Technological progress in military domain is apparent and ruthless. It has been argued for a while that conventional, non-nuclear weapons are becoming more and more lethal and can be assumed to be equivalent to nuclear weapons in terms of their capability to fulfil strategic military missions. Basically, this is the main objective of the current Russian approach to strategic arms control, that is of a security equation, which focuses on finding a way to address the challenge of all sorts of weapons with such capability, both nuclear and non-nuclear, both offensive and defensive ones.
This discussion deserves to be both technical and political. Within the scope of this piece of analysis the problem should be viewed from several angles. Firstly, it should be emphasized that a line can be drawn between destructive and non-destructive capabilities, with the former including weapons used in cyber and electronic warfare. Secondly, as mentioned above, there is a sort of dashed line between weapons for offense and defense. Also, there is a variable degree of autonomy in all the weapons mentioned, which is a problem of its own.
New types of conventional weapons can include the following ones:
defense systems (air defense, missile defense, counterspace);
space infrastructure;
electronic warfare;
cyber warfare.
Those, to reiterate, can be categorised as strike, disruptive, kinetic, and informational, intelligence, support, and also as offensive and defensive, which further complicate things.
Figure 6. New Types of Conventional Weapons. Compiled by the author based on open sources
Conventional weapons as a strategic factor
The understanding of the issue can be achieved through the analysis of the strategic tasks that missiles (and partly other means of destruction, including loitering munitions and naval mines) can presumably fulfil with conventional payloads, that is, the destruction and disabling of strategic facilities and infrastructure. The list of these is a matter of debate. In the author’s understanding, they should include three main categories:
Strategic nuclear forces and their infrastructure and battle management systems. This should also include strategic missile defense infrastructure, early warning systems (including both ground and space defense layer), space domain awareness systems.
Forces and means that enable and support the combat use of the SNF, specifically, general-purpose naval forces and air defense/nonstrategic missile defense forces that protect land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and heavy bomber bases.
Dual-use critical infrastructure, i.e., ports, bridges, tunnels, factories, power plants, etc.
How strategic are nonstrategic or tactical nuclear weapons remains in question. Despite the linguistic paradox, presumably the ability to target their depots and carriers is also an element of the challenge. In each of these categories, the following two provisional target types can be distinguished, in particularly, soft, and hard targets. Accordingly, virtually any non-nuclear weapon is suitable for the former, while the latter can be hit with increased power, accuracy, and penetration.
Presumably, at present, the main threat from strategic non-nuclear weapons comes for soft targets – at least until the massive deployment of hypersonic weapons and/or ICBMs or intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) with conventional warheads. It is noteworthy that China already possesses a significant arsenal of conventionally armed IRBMs, but they do not pose a threat to the continental US, while similar US weapons, when deployed on the territory of allies (or national systems of allies), will certainly become a significant threat to the strategic forces of Russia[1] as well as China[2] due to the proximity to their borders. In this regard the major concern is linked to the proliferation of long-range conventional weapons (including future post-INF US-made weapons) through foreign military sales and domestic development. Bright examples here include (but not limited to) the JASSM-ER air-launched cruise missile and Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missile acquisitions by such the US allies as Poland and Japan, as well as indigenous missile capabilities development by South Korea[3].
Strategic non-nuclear weapons are of particular importance in the context of the development of the concepts of strategic deterrence in Russia and integrated deterrence in the United States[4]. It is noteworthy that the concept of non-nuclear deterrence per se appeared in the Russian military doctrine in 2014, but so far remains somewhat vague[5].The reasons for the interest in the concept itself might be related to the US military operations during the unipolar moment (i.e., on the Balkans and in the Middle East), which were closely followed by the Russian scholars, politicians, and the military.
Presumably, the issue at hand (including in the broadest interpretation) allows for a tailored dose of actions and reactions, but also makes the ascent towards the nuclear threshold (and possibly beyond it) much smoother. So, the challenge is that new types of conventional weapons do not replace nuclear weapons, but augment them, and lead to the possibility of more comfortable nuclear use. Also, it increases the role of non-nuclear, but militarily capable states that can become important factors not only in deterrence, but in actual strategic warfighting. Again, it is South Korea with its huge and very powerful conventional missile arsenal that can serve the best example here. Its role in the US deterrent posture (although limited to the DPRK at the moment) was codified in the Washington Declaration on April 26, 2023[6].
Similar dynamics is inherent in the Asia-Pacific region in the form of cooperation between the US allies in the space domain. A US-Japanese cooperation agreement on space situational awareness has been in place since 2013[7]. The launch of real-time data exchange between the respective US and Japanese systems to monitor third-country satellites and space debris was planned for the 2023 fiscal year[8]. Moreover, US defense payloads are planned to be placed into orbit on Japanese QZSS communication and navigation satellites starting from 2024[9]. Cooperation in maritime situational awareness using space infrastructure of the two countries is under consideration[10]. The establishment of a trilateral US-Japan-South Korea mechanism for tracking the DPRK missile launches could also be used against Russia (and China) in the future by increasing the effectiveness of the US and its allies’ missile defense systems and creating conditions for counterforce strikes within the framework of the so-called left-of-launch intercept[11]. The main threat to the integration of the space infrastructure of the US and its allies is that “given the advances in automated big data analysis, it is possible to speak confidently enough about the probability of adjusting the orbits of space reconnaissance to ensure continuous monitoring of specified areas of the Earth’s surface for a long (albeit limited) period of time”[12]. The same is generally true for space domain awareness.
Figure 7. Space Enterprise Competition Effects. Compiled by the author based on open sources
But the main thing is that all these tools allow to hurt the adversary from several conventional spaces at once: traditional air-land-sea and relatively new ones as cyber and outer space. At the same time, however, this pain is not comparable to the impact of nuclear weapons. It is precisely here that it is worth drawing a line between types of deterrence. Tactical tasks that would, among other things, prevent certain actions of the enemy, or force him to do what you want (or force to refrain from some actions), and some of these tasks have previously been reserved for nuclear weapons. Moreover, the strategic nature of the tasks performed by non-nuclear weapons is quite possible, but the destructive effect would not be so impressive. As demonstrated in numerous current conflicts, including in Syria and Ukraine, as long as there is an external lifeline, resilience may be demonstrated by any country in the face of new types of strategic conventional weapons. Such a thing is impossible in the face of nuclear weapons – the maximum result is not to lose alone. However, here again the nexus of non-nuclear and nuclear starts to work: sophisticated non-nuclear capabilities can help you not to lose – or even enable you to win a nuclear war. The classic scenario – a real Boogeyman for Russian military thought is the following: a disarming and decapitating strike with non-nuclear weapons by the adversary against Russian targets, including auxiliary infrastructure, which allows to allocate an increased number of nuclear weapons options that hit everything that cannot be killed by non-nuclear weapons, and then when a limited number of weapons that survived to deliver a second strike are launched – those are intercepted by air and missile defenses.
Figure 8. Boogeyman First Strike Scenario. Compiled by the author based on open sources
Hypersonic effects
Hypersonic weapons (HW) today are generally understood as missile weapons that have demonstrated the ability to travel in the Earth’s atmosphere at speeds exceeding Mach 5 (i.e., five times the speed of sound in the relevant medium) over a significant segment of the trajectory, while manoeuvring along it. The types of such weapons include hypersonic cruise missiles (HCM) and hypersonic glide vehicles (HGV). In addition, it is also fair to include aeroballistic missiles and manoeuvrable ballistic missile re-entry vehicles (MaRV) provided they also make a prolonged movement in the atmosphere at hypersonic speeds and perform manoeuvres. HCMs are, in fact, a further evolutionary development of supersonic cruise missiles (especially typical of the Soviet and Russian school of anti-ship missile development, but another notable example is the French nuclear-tipped ASMP-A missile), while HGVs are a development of MaRVs[13]. Presumably, both HCMs and HGVs can use so-called ricocheting trajectories to increase the range and reduce heat loads[14].
Interestingly, the advantages of hypersonic systems (apparently, depending on actual tasks formulated to the developers by political leadership) include an increased accuracy relative to conventional missile weapons or more effective overcoming the enemy’s missile and air defenses. At the same time, due the impossibility to circumvent physical limitations, in most scenarios, the HW will generally fall short of traditional ballistic missiles’ speed, i.e., the time between the launch and the impact will be longer. Due to the above-mentioned features of hypersonic weapons, most countries with a developed missile industry remain interested in their development and deployment. Currently, active work in the field of hypersonic weapons is being carried out in Russia, China, the US (including in cooperation with Australia and the UK within the AUKUS format), France, Japan, DPRK, South Korea, India, and Iran. A curious feature is that some countries are developing dual-use systems, such as Russia (with the exception of the exclusively nuclear capable Avangard hypersonic ballistic missile and probably its successors to equip the future Sarmat heavy ICBM) and China, while others, primarily the United States, declare the exclusively non-nuclear nature of their hypersonic projects. France, for example, emphasises the role of hypersonic weapons as a means of delivering nuclear warheads[15].
HWs pose a number of strategic stability challenges related to their ability to manoeuvre, their ability to be detected by ground-based radar stations and their speed. Under certain circumstances, these characteristics can lead to uncertainty of the target to be hit by an HW, reduction of warning and response decision times, and the ability overcome defense systems. Because the capabilities of most hypersonic missile systems deployed or currently under development allow them to carry significant payloads, they can be used as delivery vehicles for nuclear or conventional warheads, i.e., they acquire the characteristics of dual-use systems. Without adequate transparency and confidence-building measures, the deployment of dual-use HWs (especially if they are assumed to have the highest possible performance, which is likely to be the default) could have a destabilising effect and lead states to adopting nuclear doctrines based on worst-case assumptions, including the doctrines of counterstrike or even preemptive strike, both of which may only be based on a limited amount of data that could be considered sufficient to decide whether to use them or not.
Given the anticipated qualities and possible missions of hypersonic weapons, this area is a good example of the so-called intertwining of conventional and nuclear weapons. At least some of the missions that are considered essential for hypersonic weapons, both at the strategic and operational-tactical level, can be accomplished without the use of nuclear warheads, thanks to the speed and accuracy of these weapons. Thus, the Kinzhal and Zircon create a non-nuclear strategic capability that could be used in the pre-nuclear phase of a conflict. Thus, as in the case of other Russian long-range precision weapons, their dual purpose still allows them to be classified as non-nuclear deterrents.
The problem of entanglement can be looked at from another angle as well: for example, a non-nuclear HW can be used as a deterrent against an adversary’s nuclear capability or as a counterforce capability against its nuclear potential. The same is possible with regard to a nuclear-capable HW, which can be deployed as a deterrent against superior conventional forces or targeted against strategic but non-nuclear missile defense assets.
One of the greatest threats in such cases is the misperception of a threat. It seems natural for a human mind to overestimate an adversary’s capabilities and underestimate its own, which in our case can lead to the ultimate use it or lose it situation: decision-makers may be so frightened by an adversary’s perceived ability to disarm that make the decision to launch a nuclear first strike. At a pre-strategic level, it is likely that hypersonic systems in non-nuclear configuration could pose threats to high-value facilities and strike capabilities of a probable adversary at a regional level against the background of escalating tensions. At the same time, the general dynamics of the conflict is unlikely to be radically different from that of conventional missile weapons, although tactically the time to make decisions on response actions may be reduced. This hypothesis is to some extent confirmed by the consequences of using HW during the warfighting in Ukraine.
The Ukrainian dimension
During the Special Military Operation in Ukraine launched by Russia in 2022, the Russian Armed Forces are quite actively using long-range precision weapons of various types, including strategic platforms, particularly heavy bombers. So far, its use, including in terms of hypersonic systems, has not resulted in effects that can be considered truly strategic (despite several successful operations, including gradual destruction of the Ukrainian energy system and limiting the stockpile of munitions and weapons prepared for the failed Ukrainian Counteroffensive in the summer of 2023). Still, current events do raise questions about the effectiveness of both planning and the weapons performance, and, on the other hand, about the possibility of theoretical overestimation of strategic non-nuclear weapons capabilities in principle.
At the same time, the possibility of relatively effective strikes against the infrastructure of the Russian strategic nuclear forces with the help of the so-called ersatzweapons, such as old Soviet reconnaissance drones converted into kamikaze drones (note that these facts once again point to the continued confusion of unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) and cruise missile), on the contrary, has been confirmed. The response to the use of nonstrategic nuclear weapons by one side with the use of strategic non-nuclear weapons by other sides is still a rather illusory scenario, but it also demonstrates a close link between nuclear and non-nuclear spheres.
Warfighting in Ukraine is closely followed by many analysts and scholars, however there is a huge challenge because of the fog of war, which is even harder to penetrate because of propaganda efforts taken by every side involved. Still, it has already demonstrated both the strengths and the weaknesses of several capabilities, old and new ones. Probably, the most important conclusion to be made out of this chapter is that the importance of sophisticated ISR capabilities is paramount, but at the same time there are no silver bullets, and what really matters is that how one combines all available capabilities and manage to repair its losses. This is absolutely applicable to non-nuclear strategic weapons, as their mass and precision remain highly relevant. However, the case can be made that overall limited ability of the weapons that comprise the bulk of Russian non-nuclear deterrence forces to achieve strategic effects might lead to reconsideration of the conventionalization trend and to a greater reliance on nuclear weapons.
The security dilemma and possible solutions
The nature of security dilemma is ruthless, but in our multi-faceted world, it becomes very multidimensional. A natural reaction to the development of missile defense is new means of defeat, that are driving a new phase of missile defense development[16]. The superiority in satellite infrastructure leads to the development of anti-satellite kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities, which, in turn, contributes to the development of rapid space launch systems and the transition to distributed mega-constellations, which calls into question the survivability of the SNF and can lead to embracing more escalatory doctrines, postures and strategies[17]. Such trends proliferate in our polycentric world, poisoned by great powers’ competition.
Figure 9. Missile Defense Effects. Compiled by the author based on open sources
There are no simple and proven solutions for the comprehensive inclusion of strategic non-nuclear weapons in the arms control architecture. However, existing agreements, as well as those that are no longer in force, have partially addressed the issue. One example is the 1987 INF Treaty, which covered all intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, regardless of their combat equipment. The 2010 New START Treaty deals to some extent with bombers converted for non-nuclear weapons use only, and the payloads of strategic delivery vehicles are not specifically defined. In addition, there is a regime for flight notifications for heavy bombers, which are now primarily used as carriers (and launchers) of non-nuclear weapons, although it is by no means sufficient.
It appears that future efforts should focus on confidence- and security-building measures in this area, as well as possible unilateral restrictions and/or transparency, with an emphasis on early notification of certain actions, as well as refraining from the deployment of relevant weapons systems in sensitive areas. In general, including on a geographically specific basis, some consideration should be given to introducing a category of escalation-threatening weapons and military equipment. These should include all those weapons that by default are on high alert in peacetime, capable of inflicting damage at an operational and strategic depth of defense and can be used for signalling and reconnaissance activities – including formal combat training activities (the so-called electronic launches among other things) in close proximity to the lines of contact of would-be adversaries[18].
One relatively easy first step can be related to the so-called Russianpost-INF moratoriuminitiative[19]. Russia and the US might eventually come up with a very limited political agreement not to deploy land-based hypersonic missiles in Europe, and then establish some sort of verification mechanism, first based on the national technical means. Clearly, this will not be an ultimate solution, but its practical implementation might demonstrate the value of such an arrangement which can later be used for other sorts of new conventional weapons.
Lastly, reducing nuclear and strategic risks without a comprehensive settlement is difficult, if not impossible. The US emphasis on risk reduction is perceived by many in Russia and in China as an attempt to consolidate unilateral advantages and one-sided practices, such as Bomber Task Force[20] and Freedom of Navigation Operations. Basically, it gives an opportunity to exercise pressure but avoid punishment. Nevertheless, this does not mean that an academic and expert community should stop looking for possible solutions that can be implemented when the conditions are ripe.
[7] Agreement between the United States of America and Japan Effected by Exchange of Notes at Tokyo May 28, 2013, with Memorandum of Understanding / Space Cooperation, Space Situational Awareness Services and Information / Treaties and other International Acts Series 13-528 // US Department of State. URL: https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/219765.pdf.
[13] Лысенко Л.Н. Наведение баллистических ракет : учеб. пособие для вузов по направлению подготовки «Ракетостроение и космонавтика» и «Гидроаэродинамика и динамика полета» / Лысенко Л.Н. – М. : Изд-во МГТУ им. Н. Э. Баумана, 2016. – 445 с. : ил. – (Вооружение и военная техника). – Библиогр.: с. 437-440. URL: https://library.bmstu.ru/Catalog/Details/465279.
[18] Bogdanov K.V., Stefanovich D.V. Global Missile Proliferation: Challenges and Solutions // Global Missile Proliferation: Challenges and Solutions // Herald of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2022. № 92. Pp. 293-300. URL: https://link.springer.com/article/10.1134/S1019331622100057.
[19] Statement by Vladimir Putin on Additional Steps to De-Escalate the Situation in Europe after the Termination of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF Treaty) // Official Website of the Russian President, October 26, 2020. URL: http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/64270.
