Chronology

The U.S. Senate proposes a policy of "advise and consent" on the ratification of the Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II). The treaty never comes into force.
26.01.1996

International Security Index iSi

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PIR PRESS NEWS

21.01.2020

«Since 2014, Russia has been openly stating that American nuclear weapons in Europe and the nuclear sharing arrangements are a direct violation of the spirit and letter of the NPT (Articles 1 and 2), especially considering the participation of the armed forces of non-nuclear NATO countries in military exercises on the use of American tactical nuclear weapons, deployed in Europe», – Nikita Degtyarev, PIR Center Intern.

30.12.2019

Wishing you a joyous 2020!

May you find peace, stability and success. Let’s welcome the new year with a new hope together.

Vladimir Mau celebrates 60th anniversary! image
29.12.2019

Vladimir Aleksandrovich Mau celebrates his 60th anniversary! His name is well-known to everyone who studies “Applied economics” in Russia.

Missile Defense Issue

It is difficult to see how Washington, Moscow or NATO would benefit from missile defense remaining a problem issue. Among other things, that could pose an obstacle to further U.S.-Russian nuclear arms reductions below New START levels. It could interfere with other types of cooperation. Agreement on a NATO-Russia cooperative missile defense arrangement, on the other hand, could remove this problem.

Real partnership on missile defense would provide a better missile defense of Europe, including European Russia. It would make NATO and Russia allies in protecting Europe, which could prove a ”gamechanger” in altering lingering Cold War attitudes in both Russia and NATO member-states.

Experts from the Pentagon and Russian Defense Ministry reportedly held productive exchanges in early 2011 regarding what a cooperative missile defense arrangement would entail. They discussed transparency, joint exercises and two jointly manned missile defense centers: a data fusion center, and a planning and operations center.

Progress slowed in spring 2011, when Russia took the position that it required a “legal guarantee” that U.S. missile defenses would not be directed against Russian strategic forces. The Russian concern has an understandable basis in principle: if U.S. missile defenses continue to grow in numbers and quality, at some future point they could undermine the balance in strategic offensive forces between Russia and the United States.

While studying the missile defense issue, PIR Center experts provide a set of recommendations which should lead to establishing the real (not declarative) partnership between Russia and its partners on the missile defense issue.

Publiscation:

1. Steven Pifer. NATO-Russia Missile Defense: Compromise Is Possible. Russia Confidential, №12, 2012

2. Evgeny Buzhinsky. The Results of NATO’s Unremarkable Summit in Chicago. Russia Confidential, №6, 2012

2. Recommendations of the Sustainable Partnership with Russia Group

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