International Security Index iSi

PIR PRESS LOGO

PIR PRESS NEWS

11.03.2019

"After the leaders of the United States and the DPRK failed to reach a compromise on further steps for the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in Hanoi, the parties sent each other signals that in case of a complete failure of the negotiation process, they will be ready to continue on the previous course. At the same time, Pyongyang did not immediately start preparations for a full-scale missile test, and Washington decided to limit the scope of its exercises with South Korea. This means that both capitals are set to continue negotiations and expect that the other side will become more сoncessive," Adlan MargoevDirector of the PIR Center “Russia and Nuclear Nonproliferation” program. 

08.02.2019

“Vienna document is a good example of a politically binding agreement having a verification mechanism. This system works, however, as long as it is a multilateral arrangement reached within the framework of OSCE. Bilateral political documents concerning arms control function quite ineffectively”, – PIR Center Board Chairman Evgeny Buzhinskiy. 

21.01.2019

“During your tenure, you took an active part in the discussions of the Board, formulating concrete recommendations on a number of important issues. I applaud your important contribution to the work of the Board,” — Antonio Guterres, the UN Secretary-General.


Transparency in Nuclear Arsenals and Doctrines

Implementing any measures contained in the future “Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control” mandated by Article VI of the NPT will clearly take a lot of time. It will in fact take longer than the implementation of all the other nuclear disarmament treaties put together.

The two preconditions required for the launch of negotiations on such a treaty are effective confidence-building and transparency measures, and verification measures. Transparency and verification are therefore closely interlinked; after all, the main principle of any effective disarmament agreement is that transparency must be verifiable.

The reverse, however, is also true. If a country fails to provide information about the numbers and other characteristics of its nuclear weapons and fissile material stockpiles, it becomes impossible for the expert community to develop effective verification mechanisms.

During their bilateral nuclear disarmament process, theUnited StatesandRussiahave already developed a comprehensive set of measures for the verification of the elimination of nuclear weapons delivery systems. But verifying the elimination of the actual nuclear warheads is a problem that has yet to be resolved.

The following steps will have to be undertaken in that regard:

- Identify a universally acceptable definition of the term “nuclear warhead”,

- Release information about the numbers and types of warheads (both actively deployed an held in reserve) held by every individual country, and develop a system of monitoring that information,

- Develop a mechanism of inspections and verification measures for the facilities where the warheads are being held,

Find a balance between the national and global security interests,

- Develop technical means which can ascertain that the warhead being destroyed is a genuine explosive nuclear device,

- Develop technical means to ascertain that every individual explosive nuclear device has been destroyed.

PIR Center in its work pays much attention to studying the mechanisms for transparency in nuclear arsenals and doctrines and future nuclear weapons reductions, holding events and organizing discussions in the Security Index journal on the subject.

Publications:

1. Recommendations of the Sustainable Partnership with Russia Group

loading