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International Security Issues in BRICS Agenda

Overview and Policy Recommendations

Report

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The report is devoted to the issues of international security in the BRICS agenda. While its preparation, the key documents adopted by BRICS were studied. Particular emphasis was placed on the analysis of the official positions of the BRICS member states on nuclear nonproliferation, disarmament, as well as the attitudes of the BRICS members to the most burning international security issues: regional conflicts, the counter-terrorism, the Iranian nuclear program, the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, as well as cooperation in the field of nuclear energy and international information security.

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INTRODUCTION

It seems that not so long ago, BRICS was just beginning to find its mission. I remember how, at a brainstorming session in Moscow in 2008, we, experts from Russia, China, India and Brazil, tried to look into the future, but even the boldest forecasts were limited by modest models of coordination on financial and economic issues. South Africa's participation was not more than a dotted line, and even then, it was skeptical; we could not even think about the expansion of the participants list. "We are like in a Pirandello play, actors in search of an author» said Ambassador Azambuja, the Brazilian delegate".

The road will be mastered by the going. The progressive movement of the BRICS already at the initial stage made it possible to include the "Peace and International Security" basket in the spotlight. Everything that *did not separate* the BRICS participants could become a subject for discussions and, gradually, for strengthening rapprochement and mutual understanding.

Today, under the Russian Chairship, BRICS activities cover an impressive range of issues, including even very specialized ones. But economic and security issues remain the most important. And while the economic agenda is more or less obvious, BRICS cooperation in the field of security raises a whole set of thoughts and questions. Where exactly are the positions of the member countries close? Where can they successfully cooperate without harming the positive, consensual climate that has developed within the association over the years? And what, on the contrary, could become a stumbling block? And should such potential stumbling blocks be removed from the agenda in advance, or retouched, or discussed, but in this case, in what format, in order to comply with the main unspoken commandment of BRICS builders: *do no harm?*

With this report, we do not aim to provide a comprehensive answer to these burning questions. Our task is to provide food for thought by summarizing information on the dynamics of the positions of the member states and comparing these positions. And this way, through comparison, at least part of the questions may

receive a clearer and more qualified answer. And the shape of those areas will begin to emerge where the prospects for security cooperation are obvious, and where they can be hardly seen or do not exist at all.

Thus, in reviewing what is existing, we seek to look ahead. This is all the more interesting and productive because we have already taken into account the *new present* of the Group, namely its expanded membership from January 1, 2024. Each BRICS country pursues its own national interests; each has its own level of development. And this is normal. As noted by Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov in an exclusive interview for the unique *Russian Security Index* project implemented by PIR Center & MGIMO, "Today, BRICS is seen as one of the pillars of a new, more equitable world order, which is designed to give all countries equal opportunities, to free the states of the Global South and Global East from the role of obedient suppliers of cheap labor and raw materials that the West imposes on them, and to consolidate the right of all nations for preserving their identity, self-determination, independent domestic and foreign policy, and protection of traditional values".

Unity in diversity – this would be an appropriate motto for the BRICS. Take, for example, the issues of nuclear weapons and nuclear nonproliferation. BRICS originally included two official nuclear-weapon states – Russia and China; India, an unofficial member of the nuclear club since 1974, ignoring the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT); South Africa, a state that used to have nuclear weapons but, unlike the previous three, voluntarily gave them up and is now at the forefront of disarmaments; and, finally, Brazil, which aspired to nuclear weapons and seems to have subdued these aspirations over the past quarter century. But now BRICS also includes Iran, which, according to our estimates, could obtain these weapons within five years if it made a political decision to do so; as well as the *near-threshold* UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt, each of which may have its own (unrelated to the BRICS) incentives to develop nuclear weapons, as well as incentives to harshly condemn the possession of nuclear weapons by others – primarily, but not only, the states of the region.

Or what about another new BRICS member, Egypt, which is not only not a full-fledged party to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), but has not signed the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) at all? Until this year, the "Five" regularly included biological and chemical weapons issues in their final declarations. The answers to these questions remain to be discovered.

It is worth re-reading all the BRICS declarations to see to what extent the new BRICS members can (or cannot) *fit* into the agenda of the Group. We should look at the positions of the countries in the Preparatory Committee for the NPT Review Conference (of course, those who are parties to the Treaty, i.e. all of them, except India) in three baskets at once: from disarmament to non-proliferation and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. It would also be useful to look at the technical capabilities of countries in the field of military and peaceful nuclear energy. Finally, we can analyze how the BRICS countries view nuclear-weapon-free zones in terms of their own objections or agreements.

Fortunately, you won't have to look for all this separately – PIR Center has already considered everything. And not just considered, but extracted the most important things and visualized them. So, everyone can draw their own conclusions.

As Sergey Lavrov noted, BRICS is "a model of genuine multilateral diplomacy". It certainly has its disagreements, but what distinguishes BRICS from other platforms is the ability to build an equal dialog. China and India are peacefully cooperating in the search for a better future. Now there are five new members in BRICS. No doubt there will be new differences (and that is logical, given Iran, the UAE and Saudi Arabia on one side, and Egypt and Ethiopia on the other), but there will always be an opportunity for compromise. No one imposes anything on each other in BRICS, that is why it is popular with other countries. And enlargement is just a new opportunity to strengthen cooperation, where everyone can share their experience and vision.

Today there is no doubt: international security issues are of common interest to the BRICS countries; they can and should become another link and by no means a zone of division. I am sure that interaction within this basket will be the most

intensive. Now the outlines of the future big interaction in a new format are only being drawn. A new global architecture is taking shape here and now; right before our very eyes.

Vladimir Orlov

June 30, 2024

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CHAPTER I. The Role of Security Issues in BRICS Activities

Today, groups and associations centered on the idea of collective efforts to ensure security are in greater demand than ever before. Experts rightly point out that in the 21st century, the paradigm of traditional ideas about security is changing, as non-traditional threats are coming to the fore. With the emergence of ISIS, al-Qaeda and other similar groups, the threat of terrorism has reached its maximum danger; terrorists' goals have also changed. For the first time, cyberthreats and information security have been discussed. At the same time, the development and spread of drugs, money laundering for criminal purposes and other challenges have made it necessary for the international community to counter these threats.

BRICS has also paid increased attention to international security issues. Although security has not been at the core of BRICS, it has received increasing attention year after year. Analyzing the evolution of security issues in BRICS allows us to assess how the BRICS countries have expanded their approaches, found common ground and achieved practical results.

I.1 BRICS as a New Actor in International Security

There is much debate in expert and *near-academic* circles as to whether the BRICS should be perceived as any kind of visible actor in the field of security ¹. Some believe that security is not a dominant theme within BRICS, as BRICS is based on economic interaction and adaptation to current changes in international relations, but not on security coordination. Thus, in the paper by Professor M. Bratersky and Associate Professor G. Kutyrev of the Faculty of World Economy and World Politics at the National Research University Higher School of Economics, the thesis is put forward that the BRICS is designed to ensure primarily

¹ Муратшина, К. Г. Сотрудничество в сфере безопасности в рамках БРИКС: между декларативными принципами и реальными инициативами / К. Г. Муратшина // Многомерность общества: цифровой поворот в гуманитарном знании 3-й молодежный конвент: материалы международной студенческой конференции, Екатеринбург, 14–16 марта 2019 года. – Екатеринбург: Уральский федеральный университет имени первого Президента России Б.Н. Ельцина, 2019. – С. 513-517. — Текст: непосредственный.

economic security, while the SCO, whose members are Russia, India, China and Iran, is responsible for ensuring *hard security* in the sphere of traditional challenges and threats². Experts believe that there is a lack in BRICS' security mechanisms. It is noted that while in the economic sphere the BRICS countries have managed to create their own institutions (e.g., the New Development Bank) that function in conjunction with the traditional economic institutions of the global governance system, there are no similar formats in the security sphere³.

In addition, there is a question of whether it is necessary to create additional BRICS institutions to combat international challenges, such as international terrorism and drug trafficking, given that the BRICS member states are already members of regional associations that have successfully dealt with transnational security threats, such as the SCO and Mercosur⁴. In this regard, there is a possibility that the excessive *overloading* of the BRICS with international security institutions will create a problem of *overlapping* of their mechanisms, similar to NATO and the Common Security and Defense Policy of the European Union⁵. In BRICS' case, such a situation could lead to a decrease in the effectiveness of the SCO and Mercosur, as well as potential formats of interaction within the BRICS.⁶

There are other problems that impede security co-operation among the BRICS countries. For example, E. Abdenour, an expert from the Igarape Institute (Brazil), believes that the main obstacle to closer security cooperation is the very nature of the group: the BRICS is not a defense alliance and does not have the tools to coordinate *hard power*. The BRICS members are geographically far apart, making security co-operation difficult. Also complicating the prospects for BRICS security

² Bratersky, M. BRICS and the Evolving Russia-India-China Security Agenda / M. Bratersky, G. Kutyrev // *Strategic Analysis*. – 2019. – Vol. 43, No. 6. – P. 597-619. — Текст: непосредственный.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Емельянов, А. И. Современные тенденции развития интеграционных процессов в Латинской Америке / А. И. Емельянов // *Россия: тенденции и перспективы развития: Ежегодник*, Москва, 01–30 декабря 2016 года / Ответственный редактор В.И. Герасимов. Том Выпуск 12. Часть 1. – Москва: Институт научной информации по общественным наукам РАН, 2017. – С. 256-261. — Текст: непосредственный.

⁵ Hofmann, S.C. *Overlapping Institutions in the Realm of International Security: The Case of NATO and ESDP*// *Perspectives on Politics*//2009. 7(1):45-52. — Текст: непосредственный.

⁶ Несмотря на то, что в основе МЕРКОСУР преимущественно лежат вопросы экономической интеграции, в рамках данного объединения существует Договор о совместных действиях по обеспечению безопасности стран МЕРКОСУР (1998 г.), а также действует Постоянная рабочая группа по борьбе с терроризмом.

cooperation is the fact that the *Ten* is a fundamentally new geopolitical structure linking "mutually recognized centers of power"⁷. It leads not only to problems in cooperation in countering regional security challenges, but also entails different perceptions of the participating countries' own interests⁸. Thus, for Brazil, India and South Africa, the problem of *East-West confrontation* is not as acute as for Russia and China, and BRICS colleagues are seen more as tactical allies⁹. Territorial and political disputes between the BRICS countries should also be kept in mind, and with the expansion of the group, it is expected to become more complicated. China and India are sharply at odds; at the same time, Iran is perceived by Saudi Arabia and the UAE as a strategic adversary in the region¹⁰. Only recently Abu Dhabi and Riyadh restored diplomatic relations with Tehran, but diplomatic ties between Egypt and Iran have not yet been resumed.

Another group of researchers appeals to the fact that security falls into *the first* of the three baskets of the BRICS: politics and security are at the center of the group's work, followed by economics and finance, and culture and humanitarian ties¹¹. From the very beginning, BRICS has not positioned itself as a stand-alone institution of international security with its own goals and objectives in isolation from the rest of the world. Rather, the group assumed an intermediate role in order to find solutions to the most important international problems. The key place was given to the UN, which was stated in all the outcome documents of BRICS summits, including the very first joint statement of the BRIC countries in 2009, which emphasized that the UN had a central role to play in combating global challenges and threats¹². At the

⁷ Еремина, Н. В. БРИКС в решении задач безопасности: основные аспекты / Н. В. Еремина // Азимут научных исследований: экономика и управление. – 2017. – Т. 6, № 3(20). – С. 393-395. — Текст: непосредственный.

⁸ Абденур А. Могут ли страны БРИКС сотрудничать в вопросах международной безопасности? // Вестник международных организаций. 2017. Т. 12. № 3. С. 73–93. — Текст: непосредственный.

⁹ Асадов, Б. Р. Вопросы теории международного сотрудничества в сфере безопасности в рамках БРИКС / Б. Р. Асадов, В. А. Гавриленко, С. Б. Немченко // Актуальные проблемы государства и права. – 2022. – Т. 6, № 3(23). – С. 437-449. — Текст: непосредственный.

¹⁰ Кузьмин, В. А. Противостояние Саудовской Аравии и Ирана в зоне Персидского залива в конце XX - начале XXI веков / В. А. Кузьмин, Н. В. Соколов // Научный диалог. – 2017. – № 8. – С. 241-260. — Текст: непосредственный.

¹¹ О межгосударственном объединении БРИКС // МИД России: официальный сайт. – Москва, 2021. Июль, 2. – URL: <https://mid.ru/ru/detail-material-page/1767167/> (дата обращения: 06.10.2023). – Текст электронный.

¹² Joint Statement of the BRIC Countries Leaders. June 16, 2009 Yekaterinburg, Russia — Текст: непосредственный.

same time, the BRICS Declaration adopted at the end of the 2012 summit noted that "BRICS is a platform for dialogue and cooperation among countries <...> to promote peace, security and development in a multipolar, interconnected and increasingly complex globalizing world"¹³, while the 2013 Etekwini Declaration of the BRICS states that it is "desire for peace, security, development and cooperation that brought together BRICS countries".

It is also important to note that when BRICS summits raise a particular issue, the text of the final declaration invariably refers to the UN or other relevant platforms as the main venue for general discussions and adoption of internationally recognized agreements – thus BRICS does not seek to monopolize its own approaches to international security issues. For example, the BRICS countries regularly support the central role of the UN in promoting constructive dialogue on ICT security. The BRICS have consistently supported the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) as effective instruments in the field of disarmament and non-proliferation, and when referring to the need to launch multilateral negotiations on an international convention to combat acts of chemical and biological terrorism, the BRICS have consistently referred to the UN Conference on Disarmament as the most important platform in this regard.

Thus, security ideas serve as a strong basis for interaction among the BRICS countries, and the group is perceived by its members as an important player in the international arena, with a responsibility for the development of international relations. At the same time, the BRICS countries uphold inclusiveness and praise multilateral approaches.

The BRICS security agenda is also expanding: over the years, the regional conflicts and opportunities for their resolution, issues of countering terrorism and threats in the information space, space militarization, the Iranian nuclear program, denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, new challenges and threats, the creation

¹³ Delhi Declaration BRICS. March 29, 2012 New Delhi, India — Текст: непосредственный.

of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East, arms control, etc. have been discussed within BRICS.

There are specialized working groups: on anti-terrorism; on security issues in the use of information and communication technologies. High-level representatives of the BRICS countries responsible for security issues meet annually. Additionally, in 2020, the BRICS Counter-Terrorism Strategy was adopted under the Russian chairship.

It is also important that the BRICS countries are major and influential powers or aspire to such a status. As a number of experts point out, as their economic and political influence grows, they will seek a more significant position in the system of global governance - including in the sphere of international security^{14 15}.

However, this provision seems to be of little relevance to the BRICS. This group is based on the principle of equality and mutual respect, and therefore none of the BRICS countries intends to use the BRICS as a mechanism to promote exclusively its own interests. At the same time, although the BRICS should not be considered an *influential player* in the field of international security due to a number of difficulties and limitations mentioned above, the *Ten* is a *significant actor* in this area, given the presence of world and regional leaders in its ranks. The voice of the BRICS states is crucial for the formation of the international order; without the involvement of Russia, China, India, Brazil, South Africa, as well as Saudi Arabia and Iran, it is impossible to solve any important international problems.

However, it is worth assuming that the BRICS' future security activities will be based on the group's humanitarian efforts and on expert work to improve the effectiveness of addressing global challenges and threats within the framework of working groups and expert platforms.

¹⁴ O. Fioretos, J. Tallberg. Politics and theory of global governance// O. Fioretos, J. Tallberg.// International Theory// 2021. 13. URL: https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-cambridge-core/content/view/F0F84DAB9F9A441915507F4B4A3BF514/S1752971920000408a.pdf/politics_and_theory_of_global_governance.pdf. – Текст электронный.

¹⁵ Wade, R. H. Emerging World Order? From Multipolarity to Multilateralism in the G20, the World Bank, and the IMF//Wade R. H.// Politics & Society//2011. 39(3). — Текст: непосредственный.

I.2 Evolution of the Security Agenda in BRICS Activities

Security issues on the BRICS agenda have undergone significant changes and evolved over the years of the group's existence. This applies both to the attitudes of the BRICS member states towards a number of topical international issues and to the increasing number of issues under consideration within the Group.

The first BRIC summit only laid the groundwork for further co-operation. The countries shared common views on critical issues, but did not yet have a concrete plan of action. The meeting of BRIC leaders in June 2009 resulted in a joint statement with extensive language. The BRICS countries expressed their support for "political and diplomatic efforts to peacefully resolve disputes in international relations"¹⁶. Also, they strongly condemned terrorism "in all its forms and manifestations" and reiterated "that there can be no justification for any act of terrorism anywhere or for whatever reasons"¹⁷. Subsequently, the topic of terrorism was raised in all BRICS summit final documents without exception. The BRICS Counter-Terrorism Working Group was launched in 2016 and the BRICS Counter-Terrorism Strategy was adopted in 2020.

In 2011, against the backdrop of the Arab Spring, the BRICS final declaration for the first time mentioned entire regions (Middle East, North and West Africa). The BRICS Five now desired that the countries affected by the dramatic events entailed by the Arab Spring, In 2011, against the backdrop of the Arab Spring, the BRICS final declaration for the first time mentioned entire regions (Middle East, North and West Africa). The BRICS Five now wished that "the countries affected achieve peace, stability, prosperity and progress and enjoy their due standing and dignity in the world according to legitimate aspirations of their peoples".¹⁸ Also in 2011, the agenda of issues under discussion was expanded. The BRICS countries stated that they express our commitment to cooperate for strengthening international

¹⁶ Joint Statement of the BRIC Countries Leaders June 16, 2009 Yekaterinburg, Russia— Текст: непосредственный.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ Sanya Declaration BRICS April 14, 2011. Sanya, China.

information security" and "will pay special attention to combat cybercrime".¹⁹. Subsequently, information security issues – as well as terrorism, which had already entered the agenda – became an integral part of all final declarations of the BRICS summits²⁰.

In 2012, Iran's nuclear program (INF) was mentioned for the first time at the BRICS summit. In this context, the BRICS countries, while expressing concern, also recognized Iran's right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy consistent with its international obligations²¹. The BRICS countries also noted that they are in favor of resolving the issues around the INF through diplomatic means, as well as through dialogue among stakeholders, including Iran, the IAEA and the UN SC²². Subsequently, the subject of the NRC was raised in the final declarations of the 2013, 2014, 2015, 2017, 2018, 2021, 2022 and 2023 BRICS summits. In all cases, the BRICS countries have favored diplomatic resolution of disputes and controversies over the NPT and, since 2015, have expressed support for the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.

The 2013 South Africa Summit further strengthened the role of the BRICS in global governance. The final document (the Etekwini Declaration) was four times larger than the previous one and brought BRICS interaction to a new level. The BRICS had previously claimed the role of an influential player in international relations, and with each passing year the BRICS was increasingly trying to occupy an important position on the world stage by expanding its own agenda. Thus, in 2013, the so-called Action Plan – an 18-point document – appeared for the first time, which was an attempt to partially institutionalize BRICS – to fix formats and areas of cooperation, as well as to outline prospects for the future. Among the qualitatively new developments, the Etekwini Action Plan identified counter-corruption

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ It is important to note that information security was first included in the agenda of the BRICS summits in 2011. However, its mentioning has been continuous only since 2013. The BRICS summit in New Delhi (2012) did not touch upon information security issues.

²¹ Delhi Declaration BRICS. March 29, 2012. New Delhi, India— Текст: непосредственный.

²² Ibid.

cooperation among the BRICS countries as one of the new areas of cooperation to be explored.

Having assumed the role of an influential player in the international arena, the BRICS has increasingly focused on various aspects of international security, especially regional crises. In 2014, the humanitarian situation in Syria and international terrorism were in the spotlight. In the context of the Syrian crisis, the topic of chemical weapons was raised and the BRICS countries strongly condemned the use of chemical weapons under any circumstances²³. Also, for the first time, the BRICS summit outcomes included the topic of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction (WMD-free zone) in the Middle East, and *the Five* also called for the convening of a conference on a WMD-free zone in the Middle East. It also urged "called upon all states of the region to attend the Conference and to engage constructively and in a pragmatic manner with a view to advancing that goal"²⁴.

In addition to topical issues, the 2014 summit agenda included for the first time the militarization of space, a topic that had not been raised at BRICS summits before. In this regard, the BRICS countries emphasized that " negotiations for the conclusion of an international agreement or agreements to prevent an arms race in outer space remain a priority task of the Conference on Disarmament"²⁵. Also, for the first time, the drug problem was raised and countries emphasized their resolve on "countering the world drug problem <...> through an integrated, multidisciplinary, mutually reinforcing and balanced approach"²⁶.

In general, it is important to note that the 2014 summit laid the groundwork for several topics at once: for example, the issues of chemical and biological weapons, the drug problem, and the idea of preventing an arms race in space were subsequently raised at all BRICS summits without exception, and the subject of the WMD-free zone in the Middle East was discussed at the BRICS leaders' meeting at the 2015 summit.

²³Fortaleza Declaration BRICS. June 15,2014. Fortaleza, Brazil — Текст: непосредственный.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Ibid.

The continuity of the issues discussed was maintained at subsequent BRICS summits. In 2016, the BRICS agenda included another topic - terrorism using chemical and biological weapons. In this context, the BRICS countries supported multilateral negotiations on the elaboration of an international convention to combat acts of chemical and biological terrorism²⁷. Speaking of traditional terrorism, the 2016 Summit was the first time that the need to counter terrorist financing was mentioned. In this regard, participating countries called "for swift, effective and universal implementation of FATF Consolidated Strategy on Combating Terrorist Financing, including effective implementation of its operational plan"²⁸.

The BRICS continuity in security issues was maintained in all subsequent years. The issues of terrorism (including terrorism using chemical and biological weapons), information security, drug problem, prevention of space militarization, settlement of regional conflicts, etc. were firmly established on the agenda of the BRICS summits. The emergence of new topics was further conditioned by the current (at the time of the summits) situation in the world and the BRICS countries' search for solutions to emerging challenges.

In 2017, for the first time, the BRICS agenda included the nuclear issue of the Korean Peninsula, which was a logical response to the new (sixth) nuclear test conducted by the DPRK on September 3, one day before the BRICS Summit. In the Final Declaration of the 2017 Summit, the BRICS countries "strongly deplored the DPRK's nuclear test" and at the same time expressed "deep concern over the ongoing tension and prolonged nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula, and emphasize that it should only be settled through peaceful means and direct dialogue of all the parties concerned"²⁹.

Subsequently, the wording of the paragraphs of the final BRICS summits declarations on this issue was the same. They supported diplomatic efforts to resolve

²⁷ Goa Declaration BRICS. October 16, 2016. Goa, India— Текст: непосредственный.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Xiamen Declaration BRICS. September 4, 2017. Xiamen, China. – Текст: непосредственный.

problems related to the Korean Peninsula, including its complete denuclearization. Until the 2023 BRICS Summit, the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula was consistently on BRICS' agenda.

Arms control and nuclear non-proliferation issues were first on the BRICS agenda in 2020, and the reason was the looming potential crisis in strategic stability in the light of the possibility of non-renewal of the New START Treaty by the Donald Trump's administration. In this regard, the text of the 2020 Moscow Declaration noted: "We express our support for urgent political and diplomatic efforts to maintain and strengthen international peace and security"³⁰. The countries also underscored the fundamental importance of the New START Treaty and called on the parties "to agree on its extension without delay"³¹.

In the following two years, in 2021 and 2022, the BRICS final declarations contained identical language calling for "continued efforts to strengthen the system of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation treaties and agreements and to preserve its integrity for maintaining global stability and international peace and security, and stressed further the need to maintain the effectiveness and efficiency as well as the consensus-based nature of the relevant multilateral instruments in the field of disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control" ³². In 2023, only a common phrase remained which was also present in the previously mentioned declarations: "we call for the strengthening of disarmament and non-proliferation".

Thus, during 15 years of BRICS activity, its security agenda has expanded considerably. The Group has raised various topics of mutual interest not only for the member states but also for the whole world: information security, terrorism, issues of preventing an arms race in outer space, terrorism using chemical and biological weapons, regional conflicts, strategic stability, and others. The BRICS countries have developed joint cooperation mechanisms, which has made the Group an influential player in the international arena. At the same time, the BRICS countries

³⁰ Moscow Declaration BRICS. November 17, 2020. Moscow, Russia. — Текст: непосредственный.

³¹ Ibid.

³² See, for example, Delhi Declaration BRICS (September 9, 2021) or Beijing Declaration BRICS (June 23, 2022).

have never tried to monopolize any particular subject and have always advocated a multilateral approach, emphasizing the central role of the UN and other relevant platforms. The BRICS work in international security is one of the key areas of the BRICS activities. It is worth assuming that in the future the BRICS will not try to institutionalize any mechanisms for cooperation in the field of security, but will continue to strive for the development of international conventions and the involvement of the entire international community in combating challenges and threats.

Security has been a link in BRICS activities for many years, uniting member states around different issues. There is no doubt that BRICS will continue to work in this area. However, as the Group expands, it may be difficult to develop a common approach, as there are sharp contradictions between some BRICS countries, and sometimes countries have radically opposite positions.

BRICS countries' Positions on Nuclear Nonproliferation, Arms Control and Nuclear Security Issues																		
Nuclear Nonproliferation																		
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons	+	+	×	+	+	+	+	+	+	+								
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	+	●	×	●	+	●	●	+	×	+								
Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons	●	×	×	×	+	×	×	×	×	×								
Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty	+	+	+	×	●	+	+	×	×	●								
IAEA Arrangements																		
Member state of IAEA	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+								
IAEA Safeguards Agreements	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+								
IAEA Safeguards Additional Protocol	×	+	+	+	+	×	●	+	×	+								
Export Control Regimes																		
Nuclear Suppliers Group	+	+	×	+	+	×	×	×	×	×								
Zangger Committee	×	+	×	+	+	×	×	×	×	×								
Missile Technology Control Regime	+	+	+	●	+	×	×	×	×	×								
Australia Group	×	×	+	×	×	×	×	×	×	×								
Nuclear Security																		
Export Control Regimes	+	+	+	+	+	+	×	+	+	×								
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material	+	+	+	+	+	×	×	+	+	×								
International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism	+	+	+	+	+	●	×	+	+	×								
Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction																		
Chemical Weapons Convention	+	+	+	+	+	×	+	+	+	+								
Biological Weapons Convention	+	+	+	+	+	●	+	+	+	+								
Proliferation Security Initiative	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	+	+	×								
Financial Action Task Force	+	×	+	+	+	×	×	×	+	×								
<table border="0"> <tr> <td>+</td> <td>Full Country Participation (Treaty Signed and Ratified)</td> <td>●</td> <td>Partial Country Participation (Treaty Signed but NOT Ratified)</td> </tr> <tr> <td>+</td> <td>Treaty Signed and Ratified with Reservations</td> <td>×</td> <td>Country is NOT a Party to the Treaty (Treaty NOT Signed)</td> </tr> </table>											+	Full Country Participation (Treaty Signed and Ratified)	●	Partial Country Participation (Treaty Signed but NOT Ratified)	+	Treaty Signed and Ratified with Reservations	×	Country is NOT a Party to the Treaty (Treaty NOT Signed)
+	Full Country Participation (Treaty Signed and Ratified)	●	Partial Country Participation (Treaty Signed but NOT Ratified)															
+	Treaty Signed and Ratified with Reservations	×	Country is NOT a Party to the Treaty (Treaty NOT Signed)															

Table 1. BRICS countries' Positions on Nuclear Nonproliferation, Arms Control and Nuclear Security Issues

CHAPTER II. PERSPECTIVES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR BRICS IN INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

II.1 Prospects for BRICS cooperation in countering international terrorism

BRICS has traditionally paid special attention to counter-terrorism issues. Anti-terrorism issues have been included in all BRICS summit declarations since 2009, when the Group was still called BRIC. Since 2016, the BRICS summits have addressed the issue of combating acts of chemical and biological terrorism, and since 2018 these issues have been raised continuously. In addition to condemning terrorist activities per se, the *Group's* documents have time and again emphasized the importance of international cooperation in countering this threat, as well as the central role of the UN in coordinating relevant efforts.

It is important to note that, in addition to the general characterization of the terrorist threat landscape, BRICS has gradually begun to draw attention to the activities of specific anti-system actors (primarily international terrorist organizations) – relevant paragraphs include, for example, the Etekwini (2013) and Fortaleza (2014) declarations - as well as to the emergence of related challenges. The Ufa Declaration (2015), for example, contains references to the threats posed by the use of ICT tools by terrorist groups, while the Brasilia Declaration (2019) draws attention to the emergence of new schemes for the illicit financing of proscribed organizations (including the use of digital assets). However, up until 2019, the topic of terrorism was raised very carefully in the outcome documents to avoid exacerbating disagreements among participants.

At the same time, the BRICS countries' cooperation on joint counter-terrorism issues has been productive. One of the natural steps was the establishment of the BRICS Working Group on Countering Terrorism in 2016. Its key tasks were to assist in the criminal prosecution of terrorists and their financiers and to promote the development of national legislations of the Group's countries in terms of responding to the terrorist threat. The importance of developing such a format of cooperation

was repeatedly stressed in the BRICS summits' outcome documents - in particular, the Goa Declaration (2016) noted that the mechanism created within the Working Group should facilitate dialogue among the BRICS members and coordinate their efforts "address the scourge of terrorism"³³.

The problem of terrorism has become increasingly important on the BRICS agenda and, due to the complexity of the threat, required the continuous development of cooperation platforms available to the BRICS. As a result, in 2019, five specialized subgroups were established within the Anti-Terrorism Group, each of which was focused on finding solutions to a specific problem - combating the financing of terrorist activities; the use of ICT tools for terrorist purposes; the activities of foreign fighters on the territory of other countries; radicalization; and building the combined capacity of international terrorist organizations³⁴. The establishment of subgroups has made it possible to increase the efficiency of the normative work of the states of the association and has also had a positive impact on the level of mutual confidence.

Cooperation between the BRICS states entered a new stage. In addition to outlining the importance of combating the terrorist threat in general, it formulated specific steps to counter it, including improving the model of cooperation between the BRICS intelligence and law enforcement agencies in preventing and combating terrorism, as well as deepening cooperation on counter-terrorism, and countering the threat of terrorism based on the purposes and principles of the UN Charter³⁵.

The Strategy is based on the ideas of the importance of respecting national interests and ensuring transparent information exchange, which is expressed in the recognition of the fundamental role of state authorities in combating the terrorist threat and the rejection of double standards. The adoption of the Strategy also helped to outline the key priorities for the BRICS development in the coming years, the key

³³ New Deli Declaration BRICS. September 9, 2021. New Deli, India. — Текст: непосредственный.

³⁴ Ниведита, Дас Кунду. БРИКС – больше прогресса, внимания и усилий // Дискуссионный клуб «Валдай»: сайт. – Москва, 2019. – Ноябрь, 25. – URL: <https://ru.valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/briks-bolshe-progressa-vnimaniya-i-usilii/> (дата обращения: 17.10.2023). – Текст электронный.

³⁵ Антитеррористическая стратегия БРИКС // BRICS: Russia 2020: официальный сайт российского председательства в БРИКС 2020»: сайт. – Москва, 2020. – URL: <https://brics-russia2020.ru/images/114/81/1148163.pdf> (дата обращения: 17.10.2023). – Текст электронный.

of which is to strengthen the unity of the BRICS members in countering international terrorism³⁶. In the future, references to the BRICS joint activities within the framework of the Strategy were regularly cited in the outcome documents of the BRICS meetings, for example, the New Delhi Declaration (2021)³⁷.

An important basis for BRICS activities in responding to the terrorist threat is norm-setting work at the national level. It should be noted that by the mid-2010s, a significant number of BRICS countries had already adopted laws on counter-terrorism or similar legal acts.

BRICS countries that have adopted a federal law on countering terrorism (or its equivalent)		
Country	Title of the Document	Year of Adoption
Brazil ³⁸	Act No. 13,260 (Anti-Terrorism Act)	2016
Russia ³⁹	Federal Law "On Combating Terrorism" N 35-FZ	2006
India ⁴⁰	UAPA Amendment Act	2004 ⁴¹
China ⁴²	Anti-Terrorism Act	2015

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ New Delhi Declaration BRICS. September 9, 2021. New Delhi, India. — Текст: непосредственный.

³⁸ Act No. 13,260 of 16 March 2016, known as the Anti-Terrorism Act // Sherlock: сайт. – Москва, 2016. – URL: https://sherloc.unodc.org/cld/ru/legislation/bra/act_no._13260_of_16_march_2016_known_as_the_anti-terrorism_act_/article_2/brazil_anti-terrorism_act_.html (дата обращения: 18.10.2023). – Текст электронный.

³⁹ Федеральный закон "О противодействии терроризму" от 06.03.2006 N 35-ФЗ (последняя редакция) // КонсультантПлюс: сайт. – Москва, 2023. – URL: https://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_58840/ (дата обращения: 18.10.2023). – Текст электронный.

⁴⁰ Evolution of India's Anti-Terrorism Law // CLAWS: Center for Land and Warfare Studies. – New Delhi. – URL: <https://www.claws.in/evolution-of-indias-anti-terrorism-law/#:~:text=UAPA%20has%20been%20the%20primary,Act%2C%202004%20%5B1%5D> (дата обращения: 18.10.2023). — Текст: электронный.

⁴¹ Author's note: the date of adoption of the relevant part is given under UAPA.

⁴² В Китае принят первый в истории страны закон о борьбе с терроризмом // Информационное агентство ТАСС: сайт. – Москва, 2015. Декабрь, 27. – URL: <https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/2560026> (дата обращения: 17.01.2024). – Текст электронный.

South Africa ⁴³	Anti-Terrorism Bill	2002
Egypt ⁴⁴	Anti-Terrorism Law Terrorist Entities Law	2015
UAE ⁴⁵	Federal Law Number 7 on Combatting Terrorism Offences	2014
Saudi Arabia ⁴⁶	Penal Law of Crimes of Terrorism and its Financing	2014

Table 2. BRICS countries that have adopted the federal law "On Counteracting Terrorism" (or its analog). Compiled by the author.

Russia, India China, South Africa, Brazil, South Africa, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE are at an advanced level when it comes to counterterrorism. Each of these countries has a federal law "On Combating Terrorism" or its direct analog. Let's look at each of the countries in more detail.

Russia. Moscow adopted the Federal Law aimed at combating terrorism in 2006. The legal act, which is a continuation of the Federal Law "On Combating Terrorism" (1998), rethought the legal and organizational foundations of the fight against the radical-extremist threat, taking into account the experience of counter-terrorist work in the North Caucasus⁴⁷. In particular, it detailed the coordination and modalities of interaction between State authorities and civil society in the context of

⁴³ Anti-Terrorism Bill // Ministry for Safety and Security. – Cape Town. – URL: https://www.westerncape.gov.za/text/2004/2/anti-terrorism_bill_15nov02.pdf (дата обращения: 20.10.2023). – Текст электронный.

⁴⁴ В Египте вступил в силу новый закон о борьбе с терроризмом // Информационное агентство ТАСС: сайт. – Москва, 2015. Август, 17. – URL: <https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/2190402> (дата обращения: 20.10.2023). – Текст электронный.

⁴⁵ Federal Law No. (7) of 2014 Combating Terrorism Crimes // UAE Legislation. – Abu Dhabi. – URL: <https://uaelegislation.gov.ae/en/legislations/1018/download> (дата обращения: 21.10.2023). – Текст электронный.

⁴⁶ Закон о противодействии терроризму вступил в силу в Саудовской Аравии // Информационное агентство ТАСС: сайт. – Москва, 2014. Февраль, 2. – URL: <https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/932190> (дата обращения: 20.10.2023). – Текст электронный.

⁴⁷ Нормативно-правовые и иные акты в сфере противодействия терроризму // Официальный портал Правительства Ростовской области: сайт. – Ростов-на-Дону, 2023. – URL: <https://www.donland.ru/activity/1100/> (дата обращения: 25.10.2023). – Текст электронный.

counter-terrorism, established a response mechanism, cited the rights and obligations of citizens, as well as guarantees for their observance.

In addition to this *basic law*, the specialized legal framework is supplemented by the laws "On Combating Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing" (2001), "On Combating Extremist Activity" (2002), "On Security" (2010) and a number of others, which allows for the formation of an effective mechanism to respond to the threats.

Russia is successfully ensuring security within its national borders. According to the statement of the Director of the Federal Security Service of Russia Aleksandr Bortnikov, 146 terrorist attacks were prevented in Russia in 2023⁴⁸, while since the start of the Special military operation – 419⁴⁹ (as of February 14, 2024). In general, according to the Russian security services, there has been a more than tenfold decrease in the number of terrorist offenses being committed⁵⁰.

Realizing the cross-border nature of terrorism, as well as recognizing its own responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security at the global and regional levels⁵¹, The Russian Federation is making active efforts to combat terrorism at the international level. Thus, the Russian Foreign Policy Concept 2023 notes that in order to eradicate international terrorism, Russia intends to enhance "multifaceted cooperation with allies and partners in the field of anti-terrorism"⁵². The importance of using the tools of international cooperation to counter the terrorist threat is also

⁴⁸ С начала 2023 года в России предотвратили 146 терактов // «Первый канал»: сайт. – Москва – 2023. Декабрь, 12. – URL: https://www.1tv.ru/news/2023-12-12/466887-s_nachala_2023_goda_v_rossii_predotvratili_146_teraktov (дата обращения: 12.10.2023). – Текст электронный.

⁴⁹ В России предотвратили 419 терактов с начала спецоперации // Информационное агентство «Известия»: сайт. – Москва, 2024. Февраль, 13. – URL: <https://iz.ru/1649284/2024-02-13/v-rossii-predotvratili-419-teraktov-s-nachala-spetsoperatsii> (дата обращения: 12.03.2024). – Текст электронный.

⁵⁰ За 10 лет число террористических преступлений в РФ упало в 260 раз // Информационное агентство «Интерфакс»: сайт. – Москва, 2021. Март, 10. – URL: <https://www.interfax.ru/russia/755351> (дата обращения: 22.10.2023). – Текст электронный.

⁵¹ Концепция внешней политики Российской Федерации: утверждена Президентом Российской Федерации В.В.Путиным 31 марта 2023 г. — Текст: электронный // МИД Российской Федерации: официальный сайт. – Москва, 2023. Март, 31. URL: <https://www.mid.ru/ru/detail-material-page/1860586/> (дата обращения: 12.03.2024).

⁵² Там же.

emphasized in the Concept of Countering Terrorism in the Russian Federation (2009)⁵³.

The Russian experience is of significant interest to foreign partners, which is reflected in the dynamics of external contacts. For example, even before joining BRICS, Ethiopia expressed interest in cooperation with Russia in the field of counter-terrorism⁵⁴. Since 2006, annual meetings of the Russian-Egyptian Working Group on Combating Terrorism have been held. Bilateral cooperation agreements have been signed between the Prosecutor General's Office of the Russian Federation and the competent authorities of such BRICS countries as Brazil, China, South Africa, Iran, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the UAE⁵⁵.

China enjoys a similar position to Russia. Beijing pays great attention to the implementation of proactive measures aimed at suppressing extremist and terrorist activities. One of the key areas of relevant work is the improvement of the legal and regulatory framework, which is based on the *National Security Law* and the *Anti-Terrorism Law* adopted in 2015. These laws not only systematized the efforts of China's national institutions to respond to the terrorist threat, eliminating duplication of powers, but also clarified some fundamental concepts, in particular, the term "terrorism" was introduced for the first time in the country's history⁵⁶. Despite the term was characterized by rather broad and vague wording, its introduction into normative practice allowed to outline the country's priorities in this area and ensure more effective work at the international level. China has consistently promoted the idea of jointly combating the terrorist and extremist threat under the auspices of UN

⁵³ Концепция противодействия терроризму в Российской Федерации: утверждена Президентом Российской Федерации Д.Медведевым 5 октября 2009 г. – Текст: электронный // Официальный портал Правительства Ростовской области. URL: <https://www.donland.ru/activity/1101/> (дата обращения: 12.12.2023).

⁵⁴ В Эфиопии отметили важность сотрудничества с Россией для борьбы с бедностью // Информационное агентство «РИА Новости»: сайт. – Москва, 2022. Август, 17. – URL: <https://ria.ru/20220817/efiopiya-1810281505.html> (дата обращения: 12.03.2024). – Текст электронный.

⁵⁵ Перечень подписанных двусторонних соглашений и иных договоренностей о сотрудничестве Генеральной прокуратуры Российской Федерации с компетентными органами иностранных государств (по состоянию на 24 апреля 2024 г.) // Генеральная прокуратура Российской Федерации: сайт. – Москва, 2024. URL: <https://epp.genproc.gov.ru/web/gprf/activity/international-cooperation/sogl/so> (дата обращения: 03.05.2024). – Текст электронный.

⁵⁶ Койбаев Б.Г., Золоева З.Т. Правовые основы противодействия экстремизму и терроризму в Китайской Народной Республике // Гуманитарные и юридические исследования. 2021. №4. С. 169-174. — Текст: непосредственный.

institutions. Thus, in 2024, Beijing published the White Paper on Counter-Terrorism Practices which was titled "China's Legal Framework and Measures for Counterterrorism"⁵⁷. The document stated that terrorism is a common enemy of human society and "all members of the international community share the responsibility to combat it"⁵⁸. Such a position of China corresponds with its concept of the common destiny of mankind, which is the need to consolidate the international community to solve global problems⁵⁹.

Similar assessments have been made by top officials. For example, ahead of Xi Jinping's official visit to Moscow in 2017, the Chinese leader gave an interview to *Rossiyskaya Gazeta* where he emphasized that "China always supports the international community's efforts to combat terrorism in a constructive manner"⁶⁰. Xi Jinping added that in this regard, it is necessary to "abandon double standards, fully identify the central role of the UN in the international fight against terrorism, and consolidate all thoughts and efforts into one"⁶¹.

Russia and China are successfully co-operating on counter-terrorism issues in the international arena. The countries regularly hold consultations on combating international terrorism⁶². The counter-terrorism agenda also unites Moscow and Beijing within the SCO, where joint border operations and exercises to prevent terrorists from using new tools of warfare (including ICT tools) are being carried out.)⁶³. Work is also underway with other BRICS countries – their representatives

⁵⁷ Все члены международного сообщества разделяют ответственность за борьбу с терроризмом.

⁵⁸ China's Legal Framework and Measures for Counterterrorism // Embassy of the People's Republic of China in South Sudan. – Juba. – URL: http://ss.china-embassy.gov.cn/eng/snfyw/202401/t20240123_11231368.htm (дата обращения: 22.10.2023). – Текст электронный.

⁵⁹ Чжан, М. Дипломатия си Цзиньпина: китайская мудрость на пути к сообществу единой судьбы для человечества / М. Чжан // Большая студенческая конференция: сборник статей VIII Международной научно-практической конференции, Пенза, 05 марта 2024 года. – Пенза: Наука и Просвещение (ИП Гуляев Г.Ю.), 2024. – С. 250-255. — Текст: непосредственный.

⁶⁰ Си Цзиньпин: Китай и Россия должны укреплять общность интересов // «Российская газета»: сайт. – Москва, 2017. Июль, 2. – URL: <https://rg.ru/2017/07/02/si-czinpin-kitaj-i-rossiia-dolzhny-ukrepiat-obshchnost-interesov.html> (дата обращения: 12.03.2024). – Текст электронный.

⁶¹ Там же.

⁶² Россия и Китай провели консультации по борьбе с международным терроризмом // Информационное агентство «РИА Новости»: сайт. – Москва, 2024. Апрель, 16. – URL: <https://ria.ru/20240416/konsultatsii-1940429031.html> (дата обращения: 04.05.2024). – Текст электронный.

⁶³ Койбаев Б.Г., Золоева З.Т. Правовые основы противодействия экстремизму и терроризму в Китайской Народной Республике // Гуманитарные и юридические исследования. 2021. №4. С. 169-174. — Текст: непосредственный.

regularly take part in the work of the *Great Wall International Forum on Combating Terrorism* and participate in internship and training programs.

Of interest to terrorism researchers is the experience of **India**, where, due to the influence of cultural, historical and political factors, the terrorist threat is seen as existential. At present, the fundamental counter-terrorism legislation in India is the *National Security Act* (1980) and *Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, UAPA* (1967)). However, a separate chapter of the *UAPA* on counter-terrorism was approved by the Indian Parliament only in 2004. In total, the legal framework on the issue includes more than 20 national legal acts adopted between 1967 and 2002.

In the case of India, relevant lawmaking is seriously complicated by the opposition of civil society and the lack of a unified approach to the concept of terrorism among Indian lawmakers. However, the threat of expanding terrorism and the trend towards criminalization of Indian society as a whole contribute to overcoming these problems. For example, after the terrorist attack in Mumbai (2008), the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act was supplemented with a number of fundamentally new provisions - in particular, the updated law enshrined a broader definition of terrorism, including the organization of militant training camps and the organisation of channels for their financing (both inside and outside the country) as areas of terrorist activity⁶⁴. While India's domestic legal practice still has a fair number of gaps (e.g., no mechanism to curb the use of digital assets to finance terrorist activities), the country aims to gradually improve its threat response system.

New Delhi considers intensification of international cooperation as one of the ways to achieve this goal. India is pursuing a multi-vector policy and, in addition to working on international platforms (primarily the SCO), is strengthening relevant contacts with countries in Europe and Asia, the United States and Russia. In recent years, there has also been a tendency to increase interaction with Middle Eastern countries (in particular, with the UAE). At the same time, it is important to

⁶⁴ Яковлев А.Ю., Яковлев П.Ю. Правовое обеспечение противодействия терроризму в Индии // Вестник РУДН. Серия: Юридические науки. 2014. №4. С. 400-410. — Текст: непосредственный.

emphasize that New Delhi's vision in many aspects coincides with the position of other leading BRICS countries, which makes rapprochement somewhat easier⁶⁵.

Brazil is becoming increasingly active in countering terrorism. Despite the fact that due to the country's ethno-religious composition (about 65 per cent of its citizens are Catholic), the threat of jihadism is de facto levelled (due to the lack of a sufficient recruitment base for radicals), the fight against terrorism is a top priority for national institutions⁶⁶.

A comprehensive understanding of the phenomenon of the terrorist threat occurred in the national legal practice in the second half of the 2010s - on the wave of activation of global terrorist movements (and, first of all, ISIS) - in particular, the national legal act *Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA)*, adopted in 2016, emphasized the transnational nature of this threat, and the term "terrorism" itself received a broader interpretation than in other laws. Thus, according to Art. 2, terrorism in Brazil is defined as "the commission by one or more persons of criminal acts motivated by xenophobia, discrimination or prejudice based on race, color, ethnicity or religion, when committed with the aim of causing social or general terror – endangering persons, property, public order or public safety"⁶⁷. In addition, *ATA* provided, for the first time, a list of acts classified as terrorist (12 items), which made it possible to separate this category of offences from other unlawful acts.

Brazil advocates increasing the effectiveness of international efforts to combat terrorism in all its manifestations - priority is given to developing cooperation under the auspices of United Nations institutions and on the basis of international

⁶⁵ Главы МИД БРИКС выступили за противодействие использованию террористами беспилотников // Информационное агентство ТАСС: сайт. – Москва, 2023. Июль, 2. – URL: <https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/17909433> (дата обращения: 06.02.2024). – Текст электронный.

⁶⁶ Security Index Yearbook 2024-2025 by PIR&MGIMO Vol.1 Digital Edition. Chapter 9. International Terrorism: Threat Has Not Gone Away, Threat Has Lurked // PIR Center: сайт. – Москва, 2024. – URL: <https://pircenter.org/en/editions/security-index-yearbook-chapter-9-international-terrorism-threat-has-not-gone-away-threat-has-lurked/> (дата обращения: 02.05.2024). – Текст электронный.

⁶⁷ Act No. 13,260 of 16 March 2016, known as the Anti-Terrorism Act // Sherlock: сайт. – Москва, 2016. – URL: https://sherloc.unodc.org/cld/ru/legislation/bra/act_no._13260_of_16_march_2016_known_as_the_anti-terrorism_act_/article_2/brazil_anti-terrorism_act_.html (дата обращения: 05.02.2024). – Текст электронный.

organisations and groups. The country's representatives regularly participate in the implementation of the BRICS counter-terrorism strategy⁶⁸.

Talking about **South Africa** it is not currently under serious pressure from international terrorist organizations and has a generally harmonious model of response to the terrorist threat. It is based on the *Anti-Terrorism Bill (2002)*⁶⁹, which has been amended over time with a number of other relevant laws and regulations (e.g. the Law on Information Protection 2008)⁷⁰ and, despite a number of lacunas (e.g., gaps in the mechanism for regulating digital transactions to suppress the financing of illegal armed groups), remains effective.

On the other hand, due to financial regulatory challenges, South Africa remains on the list of countries that have "strategic weaknesses" in their national anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing regimes⁷¹, which negatively affects their international reputation. The South African authorities plan to address the deficiencies identified by the FATF by 2025⁷².

In this context, international cooperation (including the exchange of relevant legal experience) is seen by the authorities as a good opportunity to address the existing problems. Thus, South Africa has consistently advocated for increased interaction and strategic partnership in the field of international security (including responding to the terrorist threat), considering the BRICS as one of the key platforms for dialogue building⁷³.

⁶⁸ Страны БРИКС доработали совместный план действий по борьбе с терроризмом // Информационное агентство ТАСС: сайт. – Москва, 2021. Июль, 30. – URL: <https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/12028067> (дата обращения: 06.02.2024). – Текст электронный.

⁶⁹ Anti-Terrorism Bill // Ministry for Safety and Security. – Cape Town. – URL: https://www.westerncape.gov.za/text/2004/2/anti-terrorism_bill_15nov02.pdf (дата обращения: 20.10.2023). – Текст электронный.

⁷⁰ Protection of Information Bill // South African Government. – Cape Town. – URL: <https://www.gov.za/documents/bills/protection-information-bill-30-may-2008> (дата обращения: 05.02.2024). – Текст электронный.

⁷¹ Еврокомиссия добавила Нигерию и ЮАР в список стран с высоким риском отмывания денег // Информационное агентство «Интерфакс»: сайт. – Москва, 2023. Май, 17. – URL: <https://www.interfax.ru/world/901919> (дата обращения: 07.02.2024). – Текст электронный.

⁷² ЮАР надеется покинуть серый список FATF в 2025 году // Деловой центр ДЕНЕКА: сайт. – Москва, 2023. Ноябрь, 03. – URL: <https://dineka.ru/news/1257/> (дата обращения: 07.02.2024). – Текст электронный.

⁷³ В ЮАР заявили, что рассматривают БРИКС как ключевую структуру стратегического партнерства // Информационное агентство ТАСС: сайт. – Москва, 2023. Июль, 25. – URL: <https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/18358521> (дата обращения: 06.02.2024). – Текст электронный.

When considering the implementation of counter-terrorism work under the auspices of the BRICS, it is appropriate to consider a number of states that have joined the Group in the last few years – the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Iran. This study focuses on this group of states because they are located in the Middle East region, where there is a high level of terrorist threat. In addition, the geopolitical interests of these countries are also along the lines of regional conflicts, one of the parties to which are anti-system actors (Iraq, Syria, Libya, Yemen, etc.).

Egypt faces the greatest pressure from international terrorist organizations. The country remains in the risk group according to the Global Terrorism Index (20th place in the global ranking), although it has shown some success in countering this threat⁷⁴. The legislative basis for the system of countering the terrorist threat in Egypt is *Anti-Terrorism Law* and *Terrorist Entities Law*, adopted in 2015⁷⁵. These laws significantly expanded the powers of law enforcement agencies, reducing the state's response time to potentially destabilizing incidents, and eliminated some of the legal loopholes used by representatives of international terrorist organizations, operating in the country.

At the same time, the situation in the Arab Republic of Egypt remains tense, including due to the destabilizing influence of the escalating regional crises (primarily the escalation of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict), which increases the level of terrorist danger. In addition, economic and social factors have a negative impact on the dynamics of the situation, which prompts Cairo to work more actively on developing international contacts, and dialogue within the BRICS framework could be useful in improving the model of early warning of terrorist acts within Egypt and outside⁷⁶.

⁷⁴ Global Terrorism Index 2024 // Institute for Economics & Peace Measuring the impact of terrorism: сайт. – New York, 2024. – URL: <https://www.visionofhumanity.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/GTI-2024-web-290224.pdf> (дата обращения: 02.02.2024). – Текст электронный.

⁷⁵ В Египте вступил в силу новый закон о борьбе с терроризмом // Информационное агентство ТАСС: сайт. – Москва, 2015. Август, 17. – URL: <https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/2190402> (дата обращения: 05.02.2024). – Текст электронный.

⁷⁶ Countering Terrorism in BRICS Countries Text // TV BRICS: сайт. – URL: <https://tvbrics.com/en/bricslife/countering-terrorism-in-brics-countries/> (дата обращения: 06.02.2024). – Текст электронный.

The regulatory framework of the **Islamic Republic of Iran** on counter-terrorism includes a set of legal acts, the main ones being the Law on the Accession of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the Convention of the Islamic Conference on Combating International Terrorism, the National Security Law, the Law on Law Enforcement and Security Agencies, the State Border Law, the Customs Law, the Criminal Code, the Criminal Procedure Code, the Air Code, the Maritime Code, the Rules on Acquisition and Storage of Weapons and Explosives, the Regulations on Banking Activities, and the Law on the Prevention of Terrorism.⁷⁷

Iranian officials rank the terrorist threat as a top priority⁷⁸, insisting on intensifying cooperation at the level of regional and global formats of cooperation (including BRICS). On the other hand, Tehran's final position is heavily influenced by the Israeli factor, which is also reflected in the agenda promoted by the Islamic Republic within the Group: in particular, in the wake of escalating tensions in the Gaza Strip, Iranian President Raisi called on the BRICS countries to include Israel in the list of "terrorist regimes"⁷⁹, which has faced a controversial reactions from the major BRICS members.

The **UAE** is an active actor in the fight against terrorism. The UAE authorities are firmly in control of the situation in terms of internal security. According to the latest *Global Terrorism Index* report, the level of terrorist threat in the country is characterized by experts as low, and the UAE ranks 79th in terms of the severity of this threat, behind only Brazil and South Africa (both countries rank 89th)⁸⁰.

A peculiarity of the national legislation is the broad interpretation of the concept of *terrorism*, which includes not only terrorist activities and propaganda of extremist ideology, but also any manifestations of disloyalty to the country's

⁷⁷Laws And Regulations // Iran Data Portal: сайт. – Tehran, 2023. – URL: <https://irandataportal.syr.edu/laws-and-regulations> (дата обращения: 10.02.2024). – Текст электронный.

⁷⁸ Канани: Терроризм является всеобъемлющей и международной угрозой // NourNews: сайт. – Тегеран, 2024. Январь, 8. – URL – URL: <https://goo.su/ox5zGe> (дата обращения: 10.02.2024). – Текст электронный.

⁷⁹ Президент Ирана призвал страны БРИКС признать «террористическим» режим Израиля // Информационное агентство «Известия»: сайт. – Москва, 2023. Ноябрь, 21. – URL: <https://iz.ru/1608789/2023-11-21/prezident-irana-prizval-strany-briks-priznat-terroristicheskim-rezhim-izrailia> (дата обращения: 10.02.2024). – Текст электронный.

⁸⁰ Global Terrorism Index 2024 // Institute for Economics & Peace Measuring the impact of terrorism: сайт. – New York, 2024. – URL: <https://www.visionofhumanity.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/02/GTI-2024-web-290224.pdf> (дата обращения: 11.02.2024). – Текст электронный.

leadership, which, on the one hand, simplifies the work of the relevant institutions, but, on the other hand, increases the risk of repressive measures against the opposition under the aegis of the fight against terrorism.

Abu Dhabi has positioned itself as a leading player in the broad anti-terrorism front and has consistently called for the consolidation of such international efforts⁸¹. The UAE pays particular attention to cooperation within the framework of the Global Counter-Terrorism Forum, under whose auspices *the Hedayah* – The International Center of Excellence For Countering Extremism and Violent Extremism operates in Abu Dhabi. It is also worth noting that the UAE has cooperation on counter-terrorism within the framework of the League of Arab States, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Persian Gulf.

In the context of its engagement with the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), a priority for the UAE in recent years has been to get off the FATF grey list, on which Abu Dhabi has been since March 2022. In this context, the local authorities have stepped up efforts to improve the national legal framework as well as the transparency of banking transactions. As a result, the UAE was removed from the FATF *grey list* in February 2024⁸².

Saudi Arabia has also focused on countering the terrorist threat. Since the mid-2010s, Saudi top officials have regularly called on the global community to intensify joint counterterrorism efforts⁸³, participate in global projects to reduce the threat – for example, deradicalizing Islam and combating false preachers⁸⁴.

⁸¹ Statement of the United Arab Emirates' delegation In the 3rd meeting of the Sixth Committee of the United Nations General Assembly On agenda item 108 (Measures to eliminate international terrorism) New York, 13 October 2015 // Организация Объединенных наций: официальный сайт. — URL: https://www.un.org/en/ga/sixth/70/pdfs/statements/int_terrorism/uae.pdf (дата обращения: 11.02.2024). – Текст электронный.

⁸² ФАТФ исключила ОАЭ из "серого списка" стран под финансовым мониторингом// Информационное агентство ТАСС: сайт. – Москва, 2024. Февраль, 23. – URL: <https://tass.ru/ekonomika/20072171> (дата обращения: 24.02.2024). – Текст электронный.

⁸³ Саудовская Аравия призвала мировое сообщество искоренить терроризм// Информационное агентство «Интерфакс»: сайт. – Москва, 2015. Ноябрь, 14. – URL: <https://www.interfax.ru/world/479230> (дата обращения: 03.03.2024). – Текст электронный.

⁸⁴ Саватеев, А. Д. Дерадикализация исламизма: опыт Саудовской Аравии / А. Д. Саватеев, Т. Р. Хайруллин // Ислам в современном мире: внутригосударственный и международно-политический аспекты. – 2019. – Т. 15, № 3. – С. 165-180. — Текст: непосредственный.

Riyadh is currently working more closely with the US and NATO countries on national security issues (which include counter-terrorism)⁸⁵, but is also interested in other formats, including BRICS⁸⁶.

Despite the fact that the BRICS countries have generally similar priorities in countering the terrorist threat, there are a number of factors that reduce the effectiveness of their cooperation. First of all, there is a difference in the interpretation of the term "terrorism" at the national level. Despite the fact that the general framework of the concept coincides and echoes the terminology used within the UN, each state is guided by the peculiarities of its domestic political and cultural environment when setting the final accents, which leads to the formation of divergences. This, in turn, affects the position and vision of a country in developing collective action. It remains difficult to harmonize lists of terrorist groups, which differ markedly even within the group of States considered. Because the concept of terrorism is somewhat vague, national lists often include insurgent and opposition movements that are not recognized as terrorist in other countries, which makes it very difficult to develop a collective position on them. Finally, there is a destructive influence of the factor of mutual distrust caused by political, economic or other contradictions. In the case of the BRICS, this can be clearly seen in the dynamics of dialogue between China and India, Saudi Arabia and Iran, the UAE and Iran, etc. At the same time, the existence of points of overlap (for example, in the interpretation of the level of threat from radical Islamist organizations) allows the BRICS members to maintain intensive dialogue and develop cooperation even in the face of existing differences.

In general, it can be summarized that international cooperation in countering terrorism under the BRICS umbrella has certain prospects. The issue of joint countering the threat is one of the key issues on the Group's agenda, and joint work

⁸⁵ Secretary General sets out vision for deeper NATO–Saudi Arabia cooperation in historic first visit to Riyadh // НАТО: официальный сайт. 2023. Декабрь, 13. — URL: https://www.nato.int/cps/ru/natohq/news_220769.htm?selectedLocale=en (дата обращения: 04.03.2024). – Текст электронный.

⁸⁶ BRICS Nations Forge Stronger Counter-Terrorism Alliance // Daily News: сайт. – Каир, 2024. Март, 29. – URL: <https://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2024/03/29/brics-nations-forge-stronger-counter-terrorism-alliance/> (дата обращения: 01.04.2024). – Текст электронный.

has become systematic by the end of the 2010s and continues to expand through the development of dialogue within the framework of the dedicated Working Group.

BRICS members have a similar approach to positioning the terrorist threat in the national security system, prioritize the development of external contacts and accept the need to consolidate universal efforts to combat international terrorism - although in practice they retain some disagreement on certain aspects of responding to the challenge.

In this regard, it can be expected that the BRICS states will most likely focus their efforts on comprehensive counteraction to the activities of the largest militant organizations (ISIS and al-Qaeda), including countering the propaganda, recruitment, financial and economic activities of these groups. This will, on the one hand, avoid disagreements (as all BRICS members have a similar assessment of the threat posed by these terrorist groups) and, on the other hand, maintain a positive vector of international cooperation and contribute to the further development of the relevant dialogue. In addition, another important long-term task for the BRICS should be to work together to promote at the UN level fundamental documents in the field of countering the terrorist threat, in particular, to accelerate the adoption by the General Assembly of the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism.

II.2 Prospects for BRICS cooperation in international information security

With the development of scientific and technological progress, digital (information) space is gradually becoming a full-fledged sphere of international relations and world politics. This, on the one hand, can be regarded as a positive trend in the movement towards a global society, contributing to the building of multidimensional international contacts based on the principles of openness and international cooperation. At the same time, this space, due to a number of its peculiarities, is difficult to regulate and has a significant number of *grey zones*, which leads to the inevitable growth of mutual distrust and conflict. In addition,

under conditions of international turbulence, the digital space acts as an arena of interstate confrontation and a zone of activity of anti-system actors. Against this background, threats from the information space (primarily, terrorist and criminal activities, and the use of digital means for military purposes) become particularly relevant and are reflected in the national security policies of the world's states, as well as in the focus of attention of supranational institutions, where all the BRICS states are represented (primarily, the UN).

In characterizing the UN coordination activities in responding to digital threats, it is important to mention a number of fundamental resolutions that laid the foundation for normative and cooperative work. First of all, it is the Resolution on "Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security" adopted in December 1998 at the proposal of Russia. The document contains a separate paragraph requiring all member states to inform the UN Secretary-General about "the advisability of developing international principles that would be aimed at strengthening the security of global information and telecommunication systems, as well as contribute to the fight against information terrorism and criminality". It is important to emphasize that the Russian Federation not only initiated the adoption of this resolution, but also actually started the discussion of information security issues within the UN – resolutions on this agenda were adopted annually, and the work became systematic.

Another important document is Resolution A/RES/73/27 (2018), which reaffirmed the conclusions on the applicability of international law on the use of ICTs. A particularly important part of the document was the paragraph consisting of 13 rules, norms and principles of responsible behavior of states in the information space. Thus, this paragraph notes that states should not only take measures to protect their infrastructure from ICT threats, but also cooperate to share information, respond to requests for assistance from other states that have been targeted by "malicious ICT activities", and states should endeavor to prevent the spread of

malicious ICT software and hardware, among others.⁸⁷ E. Chernukhin, Special Coordinator of the Russian Foreign Ministry for the Political Use of Information and Communication Technologies, characterized these provisions of the resolution as "the first ever 'rules of the road' in the digital sphere", adding that the meaning of these rules is "to lay the foundation for peaceful interaction between states in it, to ensure the prevention of wars, confrontation and any aggressive actions"⁸⁸.

In the context of UN activities, it is also reasonable to mention the work of specialized bodies and agencies - primarily the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), which serves as a platform for coordinating national governments and institutions and the private sector in the field of telecommunications, communications and digital relations in general⁸⁹. An important area for ITU is research work oriented towards studying trends in the development of the global digital space⁹⁰. This activity makes it possible to form a comprehensive vision of the dynamics of international cooperation in the context of information security and prevent the aggravation of threats.

On the other hand, a vulnerable aspect of the work on regulating the information space at the UN level is its continuing polarization: in fact, there are attempts by the US and a number of Western countries to lobby for their own (different from the position of the Russian Federation, China and a number of other Eurasian states) vision of the model for regulating digital relations, which leads to the emergence of working groups working in parallel⁹¹. This trend is also partly responsible for the partial shift of some initiatives to the level of regional and interregional organizations.

⁸⁷ Там же.

⁸⁸ Э.Чернухин. Международная информационная безопасность: успехи России в ООН // Российский совет по международным делам: сайт. – Москва, 2019. Февраль, 2. – URL: <https://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/analytics/mezhdunarodnaya-informatsionnaya-bezopasnost-uspekhi-rossii-v-oon/> (дата обращения: 22.10.2023). – Текст электронный.

⁸⁹ Международный союз электросвязи // Организация Объединенных наций: официальный сайт. — URL: <https://www.un.org/ru/ecosoc/itu/> (дата обращения: 18.04.2024). – Текст электронный.

⁹⁰ См., напр.: Global Cybersecurity Index // International Telecommunication Union. URL: https://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-d/opb/str/D-STR-GCI.01-2021-PDF-E.pdf (дата обращения: 04.05.2024). – Текст электронный.

⁹¹ Об итогах четвертой сессии Рабочей группы открытого состава ООН по международной информационной безопасности // МИД России: официальный сайт. – Москва, 2023. Март, 13. – URL: https://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1857793/ (дата обращения: 06.05.2024). – Текст электронный.

BRICS has paid increased attention to information security issues. This topic first came into the focus of the group in 2011, when the III Summit resulted in a declaration emphasizing the importance of paying attention to ICT and information security in general. Subsequently, similar passages were included in the Etekwini (2013) and Fortaleza (2014) declarations⁹². In addition, since the second half of the 2010s, work to consolidate efforts to respond to the digital challenge within the BRICS has become more systemic - in particular, work was initiated to prepare a five-party agreement on international information security (from 2014) and, in 2019, to develop its expanded and updated version⁹³. The adoption of the BRICS ICT Joint Action Plan (2016) can also be considered as an interim step in the development of cooperation in the ICT sector under the BRICS umbrella⁹⁴, which serves as a *benchmark* for the development and implementation of joint information security initiatives.

In general, the BRICS Working Group on Security in the Use of Information and Communication Technologies, which has been operating since 2014, is an effective platform for reconciling the positions of the BRICS members. For example, one of the significant practical results of its activities was the decision to establish a register of BRICS contact centers for computer incidents in 2024⁹⁵. In fact, it is a question of improving the efficiency of operational exchange of information on incidents in the digital space, which in the long term should weaken the position of organized criminal groups operating in cyberspace and reduce the ultimate

⁹² Муратшина, К. Г. К вопросу о сотрудничестве в области информационной безопасности в рамках БРИКС / К. Г. Муратшина // Гуманитарное знание и искусственный интеллект: стратегии и инновации: материалы международной конференции, Екатеринбург, 26 марта 2020 года / Министерство науки и высшего образования Российской Федерации, Уральский федеральный университет имени первого Президента России Б. Н. Ельцина. – Екатеринбург: Издательство Уральского университета, 2020. – С. 614-621. — Текст: непосредственный.

⁹³ Там же.

⁹⁴ Принят план совместных действий стран БРИКС в области ИКТ // Министерство цифрового развития, связи и массовых коммуникаций Российской Федерации: официальный сайт. – Москва, 2016. Ноябрь, 11. – URL: <https://digital.gov.ru/ru/events/36049/> (дата обращения: 06.05.2024). – Текст электронный.

⁹⁵ 10-е заседание рабочей группы БРИКС по вопросам безопасности в сфере использования информационно-коммуникационных технологий состоялось в Москве // BRICS: Russia 2024: официальный сайт российского председательства в БРИКС 2024: сайт. – Москва, 2020. Апрель, 18 – URL: <https://brics-russia2024.ru/news/10-e-zasedanie-rabochey-gruppy-briks-po-voprosam-bezopasnosti-v-sfere-ispolzovaniya-ikt/> (дата обращения: 04.05.2024). – Текст электронный.

effectiveness of their actions. Such developments also indicate an increase in the overall level of openness in the dialogue under the BRICS umbrella.

It should be noted that the BRICS member states generally take into account the key trends in the development of the information space and endeavour to respond to the digital challenge proactively, suppressing risks before they reach an acute stage. However, an effective response to the challenges is not possible without comprehensive development of national digital defence systems.

From the point of view of international information security, the BRICS member states can be roughly divided (using the ITU methodology⁹⁶) into several groups – *leading* (states with a multifaceted ICT system, actively developing relevant international cooperation and ensuring a sustainable dialogue on international security and stability in the information space), *medium* (states with a dynamically developing digital system, but lagging behind the leaders in a number of indicators, for example, in legislative development) and *developing* (states where the development of the digital response system is clearly dominated by one of the directions of development).

The first group includes **Russia, India, Saudi Arabia and the UAE** – in accordance with the ITU methodology, these states rely on the development of multi-vector cooperation in responding to *the digital challenge* (both in bilateral and multilateral formats), pay attention to the development of national human resources, and improve the legislative and institutional framework for activities in the digital sector. At the same time, it is important to pay attention to the difference in approaches to work in cyberspace - while Russia and India are working to improve their behavioural strategy step by step, including by adapting (taking into account national characteristics) the most successful practices of digital protection⁹⁷, Saudi

⁹⁶ Global Cybersecurity Index // International Telecommunication Union. URL: https://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-d/opb/str/D-STR-GCI.01-2021-PDF-E.pdf (дата обращения: 04.05.2024). – Текст электронный.

⁹⁷ ИБ в России и в мире // Search Inform: сайт. – Москва, 2024. – URL: <https://searchinform.ru/informatsionnaya-bezopasnost/osnovy-ib/ib-v-rossii-i-mire/> (дата обращения: 06.05.2024). – Текст электронный.

and Emirati officials, on the contrary, are inclined to bet on the forced achievement of leading positions in the digital space⁹⁸.

The second group includes **China, Brazil and Egypt**. The states represent different subregions and have different priorities for the development of the information security system. On the other hand, the unifying factor for them is the desire to comprehensively counter threats from the digital space, which is reflected in the constant updating of the national legal and regulatory framework, improvement of doctrinal bases of activity, and development of international cooperation (including active interagency cooperation).⁹⁹

The fact that China, a technological superpower, is in the *middle echelon* can be explained by the specifics of legislative regulation of the Internet space, which somewhat limits the participation of the private sector in the development of international projects in the field of information security. In addition, according to ITU experts, Beijing is still experiencing some difficulties in developing a system of specialized institutions to respond to the digital challenge, which negatively affects its position in the global network space¹⁰⁰.

At the same time, since the second half of the 2010s, Beijing has been increasingly exporting its own experience of digital governance outwards (using the *Digital Silk Road* brand for this purpose, among others)¹⁰¹, which leads to the strengthening of its global position.

The third group in this study includes **Iran and South Africa**. The states in this group have a keen interest in the digital security sector, but their national information security systems, for a number of reasons, have pronounced imbalances (e.g., the predominance of the military sector over the civilian sector or problems

⁹⁸ Цуканов Л.В. Система национальной кибербезопасности Саудовской Аравии: специфика и риски развития // Вестник Кемеровского государственного университета. Серия: Политические, социологические и экономические науки. 2021. №4 (22). — Текст: непосредственный.

⁹⁹ Посчитано на основе данных Cyber Policy Portal: <https://cyberpolicyportal.org/>.

¹⁰⁰ Global Cybersecurity Index // International Telecommunication Union. URL: https://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-d/opb/str/D-STR-GCI.01-2021-PDF-E.pdf (дата обращения: 04.05.2024). — Текст электронный.

¹⁰¹ The 'Digital Silk Road' as part of China's Belt and Road Initiative- An analysis of the EU GDPR in light of its effectiveness in personal data protection // University of Oslo. — 2024. URL: <https://www.duo.uio.no/bitstream/handle/10852/92203/LLMThesis.pdf?sequence=5&isAllowed=y> (дата обращения: 04.05.2024). — Текст электронный.

with the implementation of labor and academic mobility programs and the formation of national human resources capacity)¹⁰². In addition, in the case of Iran, international cooperation in the field of information security is severely limited due to the ongoing confrontation with a number of Western (the US, the EU) and regional (Israel, the UAE) actors. In some cases (Saudi Arabia-Iran), engagement has become more restrained and open, but has not yet expanded into sensitive areas (which include information security)

At the same time, despite the existing limitations and difficulties at the national level, all BRICS member states, without exception, see the digital space not only as a source of threats, but also as an area of effective cooperation. In this context, the BRICS is increasingly being positioned as an "equalizing" platform where best practices and approaches can be effectively shared without the risk of aggravating interethnic confrontation (which is particularly relevant in the context of the Sino-Indian, Saudi-Iranian and Emirati-Iranian rivalries).

It is worth highlighting the interaction of the BRICS countries at the UN. Thus, two projects are traditionally promoted at the UN in the area of information security: the Russian and American projects. The Russian project consists in supporting the so-called Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG), which includes representatives of all UN member states. The UN resolution A/RES/73/27 "Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security", adopted in December 2018, which initiated the creation of the OEWG, stated the following about the group itself: the resolution decides to convene "an open-ended, more democratic, inclusive and transparent consensus-based group to continue to prioritize the further development of norms, rules and principles of responsible behavior of States"¹⁰³ in the field of ICT. At the same time, the group of governmental experts convened in the wake of the U.S.-sponsored

¹⁰² Global Cybersecurity Index // International Telecommunication Union. URL: https://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-d/opb/str/D-STR-GCI.01-2021-PDF-E.pdf (дата обращения: 04.05.2024). – Текст электронный.

¹⁰³ Резолюция ООН A/RES/73/27 «Достижения в сфере информатизации и телекоммуникаций в контексте международной безопасности»: принята Генеральной Ассамблеей Организации Объединенных Наций 5 декабря 2018 г. // Организация Объединенных наций: официальный сайт. URL: <https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n18/418/07/pdf/n1841807.pdf?token=p10foSsVo3XQjXctHY&fe=true> (дата обращения: 04.05.2024). – Текст электронный.

resolution has at various times included between 15 and 25 states¹⁰⁴. Russia insisted on a more democratic approach and sought the participation in the information security dialogue within the United Nations of all States without exception, regardless of their technical development, as well as the involvement of non-profit organizations, business and independent experts. With the adoption of resolution A/RES/73/27, Russia has achieved this goal and has moved closer to the development of universal norms in the sphere of information security. Obviously, it would be impossible to achieve such a task in an exclusive format involving one tenth of the world's countries.

In November 2023, both resolutions - initiated by both Russia and the United States - were adopted in a UNGA vote. It is worth noting that the Russian draft (co-authored with a number of other countries, including China and Iran) was supported by all BRICS countries¹⁰⁵. As for the American project, it was not supported by Russia, China, and Iran; the rest of the Group was in favor of Washington's project. This situation is not a problem, but the key conclusions are, firstly, the full support of the BRICS states for the Russian project. Secondly, in the similar views on information security issues by Russia, China as well as Iran. It is behind the leadership of Moscow and Beijing that BRICS can strengthen and develop cooperation on the information security agenda¹⁰⁶.

For example, Chinese experts say that it is important to improve the level of digital security in terms of ensuring national sovereignty. For example, Shen Yi, head of the BRICS Research Center at Fudan University, noted in one of his speeches that the main threat to the BRICS countries in cyberspace comes from the United States due to Washington's desire to secure its own geopolitical interests by

¹⁰⁴ Толстухина, А.В. Лучше две киберрезолюции, чем ни одной // Российский совет по международным делам: сайт. – Москва, 2019. Февраль, 13. – URL: <https://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/analytics/luchshe-dve-kiberrezolyutsii-chem-ni-odnoy/> (дата обращения: 05.05.2024). – Текст электронный.

¹⁰⁵ Семьдесят восьмая сессия ООН. Первый комитет. Пункт 94 повестки дня Достижения в сфере информатизации и телекоммуникаций в контексте международной безопасности // Организация Объединенных наций: официальный сайт. — URL: <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4024888?ln=en&v=pdf> (дата обращения: 05.05.2024). – Текст электронный.

¹⁰⁶ Там же.

limiting the sovereignty of other actors using ICT tools¹⁰⁷. Washington seeks to assert dominance in the information field, which negatively affects the dynamics of international cooperation and information openness. In this context, Shen Yi suggests that the BRICS should be seen as a political counterweight that jointly defends the group's interests in the information space¹⁰⁸.

Ensuring the security and stable operation of economic institutions is another common priority for all BRICS member states. In addition to the development of the payment sector, it is of interest to work together to ensure cyber security in the financial sphere, develop advanced financial technologies (e.g., cross-border identification tools and AI solutions in the economy), and combat money laundering¹⁰⁹. At the same time, the economic systems of the BRICS countries have significant differences in terms of the availability of digital solutions, which requires more serious consideration of risks when launching common initiatives. Interesting initiatives in this context are being put forward by representatives of the private sector. For example, in April 2024, the international technology company *GDA Group* launched an initiative at a forum in the UAE to establish a BRICS Convention on Secure Artificial Intelligence (which should become part of the group's efforts to develop an international information security system). The implementation of this project should serve as an incentive to deepen cooperation between the BRICS and facilitate the effective integration of advanced solutions into national practices¹¹⁰. It is important to note that similar ideas were later expressed by Emirati officials at the *Dubai FinTech Summit* in May 2024¹¹¹, which indicates that there is a stable interest

¹⁰⁷ Эксперт считает, что самая большая угроза в цифровой среде для стран БРИКС исходит из США // Информационное агентство ТАСС: сайт. – Москва, 2024. Апрель, 10. – URL: <https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-rapogama/20503645> (дата обращения: 05.05.2024). – Текст электронный.

¹⁰⁸ Там же.

¹⁰⁹ Кибербезопасность и финтех станут приоритетами центробанков БРИКС в 2024 году – глава ЦБ // Digital Russia: сайт. – Москва, 2024. Январь, 30. – URL: <https://d-russia.ru/kiberbezopasnost-i-finteh-stanut-prioritetami-centrobankov-briks-v-2024-godu-glava-cb.html> (дата обращения: 05.05.2024). – Текст электронный.

¹¹⁰ В ОАЭ озвучена инициатива о создании Конвенции БРИКС по безопасному ИИ // TUZ KZ: сайт. – Астана, 2024. Апрель, 28. – URL: https://www.tuz.kg/news/4321_v_oe_ozvuchena_iniciativa_o_sozdanii_konvencii_briks_po_bezopasnomu_ii.html (дата обращения: 06.05.2024). – Текст электронный.

¹¹¹ The United Arab Emirates launches summit to discuss the future of the technology sector // TV BRICS: сайт. – 2024. Май, 10. – URL: <https://tvbrics.com/en/news/the-united-arab-emirates-launches-summit-to-discuss-the-future-of-the-technology-sector/> (дата обращения: 24.05.2024). – Текст электронный.

in coordinating relevant efforts in the BRICS space. In general, cooperation in the field of international information security under the BRICS umbrella looks promising, as the member states of the Group have demonstrated interest in multi-vector cooperation in ensuring the security of the digital space. The development of an effective dialogue is facilitated, among other things, by the overall richness of the digital agenda. On the other hand, the BRICS enlargement process is associated with the risk of deepening contradictions in the development of cooperation in the field of information security, due to unresolved differences between the members of the group, as well as the common sensitivity of the ICT sphere.

It is expected that the countries of the group will focus in the near future on the gradual convergence of positions on the most sensitive issues of information security (which should be facilitated by the admission of new advanced technological powers to the group), as well as on increasing the level of trust in the digital space as a whole. However, due to the specifics of the sphere and the complex international situation, this process is unlikely to be forced.

II.3 Prospects for BRICS cooperation in international and regional conflict resolution

All BRICS summits without exception pay attention to the possibilities of peaceful settlement of regional conflicts. However, while the first joint statement of the BRIC countries following the Yekaterinburg Summit (2009) was as broad as possible – "we reiterate our support for political and diplomatic efforts to peacefully resolve disputes in international relations" – in the following years, the focus shifted to specific conflicts - the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the Syrian conflict, the crises in South Sudan and the Central African Republic, as well as in other regions of the world. The potential of the BRICS to resolve regional conflicts should not be underestimated – the Group has real opportunities to contribute to peace processes. BRICS itself is the epitome of cooperation despite contradictions. Despite the fact that a number of countries have mutual claims against each other (some of them do

not even have diplomatic relations) and their visions of important international issues do not always coincide, in the BRICS framework, disagreements fade into the background and the search for common ground and opportunities for partnership takes center stage.

For example, territorial claims exist between India and China and Iran and the UAE (around the islands of Tombe Bozorg, Tombe Kuchek and Abu Musa); the subject of conflict between Egypt and Ethiopia is the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam the launch of which could lead to the depletion of Egypt's water resources. Iran and the Gulf countries, especially Saudi Arabia, are also in sharp conflict. Only recently have Tehran and Riyadh restored diplomatic relations, but both countries still claim leadership in the region, and each perceives the other as a competitor. There is no unanimity among the BRICS countries in voting at the UNGA, where each proceeds from its own vision of the issue¹¹².

However, these problems are not an obstacle to cooperation (at least until BRICS enlargement). With regard to world conflicts and crises in which the BRICS countries are not directly involved, their positions are almost identical. The BRICS countries took a similar position on the Arab-Israeli conflict that began on 7 October 2023. All the BRICS countries supported UNGA Resolution A/RES/ES-10/22¹¹³, which demands an immediate ceasefire and the unconditional release of all hostages, as well as the fulfilment of obligations under international law by the parties to the conflict¹¹⁴.

The common position of the BRICS countries on the Arab-Israeli conflict was also noted by Russian President Vladimir Putin. During the extraordinary BRICS summit on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the Russian leader emphasized that "it is indicative that all the BRICS countries speak from similar positions with regard to

¹¹² Барабанов, О.Н. Расширение БРИКС как консолидация не-Запада? На примере голосований в Генассамблее ООН// Дискуссионный клуб «Валдай»: сайт. – Москва, 2023. – Сентябрь, 7. – URL: <https://ru.valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/rasshirenje-briks-kak-konsolidatsiya-ne-zapada/> (дата обращения: 02.07.2023). – Текст электронный.

¹¹³ Резолюция A/RES/ES-10/22 «Protection of civilians and upholding legal and humanitarian obligations»: принята Генеральной Ассамблеей Организации Объединенных Наций 12 декабря 2023 г. // Организация Объединенных наций: официальный сайт. URL: <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4029732?ln=ru> (дата обращения: 24.12.2023). – Текст электронный.

¹¹⁴ Там же.

the need to collectively achieve a long-term and sustainable settlement of the long-standing Palestinian-Israeli problem"¹¹⁵. In addition, Egypt has become one of the mediators of the conflict, with talks involving representatives of Israel and Hamas held in Cairo on several occasions in May 2024¹¹⁶.

But the BRICS countries are united not only by a common vision of the Middle East conflict, but also by their experience in world settlement. China plays a special role in such processes. Beijing actively promotes the concept of a common destiny of mankind, which was first voiced at MGIMO University when Xi Jinping delivered his speech on March 23, 2013.¹¹⁷ As some experts have noted, since then, "building a community of united destiny for humanity has become the keyword of Chinese diplomacy in the new era"¹¹⁸. The concept of the common destiny of mankind is the need to consolidate the international community to solve global problems¹¹⁹. This Chinese approach notes that the modern world is different from previous eras: humanity cannot compete now, only cooperate.

In 2023, China published a concept paper called the Global Security Initiative (GSI). The document states that the GSI "aims to address the root causes of international conflicts, improve global security governance, promote joint international efforts to bring greater stability and certainty in an unstable and changing era, and promote lasting world peace and development"¹²⁰. Beijing's statements are accompanied by practical steps and results.

¹¹⁵ Внеочередной саммит БРИКС // Президент России: официальный сайт. – Москва, 2023. Ноябрь, 21. – URL: <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/72780> (дата обращения: 24.12.2023). – Текст электронный.

¹¹⁶ СМИ: в Каире завершились переговоры по прекращению огня в Газе // Газета «Ведомости»: сайт. – Москва, 2024. Май, 5. – URL: <https://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/news/2024/05/05/1035588-v-kaire-zavershiliis-peregovori> (дата обращения: 10.05.2024). – Текст электронный.

¹¹⁷ Незабываемое выступление Си Цзиньпина в МГИМО — воспоминания двух поколений // МГИМО: сайт – Москва, 2023. Март, 23. – URL: <https://mgimo.ru/about/news/main/xi-2013/> (дата обращения: 10.05.2024). – Текст электронный.

¹¹⁸ Петровский, В. Е. «Инициатива в области глобальной безопасности» глазами китайских политологов / В. Е. Петровский // Китай в мировой и региональной политике. История и современность. – 2023. – Т. 28, № 28. – С. 11-19. — Текст: непосредственный.

¹¹⁹ Чжан, М. Дипломатия си Цзиньпина: китайская мудрость на пути к сообществу единой судьбы для человечества / М. Чжан // Большая студенческая конференция: сборник статей VIII Международной научно-практической конференции, Пенза, 05 марта 2024 года. – Пенза: Наука и Просвещение (ИП Гуляев Г.Ю.), 2024. С. 250-255. — Текст: непосредственный.

¹²⁰ The Global Security Initiative Concept Paper // Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the People's Republic of China – Beijing. – URL: https://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/wjbxw/202302/t20230221_11028348.html (дата обращения: 10.05.2024). – Текст электронный.

In January 2022, Beijing proposed its "Outlook on Peace and Development in the Horn of Africa". Its goal, in the words of Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, is "to rid the countries of the region of interference by major powers and to take their destiny into their own hands"¹²¹.

In 2023, thanks to Beijing's mediation, diplomatic relations were restored between Iran and Saudi Arabia, the new BRICS members. It is noteworthy that other countries had previously offered their services to normalize relations, but it was only thanks to Chinese President Xi Jinping's "noble initiative" that rapprochement between Tehran and Riyadh became possible¹²².

China is also actively making efforts to normalize the conflict in Ukraine. With the start of the Special Military Operation, a group for the settlement of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict was set up in Beijing, headed by a major Chinese diplomat, Li Hui. At the same time, China's attempts are not limited to the desire to bring the conflicting parties to the table - Beijing carries out shuttle diplomacy in its best traditions, visiting, in addition to Moscow and Kiev, the capitals of other influential European powers, without taking into account the opinion of which Ukraine will not go to negotiations. As Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Mao Ning noted, "behind all this, there is only one goal that China hopes to achieve, namely to achieve consensus to end the conflict and pave the way for peace talks"¹²³.

Other BRICS countries are also trying to achieve peace in Ukraine. In August 2023, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, hosted consultations on the peaceful resolution of the conflict in Ukraine with the participation of diplomats and national security advisers from more than 40 countries – without Russia, but with China, Egypt, South Africa, Argentina and other countries of the Global South. Negotiations without Moscow's

¹²¹ Ларин, В. Л. Китайская повестка мировой политики XXI века / В. Л. Ларин // Российское китаеведение. – 2023. – № 1(2). – С. 14-34. — Текст: непосредственный.

¹²² Китай восстановил отношения Ирана и Саудовской Аравии. На очереди Украина // Информационное агентство «Регнум»: сайт. – Москва, 2023. Март, 11. – URL: <https://regnum.ru/article/3788258> (дата обращения: 10.05.2024). – Текст электронный.

¹²³ Китай зашел на второй круг // Газета «Коммерсантъ»: сайт. – Москва, 2024. Март, 4. – URL: <https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/6551758> (дата обращения: 10.05.2024). – Текст электронный.

participation was doomed to failure, as the Brazilian representative noted¹²⁴. On the other hand, unlike the previously conducted "consultations" in Copenhagen, the talks in Saudi Arabia were more open and aimed at providing the participating countries with an opportunity to exchange views. Thus, while after the talks in Copenhagen Russia requested information from representatives of developing countries about the content of the discussion¹²⁵, after the discussions in Jeddah, the Russian Foreign Ministry noted that "the participation of representatives of the BRICS countries in the consultations in Jeddah could be useful in bringing common sense to Kiev's Western patrons"¹²⁶.

However, in the context of the BRICS countries' capacity to resolve international conflicts, it is not their proposals and initiatives that are more important, but their place in the international arena. There is no doubt that it is impossible to resolve any more or less major conflict without taking into account the opinion of the "ten". This is also recognized in the West: in April 2024, Austrian Chancellor K. Nehammer, speaking about the resolution of the Ukrainian crisis, said that the West had "failed to convince the BRICS countries" to promote the Western vision of the conflict¹²⁷. He also added that "BRICS countries are major players in the international arena"¹²⁸. Aware of the important role of BRICS in global governance, an invitation to the BRICS countries to participate in the negotiations on Ukraine was also sent by Switzerland, which hosted the consultations on 15-16 May 2024.¹²⁹

¹²⁴ Чем закончились переговоры по урегулированию украинского кризиса в Джидде // Газета «Ведомости»: сайт. – Москва, 2023. Август, 7. – URL: <https://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/articles/2023/08/07/988792-chem-zakonchilis-peregovori-v-dzhidde> (дата обращения: 10.05.2024). – Текст электронный.

¹²⁵ Москва хочет получить информацию о встрече по Украине в Копенгагене // Информационное агентство «Интерфакс»: сайт. – Москва, 2023. Июнь, 28. – URL: <https://www.interfax.ru/world/909349> (дата обращения: 10.05.2024). – Текст электронный.

¹²⁶ Рябков заявил, что РФ обсудит с партнерами по БРИКС итоги консультаций в Джидде по Украине // Информационное агентство ТАСС: сайт. – Москва, 2023. Август, 6. – URL: <https://tass.ru/politika/18454745> (дата обращения: 10.05.2024). – Текст электронный.

¹²⁷ Канцлер Австрии заявил, что Западу нужны страны БРИКС для начала переговоров по Украине // Информационное агентство ТАСС: сайт. – Москва, 2024. Апрель, 9. – URL: <https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/20489759> (дата обращения: 10.05.2024). – Текст электронный.

¹²⁸ Там же.

¹²⁹ Президент Швейцарии уклончиво ответила на вопрос об участии БРИКС в форуме по Украине // Информационное агентство ТАСС: сайт. – Москва, 2024. Май, 5. – URL: <https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/20716485> (дата обращения: 10.05.2024). – Текст электронный.

The BRICS members combine political weight, wide geographical distribution, and a real desire to contribute to peacebuilding. This is complemented by the practical experience of some BRICS countries - primarily China and Russia – in resolving international disputes. In this area, the prospects of the BRICS should be assessed not in the category of probability, but according to the principle of objectivity, which is that without the BRICS countries, the settlement of any notable conflict is not possible.

II.4 Prospects for BRICS cooperation in nuclear nonproliferation and arms control issues

Arms control and nuclear proliferation were on the BRICS agenda for the first time in 2020, and the reason was the looming potential crisis in the sphere of strategic stability in light of the possibility of non-renewal of the New START treaty by the Trump administration.¹³⁰ In this regard, the text of the Moscow Declaration of the XII BRICS Summit noted: "We underscore the fundamental importance of the 2010 Russia-US Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms for the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime, and we call on the parties to agree on its extension without delay "¹³¹.

In the following two years, 2021 and 2022, the BRICS final declarations contained identical language with the prize "to continue efforts to strengthen the system of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation treaties and agreements and preserve its integrity in order to maintain global stability, international peace and security, as well as to preserve the effectiveness, efficiency and consensus of relevant multilateral disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control mechanisms"¹³²¹³³.

¹³⁰ Рябков заявил, что администрация Трампа приняла решение не продлевать СНВ-3 // Информационное агентство ТАСС: сайт. – Москва, 2020. Ноябрь, 16. – URL: <https://tass.ru/politika/10011329> (дата обращения: 10.05.2024). – Текст электронный.

¹³¹ Moscow Declaration BRICS. November 17, 2020. Moscow, Russia. – Текст: непосредственный.

¹³² New Delhi Declaration BRICS. September 9, 2021. New Delhi, India. Текст: непосредственный.

¹³³ Beijing Declaration BRICS. June 23, 2022. Beijing, ChinaТекст: непосредственный.

In 2023, this provision was removed from the outcome document, leaving only the general phrase "we call for the strengthening of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation<...>"¹³⁴, which was also present in the previously mentioned declarations.

In the context of BRICS cooperation on arms control and non-proliferation, it is important to assess the overall coordinated position of the BRICS countries, especially as the Group expands, rather than their actual capabilities in this area – the final position in this area depends primarily on Russia and the United States.

The most effective way to determine the positions of the BRICS participants, as well as their concerns, will be to analyze the official statements of the countries in the Preparatory Committee for the Review Conference (Prepcom) for the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

The greatest contradictions are visible between the *nuclear* and *non-nuclear* BRICS states, with the former advocating the responsible use of nuclear weapons and the latter mostly calling for the total elimination of nuclear weapons or emphasizing their failure as an instrument of deterrence. For example, for Russia, "continued possession of nuclear weapons is the only possible response to some external threats"¹³⁵. At the same time, Moscow believes that improvement of the situation is possible, but "further progress on the nuclear disarmament track will require the West to abandon its destructive course of undermining Russia's security"¹³⁶.

China calls for responsible use of nuclear weapons, stating that "nuclear-weapon States should follow the principles of 'maintaining global strategic stability' and 'undiminished security for all'", and nuclear disarmament "should be an objective and reasonable process of gradual and balanced reduction"¹³⁷. In keeping

¹³⁴ Johannesburg Declaration-II. August 23, 2023. Johannesburg, South Africa. – Текст: непосредственный.

¹³⁵ Выступление делегации Российской Федерации на первой сессии Подготовительного комитета 11-й Конференции по рассмотрению действия Договора о нераспространении ядерного оружия (кластер 1, ядерное разоружение), Вена, 3 августа 2023 года // МИД России: официальный сайт. – Москва, 2023. Август, 4. – URL: https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/1900234/?lang=ru (дата обращения: 10.05.2024). – Текст электронный.

¹³⁶ Там же.

¹³⁷ Remarks by H.E. Ambassador LI Song on Nuclear Disarmament at the First Meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the 2026 NPT Review Conference 3 August 2023, Vienna Energy // United Nations: official website. URL:

with China's traditional diplomacy, Beijing also "calls on all nuclear-weapon states to pursue a no-first-use policy, conclude a treaty on mutual no-first-use of nuclear weapons, and not to direct their nuclear weapons against any country"¹³⁸.

Iran has been critical of Western countries, stressing that "the actions and policies of some nuclear-weapon States, including the United States, Britain and France, are completely opposite to those of the West"¹³⁹. In particular, as Tehran notes: "the actions and policies of some nuclear-weapon States, including the US, UK and France are totally in the opposite direction. The nuclear weapons policy of the United States of America emphasizes the importance and utility of retaining nuclear weapons indefinitely; allows the first use of such weapons under different pretexts and justifications even against nonnuclear-weapon States; and continues to proliferate nuclear weapons to nonnuclear-weapon States through nuclear-sharing arrangements with NATO members"¹⁴⁰. Iran's concerns are more than justified against the backdrop of the pressure exerted on Iran and its potential nuclear weapons capabilities. Tehran thus notes the double standards of Western countries, whereby they themselves strengthen and build up their nuclear capabilities, but at the same time impose conditions on other countries, primarily Iran itself. The other non-nuclear states of BRICS are more critical.

Thus, Brazil reproaches the nuclear-weapon states, saying that "time and again nuclear-weapon States and their apologists affirm that the implementation of disarmament obligations and commitments cannot take place in a deteriorated

[https://docs-library.unoda.org/Treaty_on_the_Non-Proliferation_of_Nuclear_Weapons_-_Preparatory_Committee_for_the_Eleventh_Review_ConferenceFirst_session_\(2023\)/China_Cluster_1_new__2_\(EN\).pdf](https://docs-library.unoda.org/Treaty_on_the_Non-Proliferation_of_Nuclear_Weapons_-_Preparatory_Committee_for_the_Eleventh_Review_ConferenceFirst_session_(2023)/China_Cluster_1_new__2_(EN).pdf) (дата обращения: 10.05.2024). – Текст электронный.

¹³⁸ Ibid.

¹³⁹ Statement by H.E. Mohsen Naziri Asl Ambassador and Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations Office and International Organizations in Vienna Before the First Session of the NPT Preparatory Committee Cluster Debate on "Nuclear Disarmament" Vienna, August 3, 2023 // United Nations: official website. URL: [https://docs-library.unoda.org/Treaty_on_the_Non-Proliferation_of_Nuclear_Weapons_-_Preparatory_Committee_for_the_Eleventh_Review_ConferenceFirst_session_\(2023\)/Iran_statement-_Cluster_1-Nuclear.pdf](https://docs-library.unoda.org/Treaty_on_the_Non-Proliferation_of_Nuclear_Weapons_-_Preparatory_Committee_for_the_Eleventh_Review_ConferenceFirst_session_(2023)/Iran_statement-_Cluster_1-Nuclear.pdf) (дата обращения: 10.05.2024). – Текст электронный.

¹⁴⁰ Statement by H.E. Mohsen Naziri Asl Ambassador and Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations Office and International Organizations in Vienna Before the First Session of the NPT Preparatory Committee Cluster Debate on "Nuclear Disarmament" Vienna, August 3, 2023 // United Nations: official website. URL: [https://docs-library.unoda.org/Treaty_on_the_Non-Proliferation_of_Nuclear_Weapons_-_Preparatory_Committee_for_the_Eleventh_Review_ConferenceFirst_session_\(2023\)/Iran_statement-_Cluster_1-Nuclear.pdf](https://docs-library.unoda.org/Treaty_on_the_Non-Proliferation_of_Nuclear_Weapons_-_Preparatory_Committee_for_the_Eleventh_Review_ConferenceFirst_session_(2023)/Iran_statement-_Cluster_1-Nuclear.pdf) (дата обращения: 10.05.2024). – Текст электронный.

security scenario such as the one we find ourselves"¹⁴¹. Brazil emphasized "We are not naïve to the point of denying that the security environment has a bearing on disarmament. But disarmament – and expressions of willingness to engage towards that goal – shapes and alters said environment, by breeding confidence and good will"¹⁴². However, Brasilia expresses its dissatisfaction, saying that "responsibility is not binary, neither are behaviors and rhetoric. Nuclear deterrence doctrines, even the most defensive in nature, always rest upon a credible threat of use of nuclear weapons. It is just like a chain reaction: all that is needed is an irresponsible neutron to ignite it and no moderators to exercise control"¹⁴³.

South Africa notes that "nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation are mutually reinforcing processes and therefore progress in both elements is essential to realize the object and purpose of the NPT"¹⁴⁴.

A partly similar position to **South Africa** is taken by Egypt, which emphasizes the need to realize that "nuclear deterrence has not helped to prevent war. In fact, the continued reliance on nuclear deterrence and nuclear alliances has contributed to the current crises and to making them riskier and more difficult to resolve"¹⁴⁵. At the same time, Cairo has been moderate in its criticism of the West, noting that the "Bilateral arms-control arrangements among the NWS are in a state of paralysis.

¹⁴¹ 1st Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Vienna, 31 July – 11 August 2023 Cluster 2: Non-Proliferation Statement by the Delegation of Brazil // United Nations: official website. URL: [https://docs-library.unoda.org/Treaty_on_the_Non-Proliferation_of_Nuclear_Weapons_-_Preparatory_Committee_for_the_Eleventh_Review_ConferenceFirst_session_\(2023\)/Brazil_-_NEW_Cluster_2.pdf](https://docs-library.unoda.org/Treaty_on_the_Non-Proliferation_of_Nuclear_Weapons_-_Preparatory_Committee_for_the_Eleventh_Review_ConferenceFirst_session_(2023)/Brazil_-_NEW_Cluster_2.pdf) (дата обращения: 10.05.2024). – Текст электронный.

¹⁴² Ibid.

¹⁴³ 1st Session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Vienna, 31 July – 11 August 2023 Cluster 2: Non-Proliferation Statement by the Delegation of Brazil // United Nations: official website. URL: [https://docs-library.unoda.org/Treaty_on_the_Non-Proliferation_of_Nuclear_Weapons_-_Preparatory_Committee_for_the_Eleventh_Review_ConferenceFirst_session_\(2023\)/Brazil_-_NEW_Cluster_2.pdf](https://docs-library.unoda.org/Treaty_on_the_Non-Proliferation_of_Nuclear_Weapons_-_Preparatory_Committee_for_the_Eleventh_Review_ConferenceFirst_session_(2023)/Brazil_-_NEW_Cluster_2.pdf) (дата обращения: 10.05.2024). – Текст электронный.

¹⁴⁴ First Preparatory Committee of the Eleventh Review Conference of the Treaty on The Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) South African National Statement For Cluster I – Nuclear Disarmament // United Nations: official website. URL: [https://docs-library.unoda.org/Treaty_on_the_Non-Proliferation_of_Nuclear_Weapons_-_Preparatory_Committee_for_the_Eleventh_Review_ConferenceFirst_session_\(2023\)/South_Africa_-_Cluster_I_Statement.pdf](https://docs-library.unoda.org/Treaty_on_the_Non-Proliferation_of_Nuclear_Weapons_-_Preparatory_Committee_for_the_Eleventh_Review_ConferenceFirst_session_(2023)/South_Africa_-_Cluster_I_Statement.pdf) (дата обращения: 10.05.2024). – Текст электронный.

¹⁴⁵ Statement by the Delegation of the Arab Republic of Egypt The 1st Preparatory Committee for the 11th NPT Review Conference Vienna, 31 July- 11 August 2023 Cluster 1 Issues: Nuclear Disarmament // United Nations: official website. URL: [https://docs-library.unoda.org/Treaty_on_the_Non-Proliferation_of_Nuclear_Weapons_-_Preparatory_Committee_for_the_Eleventh_Review_ConferenceFirst_session_\(2023\)/Egypts_New_7.8_Cluster_1_final.pdf](https://docs-library.unoda.org/Treaty_on_the_Non-Proliferation_of_Nuclear_Weapons_-_Preparatory_Committee_for_the_Eleventh_Review_ConferenceFirst_session_(2023)/Egypts_New_7.8_Cluster_1_final.pdf) (дата обращения: 10.05.2024). – Текст электронный.

Experience has shown that arms-control arrangements perform very poorly if disarmament is not their overarching goal, especially considering the increasing number of domains that have a direct bearing on strategic stability"¹⁴⁶.

Saudi Arabia is reticent to oppose the possession of nuclear weapons, emphasizing: "achieving the goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons begins with the international community adopting existing treaties, agreements and legal and ethical frameworks aimed at achieving a world free of nuclear weapons. [We] believe that achieving security, peace and development lies in preventing an arms race, the production and development of nuclear weapons systems, and in building dialogues, confidence and fostering peaceful cooperation among States"¹⁴⁷.

The **UAE** is sharply critical of nuclear weapons, and firmly believes that "total elimination of nuclear weapons, as envisioned by the Treaty, is the only way to ensure their non-use and eliminate the threat they pose"¹⁴⁸. But Abu Dhabi remains moderately *down-to-earth* in its views, and therefore as an interim measure supports "efforts towards nuclear risk reduction as an interim measure, while advocating for the prompt ratification of the CTBT by all states, particularly the remaining eight states listed in Annex 2"¹⁴⁹.

It is important to say that nuclear proliferation issues are bypassed by India, which is not a party to the NPT. At the same time, several BRICS countries have the potential to develop nuclear weapons. Although the expansion of the nuclear club is unlikely, this threat has not disappeared, and a number of experts have expressed concerns about it¹⁵⁰.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid.

¹⁴⁷ النووي السالم نزع ركيزة م 2023/8/11 – 7/31 (NPT) معاهدة لمؤتمر التحضيرية للجنة الأولى الدورة السعودية العربية المملكة بيان (Cluster 1 Issues) // United Nations: official website. URL: [https://docs-library.unoda.org/Treaty_on_the_Non-Proliferation_of_Nuclear_Weapons_-_Preparatory_Committee_for_the_Eleventh_Review_ConferenceFirst_session_\(2023\)/Saudi_Arabia_-_NEW_22_Cluster_1_Issues_\(1\).pdf](https://docs-library.unoda.org/Treaty_on_the_Non-Proliferation_of_Nuclear_Weapons_-_Preparatory_Committee_for_the_Eleventh_Review_ConferenceFirst_session_(2023)/Saudi_Arabia_-_NEW_22_Cluster_1_Issues_(1).pdf) (дата обращения: 10.05.2024). – Текст электронный.

¹⁴⁸ UAE Statement before the General Debate. The First Preparatory Committee for the 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) // United Nations: official website. URL: [https://docs-library.unoda.org/Treaty_on_the_Non-Proliferation_of_Nuclear_Weapons_-_Preparatory_Committee_for_the_Eleventh_Review_ConferenceFirst_session_\(2023\)/UAE_Statement_-_General_debate_NPT_1st_PrepCom_2023.pdf](https://docs-library.unoda.org/Treaty_on_the_Non-Proliferation_of_Nuclear_Weapons_-_Preparatory_Committee_for_the_Eleventh_Review_ConferenceFirst_session_(2023)/UAE_Statement_-_General_debate_NPT_1st_PrepCom_2023.pdf) (дата обращения: 10.05.2024). – Текст электронный.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid.

¹⁵⁰ A. Gorely, A. Panda, Ar. Levite. Will More States Acquire Nuclear Weapons? Foreign Affairs, 14.12.2021. Available at: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ask-the-experts/2021-12-14/will-more-states-acquire-nuclear-weapons> (дата обращения: 10.05.2024). – Текст электронный.

In 2023, PIR Center released the report *New Nuclear Nine? Assessing the Threats of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation in the World*. The research paper notes that such BRICS countries as Iran, Egypt, Brazil and Saudi Arabia have the potential to develop their own nuclear weapons. Iran has the greatest capability in this regard; Egypt's and Saudi Arabia's capabilities are assessed as below average; Brazil has the most unlikely coefficient (among all the countries under consideration)¹⁵¹. Such a position has nothing to do with the coordination of positions within the BRICS, but it may explain the rhetoric of some countries.

In the context of finding potential areas for BRICS countries to work together on arms control and nuclear non-proliferation, it is important to note the following. The Group of Ten countries should retain language calling for the strengthening of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation – this helps to preserve the multilateralism of the BRICS agenda and adds unity to the countries within the group. However, there is no need to expand the CWRN and nuclear non-proliferation agenda within BRICS, especially since leaving in particular, there will inevitably be

¹⁵¹ Новая ядерная девятка? Оценка угроз распространения ядерного оружия в мире. Доклад. Издание 2-е (исправленное и дополненное) / Ред. В.А. Орлов, С.Д. Семенов. М.: ПИР-Пресс, 2023. – 230 с. – (ПИР-Библиотека - книжная серия). ISBN 978-5-6048679-4-5. URL: <https://pircenter.org/editions/new-nuclear-nine-report/> (дата обращения: 21.02.2024). — Текст: непосредственный.

differences of opinion among BRICS members.




Figure 1. BRICS positions on nuclear nonproliferation issues

II.5 Prospects for BRICS engagement to normalize the situation around the Iranian nuclear program

Iran's nuclear program was on the agenda of the BRICS summits for the first time in 2012. The declaration adopted at the end of the summit in New Delhi noted that "the situation concerning Iran cannot be allowed to escalate into conflict, the disastrous consequences of which will be in no one's interest"¹⁵². However, the outcome document highlighted the concerns surrounding Iran's nuclear program (INP), but expressed unanimity on the need to resolve the situation through political and diplomatic means, as well as recognition of Iran's right "to peaceful uses of nuclear energy consistent with its international obligations"¹⁵³. In total, the Iranian nuclear program was discussed at the BRICS summits a total of nine times.

The BRICS had high hopes for the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), with the 2015 Final Declaration noting that "the JCPOA is supposed to restore full confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program and provide for the comprehensive lifting of sanctions imposed on Iran"¹⁵⁴.

The US has announced its withdrawal from the JCPOA on May 8, 2018, accusing Iran of enriching uranium and developing nuclear weapons contrary to the terms of the agreement¹⁵⁵. In the context of these developments, at the BRICS summit held in July of the same year, the Group called upon "all parties to fully comply with their obligations and ensure full and effective implementation of the JCPOA to promote international and regional peace and security"

After 2018, the Iranian nuclear program was not raised at the BRICS summits for two years. It was not until 2021 that the JCPOA returned to the BRICS agenda, and the final declaration of the 13th BRICS Summit noted the importance of preserving the JCPOA. The countries also reiterated the "importance of preserving the JCPOA <...> and the need to resolve the Iran nuclear issue through peaceful and

¹⁵² Delhi Declaration BRICS. March 29, 2012. New Delhi, India. — Текст: непосредственный.

¹⁵³ Ibid.

¹⁵⁴ Ufa Declaration BRICS. July 9, 2015. Ufa, Russia — Текст: непосредственный.

¹⁵⁵ Трамп заявил о выходе США из ядерной сделки с Ираном // Информационное агентство «РИА Новости»: сайт. – Москва, 2018. Май, 8. – URL: <https://ria.ru/20180508/1520183150.html> (дата обращения: 10.05.2024). – Текст электронный.

diplomatic means in accordance with international law"¹⁵⁶. The same wording in essence and content, but in a slightly expanded form (e.g., with reference to UNSCR 2231) was contained in the declarations of the 2022 and 2023 BRICS summits.

Most BRICS countries are concerned about the Iranian nuclear program, but the difference lies in their perception of the situation. Thus, China and Russia support bringing the situation around the Iranian nuclear program back to the diplomatic track, but rightly place the responsibility for the development of the situation on the United States, whose decisions and actions determine the future of the JCPOA.

In this regard, Beijing states that "the US should abandon sanctions and pressure on Iran, return to the right path and not link talks on resuming compliance with the JCPOA to other issues, and promote the early resumption of negotiations"¹⁵⁷. Russia shares China's opinion, but perceives the situation more down-to-earth. Thus, in July 2023, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey V. Lavrov noted that it is "not very realistic to wait for the resumption of the JCPOA now, because in a year's time the United States will have elections and a new administration will come. As the Minister noted, "who knows what administration it will be, Democratic or Republican? There is no guarantee that this new administration will not repeat the trick of withdrawing from the agreement"¹⁵⁸.

The opposite position is taken by Saudi Arabia and the UAE, for whom Iran's nuclear program represents one of the key security challenges.

In this context, Riyadh "calls on the Islamic Republic of Iran to adhere to its nuclear obligations under the provisions of the Treaty and the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and to cooperate with IAEA. The resolution of this issue

¹⁵⁶ New Deli Declaration BRICS. September 9, 2021. New Deli, India. — Текст: непосредственный.

¹⁵⁷ Remarks by H.E. Ambassador LI Song on Nuclear Non-Proliferation at the First Meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the 2026 NPT Review Conference (7 August 2023, Vienna) // United Nations: official website. URL: [https://docs-library.unoda.org/Treaty_on_the_Non-Proliferation_of_Nuclear_Weapons_-_Preparatory_Committee_for_the_Eleventh_Review_ConferenceFirst_session_\(2023\)/China's_Cluster_2_Nonproliferation_final\(EN\).pdf](https://docs-library.unoda.org/Treaty_on_the_Non-Proliferation_of_Nuclear_Weapons_-_Preparatory_Committee_for_the_Eleventh_Review_ConferenceFirst_session_(2023)/China's_Cluster_2_Nonproliferation_final(EN).pdf) (дата обращения: 05.05.2024). — Текст электронный.

¹⁵⁸ Лавров: ждать новые договоренности по иранской ядерной сделке сейчас не очень реалистично // Информационное агентство ТАСС: сайт. — Москва, 2023. Июль, 13. — URL: <https://tass.ru/politika/18264185> (дата обращения: 08.05.2024). — Текст электронный.

represents a basis for building confidence among the countries of the region and a step towards achieving cooperation based on good neighborliness"¹⁵⁹.

In solidarity with Saudi Arabia, the UAE has expressed concern over Iran's alleged "violations of its nuclear-related commitments"¹⁶⁰.

Against the backdrop of longstanding political disagreements, Egypt has also expressed serious concerns about Iran's nuclear program. It is worth mentioning that no diplomatic relations have been established between Cairo and Tehran, and it was only in 2023 that the contours of a possible rapprochement were outlined¹⁶¹. At the same time, in February 2024, Egyptian Foreign Minister S.Shoukry said that participation in BRICS provides an opportunity for cooperation with Iran¹⁶².

Returning to Iran's nuclear program, Egypt's position is to strengthen stability in the region as well as to establish a WMD-free zone in the Middle East. Back in 2008, Egypt put forward its plan for a nuclear deal with Iran, according to which Iran was to suspend its nuclear program, while international society was to guarantee the supply of nuclear fuel to Iran for its peaceful nuclear program, and to take serious steps to stop the militarization of the region¹⁶³. In 2013, Cairo also offered its

¹⁵⁹ النووي الانتشار عدم ركيزة م 2023/8/11 – 7/31 (NPT) معاهدة لمؤتمر التحضيرية للجنة الأولى الدورة السعودية العربية المملكة بيان (Cluster 2 Issues) // United Nations: official website. URL: [https://docs-library.unoda.org/Treaty_on_the_Non-Proliferation_of_Nuclear_Weapons_-_Preparatory_Committee_for_the_Eleventh_Review_ConferenceFirst_session_\(2023\)/Saudi_Arabia_-_NEW_22_Cluster_2_Issues_\(1\).pdf](https://docs-library.unoda.org/Treaty_on_the_Non-Proliferation_of_Nuclear_Weapons_-_Preparatory_Committee_for_the_Eleventh_Review_ConferenceFirst_session_(2023)/Saudi_Arabia_-_NEW_22_Cluster_2_Issues_(1).pdf) (дата обращения: 10.05.2024). – Текст электронный.

¹⁶⁰ Statement by UAE. The First Preparatory Committee for the 2026 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Cluster 2- General Issues. Delivered by H.E. Ambassador Hamad Al Kaabi, Permanent Representative of the UAE to the United Nation and International Originations – Vienna // United Nations: official website. URL: [https://docs-library.unoda.org/Treaty_on_the_Non-Proliferation_of_Nuclear_Weapons_-_Preparatory_Committee_for_the_Eleventh_Review_ConferenceFirst_session_\(2023\)/UAE_-_Cluster_II_Statement.pdf](https://docs-library.unoda.org/Treaty_on_the_Non-Proliferation_of_Nuclear_Weapons_-_Preparatory_Committee_for_the_Eleventh_Review_ConferenceFirst_session_(2023)/UAE_-_Cluster_II_Statement.pdf) (дата обращения: 10.05.2024). – Текст электронный.

¹⁶¹ В Тегеране сообщили, что Иран и Египет готовятся восстановить дипотношения // Информационное агентство ТАСС: сайт. – Москва, 2023. Май, 14. – URL: <https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/17743959> дата обращения: 10.05.2024). – Текст электронный.

¹⁶² В Египте заявили, что участие в БРИКС дает возможность для сотрудничества с Ираном // Информационное агентство ТАСС: сайт. – Москва, 2024. Февраль, 27. – URL: <https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/20096921> дата обращения: 10.05.2024). – Текст электронный.

¹⁶³ Египет предложил свой план по "ядерному досье" Ирана // Информационное агентство «РИА Новости»: сайт. – Москва, 2008. Июнь, 8. – URL: https://ria.ru/20080608/109533096.html?chat_room_id=109533096 (дата обращения: 10.05.2024). – Текст электронный.

assistance in organizing a negotiating platform between Iran and other interested parties for a nuclear deal ¹⁶⁴.

Egypt called 2015 nuclear deal a key to stability in the Middle East ¹⁶⁵. In 2018, when the US withdrew from the agreement, Cairo sided with Washington, expressing understanding for the US position. Egypt also called on Iran to "fulfil its obligations under the NPT and the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA¹⁶⁶. While Iran has fully complied with its conditions defined in the JCPOA, Egypt's accusations are unsubstantiated and unfounded, Egypt has continued to make accusations against Iran. In 2021, Egyptian Ambassador to the U.S. M. Zahran said that "the nuclear program is not the only problem coming from Iran"¹⁶⁷. Thus, Egypt - in its perception of Iran's nuclear program – ranks alongside Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

Brazil and South Africa have neutral and unbiased positions on Iran's nuclear program. Brazil (together with Turkey) offered its mediation services to reach agreements with Iran as early as 2010, but since then has not actively expressed its views in this direction¹⁶⁸. At the same time, South Africa welcomed the 2015 nuclear deal, noting separately that Iran has an inalienable right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy in accordance with the provisions of the NPT¹⁶⁹.

Ethiopia and India refrain from actively discussing the Iranian nuclear program. At the same time, New Delhi, being a non-member of the NPT, on the

¹⁶⁴ Iran proposes nuclear talks in Egypt // Seattle Times: сайт. – Seattle, 2013. January, 23. URL: <https://www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/iran-proposes-nuclear-talks-in-egypt/> (дата обращения: 10.05.2024). – Текст электронный.

¹⁶⁵ Египет назвал сделку с Ираном залогом стабильности на Ближнем Востоке // «Газета.ру»: сайт. – Москва, 2015. Апрель, 3. URL: https://www.gazeta.ru/politics/news/2015/04/03/n_7078509.shtml (дата обращения: 10.05.2024). – Текст электронный.

¹⁶⁶ Egypt closely follows up Iran deal developments – Foreign Ministry // Egypt Today: сайт. – Cairo, 2018. May, 8. URL: <https://www.egypttoday.com/Article/1/49610/Egypt-closely-follows-up-Iran-deal-developments-Foreign-Ministry> (дата обращения: 10.05.2024). – Текст электронный.

¹⁶⁷ Egypt: Iranian nuclear issue should be linked to its regional interference // Arab News: сайт. – 2021. January, 16. URL: <https://www.arabnews.com/node/1793721/middle-east> (дата обращения: 10.05.2024). – Текст электронный.

¹⁶⁸ Иран, Турция и Бразилия достигли соглашения по ядерной проблеме Ирана // Информационное агентство «РИА Новости»: сайт. – Москва, 2010. Май, 17. – URL: <https://ria.ru/20100517/235156501.html> (дата обращения: 10.05.2024). – Текст электронный.

¹⁶⁹ South Africa welcomes outcome of Iran Nuclear talks in Lausanne // South African Government: сайт. – Cape Town. – 2015. April, 8. URL: <https://www.gov.za/news/media-statements/south-africa-welcomes-outcome-iran-nuclear-talks-lausanne-08-apr-2015> (дата обращения: 10.05.2024). – Текст электронный

margins of the UN called on "the parties concerned to continue dialogue for the early resolution of differences and return to full implementation of the JCPOA"¹⁷⁰.

In general, the BRICS' ability to deal with Iran's nuclear program is very limited, and as the Group expands, a number of difficulties may arise. Firstly, Iran itself is now a member of the *Ten*, and it is highly likely that it will insist on its own wording in the BRICS final declaration on the nuclear program. Secondly, Russia and China have radically opposite positions on the NPT with respect to the UAE and Saudi Arabia. In this case, it should be assumed that the topic of Iran's nuclear program will either be discussed as cautiously as possible or will be excluded from

¹⁷⁰ India Supports Termination Of Iran's Nuclear Policy At UN // NDTV: сайт. – New Delhi. – 2022. December, 20. URL: <https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/india-supports-termination-of-irans-nuclear-policy-at-un-3621861> (дата обращения: 10.05.2024).). – Текст электронный.

the BRICS agenda; the second scenario seems more likely.




Figure 2: BRICS position on Iran's nuclear program

II.6 Prospects for BRICS engagement to normalize the situation around the DPRK nuclear program and denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula

The nuclear issue of the Korean Peninsula first entered the BRICS agenda in 2017, a natural reaction in response to the DPRK's new (sixth) nuclear test on 3 September 2017, one day before the IX BRICS Summit. In the final declaration, the BRICS countries "strongly deplored the nuclear test conducted by the DPRK" and "expressed deep concern over the ongoing tension and prolonged nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula, and emphasize that it should only be settled through peaceful means and direct dialogue of all the parties concerned"¹⁷¹. Subsequently, the wording of the paragraphs of the final declarations of the BRICS summits related to this issue had a standard formulation of supporting diplomatic efforts to resolve a wide range of issues around the Korean Peninsula, including its complete denuclearization.

The positions of the BRICS countries on the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula differ, and partly divide the countries along the same lines as with regard to the Iranian nuclear program. Russia, for example, claims US involvement in the deterioration of the situation in the region. Speaking at the first session of the Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) for the 11th Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 2023, the Russian delegation said: "for many years, it has been common to blame the DPRK for violating the NPT and for the lack of progress towards the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. In fact, the United States is taking steps incompatible with the objectives of nuclear non-proliferation, drawing the Republic of Korea, a non-nuclear state in the sense of the NPT, into the sphere of its nuclear strategy"¹⁷².

China (China and Russia are parties to the Six-Party Talks on the denuclearization of North Korea) shares a common position with the Russian

¹⁷¹ Xiamen Declaration BRICS. September 4, 2017. Xiamen, China. — Текст: непосредственный.

¹⁷² Выступление делегации Российской Федерации на первой сессии Подготовительного комитета 11-й Конференции по рассмотрению действия Договора о нераспространении ядерного оружия (кластер 2, нераспространение и гарантии МАГАТЭ), Вена, 7 августа 2023 года // МИД России: официальный сайт. — Москва, 2023. Август, 7. URL: <https://www.mid.ru/tv/?id=1900275&lang=ru> (дата обращения: 10.05.2024). — Текст электронный.

Federation, highlighting US actions as the cause of destabilization on the Korean Peninsula. Speaking at Precom 2023, China stated that "China is gravely concerned that the US and ROK are strengthening 'extended deterrence'. The visit of the US ballistic missile nuclear submarine to the ROK and the establishment with ROK of a "Nuclear Consultative Group", which is similar to NATO's "Nuclear Planning Group", would heighten tensions on the Korean Peninsula, hinder the realization of denuclearization of the Peninsula and stimulate nuclear arms race and proliferation"¹⁷³.

The positions of Moscow and Beijing demonstrate their balanced view and understanding of the depth of the situation. At the same time, it was in recent years, under the Biden administration, that the United States set a course for more active military cooperation with South Korea. The events that China referred to in its speech at the PrepCom were the entry of a US nuclear submarine carrying ballistic missiles into a South Korean port, which was the first such event in 40 years¹⁷⁴. In addition, in April 2023, the United States signed the so-called Washington Declaration with South Korea. According to this document, a nuclear advisory group was established with the stated purpose of strengthening extended deterrence, discussing nuclear and strategic planning, and seeking to address the threat to the nonproliferation regime posed by the DPRK¹⁷⁵.

However, not all BRICS countries share the opinion of Russia and China. Egypt takes an exceptionally neutral position, which correlates with its position on a world free of nuclear weapons. This is what Egypt reminded us of when commenting on the outcome of the meeting between the leaders of North and South

¹⁷³ Remarks by H.E. Ambassador LI Song on Nuclear Non-Proliferation at the First Meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the 2026 NPT Review Conference (7 August 2023, Vienna) // United Nations: official website. URL: [https://docs-library.unoda.org/Treaty_on_the_Non-Proliferation_of_Nuclear_Weapons_-_Preparatory_Committee_for_the_Eleventh_Review_ConferenceFirst_session_\(2023\)/China's_Cluster_2_Nonproliferation_final\(EN\).pdf](https://docs-library.unoda.org/Treaty_on_the_Non-Proliferation_of_Nuclear_Weapons_-_Preparatory_Committee_for_the_Eleventh_Review_ConferenceFirst_session_(2023)/China's_Cluster_2_Nonproliferation_final(EN).pdf) (дата обращения: 10.05.2024). – Текст электронный.

¹⁷⁴ Атомная подлодка США впервые за почти 40 лет прибыла в Южную Корею // Информационное агентство Lenta.ru: сайт. – Москва, 2023. Июль, 18. – URL: <https://lenta.ru/news/2023/07/18/podl/> (дата обращения: 10.05.2024). – Текст электронный.

¹⁷⁵ Washington Declaration // The White House: сайт. – Washington, 2023. April, 26. – URL: <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/04/26/washington-declaration-2/> (дата обращения: 10.05.2024). – Текст электронный.

Korea in April 2018, when the two countries also signed a joint declaration declaring the beginning of an era of peace and pledging to work towards ridding the Korean peninsula of nuclear weapons. Egypt welcomed the historic summit, calling the outcome "an important step towards ending tensions, achieving peace and denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula"¹⁷⁶.

Egypt's opinion is shared by Iran, which states: "a world free of weapons of mass destruction, and this is especially true for the establishment of nuclear-free zones on the Korean Peninsula and the Middle East", - this is Tehran's demand¹⁷⁷.

South Africa has traditionally condemned the DPRK's nuclear tests, but in the context of such statements it recalls that South Africa recognizes the right of all countries parties to the NPT to the legitimate development of nuclear energy for peaceful civilian purposes¹⁷⁸. Such a statement demonstrates South Africa's balanced position and its desire to distance itself from a situation in which Pretoria takes sides.

In a similar vein is Brazil, which, while condemning the nuclear-armed DPRK, also "reiterates diplomatic efforts to denuclearize the Korean peninsula"¹⁷⁹. Brazil also urges "the DPRK to comply with those resolutions and return, without delay, to the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon State" and calls on all parties "to refrain from any action leading to the escalation of tensions in Northeast Asia"¹⁸⁰.

India, naturally, not being a member of the NPT, refrains from commenting on the situation around the Korean peninsula. However, if New Delhi had to speak out on this issue, it would hardly condemn the DPRK. This is evidenced not only by

¹⁷⁶ Egypt welcomes historic two Koreas summit, expresses hope for denuclearisation of peninsula // Ahram Online: сайт. – 2018. April, 28. URL: <https://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/298488/Egypt/Politics-/Egypt-welcomes-historic-two-Koreas-summit,-express.aspx> (дата обращения: 10.05.2024). – Текст электронный.

¹⁷⁷ Iran urges nuclear weapon-free Korean peninsula// The Times of Isreal: сайт. – 2016. May, 2. URL: <https://www.timesofisrael.com/iran-urges-nuclear-weapon-free-korean-peninsula/> (дата обращения: 10.05.2024). – Текст электронный.

¹⁷⁸ SA Government's position on the nuclear test conducted by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea // South African Government: сайт. – Cape Town. – 2013. February, 12. URL: <https://www.gov.za/news/media-statements/sa-governments-position-nuclear-test-conducted-democratic-peoples-republic> (дата обращения: 10.05.2024). – Текст электронный.

¹⁷⁹ I Preparatory Committee for the 2020 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons // OPANAL: official website. – 2017. URL: https://www.opanal.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/brazil_cluster2.pdf (дата обращения: 10.05.2024). – Текст электронный.

¹⁸⁰ Statement by Brazil in the Security Council Consultations on DPRK // Ministério das Relações Exteriores: official website. – Brasilia – 2022. January, 12. URL: <https://www.gov.br/mre/en/Brazil-UNSC/Speeches-articles%20-interviews/speeches/statement-by-brazil-in-the-security-council-consultations-on-dprk> (дата обращения: 10.05.2024). – Текст электронный.

the current state of relations between India and the DPRK, but also by the perception of Pyongyang as its partner. Thus, a brief on the Indian Foreign Ministry's website published in 2017 (at a time when North Korea was making another missile launch) notes that relations between India and the DPRK are mainly characterized by friendship, cooperation and mutual understanding¹⁸¹.

The statements and steps of the Gulf countries - Saudi Arabia and the UAE - are in sharp contrast to the positions of the other BRICS countries. For example, Abu Dhabi places all the responsibility on the DPRK, saying that "the DPRK's actions are a source of major concern as they increase tensions in the Korean Peninsula and undermine the global non-proliferation regime". Abu Dhabi also "strongly urge the DPRK to desist from its activities, which are a flagrant violation of international law"¹⁸².

Saudi Arabia refrains from harsh statements regarding the DPP and denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. However, Riyadh's political sympathies are clearly on Seoul's side. In 2024, the Saudis signed a memorandum of understanding with South Korea to expand defense cooperation¹⁸³. The agreement provides for the establishment of a joint committee to form a working group to research and develop weapon systems and production for continued defence cooperation¹⁸⁴.

It is also worth noting that among the BRICS countries, not only China and Russia are actively involved in mechanisms to normalize the situation around the DPRK, but also Egypt and Ethiopia, although more by chance than on their own initiative. Since 2006, the UN Security Council has adopted ten key resolutions regarding the DPRK's nuclear program. Egypt, as a non-permanent member of the

¹⁸¹ India – DPR Korea Relations // Ministry of External Affairs of India: official website. – New Delhi. 2017. URL: https://www.mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/2_DPR_Korea_October_2017.pdf (дата обращения: 10.05.2024). – Текст электронный.

¹⁸² UAE Statement at the UN Security Council Meeting on Non-Proliferation / Democratic People's Republic of Korea // Permanent Mission of the United Arab Emirates to the United Nations: сайт. – 2023. November, 23. URL: <https://uaeun.org/statement/uae-unscc-dprk-27nov/> (дата обращения: 10.05.2024). – Текст электронный.

¹⁸³ South Korea, Saudi Arabia sign agreement on defence cooperation // Reuters: сайт. – 2024. February, 5. URL: <https://www.reuters.com/world/south-korea-saudi-arabia-sign-agreement-defence-cooperation-2024-02-05/> (дата обращения: 10.05.2024). – Текст электронный.

¹⁸⁴ Ibid.

UNSC, participated in the adoption of six of them, and Ethiopia participated in another four. All countries were unanimously in favor of adopting the document. However, this situation is unlikely to bring normalization of the situation around the Korean peninsula any closer or facilitate the development of any effective mechanisms within the BRICS framework.

Year	UNSC Resolution	Countries
2006	UNSC Resolution 1718	Russia, China
2009	UNSC Resolution 1874	Russia, China
2013	UNSC Resolution 2087	Russia, China
2013	UNSC Resolution 2094	Russia, China
2016	UNSC Resolution 2270	Russia, China, Egypt
2016	UNSC Resolution 2321	Russia, China, Egypt
2017	UNSC Resolution 2356	Russia, China, Egypt, Ethiopia
2017	UNSC Resolution 2371	Russia, China, Egypt, Ethiopia
2017	UNSC Resolution 2375	Russia, China, Egypt, Ethiopia
2017	UNSC Resolution 2397	Russia, China, Egypt, Ethiopia
2018	UNSC Resolution 2407	Russia, China, Egypt, Ethiopia

Table 3. Involvement of BRICS member states in voting on key UNSC resolutions on the DPRK nuclear program. Compiled by the author.

Thus, the BRICS countries are united on the Korean peninsula only in their common goal of denuclearization. Otherwise, they are at different levels: in their perception of the source of instability and in the degree of involvement in its resolution.




Figure 3: BRICS positions on the DPRK's nuclear program

II.7 Prospects for BRICS interaction in the field of nuclear energy

Nuclear energy was first included in the agenda of the BRICS summits in 2011. The text of the 2011 BRICS Final Declaration noted in a separate paragraph: "nuclear energy will continue to be an important element in future energy mix of BRICS countries. International cooperation in the development of safe nuclear energy for peaceful purposes should proceed under conditions of strict observance of relevant safety standards and requirements concerning design, construction and operation of nuclear power plants"¹⁸⁵.

In 2012, the nuclear energy agenda remained on the BRICS agenda, but now it was discussed from a different angle. Thus, the final declaration noted that "energy based on fossil fuels will continue to dominate the energy mix for the foreseeable future"¹⁸⁶. BRICS member countries have also expressed their willingness to "expand sourcing of clean and renewable energy, and use of energy efficient and alternative technologies, to meet the increasing demand of our economies and our people, and respond to climate concerns as well". However, in the same context, it was noted that "international cooperation in the development of safe nuclear energy for peaceful purposes should proceed under conditions of strict observance of relevant safety standards and requirements concerning design, construction and operation of nuclear power plants"¹⁸⁷. Thus, in 2012, the topic of nuclear energy was touched upon only in the context of energy transition and sustainable development. It was also noted that *the Five* viewed the role of nuclear power in this process and how it could be utilized. However, no practical steps for cooperation were proposed, and subsequently the nuclear energy agenda was not even touched upon at the BRICS summits. It was only in 2016 that it was brought up again, and then the continuity was maintained in 2017.

In 2016, in the BRICS final declaration, the BRICS member states recognized that that "nuclear energy will play a significant role for some of the BRICS countries

¹⁸⁵ Sanya Declaration BRICS. April 14, 2011. Sanya, China. — Текст: непосредственный.

¹⁸⁶ Delhi Declaration BRICS. March 29, 2012. New Delhi, India. — Текст: непосредственный.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid.

in meeting their 2015 Paris Climate Change Agreement commitments and for reducing global greenhouse gas emissions in the long term". In this regard, BRICS members "underlined the importance of predictability in accessing technology and finance for expansion of civil nuclear energy capacity which would contribute to the sustainable development of BRICS countries"¹⁸⁸. In 2017, for the first time, BRICS started talking about practical steps of cooperation. Thus, the summit outcome document noted that BRICS members "will work to foster open, flexible and transparent markets for energy commodities and technologies. We will work together to promote most effective use of fossil fuels and wider use of gas, hydro and nuclear power, which will contribute to the transformation". In this regard, BRICS members underlined "the importance of predictability in accessing technology and finance for expansion of civil nuclear energy capacity which would contribute to sustainable development in BRICS countries. We encourage continued dialogue on the establishment of a BRICS Energy Research Cooperation Platform and urge relevant entities to continue to promote joint research on energy cooperation and energy efficiency". Thereafter, the topic of nuclear energy was not touched upon at BRICS summits, and practical cooperation was limited to the creation of the BRICS Energy Research Platform was established in 2019.

BRICS cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear energy is currently one of the most promising areas. Most BRICS countries recognize the importance of nuclear energy development, pursue active policies in this area, and some member states are global leaders in the nuclear industry. According to IAEA data as of July 2024, China has 56 active nuclear reactors (the 3rd largest number in the world), Russia has 36 (the 4th largest in the world), and India has 20 (the 11th largest in the world)¹⁸⁹. Four reactors are also operating in the UAE, all at the Barakah nuclear power plant, which is the first nuclear power plant among the countries of the Arab world. All BRICS countries (Ethiopia, to a lesser extent) have a strong interest in

¹⁸⁸ Goa Declaration BRICS. October 16, 2016. Goa, India. – Текст: непосредственный.

¹⁸⁹ IAEA PRIS // IAEA: official website.URL: <https://pris.iaea.org/PRIS/WorldStatistics/OperationalReactorsByCountry.aspx> (дата обращения: 11.07.2024). — Текст: электронный.

nuclear technology. While BRICS includes only three nuclear powers (Russia, China, India), four have the capability to build their own nuclear weapons (Brazil, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt). In the opinion of PIR Center experts, as set out in the monograph *The New Nuclear Nine? Assessing the Threats of Nuclear Weapons Proliferation in the World* (edited by V. Orlov and S. Semenov), Iran, which has the technical potential to develop nuclear weapons, has the highest chances among the BRICS member states to acquire nuclear weapons. Brazil has the lowest. The authors assess the potential of Egypt and Saudi Arabia as average. Although it is highly probable that these states will not build their own nuclear weapons in the medium term, the results of the study also reflect the potential of the countries in question not only (and not so much) in the field of military, but also peaceful atoms. Thus, the BRICS countries have significant potential for cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear energy, and joint efforts could lead to a number of mutually beneficial outcomes for all BRICS countries. Firstly, the development of nuclear energy – with a focus on entering the markets of the new BRICS member states – will contribute to the transition to a low-emission economy, as well as to the promotion of sustainable development goals: these objectives have been previously outlined in the BRICS outcome documents. Second, joint nuclear energy projects will enable the BRICS countries to ensure stable energy supplies and reduce their dependence on fossil fuels, as well as strengthen their own energy security. Thirdly, BRICS efforts in nuclear research and development will contribute to the development of nuclear technologies, primarily in terms of safety and efficient use of technology.

However, in order to realize this potential, a number of factors need to be taken into account, as well as concerns about the political and legal aspects of such cooperation. If such mechanisms are institutionalized, coordination with the IAEA, which will have the status of a supervisory player in this format, will be required. It is necessary to establish mechanisms for controlling nuclear technologies and materials. It is also necessary to take into account that the BRICS member states are at different levels of development in the field of nuclear technology and have different priorities in this area, and therefore it will be necessary to find compromises

and a common mutually beneficial field for cooperation. However, despite these difficulties, cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear energy could become one of the key elements in strengthening relations between the BRICS countries and contribute to solving global problems.

CHAPTER III. THE BRICS AS A MECHANISM FOR PROMOTING INITIATIVES IN INTERNATIONAL SECURITY

The tendency of states to form certain or international norms can be conditioned by various factors. S. Krasner, referring to the emergence of international regimes, suggests five variables that guide states: self-interest-driven selfish behavior; political power; norms and principles; custom and tradition; and knowledge¹⁹⁰.

The Russian Federation, for example, has put forward several major initiatives in the field of international security, but not all of them have been implemented, and others are still under discussion. It is within the framework of BRICS which member states can most effectively promote their own ideas. BRICS has the potential to become a global player, creating and shaping international norms and rules. This position, however, does not mean that the BRICS will impose its vision on the rest of the world.

R. Jervis believes that in order to develop security regimes, great powers "must be confident that all others will share the value and importance they place on mutual security and cooperation".¹⁹¹ BRICS brings together several large and influential powers that represent different continents and have significant political weight not only in their region but also in the international arena. Russia, China, India, Brazil, South Africa, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Egypt are the most important players in world politics, whose voice and opinion cannot be ignored. By joining their own efforts, BRICS can make a significant contribution to strengthening international security. In turn, Russia can become a unifying link and leader in this Group, not seeking to monopolize approaches to international security issues, but acting for the benefit of all.

¹⁹⁰ Krasner, Stephen D. "Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables." *International Organization*, vol. 36, no. 2, [MIT Press, University of Wisconsin Press, Cambridge University Press, International Organization Foundation], 1982, pp. 185–205, — Текст: непосредственный.

¹⁹¹ Jervis, Robert. "Security Regimes." *International Organization*, vol. 36, no. 2, [MIT Press, University of Wisconsin Press, Cambridge University Press, International Organization Foundation], 1982, pp. 357–378. — Текст: непосредственный.

III.1 Initiatives in international information security and prospects for their promotion within BRICS

In the field of international information security (IIS), Russia is one of the main initiators of the adoption of internationally recognized norms and rules. It was Russia that initiated the discussion of information security issues within the UN framework: on Moscow's initiative, in 1998, the UNGA for the first time adopted a resolution *Developments in the sphere of information and telecommunications in the context of international security* – as a result, it initiated the discussion on the development of international principles aimed at strengthening the IIS¹⁹². Later on, resolutions on this agenda were adopted annually. Russia's practical orientation towards the formation of an international regime in the sphere of IIB is confirmed at the doctrinal level. Thus, the Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation in 2016 noted that "Russia seeks to develop universal rules of responsible behavior of states in the field of ensuring international information security under the auspices of the United Nations"¹⁹³, the Foreign Policy Concept 2023 emphasizes that Moscow "intends to give priority attention to strengthening and improving the international legal regime for preventing and resolving interstate conflicts and regulating activities in the global cyberspace"¹⁹⁴. At the same time, the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation of 2021 lists as one of its tasks "strengthening cooperation between the Russian Federation and foreign partners in the field of information security, including for the purpose of establishing an

¹⁹² Резолюция ООН A/RES/53/70 «Достижения в сфере информации и телекоммуникации в контексте международной безопасности»: принята Генеральной Ассамблеей Организации Объединенных Наций 4 декабря 1998 г. // Организация Объединенных наций: официальный сайт. URL: <https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n99/760/05/pdf/n9976005.pdf?token=RjqgbGTFthv4d863K6&fe=true> (дата обращения: 17.04.2024). – Текст электронный.

¹⁹³ Концепция внешней политики Российской Федерации: утверждена Президентом Российской Федерации В.В.Путиным 30 ноября 2016 г. (утратила силу) — Текст: электронный // Президент России: официальный сайт. – Москва, 2016. Ноябрь, 30. URL: <http://kremlin.ru/acts/bank/41451/page/2> (дата обращения: 12.03.2024). – Текст электронный.

¹⁹⁴ Концепция внешней политики Российской Федерации: утверждена Президентом Российской Федерации В.В.Путиным 31 марта 2023 г. — Текст: электронный // МИД Российской Федерации: официальный сайт. – Москва, 2023. Март, 31. URL: <https://www.mid.ru/ru/detail-material-page/1860586/> (дата обращения: 12.03.2024). – Текст электронный.

international legal regime for ensuring security in the use of information and communication technologies".¹⁹⁵

Within the UN, Russia initiated the creation of the Open Working Group (OWG) in 2018. Its format implies the involvement of all UN member states in discussing the rules and principles of responsible behavior of states in the ICT sphere¹⁹⁶. The competing format to the Russian draft – a group of governmental experts convened in the wake of the US-sponsored resolution - has at various times included between 15 and 25 states¹⁹⁷.

In November 2023, both resolutions - initiated by both Russia and the United States - were adopted as part of the UNGA vote. It is worth noting that the Russian draft (co-authored with a number of other countries, including China and Iran) was supported by all BRICS countries¹⁹⁸. As for the American project, it was not supported by Russia, China, and Iran; the rest of the BRICS members were in favor of Washington's project. This situation is not a problem, but the key conclusions are, firstly, the full support of the BRICS states for the Russian project and, secondly, the similar views of Russia, China as well as Iran on information security issues. It is behind the leadership of Moscow and Beijing that BRICS can strengthen and develop cooperation on the information security agenda¹⁹⁹.

¹⁹⁵ Стратегия национальной безопасности Российской Федерации: утверждена указом Президента Российской Федерации №400 02 июля 2021 г. – Текст: электронный // Президент Российской Федерации: официальный сайт. – Москва, 2021. Июль, 2. URL: <http://www.kremlin.ru/acts/bank/47046/page/5> (дата обращения: 11.03.2024). – Текст электронный.

¹⁹⁶ Резолюция ООН A/RES/73/27 «Достижения в сфере информатизации и телекоммуникаций в контексте международной безопасности»: принята Генеральной Ассамблеей Организации Объединенных Наций 5 декабря 2018 г. // Организация Объединенных наций: официальный сайт. URL: <https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n18/418/07/pdf/n1841807.pdf?token=p10foSsVo3XQjXctHY&fe=true> (дата обращения: 17.04.2024). – Текст электронный.

¹⁹⁷ Толстухина, А.В. Лучше две киберрезолюции, чем ни одной // // Российский совет по международным делам: сайт. – Москва, 2019. Февраль, 13. – URL: <https://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/analytics/luchshe-dve-kiberrezolyutsii-chem-ni-odnoy/> (дата обращения: 05.05.2024). – Текст электронный.

¹⁹⁸ Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security : draft resolution / Azerbaijan, Belarus, Burundi, China, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Mali, Nicaragua, Russian Federation, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) and Zimbabwe // Организация Объединенных наций: официальный сайт. – 2023. Октябрь, 12 — URL: <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4024888?ln=en&v=pdf> (дата обращения: 05.05.2024). – Текст электронный

¹⁹⁹ Programme of Action to Advance Responsible State Behaviour in the Use of Information and Communications Technologies in the Context of International Security : draft resolution / Albania, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Colombia, Croatia, Cyprus, Czechia, Denmark, Djibouti, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania,

Russia is one of the main supporters of the development of cooperation under the BRICS umbrella, as relevant proposals are regularly made by top officials. For example, in September 2017. V. Putin proposed that the BRICS countries conclude an agreement on information security. In his statement, the President noted that "Russia is consistently in favor of expanding cooperation between the BRICS countries in the sphere of global information security"²⁰⁰; the Russian leader also proposed to "develop and approve rules of behavior for states in the sphere of information security"²⁰¹. In 2018, a similar statement was made by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov at the BRICS Council of Foreign Ministers, where the diplomat stated that "the BRICS countries realize the need to strengthen the international legal framework for cooperation in the field of IS"²⁰².

It should be noted that the BRICS countries have not yet managed to develop a collective approach to information security issues (which is reflected, for example, in the lack of consensus on the final content of the multilateral agreement on IIB), but some steps are being taken and, with a high probability, certain norms will soon be developed on the platform. The Russian Federation is actively promoting this direction. Russian researcher A. Manoilo believes that in order to create the BRICS collective security space, Moscow needs to institutionalize cooperation between the cyber police of the BRICS member states and the relevant structures of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs²⁰³. A. Manoilo also puts forward the idea of deepening joint cooperation in the field of information security by creating joint infrastructure projects, media, deepening cooperation with companies of BRICS member states

Luxembourg, Malawi, Malta, Monaco, Netherlands (Kingdom of the), New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Senegal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America // Организация Объединенных наций: официальный сайт. – 2023. Октябрь, 12 — URL: <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4024683?ln=en&v=pdf> (дата обращения: 05.05.2024). – Текст электронный.

²⁰⁰ Путин предложил странам БРИКС заключить соглашение по информационной безопасности // Информационное агентство ТАСС: сайт. – Москва, 2017. Сентябрь, 1. – URL: <https://tass.ru/politika/4523253> (дата обращения: 06.02.2024). – Текст электронный.

²⁰¹ Там же.

²⁰² Лавров: страны БРИКС выступают за разработку совместного соглашения по кибербезопасности // Информационное агентство ТАСС: сайт. – Москва, 2016. Июнь, 4. – URL: <https://tass.ru/politika/5261231> (дата обращения: 06.02.2024). – Текст электронный.

²⁰³ Манойло А.В. Российский подход к формированию пространства коллективной информационной безопасности стран БРИКС // Социальные и гуманитарные знания. 2018. Т. 4, № 3(15). С. 162. — Текст: непосредственный.

and in the field of IT technologies, etc.²⁰⁴. Such proposals seem ineffective and unpromising. A more productive step for the creation of a BRICS collective information security space would be to develop a joint approach and sign documents setting out areas of cooperation. The BRICS could also learn from the experience of the CSTO, which since 2009²⁰⁵ has been carrying out operations to counter ICT crime "PROXY". There are no obstacles within the BRICS that could complicate cooperation in this area, and at the same time, the absolute majority of the BRICS countries are technologically developed states, which increases the effectiveness of such cooperation.

Another potentially beneficial area of cooperation between BRICS members in the information security area could be to strengthen the digital sovereignty of BRICS members²⁰⁶. This area of de facto cooperation was already formed in 2015, when the first meeting of BRICS communications ministers declared the need to work together to develop a common approach to the international legal regulation of the principle of digital sovereignty²⁰⁷.

In general, over the past decade, the members of the Group have made significant progress in developing a digital governance regime based on respect for state sovereignty, including at the UN level. In addition, the expansion of the BRICS creates positive expectations for the scaling up of digital security solutions to countries outside the Group, mainly through the involvement of developing countries in the relevant work²⁰⁸.

²⁰⁴ Там же.

²⁰⁵ Начиная с 2014 г. «ПРОКСИ» приобрела масштаб операции постоянного действия (с 2009 по 2014 гг. носила характер ежегодной).

²⁰⁶ Игнатов, А.А., Зиновьева Е.С. «Цифровой суверенитет» в повестке объединения БРИКС // Российский совет по международным делам: сайт. – Москва, 2024. Январь, 24. – URL: <https://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/analytics/tsifrovoy-suverenitet-v-povestke-obedineniya-briks/> (дата обращения: 05.05.2024). – Текст электронный.

²⁰⁷ Стартовала первая в истории встреча ИКТ-министров стран БРИКС // Министерство цифрового развития, связи и массовых коммуникаций Российской Федерации: официальный сайт. – Москва, 2015. Октябрь, 22. – URL: <https://digital.gov.ru/ru/events/34185/> (дата обращения: 05.05.2024). – Текст электронный.

²⁰⁸ Игнатов, А.А., Зиновьева Е.С. «Цифровой суверенитет» в повестке объединения БРИКС // Российский совет по международным делам: сайт. – Москва, 2024. Январь, 24. – URL: <https://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/analytics/tsifrovoy-suverenitet-v-povestke-obedineniya-briks/> (дата обращения: 05.05.2024). – Текст электронный.

III.2 Initiatives to Prevent an Arms Race in Space and Prospects for Promoting them within BRICS

The theme of countering the militarization of space has been present in all final declarations of BRICS summits since 2014. The key idea of all such documents is the peaceful use of outer space and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. All BRICS countries, without exception, have expressed their commitment to such ideas. Despite the unity on this issue in conceptual terms, some BRICS countries may not seem to understand the specifics of certain aspects.

The UAE, for example, has stated at various levels that space should be used for peaceful purposes. Emirati diplomats regularly speak out on this issue, and in addition, officials from government agencies voice their opinion. For example, the UAE Minister of State for Advanced Technology S. Al-Amiri said that "politics should not affect space". She also added that "the U.S., Russia, China and India are carrying out anti-satellite operations, and this is not something good for the future"²⁰⁹.

At the same time, in April 2024, at the initiative of the United States and Japan, a draft resolution on the non-deployment of WMD weapons in space was put forward in the UN Security Council. Russia vetoed this initiative. Washington and Japan proposed the introduction of new restrictions in space that had not been fixed anywhere before and without prior expert, legal, and technical consultations. The US sought to "expose Russia," as the US Permanent Representative to the United Nations stated in her communication with journalists. In response to the draft U.S.-Japanese resolution, Russia offered amendments consisting of a proposal not to place any weapons of any kind in space, which in turn had already been rejected by the U.S. and its allies.

In this regard, the BRICS platform can play an important role in the Russian Federation's outreach efforts. By working within the profile committees within the

²⁰⁹ Keep politics away from space, says UAE minister // The National News: сайт. – Abu Dhabi, 2023. January, 19. URL: <https://www.thenationalnews.com/uae/2023/01/19/keep-politics-away-from-space-says-uae-minister/> (дата обращения: 05.05.2024). – Текст электронный.

Group, Moscow is able to communicate its vision of the issues in detail and potentially gain support from other BRICS countries.

This approach is already being fully implemented within other regional groups of which Russia is a full member. For example, in 2019, the SCO member states held consultations on the prevention of an arms race in outer space (hereinafter referred to as PAROS) for the first time²¹⁰. In the same year, the CIS adopted a Joint Statement of the CIS member states "On Supporting Practical Steps on PAROS". Speaking about the Joint Statement of the CIS countries, it is worth mentioning that one of its paragraphs contains a request to Russia to disseminate the text of this Joint Statement to the UN, OSCE and other international organizations²¹¹. Thus, Moscow already has the experience of a leader in promoting initiatives related to PAROS. In the context of BRICS, Russia can promote the draft treaty on the Prevention of the C (PPWT). This treaty was proposed by Russia and China at the disarmament conference in Geneva in 2008. The draft treaty has been refined several times, but as a result, no practical results have been achieved – with the exception of the adoption of an annual resolution on PPWT at the UN GA.

In 2023, Russia introduced a resolution at the UNGA on non-first deployment of weapons in space. Together with Russia, the resolution was co-sponsored by China, Brazil, and Egypt among the BRICS countries²¹². In the final vote at the UNGA, the resolution was supported by 127 countries, including all BRICS member states; 51 countries opposed it²¹³. It is worth noting that back in 2019, only 14 countries opposed the resolution, but against the backdrop of the hybrid warfare

²¹⁰ В Москве состоялись консультации государств-членов ШОС по проблематике предотвращения гонки вооружений в космическом пространстве // Шанхайская организация сотрудничества: официальный сайт. – Москва, 2019. Сентябрь, 7. – URL: <https://rus.sectsko.org/20190907/573030.html> (дата обращения: 05.05.2024). – Текст электронный.

²¹¹ Решение о Совместном заявлении государств – участников СНГ «О поддержке практических шагов по предотвращению гонки вооружений в космическом пространстве» // Единый реестр правовых актов и других документов Содружества Независимых Государств: официальный сайт. – Москва, 2019. Октябрь, 10. – URL: <https://www.cis.minsk.by/reestr2/doc/6144#text> (дата обращения: 05.05.2024). – Текст электронный.

²¹² ГА ООН приняла резолюцию РФ по неразмещению оружия в космосе // Информационное агентство ТАСС: сайт. – Москва, 2023. Декабрь, 4. – URL: <https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/19453773> (дата обращения: 06.02.2024). – Текст электронный.

²¹³ Resolution A/RES/78/21 «No first placement of weapons in outer space»: принята Генеральной Ассамблеей Организации Объединенных Наций 4 декабря 2023 г. // Организация Объединенных наций: официальный сайт. URL: <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/4029229?ln=ru> (дата обращения: 17.05.2024). – Текст электронный.

launched against Russian Federation, Western countries are adopting any methods to confront Moscow. In such circumstances, the role of diplomacy is even stronger.

The BRICS platform and the BRICS plus/outreach formats can become key mechanisms for promoting Russian initiatives in the field of PAROS, as well as in other areas. It is necessary to involve as many countries as possible in discussions on preventing militarization and an arms race in outer space. In this case, any attempts by the West to "denounce Russia" will fail, and Moscow will at the same time strengthen its role as a responsible world power. In 2004, in the First Committee of the 59th session of the UNGA, Russia unilaterally committed itself as the first step not to deploy weapons in space, and in 2005 all other CSTO states made the same commitment. A similar scenario can be realized with view to BRICS. In this regard, the enlargement of the BRICS is an absolute advantage for promoting initiatives among as many states as possible.

III.3 Initiatives on Chemical and Biological Terrorism and Prospects for their Promotion within BRICS

The issue of combating acts of chemical and biological terrorism has featured at BRICS summits since 2016. These issues have been raised continuously since 2018, and for the past six years they have been consistently included in the text of the final declarations.

However, the wording has not changed over the years, and each time the BRICS countries call "for the launch of multilateral negotiations on an international convention on combating acts of chemical and biological terrorism in the Conference on Disarmament".

The initiative to develop an international convention on combating acts of chemical terrorism (ICCBT) was presented by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov on March 1, 2016 at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. The

Russian initiative aims to fill a vacuum in international law, where there is no universal instrument to effectively respond to the threat of WMD terrorism.²¹⁴

The draft of this convention consists of 24 articles. The document provides clear definitions of various concepts (chemical weapons, toxic chemical, etc.), proposes mechanisms for cooperation, and defines the responsibility of states and cases that constitute violations of the convention. The latter include, for example, not only cases of offences using biological and chemical weapons, but also the threat of their use²¹⁵. As noted in the information note on the website of the Russian Foreign Ministry, "the adoption of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Chemical and Biological Terrorism will contribute to the security of all countries without exception at the national, regional and global levels"²¹⁶.

Despite the universal nature of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Chemical and Biological Terrorism at its core, Western countries have not only failed to provide significant support for the Russian project, but have also attempted to oppose it in some respects²¹⁷.

In the long term, the BRICS platform could become the basis for promoting this project. By presenting a united front at the Conference on Disarmament or at the UNGA, BRICS could contribute to the promotion of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Chemical and Biological Terrorism project and promote the adoption of this convention. First, however, it is necessary to resolve

²¹⁴ Инициатива по разработке международной конвенции о борьбе с актами химического и биологического терроризма (Справка) // МИД России: официальный сайт. – Москва, 2023. Март, 2. – URL: https://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/international_safety/1856485/ (дата обращения: 06.03.2024). – Текст электронный.

²¹⁵ Письмо Постоянного представителя Российской Федерации от 3 августа 2016 года на имя Генерального секретаря Конференции по разоружению, препровождающее тексты элементов проекта международной конвенции по борьбе с актами химического и биологического терроризма и прилагаемого дополнения // Организация Объединенных наций: официальный сайт. Женева. – 2016. Август, 18. URL: <https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/g16/183/52/pdf/g1618352.pdf?token=bLLRcCHqyOQcxxFmPw&fe=true> (дата обращения: 06.03.2024). – Текст электронный.

²¹⁶ Инициатива по выработке международной конвенции по борьбе с актами химического и биологического терроризма Текст: электронный // МИД Российской Федерации: официальный сайт. – Москва, 2021. Апрель, 28. URL: https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/position_word_order/1413358/ (дата обращения: 12.03.2024). – Текст электронный.

²¹⁷ Инициатива по выработке международной конвенции по борьбе с актами химического и биологического терроризма Текст: электронный // МИД Российской Федерации: официальный сайт. – Москва, 2021. Апрель, 28. URL: https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/position_word_order/1413358/ (дата обращения: 12.03.2024). – Текст электронный.

the contradictions within BRICS itself that have arisen as a result of Egypt's accession to BRICS.

The stumbling block is the position of Egypt, which is not a signatory to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), nor is it a full party to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC; signed but not ratified). Egypt's behavior stems from the fact that its security could be threatened by Israel, which is an (unrecognized) nuclear power and does not support the idea of a WMD-free zone in the Middle East²¹⁸. This fear of Cairo is not unfounded - Syria became a full-fledged participant in the CWC in 2013, and in 2014 Damascus got rid of all its stockpiles of chemical weapons. Damascus got rid of all its stockpiles of chemical weapons. In the end, however, Syria became vulnerable to Israeli attacks and did not receive any guarantees of its own security in return.

In 2024, the Joint Statement of the BRICS Ministers of Foreign Affairs/International Relations did not contain language on chemical and biological terrorism²¹⁹. It is worth noting that previously such phrases were an integral part of the joint statements on the results of the BRICS Ministerial Council meetings. This situation represents a challenge for the BRICS, but it is not a significant problem, as the Conference on Disarmament is the main international platform for discussing this issue.

²¹⁸ Ю.Белоборов, «Препятствия на пути универсализации» // Журнал «Международная жизнь»: сайт. – Москва, 2014. Апрель. – URL: <https://interaffairs.ru/jauthor/material/1185> (дата обращения: 05.05.2024). – Текст электронный.

²¹⁹ Совместное заявление Министров иностранных дел/международных отношений стран БРИКС, Нижний Новгород, Российская Федерация, 10 июня 2024 года // МИД Российской Федерации: официальный сайт. – Москва, 2024. Июнь, 10. URL: https://www.mid.ru/ru/press_service/1955719/ (дата обращения: 12.03.2024). – Текст электронный.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

BRICS does not see itself as a stand-alone institution in the field of international security. When raising a particular issue at BRICS summits, the text of the final declarations invariably refers to the UN or other relevant platforms as the main venue for general discussions and the adoption of internationally recognized agreements - thus BRICS does not seek to monopolize its own approaches to international security issues. Security ideas serve as a solid basis for interaction among the BRICS countries, and the Group itself is perceived by its members as an important player in the international arena, with responsibility for the development of international relations. At the same time, the BRICS countries support inclusiveness and favor multilateral approaches.

At the same time, the expansion of BRICS international security agenda is an unlikely scenario, and an increase in the number of members of *the Group* would lead to increased contradictions.

Another problem that BRICS will inevitably face is the divergence of approaches to a number of issues previously discussed within the BRICS framework, such as the Iranian nuclear program, which has been in the texts of the BRICS summits since 2012. Difficulties may arise for a number of reasons. Firstly, Iran itself has become a member of BRICS since January 2024, and it is highly likely that it will insist on its own wording in the BRICS final declaration with regard to Iran's nuclear program. Secondly, Russia and China have radically opposite positions on the NPT with respect to the UAE and Saudi Arabia. In this case, we should assume that the topic of Iran's nuclear program will either be discussed as *cautiously* as possible or will be excluded from the BRICS agenda; the second scenario seems more likely.

In terms of opportunities, BRICS cooperation in counter-terrorism is promising. The states of the Group share a similar approach to positioning the terrorist threat in the national security system, priorities the development of external contacts and accept the need to consolidate overall efforts to combat international

terrorism – although in practice they still have some disagreements on certain aspects of responding to the challenge. In this regard, it can be expected that the BRICS states are likely to focus their efforts on a comprehensive response to the activities of the largest international terrorist organizations (ISIS and Al-Qaeda²²⁰), including countering the propaganda, recruitment, financial and economic activities of these groups. On the one hand, this would avoid disagreements (since all BRICS members have a similar assessment of the threat posed by these militant groups) and, on the other hand, maintain a positive vector of international cooperation and contribute to the further development of the relevant dialogue. In addition, another important long-term task for BRICS should be to work together to promote at the UN level fundamental documents in the field of countering the terrorist threat, in particular, to accelerate the adoption of the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism by the UN General Assembly.

BRICS countries should also be expected to converge on information security issues. With the new expansion of BRICS, technologically advanced countries have joined BRICS, supporting the universal desire for cooperation and the formation of norms in the field of information security. Without exception, all the countries of BRICS support the Russian project on an Open Working Group promoted by Moscow at the UN. In the near future, the members of BRICS will focus on gradually converging positions on the most sensitive information security issues, as well as on increasing the level of trust in the digital space as a whole. However, due to the specifics of the sphere and the complex international situation, this process can hardly be forced.

BRICS member states' cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear energy is promising. Most of the BRICS countries recognize the importance of nuclear energy development, pursue an active policy in this area, and some member states are world leaders in the nuclear industry. Joint efforts within the BRICS framework can lead to a number of mutually beneficial results for all BRICS countries. Firstly, such

²²⁰ Organizations recognized as terrorist on the territory of the Russian Federation.

cooperation will contribute to the transition to a low-emission economy as well as to the promotion of sustainable development goals. Second, it would reduce dependence on fossil fuels and enhance their own energy security. Third, a grouping of nuclear research and development efforts can contribute to the development of nuclear technology - especially in terms of safety, as well as the efficient use of technology. However, in order to realize this potential, a number of factors need to be taken into account, as well as concerns about the political and legal aspects of such cooperation.

The BRICS *stage* also allows the Russian Federation – like any other member state of the *Group* – to more actively promote its international security initiatives. In addition to the above-mentioned project on information security, in 2016 Moscow launched an initiative to develop an international convention on combating acts of chemical terrorism. Moscow launched an initiative to develop an international convention on combating acts of chemical terrorism, and in 2023 Russia - in co-authorship with BRICS countries such as China, Brazil and Egypt - introduced a resolution at the UNGA on non-first deployment of weapons in space. Having secured the support of the BRICS countries, Russia can more effectively promote its projects on the margins of specialized platforms such as the UN General Assembly, the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, the Conference on Disarmament and others. By acting as a united front, BRICS can contribute to the promotion of these projects and the strengthening of the international security regime.











The possibility of involving states interested in joining BRICS cooperation mechanisms should be explored. Such an approach would, first, allow for the formation of more inclusive formats of multilateral cooperation, which could then have a practical impact on decision-making within the framework of universal international cooperation institutions and formats (the UNGA and its committees, the Conference on Disarmament, the NPT Review Conference, etc.); second, the participation of BRICS partner states in the above-mentioned cooperation mechanisms would allow for a more seamless and smooth integration into the formats of cooperation in the future, should these states fully join the BRICS. More


than 200 events are planned for the year of Russia's representation in BRICS. Under such conditions, the integration of "newcomers" at the initial stages is difficult, and the effectiveness of their involvement is minimal. In addition, the involvement of the largest number of countries helps to strengthen the role of BRICS as a platform for promoting international security initiatives by testing ideas within BRICS and by bringing the position of one country or Group of countries to the rest of the participants in various formats of BRICS.


BRICS is expected to remain an active player in international security in the future, but security issues will not overshadow the rest of the BRICS'S agenda. The *Ten* is a significant actor in the security sphere, given the presence of world and regional leaders in its ranks. The voice of the BRICS states is crucial for the formation of the international order: without the involvement of Russia, China, India, Brazil, South Africa, as well as Saudi Arabia and Iran, it is impossible to solve any important international problems. In the medium term, it is the search for joint effective approaches that will be at the core BRICS, including in the field of international security.


ANNEXES

Table 1. BRICS countries' Positions on Nuclear Nonproliferation, Arms Control and Nuclear Security Issues

BRICS countries' Positions on Nuclear Nonproliferation, Arms Control and Nuclear Security Issues										
										
Nuclear Nonproliferation										
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons	+	+	×	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty	+	●	×	●	+	●	●	+	×	+
Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons	●	×	×	×	+	×	×	×	×	×
Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty	+	+	+	×	●	+	+	×	×	●
IAEA Arrangements										
Member state of IAEA	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
IAEA Safeguards Agreements	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+	+
IAEA Safeguards Additional Protocol	×	+	+	+	+	×	●	+	×	+
Export Control Regimes										
Nuclear Suppliers Group	+	+	×	+	+	×	×	×	×	×
Zangger Committee	×	+	×	+	+	×	×	×	×	×
Missile Technology Control Regime	+	+	+	●	+	×	×	×	×	×
Australia Group	×	×	+	×	×	×	×	×	×	×
Nuclear Security										
Export Control Regimes	+	+	+	+	+	+	×	+	+	×
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material	+	+	+	+	+	×	×	+	+	×
International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism	+	+	+	+	+	●	×	+	+	×
Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction										
Chemical Weapons Convention	+	+	+	+	+	×	+	+	+	+
Biological Weapons Convention	+	+	+	+	+	●	+	+	+	+
Proliferation Security Initiative	×	×	×	×	×	×	×	+	+	×
Financial Action Task Force	+	×	+	+	+	×	×	×	+	×

 Full Country Participation (Treaty Signed and Ratified)

 Treaty Signed and Ratified with Reservations

 Partial Country Participation (Treaty Signed but NOT Ratified)


 Country is NOT a Party to the Treaty (Treaty NOT Signed)


Table 2. BRICS countries that have adopted the federal law "On Countering Terrorism" (or its analog). Compiled by the author.

BRICS countries that have adopted a federal law on countering terrorism (or its equivalent)		
Country	Title of the Document	Year of Adoption
Brazil	Act No. 13,260 (Anti-Terrorism Act)	2016
Russia	Federal Law "On Combating Terrorism" N 35-FZ	2006
India	UAPA Amendment Act	2004
China	Anti-Terrorism Act	2015
South Africa	Anti-Terrorism Bill	2002
Egypt	Anti-Terrorism Law Terrorist Entities Law	2015
UAE	Federal Law Number 7 on Combatting Terrorism Offences	2014
Saudi Arabia	Penal Law of Crimes of Terrorism and its Financing	2014

Table 3. Involvement of BRICS member states in voting on key UNSC resolutions on the DPRK nuclear program. Compiled by the author

Year	UNSC Resolution	Countries
2006	UNSC Resolution 1718	Russia, China
2009	UNSC Resolution 1874	Russia, China
2013	UNSC Resolution 2087	Russia, China
2013	UNSC Resolution 2094	Russia, China
2016	UNSC Resolution 2270	Russia, China, Egypt
2016	UNSC Resolution 2321	Russia, China, Egypt
2017	UNSC Resolution 2356	Russia, China, Egypt, Ethiopia
2017	UNSC Resolution 2371	Russia, China, Egypt, Ethiopia
2017	UNSC Resolution 2375	Russia, China, Egypt, Ethiopia
2017	UNSC Resolution 2397	Russia, China, Egypt, Ethiopia
2018	UNSC Resolution 2407	Russia, China, Egypt, Ethiopia

Figure 1. BRICS positions on nuclear non-proliferation issues



Abscissa (X)

- 10: Total Opposition to the Idea of General Disarmament and the Abandonment of Nuclear Weapons
- -10: Full Support for the Idea of General Disarmament and Abandonment of Nuclear Weapons

Ordinate (Y)

- 10: Country Has Nuclear Weapons and Has a Significant Number of Warheads
- >0: Country Has Nuclear Weapons
- -10: Country Has No Nuclear Weapons; Its Potential To Acquire Them Is Extremely Small

Figure 2. BRICS position on Iran's nuclear program





Figure 3. BRICS positions on the DPRK's nuclear program



PIR Center is implementing *BRICS Perspectives on Peace and Security* project. Its objectives include:

- Promoting a multilateral approach to world order, which underpins the work of the BRICS.
- Finding promising and priority areas for Russia's security cooperation within the BRICS framework.
- Development of approaches and recommendations for Russian foreign policy agencies to promote Russia's interests through the BRICS mechanisms.
- Analyzing the positions of other BRICS members on a number of international issues and finding common ground with Russia's position.

In December 2023, as part of the *Security Index* Yearbook project implemented by PIR Center in cooperation with MGIMO, an interview with the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia, Sergey Ryabkov, was published ahead of Russia's BRICS Chairship year.

PIR Center Project *BRICS Perspectives on Peace and Security*

Interview with Sergey Ryabkov, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia, on the Russian BRICS Chairship Year, implemented in the framework of *Security Index* Yearbook

