan itself was a creation of religious politics, and the country has never been able to give up mixing religion and politics, despite the havoc that such practice is causing today in the form of international terrorism. The terrorism of Islamic circles flows from mixing radicalized religion with politics. As regards a "recipe" for eliminating tensions among various religions, there is but one, which is adherence to the concept of a secular state and the secularization of politics. Religion should be treated as a personal affair and not become an instrument of state politics. Whereas countries with Christian populations have essentially ceased to act like "Christian" countries at the state level or in international politics, and whereas despite 80 percent of its population being Hindu, India is a secular country and does not project itself internationally as "Hindu," the Muslim countries, by and large, emphasize their Islamic identity both internally and externally. If the creeping trends of intolerance in western liberal democracies are a cause of concern, the failure of Muslim societies to root out religious extremism from their midst is disturbing. To use religious ideology to achieve political ends and to fight perceived injustice by mobilizing cross-national religious fervor unleashes highly dangerous forces within the global system. Faith is often nourished by rigidity of belief whereas politics is nourished by flexibility in thinking. The two must be kept separate. Religion may provide internal peace, but for external peace reason should substitute for it.

SECURITY INDEX: During the Cold War era India was a strategic partner of the USSR. After the Soviet Union's collapse India began searching for a new place in the international system. It seems that India has found a position as a regional (and even global) power with a rapidly growing economy and adherence to democratic values (the latter ensures U.S. support for India). So nowadays who are India's major partners, its allies and friends, and what is the role of Russia for India?

SIBAL: The end of the Cold War has drastically reshaped the international system. Because the end of the Cold War coincided also with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the total effect on the international system was even more drastic. India, which did not wish to be caught in the coils of the Cold War, played a leading role in founding the Non-Aligned Movement. In this way, India wanted to have more liberty of action on the international stage in order to pursue its interests by engaging both the camps. It is true though that in many ways there was a strategic content to India's relations with the USSR. At the same time, links with the United States, especially at the people-to-people level, remained strong. All countries have had to readjust their international relations in the last decade and a half. In this period, with the liberalization of its economy, India has seen its growth rates spurt as never before, giving it more prominence in international economic and political affairs. Its advances in the sphere of the knowledge economy have attracted mounting international attention. With the U.S., the relationship today has never been better. It has become India's largest trading and investment partner and its demonstrated willingness to overcome the deep differences on nonproliferation dividing the two countries, which had badly damaged bilateral relations over the years, has given the relationship a new quality. China, despite certain political and territorial differences, has emerged as India's second largest trading partner, as a result of pragmatic decisions on both sides not to allow these differences to stand in the way of developing an all round mutually beneficial relationship. Having neglected Southeast Asia for many years, the 1990s saw the emergence of a new Indian "Look East" policy which has matured today with India becoming a partner in the ASEAN summit and a participant in the East Asian Summit. India is currently discussing a free trade agreement with ASEAN. With Japan relations are taking new political dimensions. The European Union as an entity is India's largest trading partner, and we now have summit-level dialogue between us based on a strategic partnership. Within the EU, U.K., Germany, and France are India's major political, economic, and technological partners. India has been a major beneficiary of globalization and the lessening of tensions with the end of the Cold War. This has allowed India to build pragmatic relationship with countries in various parts of the world. The IBSA (India-Brazil-South Africa) initiative is another example of an imaginative way of extending India's reach and interests.



With no other country has India maintained a more stable, steady, and strong relationship than the Soviet Union/Russia. There is deep realization in Indian political circles of the enduring value of India's relations with Russia. If our relationship with Russia has not fluctuated, as has been the case in the relationships of India with the U.S. and China, of China with Russia and the U.S., and of the U.S. with Russia and China, from enemy to friend and vice-versa, it is because on a whole host of issues India and Russia think alike and have common interests. I think the India-Soviet Union/Russia relationship over the last 60 years is an emblematic story of how two large countries, which are so different in so many ways, can succeed in forging a strong relationship capable of withstanding the pressures of a changing environment.

SECURITY INDEX: Indian-Russian relations in the nuclear sphere and in military technical cooperation are quite strong and fruitful. Can we consider these successes as examples of a complex and strategic approach in bilateral relations or only as tactical moves from both sides?

SIBAL: I think in the two spheres of nuclear and military technical cooperation, relations cannot be built on tactical moves. In these vital and sensitive areas, enduring relations can be built only with strategic underpinnings. Russia is the only country which is building nuclear power plants in India. Russia took this very important decision in favor of a non-NPT country because Russia had confidence in India and saw the strategic value of building a partnership in this sensitive area with a major country. If in future the doors open for international cooperation in India's civilian nuclear sector, Russia, with already a foot in the door, is well placed to be the earliest and biggest beneficiary. In the military technical sphere, India-Russia relations are outstanding. Most of the equipment used by India's army, navy, and air force is of Russian origin. We would hardly have allowed this dependence to grow to these levels if we did not view our relations with Russia strategically. When, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian arms industry was in dire straits, India relieved pressures by placing huge defence orders. Today Russia is supplying equipment and platforms which as yet are not being used by the Russian armed forces themselves. We have in a way pushed the Russian arms industry to upgrade itself by placing orders for equipment with very advanced specifications. The BrahMos missile is a fine example of a new thrust in our bilateral defence relationship, that of graduating from a buyer-seller relationship to joint research, development, production, and marketing. As arms deals involve enormous amounts of money and the life cycles of equipment are long, the core of decision making has to be essentially strategic, not tactical.

Note

¹ Vladimir Orlov's interview of Kanwal Sibal, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of India to Russia, took place on October 23, 2006.



Yury Baluyevsky

SECURITY INDEX OF A GLOBALIZED WORLD: THE RUSSIAN DIMENSION

Hardly anyone would deny that today's global processes are of concern not just to every country on our planet, but also to each individual, no matter the part of the world from which he comes. Economic ties, cultural diffusion, the unified information space brought about by television and the Internet, and similar ways of life with shared standards are just a few of the things bringing mankind closer and closer together. Although there are many definitions of the term globalization, the real meaning of the term is the primacy of that which we have in common and the leveling of private interests (individual, national, etc.)

Therefore, globalization has become a major factor in political and expert discussions of practically any problem dealing with development trends in international political, economic, and cultural relations.

SECURITY AND GLOBALIZATION

Certainly, the openness of information contributes to the dynamic development of globalization processes. Today no event, no matter where in the world it occurs, can remain hidden.

On the one hand, globalization means the distribution of certain models. Nobody would doubt that globalization is useful and progressive, if it means sharing models that translate to high standards of living, high quality IT, high culture, and science. But no ordinary person would accept globalization if it means the suppression of national culture, information aggression, or the imposition of alien ideology and standards. Unfortunately, today we quite often observe attempts by certain politicians and governments to "conduct" globalization in the latter fashion.

Yes, globalization, which I also understand as the internationalization of life, is moving forward, overcoming and creating difficulties, breaking the resistance of certain social groups and replacing them with others. Yes, the "fruits" of globalization are not distributed evenly: the weak and the poor are out of luck as usual! Indeed, traditional cultures with deep roots that go back to antiquity are being pushed aside and into the ditch, while aggressive subcultures are getting ahead, fostered by the material opportunities provided by the vanguard of globalization—the United States.

In fact, the United States has declared practically the whole world its "zone of national interest," while its "models" of democracy and culture have become standard. It has demonstrated its willingness and ability to "establish order" in any country in the world. However, its methods for establishing this sort of order have become openly forceful of late. Furthermore, these methods are not always welcomed, either by the people of the countries where order is being established, or by the global community as a whole.



It is clear that the industrial world, which is primarily associated with the United States, has learned to make short work of regimes (states) that pose a threat to national security. The question is: what more should be done for the “freed” territories? How could the people of those countries where the leaders have, for various reasons, lost the ability to rule their states, be helped?

There have been already some attempts to divide the world in two, between the “Core” and the “Gap.” Leaf through the pages of *The Pentagon’s New Map: War and Peace in the Twenty-First Century*¹ by Thomas Barnett (until recently a professor at the U.S. Naval War College). The work was initially published in March 2003 as an article called “The Pentagon’s New Map,” with the subtitle “It explains why we’re going to war and why we’ll keep going to war,” in *Esquire* magazine. The author suggests his own definition of globalization: the transfer of the American model of development to the rest of the world.

Clearly globalization is an objective reality: it cannot be avoided or driven away by anti-globalization demonstrations. It must be understood and we must be part of it. And that means that Russia’s role and place in the global community will depend on how it can join in, integrate into the processes of globalization, following the principle: “The world is changing, it’s becoming neither better, nor worse—it is becoming different. The changes that are happening demand the evolution of international legal norms... It is important that this evolution does not overshadow that in the name of which this change is being made: *man*, and his rights and freedom.”

Today many people believe that Chapter I, Article 2, paragraph 7 of the UN Charter, which proclaims the principle of non-interference “in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state” should be revised. They propose replacing the principle of state sovereignty with the principle of global security. Human and national rights to self-determination are contrasted to the principles of state sovereignty and territorial integrity. Nation-states are accused of being unable to govern effectively given the fact of globalization. Clear political concepts like “state” and “border” are being displaced by uncertain geographic and socio-economical terms that don’t have any basis in law.

WHAT IS GLOBALIZATION AND WHY IS IT HAPPENING?

I see globalization as a direct threat to the continued existence of the Westphalian system of international relations of 1648 that continues to operate to this day, in a new multipolar system. If this threat is realized, in addition to “blowing up” the current world order, it might also shake up the constitutional system upon which sovereign states are based. It is particularly important to note that the Westphalian system made the United Nations possible: it was originated and exists today only because of the will of sovereign states, which had the goal to “never again” allow global catastrophes like World War II.

Certainly, globalization is a fundamental trend that will determine the direction of world development for many decades to come. As for Russia, globalization is likely to, or may even inevitably, lead to changes not only in the economy, but also in other areas such as politics, nationalities issues, and the social sphere. In addition to positive changes, however, there are likely to be quite a few negative ones, including new challenges in the sphere of national security. This is particularly relevant for a country with many nationalities and religions, such as Russia.

At this point we should ask some questions:

- How can we ensure that globalization will not destroy state sovereignty?
- How can we ensure that globalization will not replace international relations with a sort of “global supermarket?”
- How can we ensure that our countries’ history and culture will not be dissolved into a “unified information space” as a result of globalization?

- How can we ensure that presidents, parliaments, and governments chosen by their citizens will not have their real powers taken over by transnational financial magnates?

And, probably, one could ask many more such questions.

However, even though globalization is one of the most significant factors influencing global development today, I do not believe that it is the only factor.

MONOPOLIZATION AND THE TITANIC

As the second point, I would note two opposing trends: one is the U.S. mission to construct a unipolar world (this trend is currently prevailing, but, to my mind, will not win in the end) and the other is movement towards a multipolar world.

In my opinion, the monopoly of a single superpower, the United States, based on overwhelming military force and vast material resources, may lead the world into a corner! (Zbigniew Brzezinski indirectly recognizes this in his book *The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership*.)²

While before the 1990s, we could speak of two opposing superpowers, two military alliances, and a bipolar world, after the disintegration of Soviet Union the United States became the sole superpower and has been maximizing its efforts to establish a unipolar world under its aegis.

Despite the new international situation, the leadership of the United States and some other leading countries continue to believe that it is not only fine to threaten the use of force, but also to make good on this threat against any state without a sufficient deterrent capability. Therefore, they consider the military to be one of the main tools for ensuring national interests and achieving political and economic aims. Because of this, the majority of the large states—primarily NATO member countries, Japan, China, India, Pakistan, and Iran—are actively re-equipping their armed forces, buying new equipment and modernizing existing weapons systems.

The most dangerous aspect of this type of policy is that it does not just result in the expenditure of substantial resources but also results in concrete actions, including: the demonstration of military power and determination to use it against an objectionable regime, while using the pressure of a massive information campaign as a backdrop; the use of a military blockade in order to isolate this regime from the rest of the world; peacekeeping that is expanded through operations to “compel peace” against infringers of stability; or as we saw in the example of the Anglo-American operation in Iraq, the forced change of an unsatisfactory regime without the sanction of the relevant international institutions and despite the protests of the greater part of the world’s states. As a result, the principles of “state sovereignty” and “non-interference in the internal affairs” of sovereign states are eroding further and further. The very processes of globalization, which are being driven forward in all walks of life, have become the most important driver of world development in the 21st century.

The U.S. administration has “appointed” itself (without asking others) both the captain and the helmsman of the processes transforming the world, not hiding its aspiration to world leadership. The first “results” of this can already be seen both in Iraq and in former Soviet territory, especially Central Asia and the Caucasus. It is no surprise that at the G8 Summit in St. Petersburg, Russian President Vladimir Putin emphasized that “to us, certainly, it would not be desirable to have the same kind of democracy that Iraq has.”

The danger for Russia and the other passengers on the world *Titanic* is that nobody is asking them which direction they want to sail. Nobody wants a recurrence of the tragic destiny of the passengers of the real *Titanic*...

Let’s ask ourselves: is the global community, Russia included, threatened with the complete domination of one power—the United States? In my opinion, despite its possession of enor-



mous economic and military power and the ambition of the country's military and political leaders, the coming of a unipolar world is not guaranteed.

GLOBALIZATION AND RUSSIAN INTERESTS

I am sure that the world's states and their peoples need a fair, multipolar world, with equal rights and no self-appointed hegemon. That is why we have already seen resistance to U.S. domination in the 21st century and there will only be more challenges in future, arising from Asia (particularly China and India). Where is the guarantee that the United States will not come into direct competition with China? Can a similar rivalry between the United States and the European Union (EU) be completely excluded? Or with the Greater (in the terminology of the U.S. administration) Middle East?

Furthermore, there are and can be no values that can be considered universal for all countries and all peoples on all occasions. There are no values that are "better" than the values of so-called "backward" people, which they developed themselves through their way of living. Whatever it is like, a nation's way of life reflects the soul of its people.

Therefore, Russia's national interest clearly has been and will continue to be determined on the basis of its historical development. Certainly, the country's current situation is far from what its citizens desire. But it took centuries for Russian civilization to develop, during which time it met the challenges and threats that faced it on its own and developed a way of life of world importance.

It is quite natural that Russia today, like any state, has permanent (core) national interests, such as state sovereignty, territorial integrity, domestic political stability, the strategic stability of the international political system, and easy access to vital economic and strategic regions and lines of communication. Unfortunately, these interests are now the object of "new threats."

Russia is for globalization. And it has been contributing to it for centuries. Words like "intelligentsia" and "sputnik," sending man into outer space, the rise of the peoples of remote Russian territories to world renown, as well as Russian music and literature have become the property of all mankind. Russia made a critical contribution to victories in the world wars of the 20th century and the Napoleonic wars in the 19th century. It offered its help to the United States in its struggle for independence and to the countries of Asia, Africa, and South America when they were freeing themselves from colonial dependence. And if we go even further back in time, our Russian ancestors helped to save Europe from the army of Genghis Khan.

For these reasons we have our own view of globalization. I am against placing Russia in opposition to Europe and Asia (Eurasia), but I am also against the imposition of European civilization on Russia, since I am certain that if Russia wants to have a successful future, it must remain Russia. Russia is not Europe, not Asia, and not even Eurasia. I'd like to emphasize, it is Russia!

At the same time, the Russian Federation is in a unique geopolitical and geostrategic position. Russia's strategic priorities are determined by the nation's strategic, political, economic, and national security goals.

These goals reflect Russia's basic national interests in *three interconnected spheres*: one domestic—actually national (state)—and two foreign—regional and global. At the national (state) level, the key national interest is the development of the Russian state into an economically powerful state that is focused on satisfying the expectations of all peoples and social groups in the Russian Federation.

As a whole, Russia's strategic priorities on the *national level* are:

- the creation of a democratic society, rule of law, where the political, economic, social, and human needs of each member of society are provided for;

- ❑ economic prosperity and the consent of all social groups, movements, organizations, and political parties;
- ❑ the provision of sovereignty and territorial integrity, maintaining security and defending the Russian Federation;
- ❑ the continuation of military reform and the transition to a professional army and reduction of the draft;
- ❑ the pursuit of a very pragmatic foreign policy based on our opportunities and national interests, be they strategic, economic, or political; and
- ❑ the search for trustworthy allies as well as the ability to be a trustworthy ally.

At the *regional level*, one priority is the development of friendly relations with neighboring states:

- ❑ working with the CIS countries is a main Russian foreign policy priority;
- ❑ continuing to work actively with the European Union to form a united economic space; and
- ❑ generally ensuring that no military aggression, threats, and risks arise in the regions bordering Russia.

Having set national development priorities, which are aimed towards the transformation of the Russian Federation into a powerful and modern democratic state with an advanced economy, science, and culture, we must also appraise the wide spectrum of domestic and external threats that could prevent the realization of our goals.

Russia's current *geostrategic situation* has been influenced by the cardinal changes affecting the international political system, which have shaped the new global and regional systems of international relations. This situation is developing dynamically, is unstable, and includes periods of acute tension.

After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russia's geostrategic situation did not improve. As a result of the formation of 15 sovereign states in the post-Soviet space, many interstate problems arose that frequently led to military confrontations. This could not help but affect the general character of threats to Russian security and the balance of power both at the global and regional level.

The end of the ideological and military confrontation between two political systems has not led, as was expected, to the demilitarization of global politics. Russia's increased interaction with the West, based on general as well as close strategic interests, has not contributed to a strengthening of its security. Moreover, conditions in areas of the world vital to Russia, as well as in areas adjacent to it, have become even more complicated in several cases.

This has led to one more priority national interest: ensuring Russia has *reliable defense capabilities* that are maintained at a level adequate to meet existing and potential military threats and provide for its free, sovereign development.

As prominent Russian military theorist Aleksandr Svechin wrote in the 1920s, in the military sphere "strategic policy should be the military projection of [a state's] general policy." Thus, Russia's long-term political and economic priorities determine its strategic priorities in the military sphere.

For those of us in the military, the defense of Russian national interests consists of neutralizing threats to the Russian Federation and its allies, deterring direct or indirect aggression and attempts to pressure it through the use of force, as well as ensuring the military defense of the



integrity and inviolability of our territory, and the nation's peaceful and democratic development.

THE RUSSIAN MILITARY'S OBJECTIVES

The Russian Ministry of Defense's view of the threats to Russian security and the mission of the armed forces in the near future are based on a comprehensive assessment of the global military and strategic situation. In essence, they can be summarized as follows.

As a result of a significant weakening of Russia's defense capacity (in comparison with that of the Soviet Union), military threats to national security can now arise from both the developed states and their military alliances, as well as from developing countries that have well-armed and well-trained armies. It should be clear to all that if states with territorial or other claims vis-à-vis Russia have military power, they cannot be discounted.

Another fairly new source of military threats to Russian security is concentrated near its borders, and is related to the existence of current and potential breeding grounds for armed conflict.

In our view, the real near-term military *threats to Russian national security* are the following:

- ❑ the U.S. military and political leadership's policy of maintaining their leadership of the world and expanding their economic, political, and military presence in regions traditionally under Russian influence;
- ❑ the realization of plans for further NATO expansion;
- ❑ the undertaking of military actions in contravention of widely recognized principles and international law becoming common practice in the West;
- ❑ existing and potential flashpoints of local wars and confrontations, particularly in Russia's immediate proximity;
- ❑ the possible undermining of strategic stability as a result of a violation of international agreements in the field of arms control and reductions, and/or the qualitative and quantitative escalation of arms acquisition by other countries;
- ❑ the proliferation of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), means of their delivery, and the most modern military technologies as a result of attempts by various countries, organizations, and terrorist groups to realize their military and political aspirations;
- ❑ the expansion of military blocs and alliances to the detriment of Russia's national security interests;
- ❑ other states' territorial claims on the Russian Federation and its allies;
- ❑ the struggle for access to energy resources;
- ❑ international terrorism;
- ❑ the illegal activity of nationalist, separatist organizations directed towards the destabilization of the domestic situation in the Russian Federation; and
- ❑ the spread of information hostile to the Russian Federation and its allies.

In order to answer the question of how to ensure Russian military security given these new conditions, it is necessary:

- ❑ to define the goals of national military policy in such a way as to reflect the threats classified as most likely and dangerous;
- ❑ to develop a model for the armed forces (and for the national military as a whole) that will determine the necessary responses to these threats and their possible consequences, in order to find the optimum force structure to meet these threats;
- ❑ to create a capacity for peacekeeping operations without the involvement (or with the minimal involvement) of the armed forces;
- ❑ to improve the equipment, comprehensive maintenance, and preparedness of the armed forces, emphasizing joint, not separate, training of various military branches, units, and other related organizations;
- ❑ to defend the interests of the Russian Federation in a tough and pragmatic manner, while concluding international agreements and treaties and participating actively in the development of legal norms and laws to defend Russian interests in all international organizations, including the United Nations;
- ❑ to form geostrategic conditions favorable to the Russian Federation through the creation of alliances, coalitions, and other collective security systems; and
- ❑ to develop the state's economic capabilities and military-industrial complex, as necessary conditions to increase the country's military capacity and military power.

The activity of international terrorist organizations should be classified as a special group of military threats facing Russia. It is no secret that terrorism has become a long-term factor of modern political life, a relatively established phenomenon in the development of society.



TERRORISM AND GROWING “NORTH-SOUTH” CONTRADICTIONS

The consequences of the terrorist acts in New York and Washington have led to a new type of relationship between many of the world's states. International terrorism is now a major threat to the security of many countries; the military's main efforts should be concentrated on combating this enemy. Russia's position on this issue is well known: international terrorism should be destroyed everywhere in all of its manifestations.

Indeed, the main way to combat international terrorism today is the adequate use of military force. That is why Russia has supported the international campaign against terrorism in an open and direct manner. At the same time, however, we have stated that any military actions by states and international organizations against terrorists should be based on the principles of international law, be proportional, and be strictly verified. There should not be any political double standards in evaluations and actions against terrorism and separatism.

However, it is impossible to achieve an absolute victory in the war against international terrorism through the use of military force alone. For this reason, Russia has been looking for non-military ways gradually to destroy the environment that breeds international terrorism. Primarily, this plague must be combated by developing and increasing international cooperation based on the principles of international law, including the UN Charter. Furthermore, it is important that all states participate in the universal antiterrorist conventions.

The surge in terrorist activity observed in recent years is a manifestation of yet another contemporary trend, which I would call the “rise of contradictions between the ‘rich North’ and the ‘poor South.’”

Today in many countries, including the most developed, we see the intensification of the animosity that the indigenous population feels towards immigrants from poor countries—recall the demonstrations in France in the fall of 2005. Media coverage of poverty, illness, social ten-

sions, and military conflicts in poor countries has created an explosive mix that is increasing this animosity. Surely, the policy of “the rich and satisfied” allowing “the poor” to survive as best they can is the path to global social upheavals.

In my opinion, this situation could eventually lead to the division and impoverishment of the world as a whole. The world cannot be stable if all of the achievements of mankind are concentrated in the rich and prosperous countries alone. However, wealthy states are not ready and not willing to share their wealth.

The consequences for Russia of the tension between the North and the South have already become quite acute. Today Russia’s southern borders are adjacent to areas of current and possible future conflict. It should be noted that most of these conflicts are taking place on former Soviet territory and nearby areas. It is precisely here that international terrorism and the most brutal crimes (such as those involving narcotics and the trafficking of humans and weapons) are increasing. Another danger our country faces is that this *Eurasian zone of terrorism and crime* is located in a “global arc of crises” that was artificially provoked (and stretches, according to Zbigniew Brzezinski, who calls the area the “Eurasian Balkans,” from the borders of China, India, and Pakistan, to Iran, the south of Turkey—its border with Kurdistan, and the Balkans, and includes Afghanistan).

FORCE AND THE LAW

I believe that military power will continue to play a critical role in determining the global geopolitical balance for many years to come. The concept of international law is being transformed. A new international legal system needs to be created from scratch. Our priorities are well known.

We believe that since the world today is facing new threats, we cannot allow a legal vacuum in the sphere of strategic stability. Therefore, the current relationship between the Russian Federation and the United States should be maintained and used as a basis for the rapid development of new strategic bilateral relations.

We believe that a new legally binding U.S.-Russian agreement should be concluded that could be based on the following principles: maintaining and strengthening trust, increasing the predictability of U.S.-Russian relations, and developing our countries’ strategic partnership still further. This agreement could be given a wider scope, including issues such as strategic arms reductions, anti-missile defense, outer space, nonproliferation, the fight against international terrorism, and military-technical cooperation.

Strengthening the WMD nonproliferation regime and preventing “leaks of sensitive technologies” in the nuclear and missile spheres are critical to maintaining strategic stability today. This is due to the fact that changes in the international system over the past decade have resulted in a weakening of the WMD nonproliferation regime formed by the late 1980s and maintained by the two superpowers (the United States and the Soviet Union).

As a result of the demise of the bipolar system, many states’ motivations to obtain nuclear weapons and WMD have increased, while the means to combat this tendency have decreased. This is because in the past (during the Cold War), the bipolar system not only obligated countries on each side to prepare to attack each other, but also provided certain protections against an attack. This was also true for “third world” countries: the superpowers watched one another suspiciously and tried to block the use of force against so-called “neutral countries” that could result in a strengthening of the opposition. Today, given the decreased role of the United Nations in controlling the use of force, those countries not in the “zone of U.S. influence” are increasingly motivated to acquire nuclear weapons and other types of WMD.

The rapid evolution of conventional arms and jump in their quality leads countries afraid of a conventional attack to seek WMD, including nuclear weapons, which are both *more accessible and more affordable*. This is because nuclear weapons, which arose in the middle of the last

century as the weapons of rich states, have become the weapons of poor states, providing them an ability reliably to counter military threats from more developed countries. At the same time, *technical progress* has made nuclear weapons more accessible, to say nothing of chemical and biological weapons.

From this point of view we cannot help but be worried by the U.S. and U.K. efforts to *assign nuclear weapons a role in deterring other types of WMD*, a practice that contradicts the principle of “negative security assurances” for non-nuclear states. We are similarly concerned about the U.S. aspiration to create, in accordance with its new nuclear doctrine, small-scale and miniature nuclear munitions for pinpoint, and possibly preventive, strikes in the service of a “noble” cause, the struggle against terrorism.

Thus, new security threats and challenges force many countries to rely on nuclear arsenals more and more, a situation that indirectly increases the probability of nuclear weapons proliferation, which, in turn, causes the strategic situation to deteriorate still further and security to decrease. Hence, in our opinion, the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons and other types of WMD should be a priority area in all nuclear states’ security policies.

In the field of the European security, our proposals consist of the establishment of a system of equal security for all European states without military alliances or dividing lines, based on cooperation, which involves all European institutions (NATO, the EU, OSCE, etc.)

Proceeding from the European experience, one could propose *the consideration of new arms control measures*, including at a regional level. In our opinion, they could be based on the following “principles”:

- the indivisibility of the security of all states;
- the sufficiency of military capabilities;
- the equality of participants and voluntary character of agreements;
- equal security;
- economic acceptability; and
- capacity and adaptation to new situations.

ARMS CONTROL: A NEW APPROACH IS NEEDED

Here we would first like to give our view of the existing arms control system. The basic tools of arms control, like the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty) and the Vienna Document, played a major role in the events of the past decades, in particular the fact that the military and political changes in Europe did not lead to new crises and conflicts. However, today many facets of these documents have noticeably lost their effectiveness and ceased to correspond to the changing situation.

In its current state, the CFE Treaty regime is no longer able to maintain the stability and balance of interests of states parties given the military and political changes occurring in Europe, particularly because it has no provisions for new members joining the agreement. As for adapting the CFE Treaty, its ratification has already been postponed by the NATO states for seven years. As a result, after two stages of NATO expansion in the east and the failure of the Agreement on Adaptation to enter force, the CFE Treaty has basically lost its viability. Given this situation, the Russian Federation is not going to pretend that the CFE Treaty is functioning well and we are satisfied with it. The Third CFE Treaty Review Conference highlighted the desire of the NATO countries to fix for an uncertain term the inequality of the parties within the framework of the existing Treaty.



No less important is the adaptation of the Vienna Document of 1999, which basically repeats the 1994 text, and has ceased to carry out its main function: on confidence and security-building measures for contemporary military activities. And that is in spite of the fact that there has been a sharp rise in the intensity of military activity, the number of military exercises—including multinational exercises, and the geography of these exercises. Some parties to the document believe that large exercises are no longer occurring, and that, therefore, they do not reach the threshold where providing notification and allowing observation is required. However, modern military equipment now makes it possible for smaller numbers of troops and armaments to undertake large-scale, fairly significant military operations.

The document now in force does not take into account recent qualitative changes in OSCE member state militaries or, in particular, the role given to rapid reaction forces. Establishing exchanges of information about these forces would be an important measure in building trust and cooperation. There still remain the unnecessary Vienna Document provisions on risk reduction.

Thus, the global community's development of a common approach towards the fundamental problem of constructing a new system of international relations is vital to the optimization of regional organizations in the field of security.

RUSSIA AND EUROPE

We would also like to note that within the general framework of a common European process, we have managed through joint efforts to create a strong enough basis to continue a meaningful dialogue on the whole range of global and regional security problems. It is important that we do not stop with what we have already achieved. We need to move forward, through the coordination of national security concepts, on the basis of the UN Charter and principles of international law, to create a military strategy on a Eurasian scale. Again it should be emphasized that the critical international problems of today can be solved only through joint efforts and with the involvement of legitimate international organizations.

This problem is quite solvable. In order to solve it, we need to translate the general vision of new partner relationships into the language of real action. Here again, in Russia Europe has a reliable, predictable, and responsible partner.

I believe that the broad use of Russia's military capacity is in the interest of a "European consciousness." This can be provided for by our country joining in European processes on an equitable basis and through the joint creation of an effective European anti-crisis mechanism.

This is why Russia supports the creation of a common European security system with the formation of mechanisms for conflict prevention and resolution, primarily by peaceful means. The most important principle upon which European security is based is the unconditional observance of international obligations and standards, as well as the continued development of a system of arms control agreements.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has a visible influence on the military situation in Europe and beyond. Thanks to its military capacity, it continues to exert the greatest influence on the European and global security system.

On May 28, 2002, a declaration by heads of state and government of NATO member states and the Russian Federation was adopted at the Rome Summit. The declaration established the Russia-NATO Council, within the framework of which Russia and the NATO member states work on a national basis as equal partners on a wide spectrum of Atlantic security issues.

Russia and NATO member states cooperate in the following areas: the fight against terrorism, crisis management, WMD nonproliferation, arms control and confidence-building measures, theater anti-missile defense, search and rescue at sea, military-to-military cooperation, emergency planning and response, etc. Through the NATO-Russia Council, our relations are being

built on the principles of transparency and mutual respect. As examples of practical interaction, I would like to cite Russia's participation in the Alliance's counter-terrorist exercise Operation Active Endeavor in the Mediterranean Sea—a mutually advantageous activity that was part of the Cooperative Airspace Initiative, as well as joint exercises related to the response to an incident involving nuclear weapons and other joint training exercises.

However, despite the many positive trends in our interaction with NATO, several unresolved problems remain. First of all, there is the ongoing Alliance policy directed towards expansion through the states in the post-Soviet space, where Russia has continuing interests. This situation was initiated several years ago, during the “second wave” of NATO expansion. At the time, Russia's voice was not heard. As a result, the so-called “Baltic knot” was formed, in which the “strings” of the Russian-Baltic problems are tightly intertwined. This includes the inability to make use of Lithuanian territory and air space for the transit of Russian cargoes (including military cargoes) between the Kaliningrad area and the rest of Russia, the humiliating position of the Russian-speaking population in the Baltics, and territorial claims on Russia.

Another unresolved problem is the failure to sign a treaty with the Alliance for the prevention of dangerous military activity which, in our opinion, would make it possible to develop a legal, civilized procedure to manage the actions of parties involved in unanticipated military situations arising along Russia's borders. The September 2005 accident involving a Russian plane in Lithuania has confirmed clearly that NATO members should have listened long ago to our suggestions concerning the development of confidence-building measures where Russian and NATO forces meet.

In recent years, many military facilities—air stations, naval bases, training centers and ranges—on the territory of new NATO members have undergone modernization. These installations can be used for operational deployment as well as force support. Furthermore, we cannot but note that this is changing the military character in the area next to our borders, in areas falling under CFE Treaty restrictions.

We should note that Russia wants NATO to be a predictable and reliable partner. Combating the new threats and challenges that are facing mankind in the 21st century can only be done in concert, taking each other's interests into account.

RUSSIA LOOKS TO THE EAST AND TO THE SOUTH

Cooperation with Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) member states has become a Russian military priority. There is a broad range of interaction with Organization member states—from coordination of foreign policy and joint military planning, to combating terrorism, narcotics, illegal migration, and organized crime. The Russian divisions that are dedicated to the CSTO are part of the Collective Rapid Reaction Forces in the Central Asian Region, together with the military contingents of three other states: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. Within the Organization framework, there are plans to create a military group capable of protecting CSTO states in the Central Asian, Western, and Caucasus CSTO regions. Russian military units are being dedicated to the proposed new structure.

We also place great importance on the development of military cooperation under the Shanghai Cooperation (SCO), which is primarily aimed at preventing and combating terrorism. At the same time, traditional military cooperation with the largest states—China and India—is continuing on a bilateral basis.

CONCLUSION

Only 15 years have passed since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, an insignificant period in historical terms. Russia is once again a leading player on the “world chessboard,” though very few people would have believed it. Many recent events serve as an acknowledgement of



this fact, but the most conclusive, in my opinion, was the July 2006 G8 Summit in St. Petersburg. For the first time Russia served as chairman and had the right to put issues on the agenda that it considered important for the global community to address.

Raising the question of global energy security was right and proper. After all, explosive economic growth, increasing living standards, and victories over famine and illness are impossible without reliable sources of energy. That is why the struggle for access to energy resources in many respects determines those challenges and threats that the world faces today.

Russia has shown that it is a reliable partner and the guarantor of the energy security of its allies and partners, as well as that there are not just military, but also energy superpowers. And most importantly, it has shown that it understands the global situation perfectly and that it is ready and capable of taking responsibility for much of what is happening throughout the world. 🗣️

Notes

¹ Thomas Barnett, *The Pentagon's New Map. War and Peace in the Twenty-first Century* (NY: Putnam Adult, 2004).

² Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership* (New York: Basic Books, March 2004).



Scott Parrish and William C. Potter¹

NUCLEAR THREAT PERCEPTIONS AND NONPROLIFERATION RESPONSES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

In the wake of the failure of the 2005 NPT Review Conference, it is apparent that NPT States parties have widely divergent views about the health of the Treaty, its relevance to contemporary nuclear challenges, and the feasibility, desirability, and urgency of modifying and/or supplementing what has long been the principal legal foundation for the international nonproliferation regime. It is commonplace and largely correct to ascribe these differences in national perspectives to divergent threat perceptions. Threat perceptions, which are subjective, are often viewed as the primary factor motivating states' policy choices. There is also often an important symbolic and political linkage between perceived threats and proposed solutions. It is thus of critical importance to take stock of the proliferation threat perceptions held by those states which play a significant role in the global nonproliferation regime. This kind of analysis could be particularly useful in the aftermath of the disappointing 2005 NPT Review Conference, since it might help to identify issues on which a convergence of views, if not consensus, might be generated, as well as highlighting those issues for which it will prove difficult to gain support for collective action.

This study represents a "first cut" at such an analysis. A group of nonproliferation specialists at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies have collaborated to produce an assessment of the proliferation threat perceptions and nonproliferation strategies of 16 countries that traditionally have played a significant role in nuclear politics. The countries include several nuclear weapon states (the United States, Russia, China), a number of non-nuclear weapon states with advanced nuclear power industries (Germany, Japan, South Korea, Spain), members of the New Agenda Coalition (Brazil, Egypt, South Africa, Sweden), the Non-Aligned Movement (Indonesia, Iran)², and the three de facto nuclear weapon states (India, Israel, Pakistan). The assessments are informed by a careful examination of both official statements and actual behavior by the 16 states under review and by extended consultations with officials, journalists, and analysts from the countries in question. Prevailing national perceptions of the intensity of a range of proliferation threats were estimated using a simple "low-moderate-high" scale. Using a similar approach, country preferences for a range of nonproliferation strategies also were estimated along a similar scale. While this index is simple and does not capture the full complexity of many proliferation challenges and nonproliferation strategies, it is nonetheless useful in producing a broad-brush picture of how countries view both proliferation threats and the means of addressing them.

Although this approach may miss many subtleties in national politics and policies, it has the virtue of making explicit and amenable to debate many assumptions that otherwise would not be apparent. It also may prove useful for getting a rough fix on which proliferation threats and nonproliferation strategies have broad support among a range of countries, and which are the subject of greater controversy. The overall picture thus produced may also help in identifying



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possible coalitions and strategies for dealing with specific proliferation challenges, which might otherwise be overlooked.

NUCLEAR THREAT PERCEPTIONS

National Threats

Table 1 provides a summary of CNS estimates of prevailing national nuclear threat perceptions. As might be expected, the summary table reveals that for the countries surveyed there is not complete agreement on which individual states constitute the greatest nuclear proliferation threat. Some interesting patterns, however, emerge.

Table 1. National Threats³

| | China | DPRK | India | Iran | Israel | Japan | Pakistan |
|----------------------|--------------|---------------|--------------|-------------|---------------|--------------|-----------------|
| Brazil | Low | Low | Low | Low | Low | Low | Low |
| China | N/A | Moderate | Moderate | Moderate | Low | High | Low |
| Egypt | Low | Low | Low | High | High | Low | Moderate |
| Germany | Low | High | Low | High | Moderate | Low | Moderate |
| India | Moderate | Low | N/A | Low | Low | Low | High |
| Indonesia | Moderate | Moderate | Moderate | Moderate | Low | Low | Moderate |
| Iran | Low | Low | Low | N/A | High | Low | Low-Moderate |
| Israel | Moderate | High | Low | High | N/A | Low | High |
| Japan | Moderate | High | Low | Moderate | Low | N/A | Moderate |
| Pakistan | Low | Low | High | Low | Low | Low | N/A |
| ROK | Low-Moderate | Moderate-High | Low | Moderate | Low | Moderate | Moderate |
| Russia | High | Moderate | Low | Moderate | Moderate | Low-Moderate | High |
| Spain | Low-Moderate | High | Low-Moderate | High | Moderate-High | Low | Moderate |
| South Africa | Low | Low | Low | Low | Low | Low | Low |
| Sweden | Low | High | Low | High | Moderate | Low | Moderate |
| United States | Moderate | High | Moderate | High | Low | Low | Moderate |

For almost all states there is a close correspondence between their rankings of the nuclear proliferation threats posed by Iran and North Korea. Those that saw North Korea as a low threat also tended to discount the threat posed by Iran, while those that regarded the threat of North

Korea to be moderate or high tended to ascribe a similar proliferation threat to Iran. The principal exception to this parallelism is Egypt, which perceived Iran to constitute a high nuclear threat, while attaching a much lower danger to the nuclear challenge posed by North Korea.

Also noteworthy is the fact that all of the *de jure* nuclear weapons states surveyed agree that North Korea and Iran present a moderate or high nuclear threat. On the surface, at least, this convergence of threat perceptions would appear to create the basis for these states undertaking common action to address the proliferation challenges posed by North Korea and Iran. To the extent that France and the United Kingdom also share these perspectives—a reasonable assumption although not one examined in the study—one could imagine the P-5 seeking to adopt a joint position on North Korea and Iran. However, the difficulties in achieving cooperation among the P-5 on this issue were illustrated at the 2005 NPT Review Conference (RevCon) where disagreements over disarmament issues prevented the adoption of a joint statement at the conference. Nevertheless, the P-5 appear to agree on a approach that identifies the Six Party Talks as the appropriate vehicle for resolving the North Korean nuclear challenge, an orientation shared by Japan and South Korea.

The comparative threat assessments, however, also point to the divergence of views between the NWS and key representatives of the New Agenda Coalition and NAM (as well as to disagreements within those political groupings) on the issue of country specific threats. For example, Brazil and South Africa are inclined to treat the nuclear threats posed by all of the seven countries examined in our survey as low, while fellow NAC members Sweden and Egypt perceive the threat of Iran to be high (Sweden also regards the nuclear threat of North Korea to be high, while Egypt attaches a much lower value to that threat). Similarly divergent views about the threats posed by Iran and North Korea exist among NAM stalwarts Indonesia, South Africa, Egypt, and Iran. These differences in threat perceptions within NAC and NAM and between these political groupings and the NWS contributed to the failure of the 2005 NPT Review Conference to find consensus language on issues related to North Korea and Iran.

Among the countries surveyed, there are no other individual states that attract such widespread concern as North Korea and Iran. Most other states are regarded as threats only by their regional rivals. Israel, for example, is regarded as a high-level threat by Iran and Egypt, and China is viewed as a moderate or high-level threat by Russia, India, Japan, and the United States. Given the lack of widespread convergence of views regarding these country-specific threats, it is unlikely that broad multilateral action will be undertaken to address these regional security concerns.

Nuclear Terrorism

Despite the intense media and government focus in the United States on the dangers of nuclear terrorism, much of the rest of the world does not share this sense of urgency. For purposes of this study, nuclear terrorism is defined as having four aspects—use of radiation dispersal devices (RDDs), sabotage of or attacks on nuclear facilities, manufacture and use of improvised nuclear devices, and theft and use of an intact nuclear weapon.⁴ The Russian Federation appears to be the only other state with a comparable level of concern about some dimensions of the nuclear terrorism challenge, and even the United States and Russia tend to be dismissive of one or more forms of nuclear terrorism involving the actual detonation of a nuclear explosive.

Surveying national perspectives on the four principal types of nuclear terrorism, very few states rate these threats as “high.” On RDDs or “dirty bombs,” as they are known in the press, only the United States and Russia regard this threat as high, while seven states rate it as low. In the sample, only Spain and Iran perceive the threat of sabotage of or attack on nuclear facilities as high, and Iran presumably has in mind attacks by the United States or Israel. The possibility of terrorists building an improvised nuclear device is rated as low by ten of the states surveyed, and is not considered “high” by any state, including the United States and Russia. Only five of the states surveyed rate the threat of theft and use of intact nuclear weapons (most likely tactical nuclear weapons) as “high” or “moderate,” although a lack of



clarity regarding the definition of the term probably accounts for the designation of the “low” ranking for several states in Asia.

Table 2. The Threat of Nuclear Terrorism

| | RDDs | Sabotage of Nuclear Facilities | Improvised Nuclear Device | Tactical Nuclear Weapons |
|----------------------|--------------|---------------------------------------|----------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| Brazil | Low | Low | Low | Low |
| China | Low | Low | Low | Low |
| Egypt | Low | Low | Low | Low |
| Germany | Moderate | Moderate | Moderate | High |
| India | Moderate | Moderate | Low | Low |
| Indonesia | Moderate | Low | Low-Moderate | Low |
| Iran | Low | High | Low | High |
| Israel | Low | Low | Low | Low |
| Japan | Moderate | Moderate | Moderate | Moderate |
| Pakistan | Low | Low | Low | Low |
| ROK | Low-Moderate | Moderate | Low | Low |
| Russia | High | Moderate-High | Low | Low |
| Spain | Moderate | High | Moderate | Moderate |
| South Africa | Low | Low | Low | Low |
| Sweden | Moderate | Moderate | Moderate-High | High |
| United States | High | Moderate | Moderate | Low |

In general, the United States, some of its allies, and Russia are most worried about nuclear terrorism. The NAM countries—with the partial exception of Indonesia—are inclined to attach little concern to the threat, and only Sweden among the NAC countries surveyed identifies any of the four facets of nuclear terrorism as a high priority threat.

Probably the most counter-intuitive finding from the survey is the low priority given to the threat of theft and use of intact “non-strategic” or tactical nuclear weapons by the representatives from NAC in our sample. NAC has been in the forefront in a number of international fora, including the First Committee and the NPT Review Process, in identifying the need to take further practical steps to reduce the threats posed by non-strategic nuclear weapons, but among the four NAC states in our survey, only Sweden appears to view the threat of tactical nuclear weapons as “high.” This apparent disconnect between NAC initiatives and threat perceptions probably is due to the sample of NAC countries in our survey (in particular, the omission of New Zealand and Ireland), the exceptionally high priority attached to the issue by Sweden, and the political tradeoffs among NAC states in the formulation of NAC’s initiatives.

Notwithstanding the lack of widespread agreement on any specific form of nuclear terrorism as a high-level threat, the general issue of nuclear terrorism does not generate major political opposition as do a number of country-specific threats. Most states appear to accept the premise that non-states actors constitute an emerging threat to international peace and security even if they do not yet directly threaten their own security. As such, they tend to be willing to defer to those states, including the majority of the NWS, which emphasize the need to take immediate action in multilateral fora, including the UN Security Council, the International Atomic Energy Agency, and the NPT Review Process.

An objective observer might argue that the greatest nuclear terrorist threats pertain to the possible acquisition and use by non-state actors of improvised or intact nuclear weapons. The more widespread dissemination of radioactive sources and nuclear power facilities, however, probably makes it easier to forge broad collective action to counter the dangers of RDDs and nuclear sabotage. The most difficult nuclear threat to tackle is apt to be that of tactical nuclear weapons since the two countries possessing most of the global stocks of these weapons—Russia and the United States—not only discount their danger but are actively opposed to most initiatives designed to reduce their threat.

Nuclear Leakage from the NIS

Interestingly, nuclear leakage from the Newly Independent States (NIS) appears to attract more concern from a broader group of states than nuclear terrorism. Nuclear material trafficking, for example, is cited as a high or moderate concern by 11 countries, with five of those rating it as “high.” Braindrain is viewed as a moderate or high concern by 10 states. Russia itself also recognizes that nuclear leakage is a threat, although it generally tends to downplay its significance in public. It is noteworthy that a number of regional powers, such as Germany, Egypt, Israel, South Korea, and Japan, view the threat of braindrain from the NIS as at least “moderate.” These countries all fear that black-market Russian nuclear expertise will foster proliferation in their neighborhoods. For reasons that are unclear, these states tend to see nuclear material leakage as a similar, but lesser threat.

The countries that share a common threat perception on the issue of nuclear leakage tend to be the allies of the United States. A number of non-aligned countries (e.g., Indonesia and Iran) and some members of the New Agenda Coalition (South Africa and Brazil), do not view this threat as a high priority. While some countries, such as Iran, cynically may hope to benefit from nuclear leakage, most others appear sincere in their belief that this threat is not a top priority. As a result, it may be difficult to generate strong collective action in the context of the NPT on these issues. But a robust coalition of the willing seems achievable, particularly on braindrain, which many countries see as a threat not only in terms of nuclear proliferation, but also in terms of spreading CBW and missile know-how.

Other Perceived Threats

Islamic fundamentalism stands out as a threat recognized as serious by almost all the countries surveyed. Only Brazil and Iran did not consider it to constitute either a moderate or high priority threat (and even Iran was concerned with the threat from al Qa’ida). Nine states (China, Egypt, Germany, Israel, Japan, Russia, Spain, Sweden, and the United States) were identified as placing the threat at a high level.

However, many states do not appear to link Islamic fundamentalism with nuclear terrorism or perhaps even with nuclear proliferation more broadly. Many of the states that view Islamic fundamentalism as a moderate threat, such as Indonesia, South Africa, and India, probably perceive the threat in terms of conventional terrorism and insurgency, rather than as a nuclear-related issue. As a result, while many states may view Islamic fundamentalism as a significant threat, there appears to be much less agreement on the nature of that threat and its relationship to nuclear terrorism or proliferation.



Table 3. Other Perceived Threats

| | Vertical Proliferation | Linkage to BW and CW Threats | Defections from the NPT | Failure to Implement INPT Obligations | Failed States | Islamic Fundamentalism |
|----------------------|------------------------|------------------------------|-------------------------|---------------------------------------|---------------|------------------------|
| Brazil | Moderate | Moderate | Moderate | Moderate | Low | Low |
| China | High | Moderate | High | Moderate | Moderate | High |
| Egypt | High | Low-Moderate | Moderate | High | High | High |
| Germany | High | Moderate | Moderate | High | Moderate | High |
| India | Moderate | Moderate | Moderate | High | Moderate | Moderate |
| Indonesia | High | Moderate | Moderate | Moderate-High | Low | Moderate |
| Iran | High | High | Moderate | Moderate | High | Low (except al-Qa`ida) |
| Israel | High | Moderate-High | High | High | High | High |
| Japan | High | Moderate | High | High | Moderate | High |
| Pakistan | High | Low | Low | High | Low | Moderate |
| ROK | Low-Moderate | Moderate | Low-Moderate | Low | Moderate-High | Low-Moderate |
| Russia | Moderate | Low | Low-Moderate | Low-Moderate | Moderate | High |
| Spain | Moderate | Moderate | Moderate | Moderate-High | Moderate | High |
| South Africa | Moderate | Moderate | Moderate | Moderate | Low | Moderate |
| Sweden | High | Moderate | Moderate | High | Moderate | High |
| United States | Low | Low | Low-Moderate | High | Moderate | High |

Vertical proliferation is another threat that is viewed by almost all the states surveyed as of either moderate or high concern. In fact, 10 states (China, Egypt, Germany, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Japan, Pakistan, Spain, and Sweden) rate vertical proliferation as a high priority threat. It is particularly noteworthy that the United States stands alone among the countries surveyed in attaching little importance to vertical proliferation (South Korea was judged to have a low-moderate level of concern with this issue). Of all the threats surveyed in this analysis, this is the one on which the United States is most isolated. Even many close U.S. allies, such as Germany and Japan, view vertical proliferation as a serious danger. The two other *de jure* nuclear weapon states surveyed, China and Russia, also view it as an issue of high and moderate concern respectively, and therefore are unlikely to side with the United States when this topic is addressed in the context of the NPT. In contrast to many of the threats analyzed above, it is also an issue on which the views of the NAC and NAM countries converge, although not per-

fectly. Given the widespread consensus on the issue, it is an obvious one on which to seek collective action in the framework of the NPT notwithstanding the dissenting U.S. position.

An unusual grouping of states express concern about “failed states”—that is those states which lack the capacity to adequately control their national territory and resources, making them sources of instability, terrorism, and possible collapse. On the one hand, the threat is perceived to be moderate to high by the United States and its allies, the other NWS, as well as by Egypt and India. Although many of the non-aligned and New Agenda Coalition countries view this threat as low, several states in both political groupings have contrary perspectives, apparently driven principally by regional security considerations. Given the substantial divergence of views on the generic threat posed by failed states, it is not apparent that collective remedial action will be easy to achieve. The prospect, however, may be more promising with respect to specific states.

There is concern among most of the countries surveyed about defections from the NPT. Only Pakistan (a non NPT-party), rates this threat as “low,” while the two other NPT outliers—India and Israel, view the threat of defections as “moderate” and “high,” respectively. Significantly, however, neither the United States nor Russia currently appear to regard the threat of NPT defections to be of major concern, which in the case of the United States may be a commentary on the diminished nonproliferation value the current administration attaches to the NPT. Most other countries rate the threat as moderate, the exceptions being some states in Northeast Asia (Japan, China) which fear the proliferation consequences of North Korea’s announced withdrawal from the NPT, and the Middle East where countries such as Egypt and Israel worry about the proliferation consequences of Iran’s possible withdrawal from the treaty.

The considerable degree of shared threat perceptions related to NPT defections led some observers to suggest that the NPT states parties would take collective action on this issue at the 2005 NPT Review Conference. That prediction proved incorrect. Although there was considerable discussion at the RevCon about how to interpret and implement Article X of the Treaty, which deals with the withdrawal provisions, no agreement was reached, and states parties remained very divided on the best means to tackle the problem. Many states are opposed to reinterpreting the Treaty so as to restrict further their right to withdraw or to penalize them for withdrawal. Nevertheless, further discussions on the subject may lead to a narrowing of differences about how to reduce the incentives for states to exploit Article IV of the NPT on peaceful use of nuclear energy to achieve a near-nuclear weapon status before declaring their intention to withdraw.

There is widespread concern among the states surveyed about the failure of states parties to implement their NPT obligations, although states vary widely in their assessment of which obligations are not being implemented. For example, those states which are most concerned about the nuclear threats posed by North Korea and Iran also are particularly worried about the failure of those two states to comply with their safeguards obligations. A number of other countries, however, are equally if not more concerned by what they regard to be the failure of the NWS to honor their Article VI disarmament commitments. For these states, concern about NPT compliance tends to correlate highly with threat perceptions about vertical proliferation. Germany, Japan, and Sweden are unusual among the countries in the survey in sharing especially high perceptions of threat related to both the failure of NNWS states to implement their nonproliferation obligations and NWS to honor their disarmament commitments. Not surprisingly, these divisions were again on display during the 2005 NPT RevCon, although they tended to be overshadowed by divisions and discord within the traditional political groupings.⁵

PREFERRED STRATEGIES FOR ADDRESSING PROLIFERATION CHALLENGES

Just as national perspectives on nuclear proliferation threats vary, so do national views on preferred means to counter proliferation challenges.

Support for the NPT, especially at the rhetorical level, remains very high among the countries surveyed. Only Pakistan and India, non-signatories, attached a low priority to the NPT.



Table 4. Preferred Nonproliferation Strategies: Arms Control/Disarmament

| | NPT | 13 Practical Steps | CTBT | NSG | IAEA Safeguards | Additional Protocol | FMCT | UNSCR 1540 | PSI | Sanctions | Export Controls | Counter-proliferation | Arms Transfers | Time-bound Nuclear Disarmament |
|----------------------|----------|--------------------|---------------|---------------|-----------------|---------------------|--------------|---------------|--------------|-----------|-----------------|-----------------------|----------------|--------------------------------|
| Brazil | High | High | Moderate | Moderate | High | Low-Moderate | Moderate | Moderate | Moderate | Moderate | Moderate | Low | Low | Moderate-High |
| China | High | High | Moderate | Moderate | High | High | Moderate | Moderate-High | Low | Low | High | Low | Low | Low |
| Egypt | High | High | Moderate | Low | High | Moderate | Moderate | Low | Low | Low | Low | Low | High | High |
| Germany | High | High | High | High | High | High | High | High | Moderate | Low | High | Low | Low | Low |
| India | Low | ? | Low | Moderate | Moderate | Moderate | Low | High | Moderate | Low | Moderate | Low | Moderate | Moderate-High |
| Indonesia | High | High | Moderate | Low | High | Moderate | High | Low | Low | Moderate | Low | Low | Low | High |
| Iran | High | High | Moderate | Low | Moderate | Moderate | Moderate | Low | Low | Low | Low | Low | Moderate | Moderate-High |
| Israel | Moderate | Low | Low | Low | Low-Moderate | Low-Moderate | Low | High | High | High | High | High | Moderate | Moderate-Low |
| Japan | High | High | High | High | High | High | High | High | Moderate | Low | High | Low | Low | Moderate |
| Pakistan | Low | ? | High | Low | High | Low | Moderate | Low | Low | Low | Moderate | Low | High | High |
| ROK | High | Moderate-High | Moderate-High | Moderate-High | High | High | Moderate | Moderate | Low-Moderate | Low | Moderate-High | Moderate-Low-Moderate | N/A | Low |
| Russia | High | Low | Moderate | Low-Moderate | High | Moderate-High | Moderate | Moderate | Moderate | Low | Moderate | Low | Low | Low |
| Spain | High | High | High | High | High | High | High | High | Moderate | Low | High | Low | Low | Low |
| South Africa | Moderate | High | Moderate | Moderate | High | High | High | Moderate | Low | Moderate | High | Low | Low | Moderate |
| Sweden | High | High | High | High | High | High | High | High | Moderate | Low | High | Low | Low | Moderate |
| United States | High | Low | Low | High | High | High | Low-Moderate | Moderate | High | High | High | High | Moderate | Moderate-Low |

However, there is little agreement about what elements of the treaty need strengthening (disarmament or nonproliferation, for example), and little consensus about what concrete steps should be taken to strengthen it.

As indicated in Table 4, there is a great deal of divergence in the views of the various states on most nonproliferation measures. One of the most significant new nonproliferation initiatives is UN Security Council Resolution 1540, which directs all states to adopt and enforce effective laws to prohibit any non-state actor to manufacture, acquire, possess, develop, transport, transfer or use nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and means of delivery. The resolution further directs all states to develop and maintain appropriate physical protection and accounting measures over these weapons of mass destruction and related materials, as well as appropriate effective border controls to detect, deter, prevent, and combat illicit trafficking in such items. While Resolution 1540 demonstrates that consensus—at least in the Security Council—can be achieved for new proliferation initiatives when there is strong political will on the part of the P-5, the extent to which 1540 will be implemented remains unclear, given the lack of priority attached to the issue by some states, the lack of resources readily available for implementation by many others, and reservations by a number of states, including some close allies of the United States, about the appropriate role for the Security Council in “legislating” nonproliferation measures. In this survey, seven states attach high priority to 1540, five view it as a moderate priority, and three members of NAM (Egypt, Indonesia, and Iran) regard it as a low-and-inappropriate-approach. Although Pakistan did not block consensus on the resolution during the Security Council debate, it also expressed major reservations about the measure and initially was not enthusiastic about its implementation. More recently, however, most states, including Pakistan, appear to have accommodated themselves to the resolution and even to the idea of extending the duration of the UN committee established by the resolution to monitor its implementation.



Table 5. The Role of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones

| | NWFZ |
|----------------------|--------------|
| Brazil | Moderate |
| China | High |
| Egypt | High |
| Germany | High |
| India | Low |
| Indonesia | Moderate |
| Iran | High |
| Israel | Low |
| Japan | High |
| Pakistan | Moderate |
| ROK | Moderate |
| Russia | Low-Moderate |
| Spain | High |
| South Africa | Moderate |
| Sweden | High |
| United States | Moderate |

The signing on September 8, 2006 by the Central Asian states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) of a treaty establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone (NWFZ) in Central Asia is indicative of the disarmament and nonproliferation potential of NWFZ. In general, there is strong support for the NWFZ concept among the states surveyed and across most of the political groupings. Seven states were identified as attaching a high priority to NWFZ, and another six were viewed as regarding the creation of NWFZ as a moderate priority. Although all NWS profess to support the concept of NWFZ at the declaratory level, in practice they have great difficulty in finding a NWFZ they like. A key question, for which the survey does not provide a clear answer, is the extent to which the generally high level of support for the NWFZ concept can be translated into concrete action, such as the creation of additional NWFZ and the conclusion of their protocols by the NWS. The behavior of the NWS with respect to the recently concluded Central Asian NWFZ is likely to prove to be an important test case.

Security assurances represent another related but more divisive issue. A long standing divide has split the non-nuclear weapon states, which want legally binding negative security assurances, from most of the nuclear weapon states, which generally are unwilling to give them other than in the context of protocols to NWFZ. The United States, for example, regards negative security assurances as a low priority, although many of its non-nuclear allies, such as Germany, Japan, and Spain regard them as important.

Most of the New Agenda Coalition countries in our sample (Egypt, Sweden, and South Africa) also regard negative security assurances as an important nonproliferation approach, as does most of the NAM, exemplified in this study by Indonesia. China, interestingly, still maintains a public posture in which negative security assurances are a pillar of its nonproliferation policy. There are some indications, however, of significant internal debate about this issue and there is increasing public criticism of the policy under circumstances in which Taiwan might initiate a strike at targets on the Chinese mainland. Although a number of states, including South Africa, are apt to emphasize tough language on negatives security assurances in the context of the NPT review process, they have traditionally met with strong opposition from the NWS. Reflecting this division, no progress was made on this issue at the 2005 NPT RevCon. The issue of positive security assurances tends to be less contentious, although there is no convergence of views among the states surveyed. It is likely that some NWS, such as the United States, will continue to offer positive security assurances to its close allies whether or not the approach is blessed by other states.

Recent revelations about the Iranian, Libyan and North Korean nuclear programs have led to renewed calls to find technical fixes to proliferation challenges, such as alternative fuel cycles, conversion of research reactors to low-enriched uranium (LEU); consolidation and/or elimination of highly-enriched uranium (HEU), and long-term disposition of plutonium. Although several states surveyed are enthusiastic about the potential for technical approaches to solve major proliferation problems, they represent a clear minority perspective. Alternative fuel cycles and the introduction of new proliferation-resistant reactors, for example, are a high priority mainly for Russia. Other countries, although not typically opposing the concept, either tend not to attach much importance to the approach or to regard it as not particularly promising. As a consequence, although there has been considerable interest in and activity at the IAEA championed by Russia, steps forward are likely to be taken mainly by individual countries or small groupings of them.

Because few states actively oppose the initiative to eliminate HEU—mainly those outside of the survey which regard their HEU stocks as bargaining chips on a variety of other issues—it may be possible to create relatively broad coalitions in support of this initiative as long as the United States or another country provides political leadership and most of the resources needed for conversion and consolidation/elimination. This potential was illustrated at the 2005 NPT RevCon where broad support was generated for an initiative to combat nuclear terrorism by eliminating HEU in the civilian nuclear sector. This initiative, conceived by Kyrgyzstan and Norway, and with useful input from Austria, Canada, Germany, Greece, Japan, Sweden, and the United States, identifies HEU as the likely material of choice for a non-state actor intent

upon constructing a crude nuclear explosive device, and encourages all countries to minimize the use of and commerce in HEU for civilian purposes with the goal of total elimination of HEU in the civilian sector as soon as technically feasible.⁶

Table 6. Preferred Nonproliferation Strategies: Technical Fixes

| | Alternative Fuel Cycles | Research Reactor Conversion | Plutonium Disposition | HEU Consolidation/ Elimination/GTRI |
|----------------------|--------------------------------|--|------------------------------|--|
| Brazil | Low | Low | Low | Low |
| China | Low | Low | Low | Low |
| Egypt | Low | Low | Low | Low |
| Germany | Moderate | Moderate-High (as long as not domestic reactor) | High | Moderate |
| India | Low | Low | Low | Low |
| Indonesia | Low | Moderate | Low | Low-Moderate |
| Iran | Low | Low | Low | Low |
| Israel | Low | Low | Low | Low |
| Japan | Moderate | Moderate | High | Moderate |
| Pakistan | Low | Low | Low | Low |
| ROK | Moderate | Moderate | Moderate | Moderate |
| Russia | High | Moderate | High | Low-Moderate |
| Spain | Moderate | Moderate | Moderate | Moderate |
| South Africa | Low | Low | Low | Low |
| Sweden | Moderate | Moderate | Moderate | High |
| United States | Moderate | Moderate | Moderate | High |

Plutonium disposition likewise is primarily a concern for a small group of countries that have significant stocks of plutonium, such as Russia, Germany, and Japan. The United States currently displays only moderate interest in this issue, while most other states surveyed regard it as a low priority with little direct impact on them.

The establishment of multinational fuel centers is an example of an old approach that has been revived as a possible solution to the potential abuse of Article IV for the purpose of developing nuclear weapons. This idea, which first gained considerable currency during the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation deliberations in the late 1970s, is supported by a number of countries—including Russia—that presumably would be the suppliers of fuel to such centers.⁷ But many countries that would be potential customers for fuel supplied by such centers, for example, Brazil, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, and Japan, regard the approach with little interest.



Table 7. Preferred Nonproliferation Strategies: Other Policy Initiatives

| | CTR and Associated Programs MPC&A | G8 Global Partnership | Strengthened Norms | Security Alliances | Regional Security/Stability | Peaceful Use (Article IV) | Education | Intelligence Sharing | Assurances of Energy/Fuel Supply | Multinational Nuclear Fuel Centers | Economic/Technology Incentives |
|----------------------|-----------------------------------|-----------------------|--------------------|--------------------|-----------------------------|---------------------------|---------------|----------------------|----------------------------------|------------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| Brazil | Low | Low | High | Low | High | High | Moderate | High | Low | Low | Low |
| China | Moderate | Moderate | High | Low | High | High | Moderate | Moderate | Low | Low | Low- |
| Egypt | Low | Low | High | Low | High | High | Moderate-High | Moderate-High | High | Low | Low- |
| Egypt | High | Low | High | Low | High | High | Moderate-High | Moderate-High | High | Low | Low- |
| Germany | High | High | High | High | High | Moderate | Moderate | High | High | ? | High |
| India | Low | Low | Moderate | Moderate | High | High | Moderate | Moderate | Moderate | Moderate | High |
| Indonesia | Low | Low | High | Low | High | High | Moderate | High | Low | Low | Low |
| Iran | Low | Low | High | Low | High | High | High | Low | High | Low | High |
| Israel | High | Low | Low | High | Varies | Low | Low | High | Low | High | Low |
| Japan | High | High | High | High | High | High | High | High | Moderate | Low | Moderate |
| Pakistan | Low | Low | Low | Moderate | Moderate | Moderate | Low | Moderate | Low | Low-Moderate | Moderate |
| ROK | Moderate-High | Moderate-High | Moderate-High | High | High | High | High | High | Moderate | Moderate | Moderate |
| Russia | Moderate | High | Low | High | High | High | Low | Moderate | Moderate | High | Moderate |
| Spain | Moderate | Moderate | High | High | High | Moderate | Low | Moderate-High | Low | Low- | High |
| South Africa | Low | Moderate | High | Low | High | High | Moderate | High | Low-Moderate | Low | Low |
| Sweden | High | High | High | Low | High | Moderate | High | Moderate | Moderate | Moderate | Moderate |
| United States | High | High | Low | High | High | Low | Low-Moderate | Moderate-High | Moderate | Moderate-High | High |

They regard it either as undermining their right to develop a national fuel cycle capability, or as presenting a serious threat to their energy independence. Japan, in particular, has even implied that multinational nuclear fuel centers might stimulate proliferation. Although it is possible that further discussions among experts will identify some useful ideas about which there is a convergence of views—most likely with respect to the back-end of the fuel cycle—the multinational nuclear fuel center approach is unlikely to garner sufficient support from a broad coalition of states to move forward in the short term. States parties, for example, expressed widely different views on the subject at the 2005 NPT Review Conference. As with many solutions that appear at first blush to be “technical,” in nature, those dealing with the fuel cycle have a very political dimension which must be addressed if progress is to be made on the technical front.

There are, in addition, a variety of other non-technical approaches to nonproliferation challenges. The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction program and associated nonproliferation assistances initiatives, as well as the G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, are viewed as a priority only by a relatively small but affluent group of countries in the survey. Intelligence sharing, by contrast, is seen as a key nonproliferation tool by almost all of the states surveyed (with the exception of Iran). However, intelligence sharing has proved difficult to implement in practice. Strengthening nonproliferation norms is another approach viewed as a high priority by almost all states. The United States and Russia stand out as exceptions among NPT states parties who give this approach low priority, in part because of the logical contradiction between the maintenance of their own robust nuclear arsenals and efforts to prevent other states from following their examples. Although the remaining NPT states parties in the survey, including U.S. allies, the NAM, and the NAC all believe that nonproliferation norms should be given a high priority, prospects for progress in building a consensus on this issue are not encouraging as long as the NWS continue to attach high value to their own nuclear arsenals.

Education is a very new and underutilized approach to promoting nonproliferation and disarmament. It only has emerged as an issue internationally in 2000 when a UN General Assembly resolution created a group of government experts to make recommendations on the subject. The approach, however, has been seized upon by a number of states as a relatively non-contentious issue with the potential to have important long-term impact on global nonproliferation norms, as well as more immediate practical applications to meeting proliferation challenges. Among the countries surveyed, Japan and Sweden view the approach as especially important and have taken the lead in international fora such as the First Committee and the NPT review process to promote implementation of the Expert Group’s recommendations. A number of other states, including Brazil, China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, South Africa, and Russia also have expressed support for the general approach, and co-sponsored a resolution on the subject at the fall 2004 session of the UN General Assembly. The diverse and growing support for education and training as a tool for encouraging disarmament and nonproliferation indicates that there is good reason to expect future multilateral action in this area.⁸

Fostering regional security and stability is viewed as a high priority by almost all countries surveyed. The key difficulty pertains to the fact that countries define regional security and stability very differently, and prefer widely divergent strategies to achieve their goals. These differences are manifest when one examines the perceived utility of alliances as an approach to enhance regional security. For example, although the members of NATO regard that alliance as an important means to enhance their collective security, to promote stability in the region, and to prevent proliferation, it is perceived very differently in Moscow. By the same token, Russian efforts to enhance regional security in Central Asia by means of the Tashkent Treaty on Collective Security are viewed in Washington with some apprehension as it is seen as a means by which Russian may extend the deployment of its nuclear forces under certain circumstances. More generally, security alliances and guarantees tend to be regarded by their members/recipients as important instruments for promoting regional security and nonproliferation, although they are likely to be viewed with indifference from states outside of the region and by states in the region which are outside of the alliance.



CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

What are the challenges and opportunities for nonproliferation cooperation based on the preceding review of national threat perspectives and preferred nonproliferation strategies? Is there sufficient convergence of threat assessments and preferred strategies for control to fashion a broad-based, multilateral approach to combat new and evolving nuclear challenges or must one rely increasingly upon ad hoc “coalitions of the willing” or even unilateral action? To the extent that one can discern convergent threat perceptions, do they lend themselves to enduring nonproliferation partnerships founded in negotiated legal regimes and organizations or should one be content with less formal mechanisms tailored to specific exigencies?

On the one hand, it is relatively easy to point to the results of the survey and the accompanying analysis in support of a conclusion that divergences are so great on so many issues that a broad-based multilateral approach to combating new proliferation threats is no longer possible. According to this interpretation, divisions over old issues like the pace of nuclear disarmament and the failure of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty to enter into force persist at the same time that the international community finds it difficult to make headway in a collective fashion in addressing new threats such as non-state actors and nuclear weapons. The inability of the 2005 NPT RevCon to adopt any substantive final document is consistent with this analysis. This view resonates among some key U.S. policy-makers, who suggest that ad-hoc coalitions of the willing are better suited to acting quickly and effectively to counter the proliferation challenges posed by state-sponsors of terrorism and terrorists themselves. The U.S.-led PSI is often held up as the prototype for a new, less universal, but more flexible and efficient nonproliferation strategy.

The results of the CNS survey suggest that there are only a few key proliferation threats and nonproliferation strategies on which there is broad-based agreement. For example, while Iran and North Korea are widely viewed as the most urgent state-level proliferation threats, there are major differences among states regarding the urgency of the threat and the best methods for addressing it. And while the overwhelming majority of the countries surveyed support the NPT, they do not necessarily support a common agenda of concrete, practical steps to help the treaty better cope with contemporary challenges. This problem is well illustrated by the difficulty states parties are having in finding common ground to remedy even those aspects of treaty shortcomings for which there is considerable agreement (e.g., the lack of attention to non-state actors and the abuse by a small number of states of Article IV and Article X). More often than not, states parties in the NPT review process appear unwilling or unable to tackle the hard proliferation issues, preferring either to put aside the most difficult and pressing problems or settling on a lowest common denominator approach. Such an approach to the North Korean issue was again evident at the 2005 NPT RevCon where the only agreement that could be reached entailed entrusting the name place for the DPRK to the conference secretariat. Although this strategy may appear to “buy time” and protect the treaty from a fractious debate, in fact, it contributes to the weakening of the NPT and the review process and gives credibility to charges by its critics about the declining relevance of the treaty.

Nevertheless, it would be premature to conclude from the survey or the failure of the 2005 NPT RevCon that an enduring multilateral nonproliferation regime is obsolete. While it is correct to assert that broad-based, traditional multilateral approaches may not be tenable for some of the most pressing proliferation problems, there are several important areas where progress would appear to be possible, both within and outside of the formal NPT review process.

The survey indicated a high level of support for and little opposition to the Additional Protocol. To the extent that this support among the study’s sample is reflected in the broader universe of NPT states parties, it may be possible to make the Additional Protocol the safeguards standard under the NPT, a step which could significantly increase confidence that peaceful nuclear technology was not being abused. Although it proved impossible to make headway in this regard at the 2005 Review Conference it remains a viable future objective that would demonstrate the continued relevance and adaptability of the NPT to new and evolving nuclear proliferation challenges.

Based upon the survey findings regarding the dangers of defections from the NPT, it is conceivable that in the future states parties may reinterpret the process by which states can withdraw from the treaty and the consequences of such action. Although the 2005 NPT Review Conference failed to forge consensus on how to deal with this problem, there was a constructive debate on the issue and some useful ideas were broached for reducing the incentives for and increasing the costs of exploiting the treaty for the purpose of achieving a near nuclear-weapons status.

Much of the preceding analysis has sought to interpret the survey's findings with respect to the 2005 NPT Review Conference. Considering the failure of the RevCon, it is important to emphasize that the NPT review process is only one of a number of important multilateral fora in which to develop practical responses to nuclear proliferation challenges. UN Security Council Resolution 1540 is illustrative of the potential (and limitations) afforded by Security Council action in the nonproliferation sphere. If Security Council Resolution 1540 is implemented in an effective manner, which will require that most states genuinely believe that it enhances their national security, it could serve as a model for further Security Council action on nonproliferation issues. Both conditions, however, must prevail if 1540 is to be emulated. In this regard, nonproliferation education and training may prove to be an important tool, helping to change mindsets and to foster critical thinking skills.

The CNS survey of national threat perceptions and preferred nonproliferation strategies suggests that while significant, if limited, opportunities remain for broad-based multilateral action, it will prove very difficult to gain support for collective action to address other nuclear challenges that many but not all states perceive to be acute. Timely and effective action on these issues may require alternative responses involving more limited coalitions. Efforts to secure, consolidate, and reduce stocks of fissile material in the former Soviet Union, for example, may best be accomplished by collaboration among like-minded states for which the issue is a high priority. The same is true with respect to issues such as creating new NWFZs, where the driving force for action emanates from the states in the region concerned. In these instances, where there is little opposition to the initiative even if support is not widespread, coalitions of the willing serve as a useful supplement to rather than substitute for more widespread, collective action.

Regrettably, the survey indicates that states are deeply divided about what constitute some of the most pressing proliferation challenges and also how best to tackle them. On these issues, action by small coalitions may be the only way in which timely steps can be taken, but at the risk of jeopardizing the larger legal and normative underpinnings of the NPT and its associated multilateral institutions. This tension is perhaps most acute with respect to country-specific proliferation threats involving noncompliance—an issue of great importance to some NPT states parties, but for which others are unlikely to sanction tough, collective action.

It was not the intent of this study to offer a solution to the extraordinarily complex problem of devising nonproliferation approaches to meet new and continuing nuclear threats that have the promise to be both effective and to enjoy widespread support. At best, the fault lines may be somewhat clearer as well as the opportunities for bridging a few of the divides. That information may not be encouraging, but it is a necessary condition for estimating where nonproliferation progress is likely, possible, and improbable. 🐘

Notes

¹ An earlier version of this study was prepared for the Weapons of Mass Destruction (Blix) Commission. Additional contributors to this study include Jean DuPreez, Gaurav Kampani, Daniel Pinkston, Sammy Salama, Lawrence Scheinman, Maria Lorenzo Sobrado, and Jing-Dong Yuan. The authors also wish to express their thanks to Morten Bremer Maerli and Alexander I. Nikitin for their comments on an earlier draft of this article. This research was made possible through the support of the MacArthur Foundation.

² Egypt and South Africa are also members of the NAM, and Brazil is a NAM observer.



³ This table measures the perceptions of threat posed by those states in the top row to policy makers from states in the vertical column on the left.

⁴ See Charles Ferguson and William C. Potter with Amy Sands, Leonard S. Spector, and Fred L. Wehling, *The Four Faces of Nuclear Terrorism* (New York: Routledge, 2005).

⁵ See William C. Potter, "The NPT Review Conference: 188 States in Search of Consensus," *The International Spectator* (3/2005), pp. 19-31.

⁶ See "Combating the Risk of Nuclear Terrorism by Reducing the Civilian Use of Highly Enriched Uranium." Working Paper submitted by Iceland, Lithuania, Norway, and Sweden, 2005 Review Conference on the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, May 20, 2005 (NPT/CONF.2005/MCIII/WP.5). See also William Potter, "Nuclear Pact's Parties Must Unite on Terror." *San Jose Mercury News*, (May 6, 2005), p. 9c.

⁷ For an analysis of Russian President Vladimir Putin's 2006 proposal to establish international fuel service centers, see Ekaterina Rykovanova, "International Fuel Service Centers: Russian Proposal," *Yaderny Kontrol (Nuclear Control) Digest*, No. 3-4, Summer/Fall 2005, pp. 32-40.

⁸ The Chairman's draft report for Main Committee One of the 2005 NPT Review Conference, which was transmitted to the Plenary, contained two paragraphs on disarmament and nonproliferation education. See "Report of Main Committee I," 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, NPT/CONF.2005/MC.I/1 (May 25, 2005).



Ekaterina Shadrina

THE GREAT CASPIAN CAVIAR GAME

Almost everything we know about sturgeon is steeped in legends and myths that underscore the uniqueness of this extraordinary type of fish. Sturgeons are one of the most ancient representatives of the animal kingdom: they appeared more than 250 million years ago and have so far managed to survive every cataclysm on earth, outliving species of similar age—such as the dinosaurs and mammoths. There is archeological evidence that as long ago as 2400 years B.C., the Egyptians and Phoenicians made salted preserves of black caviar, for use as rations during long sea voyages. Meanwhile in China, a legend has been passed down since ancient times that sturgeon can grow into dragons.¹

The first references to sturgeon and derivative food products can be found in the works of Homer, Herodotus, and Aristotle. One legend states that the peoples of Europe first learned about sturgeon caviar from the voyages of Alexander the Great. His teacher, Aristotle, described ancient feasts at which caviar was served at the victors' table to the sound of victory marches. Claudius Aelianus, a Greek writer in the second century, also wrote about the sturgeon of the Caspian Sea, describing a colossal lake in the land of the Caspians inhabited by huge fish with pointed noises. Scythian tribes who fished sturgeon are mentioned by the Greek historian Herodotus more than 2500 years ago, while sturgeon fishing in the Caspian had already been described in detail by Marco Polo and Adam Olearius, as well as the Arab writer Ibn-Fakih in his *Book of Countries*. Russian fishermen learned to produce caviar as early as the 12th century, and Pope Julius II introduced caviar to royal ceremonies in Europe at the beginning of the 16th century.

It turned out that their enviable longevity served as a guarantee of immortality for these fish, but man's heavy-handed interference throughout history has ensured that sturgeon have all but vanished in most regions of the world. Experts have counted 28 species of sturgeon in the northern hemisphere and, apart from the countries of the Caspian basin, these are also found in Romania, the United States, to some degree in Western Europe (France, Spain, and the northern part of the Adriatic), Ukraine, Turkey, Bulgaria, and China.

Currently, the majority (more than 90 percent) of the world's sturgeon stocks is concentrated in the Caspian Sea basin, but in recent years these stocks have been reduced to a catastrophic extent, and now the population is teetering on the brink of total extinction. This article will examine the problem of the preservation of the sturgeon population; I will analyze the reasons for the current situation and make recommendations that could lead to a solution.

CASPIAN STURGEONS AND SECURITY

There are strong links between natural resources and security, because rapid negative changes involving the loss of livelihoods undermine the sustainability of entire communities,



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increasing the probability of tension and even armed conflict.² The lack of natural resources, dependence on such resources, and the infringement of rights related to their use, as well as environmental marginalization are all typical causes of new conflicts.³ Today, the battle for the Caspian's resources is unfolding at both the international and regional levels. In both cases, we observe distinct causes of this conflict. The Caspian basin's oil and gas riches make the area the object of geopolitics, attracting the attention of the leading world powers, primarily the United States, United Kingdom, France, and China, which are attempting to establish control over these resources and transport routes to world markets. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the formation of the newly independent states in the 1990s led to a transformation of the political situation in the region and opened up access to the energy resources of the former Soviet bloc. The Caspian began to dominate the strategies of both regional and international players.

On the regional level, we can clearly trace a link between regional security and the exploitation of aquatic bioresources. The struggle over these resources could escalate into a conflict between the countries of the Caspian region⁴ or, as was foreseen by Umerserik Kasenov, could evolve into a "sturgeon war."⁵ To date the real "sturgeon war" is taking place between underground networks and law enforcement agencies, and has grown to such a scale that experts predict a biological catastrophe in the very near future. In Dagestan, for example, tensions remain between law enforcement agencies and a significant portion of the population in coastal regions. Multiple clashes have occurred between residents on the Dagestan and Kalmyk coastlines and employees of the Caspian State Marine Inspection, a part of the Caspian Border Agency. The troubles escalated to the extent that a bomb was detonated in a residential building in Kaspiysk (on November 16, 1996), the home of seven border officers.⁶

The depletion of aquatic bioresources is already beginning to threaten the security of the countries of the Caspian basin, and is exacerbating relations between these states. First, the various parties continue to engage in constant disputes and disagreements over the development of general precepts for fishing in the Caspian, environmental issues related to the intensity of oil and gas production on the shelf, and the degree of responsibility for environmental catastrophes.⁷ Additional factors contributing to the tense relations between these states include: periodical boycotting of joint sessions of the Water Resources Committee by certain countries, such as Turkmenistan; mutual accusations of degrading the marine biosystem; ineffective efforts to combat poachers and other illegal organizations; and differing degrees of priority accorded to the preservation of bioresources in the different countries of the Caspian. Disagreements between these states prevent the development of joint approaches to the management and rational use of the bioresources of the Caspian, and to the preservation of the region's biological diversity as a resource of importance to the whole world. These complex interrelations are further complicated by the indeterminate status of the Caspian Sea itself.

The degradation of marine bioresources also has serious economic consequences for the coastal areas of the Caspian countries, for which fishing (mainly poaching) is the only source of income, and for the countries themselves, which cannot tap a colossal source of income due to the impossibility of legally exporting caviar.

STURGEON WARS

The Caspian basin is home to six species and one subspecies of sturgeon (*Acipenseridae*): beluga (*Huso Huso*), ship (*Acipenser nudiventris*), sterlet (*Acipenser ruthenus*), osetr or Russian sturgeon (*Acipenser gueldenstaedtii*), Persian sturgeon (*Acipenser persicus*), sevruga or stellate sturgeon (*Acipenser stellatus*), and the South Kura River sevruga or stellate sturgeon (*Acipenser stellatus stellatus natio cyrensis*).⁸ Throughout the entire history of Caspian fishing, the sturgeon catch has fluctuated significantly, depending on the level of restocking efforts and the intensity of fishing.⁹ At present, virtually all species and populations of sturgeon in offshore and freshwater areas of the Caspian basin are in sharp decline, due to a combina-

tion of man-made and natural factors, primarily poaching, as well as changes in sea level and available food sources.¹⁰ The average annual sturgeon catch in the Caspian basin during the 20th century has changed (measured in five year periods) from 32,000 tons in 1900-1905, falling to 7,000 tons in 1940-1945, before growing to 20-25,000 tons in 1975-1985, and once more falling rapidly to 1,100 tons in 2001-2005.¹¹

The most lucrative sturgeon food product—and the reason for the decimation of the sturgeon population—is the world-famous *black gold*, caviar, a unique food item, for many years synonymous with the phrase “*Russian caviar*.” While the word “caviar” can be applied to any fish eggs, only the roe of sturgeon is true *caviar*. The most valuable is beluga caviar, followed by ossetra caviar, with sevruga caviar in third place. The wholesale price of one kilogram of beluga caviar in Western Europe and the United States is somewhere between U.S. \$2,000 and \$3,000, while some batches can be as expensive as \$10,000. Restaurant prices are 50-100 percent higher. Ossetra caviar, as a rule, is about half the cost of beluga (up to \$1,500 per kilogram), while sevruga caviar costs slightly more than \$1,200.

The First Sturgeon War: from ancient times to late 20th century

This period in the battle against sturgeon began in the 12th century, when caviar production began on the Volga River. During the time of the Golden Horde, Astrakhan Tatars came up with the idea of blocking rivers with so-called *uchugs* to stop the sturgeon from reaching the Russian side. An *uchug* is a form of log fence laid across a river, blocking a migration path used by the fish, and is the most ancient and barbaric form of catching fish. Industrial-scale catches can be said to have started during the time of Ivan the Terrible, and coincided with the escalation of poaching on state and local levels. Fishing was performed using methods that not only ensured generous catches of fish, but also frequently damaged fish stocks. *Uchugs* and hooks, often used to catch fish, caused widespread physical damage, leading to the illnesses and death of fish (these methods were later forbidden, with good reason). This is the same period when unrecorded catches and poaching began. Sturgeon were supplied to the tsar’s table from this time forward; under a decree of Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich, up to 1,500 live sturgeon were shipped to Moscow every year. On January 6, 1704, Peter the Great decreed a state monopoly over the fishing industry, after which sturgeon was traditionally seen as the *Tsar’s fish*, a tradition that survived in Russia virtually until the Russian revolution.

During the Soviet period, industrial growth led to the appearance of large volumes of hazardous waste, which was dumped into bodies of water and also led to reductions in the stocks of aquatic resources. Hydropower construction projects on the Volga, Terek, and Kura rivers led to losses of sturgeon spawning grounds and sharply reduced the scale of natural reproduction. However, the problem of falling populations was partially resolved by the construction and operation of sturgeon hatcheries, which bred young fish for subsequent release at sea; the problem was further helped by a temporary (three-year) moratorium on all fishing. Such a luxury could only be afforded by the Soviet Union, which had a state monopoly on fishing and rigidly controlled all aspects of sturgeon production and conservation. Nevertheless, this period was followed by another collapse in the numbers of sturgeon stock, when fishing targeted the smaller broods of 1975-77 (periods during which the Volga reservoir cascade produced relatively small amounts of water and low sea levels were observed), while poaching on rivers and at sea exceeded the scale of industrial fishing.¹²

The Second Sturgeon War: USSR vs. Iran, 1986-91

In the 1960s and 1970s, pollution of the Volga and Caspian basins began, as discharges of oil products, and industrial and domestic waste water rapidly increased until 1987-88. As a result, during this period (especially in 1988), the mass death of sturgeon was observed in the Volga, downstream of Volgograd, due to the dumping of poisonous substances. Sturgeons were found to suffer from myopathy, an illness that damages muscle tissue, the liver, roe, and milt.



It was during this period that Iran commenced a policy of unofficial competition with the Soviet Union on the international market. The U.S. market was closed to Iran, while Russian caviar then dominated the European market. Taking advantage of the openness of the Soviet mass media during perestroika, when many media outlets covered the environmental situation on the Volga River, numerous articles and features appeared in Western Europe about the disadvantages of Russian caviar, compared to the superlative qualities of Iranian product.¹³ Iran then began to increase the supply of caviar to the European market—naturally, by increasing fishing volumes—an act that can be qualified as state-sponsored poaching. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union was exploiting fish stocks no less rapidly, although its activities were compensated for to some degree by the work of hatcheries and large-scale releases of young fish.

The end result was that this period became one of state-sponsored poaching by Iran and the Soviet Union, with each country vastly reducing sturgeon stocks. One of the consequences of these battles—Iran’s aggressive marketing policies and the inaction or clumsy, ill-considered policies of Soviet bureaucrats—was the tarnishing of the “Russian caviar” brand, and the appearance of a new brand, “Iranian caviar.”

The Third Sturgeon War: 1991 to the present

For more than 60 years, the Soviet Union and Iran (monitored by its northern neighbor) consistently produced and exported sturgeon to the world market, ensuring the preservation of fish populations (periodically reducing and re-developing stocks). This situation sharply changed in the post-Soviet period, when five countries appeared overnight in the Caspian basin and only one country—Iran—retained a state monopoly over sturgeon fishing. According to the World Wildlife Fund, world stocks of sturgeon have fallen by 70 percent over the last 100 years, while poaching vastly exceeds legal fishing levels—by a factor of 10-12 both in the Caspian and Volga basins (according to 2002 data).¹⁴ According to the director of the International Sturgeon Research Institute of Iran, Mohamed Purkazemi, the latest study of sturgeon populations in the Caspian showed that stocks have depleted rapidly and in the last year alone have fallen by 30 percent (2005).¹⁵

Table 1. Comparison of Sturgeon Stocks and Catches in the Caspian Basin¹⁶





Table 2. Number of Sturgeon in the Caspian Basin (in millions)¹⁷



In addition, several new factors have also appeared that have placed sturgeon under the threat of extinction:

- ❑ Budget crises, new political priorities, and complex economic realities all immediately affected the sturgeon restocking programs of each of the four Caspian countries that were formed out of the territory of the former Soviet Union. Hatcheries have found themselves on the brink of closure due to insufficient funding and have greatly reduced the output of young into the Volga and the Caspian, thus disrupting the balance once maintained by the Soviet Union to reduce damage to populations from the construction of dams and the influence of other man-made factors.
- ❑ The volume of exploration and oil and gas field development on the shelf has rapidly expanded and, as a result, the total pollution of the Caspian and rivers that feed this body of water with industrial waste from plants equipped with ineffective waste purification systems). In turn, the pollution of habitat and spawning grounds has led to illnesses in sturgeon, which have been recorded by scientists. The leading pollutant of this sea is, without a doubt, oil. Oil pollution suppresses the development of phyto-benthos and phytoplankton in the Caspian, which consist of blue-green and diatomous algae, reducing the oxygen output and causing the mass death of fish and other organisms, adversely affecting the sturgeon population. Moreover, ballast water released from oil tankers from the Black Sea have brought invasive species (such as the Western Atlantic ctenophore, *Mnemiopsis leidyi*, a form of jellyfish) that are now rapidly multiplying in the Caspian, and by doing so are undermining the available food reserves of one of the sturgeon's main staples, Caspian kilka. Mass deaths (40 percent of the total population), in part due to the injection of invasive species, have complicated the dramatic situation in the Caspian, and have for the first time caused the scientists of the Caspian countries to realize that they are facing a new type of threat. Another factor has been the sudden ejection of hydrogen sulfide from the bed of the Caspian Sea, killing many



species of Caspian fauna, including kilka, and radically disrupting the entire marine ecosystem.

- ❑ The rising level of the Caspian Sea has led to the flooding of oil wells that were already polluting enough to generate an environmental catastrophe. Further rises in sea level are likely to lead to irreversible consequences for the ecology of this body of water and the region as a whole. The rising sea level, taken on its own, is not an environmental catastrophe and does not pose a threat to the sturgeon population; the greatest amount of harm is inflicted by industrial activity. The level of the Caspian has always fluctuated, and these fluctuations are a normal result of the unstable condition of an enclosed body of water with variable conditions at its natural boundaries.¹⁸ Rapid changes in sea level have created temporary, unfavorable conditions for sturgeon stocks (as levels fall), but these stocks have quickly overcome the temporary deterioration of their habitat.¹⁹
- ❑ The pollution of the sea by radioactive waste has led to an increased uranium content in sea dwellers, of five times that observed in other waters.²⁰
- ❑ The indeterminate legal status of the Caspian Sea is the main problem slowing the passage of an agreement between the Caspian countries to protect the marine bioresources of the Caspian basin as a whole, and the sturgeon population in particular. Following the formation of the new Caspian countries in the early 1990s, it became clear that the Russian-Iranian agreements of 1921, 1935, and 1940, which regulated the status of the Caspian, do not reflect current geopolitical realities. The issue of the new status of the sea has remained unresolved for 15 years, as the countries have been unable to reach agreement about the size of the sovereign zone of each state, the development of hydrocarbons and bioresources, as well as standards of nature preservation and fishing, and the level of responsibility for pollution of the Caspian. Until the status of the Caspian is determined, all countries are observing the Soviet-Iranian agreements, under which Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Iran, and Azerbaijan enjoy sovereign rights to a 10-mile zone, and equal rights to the resources in the remainder of the sea. As a body of water, the Caspian Sea is closed to countries—and companies within such countries—that do not have a natural means of access to the basin.
- ❑ The main reason for the death of fish populations continues to be internationally organized poaching that recognizes no borders and enjoys a high level of technical sophistication.

Now imagine that all of the above factors are multiplied by the consequences of intense economic development in the Caspian countries, the development of a project to lay a gas pipeline along the Caspian Sea bed, the widespread corruption permeating national authorities, and a high level of organized crime. The combined impact of these factors is causing the catastrophically fast, mass extinction of sturgeons, resulting in colossal economic losses for the Caspian countries. According to the executive director of the Sturgeon Harvest and Production Association (APDVO), Valery Paltsev, the financial losses of the Caspian countries due to reduction of sturgeon catches in 1996-2005 exceed U.S. \$10 billion.²¹ Strictly speaking, these losses are due both to smaller catches and to illegal sturgeon fishing—estimated to total 90,000 tons, or U.S. \$6.8 billion, over the same ten-year span for the entire Caspian basin.²²

SAVE THE STURGEON!

At present, the main international agency working to save the sturgeon is the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, or CITES, which has included all sturgeon species in Appendices I and II since 1998 (just four species were covered up until 1997).

The Role of CITES

Both for private individuals and for companies exporting and importing sturgeon products, this means that international trade in sturgeon products, including caviar, must be performed in compliance with the rules determined by the Convention. Under the system controlled and maintained by the national managerial and scientific authorities of CITES, caviar shipped for export must possess a document of permission, while containers must bear special labels that identify the country of origin, the fish species from which the product is derived, the year of preparation, the type of caviar (*wild*, i.e. from nature, or from aquaculture), the number of the manufacturing enterprise, and the identification number of the shipped batch.

Exporter countries annually inform the CITES Secretariat of measures taken to preserve populations and jointly reach agreement on the predicted size of export quotas for sturgeon products in the following year. The CITES Secretariat, in turn, can accept these quotas, which is indicated in the official publication on the organization's website. Alternatively, it may decide not to publish the quotas, if the report presented by each country on planned measures and actions aimed at preserving sturgeon is considered to be unsatisfactory. CITES rules also restrict the export and import of black caviar for personal use to 250 grams per person.


At the CITES Conference of the Parties in 2000, it was resolved to introduce a standard, unified system of labeling caviar for export.²³ In 2001, CITES initiated a summit followed by the signing of the so-called Paris Agreement, which obliged Russia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Turkmenistan to take urgent measures to prevent a fall in sturgeon stocks in the Caspian. As yet, none of these countries has succeeded in meeting the recommendations of this agreement, which stipulate a collective approach to the problem, combating poaching and illegal trade, regulating sales of sturgeon products on the domestic market, and the introduction of standardized product labels.

Each year, CITES publishes quotas for caviar exports from the Caspian countries based on information submitted by these countries to the secretariat on the sturgeon population, on work to ensure the preservation of sturgeon, and on measures enacted to counteract poaching. In January 2006, CITES announced that it would temporarily cease publishing caviar export quotas for the Caspian countries, as they had failed to submit information to the secretariat about caviar volumes from illegal sources.²⁴ In 2006, the CITES Secretariat published the export quota only for Persian sturgeon from Iran (the volume was 44.3 tons instead of the 51 tons requested by Tehran), thus recognizing that Iran had met all the recommendations of the Paris Agreement and Resolution 12.7.²⁵ This provoked ichthyologists in the four remaining Caspian countries to voice doubts, disagreeing with the decision by the CITES Secretariat to declare Persian sturgeon an endemic species. In the publication, there was no *zero quota* for the other four species of sturgeon produced by this country, just as there were no *zero quotas* for any of the other countries. It must be noted that only a *zero quota* is equivalent to a complete ban on exports. The position thus taken by the secretariat does not facilitate the consolidation of the Caspian countries, instead engendering major concerns among the leaders of these states.²⁶

On January 2, 2007, the CITES Secretariat lifted the ban for caviar export quotas (for osetr and sevruga) from Russia, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan after the four countries submitted all required documentation. According to the quotas published by the CITES Secretariat, in 2007 Russia can export 23,5 tons of caviar, Turkmenistan – 2,33 tons, Kazakhstan – 11,57 tons, and Azerbaijan – 6,36 tons.²⁷ Ban for beluga export quotas remains for all Caspian states as the information provided by five states is not yet complete, and a final decision of the CITES Secretariat regarding this issue will be made in coming months. According to CITES, the Caspian states agreed to reduce combined catch quotas for the six sturgeon species by 20 percent compared with 2005, and combined quotas for caviar exports in 2007 are 15 percent lower than in 2005.²⁸



Map 1. The Actions of the Caspian Countries to Preserve Sturgeon



Russia

In 1992, Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed a directive, in Astrakhan, entitled *On Measures to Protect the Sturgeon Fish Species of the Caspian Sea Basin*. This document became the basis for a long-term program to restock, preserve, and increase the number of sturgeons, which has already been partially implemented.²⁹

Russia plays a leading role in restocking sturgeon, as it releases 50-55 million beluga, osetr, and sevruga young, raised by eight hatcheries in Astrakhan, the caviar capital of the Caspian.³⁰ Throughout all of their years of operation (including 2006), these fish farms have released more than 1.2 billion sturgeon young. As a result, more than 90 percent of beluga, more than 60 percent of osetr, and about 50 percent of sevruga derive from artificial restocking by Russian sturgeon hatcheries.

Because of their strong ability to adapt, sturgeons have evolved a capability to maintain sufficient population numbers, despite varying natural conditions, to compensate for natural losses and fishing catches, and for this reason the Caspian basin remains one of the country's important fishing resources. Despite notable achievements in population preservation, sturgeon catches by Russia continue to fall: if in 1990 almost 12,000 tons of sturgeon were caught and more than 100 tons of caviar shipped for export, in 2000 just 470 tons of fish were caught,

and just 25 tons exported, according to official reports. In 2000 the industrial fishing of sturgeon was halted, and only accidental catches were permitted when fishing for other species of river fish; then, in 2005, accidental catches were also forbidden. Currently, sturgeons are caught for reproductive and research purposes.

Despite official announcements and directives, Russian stores have continued to offer various sturgeon products without any interruption. According to Robert Moiseyev, director of the Pacific Institute of Geography at the Russian Far East Academy of Sciences (Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky), the trade in caviar and fish has grown into a multi-level, underground system that spans several economic sectors:

“...there are those that catch the fish, a second group that prepares them, while others are in charge of refrigerator storage; a fourth group takes it to the aircraft, where a fifth group flies the plane, then a sixth group accepts the goods outside Moscow, where the main fish processing plants are. There are people who maintain these plants, people who sell the product, and someone is giving them all ‘protection.’”³¹

Russia, according to modest estimates, loses up to U.S. \$400 million each year to poaching while even Turkey, which has no stocks of sturgeon, has overtaken Russia in the export of this delicacy.³² The Russian Interior Ministry estimates that black market income from the illegal production of caviar and sturgeon fish is comparable to the profit from the illegal drug trade.³³

Poaching exists in all three federal subjects of the Russian Federation with access to the Caspian: Dagestan, Kalmykia, and Astrakhan oblast. The fishing in the first two is conducted at sea, with poachers working not only along their *own* coastline, but also penetrating neighboring waters, including those of Kazakhstan, traveling far to the east of their own shores. Special high-speed vessels, often so-called “cigarette boats,” fitted with imported outboard motors and satellite navigation systems make it possible in good weather to reach fishing areas within a matter of hours. In Astrakhan oblast, poachers work in the same way both on rivers, usually using small boats, and at sea, deploying the same methods as poachers from Dagestan and Kalmykia. It is almost impossible to say which of the above areas deserves the gold medal for illegal poaching, although an analysis of news reports in the regional and federal media indicates that law enforcement agencies most frequently detain citizens of Dagestan and Kalmykia.

The main problem in the Russian approach to preservation of sturgeon and making money from the export of sturgeon is, without a doubt, state bureaucracy, corruption, and the apparent low priority of this issue in federal politics. Despite numerous declarations by the authorities concerning the need for urgent reforms in the fishing industry as a whole and sturgeon fishing in particular, very little has actually been done.

Nevertheless, some of the prerequisites for improving the situation have been created in the last two years.

First, the CITES Management Authority of the Russian Federation for Sturgeon was founded in September 2005; this agency is responsible for observing CITES procedures and is currently under the jurisdiction of the Ministry for Agriculture and Rosselkhoznadzor, the Russian Agriculture Inspection Agency. It is hard to believe, but due to bureaucratic delays in the creation of this structure Russia was unable to export black caviar for several years, thus losing a major income stream.³⁴ According to Lidiya Vasiliyeva, the director of the BIOS Research and Production Center for Sturgeon Breeding, the reason for this is strictly bureaucratic in nature:

“In Bulgaria, for example, where there already is a CITES agency, it takes about half a day to obtain a license and export caviar across the border. But I need to get through 12 agencies, which takes two full months. Although we have a breeder stock, there is nothing we can do. As a result, Russia is losing one of its national treasures.”³⁵



Second, on January 1, 2005, a new federal law was enacted, entitled *On Fishing and the Preservation of Marine Biological Resources* (until then, there had simply been no such law!). Russian parliamentary figures also developed a bill for a model law on the preservation of sturgeon for member countries of the CIS Interparliamentary Assembly. According to Gennady Gorbunov, chairman of the Committee for Agrarian and Food Policy of the Federation Council (upper house) of the Russian Federal Assembly and one of the authors of the bill, the passage of this law is the first step toward a consolidation of legislative efforts by individual states to manage the marine biological resources of the Caspian and Azov Seas. In addition, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed the federal law *On the Acceptance by the Russian Federation of the Charter of the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations*, initiating Russia's official accession into this international organization, which plays an important role in world fishing.

Third, a series of draft regulatory documents have been prepared, governing activities that affect the sturgeon family.³⁶

Finally, measures to prevent pollution of the Russian part of the Caspian Sea are being tightened. In July 2006 the Federal Inspection Service of the Russian Ministry for the Use of Natural Resources announced that it intends to apply a set of measures to prevent the pollution of the Russian part of the Caspian Sea, due to increased shipping of oil and oil products by states sharing borders with Russia. Ministries and agencies will be requested to provide information about the organization of a system of safe oil and oil product shipping by neighboring states, about vessels used to transport hazardous wastes through bodies of water adjacent to Russia's borders, as well as information about the ownership of oil that could cause irreparable damage to the environment of Astrakhan oblast, Kalmykia, and Dagestan if it were to be released into the Caspian Sea.³⁷

Azerbaijan

Azerbaijan is the second largest producer of artificially raised sturgeon after Russia, boasting hatcheries with the capacity to release 30 million fish annually. The first ever sturgeon hatchery was built in Neftchalin district, on the Kura River, in 1954, where biotechnical standards for the artificial breeding of sturgeon were developed as a result of scientific research by world-renowned scientists after a decade-long period of experimentation.³⁸ Such facilities were subsequently constructed on the Volga, and shortly after that were built in Iran and Kazakhstan. According to Azerbaijani Minister for Ecology and Natural Resources Husein Bagirov, during the years when these three sturgeon hatcheries were active in Azerbaijan and the Caspian Sea, more than 200 million young sturgeons were released into the Caspian. In addition, in 2003 a loan from the World Bank to Azerbaijan was used to build a modern sturgeon hatchery with a planned annual capacity of 15 million young.³⁹ At the current time, this is the most modern sturgeon fish farm on the Caspian, and Azerbaijan's fourth. Official data record the total release from all hatcheries in Azerbaijan as 16.89 million sturgeon young with an average weight of 1.2 grams and standard weight of 3 grams.⁴⁰ Given this data, Azerbaijan insists on an increase in its annual fishing quota, which is established by countries based on the national contribution to restoring the sturgeon population.⁴¹

As in Russia, the central problem continues to be poaching, despite the existence of laws: the law *On Fishing* (1998) and the resolution *On the Protection of Sturgeon Species* (1998). The volume of income from Azerbaijani exports has not been officially published, but judging by local media reports, trade in sturgeon in Azerbaijan is controlled by organized crime. Rauf Gadzhiev, head of the Department for the Preservation of Sturgeon Species at the Azerbaijan Ministry for Ecology and Natural Resources, believes that poaching makes up 10 to 15 percent of the total fishing volumes in the country.⁴² According to 2006 data, the police were preparing new vessels for fishing inspection work; law enforcement previously had just one vessel to enforce the law *On Fishing*.⁴³

Azerbaijan has intense offshore exploration and drilling, on a similar level to Kazakhstan, causing widespread oil pollution in the vicinity of Baku Bay and the coastal regions of Azerbaijan. The main problems continue to be the contamination of marine resources, including trans-boundary waters, as well as air pollution and the loss of biodiversity.⁴⁴

Iran

At the current time Iran is the official world leader in the caviar market, and this activity is a stable source of income for the country. This is a relatively recent phenomenon (beginning in about 1980).

The development of Iran's caviar business only began in the 20th century, in many ways as a result of actions by the Soviet Union. On October 1, 1927, the Soviet-Iranian Treaty of Assurances and Neutrality was signed in Moscow, and was accompanied by an agreement about the use of fishing areas off the southern coast of the Caspian Sea. Under this agreement, Russia received the right to produce fish resources, including sturgeon, in the southern part of the Caspian Sea. It was then that Iran's largest fishing enterprise, Shilat, was founded, from the remains of a Russo-Persian company that had existed from the 1920s to the 1940s. One should note that Iranian caviar experts learned their profession from Russian caviar masters.

Iran had no tradition of sturgeon production or caviar consumption, which can largely be explained by a religious ban on eating sturgeon and caviar. According to the Islamic faith, sturgeon are scaleless fish, making them "dirty," like pork, and cannot be used as food. During the reign of Shah Pahlavi of Iran, especially in 1960-70, Iran secured the sovereign right to the production of sturgeon in the southern part of the sea, which was accompanied by the freedom to consume sturgeon and caviar. The situation changed radically after the 1979 revolution, when the new government banned the consumption and production of caviar, declaring it *haram* (an action categorically banned and condemned under Islamic law). However several years later, recognizing the importance of this source of income for the country's isolated economy, Ayatollah Khomeini made a special resolution that granted permission to *true believers* to consume products made from these fish, and to produce caviar.⁴⁵ However, religious traditions turned out to be stronger, and prevented the consumption of these products from becoming a mass phenomenon. Caviar was virtually never consumed by the general population in Iran; 89 percent of the caviar was exported to the international market, while just 11 percent was consumed on the country's small domestic market.⁴⁶

Iran is the only one of the Caspian countries to be able to retain a state monopoly over sturgeon fishing. The problem of poaching exists here, too, although the scale is far smaller than in other countries. Of all the Caspian countries, only Iran traditionally fishes sturgeon at sea, while the remaining countries of the Caspian region formally continue to observe the fishing rules established in 1962 in the Soviet Union, and reinforced by order of the USSR Fishing Industry Ministry in 1984. These rules ban the fishing of sturgeon in the Caspian Sea; catches are taken from the rivers where spawning migration occurs. Iran (just like Turkmenistan) has no such rivers, and so the contribution of these states to the formation of sturgeon stocks by means of natural spawning is extremely limited. Each year, Iran releases about 10.5 million young, and in 2005 released 15.1 million young. Nevertheless, to date Iran has failed to present information that would make it possible to determine its contribution to the formation of resources (although the country is actively participating in the discussion of methods to come up with such a definition.⁴⁷)


Pollution in the Caspian remains a problem, partly due to the proximity of a large number of Iranian industrial plants, mines, and the flow of polluted industrial, city, and agricultural waste water into the sea.

At present, Iran is the sole exporter of caviar from the Caspian region to the world market, and maintains a stable level of exports to Europe, the United Arab Emirates, and the United



States. For a long time, up to 70 percent of U.S. sturgeon caviar imports originated in the Soviet Union (and, subsequently, from Russia). Despite the trade embargo against Iran, Iranian caviar has always been shipped to the United States. For example, since 1991 approximately 500 kg of Iranian caviar reached U.S. markets from Europe.⁴⁸ The U.S.-Iranian caviar business was reestablished just 21 years after the Islamic revolution. On March 17, 2000, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright announced that the United States would remove the ban on importing food products from Iran, including caviar.⁴⁹ From that moment, regular, direct shipments of Iranian caviar to the U.S. market began, while supplies of re-exported caviar from France, Switzerland, and, until recently, from the United Arab Emirates, continued. For example, according to data from the Iran Fishing Organization, in just the first 11 months of 2004, caviar exports to the United States grew by 48 percent over 2003, and amounted to 3.5 tons, worth U.S. \$2.6 million.⁵⁰ The export of caviar to the United States by the remaining Caspian countries during this period amounted to 2.1 tons (U.S. \$0.49 million) from Russia, 1.8 tons (\$0.75 million) from Kazakhstan, and 1 ton (\$0.44 million) from Azerbaijan.⁵¹ The data in the CITES database are somewhat more modest:

Table 3. Caviar Exports from Iran to the United States (2000–2005)⁵²




Note: In 2005 there were no exports of Iranian caviar to the United States due to a ban on imports imposed by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service.

There are concerns that the stability of these exports may be affected by the unpredictable situation related to Iran’s nuclear program and further tightening of international economic sanctions. Even if *caviar sanctions* are not introduced by the UN Security Council at a certain point, they may be unilaterally imposed by the European Union.

In 2006, only Iran (of all the Caspian countries) was permitted by a resolution of the CITES Secretariat to export the caviar of Persian sturgeon, which elicited a negative reaction from the other countries of the area. If European Union sanctions are applied, then supplies of even this caviar to the countries of the European Union and the United States may cease, leaving Switzerland as the only country in Europe that will be able to purchase these products. Meanwhile, Switzerland could apply its own sanctions, similar to those of the European Union. This would not be unexpected; in 2006 Switzerland’s largest banks, Credit Suisse and UBS, voluntarily ceased operations with Iran, believing that if the situation deteriorated, bank

losses on the U.S. market far exceed possible profits in Iran. For this reason, it is entirely possible that the same logic may be followed by the Swiss government where European sanctions are concerned. If sanctions are applied, Switzerland may temporarily cease purchases of caviar from Iran, totally isolating the country on the Western caviar market. It is Switzerland that was a traditional Western center for the import and export of caviar, consuming eight tons of caviar each year on its domestic market.⁵³ Were events to unfold in this manner, Iran may be able to re-focus its export on the Mideast and Asian markets. In any case, sanctions will not hurt Iran. In fact, the opposite is likely: Iran will essentially be applying *caviar sanctions* against Europe and the United States, with western companies incurring economic losses.

Table 4. The Largest Importers of Iranian Caviar, 2000-2005⁵⁴ (in metric tones)



Kazakhstan

Kazakhstan has two large fish hatcheries (Atyrau and Ural-Atyrau), each of which is capable of breeding up to 3 million larvae, helping the country release 6.71 million young annually. Since 2001, Kazakhstan has been implementing a project to artificially breed sturgeon in lakes and ponds. Within a period of 18-24 months, depending on the food sources available, the fish are raised to market condition (1.5-2 kg) before delivery to Kazakh markets.⁵⁵ One of the successes of Kazakhstan has been the creation in the town of Atyrau of the Caspian Ecology Monitoring Center, which works in close cooperation with an analogous center in Astrakhan. According to Astrakhan Oblast Governor Alexander Zhilkin, a joint project is being organized between two oblasts—Astrakhan and Mangystau—with Astrakhan experts playing a leading role.⁵⁶

Kazakhstan is facing similar problems to those of Russia, Turkmenistan, and Azerbaijan, and is attempting to counteract poaching by strengthening legislation. In 2006, the Kazakhstan parliament ratified an agreement between the governments of Kazakhstan and Russia on the activities of their border representatives. This document stipulates intensifying the battle against poaching in the Caspian Sea, and the possibility of traveling within the territory of adjacent countries using special written permission that would provide for an expedited entry regime.⁵⁷

The key problem in Kazakhstan remains oil pollution at sea, due to the intensity of oil development projects on the offshore shelf. The situation in the vicinity of Kazakhstan oil fields—the largest in the Caspian—is unquestionably critical. Aytkul Samakova, the Kazakhstan environment minister, has announced that despite the measures taken, nature protection expenditures lag behind the growth in hydrocarbon extraction.⁵⁸ Of particular concern are 85 flooded oil and gas wells in the Caspian coastal zone, from which oil is now seeping. So far, only five of these have been eliminated. As a result, mass deaths of sturgeon and seals were observed in the Kazakhstan sector of the North Caspian in May 2006. In addition, the predicted increase in oil production on the Kazakhstan shelf will lead to an increase in the volumes of environmental pollution by oil products, by a factor of 2.5 (12,500 tons annually), while the volume of pollution in the Caspian by all the Caspian countries could reach 30,000-40,000 tons each year.⁵⁹

Turkmenistan

The total permissible catch of sturgeon for Turkmenistan is the lowest of all: 6.3 percent of the total for the entire basin, proportionate to the contribution of that country to sturgeon restocking. Due to the absence of spawning rivers, Turkmenistan does not possess the capability to produce sturgeon on its territory. As was indicated above, according to Soviet fishing rules (the new Caspian countries agreed to observe these rules in 1992), Turkmenistan does not have the right to catch these fish at sea. According to agreements signed at the Commission on Aquatic Bioresources of the Caspian Sea, sturgeons are fished in the rivers of Russia and Kazakhstan as part of Turkmenistan's share. In Turkmenistan the construction of the first plant ever to artificially breed sturgeon and to produce caviar is under way. The construction tender was won by Florida Sturgeon Engineering (of the United States). Former Turkmenistan President Saparmurat Niyazov approved a resolution by the tender committee and gave permission to the state fishing committee of Turkmenistan for an investment contract for the planning and construction of a system with a production capacity of up to three tons of caviar, one hundred tons of market-condition sturgeon, and five million young sturgeon each year, worth U.S. \$16.9 million (project completion was slated for the end of December 2006).⁶⁰

The poaching situation remains critical: the Turkmenistan authorities have absolutely no control over illegal catches of sturgeon.⁶¹ Sturgeon poaching in the southern part of the Turkmenistani region of the Caspian is widely practiced by fishermen bearing licenses to catch other species of fish. However, the technical resources of local poachers are inferior to those from Azerbaijan, Russia, and Kazakhstan, and do not extend to rapid vessels fitted with navigational devices. Moreover, there is little or no evidence of organized crime groups in Turkmenistan. The poached sturgeon is sold, as a rule, in southwestern Turkmenistan and in the capital, Ashkhabad. The state considers this to be acceptable, and almost the sole source of subsistence for the local population (here we can see the principle of "*this is our sea and we'll do whatever we want*").

Regional Cooperation

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the countries of the Caspian Sea reached a resolution regarding the need for regional cooperation in the field of fishing, and with this goal in mind formed the Commission on Aquatic Bioresources of the Caspian Sea.⁶² So far, the results of its activity can be assessed as modest.

At a session of the Commission in Astana (in November 2005), the volumes of Total Permissible Catches (TPC) were decided with respect to sturgeon, for subsequent submission to CITES. In 2006, the countries reduced their volumes by an average of 23.3 percent when compared to the previous year: Russia by 30.5 percent (from 371 tons in 2005 to 258 tons), Iran by 16 percent (from 595 tons to 500 tons), Kazakhstan by 12 percent (from 220 tons to 195 tons) and Azerbaijan by eight percent (from 100 tons to 92 tons). The issue of the

volume of TPCs for Turkmenistan was not considered due to the absence of a representative from the country at the session. Significant changes were also seen in export quotas for sturgeon meat and caviar for 2006. When compared to 2005, the caviar export quota of the Russian Federation for the following year was reduced from 21 tons to 3.9 tons, for Iran from 60 tons to 51 tons, for Kazakhstan from 15.9 tons to 13.2 tons, and for Azerbaijan from 6.7 tons to 6.5 tons.⁶³ The parties also coordinated export quotas for sturgeon caviar and other food products, in compliance with CITES Resolution 12.7, and the export quota for beluga caviar was reduced by 50 percent, for sevruga caviar by 40 percent, and for osetr caviar by 10 percent.

The Caspian countries are gradually increasing the capacity of hatcheries, which could generate positive results in the long term (the age at which sturgeon reach maturity and start to produce caviar is 10-12 years). Over the last 50 years the number of young released from sturgeon hatcheries of the Caspian countries has increased by dozens of times: from 2.59 million in 1955 to 79.41 million in 2005. Russia is the country most active in restocking the sturgeon population, at 56.7 percent. Iran's contribution runs to 21.6 percent, Azerbaijan-13.1 percent and Kazakhstan-7.5 percent. Russian sturgeon from the Volga amounts to more than 90 percent of the number of fish currently in the sea. Russian territorial waters hold the majority (60 percent) of the total stocks of sevruga.⁶⁴

Regional cooperation will also develop under the Framework Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Caspian, signed by all the Caspian countries in Tehran in 2003. The goal of the Tehran Convention is the protection of Caspian Sea environment from all sources of pollution, as well as the protection, preservation, and rational use of the resources of the Caspian. This document also stipulates independent or joint application of all related measures to prevent pollution, as well as the protection, preservation, and restoration of the environment of the Caspian Sea. One of the main principles that will govern the parties in implementing the provisions of the Convention is the principle that *the polluter pays*, according to which the party which inflicts an adverse impact on the sea basin will meet the costs of measures to prevent, control, and reduce pollution of the offshore environment of the Caspian.

The Convention was signed by Iran, Russia, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan, while Turkmenistan also acceded to the Convention later. The Tehran Convention is the first document to be signed by all the Caspian countries, and creates a foundation for the passage of other multilateral agreements. Among these are an agreement for the preservation of the biological resources of the Caspian, and an agreement on cooperation in the fields of hydrometeorology and sea pollution monitoring. The Convention officially came into force on August 12, 2006, following its ratification by the last of the Caspian countries: Azerbaijan.

In fall 2006, verification measures commenced in three Caspian countries: parallel audits by the Russian Federation Audit Chamber, the Azerbaijan Audit Chamber, and the Accounting Committee for Control over the Use of the Budget of the Republic of Kazakhstan. These audits are assessing the effectiveness of the use of the aquatic bioresources of the Caspian Sea, as well as the resources allocated for the protection, preservation, restoration, and rational use of sturgeon. It is possible that the corresponding agencies in Iran will also become involved in this effort. As yet, it is too early to judge how effective these steps are likely to be.

THE ACTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL ACTORS

The European Union, as one of the main importers of caviar, is actively taking measures to combat the penetration of illegal products onto European markets. For example, an EU resolution (which came into force on July 9, 2006) adopted new labeling rules for member countries, obliging all parties to use CITES labels. The new rules stipulate that importers indicate the place and date where a product was caught, to confirm its legal origin. EU Commissioner for Environment Stavros Dimas expressed the hope that the new rules would facilitate the restora-



tion of the population of sturgeon in the Caspian Sea, and prompt consumers in other countries to take similar measures.⁶⁵


On June 27-29, 2006, the European Union organized a conference to discuss the problem of catastrophic reductions in the sturgeon population, inviting the main players in the caviar game: exporter countries, the main importers, private companies, non-governmental and international organizations, and law enforcement agencies. The recommendations of the conference included improvement of the information exchange process between law enforcement agencies and the creation of a corresponding database; joint international investigations; a universal, standard labeling system for caviar; reinforcement of control over the illegal sale of caviar and possible trafficking routes; and the performance of DNA tests to determine the source of caviar. Interpol, the World Customs Organization (WCO), the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), and Europol have also offered assistance in achieving these goals.⁶⁶

The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service regulates the import of caviar and other sturgeon products to the United States, including those originating from the countries of the Caspian basin. As the main importer of beluga caviar (70 percent of world imports), the United States actively participates in the preservation of sturgeon, disrupting the illegal trade in caviar and cooperating with the Caspian countries. In 2005, the United States introduced a ban on the export of beluga caviar and other products, as the Caspian countries failed to submit a plan of action for the preservation of this species, which has been listed by U.S. legislators as at risk of extinction. The ban continued in 2006, and only Iran will be able to export caviar from Persian sturgeon to the United States, under its CITES quota for 2006. Apart from Iran, the export of caviar has been permitted from Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia, and Montenegro.

Curiously, the European Union and the United States, while making stringent demands on exporter countries, actually permit the trade of illegal caviar within the markets of Western Europe and North America. A simple Internet search is sufficient to locate significant volumes of such products, including Russian caviar, although in 2005 and 2006 there were officially no exports from Russia. Thus, despite the measures taken, the illegal trade in caviar on world markets continues. According to data submitted by the EU countries and Switzerland, from 2000 to 2005 a total of 12 tons of illegal black caviar was seized (of which 2,224 kg was seized in Germany, 2,067 kg in Switzerland, 1,920 kg in the Netherlands, 1,841 kg in Poland, and 1,587 kg in the United Kingdom). The coordinator of the TRAFFIC⁶⁷ program, Stephanie Theile, believes that the amount of illegal caviar in circulation is far greater than the official statistics indicate. Due to delays in adopting a universal container labeling system that could help determine the source of the *black gold*, it is extremely difficult to combat the illegal market.⁶⁸

The role of *private business* is also noteworthy—there is a constant demand for alternative sources of caviar, and some success has already been achieved in raising sturgeon in farms. In the early 1990s, a new form of international business appeared: commercial sturgeon farming. Today, this industry represents one of the realistic ways of preserving the sturgeon gene pool, reducing pressure on sturgeon poaching, and ensuring some compensation for the lost income of exporter and importer countries from losses of sturgeon in the wild. The industry is rapidly being developed across the world, especially in China, the United States, Switzerland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Uruguay, and the Arab Emirates. Manufacturers are optimistic, and expect that the volume of caviar produced by fish farms will almost double, from 64 tons in 2005 to 125 tons in 2010.⁶⁹ However, it has to be remembered that the taste of this caviar is inferior to that of caviar from wild sturgeon. Yet the affordable price, the absence of any restrictions on sales by CITES, and the stability of the supply chain make commercial sturgeon farming a profitable and economically viable prospect for the fish industry.

Table 5: Major Caviar Exporters and Importers (1998-2004, in metric tons)⁷⁰



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BIOLOGICAL TERRORISM: WHO IS GUILTY AND WHAT IS TO BE DONE?

Après moi, le deluge—this saying precisely reflects the current attitude to the fate of sturgeons in the Caspian. The approach demonstrated by states to this profitable and prestigious source of income is now simply irresponsible. Effective and rational management would turn this asset into an unending resource for the Caspian countries, while the oil and gas potential of the region will inevitably be exhausted in 30-40 years. This situation is being exploited by criminal organizations, whose annual income from poaching and the sale of sturgeon products may be as high as U.S. \$10 billion.⁷¹

During his first trip to Astrakhan oblast (in April 2002), President Putin visited the fishing areas, where he called the catastrophic sturgeon situation *biological terrorism*: cross-Caspian poaching aimed at the barbaric catch of these most valuable fish and the sale of sturgeon products for export.⁷²

The current situation will have the following, irreversible consequences:

- depletion of sturgeon stocks and the probability of their total disappearance;


- ❑ fall in the average age and the proportion of females in the spawning population of sturgeon. The maximum age of sturgeon at sea has changed as follows: beluga: from 40 to 23, osetr: from 33 to 20, sevruga: from 25-28 to 15 years;⁷³
- ❑ reduction in the average population mass of sturgeon;⁷⁴
- ❑ economic losses of countries in the region due to poaching;
- ❑ reduction in the quality, reputation, and thus the price of caviar on the international market as the black market flourishes.

The solution to the problem lies in preserving natural reproduction and sustainable fishing of sturgeon stocks in the Caspian. However, significant reproductive levels are not immediately achievable unless the Caspian countries take the following steps to preserve the population:⁷⁵

- ❑ introduction of government sturgeon monopolies covering the catch, transport, processing, and sale of sturgeon products;
- ❑ elimination of the economic and social preconditions for poaching. Primarily, legislation governing the fight against poaching needs improvement. Currently, product seized from poachers is legally resold on the country's domestic market, which makes it a profitable enterprise for state and law enforcement agencies. This paradox engenders a tragic situation, in which all the players have a large (and profitable) motivation to continue the *Great Caviar Game*;
- ❑ development of an international legislative framework, taking into consideration the unique aspects of the Caspian, and placing an emphasis on key aspects of sustainable development in the region;⁷⁶
- ❑ harmonization of the efforts of the Caspian countries to preserve sturgeon, including a temporary ban on commercial sturgeon fishing, increase in the productivity of hatcheries and, as a result, an increase in the release of young; formation of a unified, international restocking system to preserve valuable fish species in the Caspian, fully deploying the production capacities of sturgeon hatcheries in the basin with the joint use by producers of resources *taken from the wild* and from sturgeon breeder and maintenance stock, including the transfer of *live* fish eggs between countries to achieve these goals;
- ❑ development of commercial sturgeon farming, which will make it possible to alleviate pressure on the sturgeon population in the wild;
- ❑ more stringent control over the environmental impacts of the oil industry in the region;
- ❑ creation in the countries of the region national collections of sturgeon samples *from the wild* and ensuring the official exchange of standard samples of sturgeon between managerial and scientific authorities of CITES;
- ❑ generation of reproductive sturgeon stocks at both state sturgeon hatcheries and in the private sector, in order to ensure artificial restocking by producers and the preservation of biodiversity in the population;
- ❑ implementation of permanent national and international monitoring of the condition and functioning of the Caspian ecosystem.

A separate task faced by the Caspian countries, of no less importance and even of critical importance, is the urgent determination of the legal status of the Caspian Sea, which currently lacks any form of resolution and is delaying an agreement on the protection of the biore-sources of the Caspian and the division of responsibilities between the Caspian countries. Moreover, the uncertainty of the status of the sea is the main factor generating tension between the countries and may lead to conflict over the right of ownership of oil and gas fields.

Despite some degree of progress, the situation in the Caspian remains critical. The absence of a coordinated policy on the part of the Caspian countries and the international community covering the sustainable development of marine bioresources, of the Caspian as a whole and sturgeon in particular, creates a genuine threat to regional security. This challenge can only be combated through the concerted efforts of the Caspian countries. For this reason, enhancing regional and international cooperation is a vital step. The development of a unified Caspian policy for the preservation, restocking, and rational use of sturgeon fish stocks in the long term could prevent a possible deterioration of relations between the states in the region, ensure their long-term national interests and, most important, preserve this unique marine resource.

A Russian Tsar's decree once forbade shouting and singing near sturgeon spawning grounds to avoid frightening the fish. One would like to believe that the worst times for sturgeon are a thing of the past, and that even in this modern age that ancient decree will be seen as something more than an implausible legend. 

Notes

¹ Konstantin Volkov, "Caviar without Rules," *Itogi*, October 2, 2006, <http://www.7days.ru/Paper2006.nsf/Article/Itogi_2006_01_14_23_0112.html>.

² A publication of the Environment and Security Initiative, created by four international organizations: the UN Environment Programme (UNEP), the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the UN Development Programme (UNDP), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). "UNEP, UNDP, OSCE and NATO. Environment and Security: Transforming risks into cooperation – Central Asia – Ferghana / Osh / Khujand area," 2005, p. 8, <<http://enrin.grida.no/environment-and-security/ferghana-report-eng.pdf>>.

³ "UNEP, UNDP, OSCE and NATO. Environment and Security: Transforming risks into cooperation – Central Asia – Ferghana / Osh / Khujand area," op. cit., p. 9.

⁴ This work focuses on the five countries bordering the Caspian: Russia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Iran.

⁵ Umirserik Kasenov, "Caspian Oil and International Security," *Central Asia and the Caucasus*, No. 11 (1997), <http://www.ca-c.org/journal/11-1997/st_07_kasenov.shtml>.

⁶ Under a Russian presidential decree, the border services are responsible for protection of sturgeon in the Caspian and regularly detain poachers not only from local villages, but also from neighboring Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan.

⁷ Russia and Iran share a strong position favoring the protection of the unique natural environment of the Caspian and the prevention of pollution there. In this connection, these countries do not support the projects for the construction of underwater oil and gas pipelines along the Caspian Sea bed between Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan and between Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan.

⁸ Vladimir Ivanov, *The Caspian Sea's Biological Resources* (Astrakhan: KaspNIIRKh, 2000), p. 12.

⁹ A. Mazhnik, A. Vlasenko, R. Khodorevskaya, G. Zykova, A. Popova, A. Romanov, and S. Bushueva, "Developing Approaches to Evaluate Sturgeon Stocks and Total Permissible Catches in the Caspian Sea," in *Fishery Research in the Caspian: Results of 2004 Research* (Astrakhan: KaspNIIRKh, 2005), p. 256.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Vulf Sternin and Ian Dore, 1993; Ivanov, 2000; Protocols of Sessions of the Commission on Aquatic Bioresources of the Caspian Sea, 1998-2005.

¹² Vladimir Ivanov, op. cit., p. 14.

¹³ It is incorrect to claim that sturgeon caught on the Volga are *more contaminated* than those caught in Iranian waters. All sturgeon grow and feed in the Caspian Sea, in the same waters. The degree of contamination is identical, because fish swimming toward spawning grounds do not feed in rivers.



¹⁴ “Sturgeon,” WWF Factsheet, 12th Meeting of the Conference of the Parties of CITES, Santiago, November 3-15, 2002, <http://assets.panda.org/downloads/Sturgeon_factsheet.pdf>.

¹⁵ Felicity Barringer and Florence Fabricant, “In Conservation Effort, U.S. Bans Caspian Beluga Caviar,” *New York Times*, September 30, 2005, <<http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/30/politics/30caviar.html?ex=1285732800&en=87924b6325822368&ei=5090&partner=rssuserland&emc=rss>>.

¹⁶ Mazhnik, Vlasenko, Khodorevskaya, et al., op. cit., p. 258.

¹⁷ Source: R. Khodorevskaya and A. Romanov, “Changes in the Distribution and Quantity of Sturgeon in the Caspian Sea,” in *Aquaculture of Sturgeon: Successes and Prospects for Development* (Astrakhan and Moscow: VNIRO, 2006), papers from an international scientific conference, March 13-15, 2006, pp. 12-15.

¹⁸ The average fall in sea level between 1929 and 1941 was approximately 16 cm/year, although in some years the sea level dropped by as much as 30-33 cm. The average increase in sea level between 1978 and 1995 was approximately 13 cm/year, although in some years the sea level rose by as much as 33-35 cm. V. Mikhailov, G. Rychagov, and E. Povalishnikova. “Is the Recent Increase in the Level of the Caspian Sea and Its Consequences a Natural Catastrophe?” *Vestnik RFFI*, No. 45 (December 1998), <http://www.rfbr.ru/default.asp?section_id=83>.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ D. Baydeldinova, “Threats to Environmental Security in the Caspian,” a publication of the Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Research attached to the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, January 28, 2005, <<http://www.kisi.kz/img/docs/1220.pdf>>.

²¹ The scale of possible underfishing in the above period amounts to 132,000 tons, equivalent to the predicted catch of 150,000 tons minus the actual catch of 18,000 tons. Moreover, of 132,000 tons of sturgeon caught, it will be possible to process up to 13,000 tons of sturgeon caviar with an average value of U.S. \$750 per kilogram according to 1996-2005 market prices, totaling U.S. \$9.7 billion, and up to 103,000 tons of food product (calculated as frozen product) with an average sales value of U.S. \$6 per kilogram, totaling U.S. \$618 million. From an interview by the author with Valery Paltsev, executive director of the Russian Sturgeon Harvest and Production Association.

²² From an interview by the author with Valery Paltsev, executive director of the Russian Sturgeon Harvest and Production Association.

²³ These agreements entered into force on January 1, 2004.

²⁴ “Exporters to strengthen controls and promote sustainable fishing before CITES can publish 2006 export quotas,” CITES press release, January 3, 2006, <<http://www.cites.org/eng/news/press/2006/060103.shtml>>.

²⁵ “Export Quotas for Sturgeon,” CITES, 2006, <http://www.cites.org/eng/resources/quotas/sturgeon_intro.shtml>.

²⁶ Valery Paltsev, interview by the author. This point of view was officially voiced by Russia, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan during a summit of these countries on April 24, 2006 in Moscow, and has been voiced to the CITES Secretariat. The text of the statement was submitted by Kazakhstan Fishing Industry Committee Chairman Kanat Suleimenov, acting as a representative of the party currently chairing the Commission on the Aquatic Bioresources of the Caspian Sea.

²⁷ “Export Quotas for Sturgeons,” CITES, 2 January 2007, <<http://www.cites.org/common/quotas/2007/Sturgeon2007.pdf>>.

²⁸ “Following 2006 ban, CITES authorizes 2007 quotas for all Caspian Sea caviar except beluga,” CITES Press Release, January 2, 2007, <<http://www.cites.org/eng/news/E-Press%20release%202007%20quotas.pdf>>.

²⁹ The main sections of this program are as follows: scientific observations and research to assess the condition of stocks and to determine the total permissible catch (TPC), to improve restocking technologies and to preserve sturgeon; to produce and create breeder stocks, and maintain these for the purposes of artificial restocking; state regulation of individual stages in the circulation of sturgeon: production, transportation, processing of food products and sales on domestic and foreign markets; maintain-

ing habitats and natural spawning conditions in bodies of water (fishing ground improvement efforts); commercial sturgeon farming; protection of fish stocks, combating poaching and the illegal trafficking of sturgeon and sturgeon products. This work is performed not only by state enterprises and establishments, but also by private enterprises, which independently finance such operations.

³⁰ There are a total of 11 sturgeon breeding farms, or hatcheries, in Russia.

³¹ Ekaterina Glikman, "Duma Drafts Bill on the Caviar Business," *Novaya gazeta*, March 30, 2006, <<http://2006.novayagazeta.ru/nomer/2006/23n/n23n-s17.shtml>>.

³² Anna Kozyreva, "Very Fresh Sturgeon," *RF Segodnya*, No. 16, 2003, <http://russia-today.ru/2003/no_16/16_SF_2.htm>.

³³ "An 'Underground' Delicacy," Interior Ministry Web Site, June 17, 2003, <<http://www.mvd.ru/news/769/>>. During the large-scale Operation South-East Blockhouse (Blokpost Yug-Vostok) on the Caspian in 2003, GUSB MVD police officers intercepted 1,200 incidences of poaching in a period of less than one month, seizing 180 poaching boats, 10,000 meters of nets, and approximately 400 hook and lines, 1,236 kg of sturgeon caviar, 170 kg of sturgeon fish and almost 135 tons of other seafood (the total value of the seized goods, by the most modest estimates, was 81,724,000 rubles). More than 73 people were caught illegally fishing, and as a result 5,000 criminal cases were opened.

³⁴ Every single batch of sturgeon shipped for export, and when imported into the destination country, must possess a document of permission, adhering to a specific format and level of security, issued by the national management authority of CITES. Russia produced no exports of sturgeon, including from the Caspian basin, in 2003 and 2005, when export quotas were published by the CITES Secretariat as follows: 29.5 tons (<http://www.cites.org/common/quotas/2003/2003sturgeon.pdf>) and 20.7 tons (http://www.cites.org/common/quotas/2005/sturgeon_quotas2005.pdf). Financial losses for these reasons are estimated to total U.S. \$65 million (or 55 million). The average price of sturgeon caviar in the western European market during these years is taken to be around \$1,100 per kilogram.

³⁵ Elena Komarova, "The Salty Fruits of the Ban," *Moskovskiy novosti*, December 30, 2005, <<http://www.mn.ru/issue.php?2005-50-36>>.

³⁶ The Committee of the Government of the Russian Federation on Legislative Activity on May 22, 2006 approved the concept and objectives for drafting the federal law *On the Preservation, Restocking and Rational Use of Sturgeon, and the Regulation of the Circulation of Sturgeon Products*. The draft of the federal law *On Amendments to Article 56 of the Federal Law On Wildlife* contains provisions that stipulate the destruction of illegally obtained specimens of certain wildlife species (including sturgeon) and their derivative products, following seizure. This bill was reviewed and approved at a session of the Russian government on October 4, 2006. After the above bill is presented for signature by the Russian head of state, a draft presidential decree entitled *On measures of state regulation over the circulation of products derived from sturgeon fish, including caviar* will be presented. The implementation of this decree will allow for the destruction of confiscated product derived from sturgeon in order to avoid its legalization and to ensure the sale of sturgeon products only in special stores. A number of other bills have now also been drafted: the federal law *On Amendments to Article 17 of the Federal Law On Licensing Certain Activities* and a federal law amending the section of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation on reinforcing sanctions on the illegal production of aquatic fauna and flora, in the form of imprisonment for a period of up to five years with compulsory seizure of the instruments of crimes in favor of the state; also, a number of draft resolutions of the Russian government, necessary for the implementation of the above bills and decree.

³⁷ "The Russian Ministry for Nature is Concerned about the Possibility of Pollution of the Caspian due to Oil Transportation by Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan," *REGIONS.RU/Novosti Federatsii*, July 7, 2006, <<http://www.regions.ru/news/1989796>>.

³⁸ Azerbaijani Minister for Ecology and Natural Resources Husein Bagirov, "Determination of the Legal Status of the Caspian Will Help to Resolve the Ecological Problems of this Body of Water," *Interfax*, February 7, 2005, <http://www.interfax.ru/r/B/exclusive/246.html?menu=65&id_issue=10747108>.

³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰ Commission on the Aquatic Bioresources of the Caspian Sea, Protocol of the 24th session, Appendix No. 4, Astana, 2005.



⁴¹ For example, Azerbaijan's quota for sturgeon catches in 2005 was 100 tons. In 2006 the catch fell to just 92 tons. The export quota for caviar in 2005 was 6.7 tons, and it is expected that the quota for this year will be 6.5 tons.

⁴² Paul Rimple, "Azerbaijan Assumes Control of Sturgeon," *EURASIA*, February 27, 2006, <<http://www.eurasianet.org/russian/departments/insight/articles/eav022706aru.shtml>>.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Husein Bagirov, op. cit.

⁴⁵ Guive Mirfendereski, "Sag mahi: The theology of caviar," *Iranian*, September 13, 2000, <<http://www.iranian.com/GuiveMirfendereski/2000/September/Caviar/index.html>>.

⁴⁶ "Boosting Caviar Production," *Iran Daily*, July 9, 2006, p.6, <<http://iran-daily.com/1385/2605/pdf/i6.pdf>>.

⁴⁷ This integrated index takes into consideration natural and artificial restocking, the volume of the fresh-water stock, environmental factors, the size of sturgeon spawning grounds within the territories of specific states, etc.

⁴⁸ "Sturgeon Stocks Slump," *Iran Daily*, March 5, 2006, <<http://www.iran-daily.com/1383/2228/pdf/i6.pdf>>.

⁴⁹ Remarks by Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright on American-Iranian Relations (as released by the Office of the Spokesman U.S. Department of State), March 17, 2000, Washington, D.C., <<http://www.fas.org/news/iran/2000/000317.htm>>.

⁵⁰ "Iran's Caviar exported to the USA grows 48 percent," Iran Fisheries Organisation, January 25, 2005, <<http://www.iranfisheries.net>>.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Source: CITES trade database, <<http://www.unep-wcmc.org/citestrade/trade.cfm>>.

⁵³ "Sturgeon Stocks Slump," op. cit.

⁵⁴ Source: CITES trade database, <<http://www.unep-wcmc.org/citestrade/trade.cfm>>.

⁵⁵ Naida Pirmetova, "The Influence of Poaching on Stocks of Valuable Fish in the Caspian," Publication of the Center for Regional Development in Azerbaijan, <<http://www.azregionaldevelopment.org/cgi-bin/cms/vis/vis.pl?s=001&p=0019&n=000093&g=>>>.

⁵⁶ "Mangystau Oblast to Set up Sturgeon Reproduction Center," *Kazinform*, August 25, 2006, <<http://www.inform.kz/showarticle.php?lang=eng&id=144100>>.

⁵⁷ Agreement between the governments of the Russian Federation and Kazakhstan on the activities of representatives of the border services, <<http://www.rian.ru/doc/20040109/1718709.html>>.

⁵⁸ Konstantin Borodinov, "Minister A. Samakov: 'The Environmental Problems in the Oil Fields Must Be Solved Together,'" *Kazinform*, October 5, 2005, <<http://www.earthwire.org/cache.cfm?aid=98482>>.

⁵⁹ D. Baydeldinova, op. cit.

⁶⁰ "U.S. Companies Win Sturgeon Tender Announced by the State Fisheries Committee of Turkmenistan," *Turkmenistan*, July 11, 2005, <http://www.turkmenistan.ru/?page_id=3&lang_id=ru&elem_id=6865&type=event&sort=date_desc>.

⁶¹ Oraz Kurbangel'dyev, "Towards No Fish... Turkmen authorities are not controlling sturgeon catches in the Caspian," *TsentrAziya*, October 24, 2004, <<http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php4?st=1098626580>>.

⁶² The committee was created in 1992 on the initiative of Russia for the purposes of the joint management of fishing resources, and to date has been performing functions of assessing stocks and total permissible catches of transboundary species of aquatic bioresources (sturgeon, anchovy, seals, etc.), the development of rules for the regulation of fishing and measures to protect fishing resources, the development

of recommendations for the use of standard fishing equipment, and scientific research in the field of the preservation and restocking of fish populations. Initially, only the countries of the CIS participated in the work of the committee. Iran was involved only in the capacity of an observer. In 2002, Iran became the first fully-fledged member of the committee. In line with committee recommendations, since 2001 all the Caspian countries have participated in a joint, annual program of seasonal marine expeditions to assess the number and stocks of sturgeon and to determine the impact of natural and anthropogenic factors. Each year, the committee determines quotas for fishing of sturgeon and the export of black caviar, which is subsequently submitted to the CITES Secretariat, where it is published on the organization's official website after a review and approval process. One of the latest committee innovations is to determine quotas for a new, standardized method, involving the execution of general monitoring of fish resources in the Caspian Sea. Until now, each of the countries has presented their calculations of the size of food sources, the volume of fish in their sectors, the possibilities for restocking, the evidence used determine total fish stocks in the Caspian, total quotas for sturgeon fishing, and the distribution of these quotas between the countries. The Commission on the Aquatic Bioresources of the Caspian Sea has been functioning for 14 years, and has achieved certain successes. For example, in the last two years the committee has developed and approved the Interstate Regional Program of Caspian countries for the joint management, preservation, and stable use of the bioresources of the Caspian Sea, three international seminars have been organized and conducted, cooperation has been organized between the Committee and the CITES Secretariat, and other international organizations involved in the problem of sturgeon.

⁶³ The total quota for fishing of sturgeon by the Caspian states in 2006 was reduced by 23.2 percent. Source: *Rakhat-TV*, December 1, 2005, <<http://www.rakhattv.kz/section.asp?SectionID=29>>.

⁶⁴ Mazhnik, Vlasenko, Khodorevskaya, et al., op. cit., p. 256.

⁶⁵ "EU Introduces New Rules for Marking Sturgeon Caviar," *RosBiznesKonsalting*, May 16, 2006, <<http://www.fishery.ru/news/index.php?id=8008>>.

⁶⁶ "New Rules to Combat Illegal Caviar Trade," EU press release, Brussels, May 15, 2006, <<http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/06/611&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en>>.

⁶⁷ The TRAFFIC initiative was developed by the World Wildlife Fund and the World Conservation Union (IUCN) to monitor trade in vanishing species of flora and fauna, and for research aimed at the sustainable development of these species. TRAFFIC, along with the U.S. "Caviar Emptor" program created by the Pew Institute for Ocean Science, the Sea Web organization, and the U.S. National Resources Defense Council for the preservation of sturgeon are currently the leading non governmental organizations conducting information campaigns aimed at saving the sturgeon.

⁶⁸ "Cracking Down on Illegal Caviar Trade," WWF, July 3, 2006,

<http://www.panda.org/about_wwf/what_we_do/marine/news/index.cfm?uNewsID=74780>.

⁶⁹ Jane Black, "Caviar from Farms instead of the Seas," *New York Times*, September 26, 2006, <<http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/09/26/news/caviar.php>>.

⁷⁰ "Black Gold: The caviar trade in Western Europe," Factsheet, *TRAFFIC*, <http://www.traffic.org/news/Caviar_factsheet.pdf#search=percent22trafficpercent20caviarpercent20factsheetpercent22>.

⁷¹ D. Baydeldinova, op. cit.

⁷² Vladimir Putin, speech at a meeting on the problems of the Caspian region, Astrakhan, April 25, 2002, <<http://www.kremlin.ru/text/appears/2002/04/28886.shtml>>.

⁷³ Mazhnik, Vlasenko, Khodorevskaya, et al., op. cit., p. 259.

⁷⁴ The sturgeon population in the North Caspian in 2002 was dominated by adults (80.4 percent), and by 2004 their proportion fell to 61.5 percent while in the Middle and South Caspian young and sub-commercial size fish made up 88.7 and 92.9 percent of the population, respectively. Compared to 2002 figures for the shallow zone of the North Caspian, the proportion of immature fish in the sevruga population grew from 58.2 to 64.7 percent, and reached as high as 75 percent in the deep-water zone. In the Middle Caspian in general, the number of young and sub-commercial size fish increased from 55.5 to 90.0 percent, and fell in the South Caspian from 73.7 to 61.4 percent. Young fish are predominant in the beluga



population. The average length and mass are 153.9 cm and 37.3 kg. The proportion of mature fish does not exceed nine percent, while the proportion of immature is 35 percent.

⁷⁵ The recommendations were compiled based on the results of analysis, and an interview with the expert Valery Paltsev.

⁷⁶ In part, this involves the development of a regulatory basis for the protection of the marine environment, the preservation of biological diversity, the creation of a rigid mechanism of control over the fulfillment of contracts and the application of the corresponding contracts, and the development of a legal and regulatory framework for the Caspian countries to prevent oil spills and rapidly react to emergency situations.




Ekaterina Stepanova

ISLAMIST TERRORISM TODAY: GLOBAL AND REGIONAL LEVELS

The main feature of global terrorist activity in the past two years has been its unprecedented growth. The total number of terrorist incidents in 2005 almost reached the 5,000 mark (to be more precise, there were 4,924 incidents), nearly 85 percent more than the number in the previous “peak” years of 2004 (2,646) and 2002 (2,649), and was an absolute record in the history of terrorism.

Two regions—the **Middle East and Persian Gulf states** (3,035, or 62 percent of terrorist incidents worldwide) and **South Asia, including Afghanistan** (1,238 terrorist incidents, or 25 percent of the total)—led in the number of terrorist incidents in 2005 by a wide margin. In all of the remaining regions the number of terrorist incidents was significantly less (from seven in East and Central Asia to 247 in Western Europe).¹

Figure 1. Number of Terrorist Incidents Worldwide (1998-2005)




Along with the number of terrorist incidents, the second most important indicator of terrorist activity is the number of its victims. In 2005 alone, over 8,000 people (8,161) died in terrorist incidents worldwide. This is a record number, and is significantly higher than in the previous year (5,068 dead in 2004) and nearly double the number in 2001 (4,571 victims), when the most lethal terrorist incidents in human history, those of September 11, 2001, were carried out. In 2005, the two regions with the greatest number of terrorist incidents also led in the number of victims by a large margin. In the Middle East and the Persian Gulf states alone, 6,469 people died at terrorist hands (79 percent of all killed in terrorist incidents), while in



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South Asia 1,159 individuals died (14 percent of the total number killed). In all other regions the number of victims of terrorism was far less (187 in Africa, 141 in Latin America, etc.)

Figure 2. Number of Dead as a Result of Terrorist Incidents (1998–2005)



The Middle East and South Asia have not always led in the number of terrorist incidents and terrorist victims over the course of the past eight years (see Table 1).² Although the Middle East has been among the top three regions leading in the number of terrorist incidents throughout 1998-2005, it only reached the top spot in 2004-05; South Asia (including Afghanistan) has been among the top three since 2001 and led in the number of terrorist incidents in 2002 and 2003. As for the number killed during terrorist incidents, the Middle East and Persian Gulf region (including Iraq) has only been the leader since 2003, while in 1998-99 it was only in third place in this category, and in 2000-01—that is, in the run-up to the incidents of September 11—it only occupied fifth place in the number killed in terrorist incidents. During the same period of time, South Asia was consistently one of the top three in numbers of victims, but was only in first place in 2000 and 2002.

Table 1. Regions of the World with the Most Terrorist Incidents and Greatest Number of Victims, 1998–2005

| Year | Regions with the Most Terrorist Incidents | Regions with the Greatest Number of Fatalities from Terrorism |
|------|---|---|
| 2005 | ME, SA, WE | ME, SA, Afr. |
| 2004 | ME, SA, WE | ME, SA, EE |
| 2003 | SA, ME, WE | ME, SA, EE |
| 2002 | SA, ME, LA | SA, ME, EE |
| 2001 | WE, ME, SA | NA, SA, LA |
| 2000 | WE, ME, LA | SA, LA, SEA |
| 1999 | WE, ME, LA | EE, SA, ME |
| 1998 | EE, WE, ME | Afr., SA, ME |

(EE – Eastern Europe, LA – Latin America, ME – Middle East and Persian Gulf, NA – North America, SA – South Asia including Afghanistan, SEA – Southeast Asia, WE – Western Europe.) Table compiled on the basis of data in the MIPT Terrorism Knowledge Base, 1998–2005.

It is indicative that at the turn of the century—all the way through 2001—the first place in terms of the number of terrorist incidents was held not by Asian regions but by Europe: in 1999-2001 Western Europe led in terms of the number of terrorist incidents and in 1998 Eastern Europe (including Russia) did. In those years not one of the Asian regions led in terms of terrorist victims: in 1998 the greatest number of fatalities was suffered in Africa, in 1999 in Eastern Europe/Russia, in 2000 in South America, and in 2001 in North America (largely due to the unprecedented number of victims of the September 11 incident in the United States).

A NEW TYPE OF TERRORISM

These data indicate, first of all, that the “war on terrorism” that began after September 11, 2001 and the reaction to it shifted the main target of global terrorist activities towards western and southern Asia. Second, we see a close correlation between the shift of terrorist activity worldwide and the gradual shift of the regional focus of the global campaign against terrorism led by the United States: from the retaliatory operation in Afghanistan to military action that was not directly related to the fight against terrorism (primarily, the U.S. intervention in and occupation of Iraq). Third, if at least one of the main goals of the international anti-terrorist campaign was the general lessening of the threat of terrorism worldwide, then five years later we are faced with the opposite result, that is, the steady and unprecedented growth of terrorist activity on a global scale.

The second key trend in the development of terrorism today is the accelerating erosion of the division between domestic and international terrorism. If the former can be understood as terrorism that is strictly limited by territory or is carried out by citizens (or against citizens) of just one country, while the latter is terrorist activity carried out on the territory or by or against citizens of more than one state, then the traditional differentiation of these two concepts is becoming more and more irrelevant. The erosion of the line between domestic and international terrorism is partially the result, as in earlier years, of the *internationalization* of certain aspects of terrorist activities: the conduct of terrorist acts outside of the country where they are mainly based/country of origin, as well as the establishment of a system to raise funds abroad.

However, there is an even more serious phenomenon that has been gathering attention of late: the *transnationalization* of terrorism: from the energizing of cooperation between independent groups in various countries to the creation of full-fledged transnational terrorist networks. As the al-Qa’ida example and the activity of the numerous autonomous and semi-autonomous cells in the post-al-Qa’ida jihadist movement in particular indicate, this sort of transnational network has global (*unlimited*) goals and operates on a global scale, making it possible for us to speak of the globalization of terrorism. Although these transnational networks do not substitute for the great diversity of groups making use of terrorist methods and goals that are *limited* by a particular local or regional context and are not directly led by the transnational networks, there is an undeniable demonstration effect at play and the networks often actively cooperate with the other groups (for instance, in post-Saddam Iraq).

To sum up, today it is more relevant to speak of various levels of terrorism than of “international” and “domestic” terrorism: about more traditional *local or regional terrorism* and about “new” *global terrorism*.

That said, it is precisely *extremist ideology* and *organizational capabilities* (structural form) that remain the most important strategic resources and comparative advantage of terrorist organizations, regardless of their level of operation. In the first half of the 21st century, Islamic extremism of the jihadist variety continued to remain the dominant ideology of transnational terrorism on the global level. Its role continued to grow at the local and regional level as well in Islamic regions where, it should be noted, it was often connected to radical nationalism both in the form of ethnic separatism (Kashmir, Philippines, Northern Caucasus, etc.) and national liberation (Iraq and the Palestinian territories). As for organization, the trend on both levels continued to be the spread of network elements and organizational forms ever more broadly. Its effect was greatly to strengthen a new peculiar organizational phenomenon that was not char-



acteristic of either classical networks or hierarchical ones: the effective multi-level coordination of activities via common strategic directives.

Terrorist organizations' main resources, regardless of their level, are ideology and organization. These complement their financial and technical capabilities. Here two trends are worth noting.

First and foremost, there is terrorists' growing use of new, quickly developing *information and communication technologies*, resources, and skills, not only in order to broaden their audience, base of support, and the strength of the demonstration effect and societal resonance of terrorist incidents, but also for organization-building itself and the proliferation of extremist ideology. In our opinion, current terrorist groups' information and communication capabilities and ever more *effective and sophisticated public relations* are no less, and possibly more, important than the armaments, munitions, explosive materials, and means of delivery they use (which, even in large-scale incidents such as the explosions in Madrid in March 2004 or in London in July 2005, can be relatively conventional, accessible, and inexpensive).

The second trend is the growth in the degree of financial autonomy of armed, non-state players in the contemporary world—up to and including complete financial independence and self-sufficiency. This is, incidentally, not just characteristic for terrorist organizations. It is important to emphasize that terrorists are attaining a high level of financial autonomy not just thanks to their ever-increasing immersion in the shadow economy and cooperation with organized crime, but also via completely legal means (from participation in legal businesses to the use of funds originally collected as legal, religious donations for their own aims). Terrorists' successful search for new sources and means of funding and their transition to partial or full self-funding is in large part the result of the long-term trend towards the gradual but persistent *reduction of so-called state support for terrorism* on a global scale.³

Let us briefly examine the chief types of terrorism and trends in contemporary Islamist terrorism by looking, first, at the example of the terrorist attacks in London of July 2005 as an example of transnational jihadist terrorism in its post-al-Qa'ida form and, second, at terrorism as one of the main tactics of the Iraqi insurrection. Iraq has become a zone of cooperation between transnational jihadist networks and local groups, combining Islamist extremism and local nationalism. Thirdly, if in Iraq the Islamist groups of mixed nationalities involved in insurrection were only formed in the mid-2000s, in the other hotbed of regional tension—the drawn-out Palestinian-Israeli and, more broadly, Arab-Israeli conflict, which became a full-scale war between Israel and Lebanon in 2006—the combination of Islamism and radical nationalism has already become traditional. It has been most noticeable in the two largest militarized, religious, social, and political movements: the Palestinian Hamas and Lebanese Hezbollah movements. Although the activities of both organizations go far beyond the scope of terrorism, one cannot ignore them—particularly given the sharp July-August 2006 escalation in the conflict in the Middle East.

“NEW TERRORISM” TAKES CENTER STAGE: THE LONDON TERRORIST INCIDENTS OF JULY 2005

Along with the 2004 terrorist incidents in Madrid, the terrorist attacks in London on July 7, 2005 have been the most noticeable manifestation of “new terrorism” in the current decade.

U.K. citizens and facilities have been the victims of terrorist attacks by mujahedin before. In November 2003, vehicles filled with explosives blew up at the U.K. consulate and the HSBC Bank in Istanbul (killing the U.K. consul general); British citizens were victims of the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States; the October 12, 2002 events in Bali (Indonesia); and the March 11, 2004 terrorist acts in Madrid that were all carried out by Islamist groups. However, the explosions in London on July 7, 2005 were the first successful attacks in history carried out on the territory of the United Kingdom itself. Further, in the year since July 2005 at least three similar terrorist attacks on U.K. territory were prevented.⁴ Finally, on August 10, 2006 the

United Kingdom was struck by a great air transport crisis after the authorities provided information on the preventive interdiction of plans by British Islamist terrorists to blow up several transatlantic airlines using dozens of suicide bombers and liquid explosives, causing the terrorist threat level to be raised to the highest level—critical—for several days.

It is significant that on the eve of the terrorist incidents of July 2005, in May of that year, the U.K. threat level was lowered from “severe general” to “substantial.”⁵ Furthermore, even then the basis for this decision was questionable, given that the number of “primary investigative targets” linked to terrorism in the United Kingdom had grown from 250 in 2001 to 500 in July 2004, and 800 by July 2005, and the British Security Service had warned no longer ago than March 2005 that the most significant threat to the United Kingdom and its interests overseas at that time came from al-Qa’ida and associated networks.⁶

The technical, financial, and other parameters of the July 7 incidents were not greatly different from those of other terrorist attacks launched by mujahedin in other countries since September 11, 2001. Nevertheless, it is still useful to examine these parameters, since they differ greatly from the stereotypes spread by the media.

As a result of three nearly simultaneous explosions in the London underground and an additional explosion that went off an hour later in a bus in Tavistock Place, 56 people were killed and over 700 injured. The police and intelligence services had received no warning of the attacks.⁷ The bombs were home-made (in an apartment rented for the purpose in Leeds) using readily available, inexpensive materials and equipment. Although the do-it-yourself manufacture of explosives from these materials is fairly dangerous, it does not require any special expertise: open-source information and, perhaps, the advice of a person familiar with the preparation of such devices is sufficient.⁸ The terrorists carried the potent explosives to the sites where they were to be detonated in rucksacks (of 2-5 kg each), and detonated them using regular batteries.⁹ The cost of the entire operation, including the apartment rental, necessary materials, transportation costs both within the United Kingdom and during foreign trips, totaled less than £8,000. The group funded itself from completely legal sources, and there is no evidence that it could have received any financial assistance from outside (its main resources were provided by its leader, Mohammed Siddeque Khan, who had worked at a regular job for three years and had taken out a personal bank loan of £10,000).¹⁰

The psychological and social characteristics as well as the backgrounds of the four terrorist suicide bombers were similar to previous terrorist incidents of this sort. Most important was that practically *nothing special distinguished them* from thousands of their peers, co-workers, neighbors, and friends and if there was a difference, then at first glance it was in their favor. The terrorists’ ages ranged from 18 to 30, two of them lived independently, were married, and each had a child, while the other two lived with their parents; three of them were second-generation U.K. citizens of Pakistani descent who were well integrated into British society. Although they grew up in the poor Leeds suburb of Beeston, they belonged to the middle class and did not want for anything, while the father of one of the terrorists was a successful local businessman. The leader of the group, Siddeque Khan, had graduated university, was actively engaged in social work and public assistance (he worked with invalids and children with difficulties), and was considered to be a talented teacher at his main place of work and in general a good example for area children. Not one of the members of the group had had problems with the police (the only thing that was somewhat atypical for the area where they lived), all of them actively participated in the social life of their community (visited clubs, books stores, etc.) and, like the members of other terrorist cells, spent quite a bit of time recreating outside (involved in sports, hiking, etc.)¹¹

Although they were religious and did not hide this fact (they prayed at work and visited one of the area mosques on Fridays, though they were not tied to any particular one), there were no concrete indications of religious extremism noted in any of them.¹² Not one of the three Britons of Pakistani descent were the followers of any of the extremist Islamic clerics active on British territory right up to the final period of time (and only the fourth member of the group, Jermaine Lindsay, who was of Jamaican origin and had converted to Islam in 2000 and was generally less



well integrated into British society, may have been under the influence of the radical British mullah Abdallah al-Faisal).¹³ Furthermore, not long before the terrorist incidents—apparently in order to dispel any possible suspicions—one of the group’s members returned to the western style of dress, another shaved off his beard, etc.

Thus, if there was no personal social adversity, no indoctrination by radical mullahs, and no direct order from a foreign terrorist group, what motivated this most recent group of European Islamist suicide terrorists? The same things that motivated similar groups in the past: recent global political events (Afghanistan, Iraq, etc.) were seen as a threat from the west led by the United States with the active participation of its loyal ally the United Kingdom, directed at the entire Moslem *umma* (community); the result was a reaction in the form of “religious martyrdom.” The traditional “suicide bomber farewell video” recorded by Siddeque Khan and broadcast on the Qatari television station Al-Jazeera on September 1, 2005, as well as his will, clearly testify to this. This documentary evidence is basically dedicated to the idea of the “injustices,” humiliations, and “cruelties and atrocities,” that “Muslims throughout the world” are subjected to by the western countries. Extolling the “heroes of our time”—the leaders of the jihadist movement “dear sheikh” Osama bin Laden, Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi—Siddeque Khan submits that the support citizens of western countries provide their “democratically elected governments” is the main reason why average citizens are “directly responsible” for the actions of their states and the main justification for strikes on civilians. Associating himself with the entire *umma*, Siddeque Khan addresses British citizens and residents of other western countries: “*your support of [your governments] makes you directly responsible, just as I am directly responsible for protecting and avenging my Muslim brothers and sisters*” and “*until we feel security, you will be our targets.*”¹⁴

The example of the group that committed the terrorist attacks of July 7, 2005 in London yet again testifies to the dynamic development and transformation of the jihadist movement in recent years, with which analysts simply “cannot keep up.” Indeed, the structural organization of the transnational jihadist movement at the beginning of the 21st century is in transition from a more clearly established organizational, ideological, and financial “nucleus” (al-Qa’ida) to an ever more amorphous, decentralized, spread-out network and the more active spread of cells in a method akin to “franchising.” These cells share the ideology and general orientation of al-Qa’ida and use its name as a “brand,” but are not directly tied to it organizationally: neither in the case of the Leeds group in the United Kingdom¹⁵ nor in the case of the Islamists who carried out the terrorist attacks on the trains in Madrid on March 11, 2004 is there reliable evidence of their connection to al-Qa’ida.¹⁶

In this “spread-out” network organization we see the signs of a “segmented, polycentric, ideologically integrated network” (SPIN). However, one should remember that in reality most terrorist organizations are hybrids of network and hierarchical elements at both the lower and higher levels. For example, the jihadist movement, despite the predominance of network features, has certain hierarchical elements as well. They are present both at the level of individual cells (the role of Siddeque Khan as the clear leader of the Leeds group) and within the framework of the movement as a whole (the presence of leaders, perhaps not in the classical sense but more in the ideological sense of the word, such as Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and the deceased Abu Musab al-Zarqawi). Typically, mixed, hybrid organizations are not the result of conscious organizational policy but developed organically, through natural adaptation to living conditions.

The jihadist movement cannot be reduced to a standard modern, impersonal functional- ideological network (like the anti-globalization movement) not only due the fact that it has a mixed form, but also because the network’s hierarchy is not pure, but instead has multiple levels. The fact is that in contrast to anti-globalization networks, a few shared ideological beliefs alone are not enough to ensure the effective functioning of the jihadist movement’s separate semi- or wholly autonomous cells in various locations towards a common goal. This organizational problem is solved with the aid of a model that is not characteristic either of networks or hierarchies “in their pure form”¹⁷—the *effective coordination* of the actions of lower-level semi- or completely autonomous cells not via centralized control (as in hierarchies) or through negoti-

ations and reciprocal agreements (as in networks), but with the *aid of a strategic directive, formulated in the most general form.*

When there are only informal, latent connections, this sort of strategic coordination with the aid of general directives can only be effective in two cases. Either the movement's ideology itself must already include sufficiently clear instructions about particular actions or it makes it possible to formulate strategic goals in such a way that they can be realized using various methods under a variety of circumstances and will still count as actions towards a common objective. The most ambitious and militarized version of Islamic extremism and the concept of a global jihad in response to western actions viewed as "unfair," "criminal," and "directed against all Muslims" satisfies both requirements as an ideology for a widespread, multilevel, and segmented "post-al-Qa'ida" jihadist movement. Here modern information technologies play an irreplaceable role, the Internet in particular, in helping the mujahedin to organize the movement and to attribute easily a common purpose to separate actions. Dozens of groups and cells throughout the world that are quite similar to each other but not connected in any way have the opportunity quickly to claim "virtual" responsibility for any action that corresponds to the global goals of the movement as a whole.

In addition to a general ideology, effective coordination of the actions of separate cells in the jihadist movement also require a higher level of reciprocal social obligations and interpersonal confidence, which neither network or mixed organization by themselves can ensure. The mujahedin are united not only by an abstract ideological closeness and a feeling that they are independent units that belong to a single network. The members of lower-level cells, as a rule, are also joined together by very close personal relations, which were often established even before they joined the jihadist movement. Here we are not chiefly talking about archaic clan relations but about ties of friendship and personal contacts, community ties, and shared experiences (at school, work, and social activities), that is, we are talking about a group of close friends, about an association, a distinctive "brotherhood" of like-minded believers.¹⁸

Typically, a group of Muslims (either living in a foreign land or the children of immigrants, usually well integrated into western society) bound together by ties of friendship or, somewhat less typically, kinship, attends mosque together, rents housing, or just gets together on a regular basis. Gradually such a group, made up of from four to 8-10 people, becomes internally integrated (as a rule, on the basis of an aggravated feeling of alienation from the surrounding society and a radical rejection of the policy of the authorities of the country of residence), and is politicized and radicalized on the basis of anti-western Islamic ideology, frequently under the influence of the group leader—a spiritual mini-authority and mentor. Radicalization and the pursuit of a new "fictitious" family in the form of a jihadist cell is often provoked by a socio-cultural "upheaval" (changing the country of residence, groups of close contacts, etc.), and intensified by the "virtual" influence and demonstrational effect of major world events—from the September 11, 2001 terrorist incident to the armed intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq. At some stage this sort of group may come to the conclusion that "empty conversation" is useless and that they must begin to engage in "propaganda via action." After this the "circle," as a rule, ceases to attend mosque and begins actively to seek contacts with active participants (veterans) of the jihadist movement and ways to organize terrorist attacks. It is significant that more and more frequently this internal self-indoctrination is almost spontaneous in nature, not directly tied to radical mosques or other centers of Islamic extremism in the west (!) and does not require the influence of well-known radical preachers (like, for example, the British mullahs Abu Hamza, Abdullah al-Faisal, Abu Qatada, or Omar Bakri Muhammad).¹⁹

Finally, the experience of the jihadist cell in Leeds confirms that the main strategic resource of the mujahedin is not the weapons they use, which can be easily obtained and inexpensive, and not even funding methods (which can be completely legal) or the scale of funding (today even large terrorist attacks are relatively inexpensive). The mujahedin's main strategic resource is extremist ideology together with a unique, flexible organizational model that makes it possible to coordinate effectively not through direct control from a particular center, but via a common strategic purpose and orientation along with strict discipline and internal integration even at the micro-level of individual cells.



Thus, today's transnational jihadist movement combines extremist religious trends with very modern organizational forms and information technology. This means that the global jihad cannot be reduced to "network tribalism" or relegated to the level of the tribal or clan-based skirmishes in Afghanistan or the inter-communal clashes in Iraq. The most active mujahedin are not tribal leaders but educated Muslim students and other members of the middle class, like the group of British Muslims who organized the July 2005 terrorist incidents in London (or those arrested in August 2006 in connection with possible plans to blow up transatlantic airliners).²⁰ The most beneficial soil for the generation of today's mujahedin is located in the areas of closest contact with the west, either directly (in the Muslim diasporas in western countries or in areas with a western economic, military, and cultural presence and influence) or indirectly (for example, in Muslim countries with ruling regimes viewed as allies or "agents" of the west and, particularly, the United States).

IRAQ: THE COMBINATION OF TERRORIST METHODS AND INSURGENT WAR

As mentioned above, the highest level of terrorist activity in two recent years was observed in the Middle East, where the number of terrorist incidents and victims far exceeded that of the region with the second-highest level of terrorist activity, South Asia. It is noteworthy that the high level of terrorism seen in the Middle East in the middle of the first decade of the 21st century is caused not by the long-standing Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but by the situation in Iraq, where coalition troops led by the United States are still engaged and the formation of a new, pro-western regime is encountering great difficulties. They are facing an Iraqi resistance movement made up of a variety of groups that use extremely varied methods—from guerilla attacks against the foreign troops and local security forces to terrorism and inter-communal (sectarian) violence.

The Iraqi resistance movement is very dynamic in nature. It is developing and changing form (including in response to the policy and actions of the United States and the regime it is supporting in Baghdad) nearly as rapidly as the jihadist movement at the transnational level, discussed above. Three years after the occupation of Iraq, the insurgent movement has traveled far.

In the early stages the rebels practically began from zero: despite widespread opinion, there is not complete certainty that in the early 2000s Saddam Hussein had prepared a detailed strategy of guerrilla warfare in the case of a military defeat. This is confirmed by the fact that in the first few months after the overthrow of the Iraqi regime it was relatively quiet, with almost no resistance to the U.S. troops. The first insurgent cells only began to be formed later, and on a completely different basis; that is, not so much and not merely because they belonged to the Baathist regime, but also on the basis of a mix of professional, family/clan, neighborhood/communal, regional, and other ties. Furthermore, the motivation of the insurgent groups initially appeared patriotic and nationalistic; it only gradually began to be more religious in nature than based on the discredited Baathist ideology.²¹

At that stage the insurgent movement consisted of many small localized groups, which appeared as rapidly as they disappeared. Either no one claimed responsibility for the majority of attacks, or several groups claimed it immediately. It is significant that at that stage not only did the first guerilla attacks against coalition forces garner popular support, but even the first terrorist attacks against international facilities, including the UN representative office,²² were not rejected by the population. After all, terrorist attacks on local citizens were not yet widespread and were attributed to foreign fighters/mujahedin, even though their presence in the early stages of resistance was very limited²³ (just as there was only a very small number of suicide attacks in the beginning). Generally speaking, by 2004 the intensity of guerilla and terrorist attacks by insurgents began to reach 40-50 per day, while in early 2005 they had grown to 50-60 attacks per day.²⁴

The level of local popular support for the rebels has varied over time and depending on the region and concrete community (for example, in contrast to the Sunnis and a substantial part

of the Shi'ites, the majority of Kurds support coalition forces, seeing the weakening of the Iraqi state as a chance to improve the position of their community and realize their separatist aspirations). Since the beginning of the occupation, support for the insurgents among both the Sunni and Shi'ite population has grown, to which disappointment over the political process and dissatisfaction with the military operations of coalition forces made significant contributions. The peak of this interdenominational support resulted from the events of spring/summer 2004: the U.S. siege of the Sunni Fallujah and the suppression of agitation among the Shi'ites in April and August, including operations against armed units under the leadership of Muqtada al-Sadr ("the Mahdi Army"). However, the rapprochement of Shi'ite and Sunni rebels proved to be short-lived. The radicalization of the resistance, the increasing frequency of the use of less selective, more fatal attacks that caused increasing Iraqi civilian deaths, most of whom were Shi'ite, as well as the conscious policy of the coalition forces to encourage sectarian friction facilitated the aggravation of inter-communal contradictions and prevented the creation of a united insurgent Sunni-Shi'ite front.

Since late 2004 the resistance movement has been ever more predominantly Sunni in nature, although this does not mean that the rebels have the general support of Sunni population.²⁵ This contributed to the consolidation of the armed opposition to foreign troops and the pro-American regime on the basis of *Sunni fundamentalism and radical Iraqi nationalism* and forced the rebels to pay more attention to propaganda. It must be emphasized that the predominantly Sunni nature of the resistance in late 2004 is to a certain degree a reflection of the ethnic and religious basis of the government that the United States is forming in postwar Iraq (with the reliance of the Kurds and moderate Shi'ites) and the anti-insurgent strategy they have chosen. This strategy has been generally anti-Sunni, with some reliance on the Kurdish Peshmerga militia and the partial loyalty of militarized Shi'ite units.

By 2005, in contrast to its chaotic beginnings, several relatively uniform and larger groups had been formed within the insurgent movement. They had already become well organized, combined network characteristics with the necessary level of centralization, were able to react flexibly to changes in the political situation, and had created their own system of propaganda with the use of the latest information technology.

"Tanzim al-Qa'idat fi Bilad al-Rafidayn" (the al-Qa'ida organization in Mesopotamia) became one of the largest groups, known in U.S. sources as "Al-Qa'ida in Iraq," which the United States added to its list of foreign terrorist organizations in October 2004. Before his death on June 7, 2006 in the Baghdad suburbs as the result of a U.S. air strike, it was headed by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. According to statements made by the organization, two of its 15 brigades are staffed with suicide attackers (one of them solely by Iraqi volunteers).²⁶ Throughout 2005, the "al-Qa'ida organization in Mesopotamia," which uses many foreign fighters, actively worked to make its image more "Iraqi" in nature. Moreover, even U.S. sources recognize that the majority of its members are Iraqis, and that as a whole foreign fighters make up only 4-10 percent of all rebels in Iraq.²⁷ The group is an active participant in the Iraqi resistance, though U.S. sources are inclined to exaggerate its role in the insurgency.

"Jaish Ansar al-Sunna" (the guerillas of the army of the Sunna) is a group that combines Islamism and Iraqi patriotism, and has, in addition to military units, a political wing. One of the most nationalist groups is "Al-Jaish al-Islami fil-Iraq" (Islamic army in Iraq). Al-Jabha al-Islamiya lil-Moqawama al-Iraqiya (Islamic front for the Iraqi resistance) is the most active group on the propaganda front. Along with these organizations, there are a whole series of smaller insurgent groups, such as the Jaish al-Rashideen (army of the first four caliphs), Harakat al-Moqawama al-Islamiya (Islamic resistance movement), Jaish al-Taifa al-Mansoura (army of the victorious community), Jaish al-Mujahedin (army of the mujahedin), and about 30-40 more groups.

In contrast to their behavior during the early stages of resistance, in 2005-2006 a single group would, as a rule, take responsibility for any large armed action; the issuance of statements claiming participation in such activities by several groups at once became rare, indicating an increase in consensus and, possibly, coordination of action between them. Moreover, in spite



of the severe anti-guerrilla measures undertaken by coalition forces—regular special operations, raids, “mopping up operations,” mass searches (about 8,000 in the two years beginning in May 2003), mass arrests and detentions (about 80,000 Iraqis during the same period),²⁸ and the insurgents’ loss of enclaves such as the Fallujah resistance stronghold as well as the loss of a number of their leaders (including as important a figure as Abu Musab al-Zarqawi) —they have not panicked and armed actions have not ceased. On the contrary, we see the further strengthening of the insurgent movement and its endeavors to combat the “occupiers and their accomplices,” up to and including joint declarations and operations, to say nothing of the “division of labor” that has been evident among the various groups.³³

The gradual ideological convergence of resistance fighters on the basis of an amalgam of the military and radical jihadist forms of Islamism with Iraqi nationalism is blurring the ideological and other differences between the foreign mujahedin and Iraqi insurgents. The presence of coalition forces in Iraq, seen as an “occupation,” is still the most important element binding the various groups together, causing an ideological and organizational convergence between various elements of the resistance; it is unclear whether this would remain the case if these forces were to depart. Nevertheless, the insurgent movement is not at all as heterogeneous and divided between Iraqis and foreign mujahedin as one might conclude from U.S. sources. The U.S. government continues (in part for political and propagandistic reasons) to insist that these divisions are increasing steadily,²⁹ and is basing its anti-guerrilla and counterterrorist strategy in Iraq on this notion.

Essentially, the opposition insurgent groups are not simply unified in their lack of a desire to enter into negotiations with the U.S. coalition and the new Iraqi authorities, but in addition see a real chance of realizing their primary goal: the expulsion of foreign forces from Iraq and the simultaneous punishment, including everything up to physical destruction, of the “turncoats” among the Muslim population who have gone over to the side of the enemy.³⁰ However, aside from this very concrete task neither the resistance movement as a whole nor any of its constituent groups have put forward any clear political program for the future of Iraq after the expulsion of the foreign forces.

Note that the Islamic radicalization of the Iraqi resistance helped the rebels to establish a religious base for the indiscriminate use of violence, the victims of which may be civilians. The possibility of random or unavoidable civilian deaths in the fight against coalition forces and the resistance to the political institutions of the “collaborationist” regime places the insurgent leadership in a moral dilemma. This dilemma was “solved” though a radical interpretation of the concept of jihad (holy war), according to which an action should be judged not by its results, but by its goals. In other words, “collateral” civilian victims are considered permissible and justified when the goal of an action—either direct or indirect—was to destroy the forces, power, or influence of the “enemy.” Furthermore, attempts by the enemy to hide among the local population are not seen as an obstacle to exacting retribution from that enemy. In this case, actions which may result in the death of innocent civilians are seen as justified and the civilian victims, like the fighters responsible for their loss, are viewed as “martyrs” (the only difference being that the latter meet death voluntarily, while the former are “unwilling martyrs”).

As far as acts of “pure terrorism” consciously directed against civilians are concerned, it should be emphasized that to date armed Iraqi resistance groups have very rarely taken direct responsibility for such acts. One case were the statements by al-Zarqawi approving the simultaneous bombings in Baghdad and Karbala in March 2004 during the Shi’ite holiday of Ashura (when over 180 people perished) and the attack on the leader of one of the largest Shi’ite organizations, the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, Ayatollah al-Hakim in December of the same year. Although these statements can be interpreted as an acknowledgement of participation in these terrorist acts, even al-Zarqawi denied the participation of his organization in the bombings in the sacred Shi’ite cities of Karbala and Najaf in the same month.³¹

It should be noted here that while the United States is trying, not without reason, to blame “foreign mujahedin headed by al-Zarqawi” for causing the internecine strife in Iraq, it is also provoking sectarian conflicts by relying on a variety of tribal and other groups in its fight with the

insurgents, in accordance with the “divide and conquer” principle. It is no surprise that each successive terrorist attack not only inflames internecine clashes, but also increases anti-American sentiments among the Iraqis.

WAR AND CRISIS IN THE MIDDLE EAST: BEYOND TERRORISM

In 2005-06 the Middle East remained the world’s most problematic region, not only from the point of view of terrorism, but also of military activity. Indeed, the new spurt of violence in the Middle Eastern conflict zone was tied not so much to terrorist attacks on innocent civilians by non-state actors, as to the regional war between Israel and the Shi’ite military and political group Hezbollah, in Lebanon, and Israel’s incursion into Lebanon. The number of civilian victims, primarily of Israeli military strikes in just the first month after the beginning of military actions (from July 12 to the beginning of the armistice on August 14, 2006³²), is comparable to the average number of annual victims of terrorist activity in the Middle Eastern conflict zone.

During the crisis various types and levels of conflicts and interests became interlaced. Among the local conflicts one of the most significant is the continuing Lebanese-Israeli conflict. Both Hezbollah’s military capabilities, which Israel views as a threat to its security, and the unresolved problem of Lebanese prisoners seized by Israel during the occupation before the year 2000 continue to play a destabilizing role, particularly given the increasing role of Hamas in the Palestinian Authority.

On the regional level, the conflict both in Lebanon and in the region as a whole between the interests of Israel, on the one hand, and Syria and Iran, on the other; all of these states’ attempts to alter the balance of power in the Middle East; the continuation of the Arab-Israeli conflict; and the undecided Palestinian question are all destabilizing the situation. The situation is made still more extreme by the continuing crisis and growing resistance to the foreign military intervention in Iraq.

Finally, the situation can also be viewed in the broader international context. Primarily, that means examining the conflicts between the United States and regional players such as Syria and, especially, Iran.

However, the latest crisis in the Middle East has concrete implications where terrorism/antiterrorism is concerned as well. At a minimum, it raises two critical questions on which there is no international agreement.

The first issue is the fundamentally new relationship between terrorism itself, i.e. *non-state terrorism* (by sub-national or transnational groups and networks), and so-called *state-supported terrorism*. While state support for terrorist groups has gradually decreased, especially with the end of the Cold War, this relationship has changed radically in favor of non-state terrorist organizations, which espouse extreme ideologies, have flexible and mobile organizational structures, are politically autonomous, and are ever more financially independent. This change requires a fundamental shift away from previous ideas and estimates regarding terrorist threats to security, which were predominantly aimed at pressuring “state sponsors of terrorism.” Unfortunately, as the development of the Iraqi, Palestinian-Israeli, and general Middle Eastern conflicts indicate, these changes are either given insufficient consideration by some states, including the main external actor in the region—the United States—or they consciously ignore them.

This changed relationship of non-state to state-supported terrorism may vary somewhat and be more or less noticeable depending on the region, but it can be identified clearly on a global scale. This was one of the reasons why Russia objected at the July 2006 G8 Summit in St. Petersburg (which coincided with a serious deterioration of the situation in the Middle East) to attempts to accuse Syria and Iran directly of escalating the conflict between Hezbollah and Israel. Even where, as in the present case, the interests of militarized non-state groups and several regional states are similar or even coincide, and even when the groups have old ties to state actors,³³ it would be a great exaggeration to say that Hezbollah’s actions are directly con-



trolled by Syria or Iran and ordered by Damascus or Tehran.³⁴ More generally, the main reason for the continuous instability in the region is not so much the “evil” influence of Syria and Iran (which, like Israel, are undoubtedly ready to do a great deal to protect their strategic interests), as in the failure to solve the Israeli-Palestinian question, as well as, in the past few years, the deteriorating situation in Iraq. Against this backdrop Lebanon, which had nearly managed to recover from the ruin of a protracted civil war and two foreign occupations (by Israel and Syria), seemed a unique “bright spot” until the recent Israeli invasion of July 2006. Although the predictions of a new sectarian war in Lebanon have not come to pass thus far, Hezbollah’s domestic political position was not weakened but strengthened by the war with Israel, a fact likely to have ambiguous consequences for that nation’s brittle sectarian balance, among other issues.

The second, even more critical problem, which is particularly urgent in the anti-terrorist context, is the question of what to do if the state is weak and the sectarian/nonstate group, or movement, is comparatively strong and popular. Although such a group may previously have used terrorist methods and maintain the possibility of using them in future, it could also become the main political representative of its community and enjoy the broad support of the local population. Certainly, this problem goes far beyond terrorism. It is important to understand that the key here is not the comparative “strength” or “weakness” of the state’s power (in its traditional sense as the degree of centralized state control), but the state’s *ability to function* (functionality, or capability) under specific political, ethnic, religious, socioeconomic, and regional conditions. For example, in a country that is as variegated in the sectarian sense as Lebanon, which is made up of several large communities (Maronites, Orthodox, Sunni, Druz, Shi’ite, etc.), the state is *forced* to remain relatively weak and decentralized in order to function under post-conflict conditions (to maintain some political stability and a brittle sectarian balance and create the conditions for social and economic development). Its role is in many ways limited to serving as an arbitrator of sectarian conflicts. This multi-sectarian state as a whole, and its army in particular, are able to function (functional) in the sense that they are able to maintain law and order inside the country, especially among the various communities, but they are weak in the sense that they can neither prevent attacks by local militarized groups into foreign territory, nor protect the country from external aggression. It is clear that attempts to use shortcuts to artificially “strengthen” and centralize the state and “force” it to create a powerful military capability not only have few chances for success, but also threaten to destroy domestic political stability and the sectarian balance, which was restored with such difficulty after the decades of civil war and armed outside intervention. If the international community, in the form of the UN Security Council, insists on overloading this state with responsibilities for security, including external defense, it must be prepared to undertake the lion’s share of the efforts needed to support this (including maintaining the demarcation between communities, ensuring border control, etc.)

In its most extreme form this problem can be formulated as follows: what should be done if a nonstate military/political organization is not just stronger than the state (which makes it impossible for domestic forces to undertake its disarmament and demilitarization), but also cannot be destroyed from outside without: a) completely destroying its base of public support inside the country (up to engaging in genocide against the entire community), and b) destabilizing the entire state and undermining its capabilities by destroying its domestic sectarian and/or sociopolitical balance? Let us examine this problem by looking at Hamas and Hezbollah.

In the first few decades of its existence, Hamas, which grew out of the Gaza Strip branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, was dedicated to religious and humanitarian activities, only later began engaging in armed struggle, including the use of terrorist methods. Note that Hamas, like many groups of this type, has two dimensions and is pursuing two levels of goals. On the religious side its ultimate goal is fundamentalist in nature and is focused on the creation of an Islamic state, for which “Allah is its target, the Prophet is its example, and the Koran is its constitution.”³⁵ Ideologically, such groups are not just radical, but dream about the possibility of living in “another dimension” analogous to the “first Muslim society.”

Given that for the foreseeable future this society cannot be realized and the idea of its possible creation is to a considerable extent irrational, Islamic organizations must somehow exist “in the meanwhile” and support their activities, in the expectation of a gradual advance to this distant purpose. In this “infinite” interval of time between the present and the far-off “bright future,” the Islamists are concentrating their activity on the society around them, from those most deprived to the dissatisfied among the elites. Hamas is a very clear example of this combination of proclaimed ideological goals that are unobtainable and incomparably more pragmatic social and sociopolitical aims. In particular, it is an acknowledged fact that the volume, variety, and breadth of the scope and effectiveness of Hamas humanitarian activities considerably exceed the levels of similar activities by the official authorities, the Palestinian National Authority. It is precisely this everyday social work “among the masses,” using the alternative network of social assistance centers, schools, hospitals, etc. that Hamas has created, that has become the organization’s main strategic resource, ensuring it the support of a substantial part of the Palestinian population, especially in the Gaza Strip, and an electoral victory in January 2006.

In contrast to Hamas, which was originally established as a religious movement and only turned to armed opposition and the use of terrorist methods after decades had passed, Hezbollah arose as part of the Lebanese Shi’ite community’s resistance to Israeli occupation (Southern Lebanon in 1982-85 and border regions in 1985-2000), and was a direct reaction to this occupation. Freeing southern Lebanon of Israeli troops was the organization’s main military and political goal through their withdrawal in May 2000, which, on the one hand, was seen as a great victory for Hezbollah, but on the other hand also deprived it of its main reason for maintaining a powerful military capability and presented the organization with its first serious strategic choice. This choice was related to the dual—military and political—or even multi-dimensional nature of the movement. On the one hand, for decades Hezbollah had been conducting guerrilla warfare against foreign troops, including the use of terrorist methods (which, however, never surpassed the importance of assaults, sorties, and artillery attacks by military units) and continued to preserve and even to develop its military capabilities in the six years after the withdrawal of Israel from southern Lebanon—capabilities that Israel sees as a direct threat to the security of its northern regions. On the other hand, since Lebanese society and the Lebanese state are made up of a union of various sectarian communities, Hezbollah was, first, able to become the main organization for the largest Shi’ite community in the country, after erecting whole network of social services: from hospitals and schools to its own media (the al-Manar television network and a large number of newspapers and periodicals) and undertaking a reconstruction campaign (Jihad al-Bina) in the parts of the country that had suffered economic damage while under foreign control during the long civil war. Second, Hezbollah actively participated in the political process, gaining seats in the Lebanese parliament and ministers in the coalition government via elections. Third, as the political representative of the largest Lebanese community and the only group that possesses military units that could at least to some degree defend the country from an external enemy, Hezbollah has laid claim to a broader role on both the national and inter-sectarian levels, having become one of the country’s main nationalist forces. Fourth, thanks to its ties to Iran and Syria, Hezbollah has become not just a sectarian and national, but also an important regional actor. Finally, the movement’s radical international Islamist ideology has ever broader international resonance both in the Muslim world and beyond its borders.

Hezbollah’s complex, multi-dimensional nature and, particularly, its embeddedness in Lebanon’s sectarian mosaic and the regional context explains why the primary task of the military campaign launched by Israel in July 2006—the destruction of Hezbollah’s military capabilities—could not be achieved (at least, not in the way that the goal was formulated). First of all, another Israeli intervention in Lebanon actually recreates the circumstances to which the Hezbollah movement owes its formation and decades-long existence. In other respects the effect of a new Lebanese-Israeli war on Hezbollah is unclear: on the one hand, it strengthens the movement’s military profile and the position of its most radical elements, while on the other hand it not only further consolidates public support for Hezbollah among Lebanon’s Shi’ite community, but also strengthens its national (and not just narrowly sectarian) image, visibility, and platform.



Generally speaking, multi-dimensional Islamist nationalist movements such as Hamas and Hezbollah cannot be successfully dealt with at the national (intra-Palestinian and intra-Lebanese) and regional levels without a balanced approach taking into account both *security* and support for government *functionality* or the make-up of the state. Do we really have to note that this sort of balanced approach cannot be attained through military intervention? On the contrary, it does not just imply, but requires, first and foremost, domestic political transformation and the further politicization of non-governmental actors at the national level—a process that Hamas and Hezbollah have already begun in recent years.

This strategy must be combined with legitimate international security assurances for the region (both for Israel and for its neighbors), reinforced by international aid—first, for complex, multi-sectarian states like Lebanon, with traditionally weak central authority, which, as we have shown, are weak for a reason. Finally, over the long term a final demilitarization and/or partial “etatization” and establishment of some controls over the militarized capabilities of Islamic movements like Hamas and Hezbollah is hardly likely without a renewal and progress in the efforts to settle the conflict in the Middle East (and in other centers of regional tension, Iraq first and foremost).

CONCLUSION

Transnational networks that operate globally and groups based and operating—often for decades—at the local level may not only be close ideologically. There are several structural parallels among them, their leaders, and their rank-and-file members, and at times there may even be direct contacts between them (for instance, as we have seen during the armed resistance in Iraq). However, this does not “automatically” mean that current local Islamist groups that use terrorism as one of their tactics of armed resistance belong to a “global jihad” that is directed and inspired from without.³⁶

Local and global terrorist organizations can be distinguished by the scale of their goals: unlimited, existential goals in the case of the global jihad and limited local or national goals in the case of local insurgent, separatist, or other Islamist groups. Each of these two levels of terrorism has a large degree of autonomy and its own dynamics and path of development. Thus, we cannot speak of a confrontation with some sort of “global Islamist terrorist Internationale” that is completely integrated from the local to the global level, but instead must deal with a far more complicated problem: confronting Islamist terrorism on a variety of levels. 🗨️

Notes

¹ The statistics in this paper have been calculated on the basis of the data in the National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT) Terrorism Knowledge Base, Oklahoma, 2005, <<http://www.tkb.org>>. All of the statistics only apply to the period after 1998, inclusive, since the database only includes data on both international and “domestic” terrorist incidents from that date forward.

² Ibid.

³ For more details, see Ekaterina Stepanova, “Countering Terrorist Financing,” *International Trends*, Vol. 3, No. 2 (8) (May-August 2005), <<http://www.intertrends.ru/seven/006.htm>>, last accessed November 21, 2006, pp. 66-73.

⁴ *Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005* (London: The Stationary Office, May 11, 2006), <<http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/hc0506/hc10/1087/1087.pdf>>, last accessed November 21, 2006, p. 30.

⁵ *Intelligence and Security Committee Report into the London Terrorist Attacks on 7 July 2005* (London: The Stationary Office, 2006), <http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/publications/reports/intelligence/isc_7july_report.pdf>, last accessed November 21, 2006, pp. 17-18. The top four levels of terrorist threat range from “substantial” to “critical.”

⁶ Ibid, pp. 8-9.

⁷ Ibid, p. 13.

⁸ Ibid, p. 11; *Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London*, pp. 4, 23.

⁹ *Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London*, pp. 4-5.

¹⁰ Ibid, p. 23.

¹¹ Ibid, pp. 13, 16-17.

¹² Ibid, pp. 14-16.

¹³ Ibid, p. 18.

¹⁴ As cited in *ibid*, p. 19.

¹⁵ *Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London*, p. 31.

¹⁶ The Spanish authorities did not find evidence of any organizational tie between the group responsible for the bombing of the train in Madrid's Atocha station in March 2004 and the al-Qa'ida leadership either. See, for example, *First report of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team appointed pursuant to resolution 1526 (2004) concerning Al-Qaida and the Taliban and associated individuals and entities* (New York: UN Document S/2004/679, August 25, 2004), p. 8.

¹⁷ For more details on the specifics of current terrorist organization, see Ekaterina Stepanova, "The Organizational Forms of the Global Jihad," *International Trends*, Vol. 4, No. 1 (10) (January-April 2006), <<http://www.intertrends.ru/tenth/008.htm>>, last accessed November 21, 2006.

¹⁸ For example, as in the case of the London terrorists, the explosions in Casablanca, Morocco in May 2003 were carried out by mujahedin who had literally "grown up on the same street." According to data cited by American psychologist Marc Sageman, who put together information about active participants in the jihadist movement, "friendly ties" played an important role in joining the jihad for 68 percent of mujahedin (moreover, most of them joined the jihad not individually but in small "clusters of friends.") Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004).

¹⁹ *Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London*, p. 29.

²⁰ Of the two dozen individuals arrested in relation to this affair whose names have been officially published, all of the British Muslims are only a bit over 20 years of age (just one is over 30), and they are all students, employed in the service or medical industry, or entrepreneurs. See, for example, "Air Plot' Suspects: Names Released," BBC News, August 11, 2006; "Financial Sanctions: Terrorist Financing," Bank of England Press Release, August 24, 2006 <<http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/news/2006/082.htm>>; "CPS Authorises Charges in Alleged Aircraft Terror Plot," Crown Prosecution Service Press Release, August 21, 2006 <http://www.cps.gov.uk/news/pressreleases/149_06.html>.

²¹ For more detail, see Ekaterina Stepanova, "The Challenge of Terrorism in Post-Saddam Iraq: A View from Russia," *Program on New Approaches to Russian Security (PONARS) Policy Memo No. 325* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), April 2004). <http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/pm_0325.pdf>.

²² Even though the United States was unable to secure a UN mandate in support of military intervention in Iraq, the United Nations has by no means been popular among Iraqis, due to its role in the embargo against Iraq in the 1990s.

²³ In the first half year of the occupation, the Islamists did not take responsibility for a single significant action of resistance.

²⁴ According to General Richard Myers, Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, as cited in "Iraqi Insurgency Undiminished," BBC News, April 27, 2005.

²⁵ Particularly given the passive unacceptance of a significant portion of the population with regards to methods like suicide attacks aimed at Iraqis who are standing in long lines in an attempt to obtain some type of employment (including in the new security structures) or the increasing frequency of bombings in public places.



²⁶ "In Their Own Words: Reading the Iraqi Insurgency," *International Crisis Group (ICG) Middle East Report*, No. 50 (February 15, 2006), p. 1.

²⁷ *Country Reports on Terrorism 2005* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. State Department Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, April 2006), p. 131. According to government data, the total number of insurgents in Iraq may reach as many as 20,000. The well-known bipartisan Iraq Study Group report estimates the number of foreign jihadists in Iraq at 1,300. See *The Iraq Study Group Report*, Washington, DC, 2006, p. 10 <http://www.bakerinstitute.org/Pubs/iraqstudygroup_findings.pdf>.

²⁸ Carl Conetta, *Vicious Circle: The Dynamics of Occupation and Resistance in Iraq* (Cambridge, MA: Project on Defense Alternatives Research Monograph #10, May 18, 2005, <<http://www.comw.org/pda/0505rm10.html>>, last accessed November 21, 2006.

²⁹ For example, the al-Qa'ida organization in Mesopotamia specializes more in suicide attacks against U.S. forces and facilities, while Jaish Ansar al-Sunna focuses more on Iraqi security forces.

³⁰ *Country Reports on Terrorism 2005*, p. 130.

³¹ "In Their Own Words: Reading the Iraqi Insurgency," pp. ii, 14.

³² *Country Reports on Terrorism 2004* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. State Department Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, April 2005), p. 61.

³³ According to official Lebanese government reports in late August 2006, between July 12 and August 12, 2006, 1,287 Lebanese died as a result of Israel's military operation against Lebanon, while more than 4,000 individuals were wounded. Of the 157 Israelis killed, 118 were military servicemen. As cited in Rosbizneskonsalting, August 20, 2006.

³⁴ Thus, for instance, although Iran's ayatollahs are viewed by Hezbollah as having a great deal of authority, in practice there has yet to be a case where Iranian spiritual leader Ali Khamenei has changed or insisted on cancelling a decision made by the Consultative Council, Hezbollah's highest governing body, of which Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah has been secretary general since 1992.

³⁵ One could equally argue that Israel is acting under Washington's direct orders.

³⁶ The text of the Hamas covenant is available in English translation on the site of the Avalon Project at Yale Law School: *Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement*, August 18, 1988, <<http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/mideast/hamas.htm>>. See in particular Article 5.

³⁷ Nor are they, similarly, objects without willpower that are completely controlled and manipulated by regional powers.



Alexei Arbatov

Andrei Piontkovski

WHAT DOES AHMADINEJAD HAVE IN COMMON WITH GAVRILO PRINCIP: SOLVING THE IRANIAN PUZZLE

From: Alexei Arbatov
To: Andrei Piontkovski
Subject: Iran's nuclear program

Good day, Andrei,

The more I think about the Iranian situation, the more historical analogies, such as the run-up to 1914, come to mind. In this analogy, Iranian President Ahmadinejad appears in the role of Gavrilo Princip. Although no one wants a war in Iran, the inexorable course of events, escalation of the crisis, collision of ambitions, and radically different points of view may eventually lead to war. The probability of this eventuality grows with each passing month.

Of course, in contrast to 1914, this war is not likely to become "World War III." Nevertheless, the consequences of a war in Iran would be catastrophic, given the fact that there is already a war both in neighboring Iraq on the one side and Afghanistan on the other. The result could be something that we have not seen since 1945: a trans-regional "black hole" stretching from Palestine to the Hindu Kush—a continuous zone of terrorism and civil wars, chaos and failed states, ethnic cleansing and millions of refugees, as well as narcotics and weapons trafficking that periodically overflows from this monstrous "cancerous tumor" into neighboring regions (the Balkans, Asia Minor, the Caucasus, and Central and South Asia) and from there to the rest of the world. This will greatly stimulate international terrorism and WMD proliferation, and for a long time the cooperation of the major powers in fighting these scourges will suffer.

The problem is further complicated by the fact that each party to this conflict is not simply certain of the correctness of its cause, but in a certain sense is indeed correct. As a state party to the Treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), Iran, in accordance with Article IV of the treaty, has the right to the peaceful use of nuclear power, a right that does not exclude the complete nuclear fuel cycle. Many non-nuclear weapon state parties to the treaty have a complete fuel cycle or its components, including Japan, Germany, the Netherlands, Brazil, Argentina, and South Africa. Whatever other countries may think about the Iranian program and its peculiarities, the country has the right to determine its parameters so long as it is undertaken within the framework of the NPT and under IAEA safeguards. Iran will not renounce this right.

*Sincerely,
Alexei Arbatov*



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From: Andrei Piontkovski
To: Alexei Arbatov
Subject: re Iran's nuclear program

Good morning, Alexei,

Alright, let's talk about the Iranian nuclear program. But not in the purely legal sense; I see that as a fruitless approach. All of these discussions about "rights"—does Iran have the "right" to the creation of nuclear weapons... does Israel, a state that the Iranian president on almost a daily basis threatens to wipe off the face of the earth, have the "right" to a preventive strike against Iranian nuclear facilities—are generally useless.

Why? Because the present system of international law is made up of contradictory assertions. I wrote about this in detail in an article in *Yaderny Kontrol*, so I will not repeat my contentions this morning. I will just say that, as elementary logic makes clear, it is easy to derive an arbitrary conclusion from this sort of system. Nearly any state action in the global arena can be substantiated by one international norm or another.

Thus Iran, as a sovereign state, has the right to possess any modern weapon. The Non-Proliferation Treaty? Iran has the right to leave it at any moment and this would be more honest than its continuous series of deceptions and game of cat and mouse.

And Israel and its strategic ally, the United States, have the right to self-defense and are not obliged to wait until Mr. Ahmadinejad's dream of the destruction of Israel has been realized.

In case you, Alexei, have any doubts as to this interpretation of the principle of the right to self defense, I present the opinion of two very authoritative experts.

"If anyone even tries to use weapons of mass destruction or their equivalent against our country, we will respond with measures commensurate with the threat wherever terrorists, the organizers of their crimes, or their ideological and financial supporters might be. I emphasize, wherever they might be."

"In such cases, and this I officially confirm, we will launch strikes, including preventive strikes."

Guess, Alexei, who these hawks are that preach the concept of preventive strikes, thus violating the sacred principle of national sovereignty—Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, Dick Cheney?

The first statement is from President Vladimir Putin's statement at a cabinet meeting on October 28, 2002 while the second is from a September 22, 2002 statement by Minister of Defense Sergei Ivanov.

Thus, let us analyze the Iranian situation not on the basis of barren legal debates but on the basis of military and political factors. Iran gradually is taking all of the technological steps needed to obtain nuclear weapons (sometimes in secret, sometimes in the open). Simultaneously, and even outpacing this activity, Iran is developing its missile program, a program that would be utterly senseless without the prospect of equipping these missiles with nuclear warheads.

Well-wishers and lawyers for Iran can say that they are not completely convinced of the military nature of the Iranian nuclear program (up to the first nuclear explosion) as much as they like. What is important is that the governments of Israel and the United States, as well as the overwhelming majority of professional military experts, are convinced. And the leaders of Israel and the United States have already been quite clear that if diplomatic efforts fail they will prevent the further development of the Iranian nuclear program through the use of military force.

Yours,
Andrei Piontkovski

*From: Alexei Arbatov
To: Andrei Piontkovski
Subject: bombing is not a solution*

Andrei,

Yes, Iran violated its IAEA safeguards agreement, hiding some of its projects and thereby arousing serious suspicions that it had military, not peaceful, nuclear plans. There is an array of indirect evidence of this.

But all of this is cause for a more thorough IAEA examination and the prevention of similar violations in future, not for the demands to end all uranium enrichment activities that have been advanced by the United States and included in U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1696 of July 2006 and 1737 of December 2006. Citing the unlawfulness of this requirement, Iran did not ratify the 1997 Additional Protocol, which it signed in 2003 (and would have allowed for virtually unlimited inspections) and now it is not permitting the IAEA to conduct inspections in accordance with the norms of this protocol. Iran justified the renewal of its uranium enrichment program, meanwhile, by citing the referral to the U.N. Security Council, after which it revoked its 2004 decision to “freeze” this program temporarily in the spirit of good will during negotiations with the “EU-3.” All of this is not grounds for sanctions, to say nothing of military intervention. Many states, including the superpowers, have a long list of past breaches of various disarmament agreements.

For its part, the United States is right that it cannot permit the presence of nuclear weapons in Iran, or even of the complete fuel cycle. Indeed, even under IAEA safeguards it is possible to create a uranium enrichment complex and facilities for plutonium separation for peaceful use and then, like North Korea, throw the IAEA out and leave the NPT with three months’ notice (Article X), enrich uranium to weapons grade, and rapidly build nuclear weapons. Washington’s hard line in this case is based not on Iran formally breaching the Non-Proliferation Treaty, but chiefly on the Islamic fundamentalism of the regime, its claims to the leadership of the Islamic world, its ties to organizations that some countries consider terrorist (although others do not consider them to be terrorist organizations), as well as the Iranian leadership’s provocative anti-Israeli and anti-American statements.

However, there are no international norms or treaty articles dealing with these issues. And the fact that the current Iranian regime (in contrast to the past regime under the shah, under which the Iranian nuclear program was initiated, with U.S. assistance) does not please Washington is not a reason for war in the view of other states that have good relations with Iran. Furthermore, the main weakness of the U.S. position is the blind alley of its policy in Iraq, which it invaded despite the objections of many other countries and the U.N. Security Council, under the pretext of destroying Baghdad’s nuclear program—a program that could not be found after the occupation.

Alexei Arbatov

*From: Andrei Piontkovski
To: Alexei Arbatov
Subject: Israel last resort*

Alexei,

Israel’s leaders have already made it clear that if diplomatic efforts fail they will halt the further development of the Iranian nuclear program militarily.

Yes, it will be very difficult to decide how to accomplish this. First of all, an operation to destroy the subdivided and dispersed Iranian nuclear complex is technically far more complex than the



single strike on the Iraqi reactor in 1981. But let us assume that the Israeli air force and special forces or U.S. cruise missiles can accomplish this task.

The political and military consequences of Iran's nuclear castration will be extremely negative. There will inevitably be civilian victims. Al Jazeera, the BBC, CNN, and Russia's RTR will indignantly describe the situation to all of progressive mankind. A new wave of hatred for Israel in the Islamic world is unlikely greatly to surprise or distress the Jewish state, but it will be accompanied by extremely painful military strikes. All of the "defensive weapons" that the Russian leadership has provided in recent years to its Syrian and Iranian allies ("Grad" and "Igl" missile launch systems and cruise missiles) will be launched against Israel. Some nuclear facilities may be hit. For a period of time oil exports from the Middle East will cease, delivering yet another blow to the global economy.

But understand: the alternative to a preventive strike is the possession of nuclear weapons and means of their delivery by a man as deeply and passionately convinced of the need for a final solution to the Jewish problem as German Chancellor Adolf Hitler. Therefore, if Iran does not stop its nuclear program, there will be a strike. Of course, Israel wants to put off the fateful decision as long as possible, as long as there still remains some hope for a diplomatic solution to the crisis. The United States is not inclined to force events either, since it knows that an unprecedented wave of Islamic terrorism will not only strike Israel, but also America.

Andrei Piontkovski

From: Alexei Arbatov
To: Andrei Piontkovski
Subject: do not dramatize

Andrei,

Believe me, I realize that the United States and Israel are ready to start a war in order to prevent an Iranian nuclear weapon.

But there are other players, too.

For both political and commercial reasons, Russia does not want Iran to have the full nuclear fuel cycle, but it is not ready to support full-scale sanctions, to say nothing of military measures, to avert this possibility. China's position is similar, while the European Union takes an intermediate position.

The general feeling that we are coming down to the wire is caused by Iran's persistent, gradual movement along a path that provocatively crosses the lines drawn by the United States, the European Union, Russia, the IAEA, and the U.N. Security Council, one after the other. And with each additional step taken with impunity, new demands and warnings from outside Iran become increasingly less convincing. Another factor accelerating the metronome is the approach of the U.S. presidential elections. Having gotten bogged down in Iraq, the Republican administration cannot come to the elections without having solved the Iranian nuclear problem.

I see the escape from the increasingly blind alley and the steady slide to war as follows.

First, one should not overdramatize and yield to the feeling that we are coming down to the wire. Given Iran's progress in the nuclear sphere, there is enough time for negotiations. Second, demanding that Iran give up equipment it has already built (the first enrichment cascades)—and to which it has a right under the NPT—is unrealistic. But the future of its program could be limited, and this could be the object of the six-party negotiations (the United States, Russia, EU-3, and China) with Iran. The arms limitation talks (in this case, focused on dual-use technologies)

should be conducted in the traditional way: such negotiations are never based on the all or nothing principle, and instead presume that a mutually acceptable compromise is possible.

Possible limitations to the Iranian program should take timing into account, namely: how much time is enough to leave in reserve from the moment of a hypothetical Iranian decision to leave the NPT and break with the IAEA, and the production of nuclear weapons? Incidentally, this principle is relevant in any arms limitation or disarmament treaties. We are speaking here about the period of time that will remain to adopt countermeasures after a hypothetical breach of the agreement by the other side or its withdrawal from the agreement.

If we stop Iran's enrichment program at the current level of 160 first-generation centrifuges, the time it will take to create nuclear weapons is estimated to be ten years or more. But it is unlikely that such an agreement can be obtained, given the progress of the Iranian program and the timing and political parameters of the negotiations. I think that an acceptable goal that could realistically be achieved is an interval of approximately five to seven years. This implies on the order of 700-800 first-generation (P-1) or 300-400 second-generation (P-2) centrifuges.

The political preparation for this solution requires action in several areas. First of all, technical experts must come to an agreement, after which the "six parties" must achieve a united political position. Then a package of economic, political, and technical proposals (including cooperation in the sphere of nuclear power) must be devised in order to interest Iran in coming to an agreement. An Iranian refusal of so tempting a proposal, giving it broad opportunities to develop peaceful nuclear technologies, could be seen as explicit evidence of its intention to produce nuclear weapons. In this case the major powers would be able to agree to impose full-scale, and not only symbolic, sanctions on Iran through a U.N. Security Council resolution and other measures.

In addition, Russia and the West need to reduce the acuteness of their other conflicts (for example, on NATO expansion into the post-Soviet space).

Further, the nuclear powers must renew progress in nuclear disarmament, in accordance with their obligations under NPT Article VI (in particular, fulfilling several of the 13 practical steps agreed to at the 2000 NPT Review Conference).

And finally, the United States must clearly begin to withdraw its forces from Iraq. The situation there is severely tying its hands on other political and military issues, ruinously influencing stability in Afghanistan, and whipping up international terrorism and the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Alexei Arbatov

From: Andrei Piontkovski
To: Alexei Arbatov
Subject: Russia and nothing personal

Alexei,

Can the catastrophic course of events leading to a war in Iran be stopped? Yes, it is possible. But not in the way that you propose.

Your proposals are utopian. Let's take a pragmatic look: the Iranian leadership is not homogeneous, and there are evidently fierce internal disputes occurring. If the global community had a united position and there were a real prospect of serious political and economic sanctions, the "moderates" in Tehran could be pushed to accept a compromise.

Here Moscow's role is critical. You recently wrote to me, "Russia does not want... but it is not ready..." That is, you proceed from the fact that Russian policy is inconsistent. In my view, the motives of the Russian leadership and the logic of its actions are completely consistent and likely to lead to the desired result.



The considerations determining its logic, both political (the desire to do maximum damage to the United States) and economic (keeping oil prices high), complement each other harmoniously. Furthermore, as is well known (to my respected opponent, among others), the personal commercial interests of top government officials (kickbacks) in commercial transactions with Iran unfortunately play an important role as well. Some refer to this as a “lack of coordination between various agencies.”

At any forum where the Iranian problem is being discussed today—the U.N. Security Council, the “six parties” –Moscow plays the role of a “political roof” (*krysha*), covering for the Iranian regime and its nuclear program, announcing ahead of time that it will not allow any significant sanctions and thereby making it possible for the Iranian leadership to keep gaining the time it needs to complete its nuclear program.

But this policy has another side as well. It reduces the time that Israel and the United States still have for diplomatic maneuvering and brings a military solution closer. As far as Israel is concerned, the window for military action is also being sharply narrowed by Russia’s delivery of Tor M-1 air defense systems, which clearly push it towards forcing events.

One could say that this policy is irresponsible or that it is pragmatic. That is a matter of opinion. Those in the Kremlin are completely aware of the scenarios we examined above. It appears that an Israeli and/or U.S. strike on Iranian nuclear facilities will suit them for at least three reasons.

First, the Iranian nuclear problem will be solved. An Iranian bomb is in no way good for Russia.

Second, the entire fury of the Muslim world will, with redoubled energy, be focused on the United States and Israel, while Moscow, joining the noble indignation of all of progressive humanity, will earn more points in the Islamic countries.

And finally, last but not least, after exports from the Middle East are curtailed petroleum prices will increase to unbelievable heights. So the 10-15 members of today’s Politburo, who not only govern Russia but also own it, will be extremely pleased. Just business, gentlemen. Nothing personal.

All the best,

Andrei

From: Alexei Arbatov
To: Andrei Piontkovski
Subject: re Russia and nothing personal

I do not entirely agree with your assessment of the motives behind Russian policy. If Russia were only interested in high oil prices and was generally guided by considerations of *realpolitik* in its most cynical form, then it would in fact try to provoke the United States into military action against Iran. This would surely cause oil prices to rise to unprecedented heights, would get the United States utterly enmeshed in the quagmire of hopeless conflicts in Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan, and would thereby result in the end of the “American century” (its rule as the only superpower). This would lead to a deep division between the United States and the European Union, India, and China, as well as moderate Islamic regimes, and *simultaneously* put a final end to the Iranian nuclear program, which Russia of course does not want to have a military component. But Russia, I am sure, will do everything in its power to prevent a war, since all of its other consequences - where relations with the West, Iran, the fight against terrorism and the proliferation of WMD, and regional stability are concerned - would be catastrophic.

At the same time, Russia wants to have good relations with Iran, which are no less important for it today than good relations with the Shah of Iran were important for the United States 30 years ago, when the latter helped Iran to initiate a nuclear program on an even larger scale than is planned now, including the enrichment of uranium.

This is, in part, why Russia adhered to U.N. Security Council Resolution 1696, in the hope that Iran would yield before the threat of sanctions and stop the enrichment of uranium. And this is why Moscow proposed the creation of an international enrichment center on its territory. This is why Russia is drawing out the commissioning of the first reactor bloc at Bushehr NPP. And at the same time, Russia has spoken out against sanctions that would provoke Iran to counter-sanctions, and would initiate an escalation of the conflict from which it would be hard to back down, and which unavoidably would lead to war.

But why does Russia have to accept U.S. policy unconditionally and pressure Iran just because its current regime does not please the present U.S. administration? And by the way, many U.S. NATO allies, the head of the IAEA, the previous U.N. Secretary General, UNMOVIC head Hans Blix, and even the U.S. Democratic opposition do not agree with this policy. Should we really join Washington “without looking,” out of a sense of solidarity with our allies and in a spirit of “strategic partnership,” as Britain and Spain did in Iraq in 2003? But why, then, did the United States not conduct itself and does not conduct itself in the same spirit with respect to Moscow, when the issue was the 2003 war in Iraq, withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, CTBT ratification, Putin’s proposals on a strategic dialogue after the expiration of START-1 in 2009, and about the weaponization of space, the probable expansion of NATO in the Ukraine and Georgia, and WTO negotiations, to say nothing of the “historical” correction of Jackson-Vanick? The point here is not the enumeration of the claims the United States and Russia make against each other, but the fact that the rest of U.S. policy creates a terrible environment in which to reach agreement on so complex and delicate an issue as the Iranian program.

It is another matter entirely that Russian policy is inconsistent and passive, and addresses only peripheral aspects of the issue and leaves the initiative (and also the responsibility, which, possibly, Moscow is attempting to avoid) to the EU-3, Iran, the United States, and the IAEA. This dooms us to react to and drift with the flow of events. As for what I would view as the best direction for Russian policy, I have written that above.

As far as “kickbacks” are concerned, one has to have solid facts to make this sort of accusation (addresses, names, and writes), not hypotheses, even if they appear reliable. I do not have such facts in my possession, but I am also not ready to completely exclude them, and therefore cannot adequately consider their possible influence on the practical diplomacy of Moscow. Generally speaking, personal interests are always mixed up in greater policy issues, and not only in Russia (simply recall Iraq and Halliburton, Schroeder and BTS, as well as many other examples). But to estimate their importance in this particular case is very difficult, although it is clear that to reduce everything to such interests is incorrect (as our propaganda of earlier times used to do, explaining the arms race as due to the “appetites of the U.S. military industrial complex,” and in more recent times explaining U.S. action in Iraq as a result of its ambition to “get its hands on the oil.”)

And how, in your opinion, should Russia behave in this situation?

A.

From: Andrei Piontkovski
To: Alexei Arbatov
Subject: krysha no more

If someone is still capable of stopping the Iranian nuclear program peacefully, then it is Russia. But this possibility means not providing a *krysha* (roof) to protect Iran from western sanctions and selling it weapons, but by making it clear that there is a serious possibility that Russian cooperation in the nuclear and military sphere could be curtailed.

A.P.



From: Alexei Arbatov
To: Andrei Piontkovski
Subject: what Iranians want

Andrei,

Basically, in order for us to understand more easily how Russia should behave, we must figure out what Iran's goals are. Does it really want to build nuclear weapons?

I, for my part, can only state with confidence that it wants to hold this option open. It is unknown whether in the final analysis it will actually build nuclear weapons, but Iran believes that it must acquire the technical capability, in the form of an industrial nuclear fuel cycle, to create these weapons rapidly, and is obstinately striving towards this goal, citing the articles of the NPT.

Alexei

From: Andrei Piontkovski
To: Alexei Arbatov
Subject: re what Iranians want

Alexei,

You see, "holding open the option to build nuclear weapons" is for all practical purposes the same as "building" them; that is, nearing the forbidden goal or, as you correctly formulate it, "obstinately striving" towards it every day.

You know, what particularly surprises me—both in your argument and in the position of those experts who are evidently close to your heart—is the formula: "don't allow sanctions, to say nothing of war." This formula is problematic and is internally inconsistent!

Only serious sanctions or a convincing threat of sanctions can stop the Iranian nuclear program. And may fail to stop it. Everything depends on the distribution of power among various groups in the Iranian leadership, about which we know nothing. However, the "no sanctions" policy is guaranteed to allow Iran's hawks to continue to "obstinately strive" towards a nuclear bomb. Which, according to the understanding outlined above, will make an Israeli or U.S. nuclear strike on Iranian nuclear facilities inevitable.

From: Alexei Arbatov
To: Andrei Piontkovski
Subject: change the formula

Andrei,

Let's unpack *my formula*—"no enrichment and no sanctions"—although it is not *mine*. Yes, it is problematic. The second half weakens its position, but the first makes it completely unrealistic. We demand that Iran (as do Resolutions 1696 and 1737) relinquish facilities that it already possesses, and to which it has a right under the NPT, merely because we do not like the regime. There are few regimes that please everybody! But we have international laws, which should be the only criteria for judging and penalizing states. Taking the enrichment complex that already exists away from Iran can only be done by force, which would flagrantly exceed the limits of appropriate reaction. After the Iraq war this will not be accepted not only by the Islamic world, the "third world" in general, China, India, and here in Russia, but also in Western Europe and a significant proportion of U.S. political circles.

Do we really want to start a “world war” thanks to 164 P-1 centrifuges, which will take 13 years to create enough material for nuclear weapons?

Therefore, we have to change both parts of the formula. We have to determine, both for ourselves and for the other “five parties,” the permissible, safe limits of enrichment, present these conditions to Iran (let’s say, a certain number of centrifuges of one or another type), and if it fails to agree then threaten sanctions because they will have clearly indicated their aspiration to develop a military enrichment capability that is not justified either by the energy program or Iran’s natural uranium reserves. Both the “no sanctions” and the “give up everything” policies strengthen those in Iran who, possibly, are “striving for a nuclear bomb.” We truly do not know the correlation of forces within the Iranian leadership. But our task is not to guess about this correlation or Iran’s real intentions. Instead, it is to use a more subtle and realistic policy to influence it in order to strengthen moderate forces and halt the development of the Iranian nuclear fuel cycle at a safe distance from a nuclear bomb (under full IAEA control, which is, at this point, more important than plus or minus a few hundred centrifuges). This is traditional arms control, and only it can result in success, not ultimatums issued from a sinkhole, particularly in the light of the recent events in North Korea.

But we keep talking about *desirable* policy. Let’s agree that the two of us see this in completely different ways. But what about possible future developments? According to your prognosis, where will the pendulum swing in the next few months?


Alexei Arbatov

From: Andrei Piontkovski
To: Alexei Arbatov
Subject: Akhmadinejad goes to war

In the next few months events will develop via inertia. Iran gradually will carry out its nuclear program, heartened by the apparent helplessness of the “global community.” Russia will continue to play its role as a *krysha* (providing cover) in the Security Council, and helping Iran win time. It’s possible that for tactical reasons Russia may even support some toothless resolution, which it has done everything possible to soften in advance.

The Israeli General Staff and U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff will continue to elaborate plans for strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities. Tor M-1 missiles will be deployed to their military positions.

Do they understand what this course of events will inevitably lead to in Iran? Yes, without question. And certain moderate circles in its top leadership would like to find a way to halt the military nuclear program. However, it would seem that lately the balance of power within the Iranian leadership has shifted noticeably in favor of President Ahmadinejad, who as you note resembles Gavrilo Princip.

Ahmadinejad is no longer a marionette appointed by the ayatollahs, but an independent political figure thirsting for even more power. He understands very well that the United States and Israel will not allow Iran to obtain nuclear weapons. Consciously provoking both the United States and Israel, Ahmadinejad is bringing about a military resolution to the crisis, which, he calculates, will not only make him Iran’s absolute leader but also a hero throughout the Islamic world. In addition, as a religious fanatic, he believes in the coming of the 12th Imam and believes that it is his religious duty to hasten the Imam’s appearance, which is to be preceded by a series of catastrophes, according to Shi’ite tradition. 





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
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Vyacheslav Nikonov

THE TWO ST. PETERSBURG SUMMITS¹

It is always difficult to comment on the yearly G8 Summit meetings. The G8, judged by the results of its actions, and indeed by the very structure of the group itself, is a fairly amorphous organization. It is a club, not an institution. The results that it achieves are less than obvious. And the most interesting processes that take place during the G8 Summits are hidden from outsiders.

On the other hand, it is fairly easy to answer the question of what Russia expected from the St. Petersburg G8 Summit of July 2006. Russia wanted to host a G8 Summit that proceeded smoothly, and thereby fulfill its role as chairman of this informal club.

Qualms about the St. Petersburg Summit in the media (particularly in the foreign press) and political circles far exceeded those in the Kremlin. The Kremlin viewed the G8 Summit as yet one more prominent meeting in a series of summits of equal symbolic significance, such as the celebration of St. Petersburg's 300th anniversary or the 60th anniversary of the victory in World War II. In addition to the journalists, Summit organizers were naturally nervous, particularly those directly involved in St. Petersburg. As for President Putin and his foreign policy team, they were uncommonly relaxed.

Some difficulties were expected, but not so much from the G8 Summit as from the U.S.-Russian meeting and from the free day that U.S. President George Bush would spend in Russia.

Much has been said in recent months about the fact that the "Vilnius speech" by U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney denoted the lowest point in U.S.-Russian relations in many years. This is true. At least, in the half year that preceded this speech, Putin and Bush only spoke with one another once or twice on the telephone. This was the lowest point in the whole history of the two leaders' communications. Now it seems as though in Vilnius the relations between Russia and the United States hit bottom, and have begun to rise somewhat since. How long-lived this trend will turn out to be we will see as events unfold in the near future. Ahead are several serious tests, particularly those related to the Russian-Georgian conflict, to the recognition of Kosovo independence (which Moscow sees as precedent-setting), and to NATO's conduct with regards to the possibility of former Soviet states joining the organization.

As for the question of democracy in Russia, discussion of this question both in the bilateral U.S.-Russian format and in the G8 format was solved fairly painlessly for the Kremlin. The participation of the U.S. deputy secretary of state in a meeting with one Nazi, one ultra-Communist, and one liberal organization with a popularity rating of under one percent cannot be viewed as anything other than a farce. The attempt by several colleagues from the Public Chamber to express their angry protest about this to George Bush and Tony Blair was rather surprising. And a *jab* like "Russia would not want to build the same kind of democracy as they have in Iraq" should be wished for anyone appearing in a debate. This sort of *jab* is hard to deliver badly.



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As for the St. Petersburg G8 Summit itself, to take a narrowly Russian viewpoint, one could evaluate them as extremely positive. Of course, Russia itself prepared the majority of the documents adopted at the Summit. But I would like to note that they were not simply adopted, but largely adopted without serious debates or objections on the part of Russia's other partners in this "club."


Both the content of the documents that were adopted and the Summit format were conducive not just to an improvement of Russia's image, but also the image of the G8 itself, which in recent years has had a clear reputation as a "club for fat cats" that meets in order to discuss their own problems. When I speak of the Summit format, I principally have in mind the fact that other significant actors were included: China, India, Brazil, Mexico, South Africa, and international organizations. It is also important that in the final documents on education and on combating epidemics a great deal of attention was paid to the interests of countries that do not belong to the club.

And now that Vladimir Putin and Tony Blair have publicly supported the expansion of the G8, this expansion itself will be just a matter of time.

I would particularly like to draw attention to the document that was adopted on energy security, which includes the Russian interpretation of what energy security means. It is not just the rights of consumers, which is understood as market liberalization and increasing production, but also the rights of producers, who are interested in long-term commitments for the use of energy resources, fair prices, and unimpeded delivery on world markets.

Looking back at mid-July 2006, at the days of the St. Petersburg Summit, one must admit that it was overshadowed by events: the war in Lebanon. The Summit was pushed off the front pages, and at the meetings themselves the leaders had to devote an unplanned and disproportionately large amount of time to the Mideast problems. Several Russian analysts and politicians believed that this might even be a good thing. Clearly, under these circumstances Garry Kasparov and Mikhail Kasyanov had less air time on BBC and Sky News and other television stations that they would have if events had unfolded otherwise. On the other hand, the tragic events in the Middle East did not allow Russia fully to announce its position during the Summit.


The events in the Middle East noticeably sped up the process of taking decisions at the Summit. Decisions on new problems had to be made quickly, which necessitated rapidly finding solutions to disagreements. Therefore, all documents that had been prepared in advance went through virtually without discussion. As for working out a common position on Lebanon, we saw that over the course of two days the positions grew closer before our very eyes. If the leaders had been in their national capitals at that moment, there simply could not have been a common position. Just as there would not have been a UN Security Council resolution on North Korea. It is the presence of these leaders in one place at this critical moment that allowed for the rapid agreement on these documents.

Finally, the Summit was organized well and came off without a hitch. This is an *organizational* question, but it was solved brilliantly, and left the pleasant *aftertaste* that remains from the St. Petersburg events. As far as substance is concerned, this G8 Summit, like those that preceded it and, most likely, those that follow, should not lead to raised hopes among the expert community. After all, it is primarily an informal discussion club for world leaders, decisions do not have to be taken there, but many barriers can be removed there, including psychological ones, so that such decisions may be taken in future. If there are no hopes raised by G8 Summits, then there will be no disappointments either. 

Note

¹ This commentary is based on Vyacheslav Nikonov's address to a session of the *Dialogue Club* organized by the PIR Center on July 19, 2006.

The *iSi* International Security Index (July–December 2006)



➔ ***Vera Gavrilova, Pavel Mansurov, Vladimir Orlov. *iSi* – A COMPREHENSIVE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY INDEX***

➔ ***Yury Fedorov. A VIEW BY A RUSSIAN LIBERAL: APPEASERS AND CROCODILES***

➔ ***Dmitry Evstafiev. A VIEW BY A RUSSIAN CONSERVATIVE: APOCALYPSE? NO!***

➔ ***Marian Abisheva, Sergio Duarte, Konstantin Eggert, Thomas Gomart, Ji Zhiye, Andrei Kortunov, Rama Mani, William Potter, Abdulaziz Sager, Evgeny Satanovsky, and Ekaterina Stepanova. COMMENTS BY MEMBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL EXPERT GROUP***





***iSi* – A COMPREHENSIVE INTERNATIONAL SECURITY INDEX**

The International Security Index (*iSi*) is a comprehensive index of the level of international security developed by the PIR Center through a project that has been ongoing for over a year. The project is currently undergoing an international assessment.

The aim of *iSi* is to provide quantitative indicators that reflect the dynamics of trends in international security. The *iSi* index is meant to demonstrate the extent to which the international security situation differs from the “ideal” at each point in time. It also indicates how various specific military and nonmilitary factors are affecting international security.

Without pretending to be a full and complete definition, *for the purpose of calculating the index we understand “international security” to be the integrated index of the state of the world today from the point of view of the presence or absence of threats to the physical security and economic prosperity of the citizens of our planet.* The value of this indicator is reflected in *iSi*, which is determined through our assessment of the scale of the threats in question, their duration, and the probability of their escalation from the local to the regional or global level. Furthermore, given the definition above, it is obvious that in calculating *iSi* we must take into account both military and nonmilitary factors, including those that affect the economic components of security.

The idea of creating an international security index belongs to *Security Index* editorial board member and deputy editor-in-chief of the newspaper *Kommersant*, **Azer Mursaliev**. We would like to express our sincere gratitude to him for so generously sharing his ideas and methods and for actively cooperating with us and assisting us to advance our project. A working group has been created for this project. Those active in the discussions at various stages of the project have included: Nadezhda Logutova, Anton Khlopkov, Sergey Mursankov, Alexander Bulychev, Vitaly Tsygichko, Ildar Akhtamzyan, Fedor Ladygin, Vladimir Dvorkin, Ekaterina Stepanova, Yuri Fedorov, Dmitry Evstafiev, Andrei Piontkovski, Yevgeny Satanovsky, Konstantin Eggert, Alexander Nikitin, and Julian Lindley-French. We would like to express our particular appreciation to **Alexander Saveliev**, head of the Strategic Studies Department, Center for International Security, Institute of World Economics and International Relations (IMEMO) and PIR Advisory Board member, for his analytical work in the final stage of the project.

We are also grateful for the contributions by many friends of the PIR Center at various stages of project development, and highly value their assistance and critical remarks. We should nevertheless emphasize that **the PIR Center takes complete responsibility for the final product—the methodology used to calculate *iSi* and its (for the time being, monthly) variation.**

Thus, *iSi* is determined in accordance with an original method developed by the PIR Center. It indicates the general level of the state of international security in the military, political, economic, and environmental spheres. It also takes into account the impact of nongovernmental actors (in particular, terrorist activity).

The most important characteristics of *iSi* are its **comprehensiveness, robustness, and clarity**. A great number of the factors that directly effect international security are reflected in *iSi* in a concentrated form. They include: the threat of global nuclear war, the number and intensity of local conflicts, the type of political relations between various countries and international organizations, the intensity and scale of terrorist activity, the stability of the global economy, and the threat posed by man-made catastrophes and epidemics.

The structure of *iSi* consists of two main parts. The first is the basic Index value. It is calculated on the basis of expert analyses of the probability of the occurrence of one or another global or regional event that would have a direct impact on international security. Each such event is given a certain score on the scale we have developed.

In our calculations, total points increase as the probability of various events that might disrupt international security decreases, and, correspondingly, they decrease with an increase in the probability of such events. The total of the points for each factor is the *iSi* base value, a quantity calculated once per year. Each type of factor (military, political, economic, man-made catastrophe, and terrorist) is “weighted” according to a scale of priorities and given an appropriate coefficient.

The second part of *iSi* is calculated by evaluating actual events that have an influence on international security during a particular month. Each such event is assessed both according to its positive or negative influence on international security and according to its degree of influence (weak, moderate, or strong) on the point scale we have developed. The degree of influence of each such factor is corrected depending on the country or region in which the event took place. In order to do this, we have developed a coefficient for the significance of particular regions (from 1 to 9). The number of positive points for each individual factor indicates the event’s contribution to international security; negative marks indicate the negative influence of a particular factor.

The *iSi* Index, therefore, is calculated according to the following formula:

$$\text{Comprehensive Security Index} = \sum_i k_{G_i} \times \text{factor} + \sum_i k_{R_i} \times \text{region} + \sum_i k_{L_i} \times \Delta_j \times \text{locality}$$

Where

k_{G_i} = coefficient “weight” of global factors;

k_{R_i} = coefficient “weight” of regional factors;

k_{L_i} = coefficient “weight” of local factors;

Δ_j = coefficient indicating the importance of an individual region.

The reader can learn more about the *iSi* methodology on the PIR Center website at: <http://isi.pircenter.org/eng>.

We have been calculating *iSi* on a monthly basis since July 2006. The increase or decrease in its absolute value indicates the trends in international security during the period in question, including both their direction and strength. The sum of all points provides the basic value of *iSi*, which shows how distant the global situation is at that moment from the “ideal”—when there are no threats at all.

The *iSi* methodology also allows us to calculate a value for shorter time frames. You can familiarize yourself with the current changes in *iSi* on the PIR Center website, at: <http://isi.pircenter.org/eng>.

We have taken the situation on **July 1, 2006** as the initial value of *iSi*. From that time forward, *iSi* has been determined independently and has begun to reflect changes in global conditions, indicating the security fluctuations in each following month. In accordance with our methodology, all significant events that occurred during the month in question are evaluated according to a set scale and given a numeric value depending upon their type, direction, strength, breadth, and the significance of the region that they affected. The sum of these numeric indicators of relevant events (which may be either positive or negative) is added to the initial *iSi* value, which on July 1, 2006 totaled **3,209 points**. This is how we calculated the index value for July. The August *iSi* value and that of subsequent months was calculated in a similar way, except that the total value of the numeric indicators for these months was added to the previous month’s total, not to the initial *iSi* value.



On **July 31, 2006**, the value of *iSi* was **3,174 points**, a **fall of 35 points** from the initial value. This means that during the month in question the international security situation was characterized by a relatively small predominance of negative factors over positive ones. *iSi* grew by **78 points** during the month of August, and as of **August 31** totaled **3,252 points**. The September Index differed only a little from that of August: **3,240 points**, or a **fall of 12 points** as of **September 30**. However, in October the value of *iSi* fell sharply, by **91 points**, and as of **October 31** was just **3,149 points**. By **November 30, 2006**, *iSi* had risen 44 points and equaled **3,193 points**, and on the eve of the New Year, on **December 31**, it sharply dropped down to **3,041 points**. A detailed chronology of the events from July through December 2006 that influenced *iSi* can be found on the PIR Center website at <http://isi.pircenter.org/eng>.

The PIR Center's monthly calculation of *iSi* is accompanied by interviews with our **International Expert Group**, which includes representatives from Russia, Kazakhstan, Brazil, India, China, the United States, France, and Saudi Arabia, among other countries. The evaluations of these experts in no way influence the calculation of the Index. Nevertheless, they make it possible for us to see how our calculations are viewed in a given month and, in particular, the dynamics of *iSi* over the course of several months at a time, in various regions of the world.

**Vera Gavrilova
Pavel Mansurov
Vladimir Orlov**



A VIEW BY A RUSSIAN LIBERAL: APPEASERS AND CROCODILES

The summer and the first months of fall 2006 will most probably enter into the history of world politics as a period of some of the most pronounced tensions on the global political scene, and one of its most critical, and perhaps even turning, points.

THE FALL OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE?

During most of this time, the Middle East remained the epicenter of likely global conflict. The strategic architecture of this region has been considerably altered by the war in Lebanon. A new and previously neglected force, Hezbollah, with its close ties to the Iranian leadership,¹ entered the region's political and military arena. Following Tehran's refusal to accept a compromise proposed by the six parties to nuclear talks with that country, the Iranian nuclear problem escalated to an entirely new level. In the Palestinian territories, the two leading Palestinian forces— Hamas and Fatah—remained unable to reconcile their differences, resulting in sporadic armed clashes. A violent *bellum omnia contra omnes* continued in Iraq, raising ever growing doubts over the possibility of preserving a unified Iraqi state. The summer of 2006 witnessed the aggravation of the political and military situation in Afghanistan, particularly in its southern provinces where members of the Taliban, still not fully destroyed, intensified their terrorist activities in concert with al-Qa'ida cells.

The political and military environment in the Far East deteriorated sharply in early fall 2006 too. Even though the July 2006 North Korean nuclear tests failed, and the success of the nuclear test carried out at the Hwadaeri polygon on October 9, 2006, is dubious, the essence of the processes there are more or less clear: Pyongyang has set a course towards radically heightening tensions in an attempt to blackmail the international community and ultimately have its own desires satisfied. The consequences of these actions could be severe. A nuclear test is a "red line." If crossed, the North Korean regime could potentially provoke a "chain reaction" of events that, in the worst case scenario, could result in the application of a military solution to the North Korean crisis.

Civil violence in Darfur persisted as well, as did domestic and international conflicts in other regions of Africa. At the same time, the Sudanese government remained intransigent on the issue of the length of time the UN Peacekeeping Force might stay. Meanwhile, the conflict in Aceh continued, with the situation in Eastern Timor and a number of other world regions remaining quite complex. Latin America came under the growing influence of the left, informally led by Venezuelan president Colonel Hugo Chavez, who is benefiting from an international reputation that is quite controversial, to say the least.

Just as significant is the fact that political institutions and mechanisms meant to safeguard international security and “manage” conflict proved nearly impotent. Neither the United Nations, nor the Middle East Quartet, nor the Group of Eight, nor various roadmaps or semi-formal groups such as the “group of six” set up for talks with Tehran in an attempt to find a solution to the Iranian nuclear problem succeeded in precluding a new war in the Middle East or the North Korean nuclear tests, crushing Iranian nuclear ambitions in the bud, or halting other dangerous developments. It appears that the very conceptual framework used by these international institutions itself turned out to be untenable: the framework of approaching pressing international crises by seeking compromises, the policy of “engagement” that tend to favor “carrots” over “sticks” in interacting with forces and regimes like Hezbollah, the Iranian and North Korean ruling elites, and various extremist groups, a great number of which are actively pursuing their activities in vast areas of the “third” world.



Marian Abisheva (Kazakhstan), Deputy Director of the Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies under the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, by phone from **Astana**: *I consider the Index indicators for the most recent period to be quite realistic, since there were not and will be no great leaps in these indicators, as global institutions are clearly able to play their roles in stabilizing the situation during times of sharp crisis sufficiently well, despite criticisms. I would also like to comment on the August indicators, those of the calmest month. I believe that this sort of increase in the security level is tied, no matter how odd it may seem, to the vacation season, since the level of man-made danger and man-made incidents during this period were significantly reduced.*

The reaction of Western public opinion, the mass media, and several think tanks to the new war in the Middle East has been daunting. The fact is that Israel, a continual victim of terrorist aggression, has been put in the same league as radical Islamic terrorists who, by the way, threaten not just Israel, but all of Judeo-Christian civilization. Therefore, one gets the impression that Europe, and sometimes even the United States, simply does not want to hear what radical Islamic leaders have to say. U.S. Senator Joe Lieberman was right when he recently declared: “If we should have learned one thing from 9/11 ... it is that when somebody says over and over again, as Osama bin Laden did during the 90s ‘I hate you and give me a chance, I will kill you’ they may mean it and try to do it.”²

However, it is no less worrisome, and perhaps even more so, that in many cases even military instruments turn out to be ineffective. Israeli troops failed to defeat

the paramilitary tactical forces of one of the most dangerous and radical Middle Eastern terrorist groups, Hezbollah. The U.S. Armed Forces together with their allies have been unable to halt the continuing civil war in Iraq and bring order to Afghanistan. The impression that one gets is that the **international community or, more precisely, contemporary Judeo-Christian civilization is helpless when confronted with new threats and challenges. The imagination unwillingly draws images of the falling Roman Empire, crumbling under the blows of barbarian tribes.**

Thus, the events of summer and fall 2006 confirm that unless the world discovers and implements new and effective concepts, political principles, and legal norms, as well as capable institutions to guarantee international security, Europe, and then North America and Russia, will find themselves crushed by the “new barbarians,” and the world will enter a new Dark Ages, comparable to the early Middle Ages.



Russia's current strategic and foreign policy does not engender optimism either. It seems that Moscow has finally abandoned the concept of a Russo-American partnership in countering terrorism and other new threats, enunciated by President Putin at the beginning of this decade. Today Russia's political stance instead calls for maneuvering between the United States, Europe, and extremist forces; forming informal coalitions and alliances opposing the United States; and, at the same time, cooperating to a limited degree with the United States and other Western powers when and where it fits Russian interests—as they currently are perceived in Moscow, of course.

Today, official Moscow emulates the political and diplomatic traditions it inherited from the Russian Empire, trying to use a strong hand to restore its influence and dominance in the southern part of the former Soviet Union and, most importantly, in the South Caucasus. The outcome of this trend has been a marked aggravation of Russo-Georgian relations, the future and potential implications of which are still unclear. Neither is there clarity regarding the extent to which Moscow's new ambitions are based on its real, and not assumed, economic and military resources.

THE NEW MIDDLE EAST

The war in Lebanon denoted a new period in the political and military development of the Middle East. The war was the result of a large-scale provocation initiated by the Iranian authorities, which was apparently thoroughly thought through in Tehran and successfully implemented by Hezbollah, which Iran sponsors. By unleashing this war, Tehran was apparently pursuing two objectives. The first was to distract the attention of the G8 away from the Iranian nuclear problem and prevent participants at the July 2006 G8 Summit in St. Petersburg from adopting a program of action should Tehran (as expected) refuse the compromise offered to it by the "group of six" shortly before. The second Iranian objective was to demonstrate that the country possesses powerful leverage for influencing the situation in the Middle East, and is capable of causing the international community serious trouble if the latter takes drastic measures against Iran. Both of these objectives were attained. Instead of discussing the Iranian problem at the St. Petersburg Summit, the leaders of the G8 states frantically tried to formulate a response to the events unfolding in Lebanon. At the same time, Iran clearly demonstrated its role as an important and active element of the strategic alignment in the Middle East.

The starting point of this new war in the Middle East, which this time was not in fact Arab-Israeli, as previously, but Iranian-Israeli instead, was the abduction of an Israeli soldier by Hamas militants in the Gaza strip. This incident drew Israeli political attention and its military and intelligence resources away from Israel's northern border, where Hezbollah had started to prepare for a major terrorist attack, which was carried out on July 12, 2006, just a few days before the G8 Summit. The abduction of two Israeli soldiers by Hezbollah and other terrorist acts triggered Israeli retaliation, to which Hezbollah responded with massive artillery strikes on Israeli territory.

Needless to say, both sides have been gearing up for war. After the Israeli Defense Forces (Tzahal) gave up their presence in south Lebanon following a 2000 decision by the Israeli government, led at the time by Ehud Barak, the entire territory between the Litani River and the so-called "blue line," which demarcates the border between Israel and Lebanon, found itself entirely under Hezbollah political and military control. The latter chose this mountainous territory to establish a sophisticated network of fortifications and bunkers, connected by underground tunnels and protected by mine fields with an extensive system of missile launch sites for Grad rocket systems. As a matter of fact, all of the Lebanese towns and villages in the fortified zone have been turned into Hezbollah strongholds. The civilian population and their homes were intended to be used as "human shields."

In answer, the Israeli Army had no choice but to prepare for a war aimed at restoring a *security zone* in south Lebanon, at the very least expelling Hezbollah from the area and regaining control over the territories that could potentially be used for missile launches against Israel. The

Israelis chose the U.S. strategy of “non-contact” war, which gives the air force the leading role, with the mission of demolishing the enemy’s main forces and suppressing its capacity to conduct war, and completing the mop-up operation using ground troops.

The new Israeli operation against Hezbollah proceeded according to this doctrine. During the first stage of the operation, which lasted approximately three weeks, the Israeli Air Force destroyed a substantial part of the Lebanese transport infrastructure in order to disrupt the Syrian and Iranian supply lines of Hezbollah troops operating in south Lebanon. Another goal pursued by the Israeli Air Force was the destruction of Hezbollah control centers, and the system of its strongholds and missile launchers in south Lebanon.

The first objective was generally met, but not the second one. Hence, Israeli territory kept being shelled by artillery up until the end of military operations, and the Tzahal’s major land forces, which entered Lebanon at the second stage of the operation, met fierce resistance from Hezbollah fighters, who relied on the remaining infrastructure of bunkers, tunnels, and so on. Further, the assault against the numerous Lebanese villages and towns that Hezbollah had turned into small fortresses was an extremely difficult military operation fraught with grave consequences. Israeli political and military leaders did not take the risk of pursuing the only possible option for reducing their own casualties: massive carpet bombings of the entire zone between the “blue line” and the Litani River, which would have turned it into scorched earth.

As a result, the military operation in south Lebanon in effect ended in a draw. Israel failed to expel the terrorist groups from the region and re-create a security zone there. Hezbollah suffered considerable losses and was forced to allow the deployment of large contingents of a UN international force and the Lebanese Army, which, naturally, limits Hezbollah’s freedom of action. From a political point of view, the unconditional winner of the war was Iran, which demonstrated its role as one of the key players on the Middle Eastern political scene.

However, this victory could backfire by making the Iranian position much more complicated, since most Arab regimes have not been happy to see the improved standing of both Tehran and the Shi’ite organizations allied with it. In the Middle East Tehran has long been viewed with some suspicion due to its great power aspirations and Shi’ite proselytizing. It could be interesting if Israel and moderate Sunni Arab states find themselves “in one boat,” united by a common enemy or at least a common adversary. It is not clear, however, whether the United States and its allies will use this situation to their advantage and create an effective opposition to Iran, which could also be used to contain its nuclear ambitions.

The political basis for the end of military operations was UN Security Council Resolution 1701, adopted on August 11, 2006. Both in wording and in essence, this document puts the blame for the crisis on Hezbollah (and therefore its patrons). In particular, it insists on the “*unconditional release of the abducted Israeli soldiers,*” being at the same time “*mindful of the sensitivity of the issue*” of Lebanese prisoners and “*encouraging the efforts*” aimed at urgently settling this issue. But the main idea of Resolution 1701 is the necessity of disarming Hezbollah and the withdrawal of its forces from the zone between the *blue line* and the Litani River. Paragraph 8 of the Resolution clearly declares the establishment “*between the Blue Line and the Litani river of an area free of any armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Government of Lebanon and of UNIFIL (the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon).*” In the same paragraph, the Resolution emphasizes the need for full implementation of the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords, and of Resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006), that “*require the disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon, so that, pursuant to the Lebanese cabinet decision of 27 July 2006, there will be no weapons or authority in Lebanon other than that of the Lebanese State.*”³

In order to implement these decisions, plans call for increasing the UNIFIL force to 15,000 troops, all of whom were to be deployed in south Lebanon by early November 2006. More than half of these troops were to be provided by EU member countries. Consequently, by that time the last Israeli soldier was to have left south Lebanon.



The adoption of Resolution 1701 led to the end to military operations in Lebanon. The Israeli troops have been gradually withdrawing from the south of the country. However, even though Hezbollah's leaders accepted the deployment of international peacekeeping troops in south Lebanon, they refused outright to disarm their squads and withdraw them beyond the Litani River. In other words, Hezbollah is openly ignoring key provisions of the UN Security Council Resolution. But what is most distressing about this situation is the fact that even the UNIFIL is not ready to implement the Resolution's provisions concerning Hezbollah's disarmament, since it may lead to clashes with members of terrorist groups, which the UN troops, many of who were sent by major European states, are simply not ready to face. According to press reports, most of the countries contributing troops for the UNIFIL would prefer to have their role limited to supporting the Lebanese armed forces. They are not prepared to accept the operation's mandate, which stipulates their possible deployment in combat operations and other use of force. Meanwhile, the Lebanese army is seen as weak compared to Hezbollah. Moreover, if it is deployed against Hezbollah it may simply disintegrate, as a number of its officers and soldiers are supporters.

Since the key demand of Resolution 1701—Hezbollah disarmament and the withdrawal of its forces from south Lebanon—is unlikely to be fulfilled, the probability of a resumption of hostilities in this region is rather high. Hezbollah, along with its state supporter, Tehran, may repeat the scenario of summer 2006 in one form or another if the circumstances related to the Iranian nuclear program are aggravated. In return, Israel will never allow a force that basically threatens the country's existence to remain anywhere near its borders.

This leads to the question of whether any lessons can be drawn from this situation, beyond the events directly related to the circumstances that came about as a result of the war in Lebanon. If so, what would these lessons be?

The main conclusion that Israel drew from the recent campaign is the necessity of thorough and in-depth strategic and tactical intelligence efforts on Lebanese territory and, most importantly, in its southern part, in order to have a clear understanding of the disposition and state of Hezbollah's political, military, and terrorist infrastructure. Principally, it seems that the key mistake of the Israeli leadership was its inability to establish an effective intelligence network in south Lebanon, as a result of which it failed to prepare for the type of combat activities it was obliged to undertake. The second, even tougher challenge facing the Israeli military command today is to develop a strategy and tactical measures for waging a new type of war against paramilitary terrorist units relying on a prearranged network of fortifications and shelters and with the support of a large part of the civilian population.

The most important political conclusion that the international community, and especially Western countries and Russia, should draw from these events is that Iran has become an active and dynamic opponent that is cunningly using all of the leverage and tools at its disposition in order to obtain its goals. If this conclusion is not made and practical steps to deal with the problem are not taken, then the threats emanating from extremist forces, including threats to Russian security, will mount.

This absolutely applies to the Iranian nuclear program. Iran continued its uranium enrichment activities through summer and fall 2006, actions viewed by the majority of experts and political analysts as preparatory steps for the development of a nuclear weapon. The inauguration in summer 2006 of a heavy water plant, intended to fuel nuclear reactors that produce weapon-grade plutonium, can be seen as additional proof supporting such conjectures.

Tehran's strategy includes not only the demonstration of force, as occurred during the war in Lebanon, but also diplomatic maneuvering: undertaking onerous, tiring talks, during which minor concessions alternate with strict ultimatums and the very agreement to conduct "talks about future talks" is presented as an important step towards cooperation. This strategy is understandable: Iran is seeking to avoid harsh international sanctions and at the same time pursue the development of a nuclear weapon. It is less clear, however, why major Western countries and Russia are ready to follow the rules imposed by Tehran.

On July 31, 2006, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1696, in which it noted *with serious concern* that:

"Iran has not taken the steps required of it by the IAEA Board of Governors, ... and which are essential to build confidence, and in particular Iran's decision to resume enrichment-related activities, including research and development, its recent expansion of and announcements about such activities, and its continued suspension of cooperation with the IAEA under the Additional Protocol." The Resolution demanded that Iran "suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development, to be verified by the IAEA." The Security Council expressed "its intention, in the event that Iran has not by that date complied with this resolution, then to adopt appropriate measures under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations [this Article provides for the possible introduction of non-military sanctions - author] to persuade Iran to comply with this resolution and the requirements of the IAEA, and underlines that further decisions will be required should such additional measures be necessary."

This resolution failed to be implemented. Tehran simply ignored it. Its reaction came down to its agreement to hold negotiations during which it will perhaps agree to halt uranium enrichment for two months. It is possible that Iranian scientists need this time in order to eliminate various defects in their centrifuge cascade.



Sergio Duarte (Brazil), Ambassador, Chairman of the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference (2005), by phone from **Brasilia**: *I am not so certain that security is measurable. The security situation is influenced by many factors that cannot be measured, such as the behavior of political leaders. Nonetheless, I agree with the dynamics identified in the iSi Index during these months, even if I do not completely trust the numbers.*

Despite Teheran's obstructive stance, the EU3, made up of the United Kingdom, Germany, and France, engaged in preliminary talks with Iranian representatives. During these talks, Iran declared it was ready to discuss security guarantees, which it demanded from the major powers, as well as the details of building light water nuclear reactors in Iran. In exchange, Tehran promised not to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and potentially to allow IAEA inspectors to examine its nuclear installations.

It would appear that everything has its limits. In the end, the negotiations between Iran and the EU3 fell through in mid-October 2006, and the Iranian nuclear problem was once again sent to the UN Security Council, and a new resolution, containing modest sanctions, was adopted in December 2006. I have to admit, though, that I am absolutely certain that this time around Iran will also ignore the Security Council decision.

AN AFGHAN DEAD END

In summer 2006, the political and military situation in Afghanistan was quite aggravated. The Taliban troops that were not crushed, along with Al-Qa'ida cells based in Afghanistan and the neighboring regions of Pakistan, have completed their realignment, obtained additional financial resources (mostly from growing and selling drugs), and launched considerable guerilla activities in the country's four southern provinces. In carrying out their activities, the Taliban is helped by the total lack of government control in the Pakistani regions bordering on Afghanistan, the so-called "tribal zone," which has provided refuge to some of Al-Qa'ida's leaders including, according to some experts, Osama bin Laden himself. Hamid Karzai's government remains extremely weak and is only in control of a few of the country's regions.

This situation put considerable pressure on international coalition troops, led by NATO. The growing losses in Afghanistan are accepted painfully by the European public, while the European mass media is increasingly critical of participation in the NATO operation in Afghanistan. The request by the NATO command in Afghanistan for an increase in Alliance troops stationed there has still not been met.



Meanwhile, the success or failure of this operation is of utmost importance for NATO's future. If the operation in Afghanistan is successful, it will confirm NATO's ability to effectively solve security and stability problems in the regions far from its traditional zone of responsibility. Today, this is the epitome of current ideas about the Alliance's future. However, if NATO turns out to be incapable of fulfilling its performance targets in Afghanistan, the country will once again turn into a safe haven for Islamic terrorist and extremist groups. That would do considerable harm to regions bordering on Afghanistan, including Central Asia and Pakistan. More importantly, the future of NATO will be put in doubt and the organization may lose its significance.

The increase in terrorist activity in Afghanistan's southern provinces does not, however, alter the overall strategic situation in the country. This can be described as a military and political dead end. The Taliban troops and Al-Qa'ida cells, operating primarily in the south of the country, cannot gain control over the entire territory as long as international peacekeeping troops are stationed there.

But both foreign troops and Hamid Karzai's government are incapable of establishing effective control over the entire country and guaranteeing the central government's firm authority. The International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan that operates under NATO's command and totals 20,750 troops, together with the U.S. troops (21,200 soldiers) stationed in Afghanistan through Operation Enduring Freedom, as well as the armed forces of Hamid Karzai's government (which currently number 20-30,000 men) can only control major cities and principle roads.

In fact, the real power outside of Kabul and several provincial capitals is concentrated in the hands of warlords, clan heads, provincial leaders relying on the traditional power structures, and the like. The situation is aggravated by the fact that it has been impossible to cut Afghanistan's production of opium poppy, the principle source of income for the majority of the rural population as well as a gold mine for local clan elites and tribal groups.

The situation is further complicated by the fact that there is no consensus within Karzai's government itself on a development strategy for the country. Top government officials include individuals who left Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation and spent a long time in the West before returning to the country; military and political figures who were once close to the most influential Afghan resistance leader, Ahmad Sheikh Massoud, who controlled the Panjsheri Valley, as well as leaders of organizations that carried out religious jihad against Soviet troops—Burhannudin Rabbani, Yunus Khalis, and others. They have access to considerable financial resources and still have significant armed forces at their disposal. All these groups and leaders compete with one another, making the already complex political situation in the country even more complicated.

The situation described above does not provide the grounds to expect that the number of military personnel stationed in Afghanistan will decrease in the near future. On the contrary, a certain build-up in troop presence is more likely. That means that Afghanistan will live with a foreign military presence for a long time. Therefore, the United States and a number of other Western countries are likely to maintain their military presence in Central Asia as well.

IRAQI QUICKSAND

By early 2006 it seemed that some signs of stabilization in Iraq had finally appeared. The formation of new Iraqi ruling institutions was progressing in a relatively orderly, albeit slow, fashion. In particular, 63 percent of the Iraqi electorate participated in a referendum that took place on October 15, 2005. More than 78 percent of those who voted supported the constitution. On December 15, 2005, the election of a full-fledged parliament was conducted in accordance with the new constitution. The majority in the new parliament, however, was obtained by Kurds and Shi'ites, who received 218 out of 275 seats.

The parliamentary election was the last step in the implementation of the *road map*, developed earlier by the U.S. administration to establish legitimate political institutions in Iraq. By summer 2006, the government had been successfully formed and featured a more balanced representation of the major ethnic and religious groups than the parliament; the leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), Jalal Talabani, was elected president of Iraq, with two vice presidents—one Sunni and one Shi'ite, a Shi'ite prime minister, and two deputy prime ministers—a Sunni and a Kurd. The Interior and National Security Ministries are led by Shi'ites, but the Minister of Defense is a Sunni. This would seem to support the formation of a more or less stable system of political institutions, free from previous political figures such as Ba'athist functionaries, agents of Saddam's security services, and other elements closely tied to the past regime.

However, after the February 2006 explosion of a Shi'ah mosque in Samarra by Sunni terrorists, the Iraqi civil war sharpened, becoming more chaotic and completely uncontrollable. In summer and fall 2006 the scale of terrorist attacks and political assassinations reached their apogee. September 2006 in Baghdad alone local terrorists from a variety of religious and political movements took nearly 2,670 lives, or 400 more than during the previous month. Over all, international organizations estimate that on average nearly 90 people lose their lives in Baghdad each day, while this number reaches 500 people a day for the country at large.

The key sources of chaos and instability in Iraq are the following:

- ❑ The activity of former officials in the Hussein regime, especially Ba'athist functionaries, the security services, and some military personnel, who have not been able to find a place in the newly formed political institutions. These groups rely on the Arab Sunni minority, which accounts for approximately 20 percent of the country's population.
- ❑ Radical Islamist movements, both Sunni and Shi'ah, including groups linked to al-Qa'ida and other international Islamist terrorist networks, are of particular importance.
- ❑ A multitude of minor religious, political, and openly criminal groups, interested in preserving the chaos and maintaining weak state institutions so that they may pursue their own illegal activities unhindered.

There are no solid grounds for expecting a rapid stabilization of the situation in the country, and particularly the suppression of terrorist and criminal activity there. The new Iraqi Armed Forces and security services are going through a slow and painful development process. The integration of paramilitary units, such as the Kurdish Peshmerga, units receiving orders from the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, the Mahdi Army, the Badr Brigade, and other smaller militia groups, into the official security and military institutions that started after both the parliamentary elections and the formation of the government, has far from always been helpful in stabilizing the situation. There have been quite a number of cases when members of former paramilitary units, acting under official mandate, have pursued their political enemies and continued to engage in religious and other clashes.

The U.S. contingent in Iraq (numbering approximately 150,000) can guarantee the physical protection of top government elites, the major political institutions, principle lines of communication, and economic assets; suppress civil unrest; and prevent destructive forces from obtaining power. However, it is incapable of ensuring effective law enforcement and halting terrorist activity. Military units are not meant to address this type of challenge: this is most effectively handled by the local police and special services, which, in the best of all worlds, should be national and not international. Only local personnel can be fully aware of the specifics of a situation and capable of developing an effective network of intelligence sources and the other conditions indispensable in combating terrorism and crime.

Iraqi developments in summer and fall 2006 bring into question the stabilization strategy developed by the international coalition, the United States in particular. The coalition presumed that normalizing the situation in Iraq is directly dependent on the speed of establishing effective political institutions capable of maintaining vital infrastructure and restoring law and order. In





Konstantin Eggert (Russia), Editor-in-Chief of the BBC Russian Service Moscow Bureau, by phone from **Moscow**: *The war in Lebanon, North Korean nuclear tests and tension over Iran, as well as the panicky reports by British scientists about the threat of climate change and the U.N. statement on the spread of venereal diseases in developing countries all should have caused experts to experience a surge in anxiety; however, this did not occur. The Index indicates that the global situation as a whole is not causing significant worry. This seems somewhat odd, since after the nuclear explosion carried out by Pyongyang the possibility of a nuclear conflict in Asia grew measurably.*

fact, the American strategy in Iraq is to contribute to this process, by gradually transferring an increasing proportion of the responsibility for maintaining security to Iraqi law enforcement authorities.

The aggravation of Iraqi conditions increases doubts regarding the possibility of preserving a unified Iraqi state. A number of U.S. allies in the international coalition, including the United Kingdom, are increasingly in favor of withdrawing their troops from Iraq, since their continuing presence there contributes to the country's instability. In particular, Sir Richard Dannatt, the current head of the U.K. Armed Forces, declared at the end of October 2006 that British troops should get out "sometime soon because our presence exacerbates the security problems." He also added: "I don't say that the

difficulties we are experiencing round the world are caused by our presence in Iraq but undoubtedly our presence in Iraq exacerbates them."

It seems that western political circles are starting to consider seriously the idea of withdrawing from Iraq and dividing the country into three separate states – Kurdish, Shi'ite and Sunni. Academic and political circles have already begun fierce discussions of what would be more dangerous: a civil war in Iraq that would be impossible to stop, or a full withdrawal from Iraq leading to an acute outbreak of domestic violence comparable to the Indo-Pakistani war of the late 1940s, which resulted in the establishment of two separate states.

So far the idea of a military pullout from Iraq has faced harsh opposition in Washington. Both the Pentagon and the White House adamantly reject the possibility of reducing the U.S. military contingent deployed in Iraq. President Bush insists that "the war we fight today is more than a military conflict. It is the decisive ideological struggle of the 21st century."⁴ He is right. Withdrawal from Iraq would not constitute a victory of "patriotic resistance of the Iraqi people to foreign occupation"—it would be the triumph of the most odious and "dark" forces in the Muslim world, forces that are destroying their countrymen and coreligionists with even greater zeal than they employ in eliminating foreign soldiers.

The withdrawal of U.S. and allied troops from Iraq would irrevocably ignite the Middle East both politically and militarily. Specifically, the north of Iraq would see the emergence of a Kurdish state that would naturally become the center of gravity both for Turkish and Iranian Kurds. The former would not correspond to U.S. interests, since it would undermine the territorial integrity of the most important American ally in the region, Turkey. But the latter could potentially be used to contain the Iranian regime, especially if the United States decides to solve the Iranian nuclear problem through the use of force. Predicting the consequences of the establishment of Sunni and Shi'ite states, on the other hand, is a task that no serious specialist would be likely to take on.

PYONGYANG'S NUCLEAR CONVULSIONS

In summer 2006, the North Korean regime took the risk of significantly aggravating the political and military situation in Northeast Asia. On July 5, 2006, just a few days before the G8 Summit in St. Petersburg, several ballistic missiles were fired from a North Korean missile test site but failed to reach their target. Nevertheless, the political repercussions have been quite noteworthy. The missile tests constituted proof that Pyongyang had decided to move

from words to action and essentially begin blackmailing the international community. The latter was ill-disposed to accept the North Korean interpretation of the joint statement of the states involved in the six party talks, which, in brief, stated that the DPRK must first receive a light water nuclear reactor and would not be prepared to eliminate its nuclear capabilities before it receives such a reactor. In addition, the other countries involved in the six party talks would have to lift some of the economic sanctions directed against North Korea's top leadership.

Indeed, Pyongyang was extremely irritated by the fact that the United States froze the bank accounts of persons and entities suspected of contributing to the proliferation of nuclear technologies and weapons of mass destruction, including 13 North Korean companies. Washington simultaneously took measures against banks that were caught laundering North Korean funds earned through the drug trade. It is known that at least part of this money goes toward providing top Pyongyang elites with the luxurious lifestyle they so much enjoy. Quite possibly, freezing the funds turned out to be the last drop that made the cup of Kim Jong-Il and his intimates' patience run over, which led them to decide to take the risk of forcing North Korea's partners in the six party talks to make concessions to Pyongyang by moving the nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula to an entirely new level.


The missile tests did not get the results for which Pyongyang was aiming. Instead, they provoked the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1695, which expresses "grave concern at the launch of ballistic missiles by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)." The Security Council also manifested a harshness that was atypical and condemned the North Korean nuclear tests, while requiring all Member States to "exercise vigilance" and "prevent missile and missile-related items, materials, goods and technology being transferred to DPRK's missile or WMD programs." The Russian diplomatic community, acting in its usual spirit of forgiving violators of the NPT regime, tried to soften Resolution 1695 as much as possible, and to eliminate any reference to potential sanctions against the DPRK. Vitaly Churkin, Russia's UN ambassador, spoke against "punishing" North Korea. In his opinion, the prospects for a resumption of six party talks on the North Korean nuclear program should not have been undermined by bringing up the sanctions issue.

Even though the missile tests have remained unpunished, Pyongyang has not achieved any of its goals, including lifting the freeze on North Korean funds. This caused the North Koreans to decide on another, much riskier step. At 10:36 a.m. on October 9, 2006, North Korea carried out an explosion in an abandoned underground mine, which Pyongyang declared to be a successful nuclear test.

It is still not entirely clear what exactly exploded at the North Korean Hwadaeri test site. Estimates of the explosion's strength do not even coincide. According to U.S. estimates, its strength was 200-800 tons of TNT equivalent.



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 **Thomas Gomart (France)**, Director of Russia/CIS programs at the French Institute of International Relations (IFRI), by phone from Paris: *I generally agree with your data so far as the difference between the August and October indices are concerned, although even here they are not absolutely accurate. August was a month of decreasing tension after the events in Lebanon, whereas by October stresses were increasing in Iran and North Korea and, of course, a feeling of "nervousness" was growing in connection with the approaching U.S. elections.*

South Korean specialists believe the strength of the explosion was 550 tons of TNT equivalent. If these estimates are valid, then it most likely means that a nuclear reaction took place in only a relatively small part of the nuclear explosive material. Based on their estimates, American military experts suggested that the North Korean nuclear test had failed. The Russian military, proved to be even more pessimistic than its American and South Korean colleagues. Russian Minister of Defense Sergey Ivanov reported to President Putin that a bomb with the strength of 5 to 15 kilotons went off in North Korea. As the Russian press noted, "defining the strength of the explosion in

the 5 to 15 kilotons range is equivalent to openly admitting a monstrous technological backwardness.”⁵

One way or another, the North Korean nuclear test confirmed that the DPRK not only longs to possess a nuclear weapon, but is also ready to cross the “red line” beyond which its actions could trigger a harsh reaction from the international community, including Russia and China. To date, these latter states have used all possible means to repel even the slightest allusion to possible international sanctions, justifying their position by the need not to irritate Pyongyang and, instead, to use all possible ways to take the security interests of North Korea into account, as well as the “concerns” of its government, which often turn out to be paranoid. The test, however, caused the UN Security Council to adopt harsh Resolution 1718, which not only condemns North Korea and requires it to renounce the acquisition of any type of WMD and its missile program, to return to the NPT and guarantee the transparency of its nuclear activity, but also imposes certain sanctions against North Korea. These sanctions include:

- ❑ Prohibition of any transfers to or from the DPRK of heavy weapons and related materials, including spare parts;
- ❑ Mandatory establishment of a list of other materials and equipment that may contribute to the North Korean nuclear and missile programs;
- ❑ Prohibition of the export of all luxury goods to the DPRK (which should be particularly unpleasant for the ruling elite);
- ❑ Obligatory freezing of all funds and other financial assets and economic resources that are owned or controlled by people or entities who will be designated by the special committee established by the United Nations;
- ❑ In order to prevent illicit trafficking in nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, all UN Member States are called upon to take cooperative action, including inspection of cargo to and from the DPRK.⁶

According to media reports, the draft of Resolution 1718 proposed by the United States was considerably toned down at the insistence of Russia and China. For example, a general reference to Chapter VII of the UN Charter, providing for the imposition of sanctions, including military sanctions, was replaced by a more precise reference to Article 41 of the same chapter, which only lists those sanctions that do not require the use of force. It is not clear how exactly the inspection of North Korean cargo would be conducted without the use of force if, for example, the DPRK carries out acts of violence in order not to allow such inspections to take place.

My guess, however, is that the softening of the U.S. position during the drafting of Resolution 1718 was not so much due to the Chinese or Russian positions as to the fact that the United States itself is not prepared to use force against North Korea, given the large US military contingent already deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan, while the possibility of military action in Iran cannot be excluded. Given these circumstances, the U.S. delegation likely leaned towards the option of relatively soft sanctions without excluding, of course, the possibility of adopting a tougher alternative if the measures called for in Resolution 1718 turn out to be ineffective.

The adoption of Resolution 1718 naturally raised the question of whether or not it would be implemented, and whether a strict control regime over transfers to and from North Korea could be applied in reality. The answer to these questions largely depends on China, since North Korea’s major trade routes pass through its territory.

North Korea’s nuclear test was a serious diplomatic defeat for China and Russia. It was thought that the key to resolving the North Korean nuclear problem should be sought in Beijing. In particular, there was a belief that the North Korean authorities would not dare to commit an act that China might view extremely unfavorably. It is easy to see why China might have such a view. The *nuclear domino effect* in Northeast Asia as well as the growing interest of Japan and Taiwan in U.S. anti-missile systems and, generally, for military cooperation with the United States go against Beijing’s strategic plans. Therefore, the North Korean nuclear test indicates that

Pyongyang is not disposed to listen to advice coming from Beijing. It turned out that the Chinese tactic, shared by Russia, of “appeasing” or “pacifying” Pyongyang (including by curbing the adoption of harsh UN Security Council resolutions) fell through. Instead of preventing North Korea from taking hasty action, the patronage of Russia and China convinced Pyongyang that it could challenge the international community with impunity.

The realization that China may lose face and have to deal with the undesirable consequences of “nuclear dominoes” apparently encouraged Beijing to take decisive action. News that China had cut all oil supplies to North Korea began to surface. This action turned out to be more powerful than any declarations or UN resolutions, causing Pyongyang to agree to return to the six party talks. However, as has often been the case, this cooperation does not mean that North Korea will renounce its attempts to obtain nuclear weapons. It is far more likely that Pyongyang will apply these arguments in a new grueling discussion in an attempt to eliminate or soften the sanctions and buy time.

A SUMMIT IN THE SHADOW OF LEBANON

The aggravated political and military situation in the Middle East and Afghanistan, escalating nuclear crisis in Iran, and North Korean missile launches drew the attention of global political and economic elites away from the St. Petersburg Summit that took place in July 2006. Just one month before the Summit took place, it had been expected to become the central international event of 2006.

The Summit preparations were not easy. It is true that reaching consensus on two of the issues Russia included in the agenda—education and infectious diseases—was relatively simple. No one doubts that both education and public health are issues of the utmost importance and require international cooperation. Thus, all that had to be done was to find appropriate the diplomatic procedures to formulate a common point of view.

It also became clear that reaching a real consensus on the third topic proposed for the discussion of G8 leaders—energy security—was impossible. After the winter 2005-06 gas crisis between Russia and Ukraine, European countries made a clear choice to begin minimizing their dependence on natural gas supplies from Russia, while Moscow, on the contrary, aimed to solidify its position as Europe’s major gas supplier. Combining these two opposing positions is impossible. That is why among the task entrusted to the diplomats undertaking the Summit preparations was to draft a document that would give the impression that some progress had been achieved, even though both parties’ approach was and remains contradictory on the majority of specific problems related to energy security.


Given these circumstances, the most interesting question at the Summit was whether it would be possible to *trade* Russian support for the Western stance on Iran and some other issues in exchange for a promise by the leaders of the world’s major democracies not to publicly criticize

Kremlin for hampering democracy and unleashing the gas war against Ukraine. But because of the war in Lebanon, neither Iran nor the future of Russian democracy were discussed seriously. A much more profound and complicated issue—that of the political nature of the G8—also remained unresolved.

Originally, this institution was designed as a mechanism where pressing global issues were discussed and a coordinated response developed by the seven leading western states, united by common values and a shared vision of the world. Russia’s



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 **Zhiye Ji (China)**, Director of the Institute of Russian Studies, by phone from **Beijing**: *On the whole the Index quite accurately depicts the trends during these months, particularly insofar as the drops in October are concerned. As a Chinese citizen, I certainly view the events related to the North Korean nuclear tests as the most negative of the past year. And as for the increase in the Index during August, it reflects the period of "political vacations."*

accession to the group has been, in a certain sense, an advance for the country: the participation of Russia was expected to solidify the democratic forces in Russian society. However, the recent curtailing of those democratic processes and the formation of a new Russian foreign policy, largely stemming from strategic policies that differ from those of the western countries, brings a question to the table: how is the G8 really different from the UN Security Council? Despite the absence of meaningful results, the St. Petersburg Summit once again drew attention to Russian foreign policy.

RUSSIA: A NEW PHILOSOPHY AND THE PRACTICAL RESULTS OF ITS FOREIGN POLICY

Eurasian security, especially in those regions bordering on Russia, is highly dependent on Russian policy choices. The events of summer 2006 demonstrated that Russia has embraced a new strategy that has a number of significant differences from the one proclaimed by President Vladimir Putin after September 11. The new foreign policy philosophy was broadly outlined by Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov in a speech he delivered at the Moscow State Institute for International Relations (MGIMO) on September 1, 2006.⁷ It comes down to the following key points.

Lavrov indicated that overcoming the period of economic instability and political turmoil that Russia went through in the last decade of the past century made “our foreign policy more purposeful and productive, and Russian diplomacy more called for in world affairs.”⁸ The minister insisted that “not a single problem of some significance is tackled without our participation; the number of our partners and allies is growing.”⁹ Overall, the key thought running through the minister’s address has been the idea that today Russia has regained the power it sought, allowing it to play a weighty role in world affairs as an independent force. The idea of Russian foreign policy independence became the second key insight of Lavrov’s conceptual speech.

“Russia has again acquired the ability and political will to pursue a truly national policy based on Russian interests,” he declared. ...“The foreign policy independence acquired by Russia is the main achievement of recent years and an absolute imperative corresponding to the political and diplomatic tradition of Russia.”¹⁰

Such a declaration immediately brings forward two matters of principle. The first one is the inherent meaning of “a truly national policy”—a term that is generally less common in democratic politics than in an authoritarian political discourse saturated with nationalistic ardor. The second is the meaning of the term “foreign policy independence” in an interdependent and increasingly globalizing world.

The third conceptual insight presented by Lavrov is the idea that world politics is about to live through

“the most crucial, and inevitably contradictory moment. ...The unpredictability of world development will persist. ...Salvation can only be collective.” At the same time, the head of Russian diplomacy proposed the idea of creating a new *concert* of major world powers. “Russia perceives no reasonable alternative to the formation in a globalizing world of a new collective leadership of major countries which would be geographically and civilizationally representative. The Group of Eight could become an important element of that ‘orchestra.’”¹¹

Finally, Lavrov explicitly spoke against the course of action pursued by the United States:

“Attempts to destabilize whole countries and regions under the slogans of ‘democratization and freedom promotion around the world’ cannot but evoke concern,” declared Lavrov, clearly alluding to U.S. foreign policy. “Not only not irreproachable in terms of international law and common sense, but also counter-productive is the line on isolating some or other players on the international scene. As a rule, that approach yields results directly opposite to those sought. That is why we cannot join the ultimatums which drive everybody into an impasse and lead to an escalation whose logic always works for force-based variants.”¹²

Lavrov is certainly right speaking about the beginning of a new and quite challenging period of world development, which requires collective action. However, the challenge lies not only in making decisions that would be acceptable to all members of the group, but also in the nature of such decisions. In Russia's experience, "a truly national foreign policy" is understood in today's Moscow as flirting with terrorist organizations, such as Hamas, and with leaders such as Hugo Chavez, the Iranian leadership, and other unsavory players on the world political scene.

Moreover, as the events of summer and fall 2006 demonstrated, the new Russian foreign policy includes exercising pressure on Georgia and Moldova. One cannot but notice that while Russian diplomacy actively protests against using force in North Korea, Iran, and other similar regimes, in Georgia's case Moscow is ready, at least verbally, to apply military force. For example, in mid-October 2006, Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Air Force Vladimir Mikhailov openly declared that Russia would not remain indifferent in the event of a military conflict in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. "If the minister of defense said that we [Russia] would certainly take adequate measures, then he probably meant the use of air, naval, and land forces," General Mikhailov noted the Russian position in a sharp, military manner.¹³

However, such double standards are only one of the weaknesses from which the new Russian foreign policy philosophy suffers. Equally alarming is the fact that the perception of Russia regaining power and influence is based solely and exclusively on the revenues obtained through growing world oil prices. In the meantime, not a single one of the true challenges facing the Russian economy and society has been resolved. Military reform has not been carried out, and the Russian army is still in a desperate state. No new sources of economic growth other than revenues from energy exports have been discovered. The demographic crisis has not been overcome. Russian electricity and transportation infrastructure is in need of immediate modernization. Thus, Russian prowess is largely exaggerated, which means that a foreign policy based on Russia's self-perception as a newly reborn major power cannot be productive. Zbigniew Brzezinski was right when he wrote in June 2006:

"Russia's 'sovereignty' is an obsolete stereotype. Its influence pushes the Russian Federation to implement unilateral actions towards Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova, but such actions do nothing other than undermine Russia's reputation and unveil its complete helplessness; in other words, they can do nothing to Russia but harm."¹⁴

The events of summer and fall 2006 confirm this conclusion. The government of the Kyrgyz Republic allowed the United States to maintain its airbase in Manas despite Moscow's pressure. In August 2006, after Uzbekistan's return to the CSTO, Uzbek President Islam Karimov met with U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Richard Boucher and probably discussed the issue of reestablishing ties with the United States, which were nearly reduced to zero after the bloody events in Andijan. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization Summit that took place in summer 2006 did not see the renewal of last year's statement calling for a timeline for the closure of American military bases in Central Asia. It is unlikely that the election of Vladimir Yanukovich's government in Ukraine can be seen as a major Russian diplomatic victory. That government's main political support is big business in eastern Ukraine, a major competitor of Russian business. The aggravation of Russo-Georgian relations and our flirting with separatist groups in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Transnistria could draw Russia into conflicts that would be difficult to pull out of, and could definitely complicate Russia's relations with Europe and the United States.


President Putin's attempt to establish some sort of "special relations" with Germany in the energy field has not been successful either. German Chancellor Angela Merkel rejected the Russian president's seemingly tempting proposal concerning a strategic energy partnership involving guaranteed gas supplies for Germany in exchange for giving Gazprom access to German gas distribution networks. Instead of the energy alliance with Russia, the German chancellor signed an energy declaration with France, something not at all in Moscow's plans.




RECAPPING THE RESULTS OF THE PAST FOUR MONTHS

The events that took place on the world political scene in summer and fall 2006 demonstrated that reliable international security cannot be based on earlier approaches. The forces confronting the civilized world today see the policy of engagement, the search for compromises, and mutual concessions as an explicit sign of weakness in their partners, and they are ready to take full advantage of this weakness. Here one cannot but remember Winston Churchill's observation: "An appeaser is one who feeds a crocodile hoping it will eat him last." Neither should one forget the lessons of history: the downfall of the Roman Empire was preceded by attempts to buy the loyalty of the chiefs of nearby barbarian tribes by paying them tribute. However, that strategy did not save Rome. The more tribute tribal chiefs collected, the more their mouths watered, and the greater was their longing to invade the empire and take away everything that their caravans could carry.

 Ekaterina **Stepanova (Russia)**, Senior Researcher and Director of the Group on Nontraditional Security Threats at the Center for International Security, Institute for World Economy and International Relations of the Russian Academy of Sciences (IMEMO RAN), by phone from **Moscow**: *The calculation of the index implies developing a so-called "early warning" system. I have doubts about the calculations and the attempt to express international security in a single number. More likely, this is an index made up of forecasts and evaluations.*

Nonetheless, cynical historians who have spent their entire lives in dusty archives are sure of one thing: the only lesson that history can give us is that nobody ever pays attention to its lessons. 

Nonetheless, cynical historians who have spent their entire lives in dusty archives are sure of one thing: the only lesson that history can give us is that nobody ever pays attention to its lessons. 

Yury Fedorov



A VIEW BY A RUSSIAN CONSERVATIVE: APOCALYPSE? NO!

Summer and fall 2006 turned out to be among the most active periods in recent international history in terms of military and political developments. During the second half of 2006, all of the potential for conflict that had long been accumulating in the world came to light as if at the wave of a magician's wand. As a result, instead of the static picture of a *new world order* – in which only a few marginal individuals expressed doubts about the "general line" – in one wave of a hand both politicians and average citizens began to see the small number of states known as the "axis of evil" as something like a "new world disorder," or at least the general view of the world became quite fragmented.

New historical eras arrive, as a rule, gradually, but they begin unexpectedly. At first, events that do not fit into the previous paradigm are ignored, later they begin to be considered phenomena. After that, one begins to get the sense that this has all happened before, but on one beautiful day we wake up in a new world, which—surprise!—does not resemble the one to which we have become accustomed. So now, as the wheels of history move down the rails of the post-bipolar era, when all *civilized* people support friendship (although to different degrees—from ecstatic convergence to tough partnership) with the west; where there is no alternative to liberal market economics; and where political liberalism is undisputed as the only correct ideology (just like Communism in the Soviet Union); now on this smooth route some pebbles have appeared, which are beginning to not just crunch under the wheels, but to seriously impede the progress of humanity. During the last six months the number of these pebbles has exceeded the level at which one could simply ignore them. Discussing the events of summer and fall 2006, we will examine how the wheels of international politics squealed as they passed over the pebbles of a new historical era.

A NEW NUCLEAR POWER

Let's begin with North Korea's detonation of a low-yield atomic bomb in October 2006. What did we observe?

First of all, we observed that the North Korean leadership is resourceful and completely rational. They realize that a new era has begun and that very proud North Korea is great not because of its poor resources, but because of the inspirational ideas of *juche*. Otherwise, Pyongyang would not have conducted its nuclear test in such a demonstrative manner.

The North Korean nuclear test, conducted in defiance of Chinese opinion, shows the desire of Pyongyang to get out from the shadow of its "older brother." North Korea also wanted to demonstrate the futility of any hopes that Beijing could use North Korea as a chip in its strategic bargaining with Washington. The lesson for all of this is clear: North Korea is an independent state, and nobody can control its behavior.

The most important accomplishment of North Korea is not that it was able to conduct a nuclear test, and not even the fact that this nuclear explosion was produced by a device that North Korean delivery systems could carry over a significant distance—almost to the United States.¹⁵ The main accomplishment of North Korea is that Pyongyang was able to create a situation of strategic uncertainty about not the status, but the scope of its nuclear program among the regional powers. And in a situation of strategic uncertainty, even the United States will not take any very decisive action against North Korea, despite overwhelming U.S. military superiority.

And believe me, we will observe many more "inconsistent" moves by Pyongyang, which will sometimes give hope, and other times lead to stupor. But the keys to the game will not be held in Washington, nor in Brussels, Moscow, or even in Beijing.

But if the facts indicate that the actions of the North Korean leadership are rational, carefully considered, and clever, then perhaps it is time for the other participants in the six party talks (including Russia) to reject the previous perception of the northern part of the Korean peninsula as a permanently starving country led by a maniacal communist? Maybe it is time to recognize the North Korean leadership as serious partners who have their own perception of the situation, their own goals and resources? Then, you see, at least some level of trust and understanding might be established, the absence of which has turned the much-heralded six party talks into an exchange of slogans and accusations.

THE CONFLICT BETWEEN ISRAEL AND HEZBOLLAH: THE FIRST WAR OF THE NEW ERA

The war between Israel and Hezbollah is one of the main factors that will shape the international relations in the medium term, and not just in the Middle East. It was the first serious armed conflict, almost a full-scale war, which was conducted under religious slogans and by a state against a non-state actor.

Considering these factors, although the asymmetrical nature of the conflict was noticeable, it was not as strongly marked as many specialists had predicted. The picture of the successful attack on an Israeli patrol boat by an unmanned aerial vehicle designed and constructed by Hezbollah, as well as the ability of Hezbollah to strike (although not with much accuracy) targets up to 70 km inside Israel, demonstrates the qualitatively new military capabilities of non-state actors. While undoubtedly the capabilities of Hezbollah remain unique, it cannot be ruled out that other similar actors could soon acquire the ability to produce technically advanced types of weaponry in limited quantities.

The Israel-Hezbollah War will also have a long-term impact because it was the first Arab-Israeli war that Israel did not win. While one cannot claim that Israel lost, the fact that it did not achieve victory is also obvious. Owing to political and historical factors, the failure to achieve victory is the same for Israel as defeat.



The main point is not that Israeli generals directed the war with a strange combination of self-assuredness and fear, looking to their political leadership. And it is not even the fact that the military campaign did not achieve a single one of its declared goals and the Israeli soldiers whose capture provoked the conflict remained prisoners of Hezbollah. It is not even that the Hezbollah rocket attacks instilled in Israelis a sense of strategic vulnerability that had not existed even during the worst periods of Arab-Israeli confrontation, at least since 1967. More important was that the anti-Hezbollah consensus inside Israel quickly broke down as soon as the first signs of difficulty with the military campaign emerged. In other words, Israeli society, famous for its ability to unite in times of danger, clearly demonstrated to the entire world and to Hezbollah that it is not ready to sacrifice in the name of maintaining Israeli military and political hegemony. Israel remains ready to fight Hezbollah (and any other opponent), but it wants to do so in a way that minimizes the economic costs to its citizens. This is an important message for the entire Middle East that can be interpreted in only one way: Israel is moving from strategic dominance of the region to strategic defense. Of course, one can now justify this policy and blame Russia, Syria, anyone who could possibly have aided Hezbollah. For example, if only Moscow hadn't given those Islamists intelligence information, everything would have been fine. Without resorting to the well-known joke about a poor dancer, one can simply remind our Israeli friends that during the entire Cold War the Soviet Union energetically and effectively assisted the Arab countries in every way it could—weapons, money, and advisors. However, that did not prevent Israel from decisively defeating the Arab armies every time.


By the way, only the most naïve could fail to link the results of the Israel-Hezbollah war with shifts in the tactics of the Iranian leadership in the negotiations over the Iranian nuclear program. In response to the almost hysterical provocations of the United States and Israel, Iranian President Ahmadinejad—who himself represents not a unique phenomenon, but a trend in contemporary international relations—shifted to an increasingly refined exploitation of the contradictions between the European Union, the United States, and Russia. The cause of this shift is quite simple: the results of the war in Lebanon showed that the United States lacks the resources for a major geopolitical project (and the defeat of Iran is such a project), because Israel has ceased to exist as an offensive military political factor. Yes, of course the Israelis could bomb Iranian nuclear facilities, but such a course is clearly inadequate for a major long-term geopolitical strategy. And without being able to rely on Israel as an offensive force, the United States is hardly ready to begin a direct confrontation with Iran, much less use military force against it.

One thing is now clear: with its non-victory in Lebanon, Israel significantly exacerbated the situation in the Middle East and possibly created an entirely undesirable dynamic. The major lesson for all world political leaders is that there are situations in which it is better not to start a war, even if you are completely sure that of your victory.

In many analyses of the situation in Lebanon, including those by both western and Russian specialists, there are a lot of distortions of the actual situation in Lebanon, which interfere with sober assessment of the situation. Hezbollah is not the mythical al-Qa'ida (there are few who will now disagree that al-Qa'ida is more of a "phantom umbrella" uniting separate relatively independent groups). Hezbollah is an organization that has won the battle for the hearts and minds of Lebanon not so much by issuing calls to jihad as by adequately and effectively directing political and social-economic processes. We also often forget that Hezbollah is the result of a completely democratic development of the Lebanese political system. This organization is a force that draws its strength from civil society, excellently mastering its mechanisms and becoming an integral part of it. In this regard, the path of Hezbollah may become much more attractive to other similar organizations than the sectarian anti-Semitism that guides al-Qa'ida, Islamic Jihad, and Hamas, which has proven completely incapable of managing the microscopic Palestinian autonomy.

One can disagree with the methods of Hezbollah and its actions during the war with Israel, although it is also necessary to note that from the point of view of humanitarian purity, the actions of Israel during the war did not differ much from the efforts of the Hezbollah fighters firing rockets. It is even possible to continue considering Hezbollah a terrorist organization. However, it is impossible not to acknowledge Hezbollah as a powerful factor which defines and will continue to define the development of the military-political situation in the Middle East.

Then who exactly lost the Israel-Hezbollah war? The current leadership of the majority of Arab states proved to be if not politically, then ideologically bankrupt, refusing to lift a finger to help the people they publicly declared to be brothers. It is clear why they took no action: many leading politicians in the Arab countries, and even some of their leaders, are among those who declared for years that they were prepared to drive Israel into the sea but were always defeated, leaving behind battlefields littered with fragments of Soviet weaponry. In their souls is an almost superstitious fear of Israel and an almost mystical desire, while hating Israel, to avoid even the shadow of conflict with Tel Aviv. These leaders are capable of neither a solid peace settlement with Israel (even Hosni Mubarak, although Egypt does have a full peace treaty with Israel) nor a decisive final war. The war in Lebanon showed that Arab nationalism has no future as a political platform. The question of when these regimes will be replaced by more Islamist oriented ones is just a matter of time.

 Andrei **Kortunov (Russia)**, President of the New Eurasia Foundation, by phone from **Moscow**: *I believe that an index should be calculated with a long-term perspective in order to look at trends over the long run. There are many small, insignificant factors that in future could distort the current results. But generally I would say that I do not see any divergences with the trends I have felt intuitively that would contradict the numerical indicators of this period.*

Hezbollah does not suffer from this fear of Israel, and the new generation of Arab youth was raised not on stories about how many Arabs died in vain or were taken prisoner in wars against Israel, but instead were taught that serious defeats can be inflicted on Israel, even if it cannot be entirely conquered. Hezbollah, whether one likes it or not, is now the ideological leader on the Arab street. The question now is whether to ignore this factor, declaring it a “terrorist organization,” or to try and understand it. Hezbollah—unlike Arab nationalists, who are classmates and share the views of Saddam Hussein—is capable of both serious confrontation with Israel, and long-

term peace with it. Hezbollah is strong enough to pursue either course. The question is only whether Israel is capable of reappraising its position in the Middle East and understanding the new reality. At the moment, there is little hope of Israel adopting such a policy. It hurts to be weak, and the rather morally corrupt Israeli ruling class looks imprudent.

A GEORGIAN GAMBIT?

The significant increase in tensions in Russian-Georgian relations is one factor which to some degree supports the hypothesis about the emergence in international politics of a new wave of conflicts (linked with the expectation of an intensifying struggle for natural resources). U.S. policy, which is pushing its satellite Mikhail Saakashvili toward confrontation with Russia, does not at all differ from the classics of the genre of natural resource competition during the 19th and 20th centuries. A great power sometimes sacrifices a pawn in order to gain a better position for the next geopolitical move.

The direction of U.S. geopolitical moves is clear—to establish a base for direct military access to the eastern shore of the Black Sea from Azerbaijan to Georgia. And if this does not succeed, to turn the region into a zone of permanent instability, like Iraq (which would be easier). With these moves the United States would not so much strike a blow at Russia as create for itself the possibility to permanently and without much additional effort control important oil transportation routes.

Both the (proposed) Transcaspian Oil Pipeline and the Blue Stream Pipeline lie within either the zone of permanent military instability or within range of the most basic strike systems of the U.S. military. And this situation will be an additional instrument of influence not so much on Russia as on the European allies of the United States, for whom energy security is critical.

As a result, Russia is faced with the unpleasant prospect of either losing political face in polemics with Mikhail Saakashvili—a typical populist-obscurantist—or directly confronting the



United States and Europe. Of course, in the medium-term our European partners are just as interested as Russia in replacing Saakashvili with a more responsible figure, but considering the inherent anti-Russian solidarity of “progressive humanity,” Europe will hardly raise its own voice on this issue.

From this situation, Russia can draw one of the principal lessons of recent years for its foreign policy: one can endlessly play virtual games and engage in information warfare. In this regard, Russia long ago beat Saakashvili on points. However, the gain from this type of victory is small, since our main opponent (if not enemy) in this case is the United States, not Saakashvili. And once one recognizes this unpleasant reality, it becomes clear that victory will not belong to the one who more cleverly smears his opponent with rhetoric, but the one who has a stronger set of actual moves and significant resources, including military resources. And the United States is much stronger in these resources than Russia, even before considering freedom of action.


In the era of the Global War on Terrorism and the Orange Revolution our country’s lack of real resources and occasional lack of the political will to use them was acceptable. One way or another the War on Terrorism and the Orange Revolution were mostly “virtual” projects. But if the prediction that the next era will be one of a struggle for natural resources is justified, then the retention of this type of approach will become suicidal. The era of natural resource competition will not acknowledge victories on points, but only by knockout.

The case of Saakashvili is also significant because it shows the utter uselessness of trying to increase influence in the west by improving our image. Even in the case of a confrontation between Russia and an obviously irresponsible personality like Saakashvili the sympathies of the West are entirely not with Russia. Reading the U.S. and European press is sufficient to confirm this proposition. The moral of this story is that we should think less about our image and more about how one or another action impacts our interests. In the final analysis, the West will deal only with those who are capable of implementing their plans without getting distracted by polemics with the surrounding world. As they say, don’t cast pearls before swine...

Nevertheless, it is necessary to take our relations with the United States on the issue of Saakashvili and what is called Georgia seriously. Here is the logic and attractiveness of resource competition with the use of potential satellites: with rare exceptions—which are usually connected either with personal factors or with the domestic politics of particular countries—this approach allows the resolution of global problems in localized and insignificant areas. And the confrontation between Russia and Georgia, if Russia continues to make mistakes, and if the radical hysterics don’t take control in Washington, will develop as if abstracted from the Great Game

of the 19th century. Most importantly, it won’t require major expenditures by the United States, with the exception of financing Saakashvili’s supporters, who are generally undemanding.

Sometimes one has the impression that for the United States, Georgia plays the same role that Finland did for Great Britain in the 1930s. Finland was a sort of sacrificial lamb for Stalin, who had already indicated his readiness to restore the influence of Moscow along the borders of the former Russian Empire. From the British point of view, it wouldn’t be bad if Finland was crushed under the heel of Stalin’s boot—because Russia would then find itself in complete international isolation and Hitler would turn his gaze to the east. If Finland wasn’t crushed, Britain would also benefit: the prestige of the

 Rama **Mani (India)**, Executive Director of the International Center for Ethnic Studies, by phone from **Colombo**: *During the period of Summer to late Fall 2006 the iSi Index was, we see, fairly stable: its drops and rises did not even exceed 100 points. There were small changes, in my view, due to the unstable situation in Iraq and the unpopularity of George Bush junior, related to misfortunes both in the United States and abroad. During the fall months the situation really began to cause a lot of questions, thanks to the upcoming U.S. legislative elections. Whether the democrats will bring more stability, however, remains an open question. We will have to wait for the new iSi indicators.*



William Potter (USA), Director of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, by phone from **Monterey**: *I do not think that the international situation changed substantially during this period, as far as international security is concerned. However, I believe that the formation of a democratic majority in U.S. Senate and House of Representatives could accelerate the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq, which would likely have a very positive effect on regional and global stability.*

Soviet Union would suffer a serious blow, and the Red Army would be discredited as a serious military force. The problem is that Russia is not the Soviet Union, Georgia is not Finland, and Saakashvili—forgive me—is nothing like Mannerheim. But Russia has to prove these facts to the world, while the Georgian leadership, as we already discussed has all the advantages of total innocence in the eyes of “progressive society.”

It is hard not to admire the willingness of the United States to be drawn into a serious conflict over Georgia—if not a Great Game—while the problems related to the occupation of Iraq are not resolved; when

the situation in Afghanistan, to put it lightly, has intensified; when the authority of the United States in the developing world has fallen to its lowest level since the Vietnam War. However, they understand in the United States that the stakes in the competition for natural resources are very high, and it is necessary to take risks, including sacrificing unnecessary allies, like suitcases with broken handles. It also seems that our friends in Washington are almost certain that they can use the conflict with Georgia to neutralize the Russian factor in Transcaucasia and the Black Sea region, at least for two-three years.

AFGHANISTAN: LITMUS TEST FOR THE CHANGE OF CENTURIES IN WORLD POLITICS

By the way, what about Afghanistan? I deliberately say “by the way,” since for five years the war in Afghanistan was clearly forgotten, and it was believed that this state would easily become an example of how to build a prototype democracy in a complex society dominated by Islam. On the other hand, about a year ago it became clear that intelligent people in the United States were counting on a very soft exit from Afghanistan and the transfer of primary responsibility for the situation there into the hands of the Europeans, who wanted to show their geopolitical independence and ability to implement a force projection and stabilization operation on an almost global scale. In other words, in Washington they wanted to implement an idea from the Vietnam War: “Declare Victory and Leave.” This approach was understandable, considering that the author of this famous phrase was none other than U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. But it didn’t work out; the plan didn’t succeed. Already by September 2006 NATO casualties in Afghanistan for the year exceeded those of the past five years. Even more important, U.S. casualties did not decline.

But this is not the main problem: the Taliban, over whom victory has repeatedly been declared, have moved from small-scale terrorism and rear-guard actions against the multinational forces in inaccessible mountain regions to offensive operations and attempts to seize populated areas. In other words, the Taliban is trying to reestablish control over territory. This is a major change, which indicates that the Afghan population, even if it doesn’t support the Taliban, at a minimum does not feel sharply negative about them. And that is the source of the problems facing the United States and its allies: over an extended period of time they have not been able to create a social-political paradigm that is attractive to Afghan society. In effect, the United States has recreated the pre-Taliban social situation: banditry, trade in narcotics, and warlordism. In other words, the same conditions from which the Taliban emerged. The situation in Afghanistan will not necessarily come full circle (anti-Taliban forces are still fairly strong). However, Washington will not succeed in rapidly quitting the Afghan mountains, and Afghanistan will certainly remain a resource drain on the United States and NATO for a long time to come.

But here we see the emergence of resource competition and clear signals of a change of centuries in world politics. Indeed, the operation in Afghanistan and the American military pres-



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ence in Central Asia began in 2001, the period—notwithstanding the events of 9/11—of the greatest expansion of American political globalism. This was a time when the United States—even in its worst nightmares—did not believe that it would be forced to engage in a struggle for natural resources, when it dominated. At that time even the most restrained American leaders were certain that the United States would eternally play the role of a global stabilizer that ensured the security of friendly regimes.

Recall that after the fall of the Taliban, only three regimes hostile to the United States remained: North Korea, Cuba, and Iran. Somewhere in the background there was also “Uncle Lukashenko,” a scarecrow used to frighten nervous European politicians. At that time the establishment of a stable and reasonable (in religious terms) regime in Afghanistan was not just a matter of political prestige, it was a question of faith in the American technology of political management, and in addition there was the possibility of control over one possible transportation route (although it is unlikely that the trans-Afghan route was ever seen as a realistic project). Now the situation is different. The number of regimes which openly ignore U.S. opinions has increased, but more significantly, the nature of international processes has changed.

In the framework of a struggle for natural resources a state must concentrate on its principal areas of activity. Afghanistan is not such an area for either the United States or Europe. Until Central Asia is stabilized, it would not be bad for the United States if the region again turned into a full-scale “hot spot.” In the final analysis, Russia currently has more influence in the region than the United States, and the overall dynamic is not in favor of our American partners. As a result, instability in Central Asia is a problem for Russia, which has influence in the region, but not for the United States, for which these countries not to mention their populations, are not important (despite all the rhetoric about Tulip Revolutions and human rights).

This context allows one to understand the flood—it can’t be described otherwise—of Americans into Pakistan, which outwardly appears illogical. According to the logic of the previous era, stubbornly destabilizing a generally pro-American regime in an anti-American society that has nuclear weapons is completely incomprehensible. But it makes perfect sense considering the logic of a struggle for resources. By turning not just Afghanistan but also Pakistan into a boiling skillet doused in neo-Taliban sauce, the United States, sacrificing questionable and, I might add, expensive resources, can easily earn a much more important resource: India. India, which finds itself squeezed between China, which no longer hides its ambitions, and an aggressively Islamist Pakistan, will simply be forced to agree to American terms of partnership, although in principle these might turn out to be perfectly acceptable. In any event, only one step remains before the full legalization of India as a nuclear power.

A NEW ARMS RACE: ARE CURRENT FEARS REALISTIC?

A lot has been said in the past six months about the possibility of a new arms race. To some extent these discussions reflect reality, but only to some extent. For example, many forget that one of the main causes of the current arms race is the United States. Not having managed to implement a full economic and political conversion of its military-industrial complex, and having exhausted the strategy of “skipping a cycle” in the development of that complex, the United States is now compelled to return to arms procurement. Indirect increases in the purchase of arms by the United States demonstrate that in the U.S. economy—which appears healthy from the outside – industry is beginning to face a crisis and defense industries are starting to have excess capacities. Earlier, these problems were successfully ignored. As a result, the United States now has to shift from short-term, or almost trial purchases to large-scale, serial acquisition of modern types of armaments and military hardware.

If one examines the other characteristics that are supposed to indicate the beginning of an apparently new arms race, in reality they have a local character, and can often be explained as the result of “delayed demand,” that is the replacement of weapons that have outlived their useful lives. For example, Algeria and Syria received their last weapons during the twilight of

the Soviet Union. But there are significant exceptions. Principally, the military programs of India and China, which have the same nature, but different contents.

Both states have set themselves the goal of significantly increasing their status in the international arena. However, if India is trying to create effective means of power projection and influence on a regional scale, China has probably defined its strategic goal as attaining rough strategic parity with the United States. As a result, we can regard the current growth in military expenditures as a result of the formation of full-scale multipolarity, in other words, the process that was politically declared six or seven year ago, but has only now begun to adopt practical and comprehensible forms.

And if the hypothesis about the current increase in interest in arms purchases is an indicator of preparations by a whole series of new centers of power to develop under conditions of genuine multipolarity, then it is worthwhile to conclude that considering the new era from the point of view of military-political aspects, the development of international relations will be the era of resource competition.


WASHINGTON AND THE NEW ERA: FEARLESS DESPITE DIFFICULTIES

Some in Russia harbor naïve hopes that the United States will retreat into isolationism in the face of increasing foreign policy challenges, renounce the concept of exporting democracy by force (the basis of Bush administration foreign policy), and begin to respectfully listen to its partners. But one need only read the pronouncements of Democratic Party leaders, vainly criticizing Republicans for the war in Iraq and for plans to intervene in Iran, to realize that fundamental changes in U.S. foreign policy are unlikely any time soon. In fact, the emphasis on the export of democracy by force might even expand. After all, the Democratic Party is historically more inclined than the Republican Party to support humanitarian interventions and other similar adventures.

As a matter of fact, President Bush is quite correct when he says that the Democratic Party has no plan for Iraq. In September 1993, the current favorite of radical Republicans, Senator John McCain, who spent the worst months of his life as a prisoner of war in Vietnam, told a large audience the following story. When McCain worked as an assistant to then Senator Barry

Goldwater, who opposed expanding the U.S. presence in Vietnam, Goldwater said: "John, if I had become president, you would never have ended up in a Vietnamese prison." "Exactly," answered McCain, "I would have ended up in a Chinese prison." As is well known, Goldwater supported a war against China. It seems to me that the Democratic alternative to current U.S. foreign policy is something similar: climb out of the Iraqi frying pan and fall into the Syrian or Iranian one.

The United States now faces a critical decision about changing the paradigm that guides its international actions. Already today one can suggest, heretically, that pragmatic and political motives lie behind the whipping up of fears about a new arms race, a trend that began about

 **Abdulaziz Sager (Saudi Arabia)**, Chairman of the Gulf Research Center, by email from **Dubai**: *The July Lebanese crisis definitely increased worries that a regional war would be unleashed in the Middle East, which should have been reflected in the August indices as well. When these fears did not materialize, the situation stabilized. Nevertheless, the increase in violence at the end of October in Iraq and worries about an increase in sectarian clashes in the region caused the barometer to rock towards a more pessimistic view once again. On the whole, I agree that the Index numbers reflect the general state of the security situation.*

six months ago, and the proposal that the whole civilized world must work to restrain it. The general struggle for arms control is intended to replace the previous paradigm guiding international relations, the global war on terrorism. In reality, by its fifth anniversary, the global war



on terrorism had proved a political failure—although it succeeded from the point of view of the security of the United States itself, as the fighting with terrorists is taking place in other countries, not the United States. Of the broad coalition which supported the United States after 9/11, only the United Kingdom and a few satellites—which can only with difficulty be termed independent states—remain. The global war on terrorism has exhausted its potential as a unifying concept and must naturally be replaced with something new. A struggle against a new arms race, especially considering that this process involves states to which the United States is not that sympathetic, could earn Washington additional support in the world. Of course, creating a new paradigm will also require formal mechanisms that have international legitimacy, so a role will be found for the United Nations.

This change in paradigms is illustrated by the ease with which the United States allowed Israel to drown the Lebanese “orange revolution” in blood. Naturally, after the Israeli actions in Lebanon, American clients have hardly any prospect of electoral victory in Lebanon. And no small sum was expended in support of the Lebanese “orange forces,” which were expected to deliver serious results. In other words, “orange forces”—not just in Lebanon—will most likely be used as pawns in power politics. Washington is in principle no longer interested in the political prospects of the former “hopes of progressive humanity.”

Such is the logic of the new era, which will most likely be an era of competition for resources: natural resources, transportation resources, information resources, and geopolitical resources. The drive of some countries for resource control was already evident earlier. For quite a while it has been noted that the maintenance of U.S. global hegemony requires more than control of international finances and dominant military power. The United States has long sought indirect political control, not just economic control, over resource-rich territories. However, these little alarm bells, or as we termed them earlier, pebbles, were attributed to the eccentricity of individual U.S. leaders, who were too enmeshed in economic issues. For example, U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney, who in Russian eyes has acquired the characteristics of an international evil-doer, strongly reminiscent of either Osama Bin Laden or Boris Berezovsky. It seems to me that the rage against Cheney—although he is a powerful global lobbyist—is pointless. The wheels of history have simply started to turn in a direction that makes it very important to possess not just ideals of freedom and democracy, but also reserves of oil, gas, and coal, control over transportation corridors, etc. And powerful battalions of troops will be the most critical instrument for achieving these goals, more important than quotes from George Washington.

As a result, the victory of the Democratic Party in the November 2006 congressional elections—despite its importance—will not change much in U.S. foreign policy. New actors will simply emerge, who may turn out to be somewhat less pleasant interlocutors than the now comfortably familiar neo-conservatives, who seem almost Russian at times. In general, we need to forget the idea that short-term changes in U.S. domestic politics can shake the foundation of foreign policy. Of course, there are precedents which show that elections can determine the international course of the United States. But not now, since this is a period in which the system of international relations is changing its overall character, and the U.S. elite cannot afford to waver. And if one looks closely, behind the fence of rhetoric about democracy, the efforts of the United States to concentrate its resources on critical tasks are already visible. Washington is concentrating on tasks that are important in terms of the coming era, the era of resource competition.

Looking at this pattern, it becomes clear why the United States is reacting relatively moderately in response to the antics of its Latin American neighbors like Hugo Chavez and Evo Morales. Some 20 years ago, in response to the much sharper moves of pro-Cuban leftists, a group of expeditionary *Sonderkommando* was formed, which cleaned out Grenada. Less than 15 years ago, George Bush Sr., largely out of considerations of personal prestige, conducted a geopolitically unnecessary military operation and sent Manuel Noriega to a U.S. prison. And now his son—not just his son, but the President of the United States—is insulted from every soapbox in Latin America, where they are forming geopolitical blocs and purchasing weapons which might change the regional balance of power. Right in the backyard of the United States, in Mexico, a leftist radical almost became president. Nevertheless, the United States exhibits a suspicious cold-blooded indifference. What explains this stance? Has the imperial essence of U.S. policy

changed? No. Has George W. Bush ceased to believe in his messianic destiny? This is also hardly likely. The paradigm of international relations has changed. Now the United States is unconcerned with personal grievances and preserving the psychological comfort of its leaders. At the moment, the U.S. needs to deal with the most critical resource centers, and realistically, Latin American does not fall into this category. As a result, the United States tolerates crude attacks, replying, at the most, with some harassment of the Venezuelan foreign minister, for which it later awkwardly apologized. These Latin American leaders will be dealt with demonstratively and forcefully later, so that others don't copy them. But that will happen only after the United States has resolved the major challenges that face it in more critical regions of the world.

RUSSIA AND THE CHALLENGES OF THE NEW ERA

What about Russia? Ideally, it would not be bad to survive the new era on the periphery of world events, but geography dictates that Russia will simultaneously be a participant in the struggle for resources and a resource for which other serious players on the world stage will not hesitate to compete under the right circumstances. As a result, the beginning of the new era is not only an opportunity for Russia to right some specific wrongs of the 1990s, but also a major challenge. It will in fact be a test of Russia's ability to be an actor in international politics, not just an object. And this challenge has become increasingly obvious in recent months.

We need to not only understand the essence of the era of resource competition, but also think through the methods we use on the international stage. One way to put it is that Russian foreign policy should become a policy of enlightened cynicism, and Russian military policy should become a policy of power accumulation. Cynicism in the sense that while digging ourselves out of the ditch of virtual politics, we should deal with real forces, engage in real projects, seek real allies, and stop wasting time on what might politely be called *foreign policy propaganda*. Enlightened, meaning that we should not just live by our short-term interests, but should understand the dynamics of the situation and structure our policy to take the future into account.

Power accumulation means that already very soon, sooner than we want or imagine, we will need a full-fledged military force, one that is capable of controlling territory, not just chasing Basayev and other bandits through the mountains and forests. These forces don't need to be that big. For example, in order to sustain a large and intensive operation in Iraq, the United States has used only about 300,000 troops in rotation. This number could be considered an indicator of the number of well-equipped and trained forces—cut-throats, if you will pardon my cynicism—that Russia should seek to create in the nearest future.


And from this point of view, it may be worth taking a new look at the situation in Georgia. In the final analysis, no matter what they say in American newspapers and journals, Georgia is absolutely not



Yevgeny Satanovsky (Russia), President of the Ariel group and President of the Institute for Israel and Middle East Studies. by phone from **Moscow**: *A security index is a very notional, "slippery" concept, and quite debatable. It is hard to determine a single number to characterize international security, since it is hard to make comparisons. What is insecurity or security? The determination of insecurity or security could be the subject of much discussion. But on the whole the Index is interesting and leads to a good amount of discussion, which is probably its most important value.*

a critical geopolitical resource. It is a territory of doubtful economic value, the control of which does carry with it a certain amount of foreign policy prestige. However, it would be better to concentrate on preparing for the struggle over resource-rich territories, and not waste already scarce political and military capabilities on an effort to settle accounts with a mentally unstable and bankrupt political leader. Of course, we will deal with Saakashvili, but later, when we can do so without hindering our progress toward our main goal—achieving control, preferably direct control, over the maximum amount of resource-rich territory. In the end, George Bush will tolerate Hugo Chavez (who is, by the way, an almost perfect clone of Saakashvili, but Chavez, as

they say, “is *our* son of a bitch,” or at least “almost ours”), and we can easily tolerate Saakashvili. It will be even easier to tolerate him if we stop subsidizing him directly and indirectly, and treat his appearances on television as if they were analogous to a show by some stand-up comic.

Lev Gumilyev once noted that centuries do not always coincide with their date on the calendar. Sometimes, they start earlier. For example, the 19th century began with the horrific Napoleonic Wars and the European revolutions, which literally started during the 18th century. Sometimes they start later. The 21st century, like its predecessor—the 20th, which started in 1914—began later than the sprays of champagne that celebrated the millennium. And maybe it still hasn’t started yet. Perhaps the 21st century, the contours of which political scientists and politicians have long been trying to guess at, is only approaching our door. But we should remember that in the end, all centuries have begun with a major event, sometimes with a catastrophic change in the character of war and role of military force in the world. And only later, after some time has passed, does a new political picture of the world form. It will hardly be otherwise this time. Now, based on the experience of the past half-year, we are discussing not something abstract, but issues relating to the formation of a new role for military force in the world, new means of its application, and new perceptions of its role by the major players in the system of international relations. And so the 21st century begins.... 

Dmitry Evstafiev

Notes

¹ Hezbollah is a Shi’ite terrorist organization based on Lebanese territory. It was created by and is financed by the Iranian leadership. It has about 6,000 men in its military units. Hezbollah provides weapons and trains fighters in the Palestinian terrorist groups Hamas and Islamic Jihad. It hates the United States and Israel every bit as much as al-Qa’ida does. See Mark Shteynberg, “Strikes from the North and from Inside,” *Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye*, March 7-13, 2003.

² Jackson Diehl, “Bush’s Choice on Iran,” *Washington Post*, January 30, 2006, p. A17.

³ UN document S/Res/1701 (2006), paragraph 8.

⁴ “The war we fight today is more than a military conflict. It is the decisive ideological struggle of the 21st century,” *Financial Times*, September 1, 2006, p.7.

⁵ Viktor Myasnikov, “We have a nuclear neighbor,” *Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye*, October 13, 2006, <<http://www.ng.ru>>, last accessed November 15, 2006.

⁶ “Resolution 1718 (2006), Adopted by the Security Council at its 5551st meeting, on 14 October 2006,” S/RES/1718 (2006), United Nations Website, <http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions06.htm>, last accessed November 16, 2006.

⁷ Transcript of Address by Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov at MGIMO University on Occasion of Start of New Academic Year, Moscow, September 1, 2006.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ The Russian Air Force will help Abkhazia and South Ossetia if Georgia attacks them. Rambler Mass media, October 13, 2006, <<http://www.rambler.ru/news/events/russiageorgia/8896383.html?print=1>>, last accessed January 12, 2007.

¹⁴ Zbigniew Brzezinski, “In the Eyes of a Chess Player,” *Nezavisimaya gazeta*, June 27, 2006, <<http://www.ng.ru/printed/68930>>, last accessed November 16, 2006.

¹⁵ The editors of *Security Index* would like to point out that while North Korea has been developing missiles that may nearly reach the United States, there is as yet no evidence that they have developed a small enough nuclear warhead to mount on such a missile.



David Hoffman

1983: TURNING POINT OF THE COLD WAR

Except for the Cuban missile crisis, 1983 was the tensest year of the Cold War. It was the year that U.S. President Reagan launched the Strategic Defense Initiative, and the year that he called the Soviet Union an “evil empire.” It was the year that a Soviet pilot shot down the Korean Airliner, Flight 007, and the year in which NATO installed the Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles in Europe. In many ways, this was the year that the Cold War reached its apex. In the fall, Reagan began to shift in a direction that would make him more receptive to doing business with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev three years later.

Reagan was a man of complexity. He could hold in his mind two views which seemed in conflict. He was both distrustful of the Soviet Union and distrustful of the theory of nuclear deterrence. In 1983, these two beliefs were tested. The path was set for dramatic change.

REAGAN

Reagan’s life in the movies and in politics was guided by a visceral anti-Communism, which he brought with him to the presidency. In 1982, he delivered a speech to the British parliament that captured his true beliefs. “It may not be easy to see, but I believe we are now at a turning point,” Reagan declared. “In an ironic sense, Karl Marx was right. We are witnessing today a great revolutionary crisis—a crisis where the demands of the economic order are colliding directly with those of the political order. But the crisis is happening not in the free, non-Marxist west, but in the home of Marxism-Leninism, the Soviet Union.” He went on, “It is the Soviet Union which runs against the tide of history by denying freedom and human dignity to its citizens. It is also in deep economic difficulty... Over centralized, with little or no incentives, year after year, the Soviet system pours its best resource into the making of instruments of destruction. The constant shrinkage of economic growth combined with the growth of military production is putting a heavy strain on the Soviet people...” He added that “the march of freedom and democracy ... will leave Marxism-Leninism on the ash-heap of history as it has left other tyrannies which stifle the freedom and muzzle the self-expression of the people.”

Reagan’s address was given at a time of a growing nuclear freeze movement in Europe. His views of Moscow were not widely shared in Europe and they were deeply controversial in the United States. The decade of détente was over, but many Americans were not certain of Reagan’s direction. In a speech March 8, 1983 to a group of evangelical Christians meeting in Orlando, Florida, Reagan described the Soviet Union as “the focus of evil in the modern world” and urged the ministers to reject the nuclear freeze. “So in your discussions of the nuclear freeze proposals,” he said, “I urge you to beware the temptation of pride—the temptation of blithely declaring yourself above it all and label both sides equally at fault, to ignore the facts of history and the aggressive impulses of an evil empire, to simply call the arms race a giant



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misunderstanding and thereby remove yourself from the struggle between right and wrong and good and evil." The words "evil empire" came to embody Reagan's view of the Soviet Union.

At the same time, Reagan did not subscribe to the traditional views about nuclear deterrence. It had been an article of faith among U.S. policy-makers and presidents since the end of World War II that the United States must maintain a threat of massive retaliation and the country should build enough nuclear weapons to make the threat credible. The two superpowers had built larger and larger arsenals, driven by technology and ideology. The United States had settled on a policy, originally advanced by Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara, of constructing an arsenal large enough to destroy 25 percent of Soviet cities and 50 percent of its industry, which McNamara called "assured destruction." Later, a critic of McNamara added the word "mutual" to this and the policy came to be known as "mutual assured destruction," or MAD. It was a simple idea which many Americans easily grasped, the notion of two cocked pistols aimed at each other. In truth, both nations aimed largely at counterforce targets, each others' missiles—but the popular culture and legend was captured by mutual assured destruction. Moreover, the era of détente in the 1970s had persuaded many Americans that mutual assured destruction could be managed by arms control agreements such as the SALT treaties. These were given enormous importance in American thinking and were the legacy of Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger.

Reagan's rise to power came in part because Americans began to lose faith in détente, worried by Soviet modernization programs that seemed to expand even as the SALT treaties were signed. The Soviet missiles were not as threatening as was believed at the time, but the American people were told by Reagan and others they were very threatening. Critics said the Soviet Union was using détente and SALT as a cover while preparing to fight and win a nuclear war. Hawkish defense officials and scholars who made this argument took part in a famous intelligence experiment in 1976, known as the "Team B" process, in which a group of outsiders was asked to review the raw intelligence and come up with an alternative view of Soviet intentions—that is, alternative from the regular annual analysis of Team A. The report of Team B was secret at the time, but has since been made public. It said the Soviets were determined to build a nuclear war-fighting machine.¹ Many of the members of Team B then created a group called the Committee on the President Danger to campaign against the SALT II treaty, which President Carter and Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev signed in 1979. Reagan joined criticism of SALT II and the committee members went to work for his administration after the 1980 campaign, in which he defeated Carter. Harvard Professor Richard Pipes was the leader of Team B, and also author of key phrases cited above in the Westminster speech Reagan gave as president.²

When he ran for president in 1980, Reagan remained largely silent on the issue of nuclear deterrence. He had deeply held views but he did not talk about them. In truth, Reagan found the idea of MAD abhorrent. For a number of reasons, he did not believe in this core theory of the nuclear age. According to biographer Lou Cannon, Reagan believed in the idea of Armageddon as a Biblical account of the world's final battle.³ "Reagan was guided by both extraordinary vision and by remarkable ignorance," Cannon wrote. "He was suspicious of the traditional attempt to regulate the pace of the arms race with accords and treaties that encouraged the two superpowers to improve the quality of their offensive nuclear weapons and to increase the size of their nuclear arsenals. Unlike the traditionalists, Reagan was convinced that it was necessary to reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons on both sides and eventually to get rid of them."

This side of Reagan was not evident in his first two or three years in office when he ordered a large U.S. military buildup. Reagan's beliefs had their foundation not in some arcane military theory but in the triumph of capitalism, as he had articulated in the London speech. As his advisor Martin Anderson put it, Reagan was confident that "the productive power of the United States economy was vastly superior to the Soviet economy, that if we began a drive to update the power and scope of our military forces, the Soviets would not be able to keep pace."

The 1981 assassination attempt delayed formulation of Reagan's foreign policy. But he approved early efforts to intensify the Cold War competition with the Soviet Union. Among

many different policies – including the military buildup, and the covert campaign to aid the mujahedin in Afghanistan – Reagan approved a CIA plan to sabotage the Soviet economy through transfers of technology that contained hidden malfunctions. The United States had learned from the French of a massive effort by the KGB to steal technology from abroad. This information had come from an agent the French named “Farewell,” who was Colonel Vladimir Vetrov, a 53-year-old engineer assigned to evaluate intelligence collected on Western technology through the KGB. Using a shopping list of technology which they had obtained from Vetrov, the Americans then leaked sensitive items to be sold to the Soviet Union through third parties. This included software to run the pumps, turbines and valves of the Soviet natural gas pipeline to Europe. According to Thomas C. Reed, a former secretary of the Air Force, the software “was programmed to go haywire, after a decent interval, to reset pump speeds and valve settings to produce pressures far beyond those acceptable to pipeline joints and welds.” He added, “The result was the most monumental non-nuclear explosion and fire ever seen from space.”⁴

In March 1982, Reagan took part in his first nuclear war simulation. This was to examine the command-and-control of nuclear weapons. Reed was a staff member at the White House National Security Council; he had worked on command-and-control issues in the Pentagon in the 1970s. Reed found that previous presidents had not planned very well what they would do in a real nuclear crisis. The president, who was commander-in-chief, was vulnerable if the White House were attacked. “The system as I found it would have been headless within minutes of an attack,” he said. In late February and early March 1982, the military scheduled a nuclear command post exercise, a simulation of a nuclear crisis. Reagan was briefed and the simulation was carried out over four days. Reagan did not play himself: the role of “president” fell to a stand-in. Reagan watched closely.

“The exercise itself started on a Monday morning,” Reed wrote in his memoirs. “That afternoon both the exercise and the real president came to the Situation Room to receive the threat briefing. An intelligence officer laid out the Soviet order of battle, then the warning systems began to report simulated missile launches and impact predictions. The minutes flew by until a screen in that cramped basement room began to show red dots on a map of the U.S.—simulated impacts. The first ones annihilated Washington, so this briefing was assumed to be taking place in some airborne command post over the central plains.”

“Before the President could sip his coffee, the map was a sea of red,” Reed recalled. “All the urban centers and military installations in the U.S. were gone. And then, while he looked on in stunned disbelief, he learned that the Soviet air force and the second round of missile launches were on their way in. For the next half hour more red dots wiped out the survivors and filled in the few holes in the sea of red.”

“In less than an hour President Reagan had seen the United States of American disappear,” Reed recalled, adding: “I have no doubt that on that Monday in March, Ronald Reagan came to understand exactly what a Soviet nuclear attack on the U.S. would be like. It was a sobering experience, and it undoubtedly stiffened his resolve to do something about a shield against such an attack.”

In fall 1982 and spring 1983, Reagan began to listen to ideas for a shield against ballistic missile attack. Several factors pushed him in this direction. Reagan always had a strong belief in the power of American technology. He also may have been influenced by his Hollywood experience. As an actor, he portrayed a cinematic hero, Secret Service agent Brass Bancroft, in the 1940 film *Murder in the Air*. In the movie, Bancroft stops a spy from stealing a death ray known as the “Inertia Projector” which can bring down distant enemy airplanes.⁵ Reagan may also have been influenced by the suggestion of nuclear scientist Edward Teller that a laser could be used to shoot down incoming missiles.

Reagan also faced very real political challenges in 1982. Congress was balking at deployment plans for the MX missile. Reagan had come to office believing the United States faced a “window of vulnerability” to Soviet missiles—and he had pushed ahead a major defense buildup and modernization. But the political difficulties facing the MX led some advisors, and Reagan him-



self, to look for other options. At a meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on February 11, 1983, the subject turned to the feasibility of missile defense. Although this was not the only response to the MX deadlock, Reagan seized on it. On March 23, 1983, he announced plans to accelerated research into missile defenses.

Reagan paid homage in the speech to deterrence. "This approach to stability through offensive threat has worked," he declared. "We and our allies have succeeded in preventing nuclear war for more than three decades." But Reagan said that in recent months, he and his advisors and the Joint Chiefs of Staff "have underscored the necessity to break out of a future that relies solely on offensive retaliation for our security." Reagan added, "Over the course of these discussions, I have become more and more deeply convinced that the human spirit must be capable of rising above dealing with other nations and human beings by threatening their existence."⁶

Reagan was an idealist, and let some of his idealism shine through in this address, which was largely devoted to military spending. "Wouldn't it be better to save lives than to avenge them?" he asked. "Let me share with you a vision of the future which offers hope. It is that we embark on a program to counter the awesome Soviet missile threat with measures that are defensive. Let us turn to the very strengths in technology that spawned our great industrial base, and that have given us the quality of life we enjoy today."

He then asked: "What if free people could live secure in the knowledge that their security did not rest upon the threat of instant U.S. retaliation to deter a Soviet attack, that we could intercept and destroy strategic ballistic missiles before they reached our own soil or that of our allies?" He summoned "the scientific community in our country, those who gave us nuclear weapons, to turn their great talents now to the cause of mankind and world peace, to give us the means of rendering these nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete."

At the same time that Reagan was launching the missile defense idea, another challenge to the Soviet Union came in the Pacific Ocean. The United States had been staging psychological operations against the Soviet military and intelligence. In April-May 1983, the U.S. Pacific Fleet held its largest exercises to date in the northwest Pacific. Forty ships, including three aircraft battle groups, participated in an exercise that was one of the largest ever attempted. Among the carriers was the *U.S.S. Enterprise*. At one point the fleet sailed within 450 miles of the Kamchatka peninsula and Petropavlovsk, the only Soviet naval base with direct access to the open seas. U.S. attack submarines and antisubmarine aircraft conducted operations in protected areas—"bastions"—where the Soviet Navy had stationed ballistic missile submarines. U.S. aircraft from the carriers *Midway* and *Enterprise* carried out a simulated bombing run over a military installation on the small Soviet-occupied island of Zelenny in the Kuril Islands.⁷

These operations would have been alarming to Soviet leaders in any event, but there was an additional twist. Unbeknownst to the United States at the time, a spy ring was giving away secrets from the U.S. Navy. John Walker was the organizer, and his friend Jerry Whitworth was his chief collection agent. Whitworth was stationed on the *Enterprise* during the Pacific fleet exercise, formally known as Fleet Exercise 83-1. Although it is not known how much information reached Moscow, it is possible that the Soviet leadership was received precise messages from one of the most sensitive exercises of the Cold War. According to a 1986 Senate Intelligence Committee report, Whitworth had access to top-secret intelligence information on the *Enterprise* and passed it to the Soviets through Walker. Whitworth "provided the Soviets with a full year of operational message traffic from the U.S.S. *Enterprise*, including TOP SECRET information. He also compromised the operations order for Fleet Exercise 83-1, a unique exercise near the Soviet coast by three carrier battle groups." According to the Senate report, these leaks permitted the Soviets to gauge the true capabilities of the U.S. Navy.⁸ While the precise nature of the information Walker and Whitworth betrayed is not known, it may well have increased a sense of tension and paranoia in Moscow about American intentions.

The risk of misunderstanding and miscalculation was real.

ANDROPOV

Brezhnev died in November 1982, and within a matter of months his successor, Yury Andropov, was ill. Only three months after becoming General Secretary, Andropov had to undergo dialysis for kidney failure. Of his 15 months in power, half his time was spent in the hospital. During a working holiday in February 1983, Andropov's health suffered a sharp decline. "He had had kidney trouble all his life, and now it seemed his kidneys had given up altogether," wrote Russian historian Dmitry Volkogonov.⁹ By summer 1983, "Andropov's health was giving rise to serious concern," he added. "Painful sores appeared on his body, and signs of general debility increased... On his now irregular appearances at work, Andropov could manage to climb the few steps to the lift only with great difficulty. He was greatly embarrassed when his bodyguards or others helped him, and did not want people to know about his deteriorating condition." That summer, Andropov's colleagues had an elevator installed in the Lenin Mausoleum so he would not have to endure the stress of walking up the steps 3.5 meters.

Andropov's paranoia about a nuclear missile attack led to the establishment of Operation RYAN, or *Raketno-Yadernoye Napadenie* (Nuclear Missile Attack). This operation was launched when Andropov was still head of the KGB in 1981, Brezhnev's last year. The operation stemmed from concerns about the Reagan administration's sharp rhetoric aimed at Moscow. In May 1981, Brezhnev denounced Reagan's policies in a secret address to a major KGB conference in Moscow. At the same session, Andropov delivered a more dramatic address, saying that the new U.S. administration was actively preparing for nuclear war.

"To the astonishment of most of his audience, Andropov then announced that by a decision of the Politburo, the KGB and GRU were for the first time to cooperate in a worldwide intelligence operation codenamed RYAN," according to the British intelligence historian Christopher Andrew and former KGB agent Oleg Gordievsky.¹⁰ The GRU was responsible for monitoring any Western military preparations for a first-strike on the Soviet Union, while the KGB's task was to look for advance warning of a decision by the United States and its NATO allies to launch such an attack. The instructions went out to KGB residencies in November, 1981. According to Andrews and Gordievsky, the agents in the field viewed these instructions with some skepticism. They were less alarmed than the KGB headquarters about the risks of nuclear war. However, none were willing to challenge the Center's assessment. "RYAN created a vicious circle of intelligence collections and assessment. Residencies were, in effect, required to report alarming information even if they themselves were skeptical of it. The Center was duly alarmed by what they reported and demanded more."

In February 1983, just as Reagan was discussing the Strategic Defense Initiative with his advisors, the KGB sent residents new and detailed instructions which reflected the Center's belief in the steadily increasing nuclear threat. The instructions were dated February 17 and began by saying, "In view of the growing urgency of the task of discovering promptly any preparations by the adversary for a nuclear missile attack (RYAN) on the USSR, we are sending you a permanently operative assignment and a briefing on this question."

According to Andrews and Gordievsky, the first part of the assignment laid down seven tasks with time limits for collecting intelligence on likely indicators of preparations for nuclear attack, ranging from increases in the price paid to blood donors to heightened activity by western intelligence and security services. (The KGB had failed to grasp, however, that British blood donors are unpaid.) While many of the instructions were somewhat conventional, they also reflected the Center's "sometimes bizarre conspiracy theories about the clerical and capitalist components of Western imperialism. It suspected that Church leaders and heads of major banks might have been informed of plans for a nuclear first strike, and ordered Residencies to investigate."

The instructions also took note of the deployment of Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles in Europe by the United States and its NATO allies, a response to the Soviet deployment of SS-20 "Pioneer" missiles aimed at Europe in the late 1970s. The arrival of the Pershings was especially worrisome to Moscow. According to the KGB briefing, the Pershings



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might be able to reach Moscow in a very short time, four to six minutes, which would not be sufficient for Kremlin leaders to reach their underground bunkers. This may have been an overestimate, but the Pershings did have a high degree of accuracy: they could hit a circle error probable (CEP) of 100 feet at a range up to 1,000 miles, and they flew at 6,092 miles per hour. The missiles carried a single warhead with variable yield between five and 50 kilotons.

According to Volkogonov, Andropov was consumed with the issue of the Pershing II missiles, the first battery of which were to be deployed in Germany in December 1983. "In 1983, Andropov devoted practically all of his limited time to this issue," he said. "Wholesale efforts were made to mobilize world opinion against the American move, and the Socialist and Communist Parties of Western Europe were exploited to this end."

The Kremlin's fear of the Pershing II missiles and the search for intelligence about a possible attack also extended to East Germany. The KGB assigned a major role to East German intelligence under Markus Wolf. By the early 1980s, Wolf said in his memoirs, "our Soviet partners had become obsessed with the danger of a nuclear missile attack."¹¹ He said, "Like most intelligence people, I found these war games a burdensome waste of time, but these orders were no more open to discussion than other orders from above." According to a monograph published by the CIA, Wolf created a special staff and built a round-the-clock situation center with a special link to Moscow; the center was dedicated to monitoring a "catalogue" of political and military indicators of an impending U.S. attack. The East Germans ordered construction of underground bunkers for top political, military and intelligence officials.

Andropov was also deeply worried about Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). Four days after Reagan's announcement, Andropov told *Pravda* that the United States was preparing a first strike attack on the Soviet Union and he asserted that Reagan was "inventing new plans on how to unleash a nuclear war in the best way, with the hope of winning it." Andropov's harsh reaction was unprecedented. He accused Reagan of "deliberately lying" about Soviet military power to justify SDI, and he denounced the potential missile shield as a "bid to disarm the Soviet Union in the face of the U.S. nuclear threat." The CIA predicted later in the year that the Soviets would attempt to block Reagan's program without building one of their own.

At the core of Soviet concern about SDI was not that it would work. Most Soviet scientists had concluded long before Reagan's announcement that missile defenses were impossible, at least in the short term. However, the Soviet elite realized that the country was decades behind the West in high technology. Most Soviet mainframe computer designs were based on pirated IBM architecture. "The weakness of the consumer economy" in Soviet times "militated against PC development," said historian David Reynolds. "The PC and communications revolutions posed a double challenge to the Soviet bloc—economic and ideological."¹²

Soviet Chief of the General Staff Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, speaking to American journalist Les Gelb, confided, "We cannot equal the quality of U.S. arms for a generation or two. Modern military power is based on technology, and technology is based on computers. In the U.S., small children play with computers... Here, we don't even have computers in every office of the defense ministry. And for reasons you know well, we cannot make computers widely available in our society. We will never be able to catch up with you in modern arms until we have an economic revolution. And the question is whether we can have an economic revolution without a political revolution."¹³

In summer 1983, tensions deepened. On June 16, Andropov told the Central Committee that there had been an "unprecedented sharpening of the struggle" between east and west. "The threat of nuclear war overhanging mankind causes one to reappraise the principal goals of the activities of the entire Communist movement." On August 11, yet another dispatch from the Center urged KGB agents to focus counterintelligence on any decision being made by the west for a nuclear missile strike. The directive wanted information about any sudden increase in spying by the west, which was seen as an indicator of preparations for an attack.

FLIGHT 007

On September 1, 1983, Andropov was informed at his residence in the outskirts of Moscow that a U.S. warplane had been shot down over the southern half of Sakhalin Island. Then, at the Kremlin, he chaired his last Politburo meeting. Just before the meeting, Ustinov approached Andropov and told him, "A plane's been shot down. It turned out not to be American, but South Korean, and a civil aircraft, at that. We'll find out more and report in greater detail."

According to Volkogonov, Andropov clearly had other sources of information, and replied, "Fine. But I was told there'd been a spy plane above Kamchatka. I'm flying to the Crimea later today after the meeting. I must have a rest and get some treatment. As for the plane, you sort it out." After the three-hour meeting, Andropov went on holiday to Simferopol.

The shoot-down came at 3:26 a.m. local time on September 1, when a Soviet Su-15 fired two air-to-air missiles at the Boeing 747 jet, Korean Airlines Flight 007, which had strayed off course en route to Seoul. The plane was carrying 269 crew members and passengers. The Soviets had been tracking the plane for over an hour. The radio transmissions with the pilot were picked up by U.S. and Japanese intercepts.

The United States denounced the shoot-down as deliberate mass murder. Reagan called it "an act of barbarism, born of a society which wantonly disregards individual rights and the value of human life and seeks constantly to expand and dominate other nations."

In fact, after about two days, U.S. intelligence concluded that the Soviets probably did not know they were attacking a civilian airliner. This was acknowledged in 1988 by a State Department official, J. Edward Fox, who wrote in a letter to Congress that "we had concluded by the second day that the Soviets thought they were pursuing a U.S. reconnaissance aircraft throughout most, if not all, of the over flight." He added that "the bottom line is that the Soviets, through their own ineptitude, probably were not certain what type of aircraft they were shooting down." The Soviet air defenses in the region had been on high alert "and in a state of anxiety" after the Pacific Fleet exercises in the spring, according to the CIA, which said "the local Soviet air defense commander appears to have made a serious but honest mistake."¹⁴ According to Andrew and Gordievsky, eight of the 11 air defense tracking stations on the Kamchatka Peninsula and Sakhalin Island were not functioning properly.¹⁵

The Soviet reaction was to lie about the events and cover it up. Moscow did not acknowledge the incident until September 6 and delayed an official explanation for three more days. On September 9, at a press conference, Ogarkov assured that the regional air defense unit had identified the plane as an RC-135 of the type that routinely performed intelligence operations along a similar flight path. He insisted that the plane was on an intelligence mission. "The way this incident was dealt with throws light on the mentality of the Soviet leadership," said Volkogonov. "Andropov himself was silent on the issue for more than a month... The plane's 'black box' had been found and brought to the surface. It was decided to say nothing of this, either to the world's press or to Seoul, and Soviet ships were kept in the area for another two weeks to give the impression that the fruitless search was still going on."

The U.S. strategy at the time was to use the disaster to keep the Soviets on the defensive with strong rhetoric, but to keep sanctions and other retaliatory actions to a minimum. Secretary of State George Shultz flew to Madrid to meet with Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko. Shultz raised the airliner in their private, first meeting. "The atmosphere was tense," he recalled. "He was totally unresponsive." A larger meeting which followed was "brutally confrontational," Shultz recalled. "At one point, Gromyko stood up and picked up his papers as though to leave. I think he half-expected me to urge him to sit down. On the contrary, I got up to escort him out of the room. He then sat down, and I sat down. After the meeting ended, my interpreter, Bill Krimer, told me that he had been interpreting in high-level meetings with the Soviets for 17 years and had never seen anything remotely like it."

Relations had indeed gone into a deep freeze. Reagan had seized on the shoot-down to broadly indict the Soviet system. The United States had attempted to embarrass Soviet officials and



challenge their lies. The Soviet leaders saw the episode as a provocation and believed it was a deliberate attempt to trip them up. On September 29, Andropov issued one of the most harsh condemnations ever of the United States. The Reagan administration, he said, is on “a militarist course that represents a serious threat to peace....if anyone had any illusion about the possibility of an evolution for the better in the policy of the present administration, recent events had dispelled them completely.”

FALSE ALARM

Unbeknownst to the United States, the Soviet armed forces experienced a major false alarm in the nuclear missile attack warning system on September 26, 1983 at the top-secret early warning station Serpukhov-15 south of Moscow. The station monitored satellites which in turn watched for signs of a missile attack. On that night, Stanislav Petrov, deputy chief of the department for combat algorithms, was filling in for another commander. Seven satellites in orbit above the Earth were positioned to monitor the American missile fields, usually for a period of about six hours. Each satellite was a cylinder, six feet long and five feet around, and sent streams of data to the command center. The brain of the center was the M-10, the best super-computer that existed in the Soviet Union, which analyzed the data and searched for signs of a missile attack.¹⁶

On this night, one of the satellites was reaching the highest point of its orbit, about 19,883 miles above the Earth. The satellite system was known as Oko, or “Eye,” but the spacecraft were known to Petrov by simple numbers, one through nine. The satellite approaching its apogee was No. 5. From space, it scanned the very edge of the Earth, using infrared sensors to detect a missile launch. The satellite could spot the heat given off from a rocket engine against the black background of space.

At 12:15 a.m., Petrov was startled. Across the top of the room was a thin, silent panel. Most of the time no one even noticed it. But suddenly it lit up, in blood red letters: LAUNCH. A siren blared, a fierce wake-from-the-dead wail. Petrov was jolted. On the big map with the North Pole, a light at one of the American missile bases was illuminated. Everyone froze. The electronic panels showed a missile launch. The board said: “high reliability.” This had never happened before.

The operators at the consoles on the main floor jumped up, out of their chairs. According to Petrov, they turned and looked up at him. He stood, too, so they could see him. He started to give orders. He wasn't sure what was happening. He ordered them to sit down, and start checking the system. He had to know whether this was real, or a glitch. The full check would take 10 minutes. But if this was a missile attack, they could not wait 10 minutes to find out. As they scrambled, Petrov scrutinized the monitors in front of him. If there was a missile, sooner or later they would see it. What trajectory? There was no sign of it. Petrov ran through the possibilities in his mind. If just one missile, could it be an accidental or unauthorized launch? He concluded it was not likely. He knew of all the locks and precautions, and just one person could not launch a missile. Even the idea of two officers conspiring to launch a missile seemed impossible. And if one missile was launched, he thought, what did that mean? This is not the way to start a nuclear war. For many years, he had been trained that a nuclear war would start only with a massive strike. He said it again, to himself: this is not the way to start a nuclear war.

He had a microphone in one hand, part of the intercom system to the main floor. With the other hand, he picked up the telephone to call his superiors, who ran the larger early warning system, which also included ground-based radars. Petrov had to reach his own conclusion quickly; the supervisors would want to know what was happening. He was not through with his own checks, but he could not wait. He told the duty officer, in a clipped tone: “I am reporting to you: this is a false alarm.” He didn't know for sure. He only had a gut instinct. “Got it,” the officer replied. Petrov was relieved; the officer did not ask him why.

Two minutes after the first alert, and just after he had declared the alert a false alarm, with the phone still in his hand, the duty officer still on the line, Petrov was jolted again. The panel flashed: Another missile launched! Then a third, a fourth, and a fifth. Now, the system had gone into overdrive. The additional signals had triggered a new warning. The blood-red letters on the panel began to flash: MISSILE ATTACK, and an electronic blip was sent automatically to the higher levels of the military. Petrov was frightened. His legs felt paralyzed; the cushioned arm chair had turned into a hot frying pan. He was stricken, and had to think fast.

Petrov knew the key decision-makers in a missile attack would be the General Staff. In theory, if the alarm were validated, the response would be ordered from there. The Soviet missiles would be readied, the targets fed in, the gyroscopes in the guidance systems spun up, and the silo hatches opened. The Soviet leadership would be alerted. There would be so little time to make a decision, and so little time to flee.

The siren wailed. The red sign flashed. Petrov made a decision, based on his experience and his instincts. He knew the system had glitches in the past; there was no visual sighting of a missile through the telescope; the satellites were in the correct position. It was probably too early for radars to see anything, but there was nothing from the radar stations to verify an incoming missile. He told the duty officer again, "This is a false alarm." The message went up the chain.

The emergency was over. The sirens stopped. There was no nuclear missile attack. There was no retaliation.

THE DAY AFTER

A few days after the false alarm, Andropov's health took another turn for the worse. He was in the Crimea, and went for a short walk in the park. The lightly dressed general secretary had become tired and taken a breather on a granite bench in the shade. His body became thoroughly chilled, and he soon began shivering uncontrollably. Volkogonov quotes Academician Yevgeny Chazov as saying that when he examined Andropov in the morning, he found widespread inflammation, requiring surgical intervention.

"The operation was successful, but his organism was so drained of strength that the post-operative wound would not heal... His condition gradually worsened, his weakness increased, he again stopped trying to walk, but still the wound would not heal. ... Andropov began to realize that he was not going to get any better."

Chazov wrote in his memoir, "On September 30, 1983 the final countdown on Andropov's health began. From October 1983, Andropov stopped exercising direct control of the Politburo, the Central Committee and the Supreme Soviet. He stopped coming to the Kremlin."

Tensions grew still deeper with the United States. Shultz recalled, "At a long session with the president in mid-October, I told him that the absence of dialogue, even though the reasons were well understood, was causing worry both here and among the allies." Reagan said, "If things get hotter and hotter and arms control remains an issue, maybe I should go see Andropov and propose eliminating all nuclear weapons." Shultz replied, "Without an arsenal of nuclear weapons, the Soviets are not a superpower." Reagan did not go.¹⁷

In the fall, a war scare frenzy gripped both the Soviet Union and the United States. Soviet attacks on Reagan reached a fever pitch. Moscow compared him to Hitler and alleged that he had ties to the mafia. The Soviet media repeated over and over again that the danger of nuclear war was higher than at any time since World War II. Among other things, the government televised a Defense Ministry film that depicted a warmongering America bent on world domination. The film showed U.S. nuclear explosions, and various U.S. missiles interspersed with scenes of war victims, Soviet war memorials and words of Moscow's peaceful intentions.



The author Suzanne Massie recalled visiting the U.S. and Canada Institute in Moscow in late September. "I found when I got there that they were desperate; they were backed in a corner, and they were very worried."¹⁸

The fear of war had also taken hold in Europe and the United States. The nuclear freeze movement was running strong and more than 2 million people demonstrated on October 22-23. Also, ABC television was scheduled to broadcast in the United States a film titled "The Day After" about the result of a Soviet nuclear attack. The film had an impact on Reagan's thinking. He wrote in his diary for October 10, 1983: "In the morning at Camp David I ran the tape of the movie ABC is running on November 20. It's called 'The Day After' in which Lawrence, Kansas, is wiped out in a nuclear war with Russia. It is powerfully done, all \$7 million worth. It is very effective and left me greatly depressed. So far they haven't sold any of the 25 ads scheduled and I can see why... My own reaction: we have to do all we can ... to see that there is never a nuclear war."

At the White House, Jack F. Matlock of the National Security Council met October 11 with Sergey Vishnevsky, a columnist from *Pravda* whom Matlock had known from tours in Moscow. At a private lunch, Vishnevsky told Matlock, according to a memo Matlock wrote afterwards: "The state of U.S.-Soviet relations has deteriorated to a dangerous point. Many in the Soviet public are asking if war is imminent. He himself is worried and personally uncomfortable because now he must write nothing but propaganda about the U.S. rather than the more objective stories he prefers..." Vishnevsky also said Andropov's September 28 statement "was virtually unprecedented and is a reflection of the leadership's current frustration..." While the point of the warning was, in part, to prepare the Soviet people for belt-tightening in a new round of military competition, Vishnevsky said "the leadership is convinced that the Reagan administration is out to bring their system down and will give no quarter; therefore they have no choice but to hunker down and fight back."¹⁹

Several other key events came in October. Robert C. McFarlane was appointed Reagan's national security adviser, succeeding William P. Clark, and was immediately thrust into two near-simultaneous crises. On October 23, a truck laden with the equivalent of over 12,000 pounds of TNT crashed through the perimeter of the compound of U.S. Marines at the Beirut airport. The explosion killed 241 U.S. military personnel and was the largest single loss of life by the military during Reagan's term. On October 25, the United States invaded the small Caribbean island of Grenada to oust a Marxist regime there.

Sometime in this month, Reagan also received a top-secret summary of the Operation RYAN materials that had been provided by Gordievsky to the British. The materials were considered so sensitive that they were brought by hand by CIA director William Casey directly to the president.²⁰

Also at this time, Reagan received a full briefing on the Single Integrated Operational Plan, the secret nuclear war plan of the United States, which includes a complex procedure for presidential decision-making in a crisis. Reed says Reagan also received such a briefing in 1982 in conjunction with the exercise, but others have said the 1983 session was Reagan's first full briefing.

In early November 1983, the KGB grew increasingly anxious about a surprise nuclear attack. This worry may have been spurred by a major NATO nuclear command post exercise, Able Archer 83, which was planned for November 2-11. The exercise was to test the procedures for command and communications in the event of war. The exercise had been held annually, but this year there were plans to upgrade it and bring in President Reagan and Vice President Bush, as well as the Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to make the rehearsal seem more realistic.

Able Archer was to focus on an attack in Europe and included a practice drill to take NATO forces through a full-scale simulated release of nuclear weapons. On November 5, the KGB Center in Moscow sent to residencies an inquiry about "regarding possible operations by the USA and its allies on British territory" in preparation for a surprise attack. The attached instruc-

tions insisted that the residencies watch for any signs of nuclear attack decision-making, such as unusual activity at the prime minister's residence at 10 Downing Street, or changes in the work schedule at the British Defense Ministry. The KGB Center implored the residencies, "Surprise is the key element in the main adversary's plans and preparations for war in today's conditions. As a result it can be assumed that the period of time from the moment when the preliminary decision for RYAN is taken, up to the order to deliver the strike, will be of very short duration, possibly 7-10 days."

On the same day, Politburo member Grigory Romanov spoke at the Kremlin Palace of Congresses to commemorate the October Revolution. He said, "Perhaps never before in the postwar decades has the situation been as tense as it is now.... Comrades! The international situation at present is white hot, thoroughly white hot."²¹

McFarlane, who had been national security advisor only for a few weeks, moved to downgrade the Able Archer exercise, and removed Reagan from participating. He wanted to avoid a misunderstanding with the Soviets. In the middle of Able Archer, the KGB sent a flash telegram to both KGB and GRU residencies in Western Europe, mistakenly reporting an alert at U.S. bases Europe. According to Andrew and Gordievsky, "Moscow Center suggested that possible reasons for the alert might be heightened security following the death of over 240 Marines in a Beirut bombing two weeks earlier, and forthcoming U.S. army maneuvers. But it clearly implied that an alternative explanation was the beginning of a countdown toward nuclear first strike."

Tensions lingered even after Able Archer. The first cruise missiles and Pershings arrived in Europe, and were deployed on time. The Soviet delegation walked out of the negotiations on intermediate-range missiles in Europe to protest the deployments. Reagan wrote in his diary that U.S. Ambassador to Moscow Arthur Hartman came by and confirmed "Andropov is very much out of sight these days." Shultz returned from Europe in early December, and "I found President Reagan thinking again about his desire to eliminate nuclear weapons." Shultz told two aides, "This is his instinct and his belief. The president has noticed that no one pays any attention to him in spite of the fact he speaks about this idea publicly and privately. I told the president yesterday that I would study the proposition. We owe him an answer. The president believes this is the way to go. If we disagree, we have to demonstrate why."²²

Reagan was shifting. His nuclear abolitionist views were bubbling to the surface. In his memoirs, he recalled, "Three years had taught me something surprising about the Russians: many people at the top of the Soviet hierarchy were genuinely afraid of America and Americans. Perhaps this shouldn't have surprised me, but it did. In fact, I had difficulty accepting my own conclusion at first. I'd always felt that from our deeds it must be clear to anyone that Americans were a moral people who starting at the birth of our nation had always used our power as a force for good in the world..."

"During my first years in Washington, I think many of us in the administration took it for granted that the Russians, like ourselves, considered it unthinkable that the United States would launch a first strike against them. But the more experience I had with Soviet leaders and other heads of state who knew them, the more I began to realize that many Soviet officials feared us not only as adversaries but as potential aggressors who might hurl nuclear weapons at them in a first strike; because of this, and perhaps because of a sense of insecurity and paranoia with roots reaching back to the invasions of Russia by Napoleon and Hitler, they had aimed a huge arsenal of nuclear weapons at us."

"Well, if that was the case, I was even more anxious to get a top Soviet leader in a room alone and try to convince him we had no designs on the Soviet Union and Russians had nothing to fear from us."²³

Reagan's shift became public in a speech January 19, 1984, delivered from the White House and beamed live to Western Europe. In this address, Reagan appealed for cooperation with the Soviet Union. He didn't mention communism, nor the Korean airliner, nor the evil empire. He suggested that if a hypothetical Ivan and Anya from the Soviet Union would meet a Jim and Sally from America, they would share common interests. The speech marked the turning point



for Reagan, and he never went back to the harsh rhetoric of earlier years. He was ready for change. 📁

Notes

- ¹ Donald P. Steury, ed., *Intentions and Capabilities: Estimates on Soviet Strategic Forces, 1950-1983* (Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 1996). See p. 325-429, especially "Soviet Strategic Objectives: An Alternative View, Report of Team B," p. 365.
- ² Richard Pipes, *VIXI: Memoirs of a Non-Belonger* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), is Pipes' account of these events. There are many others.
- ³ Lou Cannon, *President Reagan: The Role of a Lifetime* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991), see chapter. 13, "Focus of Evil."
- ⁴ Thomas C. Reed, *At the Abyss: An Insider's History of the Cold War* (Presidio Press, 2004). This event was also described in an article by the author February 27, 2004 in *The Washington Post*.
- ⁵ Several works have described these earlier influences on Reagan, including Cannon, and Paul Lettow, *Ronald Reagan and his Quest to Abolish Nuclear Weapons* (New York: Random House, 2005).
- ⁶ Address by the President to the Nation, The Oval Office, March 23, 1983, White House transcript.
- ⁷ Benjamin B. Fischer, "A Cold War Conundrum" (Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 1997). There are several additional sources for some of these events, including Seymour M. Hersh, *The Target is Destroyed: What Really Happened to Flight 007 and What America Knew About It* (Vintage Books, 1987).
- ⁸ *Meeting the Espionage Challenge: A Review of United States Counterintelligence and Security Programs* (Washington, DC: Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence, United States Senate, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986).
- ⁹ Dmitri Volkogonov, *Autopsy for An Empire* (Free Press, 1998).
- ¹⁰ Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, *Comrade Kryuchkov's Instructions: Top Secret Files on KGB Foreign Operations, 1975-1985* (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1993).
- ¹¹ Fischer, "Conundrum."
- ¹² David Reynolds, *One World Divisible* (W.W. Norton, 2000). See Chapter 14.
- ¹³ As quoted in Fischer, "Conundrum"
- ¹⁴ See Fischer, "Conundrum," Hersh, *The Target is Destroyed*, and for the Fox letter, *New York Times*, January 13, 1988, page 9.
- ¹⁵ Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky, *KGB: The Inside Story* (Harper Collins, 1990), p. 594
- ¹⁶ Interview with Stanislav Petrov, January 2006.
- ¹⁷ George P. Shultz, *Turmoil and Triumph: My Years As Secretary of State* (Charles Scribners Sons, 1993), p. 372.
- ¹⁸ Deborah Hart Strober and Gerald S. Strober, *The Reagan Presidency: An Oral History of the Era*, see comments of Suzanne Massie, p. 224-225.
- ¹⁹ Matlock's memo to file, accessed at the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library.
- ²⁰ Information provided by confidential source in intelligence.
- ²¹ Beth A. Fischer, *The Reagan Reversal: Foreign Policy and the End of the Cold War* (University of Missouri Press, 1997).
- ²² Shultz, p. 376.
- ²³ Ronald Reagan, *An American Life* (Pocket Books, 1990).



GENERAL VANDAM, THE FORGOTTEN FOUNDER OF RUSSIAN GEOPOLITICS¹

Aleksey Vandam, *Our Situation* (St. Petersburg: A.S. Suvorin, 1912).

Aleksey Vandam, *Geopolitics and Geostrategy* (Moscow: Kuchkovo pole, 2002).

Aleksey Vandam, *Unheard Prophets of Future Wars/The Great Confrontations* (Moscow: AST, 2004).

Reviewed by Sergey Ponamarev

Today *geopolitics* and *international relations* have become high school subjects, with the higher grades often consciously studying world politics, using such terminology as *security system*, *geopolitics*, *geostrategy*, and *multipolarity*. Every newswire is filled with phrases about *strategic stability* and *unconventional challenges and threats*. *International relations* departments have appeared in practically every respected institution of higher learning. Understanding subtleties of international relations is now considered in good form. At the same time, the majority of Russians, even those interested in this subject, think of political science as a *new science*, developed in the West and existing in Russia only for the past 10-15 years. Works by Karl von Clausewitz, Helmuth von Moltke, and Alfred Thayer Mahan are considered the foundations of the science of “geopolitics,” which abroad took its first steps in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. We have, on the other hand, blissfully forgotten those who during the same time period tried to form a basis for the formulation of this future science in Russia. These people did exist and, moreover, their works did not pale in any way in comparison with that of their more illustrious Western counterparts.

One of these forgotten authors was Aleksey Vandam. Behind a strange European surname hides an officer of the General Staff of the Russian Army, a war general, a war-time intelligence operative, a hero of the Anglo-Boer War, traveler, and researcher Aleksey Efimovich Edrikhin. His life in and of itself is fascinating and could be an exemplary plot for a historical action film.

Aleksey Edrikhin was born into the large family of a retired private soldier in the Minsk region on March 17, 1867. At 17 years of age, Edrikhin volunteered to join the 120th Serpukhov Army Regiment. Curiously, when he joined the army he demonstrated the lowest acceptable level of education, equivalent to less than four years of education, and could literally only read and count. Nevertheless, only two years later Edrikhin entered the Vilno Infantry School for the Nobility,² from which he graduated in 1888. We have very little information about the early stage of his service, but it is evident that he was constantly educating himself, striving to overcome the limits of a low social background, poverty, and the hopeless drudgery of garrison life.

In spite of all this, in 1897 Lieutenant Edrikhin (in 11 years he moved up just two ranks!) successfully passed all his exams (two of which were in foreign language) and entered the Nikolaevsky Academy of the General Staff. After two years of study, however, Lieutenant Edrikhin requested a transfer to the front of the Anglo-Boer war as a volunteer. The request was approved by Minister of War Kuropatkin himself.

It is precisely at this point in time that the career of General Staff company officer Edrikhin began to take off. It appears by all accounts that the trip to Africa was his first mission as a wartime spy. During this journey his talent for research manifested itself. He published his “Letters on Transvaal” under the alias A.E. Vandam in the newspaper *Novoye vremya*. Igor Obraztsov, in researching his biography of Edrikhin, believes that the strange surname was



chosen either in honor of a general of the Napoleonic wars, named Vandam, or one of the heroes of the Anglo-Boer war, Commandant of the Johannesburg mounted police Van Damm. Whatever the case may be, Edrikhin published all of his future works under this surname.³

Later in his career, Edrikhin worked at the Intendant Office of the General Staff, which served as a cover for Russian military intelligence, and then was sent to China as a military agent, on the eve of the Russo-Japanese war (the posting required fluency in Chinese). Edrikhin greeted World War I in the rank of a colonel of the General Staff in the Kiev military region and served throughout the war, from day one until its end, earning the rank of major general in 1917. He did not accept the revolution. However, his participation in the White movement was brief. Edrikhin emigrated in 1919. He died in 1933 in Tallinn, in a foreign country, and was laid to rest at the Russian cemetery of the St. Alexander Nevsky Cathedral.

Edrikhin may be called, without exaggeration, one of the first Russian researchers in the field of geopolitics and international military security theory. He wrote and published relatively few works: in 1912 the Suvorin publishing house in St. Petersburg printed his first book, *Our Situation*, and a year later, another one, *The Highest Form of Art. A Review of the Current International Situation in Light of Grand Strategy*. Both of these oeuvres have been recently reprinted and we would like to turn the readers' attention to them. In 2002, as part of the "Geopolitical Angle"⁴ series, a collection of Vandam's works was published under the general title *Geopolitics and Geostrategy* and in 2004 the same works were reprinted in the collection entitled *Unheard Prophets of Future Wars*. To our great regret, possibly due to the limited edition of these publications, General Edrikhin's works again failed to reach the broad reading public.

In both works, the author reveals the logic and the systematic character of state action in the international arena, dictated by their basic and constant national interests. Relying primarily on the method of the international survey, Edrikhin attempts to define the main goals and tasks for the Russian state, as well as identify the forces that try to prevent us from fulfilling our national interests. What makes his works particularly significant and thorough is the author's drive to identify the highest geopolitical laws governing international relations. Edrikhin strives to explain interdependence and confrontations between states via an evolutionary law of survival of the fittest and extinction of the weakest in the historical process:

"...just as a battle is but a fleeting single act within a war that may last for years, war itself is nothing but a brief act within a never ending struggle for survival. It follows, logically, that in order to wage this struggle for survival, a special art form is required: grand strategy and politics."⁵

As a starting point, the author takes the geographic location of a state on the world map, availability of all necessary resources, climate conditions, etc. One may essentially say that Vandam was the first among Russian authors to use geostrategic analysis in international relations.

"The people of Russia, due to their geographic location, are doomed to an isolated, poor, and consequently unsatisfactory existence. This dissatisfaction has manifested itself in the ever unflagging instinctive popular striving 'toward the sun and temperate waters,' and the latter, in its turn, has clearly determined Russia's position in the theater of life struggle [...] the Great Northern Power has [...] but one front line that faces the south and stretches all the way from the Danube estuary to Kamchatka."⁶

On this "front of the struggle for survival" Russia encountered forces whose interests stood in contradiction to the further progress of the Russian people. Edrikhin offers an analysis in *Our Situation* of the history of the Russian southern and eastern expansion over the course of four centuries. In great detail, he tells the story of the Siberian advance, of Russian settlers reaching the Pacific coast, contacts with the local population, the Russian development of Alaska, as well as about the slow and inevitable process by which we gradually lost the vital space that had been earned through great effort and sacrifice. The author arrives at a troubling conclusion:

"For a people endowed with practical sense, creative energy, and quick wit, there is something abnormal in this still continuing wandering and indecisiveness. Clearly, we have lost our way somewhere, at some point in time and have wandered so far astray that now we cannot even see the direction toward the purpose which had been destined to us by Providence."⁷

Based on the geographic and historical instinctive striving of the Russian people over 400 years, Edrikhin defines this “purpose”:

“Destiny itself started directing us toward the East. [...] Providence lit up such a powerful lighthouse on Amur that its light was visible to all of Russia, and it clearly said to us, ‘This is your path!’”⁸

Edrikhin spares no colors in describing the feats and failures of the Russian public figures who consciously or unconsciously recognized the historic direction for the Russian state: Obukhov, Poyarkov, Khabarov, Stepanov, Zinoviev, Golovin, Purtyatin, Nevelsky, Baranov, and many others. Edrikhin asserts that precisely “our situation” pushed us eastward, but the opportunity was not grasped and appreciated at the “important historic moment when the arena was yet unoccupied.”

“Having completed our Siberian advance to the coast of the Yellow Sea, Russia could have become a sea-faring power on the Pacific equal to England on the Atlantic, and turned Russians into patrons of Asia, just like the Anglo-Saxons of the United States became patrons to the American continent.”⁹

After defining the range of Russia’s national interests and making a maximally objective estimate of our state’s actions in the struggle of the theater of life, the author next goes on to describe those states whose geographic and historical situations predestined them to become our opponents. Edrikhin not only describes the motives behind the actions of those powers that oppose Russia, but also analyzes the reasons behind their victories and our defeats. Notably, the author does not try to hide his patriotic bias, but tries as best he can, at the same time, to be completely objective when characterizing historical events. General Edrikhin also realizes as a scholar that while geostrategic factors predetermined the perpetual opposition, the understandable desire to gain victories, known to any state and nation, turned Anglo-Saxons into enemies of Russian interests.

“Development of a Pacific fleet with a requisite excellent naval base in the islands of Hawaii, as Shelekhov and Baranov intently demanded, was deemed unnecessary, since the prevailing wisdom of the time was that the Great Ocean was to remain for ever a barren emptiness of no interest to anybody. After Anglo-Saxons arrived and took away our grazing pastures in the Pacific, we retreated to Kamchatka. Later, the same Anglo-Saxons arrived in China and started braking our neighbors’ doors and windows. Hearing this noise, we descended to the Amur and settling down our knapsack, seated ourselves comfortably while waiting for new events.”¹⁰

Nevertheless, in Edrikhin’s opinion, Anglo-Saxons have no more dangerous opponent than the Russian people. It is Russia who can and must prevent them from spreading their absolute domination over the globe:

“During the battle of Manila, Anglo-Saxons moving in from Southern Asia aimed their cannons over the heads of the already defeated Spaniards at the great Slavic power, thereby opening a struggle that by the mid-20th century would have to end in a triumph of the Anglo-Saxon race around the globe [...] the Anglo-Saxons’ chief opponent on their path toward world domination is the people of Russia.”¹¹

As the main conditions for the complete fulfillment of a state’s national interests in the international arena, Edrikhin points toward:

- ❑ a state’s geographic location;
- ❑ availability of strategic resources;
- ❑ a clearly defined direction of geostrategic development;
- ❑ maintaining the same political course, even when changing rulers and governments.

In the struggle for survival, which is more difficult and demanding of higher skill than war, a people are like an army whose members fight according to their own individual strategies and tactics. But the government, like a supreme commander of the people, must, first of all, carefully watch the direction taken by the people’s entrepreneurial spirit; second, having done an exhaustive and in-depth study of the war theater, define accurately which direction would best serve the interests of the state as a whole; and third, by using available resources, skillfully remove the obstacles that the people encounter on their way.¹²

Such qualities as political and strategic foresight, consistency in maintaining a political course, which Anglo-Saxon governments possess, explain, according to Edrikhin, our opponent’s



superiority over us in the struggle of the theater of life. Curiously, long before Zbigniew Brzezinski did it, Edrikhin was the first to draw parallels between drawing action plans for state actors in the international arena and a chess game.

"If only for fairness' sake, we must admit that the global conquerors and our life-long rivals, Anglo-Saxons, possess one incontestable quality: at no point in time and not in any matter has our vaunted instinct played for them the role of a virtuous Antigone. Carefully observing the life of humanity overall and appraising each event according to its affect on their own affairs, they develop in themselves, through a tireless work of the intellect, an ability to see and almost to feel across large distances and links of time. [...] in an art of life struggle, i.e. in politics, this ability offers them all the advantages possessed by a brilliant chess player over a mediocre opponent. The surface of the globe dotted with oceans, continents, and islands appears to them as a chess board, while the peoples with their thoroughly explored basic features and the spiritual qualities of their rulers – appear as live pieces and pawns that the player may then move with such calculation that the opponents, who see an independent enemy in every pawn, are lost in confusion, trying to recognize when exactly they faced a fatal move that eventually led to their loss of the game."¹³

Touching on the matter of Russia's relations with other states, Edrikhin comes to the conclusion that the strongest foundation for a partnership is, again, opposition to the expansion of Anglo-Saxon civilization. Therefore, he recognizes as our allies Germany in the West and China in the East, pointing out that, first, all three states are forced to constantly defend their right to expand their vital space; and second, that they are all three countries of "one continent" and are fated, by their geographic location, to oppose the "insular" Anglo-Saxons.

"After various experimentations with Anglo-Saxons and Americans, China may boldly state, 'it is bad to have an Anglo-Saxon as an enemy, but God forbid having him as a friend.'"¹⁴

One may dispute general Vandam's (Edrikhin's) political views and conclusions. However, what remains beyond argument is the fact that his works deserve to have been made the foundation of Russia's own understanding of geopolitical science as early as the beginning of the 20th century. It seems incredible that the author was able to predict, with such depth and precision, major historical events and processes, among them the First and Second World Wars, as well as the Cold War. Edrikhin's works have been unjustly forgotten and no longer anticipate historical events, but their methodological basis, broad spectrum, and multifaceted approach call for close scrutiny by Russian and international experts. 🐢

Notes

¹ The author would like to thank Gennady Evstafiev and Alexander Klimenko for their provision of materials for and assistance with this review.

² The "Vilenskoye yunkerskoye pekhotnoye uchilishche" in present-day Vilnius, Lithuania.

³ Igor Obraztsov, *A Forgotten Name. A.E. Vandam. Geopolitics and Geostrategy* (Moscow, 2002), p. 17.

⁴ In Russian, "Geopolitichesky rakurs."

⁵ Aleskey Vandam, "Our Situation," *Geopolitics and Geostrategy* (Moscow: Kuchkovo pole, 2002), p. 29.

⁶ *Ibid*, p. 31.

⁷ *Ibid*, p. 51.

⁸ *Ibid*, p. 75.

⁹ *Ibid*, p. 76.

¹⁰ *Ibid*, p. 51.

¹¹ *Ibid*, p. 88.

¹² *Ibid*, p. 68.

¹³ *Ibid*, p. 44.

¹⁴ *Ibid*, p. 104.



THE ROUGHNESS OF A FLAT WORLD

Thomas Friedman, *The World Is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-first Century* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005).

Reviewed by Mikhail Yakushev

The Russian translation of the 2005 bestseller by famous American journalist Thomas Friedman *The World Is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-first Century* has been just published in Russia. Its expressive name reflects the main idea of the author—on the cusp of a new millennium we are witnessing an information revolution and an economic globalization that is transforming our planet into a “flat world,” divided by national borders and marked by diverse geographical “roughness.” In this flat world, no technological obstacles will stop the free flow either of people and ideas or of goods and capital. Unlike Christopher Columbus who, according to a legend cited by the author, informed the Spanish monarch that the world was round, Thomas Friedman, in several hundred pages of captivating narrative, again and again categorically asserts, or proves using numerous examples, or simply joyfully, almost childlike, exclaims that the world is flat! And that this is great! It is great for everybody: Americans, Hindu, Chinese, people in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and everyone who has enjoys the achievements of information technology, who shares the values of the free market economy, and who has found a place in the system of the international division of labor...

Generally speaking, it would be possible to stop right here and simply to recommend reading (or re-reading) this book as an example of brilliant journalistic work on the topic of “Globalization and Its Advantages for the Modern World.” Truly, *The World is Flat* is fascinating and intellectually stimulating to read: the reader will encounter the diaries of a traveler to India and other countries. In addition, the reader will find his serious analysis of global macroeconomic processes, his fairly professional analysis of the advantages of different world views in the creation of computer software, and his interesting predictions of events on the planetary scale in the coming decades. However, *The World Is Flat* is interesting not only as an interpretation of the concept of the globalization of information. In the final analysis, there are plenty of “panegyrics” praising information technologies and the free market already (at least, no fewer that those criticizing both). Instead, it is important to concentrate on the way the author presents and proves the book’s main idea, what he has held back, and what questions have not been answered.

Thus, in Friedman’s opinion, in the “flat world” the chance for success is not determined by citizenship or residence, but level of education, talent, persistence, and the availability of information systems. This is proven, for example, by the ever increasing transfer of whole business processes, previously undertaken by U.S. citizens on U.S. territory, to India and other countries where one can take advantage of inexpensive telecommunications and the population’s high level of education. The quality of life in Bangalore, India, is gradually approaching that of California’s Silicon Valley. The author substantiates his argument nearly like a religious sermon. It is no accident that he describes 10 (exactly 10!) so-called “flatteners” (forces that “flattened the world”), from the fall of the Berlin Wall as a symbol of the “liberation from communism” to the development of outsourcing and the distribution of Internet search systems. It is not surprising that he notes the “triple convergence” of (just three!) components in the first



years of the 21st century: technology, professional training and people's psychological readiness to work, and the new availability of human resources in those countries that have only recently overcome a great "turning point" after the end of the Cold War opposition of two social systems. Also, it is not surprising that the book ends with a chapter called "11/9 versus 9/11," where the first date refers to the fall of the Berlin Wall and symbolizes "creative imagination," and the second to the events of 2001, that have already been commonly seen as a "modern apocalypse" for some time now.

In this connection, the sections of Friedman's book dedicated to geopolitics and international relations are of particular interest. Generally, the situation here too seems encouraging: as the international division of labor deepens (for example, the manufacturing of Dell computers and the expansion of the McDonald's fast food network), the reasons for interstate conflicts disappear. The exceptions, such as the antagonism between mainland China and Taiwan, only confirm the general rule. Thus, the reason why the nuclear weapons tests in Pakistan and India in 2002 did not lead to military confrontation was because of the unwillingness of the Indian authorities to bring into question India's reputation as "the central place in the system of global services." Of course, here Friedman's thoughts are only being described in the most general and simplified way (you have to read the book to familiarize oneself with his thoughts), but his approach does immediately raise some doubts. The author calls himself "a technological determinist," and the question arises, to what degree are the solutions to geopolitical problems determined by technological factors? And how important are phenomena related to economics, such as the economically justified distribution (throughout the various countries of the world) of the production of high-tech components.

It would be wrong to say that these sorts of questions have not gotten the attention of the first researcher of the "flat world." Thus, Friedman describes the realities of Islamic extremism in quite a lot of detail, along with the reasons for its existence and development. It is noteworthy that he uses the ethical/philosophical concept of "humiliation" here. The humiliation of individuals, social and religious groups (and, sometimes, whole nations), which is not always deliberate, but sometimes casual and rash, may possibly explain many negative global processes. However, the book does not expand upon this particular hypothesis in detail. Incidentally, this idea could be compared to the theory of "alienation" developed by Karl Marx in the mid-19th century, and used to analyze how the "alienation" of dozens, if not hundreds million, of inhabitants of our planet from the achievements of modern technologies influences their living conditions and the prospect of a change in these conditions. Of course, the book does not conduct such an analysis, but there is a neologism that is quite strange for the Russian-speaking reader, "Islamic Leninism," which, according to the author, makes it possible to explain the existence and destructive behavior of organizations like al Qa'ida. Of course, one can hardly assume that extremist religious organizations are closely acquainted with Lenin's work, and here again doubts arise regarding the degree to which the theoretical constructions that the author uses to explain some of the "roughness" of the "flat world" have been researched.

Is the "flat world" (not in the direct, but in the figurative sense used by Thomas Friedman) reality or illusion? If it is reality, then why is it not so for everyone? To what degree does the "flat world" correspond to the "golden billion" theory: do the two conflict, or can they be reconciled? How can the example of India as a fine inspiration to other countries, a global services center and site of offshore programming, be reconciled with the deep economic, social, and political conflicts inside that country? Does the "digital divide," which is becoming ever more real not only between different countries, but also between social groups, various generations, and regions of individual countries, threaten the movement to a "flat world?" And lastly, there is a question that is not very politically correct: if we admit that globalization currently simply reflects the present stage of the development of the international division of labor, than in what way, not from a technological, but from a socioeconomic standpoint, is this stage considerably different from the situation at the end of the 19th century? Friedman's book provides direct answers to some of these questions, but the author keeps silent on others, suggesting the reader reflect on the answers. Therefore it is not only fascinating just to read this book about the "flat world," but to study it as a full-length portrait of the first years of our millennium, that may not be entirely objective, but is at least written by an enthusiastic and sincere writer. 🐼



THE IMPORTANCE OF THE NUCLEAR WEAPONS COMPLEX SHOULD BE LEGALLY FORMALIZED

To the Editor-in-Chief,

It took many years of concerted efforts to create and perfect Russia's nuclear arsenal. Its existence, furthermore, enabled us to attain strategic parity with the United States and to ensure the peaceful existence of three generations, despite the acute international crises of the second half of the 20th century and the new century now as well.

Thus it was with particular interest that I read Alexander Saveliev's article "On the Role of Nuclear Weapons in the Provision of Russian Security in the 21st Century" in PIR Center's *Yaderny Kontrol*, No. 3, of 2005.¹ The author rightly notes that "the absence, at the present time, of large-scale, real threats to Russia that would require decisions about the application of nuclear weapons in no way frees the country's leaders from the responsibility 'not to forget about war,' including the elaboration and perfection of plans for just this situation. The widespread assertion that nuclear weapons are allegedly not 'weapons,' given that their application would unavoidably lead to universal destruction, remains just an assertion, just as does the opposite contention, that the immutable essence of this weapon is that it is an instrument for waging war and continuing policy by 'other means.'"²

I would like to remind you that in May 2006, Russian President Vladimir Putin set the basic priorities for the intermediate-term and long-term development of the nation's military, along with specific guidelines for military modernization, in order to deal with the threats and challenges that we must be ready to face. In addition to terrorism, one of the most fundamental threats is the increased military preparedness of a number of major countries and the continuing arms race that is reaching new technological levels.

At the present time we must draw attention to the threat of the introduction of nuclear weapons into space orbit, the intention of some powers to make use of low-yield nuclear weapons, and the increase in the number and intensity of local conflicts.

We cannot but worry about U.S. Defense Department expenditure trends, including the proposed allocation of \$492 billion in 2007, along with an increase in armed forces personnel of over 50,000 individuals.

Contemporary Russia does not have the wherewithal, or indeed the intention, to spend as much on defense as the United States, an amount totaling some 13.5 trillion rubles each year. But at the same time, the Russian president set the military and the defense industrial complex the task not just of ensuring strategic deterrence, but also of maintaining a sufficient capability to meet any challenge by any potential enemy. This requires not an endless increase in military expenditures but instead the achievement of intellectual superiority.



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I would like to emphasize that the Russian Federation is not the only country with strategic nuclear forces: the United States, like Russia, is undertaking the modernization and development of these forces. Therefore, much depends on our nuclear weapons designers and engineers. They are the ones who must substantially increase the quality of Russia's strategic nuclear forces and the degree to which our nuclear triad is equipped with the most modern weapons and military technology.

In my view, one of the State Duma Defense Committee's most important initiatives may prove to be legislation underpinning the special significance of the nuclear weapons complex in ensuring national security and defense. A special federal law could determine the status and the legislative basis for the activities undertaken by the nuclear weapons complex, provide for its effective operation, as well as include measures for the state support of its unique institutions, which undertake the design, production, prototype development, operation, and dismantlement of nuclear munitions, special types of nuclear weapons, and nuclear propulsion systems.

Here I have to note the contribution of the PIR Center, which for more than a decade has made influential and meaningful contributions to the analyses and practical discussions about the role of nuclear weapons and Russian nuclear centers in ensuring the defense capabilities and security of the Russian state. I am certain that the lively expert discussion of these issues that graced the pages of *Yaderny Kontrol* will be continued on the pages of its successor, *Security Index*.



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Notes

¹ Alexander Saveliev, "On the Role of Nuclear Weapons in the Provision of Russian Security in the 21st Century," *Yaderny Kontrol*, No. 3, 2005, pp. 45-54.

² *Ibid*, p. 54.



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
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ON OPTIMISM

“Optimism is the content of small men in high places.”

F. Scott Fitzgerald, “The Crack Up”

“Optimism is generally a simple and modest ideology, which as a rule makes it impossible to view the world as a whole. It is usually defined as being the opposite of pessimism; but it also never coincides with a tragic world view, which can provide a key to understanding the world’s complexities.”

Alexander Blok, “The Collapse of Humanism”

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CENTRE RUSSE D'ETUDES POLITIQUES, GENEVE

"With numerous international organizations based here, Geneva is an impressive international crossroads. No less impressive are Geneva traditions in the diplomatic and humanitarian fields. We are happy that the inauguration of the Centre russe d'études politiques in Geneva coincides with a remarkable anniversary in Swiss-Russian relations: one hundred years ago Switzerland launched its diplomatic presence in Russia."

Vladimir Orlov,
President, Centre russe d'études politiques

The goal of Centre russe d'études politiques (CREP) is the strengthening of international peace through reenergizing dialogue on international security issues between Russia and Europe, as well as Russia and Switzerland. This dialogue should involve international experts, government representatives, political scientists, university students, business executives, and media representatives.

Key areas of research include the transformation of the international security architecture; analysis of responses to new security threats and challenges; energy security; and nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

CREP is a nongovernmental, nonprofit organization incorporated in the form of an Association, with a few dozen members from Russia, Switzerland, the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Kazakhstan, among others. PIR Center has become new center's key Russian partner, and CREP, for its part, represents the PIR Center in Switzerland and Europe.

Website: **<http://www.crep.ch>**

(available in English, French, German, Italian, Russian)

For more information, please, contact info@crep.ch