




**Position of the Russian Federation
on the issues related to the Treaty
on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear
Weapons**

Moscow, 2023

Three Pillars of Treaty on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons






RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY
DOCTRINAL FRAMEWORK

The National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation (1)

- Maintaining strategic stability, strengthening peace and security along with legal foundations of international relations;
- Maintaining a sufficient level of nuclear deterrence;
- Strengthening international peace and security, preventing the use of military force in violation of the UN Charter, eliminating the preconditions for unleashing a global war and the risks of nuclear weapons use;
- Creating conditions for the fullest realization of the combat capabilities of troops (forces), development of requirements for promising formations and new means of armed struggle;


The National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation.

July 2, 2021.



The National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation (2)

- Increasing the level of anti-terrorist protection <...> of defense institutions, nuclear power, nuclear weapons, chemical, fuel and energy complexes of the country;
- Prevention and suppression of terrorist and extremist activities of organizations and individuals, attempts to commit acts of nuclear, chemical and biological terrorism;



The National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation.

July 2, 2021.

The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation

The Russian Federation shall reserve the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction against it and/or its allies, as well as in the event of aggression against the Russian Federation with the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is in jeopardy.

The decision to use nuclear weapons shall be taken by the President of the Russian Federation.

*The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation.
December 30, 2014.*



The Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (1)

The Russian Federation intends to give priority attention to: <...>

2) strengthening and developing **the system of international treaties** in the areas of strategic stability, arms control, prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery, and related goods and technologies <...>

3) strengthening and developing **international political foundations (arrangements)** for maintaining strategic stability, regimes of arms control and non-proliferation of all types of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, with mandatory comprehensive and coherent consideration of all types of weapons and factors affecting strategic stability;



УКАЗ

ПРЕЗИДЕНТА РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ

Об утверждении Концепции внешней политики Российской Федерации

В целях актуализации приоритетных направлений, целей и задач внешнеполитической деятельности Российской Федерации постановляю:

1. Утвердить прилагаемую Концепцию внешней политики Российской Федерации.
2. Признать утратившим силу Указ Президента Российской Федерации от 30 ноября 2016 г. № 640 "Об утверждении Концепции внешней политики Российской Федерации" (Собрание законодательства Российской Федерации, 2016, № 49, ст. 6886).
3. Настоящий Указ вступает в силу со дня его подписания.



Президент
Российской Федерации В.Путин

Москва, Кремль
31 марта 2023 года
№ 229



*The Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation
March 31, 2023.*

The Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (2)

- 4) preventing an arms race and precluding its transfer to **new environments, creating conditions for further phased reduction of nuclear potentials** <...>
- 9) developing cooperation in the field of **the peaceful uses of atomic energy** to meet the needs of all interested states in fuel and energy <...>
- 10) strengthening the role of **multilateral export control mechanisms** in the areas of ensuring international security and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery <...>.

*The Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation
March 31, 2023.*



УКАЗ

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


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The President of the Russian Federation Executive Order №355 of 02.06.2020 "On Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence"

The Russian Federation reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction against it and/or its allies, as well as in the event of aggression against the Russian Federation with the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is in jeopardy.

The President of the Russian Federation Executive Order N 355 of 02.06.2020 "On Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deterrence».






NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION
RUSSIA'S POSITION

Russia's Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy (1)

"Russia has consistently advocated the strengthening of the non-proliferation regime based on the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which continues to function fully and remains one of the pillars of the global architecture of international security and the non-proliferation regime. During the new NPT Review Cycle we are willing to do our utmost to reach agreed decisions on strengthening the Treaty."



Source: Statement of the delegation of the Russian Federation at the General Policy Debate of the 2023 session of the UN Disarmament Commission, New York, April 4, 2023.

Russia's Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy (2)

"Russia remains committed to the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. Resuming the nuclear disarmament process and achieving tangible results along this path require the efforts of the entire international community to build a security climate conducive to consistent progress towards a world free of nuclear weapons. Attempts to impose on nuclear-weapon states the prompt and unconditional elimination of their arsenals without taking into account current strategic realities and their legitimate security interests are clearly futile."

Source: Statement by Gennady M. Gatilov, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations Office and other International Organizations in Geneva, at the Plenary Session of the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, 24 January 2023.



Russia's Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy (3)

"We also consider it extremely important to discuss in depth the issue of granting "negative" security assurances (NSA) to non-nuclear states, which has become multidimensional due to the establishment of the trilateral partnership AUKUS, the longstanding practice of joint nuclear missions within NATO and the final consolidation of nuclear status for this military-political bloc, the overwhelming majority of its members considering themselves to be non-nuclear states".



Source: Speech by Gennady M. Gatilov, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the UN Office and other International Organizations in Geneva, at the Plenary Session of the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, January 24, 2023.

Russia's Nuclear Non-Proliferation Policy (4)

"Russia has consistently advocated strengthening the non-proliferation regime based on the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The 10th Review Conference was held in August 2022. It ended without the adoption of an outcome document. However, it is unjustified to dramatize the situation, to draw pessimistic conclusions and to speak of some sort of "NPT crisis". Irrespective of whether or not there is a final report, the Treaty remains in force. It remains one of the cornerstones of the global international security architecture and non-proliferation regime. The Conference clearly demonstrated that the States Parties are committed to the NPT and remain firmly guided by its principles".



Source: Statement by Sergey A. Ryabkov, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, at the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva, March 2, 2023.

NPT Articles I and II

Art. I

"Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices".

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty



Art. II

"Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices".

NATO Joint Nuclear Missions

" Joint NATO nuclear missions are being carried out in which non-nuclear alliance members are involved in training to practice the use of U.S. nuclear weapons against us. According to expert estimates, there are now about 200 U.S. nuclear bombs of the B61 family in the five non-nuclear NATO countries. The infrastructure for the operational deployment of these weapons, which are capable of reaching Russian territory and striking a wide range of targets, including strategic ones, is maintained. NATO member states are cooperating in joint nuclear planning. "



Source: Interview with Vladimir I. Ermakov, Director of the Non-Proliferation and Arms Control Department of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, January 27, 2022.

The DPRK and the Korean Peninsula denuclearization (1)

"We are convinced that South Korea, as well as the United States and North Korea, need to focus on normalizing bilateral relations and strengthening mutual trust, rather than trying to solve the entire complex of the subregion's long-standing problems at once and only among themselves. The latter is the task of all the states involved, which can only be accomplished by joint efforts while respecting each other's legitimate interests."



Source: Interview by Sergey Lavrov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, to the South Korean news agency Yonhap. Moscow, September 29, 2020.

The DPRK and the Korean Peninsula denuclearization (2)

"The DPRK has already taken a step in the right direction, refrained from missile launches and nuclear tests for more than a year and a half and received nothing in return, only unilateral American sanctions and persistent unwillingness to discuss those documents, including the resolution on easing the sanctions regime, which was introduced by Russia and China. The DPRK <...> on the contrary, receives only the further development of military cooperation between the United States and South Korea."



Source: Interview with Pavel V. Ilyichev, Director of the Department of International Organizations of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, RIA Novosti, Moscow, March 8, 2021.

The DPRK and the Korean Peninsula denuclearization (3)

"We would not want to speculate about the prospects for an open nuclear confrontation in Northeast Asia, since the efforts of all parties involved should be focused on avoiding it. The only reliable way not just to move away from the dangerous line, but to solve the many problems of the sub-region, including the nuclear one, would be to create a peacekeeping system. A peacekeeping system based on the principles of equality, gradualism, and simultaneity should provide security guarantees to all who need them.

Russia is ready for dialogue and is open to constructive contacts with all interested parties on the basis of joint initiatives with China, the Road Map and the Action Plan for the Comprehensive Resolution of the Korean Peninsula Problems ."



Source: Statement by Sergey A. Ryabkov, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, in an interview to RIA Novosti, Moscow, January 28, 2023.

The DPRK and the Korean Peninsula denuclearization (4)

"The return of U.S. nuclear weapons to the South of the Korean Peninsula would have particularly unpleasant consequences, which the Republic of Korea has begun to openly talk about - this step would inevitably have to be taken into account in the defense planning of Russia and, I think, China <...>. Moscow, together with Beijing, is working on a road map and an "action plan" for a comprehensive settlement of the Korean Peninsula problems."



Source: Statement by Sergey V. Lavrov at the session of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation in response to questions from the media received for the press conference on the results of Russian diplomacy in 2022, Moscow, January 30, 2023.

The DPRK and the Korean Peninsula denuclearization (5)

"The build-up of US military activity on the Korean peninsula increases the risk of a nuclear conflict in the region".

In October 2023, for the first time since 1981, the ballistic missile submarine Kentucky appeared in South Korean waters with nuclear-capable ballistic missiles



Source: interview of Oleg N. Burmistrov, Ambassador at Large of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Moscow, October 15, 2023.

Iran and the JCPOA (1)

"Regarding the situation around the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on Iran's nuclear program, our representatives are in constant contact. We believe it is important to continue efforts to preserve the nuclear deal and create conditions for the resumption of its sustainable implementation on the basis of UN Security Council resolution 2231."



Source: Statement by Russian President Vladimir V. Putin on the results of the meeting of the presidents of the countries that are guarantors of the Astana process, Tehran, July 19, 2022.

Iran and the JCPOA (2)

"The U.S. has done everything possible to push the Iranian nuclear program forward in both quantitative and qualitative terms. In this, it must be said, Washington has succeeded: the Iranians have exceeded the limits set by the JCPOA in almost all parameters and have advanced far beyond even what they had before the deal was concluded in 2015."



Source: Statement by Mikhail I. Ulyanov, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the International Organizations in Vienna, in an interview to RIA Novosti Moscow, January 31, 2023.

Iran and the JCPOA (3)

"We proceed from the fact that the agreement on its resumption was reached quite a long time ago. And now for some reason the European countries have lost their enthusiasm; the Americans, through various sources, are already stating anonymously that they have to look for something else. **I think it would be a huge mistake - to miss the chance to renew this deal.**"



Source: Statement by Sergey V. Lavrov at a press conference following his visit to New York as part of Russia's presidency of the UN Security Council, New York, April 25, 2023.

Iran and the JCPOA (4)

"I think it is not very reasonable to wait for the resumption of the JCPOA now, because in a year's time there will be elections in the United States, a new administration will come. And who knows what kind of administration it will be, Democratic or Republican? But no one can give any guarantees that this new administration will not repeat the trick of withdrawing from the agreement reached."



Source: Statement by Sergey V. Lavrov to journalists. Jakarta, July 13, 2023.

Tactical Nuclear Weapons Deployment in Belarus(1)

- March 25, 2023 – Moscow and Minsk agreed to deploy tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus **without violating** the non-proliferation regime.
- 10 carrier aircrafts have been deployed, the Iskander complex has been handed over.
- Crew training since April 3, 2023.
- Completion of the construction of a special storage facility for tactical nuclear weapons since July 1, 2023.



Tactical Nuclear Weapons Deployment in Belarus(2)

"In no way does the deployment of nuclear warheads on the territory of Belarus without transferring control over them to Minsk, as well as access to appropriate technologies, contradict the provisions of Articles I and II of the NPT."



Source: Press service of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Belarus responding to the question of the TASS agency about the deployment of Russian tactical nuclear weapons on the territory of Belarus

Minsk, March 28, 2023.

Tactical Nuclear Weapons Deployment in Belarus(3)

"We don't transfer. Neither does the US to its allies. Basically, we do everything that they have been doing for decades. They have allies in certain countries and their carriers are trained, and their crews are trained. We are going to do the same."



Source: Interview with Vladimir V. Putin for the program "Moscow. Kremlin. Putin", Moscow, March 26, 2023.

Tactical Nuclear Weapons Deployment in Belarus(3)


"By deploying tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus, we are adequately responding to the accelerated militarization of Eastern Europe and the growing military activity of the United States and NATO."




Source: Alexander G. Lukashenko, the President of Belarus, in his greeting to the participants of the XI Moscow Conference on International Security. Moscow, August 25, 2023.






NPT ARTICLE VII

Nothing in this Treaty affects the **right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.**



Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (1)



-  Nuclear weapon states
-  States with third parties' nuclear weapons deployed on their territory
-  Nuclear-weapon-free zones
-  Non-nuclear weapon states
-  Non-parties to the NPT

Source: Presentation by the Russian Ministry of Defense at the 2015 NPT Review Conference (revived as of November 2023)

Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (2)

Russia has ratified the Protocols to the Treaties on the Establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones:

- in Latin America;
- in Africa;
- in the South Pacific;
- in Central Asia.

Russia, like other nuclear Powers, has not signed the Protocol to the Treaty on the Establishment of a Nuclear-weapon-free Zone

- in Southeast Asia.

The reason for refusing to sign the Protocol is **the clause** of the Treaty, according to which the nuclear-weapon-free zone extends to exclusive economic zones.

Russia's reservations on the ratification of the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia

- The traditional reservation was made that Russia would not consider itself bound by the obligations provided in the Protocol in the event of an attack on it, its Armed Forces or other troops, its allies or the State with which it is bound by security obligations.
- Russia reserves the right not to consider itself bound by the obligations provided for by the Protocol if a State party to the Treaty allows foreign military vessels and aircraft with nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices onboard to enter its ports and land at its airfields, as well as their transit through its territory.

Source: Comment by the Department of Information and Press of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the ratification by the Russian Federation of the Protocol to the Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia. April 27, 2015.

ДОГОВОР О ЗОНЕ СВОБОДНОЙ ОТ ЯДЕРНОГО ОРУЖИЯ В ЦЕНТРАЛЬНОЙ АЗИИ

Стороны настоящего Договора,

руководствуясь Алматинской декларацией глав центральноазиатских государств, принятой 28 февраля 1997 года, Заявлением министров иностранных дел пяти государств региона, принятым в Ташкенте 15 сентября 1997 года, резолюциями и решениями Генеральной Ассамблеи Организации Объединенных Наций 52/38 S от 9 декабря 1997 года, 53/77 A от 4 декабря 1998 года, 55/33 W от 20 декабря 2000 года, 57/69 от 22 ноября 2002 года, 58/518 от 8 декабря 2003 года, 59/513 от 3 декабря 2004 года и 60/516 от 8 декабря 2005 года, озаглавленными «Создание зоны, свободной от ядерного оружия, в Центральной Азии», и Коммюнике Консультативной встречи экспертов центральноазиатских стран, государств, обладающих ядерным оружием, и Организации Объединенных Наций, принятым в Бишкеке 9 июля 1998 года,

подчеркивая необходимость продолжения систематических и последовательных усилий по сокращению ядерного оружия на глобальном уровне с конечной целью ликвидации этого оружия, а также всеобщего и полного разоружения под строгим и эффективным международным контролем и *будучи* убеждены в том, что все государства обязаны вносить вклад в достижение этой цели,

будучи убеждены в том, что зона, свободная от ядерного оружия, в Центральной Азии будет представлять собой важный шаг на пути к укреплению режима ядерного нераспространения, развитию сотрудничества в использовании ядерной энергии в мирных целях, развитию сотрудничества в экологической реабилитации территорий, пострадавших от радиоактивного заражения, и укреплению регионального и международного мира и безопасности,

считая, что зона, свободная от ядерного оружия, в Центральной Азии будет способствовать укреплению безопасности центральноазиатских государств, особенно если пять государств, обладающих ядерным оружием, которые признаны таковыми в Договоре о нераспространении ядерного оружия 1968 года (далее именуемом ДНЯО) присоединятся к предлагаемому Протоколу о гарантиях безопасности,

принимая, что в ряде регионов, включая Латинскую Америку и Карибский бассейн, большую часть Тихого океана, Юго-Восточную Азию и Африку, созданы зоны свободные от ядерного оружия, в которых обладание ядерным оружием, его разработка, производство, привнесение и развертывание, а также применение или угроза его применения запрещены, и *стремясь* распространить такой режим на всю планету на благо всего живого,

подтверждая обязательства, изложенные в ДНЯО, «Принципах и целях ядерного нераспространения и разоружения», принятых на Конференции 1995 года участников ДНЯО по рассмотрению и продлению действия Договора, и Заключительном документе Конференции 2000 года участников ДНЯО по рассмотрению действия Договора, а также принципы и цели, изложенные в Договоре о всеобъемлющем запрещении ядерных испытаний 1996 года (далее именуемом ДВЗИИ),

доставивши создать в Центральной Азии зону, свободную от ядерного оружия, и договорившись о нижеследующем:

Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Middle East (1)

"We consider the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZ) in various regions of the world as an important element of maintaining the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Our country has ratified all signed protocols to the NWFZ Treaties, providing the relevant security assurances to more than 100 NPT States Parties.

We support the early resolution of the issue of establishing a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery in the Middle East, as provided for in the resolution of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference."



Source: Statement by Vladimir I. Ermakov, Head of the Russian delegation, Director of the Department for Non-Proliferation and Arms Control of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, during the General Policy Debate in the First Committee of the 77th Session of the UNGA, New York, 4 October 2022.

Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Middle East (2)



- " We view positively the results of the three sessions of the Conference on the Creation of a Middle East Zone Free of Nuclear and Other Types of WMD and Their Means of Delivery. It is important that the states of the Middle East region are taking matters into their own hands.
- We look forward to the soonest possible inclusion of Israel in this process, as well as the United States, which was the co-author of the 1995 resolution on the WMD-free zone. We are ready to continue to assist, whenever possible, in the negotiations as an observer."



Source: Statement by Sergey A. Ryabkov, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, March 02, 2023.



NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT

RUSSIA'S POSITION

NPT ARTICLE VI

Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue **negotiations in good faith** on effective measures relating to **cessation of the nuclear arms race** at an early date and to **nuclear disarmament**, and on a **treaty on general and complete disarmament** under strict and effective international control.



Sculpture "Good conquers evil", Zurab Tsereteli. The monument was created from fragments of dismantled American and Soviet Pershing-2 and SS-20 missiles.

Russia's Nuclear Disarmament Policy

- "More generally, in our view, amid global turbulence and international political fragmentation, there is a **demand**, primarily within the NPT framework, **4 for respectful and engaged dialogue** as the only possible means of overcoming disagreements, increasing the level of trust, and finding common ground.



As for **nuclear disarmament** itself, we are convinced that **there are no shortcuts**. It is impossible to achieve real progress in this area simply by outlawing nuclear weapons.

Non-nuclear-weapon states, along with nuclear-weapon states, should contribute in deed, not in word, to the overall reduction of international tensions, the promotion of stability, and a **realistic global disarmament agenda**, especially in the implementation of Article VI in its entirety."

Source: Statement by the Deputy Head of the Delegation of the Russian Federation at the Tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Cluster I, Nuclear Disarmament)

Russia's participation in Disarmament and Arms Control Treaties



- **Multilateral Treaties:**

- Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) – 1968
- Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) – 1996

- **Bilateral Agreements (Russia-USA):**

- Treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States of America on Measures for Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START III) – 2010. February 3, 2021 – the New START treaty (until February 5, 2026).
- **Russia suspended its obligations under the New START treaty since February 28, 2023.**



Russian-American Strategic Stability Dialogue (1)

The United States is unilaterally destroying the security system. At the moment, the New START Treaty is the only arms control treaty between Russia and the United States. In March 2023 Russia has suspended its participation in it, and the treaty will expire in 2026. **At the moment, there are no prerequisites for signing new documents between Moscow and Washington.**



Russian-American Strategic Stability Dialogue (2)

New START


"I am compelled to announce today that Russia is **suspending its membership in the New START Treaty**. To reiterate, we are **not withdrawing from the Treaty**, but rather suspending our participation."

New START arms treaty

The U.S. Senate has ratified the new START treaty to reduce deployed strategic warheads by about 30 percent. The treaty must now be ratified by the Russian Duma; current stockpiles and reductions under the treaty:

Source : Vladimir V. Putin delivered his Address to the Federal Assembly, Moscow, February 21, 2023.

What's affected



*No reliable public estimates for number of warheads in Russian reserve or awaiting dismantlement

NOTE: Other nations with nuclear warheads: France (300), China (240), UK (160), Israel (80), Pakistan (70-90), India (100), North Korea (about 10)

Not affected by treaty



Treaty would also

- Revive on-the-ground arsenal inspections
- Limit missiles, bombers, launchers capable of carrying nuclear warheads

Source: Arms Control Association

Russian-American Strategic Stability Dialogue (3)

New START

- August 2022 - Russia denied US inspections of its nuclear facilities (under NEW START), stating that due to sanctions, Russian inspectors could not obtain transit visas for visits to the United States.
- January 1, 2023 - The US State Department accused Russia of violating NEW START.
- February 21, 2023 - Russian President Vladimir Putin, in a message to the Federal Assembly, announced the suspension of Russia's participation in the treaty.

‘We know that the West is directly involved in the attempts of the Kyiv regime to strike at the bases of our strategic aviation.’ *(on the reasons for the suspension of Russia's participation)*



Source: Statement by Vladimir V. Putin in his message to the Federal Assembly, Moscow, February 21, 2023

Russian-American Strategic Stability Dialogue (4)

New START

- While the Treaty is valid: Russia will continue to comply with the stipulated quantitative arms restrictions. - *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation.*
- Moscow will not take any steps towards the United States until the United States makes efforts "to achieve a general de-escalation and create conditions for the resumption of full-scale functioning" of the agreement. - *Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation.*



Sources: Official websites of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation and the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation

Russian-American Strategic Stability Dialogue (5)

"The United States proposes to put the dialog on strategic stability and arms control on a systematic basis, and to do so with no regard to everything that is going on in the world; we are not ready for this."



Source: Sergei A. Ryabkov, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, in the interview to RIA Novosti, October 25, 2023.

Russia's position on the CTBT (1)

"Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a federal law revoking Russia's ratification of the CTBT. This law puts Russia on an equal footing with the United States, which signed but did not ratify the treaty."



Source: Post on social media X (former Twitter) by Mikhail I. Ulyanov, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the International Organizations in Vienna. November 01, 2023.

Russia's position on the CTBT (2)

- "Russia can only resume nuclear testing if the U.S. conducts nuclear tests first. "
- "Russia will not stop transmitting data from monitoring radionuclide stations on its territory and receiving data from outside the country. "



Source: Sergei A. Ryabkov, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, in the interview to RIA Novosti, October 10, 2023.

Russia's position on TPNW

"Sharing our commitment to the noble task of building a world free of nuclear weapons, we continue to firmly adhere to the position that **the development of the TPNW was premature, erroneous and in fact counterproductive. This treaty does not contribute in any way to reducing the growing nuclear risks and does not bring humanity one step closer to the goal stated in it.** The approach laid down in the TPNW only leads to an increase in contradictions between nuclear and non-nuclear States. It does not take into account the military-political and military-strategic situation and runs counter to the principle that nuclear disarmament should be carried out in such a way that it leads to "an increase in the level of security for all." We do not see realistic ways to implement any practical measures on the basis of the TPNW for the direct reduction of nuclear weapons."



Source: Comment by the official representative of the Russian Foreign Ministry, Maria V. Zakharova, on the conclusion of the First Conference of the States Parties to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). 24 June 2022.

The INF Treaty and Russia's view on it

The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty ended in August 2019, after the United States and then Russia withdrew from it. At the same time, **Moscow unilaterally observed the moratorium on the deployment of the INF Treaty.**

Nowadays Russia's stance changes: "Washington continues to deploy its missiles in countries close to Russia, and they may soon be deployed in the Asia-Pacific region, including Japan. Because of the actions of the United States, **Russia may "fall back" from the moratorium on the deployment of ground-based intermediate and shorter-range missiles.**"



*Source: Vladimir I. Yermakov,
Director of the Department for
Nonproliferation and Arms Control of
the Russian Foreign, in an interview
with TASS*

Russia's Position on the Missile Defense Systems

After the US accusations against the Russian Federation that it is destroying the nuclear "stability" regime, Russia's permanent representative to the UN, Vasily A. Nebenya, stated that it was the US that completely put an end to the nuclear stability by withdrawing from a number of agreements.

In 2003, the United States unilaterally withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missiles Treaty reached with the USSR. In 2019, Washington decided to withdraw from the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty).

"If the US has forgotten it, we can recall the sequence of steps, as well as who initiated the collapse of this treaty."



Source: Statement by Russia's Permanent Representative to the UN Vasily A. Nebenya at the UN Security Council session, New York, March 31, 2023.

Russia's denunciation of the CFE Treaty

"Recent events — the requests by Helsinki and Stockholm for membership in NATO, Finland's admission to the alliance and its agreement with the United States that creates the basis for the deployment of American forces on the Finnish territory — have significantly worsened the military and political situation in Europe. In such conditions, the CFE Treaty has become a relic of the past."



Source: Sergei A. Ryabkov, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, speaking about the launch of the process of denunciation of the CFE Treaty, May 10, 2023.

Russia's New Types of Weapons(1)

"No country in the world has hypersonic weapons at all, and hypersonic weapons of continental range - even more so. We already have air-based hypersonic "Kinzhal" (Dagger) complexes in our troops, and the "Peresvet" laser combat complexes are already in the troops. "

"The Strategic Rocket Forces has begun to receive the newest, hypersonic strategic range missile system with a gliding "Avangard" cruise unit. These weapons of the future are capable of overcoming both current and prospective missile defense."



Source: Statement by Russian President Vladimir Putin at a meeting of the Board of the Ministry of Defense held at the National Defense Management Center, December 24, 2019

Russia's New Types of Weapons(2)

"When Vladimir Putin presented our new hypersonic missile and other weapons, he clearly said that the command to start working on them came exactly when the United States announced its withdrawal from the Treaty on the Limitation of Missile Defense Systems, because it was clear that if they wanted to completely isolate themselves with an "anti-missile shield", they would focus on already known types of weapons. And it is necessary to overcome this "shield" with other systems, from which there is no "antidote", or, at least, it is not expected in the near future. "



Source: Answer to questions by Sergey V. Lavrov, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, at the All-Russian Youth Educational Forum "Territory of Meanings", Moscow region, Solnechnogorsk. August 23, 2020.

Russia's New Types of Weapons (3)

Testing and use

- The Sarmat strategic missile system has successfully passed flight tests. – statement of the Commander of the Strategic Missile forces, Colonel-General S. Karakayev, November 18, 2022
- Dagger missiles are successfully used in the course of the SVO in Ukraine. "The Dagger aviation missile system has shown high efficiency and invulnerability against air defense systems deployed in Ukraine." – Statement by the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation V. V. Gerasimov, December 22, 2022
- On May 28, 2022, information appeared in TASS with reference to the Russian Defense Ministry about the test defeat of a target in the Barents Sea by a Zircon missile

Russia's New Types of Weapons (4)

"Today we have an important, if not significant, event: the frigate Admiral Gorshkov begins a long sea voyage. But there is nothing unusual here: this is a common thing, but this time the ship is equipped with the latest hypersonic missile system "Zircon", which has no analogues – this is a hypersonic sea-based system - as well as other weapons of the latest generations."



*Source:
Vladimir V.
Putin's speech
before entering
combat service
of the frigate
Admiral
Gorshkov,
Moscow,
January 4, 2023*



Russia's Initiatives Against the Deployment of Weapons in Outer Space (1)

- 2008 – The Russian-Chinese draft treaty on the prevention of the placement of weapons in outer space, the use of force or threat of force against space objects (PPWT) was submitted to the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva, which provides for a ban on the placement of weapons of any kind in outer space and on any forceful actions against space objects.
- 2014 – Russia and China updated the draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space, the Use of Force or the Threat of Force against Space Objects, taking into account the proposals of interested states.
- 2020 – at the 75th session of the UN General Assembly, Russian President Vladimir Putin proposed to conclude a legally binding agreement that would prohibit the placement of weapons in outer space.



*Source: website of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
of the Russian Federation*

Russia's Initiatives Against the Deployment of Weapons in Outer Space (2)

"Russia is taking the initiative to conclude a legally binding agreement with the participation of all the leading space powers, which would provide for a ban on the deployment of weapons in space, on the use of force or threat of force against space objects."



Source: Speech by Russian President Vladimir Putin with a video message at the plenary session of the 75th anniversary session of the United Nations General Assembly. September 22, 2020.

Russia's Initiatives Against the Deployment of Weapons in Outer Space (3)

"It is impossible to directly link the risks of placing weapons in space with Russia's special military operation on the territory of Ukraine. **There is no such direct link.** However, the fact remains that the United States and its allies will use the Ukrainian map as an additional argument in favor of implementing their military plans not only on land, at sea and in the air, but also in space. <...> They initially did not plan to take on any obligations that would limit their military space plans. **We may well assume that such plans also provide for the possibility of placing weapons in space.**"



Source: Statement by Andrey I. Belousov, the Deputy head of the Russian delegation to the Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), August 6, 2022

The Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation and Arms Control issues (1)

‘The procedure for the conclusion, execution and denunciation of international treaties is governed by the Federal law "On international treaties of the Russian Federation" of July 15, 1995’.

Paragraph 1.g of Article 15 of the Federal law No. 101 states that the treaties ‘on matters involving the defense of the Russian Federation, disarmament and international arms control, international peace and security’ shall be subject to ratification.

Source: Federal Law "On International Treaties of the Russian Federation" of July 15, 1995.

The Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation and Arms Control issues (2)

"Today, it would be right for parliaments to discuss the consequences of the deployment of American missiles in the territory of European countries. It is quite obvious that the United States has assigned them the unenviable role of countries that will be forced to take on a retaliatory nuclear strike. Do the citizens of European countries want this? Does such a role correspond to their understanding of ensuring the security of their States? It would be right not only to think about this, but also to understand that if American missiles are deployed in Poland and Romania, Europe will lose what it has been able to achieve in the framework of global security for decades.

Provoking the world to a new arms race, the United States remains true to its idea of super-superiority and complete impunity. Russia will not remain indifferent in such a situation. "

Source: Comment by Vyacheslav V. Volodin, the Chairman of the State Duma, on the situation that developed after the US withdrawal from the INF Treaty. August 23, 2019.



The Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation and Arms Control issues (3)

Leonid E. Slutsky, Chairman of the State Duma Committee on International Affairs, on the U.S. withdrawal from the INF Treaty

- The breakdown of the INF Treaty is a serious blow to strategic stability. The prospect of deploying intermediate-range and shorter-range land-based missiles in Europe, especially in Central and Eastern Europe, poses the greatest danger. The risk of a nuclear conflict "by mistake" becomes considerably higher.
- If Washington begins to deploy land-based intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles in the Asia-Pacific region, there will likely be an arms race between the United States and China, a significant portion of whose nuclear arsenal is precisely made up of INF. This will further complicate the task of maintaining control over strategic nuclear weapons and weaken the nonproliferation regime.
- However, termination of the INF Treaty does not in itself mean a critical weakening of Russia's security. A reliable nuclear deterrent is assured for years to come. Russia's latest weapons, including hypersonic weapons, guarantee the ability to destroy a potential enemy regardless of the quantitative parameters of American nuclear missiles and missile defense systems.
- In this connection, the demise' of the INF Treaty should rather be perceived as a reason to begin serious work on strengthening strategic stability in the new military-strategic conditions. These conditions should primarily include the factor of "third" nuclear powers (not only China, but also Britain and France) in the U.S.-Russian dialogue, the absence of a line between nuclear and strategic non-nuclear weapons, the growth of confrontation in Washington's policy, and the gradual withering away of nuclear arms reduction treaties.



Source: Article by Leonid E. Slutsky, "After the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: How to Ensure Strategic Stability. State Duma Committee on International Affairs", August 5, 2019.

The Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation and Arms Control issues (4)

Position of the Federation Council on Russia's Suspension of the START III Treaty

"The U.S. itself is blatantly violating START III, starting with the preamble of the treaty regarding the indivisibility of security. And it is not for Washington to accuse Russia of anything. We have not abandoned arms control, but it is the United States that has declared an all-out hybrid war on Russia and is betting on a strategic defeat for our country.

The U.S. is blatantly abusing the START III treaty by not including allegedly converted strategic offensive weapons into the caps."



Source: Statement by Leonid E. Slutsky, the Chairman of the State Duma Committee on International Affairs, January 31, 2023.

The Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation and Arms Control issues (5)

Position of the Federation Council on Russia's revocation of ratification of CTBT

"The revocation of CTBT ratification does not mean that Russia withdraws from the treaty, suspends its validity, or ceases to fulfill its obligations under the voluntary moratorium. **Russia will not conduct nuclear tests unless the United States to do so first.** However, the (so-called) 'Collective West' has already unleashed a hail of accusations against our country for undermining global nuclear security – as always, turning the situation upside down.



Source: Article by Leonid E. Slutsky, the Chairman of the State Duma Committee on International Affairs, in 'Izvestia' Newspaper October 18, 2023.

The Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation and Arms Control issues (5)

On Russia's denunciation of the CFE Treaty

"The norms of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe do not meet the new realities, our partners pay no attention to them. And Russia's withdrawal from it is absolutely the right decision.

That is why we have already suspended more than one treaty and denounced some. I think that, in fact, the entire security architecture that was created in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s is being destroyed.

The fact that they are supplying so many weapons, especially lethal ones, shows that they do not adhere to the norms of this document. On the one hand, they seem to be parties to the treaty, but on the other hand, they are supplying weapons. That is why I think that everything is



Source: Statement by Vladimir M. Dzhubarov, First Deputy Chairman of the Federation Council Committee on International Affairs, May 10, 2023



PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY

RUSSIA'S POSITION

NPT ARTICLE IV

1. Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes **without discrimination** and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.

2. All the Parties to the Treaty undertake to **facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy**. Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also co-operate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty, with due consideration for the needs of the developing areas of the world.



NPT ARTICLE III

1. Each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes **to accept safeguards, as set forth in an agreement to be negotiated and concluded with the International Atomic Energy Agency** in accordance with the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Agency's safeguards system, for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfilment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Procedures for the safeguards required by this Article shall be followed with respect to source or special fissionable material whether it is being produced, processed or used in any principal nuclear facility or is outside any such facility. The safeguards required by this Article shall be applied on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere.

3. The safeguards required by this Article shall be implemented in a manner designed to comply with Article IV of this Treaty, and to **avoid hampering the economic or technological development of the Parties** or international co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including the international exchange of nuclear material and equipment for the processing, use or production of nuclear material for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this Article and the principle of safeguarding set forth in the Preamble of the Treaty



IAEA


International Atomic Energy Agency

Atoms for Peace and Development



Russia's Policy in the Field of Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (1)

- " I would like to stress that Rosatom, as a recognized leader in the field of peaceful nuclear energy, uses the most advanced engineering solutions and technologies based on the strictest physical safety standards, sanitary and environmental requirements when building NPPs.
- Moreover, the construction of the plant and its preparation for operation are carried out in strict compliance with the IAEA rules and recommendations. Mr. Grossi, who has just attended our ceremony, said just that: he attested that the multi-level safety system envisaged at the 'Akkuyu' is one of the most modern and reliable in the world."



Source: Vladimir V. Putin in his speech at the ceremony marking the delivery of nuclear fuel to the 'Akkuyu' NPP. April 27, 2023.

Russia's Policy in the Field of Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy (2)

- Russia attaches great importance to the development of cooperation with member states of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in the peaceful use of atomic energy. This creates the necessary basis for the implementation of specific bilateral projects;
- The application of IAEA safeguards at the International Uranium Enrichment Center (IUEC) facility continues in strict accordance with the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement between Russia and the IAEA and its Additional Protocol. The Agency's secretariat annually confirms that nuclear material to which safeguards have been applied in Russia continues to be used in peaceful activities;
- Russia supports the efforts of states to introduce peaceful nuclear technology in industry, science, medicine, and agriculture.



Sources:

- *Statement of the Russian Federation delegation on nuclear non-proliferation and IAEA safeguards at the second session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Geneva, April 27, 2018.*
- *National Report of the Russian Federation to the 2020 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).*

Russia's Position on IAEA Safeguards (1)

"We support the IAEA's efforts to verify the fulfilment of the NPT States parties' non-proliferation obligations. This Agency is the only international mechanism authorized to carry out such activities. We support a stronger IAEA safeguards system that maintains its impartiality and welcome the universalization of the Additional Protocol to the IAEA Safeguards Agreement, on the understanding that accession to the Protocol is a voluntary measure."



Source: Statement by Vladimir I. Ermakov, Head of the Delegation of the Russian Federation and Director of the Department for Nonproliferation and Arms Control of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, at the General Debate in the First Committee of the 76th Session of the UN General Assembly. New York, October 6, 2021.

Russia's Position on IAEA Safeguards (2)

"We attach great importance to the IAEA safeguards system as the verification mechanism of the Treaty and consider it extremely important to ensure its objective, depoliticized and technically sound application."



Source: Vladimir Putin's statement "To the participants and guests of the Tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons" Moscow, 1 August 2022.

Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle (1)

Objectives:


- Increase non-proliferation assurances associated with the civilian nuclear fuel cycle;
- Preserve assurances of supply and services around the world could be achieved through a set of gradually introduced multilateral nuclear approaches:

Five suggested approaches (1):

1. Reinforcing **existing commercial market mechanisms** on a case-by-case basis through long-term contracts and transparent suppliers' arrangements with government backing. Examples would be: fuel leasing and fuel take-back offers, commercial offers to store and dispose of spent fuel, as well as commercial fuel banks.

2. Developing and implementing **international supply guarantees** with IAEA participation. Different models should be investigated, notably with the IAEA as guarantor of service supplies, e.g. as administrator of a fuel bank.

Source: Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Expert Group Report submitted to the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, INFCIRC/640, February 22, 2005.



Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle (2)

Five suggested approaches (2):

3. Promoting voluntary conversion of **existing facilities to MNAs**, and pursuing them as **confidence-building measures**, with the participation of NPT non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon States, and non-NPT States.

4. Creating, through voluntary agreements and contracts, **multinational, and in particular regional, MNAs for new facilities** based on joint ownership, drawing rights or co-management for front-end and back-end nuclear facilities, such as uranium enrichment; fuel reprocessing; disposal and storage of spent fuel (and combinations thereof). Integrated nuclear power parks would also serve this objective.

5. The scenario of a further expansion of nuclear energy around the world might call for the development of a **nuclear fuel cycle with stronger multilateral arrangements** – by region or by continent – and for **broader cooperation**, involving the IAEA and the international community.



Information Circular

INFCIRC/640

Date: 22 February 2005

General Distribution

Original: English

Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle:
Expert Group Report submitted
to the Director General of the
International Atomic Energy Agency

Summary

The text of the report of the independent Expert Group on Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle, commissioned by the Director General, is reproduced in this document for the information of Member States.

Source: Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Expert Group Report submitted to the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency, INFCIRC/640, February 22, 2005.

International Uranium Enrichment Center (1)

"We need to create a global infrastructure that would provide all interested States with equal access to nuclear energy, ensuring reliable compliance with the requirements of the non-proliferation regime, among which there is creating a system of international centers for the provision of nuclear fuel cycle services, including enrichment, under the supervision of the IAEA, on the basis of non-discriminatory access as a key element in the development of this new infrastructure."



Source: Statement by Vladimir V. Putin, the President of the Russian Federation, at the Plenary Session of the Interstate Council of the Eurasian Economic Community, Russian Initiative to Create a Global nuclear Energy Infrastructure. January 25, 2006.

International Uranium Enrichment Center (2)

The International Uranium Enrichment Center in Angarsk was established on September 5, 2007, in pursuance of the initiative of Russian President Vladimir Putin to create a global infrastructure that will ensure equal access of all interested parties to nuclear energy, expressed at the EurAsEC Summit on January 25, 2006. The Center was established on the basis of an Intergovernmental Agreement between Russia and Kazakhstan dated May 10, 2007, in order to ensure guaranteed supplies of enriched uranium.

Objectives

- Establishment of a network of international centers for the provision of nuclear fuel cycle services, including enrichment, under the supervision of the IAEA, on the basis of non-discriminatory access;
- Ensuring guaranteed supplies of uranium enrichment services to its shareholders through guaranteed access to the separation and sublimation capacities of all Russian enterprises;
- Strengthening the role of the IAEA in the global production of nuclear energy.



Source: IUEC Website.

International Uranium Enrichment Center (3)

- "A global security architecture has been created on the principles of the NPT, and the IUEC is a brick in this architecture. Our task is to prove that this brick is correct, solid, tightly stacked in the building. We have to show the inviolability of the principles that are inherent in the ideology of the IUEC as a center providing guaranteed services in the field of the nuclear fuel cycle - uranium enrichment - to the states as an alternative to the development of their own enrichment technologies'.
- 'Building on the foundations of the concept laid in the Russian president's initiative, we have proven that the Center operates not just as a legal entity issuing shares, but as a working mechanism. Over the past year, we have become even stronger and able to find ways to work and develop in a very difficult external environment".



Source: "We have moved into the cohort of experts". Gleb V. Efremov, the director of International Uranium Enrichment Centre, on the development of IUEC at the new stage of the organization's leadership. Yaderny Control, 12 (58), 2019.

Sources:

- Website of the President of the Russian Federation: <http://en.kremlin.ru/>
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation: <https://mid.ru/en/>
- Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation: <https://eng.mil.ru/>
 - Russian State Duma: <http://duma.gov.ru/en/>
 - Russian Council of Federation: <http://council.gov.ru/en/>
- International Atomic Energy Agency: <https://www.iaea.org/>
 - State Corporation on Nuclear Energy Rosatom: <https://www.rosatom.ru/en/index.html>
- International Uranium Enrichment Center: <https://eng.iuec.ru/>
 - PIR Center: <https://pircenter.org/en/>
- NONPROLIFERATION.WORLD: <https://pircenter.org/en/nonproliferation-world/>
 - CTBTO Map: <https://www.ctbto.org/map/>
 - United Nations: <https://www.un.org/en/>