

CHAPTER 3

RUSSIAN-AMERICAN COOPERATION ON NPT EXTENSION: LESSONS LEARNED

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The Eighteen-Nation Committee's negotiations on the duration of a future Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) resulted in broad consensus and compromise that 25 years after its entry into force a conference on the extension of the Treaty would be convened to decide 'whether [it] shall continue in force indefinitely or shall be extended for an additional fixed period or periods'.¹

The 1995 Review and Extension Conference (NPTREC), as the name implies, had the dual task of reviewing the NPT and deciding upon its extension. It took place from April 17 to May 12, 1995 at the United Nations Headquarters in New York and resulted in the adoption of a 'package deal' that also came to be known as 'indefinite extension plus' or 'permanence with accountability'. The package deal comprised three decisions (on 'strengthening the review process for the Treaty'; 'principles and objectives for nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament'; and 'indefinite extension') and the Resolution on the Middle East.

As U.S. Special Representative for Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Ambassador Thomas Graham argues, 'the consensus decision to extend the NPT indefinitely and without conditions was a team effort that required numerous contributions'.² The contribution to the achievement of the NPT extension made by the United States and Russia is hard to underestimate. Their

¹ 'Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons' (1968) United Nations, Office for Disarmament Affairs, available at <https://www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/npt/text> (17 May, 2021).

² Graham, Thomas Jr. (1995) 'Speech at the Woodrow Wilson Center,' U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Arms Control Text, available at <https://www.thom-asgraham.info/Speech%2347May1995.pdf> (18 May, 2021).

concerted efforts to achieve the indefinite extension of the NPT were fueled by their shared interest in halting the proliferation of nuclear weapons proliferation, and hence preserving the NPT. It should be noted that, at the time, the two countries enjoyed generally good relations and closely collaborated on a number of issues and activities, including nuclear-related. In 1991, the United States and Russia signed the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), which became the first agreement to practically reduce strategic arms on both sides. Later the same year, Washington and Moscow agreed to start a Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (CTRP), better known as the 'Nunn-Lugar program' – it was designed to achieve the dismantlement and destruction of weapons of mass destruction in the former Soviet republics and ensure safety and security of Russian nuclear infrastructure.

Ambassador Jayantha Dhanapala, President of the 1995 NPTREC, provided considerable assistance in their endeavor. His fundamental objective was to ensure that 'the decision [will] be unanimous, or [...] at least a parliamentary consensus decision'.³ In order to achieve consensus on the Treaty extension, he established a President's Consultation Group made up of representatives from different regions of the world, including representatives from the United States and Russia.

Canada and South Africa also played a significant part in the indefinite extension of the NPT, serving as a 'bridge' between the nuclear-weapon states (NWSs), who supported the indefinite extension of the Treaty, and the non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWSs) – the majority of them being the NAM states – who originally opposed it.⁴

Lastly, one cannot fail to mention the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), negotiations on which commenced in January 1994. Many NNWSs disgruntled by the lack of progress in the area of nuclear disarmament had high hopes about the future of

³ 'Oral History Interview with Thomas Graham,' (2017) History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Contributed to NPIHP by Michal Onderco, Wilson Center, available at <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/177539.pdf?v=1819499f04e42170c2d9c6014deadcd4> (18 May, 2021).

⁴ Krieger, David (2019) 'Participation in the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference,' Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, available at <https://www.wagingpeace.org/participation-in-the-1995-npt-review-and-extension-conference/> (18 May, 2021).

the CTBT and were looking forward to the Treaty being concluded. Without it, NNWSs would certainly be less inclined to support the indefinite extension of the NPT.

In the Lead-Up to the 1995 Review and Extension Conference

States Parties' Positions Prior to the NPTREC

In the early 1990s, the majority of the NPT member-states remained uncertain about how they were going to vote at the NPTREC. It was estimated that the number of the conference participants was going to be around 170, of which at least 86 would be necessary for any extension option to win. Since the cold war era NPT states parties remained conditionally divided into two groups: 'Western' and 'Eastern'. The Western Group comprised the United States and its allies – NATO states, Australia, and Japan – around 25 states in total. The Eastern Group consisted of about 20 states loosely associated with the former Soviet Union and its allies. As Ambassador Dhanapala points out,

Given that many of the states in this Group wished to become, and in fact later became, members of NATO and/or the European Union, it was not at all surprising that the Western and Eastern Groups worked closely together throughout the NPTREC deliberations. They collaborated often.⁵

In 1992, the Center for Security and Technology Studies Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory held NPT Extension Conference Workshop that was intended to recall the lessons learned from the previous review conferences and develop a strategy for the NPTREC. The workshop concluded that the achievement of a successful outcome would be virtually impossible without U.S. leadership. The head of the U.S. delegation was meant to have sufficient stature that 'nonproliferation issues are raised in high-level

⁵ Dhanapala, Jayantha and Randy Rydell (2005) 'Multilateral Diplomacy and the NPT: An Insider's Account,' United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, available at https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/122090/2005_MultilateralDiplomacy_en.pdf (18 May, 2021).

discussions with states that are pivotal to the success of the NPT Conference'.⁶

The workshop participants also noted the importance of 'face-to-face contacts' with other states. Special significance was attached to 'establishing key allies,' *inter alia* Russia, China, Mexico, and Egypt, and working out major nuclear-related issues prior to the NPTREC. Building good rapport with China was important due to its considerable influence on the NAM States; Mexico and Egypt, due to their leadership position among the NAM States and the Arab States respectively.

The results of the initial surveys carried out by the United States and Canada before the 1995 NPTREC, suggested that about 80 states preferred indefinite extension to any other option and another 15–16 were leaning towards it.⁷ The United States, Russia, Japan, the European Union, and most of the rest of Europe came out firmly in favor of an indefinite extension. They were also joined by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, NATO, the G7, the South Pacific Forum, and the Secretary-General of the United Nations.⁸

China maintained publicly that it wanted 'a smooth extension' of the NPT but was hesitant to join the other NWSs in their collective endeavors to achieve indefinite extension. At that point, it was trying to disassociate itself from other nuclear-weapon states by pretending that it was 'a non-nuclear-weapon state, which has acquired some nuclear weapons by chance'.⁹

The opposition to indefinite extension came from countries concerned about the lack of progress on disarmament that did not

⁶ Chrzanowski, Paul (1993) Preparation for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Extension Conference in 1995. Workshop summary, U.S. Department of Energy Office of Scientific and Technical Information, available at <https://www.osti.gov/biblio/10181832> (18 May, 2021).

⁷ Ottoway, David and Steve Coll (1995) 'A Hard Sell for Treaty Renewal,' Washington Post, 14 April, available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1995/04/14/a-hard-sell-for-treaty-renewal/51a544fc-5f73-43e5-af69-90d3e7280a9a/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.b4d44bc1567c (18 May, 2021).

⁸ Bunn, George (1994) 'Viewpoint: The NPT and Options for Its Extension in 1995,' The Nonproliferation Review (Winter), available at <https://www.nonproliferation.org/wp-content/uploads/npr/bunn12.pdf> (18 May, 2021).

⁹ Orlov, Vladimir and Roland Timerbaev, Anton Khlopkov (2002) Nuclear Non-proliferation in U.S.-Russia Relations: Challenges and Opportunities, PIR Library Series, available at <https://ru.scribd.com/document/258766334/13464048280-pdf> (18 May, 2021).

want to give up their leverage over nuclear-weapon states, mainly members of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), which at the time were about 110 strong.¹⁰ The NAM Conference took place in Tehran, Iran, from August 26 to 31, 1992, concluded that the nuclear weapon states failed to 'demonstrate a genuine commitment with regard to complete nuclear disarmament within a time-bound framework under Article VI of the NPT'.¹¹

Nigeria suggested there should be a one-time extension for 10–15 years.¹² Miguel Marin-Bosch, Mexico's chief nonproliferation negotiator, who became one of the biggest proponents of the 'rollover extension' option among the NAM member states, thought the Treaty 'should be extended for a relatively short period, perhaps 10 years, during which the "haves" should achieve a worldwide ban on nuclear weapons'.¹³ Jean Du Preez, a member of South Africa's delegation to the NPTREC, also posits that Mexico was floating around the so-called 'red light' approach that 'there should be another extension conference after 25 years to decide not to [continue with the treaty]'.¹⁴

Some NAM members, avid supporters of the CTBT, suggested that if the NPTREC was to fail, the NPT could be extended for a short period of time, e.g. two years and then a new extension conference would have to be held to decide the future of the Treaty, 'assuming that the CTBT had been achieved in some form by

¹⁰ Preston, Julia and Jeffrey Smith (1995) 'The Nuclear Treaty: Product of Global Full-Court Press by the U.S.,' *The Washington Post*, 14 May, available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1995/05/14/the-nuclear-treaty-product-of-global-full-court-press-by-us/12c033a4-37ac-4b0d-aeb5-d7f941d6141b/?utm_term=.6278ca354d0e (18 May, 2021).

¹¹ 'Final Document of the Tenth Conference of Heads of State of Government of NAM – Letter from Indonesia' (1992), United Nations, available at <https://www.un.org/unispal/document/auto-insert-179754/> (18 May, 2021).

¹² 'Oral History Interview with Jean duPreez' (2018) History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Contributed to NPIHP by Michal Onderco, Wilson Center, available at <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/177632.pdf?v=f8f6e59812906060aa639fc71a0f674a> (18 May, 2021).

¹³ Ottoway, David and Steve Coll (1995) 'A Hard Sell for Treaty Renewal,' *The Washington Post*, 14 April, available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1995/04/14/a-hard-sell-for-treaty-renewal/51a544fc-5f73-43e5-af69-90d3e7280a9a/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.b4d44bc1567c (18 May, 2021).

¹⁴ 'Oral History Interview with Jean duPreez' (2018) History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Contributed to NPIHP by Michal Onderco, Wilson Center, available at <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/177632.pdf?v=f8f6e59812906060aa639fc71a0f674a> (18 May, 2021).

1997'.¹⁵ This idea, however, did not get much traction, namely because the language of Article X.2 of the NPT provided for only one extension conference.¹⁶

In his 1994 article, one of the NPT negotiators George Bunn claimed that the majority of state-parties to the NPT would be naturally drawn towards the rolling extensions option. He argued that the main motivations for states to choose this option would be to gain advantage over NWSs to press them towards disarmament and to not be conditioned to give up any right to ever pursue a military nuclear weapons program.

Prior to the NPTREC, South Africa was hesitant to commit itself to any extension option. According to the South African Foreign Ministry, that position was supposed to allow the country to stay flexible and serve as a mediator for supporters of the indefinite extension and the members of NAM.¹⁷ Peter Goosen, Chief Director for Peace and Security of the South African Department of Foreign Affairs, identified 'the main risk as coming from those advocating for an indefinite extension, such as the United States, Russia, and U.S. allies'. His vision of South Africa's position was to 'build a bridge away from indefinite extension'.¹⁸

In January 1995 at the fourth and last Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) for the NPTREC, South Africa came forward with a so-called 'third option' for the Treaty extension. The proposal was to have a 'rolling extension of successive fixed periods which would extend the Treaty in perpetuity, but where a positive vote would be required between each of the succeeding periods to initiate the start of the following period'.¹⁹

¹⁵ Bunn, George (1994) 'Viewpoint: The NPT and Options for Its Extension in 1995,' *The Nonproliferation Review* (Winter), available at <https://www.nonproliferation.org/wp-content/uploads/npr/bunn12.pdf> (18 May, 2021).

¹⁶ Ibidem.

¹⁷ Onderco, Michal and Anna-Mart van Wyk (2019) 'Birth of a Norm Champion: How South Africa Came to Support the NPT's Indefinite Extension,' *The Non-Proliferation Review* 26 (1-2), available at <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10736700.2019.1591771?af=R> (18 May, 2021).

¹⁸ Ibidem.

¹⁹ 'Oral History Interview with Jean duPreez' (2018) History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Contributed to NPIHP by Michal Onderco, Wilson Center, available at <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/177632.pdf?v=f8f6e59812906060aa639fc71a0f674a> (18 May, 2021).

Preparations for the Review and Extension Conference

Beginning as early as 1991, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States began a series of consultations in preparation for the NPTREC to develop a common strategy.²⁰ Later they were joined by French diplomats. China did not participate in the consultations.²¹ Dr. Lewis Dunn, former U.S. Ambassador to the Review Conference to the NPT, characterized them as 'real conversations among equal states,' adding that 'over the time, genuine trust, confidence, and strong professional and personal relationships built up, including via coordination and cooperation in the preparatory process for the 1995 Conference'.²² Ambassador Grigory Berdennikov, then-Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, posits that the cooperation between the United States and Russia on the indefinite extension of the NPT mostly taking place within the P5 format.²³

Russia's initial belief was that the deliberations on the NPT extension at the NPTREC would go quickly and smoothly and that the voting process would be a breeze. Therefore, Russia made a proposal to put the decision on the Treaty extension to vote on the first day of the NPTREC before the review of the Treaty implementation. The United States, however, did not share the optimism — U.S. diplomats were not convinced that the indefinite extension would be agreed upon easily. Their preferred strategy was to place the vote closer to the end of the agenda to allow themselves enough time to determine participants' views on the extension and attempt to sway those who would hesitate to take their side.²⁴ Even though the results of the U.S. intelligence estimates predicted high chances of the indefinite extension option receiving a majority of votes at the NPTREC, the U.S. officials worried that a thin majority 'would

²⁰ Orlov, Vladimir (1995) *Soviet/Russian – American Cooperation on Negotiating, Drafting (1966-1967), Signing (1968), and Indefinitely Extending (1995) of the NPT*, PIR Center, available at <http://www.pircenter.org/media/content/files/13/14811505840.pdf> (18 May, 2021).

²¹ Ibidem.

²² Ibidem.

²³ Berdennikov, Grigory (2019) Personal Interview, 17 September.

²⁴ Orlov, Vladimir (1995) *Soviet/Russian – American Cooperation on Negotiating, Drafting (1966-1967), Signing (1968), and Indefinitely Extending (1995) of the NPT*, PIR Center, available at <http://www.pircenter.org/media/content/files/13/14811505840.pdf> (18 May, 2021).

not provide the NPT with the political and moral authority necessary to curb the spread of nuclear arms'.²⁵

The third session of the PrepCom for the NPTREC, which took place from September 12 to 16, 1994, became a cause of concern to the United States. As Ambassador Graham points out, the United States had serious doubts that the Treaty would be extended indefinitely. At that time, Washington estimated the number of supporters of the indefinite extension at 50 – 60 states, which would not be enough to win the vote.

In December 1994, Russia put forward a 'two-fold initiative' suggesting that the NWSs should draft a short (without a preamble) resolution advocating for indefinite extension. The rationale behind skipping out the preamble was to avoid as much as possible any kind of debate over the document. The United Kingdom was the only state to back up the Russian initiative. The United States opposed the proposal due to its concerns that NAM might 'issue a collective resolution in response and put it to a vote first'.²⁶ Russia completely rejected this rationale, as it believed that the existing differences among the NAM members would not allow them to present a unified front against the NWSs.²⁷

Canada suggested taking more 'cautious and gradual actions before and during the Conference' and gradually work towards bringing the critics of the indefinite extension and undecided states over one by one.²⁸ Russia was initially not a proponent of this idea but eventually it came around.

During 1994 and 1995, the U.S. and Russian officials held a plethora of bilateral meetings to round up votes for the indefinite extension of the NPT. They were joined by like-minded states, including Australia, Canada, France, and Japan.

²⁵ Ottoway, David and Steve Coll (1995) 'A Hard Sell for Treaty Renewal,' *The Washington Post*, 14 April, available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1995/04/14/a-hard-sell-for-treaty-renewal/51a544fc-5f73-43e5-af69-90d3e7280a9a/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.b4d44bc1567c (18 May, 2021)

²⁶ Orlov, Vladimir (1995) *Soviet/Russian – American Cooperation on Negotiating, Drafting (1966-1967), Signing (1968), and Indefinitely Extending (1995) of the NPT*, PIR Center, available at <http://www.pircenter.org/media/content/files/13/14811505840.pdf> (18 May, 2021).

²⁷ *Ibidem*.

²⁸ *Ibidem*.

Views on the NPT's extension before the 1995 Conference



Source: Estimate by the Campaign for the Non-Proliferation Treaty (published before the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference).

In order to round-up votes for the NPT extension, Ambassador Graham travelled to more than 50 countries. According to *Washington Post* reporting, his argument for the indefinite extension of the Treaty was based on the language of the statement issued at the end of the meeting between U.S. President Bill Clinton and India's Prime Minister P.V. Narashima Rao. The statement concluded with a declaration that the two countries 'offered their strong support'²⁹ for efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons 'with the goal of eliminating such weapons'.³⁰ In the negotiations with diplomats, he cited this statement as evidence of U.S. commitment to Article VI of the NPT. The newspaper described U.S. efforts to secure the votes for the indefinite extension of the NPT as 'creative arms twisting'³¹ resembling 'an election campaign more than a typical U.S. foreign policy exercise'.³²

²⁹ Ottoway, David and Steve Coll (1995) 'A Hard Sell for Treaty Renewal,' *The Washington Post*, 14 April, available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1995/04/14/a-hard-sell-for-treaty-renewal/51a544fc-5f73-43e5-af69-90d3e7280a9a/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.b4d44bc1567c (18 May, 2021)

³⁰ Ibidem.

³¹ Preston, Julia and Jeffrey Smith (1995) 'The Nuclear Treaty: Product of Global Full-Court Press by the U.S.,' *The Washington Post*, 14 May, available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1995/05/14/the-nuclear-treaty-product-of-global-full-court-press-by-us/12c033a4-37ac-4b0d-aeb5-d7f941d6141b/?utm_term=.6278ca354d0e (18 May, 2021).

³² Ibidem.

Aware of the threat that NAM countries' opposition posed to the U.S. efforts to achieve indefinite extension, Ambassador Graham sought to bring as many 'non-aligned states' to its side as possible by conducting a series of bilateral consultations with the NAM states. The idea behind these visits was to avoid discussing NPT extension with the NAM as a block but rather face them individually. Among the states who were in opposition to the indefinite extension option one of the most influential and powerful actors was Egypt. Egypt, as many other states of the Middle East, was highly concerned by the fact that Israel was remaining outside of the NPT. Ambassador Graham visited Egypt multiple times in order to obtain its support for the indefinite extension of the NPT; however, each time Egypt was deliberately steering the negotiations towards the subject of Israel's accession to the NPT.³³

One of the states that the United States saw as a potentially powerful ally for the promotion of the indefinite extension option was South Africa. Ambassador Graham began his attempts to get South Africa on the U.S. side as early as in the summer of 1994, when he visited Pelindaba, South Africa, to discuss the issue of the NPT extension with local diplomats. The U.S. President Bill Clinton and General Colin Powell (the U.S. National Security Advisor from 1987 to 1989) both spoke directly to President Nelson Mandela trying to bring him on board.³⁴ In the meanwhile, U.S. Vice President Al Gore succeeded in establishing 'a special link' with South African Vice President Thabo Mbeki, securing South Africa's support for an indefinite extension of the NPT.³⁵

Moscow also attached great importance to South Africa's support in promoting the indefinite extension. Therefore, on the eve of the NPTREC Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev sent a letter

³³ 'Oral History Interview with Thomas Graham,' (2017) History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Contributed to NPIHP by Michal Onderco, Wilson Center, available at <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/177539.pdf?v=1819499f04e42170c2d9c6014deadcdca> (18 May, 2021).

³⁴ Preston, Julia and Jeffrey Smith (1995) 'The Nuclear Treaty: Product of Global Full-Court Press by the U.S.,' *The Washington Post*, 14 May, available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1995/05/14/the-nuclear-treaty-product-of-global-full-court-press-by-us/12c033a4-37ac-4b0d-aeb5-d7f941d6141b/?utm_term=.6278ca354d0e (18 May, 2021).

³⁵ 'The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy,' Ed. by Cooper, Andrew F. and Jorge Heine, and Ramesh Thakur (2013), available at <https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199588862.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199588862> (18 May, 2021).

to South African Foreign Minister Alfred Nzo endorsing his initiative to support the indefinite option at the NPTREC. A similar letter was also sent to Minister Nzo by the U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher.³⁶

The other NAM member that the NWS actively lobbied was Benin; French diplomats played the key role in this process.³⁷ Those efforts borne immense fruit; South Africa and Benin effectively managed to bridge the gap between the NWS and the NAM at the NPTREC.

Moscow had fewer 'special relationships' with other countries than the United States; nevertheless, it discussed the NPT extension with about 50 states, including newly independent states and Iran. As Ambassador Timerbaev pointed out, the United States at the time was more powerful than it even is now, so it was fairly easy for it to bring undecided states over to its side. Nevertheless, as Ambassador Graham points out, '[the Russians] were definitely very helpful. <...> Berdennikov first, and then Kislyak, and we have remained very good friends ever since'.³⁸

According to Ambassador Berdennikov, Russian diplomats approached many representatives from different countries trying to persuade them to support the indefinite extension.³⁹ The negotiations records show that during the NPTREC the Russian Federation had to work closely with the Ukrainian diplomats in order to convince them to co-sign the resolution on the extension of the NPT — 'Kiyv demanded that some provisions concerning security assurances be included in the succinct text of the resolution'. Russia was not going to allow that to happen because if Kiyv's demands were accepted, other states might also begin to propose their amendments. Russia had also to exert some pressure on the Moldavian and Azerbaijani delegations at different stages of the Conference. However, 'the two states did not have any particular interests at the Conference and their uncompromising policy did not last long'.⁴⁰

³⁶ Orlov, Vladimir (1995) Soviet/Russian – American Cooperation on Negotiating, Drafting (1966-1967), Signing (1968), and Indefinitely Extending (1995) of the NPT,' PIR Center, available at <http://www.pircenter.org/media/content/files/13/14811505840.pdf> (18 May, 2021).

³⁷ Ibidem.

³⁸ Ibidem.

³⁹ Berdennikov, Grigory (2019) Personal Interview, 17 September.

⁴⁰ Orlov Vladimir, Timerbaev Roland, Khlopkov Anton. Nuclear Non-Proliferation in U.S.-Russia Relations: Challenges and Opportunities, <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/54962/nuclear%20nonproliferation.pdf> (accessed July 13, 2019).

Following the conclusion of the fourth and last PrepCom meeting in mid-January 1995, Canada recognized that, while the indefinite extension was by far the leading option, the number of states in favor still fell short of a legal majority and was not growing quickly enough. Based on consultations with friends and allies, and on reporting from posts, Canada identified a list of 74 states to be 'lobbied' during March and April. This group included: 28 states, 'undecided'; 19 states, 'leaning against'; and 27 states, 'leaning for' indefinite extension.

The idea of finding some mechanism to demonstrate tangible support for indefinite extension was first broached by Russian Ambassador Berdennikov at a meeting of the Western Group plus Russia on March 21, 1995. At a Mason Group meeting in Geneva on April 6, the United Kingdom provided language on an unadorned decision to be put forward by this Group at the 1995 NPT Conference. The draft decision read, 'the Conference of States Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, held in accordance with Article X.2 of the Treaty, decides that the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely'.⁴¹ It was agreed that the Group would consolidate broad-based support for this draft decision at the Conference. Canada was asked to play a leading role and 'to exercise custodianship of a list of co-sponsors'.⁴²

In March 1995, the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) presented a white paper titled 'The NPT. Problems of Extension'.⁴³ The document estimated that at the time there were 70 states in favor of the indefinite extension, 38 states were ready to accept it under certain conditions, and three (Venezuela, Yemen, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea) were firmly against it. It outlined four scenarios for the Treaty extension at the NPTREC:

- indefinite extension;
- extension for a long additional period;

⁴¹ 'Indefinite Extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty: Risks and Reckonings,' ACRONYM Report No. 7, (1995), available at <http://www.acronym.org.uk/old/archive/acrorep/a07ext.htm> (18 May, 2021).

⁴² Rauf, Tariq and Rebecca Johnson (1995) After the NPT's Indefinite Extension: The Future of the Global Nonproliferation Regime, *The Nonproliferation Review* (Fall), available at <https://www.nonproliferation.org/wp-content/uploads/npr/raufjo31.pdf> (18 May, 2021).

⁴³ Orlov, Vladimir (1995) Soviet/Russian – American Cooperation on Negotiating, Drafting (1966-1967), Signing (1968), and Indefinitely Extending (1995) of the NPT,' PIR Center, available at <http://www.pircenter.org/media/content/files/13/14811505840.pdf> (18 May, 2021).

- rollover extension periods (5-10 years) with each extension being linked to the fulfillment of specific obligations under the Treaty by the nuclear-weapon states;
- no positive outcome.

SVR experts argued the first option to be the most preferable. The second option, while less appealing compared to the first option, was also considered acceptable. The last two options were not considered viable.⁴⁴

China who initially saw the whole indefinite extension initiative as a conspiracy, eventually switched from firmly opposing to supporting it. In April 1995, ambassadors from all the P5 countries — the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia, China, and France — met for a private discussion to ponder on the necessity of a collective statement on the ultimate future of nuclear weapons. At the meeting, Ambassador Berdennikov proposed to release 'a coordinated statement' on the pledge to eliminate nuclear weapons arguing that it would be an important contribution for the NPTREC.⁴⁵

On April 5, 1995, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation made a statement offering security assurances to NNWSs. Consequently, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and China also made similar statements. Upon the request from Russia, the item entitled 'Proposal by China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America on security assurances' was inscribed on the agenda of the 3514th meeting of the UN Security Council.⁴⁶ The meeting that took place on April 11 adopted UNSCR 984, which took note of five statements made by NWS. This

⁴⁴ Foreign Intelligence Service of the Russian Federation (1995) 'Possible Scenarios: Do All of them Lead to the Goal,' Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Extension Challenges, available at <http://svr.gov.ru/material.htm> (18 May, 2021).

⁴⁵ 'Understanding Chinese Nuclear Thinking' (2016) Eds. Zhao Tong, Bin Li, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, available at https://carnegieendowment.org/files/ChineseNuclearThinking_Final.pdf (30 July, 2021).

⁴⁶ 'The Proposal by China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America on Security Assurances,' United Nations, Repertoire, 12th Supplement (1993-1995): Chapter VIII, available at <https://www.un.org/french/docs/cs/repertoire/93-95/CHAPTER%208/GENERAL%20ISSUES/32.%20Proposal%20by%20China,%20France,%20Russia,%20UK%20US%20on%20Security%20assurances.pdf> (18 May, 2021).

was all part of an attempt to gain favor with the NNWSs in the run-up to the NPTREC.⁴⁷

One month prior to the NPTREC the Security Council of the Russian Federation convened a meeting to agree on the overall strategy regarding the extension of the NPT and provide instructions for the Russian delegation.⁴⁸ They decided that Russia should strive to achieve an indefinite extension of the NPT, with the option of 25-year rolling periods being its fallback option.⁴⁹

Deliberations

The President of the NPTREC Ambassador Jayantha Dhanapala recalls that 'in the months leading up to the opening of the NPTREC, and indeed even well into the event itself, nobody could comfortably have predicted the precise outcome'.⁵⁰ According to the participants, debates that took place at the NPTREC were 'fundamentally different to all debates at previous review conferences'.⁵¹

Experts give different opinions regarding the backdrop against which the NPT extension took place. According to Tariq Rauf, former Director of the International Organizations and Nonproliferation Project of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies⁵², and Dr. Rebecca Johnson⁵³,

⁴⁷ 'Resolution 984 (1995) Adopted by the Security Council at its 3514th meeting, on 11 April 1995, UN Digital Library, available at <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/176507?ln=ru> (18 May, 2021).

⁴⁸ Orlov, Vladimir (1995) Soviet/Russian – American Cooperation on Negotiating, Drafting (1966-1967), Signing (1968), and Indefinitely Extending (1995) of the NPT,' PIR Center, available at <http://www.pircenter.org/media/content/files/13/14811505840.pdf> (18 May, 2021).

⁴⁹ Ibidem.

⁵⁰ Dhanapala, Jayantha and Randy Rydell (2005) 'Multilateral Diplomacy and the NPT: An Insider's Account,' United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, available at https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/122090/2005_MultilateralDiplomacy_en.pdf (accessed January 13, 2019).

⁵¹ 'Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation, NPT Conference 17/4/95-12/5/95, "Darryl's Meeting with Sven Jurchewsky [SIC] 145/95",' (1995) History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Special Collections, Hartley Library, University of Southampton, Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation MS424 A3079/1/1/19f1, available at <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/176511> (18 May, 2021).

⁵² Rauf, Tariq (2019) Personal Interview, 2 April.

⁵³ Johnson, Rebecca (2019) Personal Interview, 2 April.

the founder of the Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy, the political climate in 1995 was 'propitious' for a successful outcome of the NPTREC. As they point out, since the previous 1990 NPT Review Conference (RevCon), a lot of positive developments took place: the Cold War confrontation had ended, the two Strategic Arms Reduction treaties (START I and START II) had been signed. What might have been even more significant – 'important progress [had been] made at the Geneva-based CD on negotiating a CTBT'.⁵⁴

The NPTREC opened on April 17, 1995. The Conference was attended by 178 states parties.⁵⁵ In order to ensure an indefinite extension of the Treaty, its supporters now had to secure at least 90 votes and not 86, as it had been predicted earlier. The main question to arise before the NPT states parties at the outset of the Conference had to do with the rule 28.3, 'which dealt with the adoption of the decision on the extension'.⁵⁶ It took participants of the Conference an extraordinary amount of time to arrive at a consensus on how the voting procedure was going to be held. According to Ambassador Dhanapala and Dr. Rauf, 'this matter took up an extraordinary amount of time, and ultimately proved to be moot, since the three final decisions and the Middle East resolution were adopted without a vote'.⁵⁷

In the course of the month-long deliberations at the NPTREC in New York, the P5 had regular meetings to discuss the progress on the indefinite extension. According to a member of the Russian delegation Grigory Berdennikov, these meetings were held two times a week in an informal setting.

During the general debate, several proposals were advanced for the extension of the Treaty, namely:

- indefinite;
- a single fixed period (proposed by Nigeria);

⁵⁴ Ibidem.

⁵⁵ Smirnov Aleksandr and Aleksandr Botov (1995) 'Protsedurnyye izyski vokrug atomnoy bomby [Procedural Frills Around the Nuclear Bomb],' *Kommersant* 71, 19 April, available at <https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/107037> (18 May, 2021).

⁵⁶ Dhanapala, Jayantha and Randy Rydell (2005) 'Multilateral Diplomacy and the NPT: An Insider's Account,' United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, available at https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/122090/2005_MultilateralDiplomacy_en.pdf (accessed January 13, 2019).

⁵⁷ Dhanapala, Jayantha and Tariq Rauf (2016) Reflections on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, SIPRI, available at https://mafiadoc.com/reflections-on-the-treaty-on-the-non-sipri_597a1f961723dd93e84db30b.html (18 May, 2021).

- a rollover of 25 years with options for further extension (proposed by Venezuela);
- a rolling extension of successive, but as yet unspecified, fixed periods (proposed by Indonesia, Myanmar, and Papua New Guinea);
- suspension of the conference to be reconvened at a later date (suggested by Egypt and Syria).⁵⁸

80 speakers in the general debate supported the indefinite extension and 10 strongly opposed it. As Ambassador Berdennikov claims, opponents of the indefinite extension '[portrayed it] as a sort of a radical, even an extreme solution favored by a minority of influential participants',⁵⁹ which naturally raised concerns among its supporters, the United States in particular. 'Compromise' and 'middle-ground' solutions, such as the ones proposed by Venezuela and Mexico, could potentially swing undecided voters away from the indefinite extension option.⁶⁰ In order to deal with the two 'problematic' delegations, the United States resorted to 'strong-arm tactics' and pressure.⁶¹ In 1995, both Venezuela and Mexico's economic situation was similarly dire and they both relied on the United States to alleviate it. Early that year the Clinton administration provided Mexico with a \$20 billion loan, which further exacerbated its dependency on the United States.⁶²

⁵⁸ 'Russia's Kozyrev Urges Permanent Extension of NPT' (1995) Collection of remarks by Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev and representatives from other nations regarding the extension of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Federation of American Scientists, available at <https://fas.org/nuke/control/npt/news/950424-388652.htm> (18 May, 2021).

⁵⁹ 'Oral History Interview with Grigory Berdennikov' (2016) History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Contributed to NPIHP by Michal Onderco, Wilson Center, available at <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/177422> (18 May, 2021).

⁶⁰ Ibidem.

⁶¹ 'Oral History Interview with Jayantha Dhanapala' (2017) History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Contributed to NPIHP by Michal Onderco, Wilson Center, available at <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/177429> (18 May, 2021).

⁶² Preston, Julia and Jeffrey Smith (1995) 'The Nuclear Treaty: Product of Global Full-Court Press by the U.S.,' The Washington Post, 14 May, available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1995/05/14/the-nuclear-treaty-product-of-global-full-court-press-by-us/12c033a4-37ac-4b0d-aeb5-d7f941d6141b/?utm_term=.6278ca354d0e (18 May, 2021); Lewis, Patricia (2019) Personal Interview, 18 September.

Eventually, the U.S. efforts paid off and Venezuela reversed its position on the extension of the Treaty and decided to co-sponsor the Canadian draft decision for indefinite extension. At the same time, Ambassador Adolfo Taylhardat resigned from his position as the head of the Venezuelan delegation. Ambassador Graham admits that the United States was also seeking to remove the head of the Mexican delegation Ambassador Bosch from his position but to no avail. Ambassador Bosch stated that in his recollection Ambassador Graham never mentioned any 'aid pack' to him overtly; however, he insinuated that if the NPT was to endure (read 'extended indefinitely'), it would 'be better for bilateral nuclear cooperation purposes'.⁶³

The results of the general debate left the United States and Russia feeling anxious about the future of the NPT extension and pushed them towards a more proactive approach with regards to the promotion of the indefinite extension. The plan that they came up with was to approach one of the NNWSs and ask them to table a proposal for the indefinite extension. They believed that this would make them more likely to subscribe to this option. They choose Canada because it had good rapport with the United States and had an impeccable track record of nonproliferation. Ambassador Graham then approached the Canadian delegation and asked them to sponsor a resolution on the indefinite extension, which they agreed to do because it had been a common practice between the two states.

The delegation of South Africa played an important role in promoting the indefinite extension and the Canadian resolution. South African Foreign Minister Alfred Nzo expressed his country's commitment to the indefinite extension 'without any preconditions or linkage to other nuclear disarmament measures such as CTBT',⁶⁴ also adding that that fixed period extension 'would erode confidence in the NPT, endangering the nonproliferation regime' — the argument actively promoted by the United States and Russia.

One month prior to the NPTREC Vice President Gore sent a letter to South Africa's Deputy President Thabo Mbeki assuring him of

⁶³ Welsh, Susan (1995) 'Delegate Perspectives on the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference,' *The Nonproliferation Review* (Spring/Summer), available at <https://www.nonproliferation.org/wp-content/uploads/npr/welsh23.pdf> (18 May, 2021).

⁶⁴ Lee, Donna and Ian Taylor, and Paul Williams (2006) *The New Multilateralism in South African Diplomacy*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, available at https://books.google.ru/books?id=C51_DAAAQBAJ&pg=PA1&hl=ru&source=gbs_toc_r&cad=4#v=onepage&q&f=false (18 May, 2021).

the U.S. commitment towards strengthening the NPT review process, while also stressing, 'that efforts to strengthen the review process [should] not unintentionally encumber the Treaty or in any way put it at risk, or cloud its duration'.⁶⁵ In his recollection, Ambassador Graham said that could not 'remember anything in the Statement of Principles and Objectives that was a big problem for [the United States]'.⁶⁶

In order to facilitate negotiations on the extension of the Treaty, Ambassador Jayantha Dhanapala established President's Consultation Group. The idea of President's Consultations was based on a similar practice used in the 1985 RevCon. The Group 'included all the conference office-holders, the five NWS in the NPT, the chairs of the political groups, and key delegations selected by the president. It was conceived as an "inner cabinet," a focus group, or more accurately, a laboratory to discuss the all-important extension issue which transcended the normal business of the main committees'.⁶⁷ In order to ensure transparency regarding the Group's decisions its members 'were encouraged to report back to their groups regularly and seek their endorsement on the decisions being taken'.⁶⁸ One of the main topics discussed among the members of the Group was the Principles for Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament put forward by South Africa.

During the third week of the NPTREC, an important NAM ministerial meeting was held in Bandung, Indonesia. The meeting took place from 25 to 27 April and adjourned without a consensus NAM position on the extension of the NPT, which played directly into the hands of the indefinite extension supporters. However, as Ambassador Dhanapala points out, at that point he still had doubts as to whether the indefinite extension option had amassed enough supporters to be adopted without a formal vote. He was so adamant

⁶⁵ 'Letter, Al Gore to Thabo Mbeki' (1995) History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Archive of the Department of International Relations and Cooperation of South Africa, Wilson Center, available at <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/208589> (18 May, 2021).

⁶⁶ 'Oral History Interview with Thomas Graham,' (2017) History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, Contributed to NPIHP by Michal Onderco, Wilson Center, available at <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/177539.pdf?v=1819499f04e42170c2d9c6014deadcd> (18 May, 2021).

⁶⁷ 'The Oxford Handbook of Modern Diplomacy,' Ed. by Cooper, Andrew F. and Jorge Heine, and Ramesh Thakur (2013), available at <https://www.oxfordhandbooks.com/view/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199588862.001.0001/oxfordhb-9780199588862> (18 May, 2021).

⁶⁸ *Ibidem*.

about avoiding a vote on the extension because he felt strongly 'that a divided for an indefinite extension would be bad for the treaty – given the vital international security interests involved'.⁶⁹

Negotiation of the 'Package Deal'

Ambassador Dhanapala, along with the United States and Russia, understood that in order to achieve indefinite extension without a vote it would have to be accompanied by another decision, or decisions, that would serve the interests of the opponents of the indefinite extension. In order to further explore the concept of the 'indefinite-plus' option, he decided to continue with the President's Consultations Group meetings. The 'indefinite-plus' included two proposals: on the strengthened review process and principles and objectives for nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament. The first one was first elaborated by Canada in early 1995, while the second one was put forward by South Africa. Ambassador Dhanapala seized upon these ideas 'as a way of fulfilling the [...] dominant requirements that had emerged from the general debate and his own discussions'.⁷⁰

After extensive consultations with the Consultations Group, he presented three documents, namely a draft decision on strengthening the review process for the Treaty (NPT/CONF.1995/L.4); a draft decision on principles and objectives for nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament, as contained in the document (NPT/CONF.1995/L.5); and a draft decision on the extension of the Treaty, as contained in the document (NPT/CONF.1995/L.6). Thus, was born the concept of a 'package deal' that came to include the Middle East Resolution and three decisions: on indefinite extension; strengthened review process and principles and objectives for nonproliferation and disarmament.

One by one the opponents of the indefinite extension began to soften their stand. As Ambassador Bosch claims, by the end of April 1995 demonstrable majority of the NPT states parties were in favor of

⁶⁹ Dhanapala, Jayantha and Randy Rydell (2205) 'Multilateral Diplomacy and the NPT: An Insider's Account,' United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, available at https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/122090/2005_MultilateralDiplomacy_en.pdf (18 May, 2021).

⁷⁰ Rauf, Tariq and Rebecca Johnson (1995) After the NPT's Indefinite Extension: The Future of the Global Nonproliferation Regime, The Nonproliferation Review (Fall), available at <https://www.nonproliferation.org/wp-content/uploads/npr/raufjo31.pdf> (18 May, 2021).

indefinite extension, which would make attempts to oppose it akin to political suicide. Eventually, Mexico gave up on the 25-year roll-over extension option in favor of the 'indefinite-plus'.⁷¹

The President, while recognizing that a clear majority existed for indefinite extension, did not overtly favor any particular option, and chose to table language on an extension decision in his Consultations only after an agreement had been reached on the 'principles' and 'strengthened review'.⁷²

Negotiation of the Resolution on the Middle East

One of the thorniest problems that the NPTREC had to debate was the nuclear status of Israel. Arab States — many of which were in fact against indefinite extension — claimed that Israel not being a Party to the NPT was eroding their belief in the Treaty as being able to guarantee them proper security. They viewed Israel's nuclear disarmament as a priority and looked forward to the NPTREC taking a decision in this regard. However, as was the case with the NAM, Arab States suffered from the lack of unanimity and were unable to build a unified front against the supporters of indefinite extension.

Upon coming to the realization that in order to achieve indefinite extension of the NPT without a vote, the United States was ready to go to great lengths, Egypt decided to take advantage of the situation. Cairo stated that it would support indefinite extension only if the NPTREC came up with a decision with regard to the establishment of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Middle East, which would naturally require Israel to forgo its nuclear-weapons program. After the United States failed to change Egypt's position the way it was done with Mexico and Venezuela earlier, an effort was made to find a mutually acceptable compromise.⁷³

⁷¹ 'Mexico: Draft Resolution' (1995) United Nations Digital Library, available at <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/199290?ln=ru> (18 May, 2021).

⁷² Rauf, Tariq and Rebecca Johnson (1995) After the NPT's Indefinite Extension: The Future of the Global Nonproliferation Regime, *The Nonproliferation Review* (Fall), available at <https://www.nonproliferation.org/wp-content/uploads/npr/raufjo31.pdf> (18 May, 2021).

⁷³ Orlov, Vladimir (1999) 'Konferentsiya 1995 goda po rassmotreniyu i prodleniyu sroka deystviya dogovora o nerasprostraneni yadernogo oruzhiya: osobennosti, rezul'taty, uroki [1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Characteristics, Outcomes and Lessons],'

Egypt and 13 other Arab States sponsored a draft resolution that called on Israel to join the NPT and place all of its nuclear facilities under the IAEA safeguards and invited the P5 to provide security assurances to all states of the region that are Parties to the NPT. The United States and Russia could not support this draft; however, Russia advised against dismissing it completely and instead proposed to work towards creating conditions for an 'exchange'.⁷⁴

The consultations that ensued were highly charged not least the fact that the time to find consensus on this issue was extremely limited. As a result of the negotiations, the text of the Resolution was somewhat watered-down to accommodate for the interests of the United States and Russia. References to Israel and the P5 obligation to provide security assurances to the states of the region disappeared from the draft text. Some of the Arab States, including Egypt, Iran, and Syria, were not completely on board with all the changes; however, they realized that if they had continued to push for a stronger language, they would have stood accused of blocking a consensus.⁷⁵

Ambassador Dhanapala posits that 'the Conference would [not] have adopted the indefinite extension without a vote if the resolution issue had not been settled as it was' despite the fact that 'the "package" of the three decisions and the resolution were technically separate'.⁷⁶

The legally binding draft Decision on the Extension of the Treaty was crafted by the President was finalized and was ready for adoption on Wednesday, May 10, and was adopted without a vote on May 11. As David Krieger, President of Nuclear Age Peace Foundation and participant of the NPTREC, recalls, 'the U.S. and other nuclear-armed countries were ecstatic'.⁷⁷ Ambassador Berdennikov described the results of the Conference as 'a very significant achievement and contribution both to stability and to further progress in

Scientific Reports 11, PIR Center, available at <http://pircenter.org/media/content/files/9/13464238930.pdf> (18 May, 2021).

⁷⁴ Ibidem.

⁷⁵ Ibidem.

⁷⁶ Dhanapala, Jayantha and Randy Rydell (2005) 'Multilateral Diplomacy and the NPT: An Insider's Account,' United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/122090/2005_MultilateralDiplomacy_en.pdf (18 May, 2021).

⁷⁷ Krieger, David (2019) 'Participation in the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference,' Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, available at <https://www.wagingpeace.org/participation-in-the-1995-npt-review-and-extension-conference/> (18 May, 2021).

arms control'.⁷⁸ The Honorable Lawrence Scheinman, Assistant Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, posited that the United States, 'felt comfortable with all three elements of the package that was put forward by the President' and that they were 'good,' 'sound,' and 'pointed in the right direction'.⁷⁹

The cooperation between the United States and Russia contributed significantly to extending the NPT without a vote. It was permeated with goodwill and a general spirit of partnership. Dr. Dunn points out that the effectiveness of the U.S.-Russia cooperation could be attributed to the following factors: them having shared interest in preserving the NPT through its indefinite extension; the absence of specific tough NPT-related issues between them that needed to be resolved; and the fact that U.S. and Russian representatives had 'robust professional and personal relations'. He further adds that the success of their efforts had been bolstered by the divisions among NNWS, especially NAM, as was evident from the outcomes of the 1995 Bandung Conference.⁸⁰ Unlike the NWS led by the United States and Russia, the NAM states did not have a strong campaign for creating the conditions for the extension of the Treaty, 'including specific demands for nuclear reductions or freer transfers of peaceful nuclear technology'.⁸¹

'Resolution on the Middle East proved to be the only major irritator in U.S.-Russian approaches during this Conference'.⁸² However, Russia shared Ambassador Dhanapala's insistence on the NPT extension without a vote and, therefore, agreed to support the watered-down language of the Resolution on the Middle East that did not

⁷⁸ Welsh, Susan (1995) 'Delegate Perspectives on the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference,' The Nonproliferation Review (Spring/Summer), available at <https://www.nonproliferation.org/wp-content/uploads/npr/welsh23.pdf> (18 May, 2021).

⁷⁹ Ibidem.

⁸⁰ Dunn, Lewis A. (2016) 'Three NPT Snapshots – and Some Lessons and Implications for Rebuilding U.S.-Russian Cooperation,' PIR Center, available at <http://www.pircenter.org/media/content/files/13/14813159450.pdf> (18 May, 2021).

⁸¹ Preston, Julia and Jeffrey Smith (1995) 'The Nuclear Treaty: Product of Global Full-Court Press by the U.S.,' The Washington Post, 14 May, available at https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1995/05/14/the-nuclear-treaty-product-of-global-full-court-press-by-us/12c033a4-37ac-4b0d-aeb5-d7f941d6141b/?utm_term=.6278ca354d0e (18 May, 2021).

⁸² Orlov, Vladimir (1995) Soviet/Russian – American Cooperation on Negotiating, Drafting (1966-1967), Signing (1968), and Indefinitely Extending (1995) of the NPT,' PIR Center, available at <http://www.pircenter.org/media/content/files/13/14811505840.pdf> (18 May, 2021).

even mention Israel, let alone called for its disarmament. Together with the United States and the United Kingdom, it became a co-sponsor of the Resolution.⁸³

Conclusions

During the NPTREC, the United States and Russia developed a concerted approach aimed at reaching the indefinite extension of the NPT. They made coordinated efforts to bring as many NNWS as possible to their side through persuasion, pressure and, at times, even blackmail. Although Russia had less leverage and capacity to influence NNWS' decision with regards to the NPT extension, it still managed to effectively convince former Soviet republics, Iran, and a few other NPT state parties to support the indefinite option.

The United States and Russia, as members of the President's Consultations Group, made full and active contribution to the negotiation of the package of decisions, which led to the indefinite extension of the NPT. For them, the adoption of the Middle East Resolution and decisions on strengthening the review process for the Treaty, and principles and objectives for nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament was a small price to pay for getting the NPT extended indefinitely and without a vote.

Despite not being entirely satisfied with the language of the final version of the Middle East Resolution that was almost entirely written by the United States and did not contain any specific mention of Israel and its military nuclear program, Russia agreed to co-sponsor the Resolution. Similar to the President of the NPTREC and the United States it was seeking to ensure that the NPT was extended without a vote, as the voting procedure could create potential difficulties and lead to undesirable consequences such as walkouts and even withdrawals.

⁸³ Ibidem.