Chronology

The Agreement on Application of IAEA Safeguards between the DPRK and IAEA comes into force.
10.04.1992
The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction is opened for signing.
10.04.1972
The nuclear submarine USS Thresher is lost at sea. 129 perish.
10.04.1963

International Security Index iSi

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PIR PRESS NEWS

03.04.2020

“In addition to obvious public health consequences, the epidemic of the novel coronavirus in Iran could affect the implementation of the IAEA safeguards agreements. In his article for the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Professor George M. Moore of the Middlebury Institute for International Studies at Monterey warns: Iranian authorities may restrict the access of IAEA inspectors to the country under the pretext of combating the spread of infection. Although the IAEA assures that the inspections at nuclear facilities in Iran are carried out in full, the risks, according to Moore, are extremely high. In the absence of convincing information from the sites themselves, the international community (primarily Israel and the United States) will proceed from the most pessimistic scenarios for the development of the Iranian nuclear program” - this is the leitmotiv of the 521st issue of Yaderny Kontrol.

31.03.2020

On March 12, 2020, a workshop “50 Years after Ratification of the NPT by the Soviet Union and its Entry into Force: Lessons Learned and Prospects for Strengthening of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime” took place. The event was co-sponsored by the PIR Center and the Institute of Contemporary International Studies (ICIS) at the Diplomatic Academy of the Russian MFA.

30.03.2020

The Anniversary XX PIR Center International School on Global Security 2020 extends applications deadline to April 13. The School will take place from 6 to 14 June in Zvenigorod, Moscow region.

Transparency in Nuclear Arsenals and Doctrines

Implementing any measures contained in the future “Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control” mandated by Article VI of the NPT will clearly take a lot of time. It will in fact take longer than the implementation of all the other nuclear disarmament treaties put together.

The two preconditions required for the launch of negotiations on such a treaty are effective confidence-building and transparency measures, and verification measures. Transparency and verification are therefore closely interlinked; after all, the main principle of any effective disarmament agreement is that transparency must be verifiable.

The reverse, however, is also true. If a country fails to provide information about the numbers and other characteristics of its nuclear weapons and fissile material stockpiles, it becomes impossible for the expert community to develop effective verification mechanisms.

During their bilateral nuclear disarmament process, theUnited StatesandRussiahave already developed a comprehensive set of measures for the verification of the elimination of nuclear weapons delivery systems. But verifying the elimination of the actual nuclear warheads is a problem that has yet to be resolved.

The following steps will have to be undertaken in that regard:

- Identify a universally acceptable definition of the term “nuclear warhead”,

- Release information about the numbers and types of warheads (both actively deployed an held in reserve) held by every individual country, and develop a system of monitoring that information,

- Develop a mechanism of inspections and verification measures for the facilities where the warheads are being held,

Find a balance between the national and global security interests,

- Develop technical means which can ascertain that the warhead being destroyed is a genuine explosive nuclear device,

- Develop technical means to ascertain that every individual explosive nuclear device has been destroyed.

PIR Center in its work pays much attention to studying the mechanisms for transparency in nuclear arsenals and doctrines and future nuclear weapons reductions, holding events and organizing discussions in the Security Index journal on the subject.

Publications:

1. Recommendations of the Sustainable Partnership with Russia Group

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