Comprehensive overview of current events and trends in the field of international security and international relations
here AUKUS came from and how the world met it?
Ms. Michaela Lokteva, an employee of the State Atomic Energy Corporation “Rosatom”
AUKUS is a strategic partnership framework between Australia, the UK, and the US, formed in 2021, uniting historic allies under a new security pact. The basis for cooperation among the three countries can be traced back to World War I and World War II. According to Andrew Brew, the general security partnership between the US and Australia developed even earlier: “…Australian troops have stood shoulder to shoulder with Americans in every significant military engagement since World War I…”. Later, during World War II, Australia and the UK were united within the British Commonwealth of Nations[1]. As expert Evgeniya Kudrova states[2], during World War II, the naval forces of the three countries conducted joint operations in the Western Pacific Ocean. A notable example of cooperation between Australia and the U.K. was their involvement in the Western Desert campaign in the 1940s. The US and Australia also formed strong ties with the signing of the ANZUS Treaty in 1951[3], which was established between Australia, New Zealand, and the US, aimed at protecting the Pacific region. As the preamble of the ANZUS Treaty states, the parties: “…declare publicly and formally their sense of unity, so that no potential aggressor could be under the illusion that any of them stand alone in the Pacific Area…”[4]. Additionally, all three AUKUS countries shared an ideological opposition to communism. Therefore, the historical foundation for the AUKUS partnership is quite clear. Today, the scope of cooperation between these nations remains extensive. According to the U.S. Embassy in Australia, the countries share numerous agreements on defense trade and technology. One example of this cooperation is Australia’s support for the U.S. military presence in the Indo-Pacific[5]. Moreover, the U.S. Department of State notes that “Australia is one of America’s largest defense customers….”
In terms of political prerequisites in modern times, AUKUS reflects Australia’s shift toward a clear strategic alignment with the ongoing U.S. resistance against China and its presence in the South Pacific. It also demonstrates the U.K.’s renewed support for the U.S. strategy. China is regarded not only as a competitor to the U.S. but also as a challenge to Australia in the Pacific, due to its growing economic influence and the expansion of its artificial islands, which serve as attempts at naval posturing. Over the years, China has constructed several artificial islands[6] in the Pacific, mainly to resolve its territorial disputes. Some of these islands in the South China Sea have been militarized[7], raising regional security concerns. Despite increasing U.S.-China tensions in trade and defense, the U.S. naval presence in the Pacific remains smaller compared to other regions. Furthermore, with President Donald Trump’s inauguration in 2025, the U.S. as a security partner has become more unpredictable for its allies, as the new president pursues unconventional policies in international relations. This situation incentivizes Australia to strengthen its own and the U.S. fleet’s presence in the region through the AUKUS framework. This is corroborated by political science expert Dr. Olga Leonova, who stated: “The emergence of the AUKUS partnership showed that Australia has made its final strategic choice [Turnbull, 2021]. It has clearly defined its positions in the growing competition with China for influence in the region[8].” For the U.K., the partnership similarly aims to bolster its position in the Pacific and respond to the challenge of containing Chinese influence.
Next, let’s examine how Australia came to adopt a pro-AUKUS stance in its foreign and defense policies. As discussed earlier, AUKUS reinforces the traditional alliance between the U.S. and Australia. According to one expert[9] in the field, Mr. Vladimir Ladanov, the main reason behind the shift in Australia’s foreign policy toward the AUKUS partnership was the “fear of abandonment by the US.” In his work, Mr. Ladanov concludes that Australia is largely capable of conducting an independent defense policy without relying on the U.S., but such an independent policy would be ‘a clear break with the past’ and is not currently supported domestically. This fear dates back to the 1940s when Japan rose in regional power, and Australia was unable to maintain influence on its own, relying instead on U.S. assistance. In the 21st century[10], with countries like China rising and trying to expand their regional influence, Australia finds itself in a similar situation, worried about losing strategic positions to emerging powers. The AUKUS partnership supports this strategic goal from both sides. It bolsters the U.S. position in the region by containing Chinese influence. Additionally, if this alliance deepens relations between the AUKUS members, in the event of increased Chinese aggression, the U.S. and the U.K. would likely defend Australia. A key issue with this policy is that, by 2025, the U.S. has become a less reliable and predictable strategic partner, especially following the inauguration of Donald Trump. One example of the unpredictable policymaking of the current U.S. president is the recent tariff package he introduced, which also includes tariffs on imports from Australia[11].
Finally, this article explores the history of Australia’s nuclear ambitions. Australia is widely recognized as a proponent of nuclear nonproliferation, actively participating in negotiations and implementing key nonproliferation agreements such as the NPT, and maintaining close cooperation with the IAEA. However, according to declassified documents, as revealed in the Fall 1997 Non-Proliferation Review in Jim Walsh’s article[12], Australia had certain nuclear ambitions in the 1950s and 1960s, which the author refers to as “the attempted procurement phase.” The author states that Australian policy “demonstrates the tremendous capacity of states to change their behavior and beliefs, even on matters as central as nuclear weapons and national survival.” Instead of developing its own nuclear program, Australia sought to acquire nuclear weapons from other countries, such as Great Britain – a policy reflected today in the AUKUS partnership, where, instead of developing its own nuclear submarines, Australia is gaining significant momentum for industry development and procurement from other states. Additionally, the article highlights two key factors that fueled Australian nuclear ambitions. First, the acquisition of nuclear weapons by China could pose a regional security threat to Australia. Second, Great Britain’s decision to withdraw some military units from Pacific territories and the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam left Australia less protected from potential regional threats. This trend is also evident in the AUKUS partnership, where Australia seeks to reinforce its regional presence in response to China’s growing influence and military presence. In contrast, the U.S. and U.K. influence in the Pacific remains comparatively weaker.
Essence of the partnership
The partnership was built on the foundation of the Five Eyes alliance, which is an alliance between Australia, the U.S., the U.K., New Zealand, and Canada aimed at intelligence cooperation. This alliance was initially formed during World War II, along with previous security cooperation frameworks involving these countries over the years. According to the Australian Foreign Affairs article[13], one of the main political reasons for creating AUKUS was the United States’ loss of technological leadership compared to China. At the same time, Australia has shifted its current domestic stance toward using nuclear energy because of increasing security concerns in the Pacific, including potential security threats from China’s expanding regional influence and the comparatively weaker state of Australia’s navy.
According to news sources[14], the talks about the deal were started by Australia in the spring of 2021. On September 15, 2021[15], the partnership named AUKUS was announced publicly in a joint statement from the participating countries. The statement included several key points. First, it aimed to “strengthen the ability of each to support our security and defense interests” and “deepen diplomatic, security, and defense cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region.” These claims reinforce the idea that AUKUS is primarily a deterrence mechanism against potential regional Chinese aggression and also promote the countries’ interests in the Pacific. The second point in the statement is that the partnership isn’t limited to just supplying nuclear submarines to Australia, but also involves exchanging information and technologies, as well as industrial cooperation among member states. Third, the statement emphasizes Australia’s commitment to nonproliferation norms, stating that the country upholds ‘safeguards, transparency, verification, and accountancy measures to ensure the nonproliferation, safety, and security of nuclear material and technology.’ With these statements, the parties assert that the deal does not violate the nonproliferation regime, highlighting Australia’s long-standing positive reputation in the nonproliferation field.
The Joint Statement was followed by the AUKUS agreement[16], a legally binding document signed by the parties in 2021 and entered into force in 2022. According to Article II of the AUKUS agreement, parties can exchange any information that may be needed to “…research, develop, design, manufacture, operate, regulate, and dispose of military reactors….”
The article discusses the possibility of all participants accessing information on constructing military reactors. This is particularly relevant for Australia, as it is a non-nuclear-weapon state with obligations not to develop nuclear weapons. However, the country would now receive information that could potentially be used for a nuclear weapons program. Article III of the treaty states that: “The use of any information (including design drawings and specifications) communicated or exchanged under this Agreement shall be the responsibility of the Party receiving it.” This clause suggests an attempt by the U.S. and the U.K. to limit their liability in case of noncompliance with nuclear regulations during the implementation or interpretation of the AUKUS agreement. Furthermore, Article IV (b) of the treaty specifies that information about naval nuclear propulsion cannot be shared with parties outside the agreement. The article does not mention nuclear military reactors explicitly, because sharing such information is governed by other nonproliferation agreements. Additionally, Article IV (c) states that the agreement will adhere to IAEA safeguards regarding nuclear materials and peaceful nuclear activities on Australian soil, in line with treaties such as the NPT and the Additional Protocol. These articles aim to affirm the legitimacy of the AUKUS partnership with respect to nuclear regulation. Although the agreement involves sensitive information and materials that could, in theory, be used for a nuclear weapons program, it emphasizes the distinction of its subject from nuclear weapons, exemplified by the definition of reactor in Article IX (f): “Reactor means an apparatus, other than an atomic weapon…”. Since naval nuclear propulsion is a relatively rare technology, the agreement devotes considerable attention to safeguarding information related to nuclear naval propulsion, as seen in articles V and VI.
To clarify what the AUKUS partnership would involve in reality, the parties outlined the first pillar of the deal in the March 2023 Joint Statement[17]. This part of the AUKUS implementation plan involves the transfer of the SSN-AUKUS submarine, which is based on technology from the three countries and will be operated and built by Australia and the U.K. This process includes training Australian personnel, supporting Australian infrastructure and legal systems related to SSN, Australia purchasing U.S. submarines, and exchanging produced SSNs between the U.K. and Australia. If the plan is implemented, Australia is expected to become an independent producer and operator of nuclear submarines, which could have significant regional security implications for the Pacific. The second pillar[18] of AUKUS focuses on the overall development of the countries’ innovation and military capabilities. That includes facilitating defense trade, cooperation in cyberspace, intelligence, the industrial sector, engaging private financing and investments in defense sectors, and other initiatives undertaken by states. This part of the partnership should not be underestimated, as the scale of cooperation involved is ambitious and has the potential to elevate the technological capabilities of the participating countries to the next level globally. According to the CSIS, while discussing the technological race: “…nowhere is this race more contested than in the Indo-Pacific region, which incubates much of the world’s technological innovation and has become a hotbed of strategic technological competition.”[19] With the AUKUS countries involved in such cooperation, they could pose significant challenges to Chinese technological primacy in the region and on the global stage. At the same time, precise information on progress toward the second pillar is scarce, which can be attributed to the complexity of exchanging information on critical technologies and warfare between nations, as well as the need to align legislation and policies to facilitate this exchange.
The next major milestone for the AUKUS partnership was the new agreement introduced in 2024[20], replacing the previous 2022 agreement. The preamble of this new agreement has undergone significant changes compared to its predecessor. While the 2021 agreement’s preamble only mentioned the states’ commitment to the NPT, the 2024 agreement outlines several nonproliferation obligations with specific commitments from the states. It references the NPT commitments, noting that Australia, as a NNWS, is obliged not to receive, produce, or seek assistance in nuclear weapons, while the U.S., as an NWS, has committed not to facilitate such transfers or encourage NNWSs to do so. Additionally, the preamble recognizes the comprehensive safeguards agreement between Australia and the IAEA as well as Australia’s obligations under the Rarotonga treaty. Since its announcement, the AUKUS partnership has been controversial, with many states questioning whether it aligns with the nonproliferation principles developed over the past century. Therefore, it is only logical that the new agreement includes statements indicating that the AUKUS agreement and partnership are consistent with the nuclear nonproliferation obligations of the member states.
Within the main body of the agreement, the first key point is found in Article IV, clause E, which states that “Australia shall indemnify…the United States and the United Kingdom against any liability…resulting from Nuclear Risks connected with the design, manufacture, assembly, transfer, or utilization of any Material or Equipment.” This means that any nuclear incidents, radioactive releases, or other safety hazards arising from the use of nuclear materials, including nuclear-propelled submarines, will be the responsibility of Australia and not the responsible for the supplying countries. Article VI outlines the obligations and limitations of states under the agreement. Firstly, clauses D and E of the article specify the use of nuclear materials under the agreement.
Australia shall not enrich or alter the form of any materials supplied under the agreement, including enriched uranium transferred to it. Second, clause G notes that Australia cannot use the information transferred under the agreement for any purpose other than naval propulsion. Third, the parties reserve the right to suspend the implementation of the agreement if Australia is found in noncompliance with the NPT or its IAEA safeguards agreement, which also includes withdrawing from the aforementioned agreements. Finally, clause K states that “All Australian nuclear-powered submarines shall be conventionally armed.” This final clause encompasses both submarines supplied to Australia by the U.S. and the U.K., as well as those that Australia will produce itself. Additionally, the parties concluded non-legally binding agreements, such as memorandums of understanding, one of which was signed in 2024[21]. The goal is to reflect each state’s approach to certain articles within the AUKUS Agreement of 2024. One key point in the understanding is Article 5, where states reaffirm their commitment to enable the IAEA to fulfill its core mission of preventing diversion from peaceful purposes.
Overall, the project is ambitious and demands significant industrial and financial resources from the U.S. and Australia, respectively. There have been numerous concerns that the AUKUS plans might not be realized on time due to various challenges. Aside from negotiations with the IAEA regarding the transfer of nuclear materials to Australia, which could take as long as necessary to secure a positive decision, the U.S., according to news sources, is experiencing production delays related to the AUKUS submarines[22]. Another major setback occurred with the recent tariffs imposed by President Donald Trump, which include tariffs on steel and aluminum used in the production of these submarines. These new tariffs could raise the costs of materials and components, most of which the U.S. largely imports from its now tariffed trading partners. Additionally, since the transfer involves sensitive technology, the U.S. faces licensing issues with some of the technology involved in the AUKUS deal, potentially delaying the submarines’ delivery[23].
Equivocal response from the world
The AUKUS partnership is unprecedented and revolutionary for the international nuclear domain, which has elicited differing responses from countries. These responses are important to consider when assessing the potential implications of the deal. Regionally, Indonesia was among the earliest opponents, raising concerns about regional arms races, nonproliferation issues, and its own safety from potential nuclear accidents due to its regional position[24]. However, over time, its stance softened, possibly in response to Australia’s repeated commitments to engage and inform the IAEA and some diplomatic efforts towards Indonesia. Malaysia also initially expressed a negative view of the partnership but adopted a more neutral stance over the years, driven mainly by its interest in economic cooperation with AUKUS member states. It’s worth noting that Malaysia’s concerns extended beyond the common arms race argument to include worries about setting a precedent[25] for a non-nuclear-weapon state acquiring nuclear materials that could be used to develop nuclear weapons.
In terms of proponents of the deal, the list included Singapore, which went as far as promising to provide access to ports for submarines under AUKUS, and claimed: “We believe that Australia adds to regional security in ASEAN and beyond.”[26] Support for AUKUS was also expressed by the Philippines, a country in a unique geographical proximity to China, thus having valid concerns over deterrence towards it. According to the publication “Indo-Pacific Reactions to AUKUS” by Perth USAsia Centre[27], the Philippines are threatened on three major levels: their proximity to Taiwan as a center of instability, proximity to the South China Sea filled with territorial disputes with China, and the expansion of the Chinese fleet in the Philippine Sea. Two other countries expressed some interest in the AUKUS partnership, namely South Korea and Japan, with the former interested in pillar I of the deal and the latter in pillar II. For South Korea, AUKUS is especially interesting if the partnership expands, as such a framework would allow South Korea to acquire nuclear materials that it has been trying to get for its own nuclear submarine fleet. Under current agreements with the U.S., South Korea is limited in its acquisition of highly enriched uranium unless approved by the U.S., even if it involves unsafeguarded activities like naval propulsion. For Japan, the interest lies in the second pillar of the deal, which offers cooperation on technologies such as hypersonic weapons and electronic warfare[28].
Another important regional actor, India, remained fairly neutral in its statements on AUKUS[29]. India is known for maintaining a generally neutral policy toward the U.S. and China, as both provide economic benefits. However, due to the more aggressive nature of China’s regional influence expansion and military presence, as well as the economic advantages that AUKUS could offer—since the partnership would boost regional technology market demand to support such an ambitious project, including both of its pillars – India is likely to remain relatively receptive to the partnership.
Whether the overall sentiment towards AUKUS is positive or negative in the regional block, the common concern that most countries seem to share is avoiding being endangered by a possible conflict between Australia or other AUKUS states and China, which could potentially threaten the security of nearby states and naval safety.
One of the more expected negative responses to AUKUS came from China, as the deal suggests the containment of its influence in the region. Despite expanding its military presence in the Indo-Pacific, China called the deal “the obsolete Cold War… mentality,” implying that it would inevitably lead to an arms race in the area. Furthermore, the country accused the AUKUS members of applying a “double standard,”[30] as the partnership involves the legal transfer of highly enriched uranium and sensitive nuclear technology. China was also further provoked by Taiwan’s[31] welcoming of the partnership, despite Taiwan being part of China and recognized by the UN and 106 other countries[32]. Nonetheless, Taiwan continues its separatist policies. The announcement and progress of the AUKUS deal have significantly worsened relations between China and the AUKUS members, as it threatens to deter Chinese naval influence in the region and the expansion of its nuclear submarine fleet. In criticizing AUKUS, China relies on the nonproliferation argument, claiming that the alliance could create proliferation risks and undermine the nonproliferation regime altogether[33]. This viewpoint is shared by Chinese allies – Russia and North Korea – both of which expressed similar concerns about proliferation risks and regional tensions[34][35].
Notably, leaders of Russia and China released a joint statement in 2023[36] on the partnership between the two states, claiming that despite having close ties, the countries do not resort to forming military blocks among each other and “surpasses such framework of interstate interaction,” and such cooperation is not aimed against any other states. The states have expressed their overall resistance to the Cold War ideology and block formation. The statement includes direct criticism of AUKUS as they claim it would destabilize the Pacific, calling for AUKUS member states to “strictly implement their obligations on the nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, and to maintain regional peace, stability, and development in the region.” This strongly hints that certain classes of missiles on board nuclear submarines are capable of carrying nuclear warheads. Additionally, in the most recent joint statement of the two leaders dated May 8th, 2025, they reiterated their criticism of AUKUS: “…efforts of the AUKUS partnership… supporting the activities of their nuclear forces, on the territory of a country party to the Treaty on a Nuclear-Free Zone in the South Pacific Ocean undermine strategic stability and provoke an arms race in the region.”[37] As seen in both official documents, the criticism of AUKUS in the second statement is more direct and openly condemnatory, reflecting that the negative stance of China and Russia toward the deal has only gained momentum over the past few years.
Regarding the European Union, the main negative reaction came from France, which previously had a contract with Australia for the supply of submarines worth $90 billion[38]. According to news sources[39], France was not informed of the upcoming deal by its NATO allies and was unexpectedly surprised by the announcement of AUKUS. France viewed the newly formed partnership as a diplomatic blow, especially since it had canceled a significant submarine contract with Australia and was excluded from a partnership aimed at expanding influence in the Indo-Pacific. France had recently shown interest in this region before the AUKUS announcement in the European strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific. The country responded to the news by saying, “It’s really a stab in the back.” While France’s negative reaction didn’t stem from concerns over non-proliferation, it might use that issue to criticize the deal if relations between France and AUKUS members further deteriorate.
A notable exception in the international response to AUKUS is Brazil, a country with long-standing ambitions to acquire nuclear-powered submarines. However, under the safeguards agreement, Brazil would need IAEA approval, just like Australia, to use nuclear materials (fuel) for such propulsion. Therefore, Brazil’s main goal is to reach an agreement with the IAEA and have the AUKUS negotiations on safeguards resolved in its favor. This is further supported by the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey, which states, “…Brazil seems to appreciate that whichever submarine safeguards agreement is negotiated first will set a precedent for others.”[40]
Conclusion
The formation of AUKUS makes sense historically, bringing together three countries to promote their strategic interests in the Pacific. One of the main goals of the partnership is to counter the growing Chinese influence in the region and strengthen the positions of the U.S. and its AUKUS allies there. The new security alliance has ambitious plans, including military, industrial, and technological milestones for all participating nations. Australia has shown a significant change in its policy regarding nuclear energy, as the partnership involves the transfer of conventionally armed nuclear-powered submarines to Australia and the development of its own industry. In official statements and documents, countries have increasingly emphasized their commitment to upholding nonproliferation standards. This focus on nonproliferation is also reflected in the second agreement between AUKUS members concerning the transfer process and industrial development.
The increased focus on nonproliferation by the AUKUS countries stems from differing international views on the transfer. The announcement of AUKUS not only triggered the expected negative reactions from China and its allies but also raised concerns among regional and global actors regarding nonproliferation. Opposing countries like China, Russia, and North Korea became more vocal and direct in their condemnation as the deal progressed, while most regional countries remained either supportive or neutral. An important issue raised even by countries that support or stay neutral toward AUKUS is that Australia is part of the nuclear-weapon-free zone established in the Pacific under the Rarotonga treaty. The other two main concerns expressed by different countries were the increase in regional tensions caused by the deployment of AUKUS submarines in the Pacific and worries about the weakening of the nonproliferation regime and related treaties, including the NPT.
The author expresses gratitude to her academic advisor, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary (retired) Dr. Mikhail Lysenko, for his valuable advice and assistance in writing this work.
[5] U.S. Security Cooperation with Australia. United States Department of State. URL: https://www.state.gov/u-s-security-cooperation-with-australia (дата обращения: 15.03.2025).
[6] China Has Fully Militarized Three Islands in South China Sea, US Admiral Says // The Guardian. 21.03.2022. URL: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/21/china-has-fully-militarized-three-islands-in-south-china-sea-us-admiral-says (дата обращения: 15.03.2025).
[8] Leonova O. The Impact of the Strategic Partnership AUKUS on the Geopolitical Situation in the Indo-Pacific Region // International Organisations Research Journal. 2022. Vol. 17, No. 3. P. 194–211. DOI: 10.17323/1996-7845-2022-03-08 (дата обращения: 15.03.2025).
[15] Agreement between the Government of Australia, the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Government of the United States of America for the Exchange of Naval Nuclear Propulsion Information. URL: https://www.aph.gov.au/…/2_AUKUS_treaty_text.pdf (дата обращения: 15.03.2025).
[19] Agreement among the Government of Australia, the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Government of the United States of America for Cooperation Related to Naval Propulsion. 2024. URL: https://www.asa.gov.au/…/Agreement%20among%20the%20Governments…pdf (дата обращения: 15.03.2025).
[26] Transcript of Joint Press Conference of the 13th Singapore–Australia Joint Ministerial Committee. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Singapore. 01.05.2023. URL: https://www.mfa.gov.sg/…/20230501sajmcjpc (дата обращения: 15.03.2025).
[34] Russia, China Express Concern over Effect of AUKUS Agreements on Stability in Asia Pacific // TASS. 2024. URL: https://tass.com/world/1789235 (дата обращения: 15.03.2025).
[36] Совместное заявление РФ и КНР об углублении отношений всеобъемлющего партнерства и стратегического взаимодействия, вступающего в новую эпоху. 2023. URL: http://www.kremlin.ru/supplement/5920 (дата обращения: 25.03.2025).
