Analyses
This article is based on the keynote speech by Dr. Alexander Vorontsov, PhD in History, Head of the Department of Korea and Mongolia, Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Science, PIR Center Advisory Board Member, at the 125th Spring Session of the Trialogue Club International entitled “Russia and the DPRK: A New Alliance or an Ad-hoc Partnership? New Realities for the Korean Peninsula”.
The dynamics of the development of bilateral relations between the Russian Federation and the DPRK after the signing of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty on 19 June, 2024 leads analysts to conclude that cooperation between Moscow and Pyongyang has now reached an unprecedented high level, perhaps even surpassing the corresponding parameters of the Soviet Union period. This phenomenon is based primarily on two factors: Pyongyang’s uncompromising support for Russia’s special military operation (SMO) in Ukraine and the unique trusting personal relationship that has developed between the leaders of our two countries.
There is plenty of evidence for this statement. There is a regular exchange of visits between representatives at a high political level, who perform, among other things, the functions of special envoys of heads of State. During the past month Lee Hee Yong, a member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the WPK, visited Moscow, and Sergei Shoigu, Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, visited Pyongyang. Both of them were accepted by the heads of state.
The 10th and 11th Meetings of the intergovernmental commission of the Russian Federation and the DPRK on trade, economic, scientific and technical cooperation, held in Pyongyang in November 2023 and 2024. The events were unprecedented in terms of the number and composition of participants: the Russian delegation exceeded 100 people, in each case included ministers and deputy ministers. Over the past two years, the heads of almost all leading Russian agencies have visited the DPRK. Inter-party relations are actively developing: Dmitry Medvedev, Chairman of the United Russia Party, met with Lee Hee Yong, Secretary of the Central Committee of the WPK, on 26. 02. 2025, and inter-parliamentary relations have become systemic.
Although cooperation in the economic sphere is burdened by international sanctions, there are areas that are not affected by them, where there is a high dynamics of interaction. The signed Agreements on cooperation in the field of healthcare and the development of road transport are being vigorously implemented. So in the near future, a ceremony is being prepared to begin the construction of an automobile bridge over the Tumangan border river. Cooperation is actively developing in the educational, cultural, sports, tourism, and humanitarian fields in general. More and more Russian students are showing interest in learning the North Korean version of the Korean language. The fact that several hundred Russian servicemen who were injured in the course of their military operations were accepted free of charge to undergo rehabilitation courses in medical institutions in North Korea was highly appreciated in Russian society. A high-level delegation from the DPRK is expected to arrive in Moscow on May 9 to celebrate the 80th anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War.
The Russian and international expert community is increasingly voicing the following assessments: after signing the said Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty with Russia, the DPRK now finds itself in a uniquely favorable position; it has become the only state in the world that has alliance treaties with two superpowers. The reality is that most of the tasks of the 8th Congress of the TPC 2021 have been accomplished. Among other things, the “10 x 20” project for the development of the periphery is now being successfully implemented, where not only local industry and grain storage facilities, but also modern hospitals are being built in the district centers. There is reason to believe that this is facilitated by cooperation with Russia, including in the medical sphere.
Based on these facts, there are even bold judgments that the DPRK’s star is now rising on the Korean Peninsula, which is successfully emerging from the economic crisis and geopolitical isolation, while South Korea has entered a period of serious crisis turbulence.
In military and political terms, the Korean Peninsula is teetering on the brink of conflict, the likelihood of which has increased during the administrations of J. Biden in the United States and Yoon Suk Yeol in the ROK. The strategic goals of the governments of both of the above-mentioned countries have been de facto aimed at the liquidation of the DPRK. Among other things, the strategy of Korean unification announced by Yoon Suk Yeol openly denies the DPRK the right to exist, which is an amazing example of non-recognition of the realities in the form of the existence of two Korean states, members of the UN.
In this context, both Pyongyang’s choice in recent years to strengthen its national defense capabilities, including its nuclear missile component, and Moscow’s conclusion that under the current circumstances the ideas and attempts to restore the negotiation processes based on the principles of denuclearization of the DPRK have lost their relevance and realism become more understandable.
As is well-known, the fundamental permanent basis of Russia’s policy towards the Korean Peninsula is the approach, the essence of which is as follows. Korea is Russia’s neighbor, and each of the Korean states represents its own special, unique, but extremely important value for Moscow. Therefore, the course aimed at careful attitude and cultivation of good-neighborly, friendly relations with both Korean states corresponds to the fundamental national interests of Russia.
These strategic attitudes remain vital today. At the same time, naturally, the events of world politics in recent years, which arose in connection with the military conflict in Ukraine, predetermined a serious transformation of both Russian-North Korean and Russian-South Korean relations.
Russia was forced to launch a Special military operation (SMO) in Ukraine on February 24, 2022. in response to the long-term expansion of the NATO bloc to the East, which ignored numerous appeals, proposals and warnings from Moscow, brought its military infrastructure close to Russia’s borders, began to actively develop the territory of Ukraine militarily and decided to use the Kiev regime as the main tool for inflicting a “strategic defeat” on Russia.
The DPRK and the Republic of Korea reacted to this epoch-making event in diametrically opposite ways. Pyongyang fully shared and supported the Russian assessments of the causes of the conflict, as well as the motives for actions conditioned by the protection of national sovereignty and security. Seoul, bound by allied obligations with the United States, supported Washington’s position, seeking to present Russia’s actions as allegedly “unprovoked aggression” in order to “restore the Russian empire,” etc., and joined the anti-Russian sanctions of the West.
Naturally, these new realities have profoundly affected Moscow’s policy towards both Pyongyang and Seoul.
Russian-North Korean relations
From the very beginning of its operation to this day, the DPRK has taken a position of resolute, firm support for Russia’s actions both at the level of political and international rhetoric and at the level of practical actions. A fundamentally important action of the DPRK was the vote in solidarity with Moscow on the anti-Russian resolution at the UN General Assembly, adopted on March 2, 2022, February 23, 2023 and further on Ukraine. Pyongyang has voted against this resolution every time.
The DPRK media periodically and in detail, from an objective position of full solidarity with Russia, truthfully covered the course of its war, the reasons for its beginning, including the factors that forced Moscow to make such a difficult decision, etc. In this context, it is advisable to highlight a detailed article by the well-known political scientist Kim Myung-chol, dedicated to the anniversary of the beginning of the SMO and a detailed analysis of the events that occurred during this period. The Korean expert focused readers’ attention, among other things, on the following theses: “The policy of “eastward expansion” of NATO, which is pursued by the United States and the West, is aimed at accelerating the encirclement of Russia, the successor of the USSR, by an enemy ring and, ultimately, at splitting and weakening Russia, at its eternal destruction – this is already a clear fact. … The policy of hegemony of the United States and the West … forced Russia to take preventive military action to eliminate the military threat to its country from the outside.” [1]
One of the culminating manifestations of categorical support and solidarity with Russia was the statement of Kim Yo Jong, Kim Jong Un’s sister, on January 27, 2023, filled with powerful energy and imagery, in which it was emphasized that “we are in the same trench” with Russia.
In this statement, it was emphasized: “I express serious concern and strongly condemn the actions of the United States, which are escalating the military situation by transferring military offensive equipment to Ukraine, including its main tank. … I have no doubt that any military equipment that the United States and the West are proud of will burn down and become a pile of iron in front of the indestructible fighting spirit and power of the heroic Russian army and people. No matter how desperate the allied imperialist forces may be, they will never break the heroic spirit of the Russian army and people with high patriotism, fortitude and strong spirit. We will always stand in the same trench on the battlefield with the Russian army and people who are fighting for the dignity and honor of the country, its sovereignty and security.” [2]
The DPRK has taken not only statements, but also practical steps to support Russia. In July 2022, the DPRK established official diplomatic relations with the Donetsk and Lugansk People’s Republics. Thus, the DPRK became the fifth country to recognize the DPR and the LPR after South Ossetia, the Russian Federation, Abkhazia and Syria. At the same time, Kiev, as expected, broke off diplomatic relations with the DPRK in response. [3]
Moreover, the DPRK’s political organizations have resolutely engaged in a fierce polemic with representatives of the West, including the EU, on this issue. Pyongyang noted “due to the fact that our country recognized the independence of the DPR and the LPR, on July 20, the EU representative found fault with us, ranting that this was a “violation of international rights” and “a hostile act against sovereignty and territorial integrity. …The EU should not pry into its own business, condemning the use of sovereignty by other countries, but should first of all learn how to treat all issues fairly in accordance with the UN Charter, the principle of which is respect for sovereignty, sovereign equality and non-interference in internal affairs, and international law.” [4]
Then another important event took place both on the way to further strengthen friendly relations between the Russian Federation and the DPRK, and in the process of consistent implementation of the North Korean line to support its own. On October 4, 2022, Pyongyang officially supported the results of referendums in the DPR, LPR, Zaporizhia and Kherson regions on joining Russia and recognized the legality of their very fact of becoming part of the Russian Federation. [5]
Explaining this decision of his government, the head of the Department of International Organizations of the DPRK Foreign Ministry, Cho Chol Su, stressed: “We respect the will of the residents who wanted to reunite with Russia, and support the position of the Russian government on making these regions part of the country.” He also highlighted the fact that “Referendums were held in accordance with the UN Charter, which enshrines the principles of equal rights of people and their right to self-determination, in accordance with legitimate procedures that allowed reflecting the will of the inhabitants of two republics and two regions,” [6] and the overwhelming majority of voting participants supported joining Russia.
By taking such a bold step, the DPRK became the first state in the world to recognize the legitimacy of both plebiscites in the four above-mentioned subjects and the legislative registration of their entry into the state structure of the Russian Federation. [7]
Moscow and Pyongyang’s common understanding of the specifics of today’s international relations, challenges and threats to their own national interests, first of all, the nature of the policy of the US administration of J. Biden, aimed ultimately at eliminating both Russia and the DPRK in their current form, logically and expectedly led the two states to a higher level of cooperation.
This was reflected in the signing of the bilateral Treaty on Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between Russia and DPRK on June 19, 2024, which created a legitimate legal basis for further expansion of cooperation in all areas, and quickly confirmed its effectiveness, the fact that it is not just a “piece of paper” and a really valid working document. The manifestations of a new phase of rapprochement between Moscow and Pyongyang after the signing of this treaty are numerous.
This is also Moscow’s more resolute support for Pyongyang’s actions to ensure its own security on the Korean peninsula, expressed in clear unambiguous formulations by the leadership of the Russian Foreign Ministry. In this regard, it is enough to mention the relevant statements of Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and his deputy Andrei Rudenko.
On September 26, 2024, Sergey Lavrov emphasized the following: “We fully take into account and rely on new realities in the current international situation in the field of global and regional security, including in the nuclear dimension. We understand the principled position of our Korean friends that the nuclear missile shield and other self-defense measures are the basis for ensuring our own independence and security. The United States, with the support of its allies, is aggressively dragging elements of the military-strategic infrastructure into the region and actively using systems related to nuclear weapons carriers there, practicing together with the Republic of Korea and Japan in increasingly provocative and destabilizing schemes of the so-called “expanded nuclear deterrence”. It has come to the point that the US-South Korean alliance is already openly called, by analogy with NATO, the “nuclear alliance”, which is clearly on the way to becoming a triple bloc with the participation of Japan, which has defiantly embarked on a course of remilitarization. This is a real and extremely serious threat to regional security. Under these conditions, even the term “denuclearization” in relation to the DPRK has lost all meaning. This issue is closed to us. [8]
Characterizing the essence of the signed document, Andrey Rudenko highlighted the following: “The Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty between Russia and the DPRK is designed to play a stabilizing role in Northeast Asia, will make a positive contribution to maintaining the balance of power in the region based on the principle of indivisibility of security, reducing the risk of a recurrence of war on the Korean peninsula, including with the use of nuclear weapons, and generally lays the foundation for the construction of a new Eurasian security system”, … “Article 4 of the document is of particular importance, providing for the provision of mutual military assistance in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter and in accordance with the laws of the Russian Federation and the DPRK in the event that one of the parties is subjected to an armed attack by any state, finding itself in a state of war,” he said. “Thus, the content of the mentioned article clearly indicates that the treaty is defensive in nature, is not directed against the security of third countries, and is aimed at maintaining stability in the Northeast Asia region.” [9]
Based on the legal basis of the treaty, Pyongyang has also begun to provide more resolute and diverse assistance to Russia. In recent days, the media of the West and South Korea have been writing a lot about the fact that the DPRK sent not only ammunition to Russia, but also its soldiers.
In this regard, Russian President Vladimir Putin spoke clearly and frankly. In particular, “The Head of State noted that the provision of military assistance is discussed in the fourth article of the document. “There is a fourth article. What we will do with this article is still a question. We are in contact with our North Korean friends. And when something needs to be decided, we will certainly decide, our friends from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea have a corresponding position,” Putin said. “But I want to say that this is our sovereign decision: we will apply something, we will not, where, how, whether we need it or whether we will be engaged, for example, only in conducting some exercises, preparing, transferring some experience – this is our business.” [10]
This alliance agreement is inherently similar to those treaties that the United States has long concluded with many countries, including the Republic of Korea, and on the basis of which they permanently deploy their own troops and military bases in them. The Russian leadership has repeatedly explained the purpose and objectives of the said agreement with the DPRK.
Russian-South Korean relations
At the moment of the geopolitical fracture, Seoul, like all US allies, Seoul, as expected, immediately joined the course of the senior partner, including the anti-Russian sanctions regime. Russia has included the ROK in the list of “unfriendly states” as a response. At the same time, Moscow noted that South Korea does not seek to become at the forefront of Western sanctions policy, that the degree of its participation in anti-Russian actions is more moderate compared to many other US allies, and Russophobia does not spread in the country.
It seems to us that the goal of the Foreign Ministries of both countries is pragmatic tasks to preserve the maximum possible in the field of our mutually beneficial cooperation. As part of this goal, Moscow’s urgent task was to try to keep Seoul from directly supplying lethal weapons to Ukraine, to which Washington began to harshly urge all its allies. Until recently, such a line was more or less maintained by the leadership of the Republic of Korea, and in response to numerous requests from Ukraine for the supply of numerous types of weapons and pressure from Washington, the response to this request was sustained by South Korea in the spirit that the Republic of Korea, for humanitarian reasons, is ready to provide Ukraine with only non-combat weapons and means of protection, such as helmets and bulletproof vests, but supplies of combat, especially offensive weapons are excluded.
Naturally, there is an understanding in these calculations by Seoul that if South Korea were to be careless in terms of military cooperation with Ukraine, this would provide Russia not only with a reason, but also a direct basis for revising the current restrained approach to the issue of modern arms supplies to the DPRK.
As a result, Moscow even formed an informal definition that South Korea has now become the “friendliest among unfriendly” states for Russia.
However, the realities of allied relations with the United States and the logic of behavior within the framework of this model often force Seoul to take certain steps that it may be would prefer not to take. One of such important events was the first-ever trilateral summit of the United States, Japan and South Korea held at Camp David on August 18, 2023, which resulted in a profound transformation of the trilateral association, which previously did not go beyond the amorphous term “coalition structure”, into an almost full-fledged military-political security pact. As a result, both Far Eastern allies of the White House made serious concessions to Washington, which could complicate their relations with Russia. This also applies to South Korea.
Moscow has repeatedly demonstrated restraint in its reaction to Seoul’s accession to anti-Russian sanctions, commitment to dialogue and maintaining positive bilateral relations with the Republic of Korea. This approach is still fully maintained today. At the same time, Moscow proceeds from the understanding that if we believe the statements of the South Korean partners that they do not supply lethal weapons to Ukraine, then they should also take our word for it that we comply with UN Security Council resolutions.
The events of recent weeks, the progress of cooperation between the Russian Federation and the DPRK, of course, have formulated new questions for Seoul. The future of Russian-South Korean relations largely depends on what response the leadership of the Republic of Korea chooses to new challenges.
In this regard, we consider it necessary to emphasize that today a fundamentally important integral feature and component of Russian policy towards the Korean peninsula and, specifically, the Republic of Korea is its non-confrontational nature, the desire to maintain in relations with Seoul that, although currently low, but an important level of interaction and cooperation, which is still maintained.
The strategic goal of this approach is to use the preserved segments of bilateral cooperation, primarily in the humanitarian field today, as a foundation for restoring a full-fledged volume of bilateral cooperation after the end of the conflict in Ukraine. It is precisely this important task that Vassily Nebenzia, Russia’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations, pointed out with all frankness in his speech to the UN Security Council on October 30, 2024.
At first, he gave a vivid description of the unfair actions of the West, led by the United States. “I want to ask one very simple question: even if we imagine that all that our Western colleagues claim about military cooperation between Russia and the DPRK would suddenly turn out to be true, why are the United States and its allies trying to impose rotten logic on the whole world that they have the right to help the Zelensky regime by mobilizing the entire the military and intelligence potential of NATO, and Russia’s allies do not have the right to do this? Where, ladies and gentlemen, do you get this neocolonial sense of your own exclusivity and impunity and an unfounded belief that what you can do is not allowed to others?”
But then Amb. Vasily Nebenzia directly addressed the representative of the Republic of Korea to the UN with the following words. “I think it’s no secret that the Western accomplices of the Zelensky regime have been trying for more than two years to persuade the leadership of the Republic of Korea to more active military-technical cooperation with the Kiev regime, to encourage it to supply it with highly demanded lethal weapons. Here, the anti-Pyongyang “hype” to Washington, London and Brussels is just very useful, because the Kiev regime has almost completely “sucked out” their own reserves.
We hope that our South Korean colleagues will have the wisdom not to fall for this trick. In any case, I can assure you that, despite the current difficult period, we strive to preserve the prerequisites for the resumption of traditionally good-neighborly relations between Moscow and Seoul and appreciate your restraint. Public opinion polls in your country are also optimistic, which show that the overwhelming majority of the population does not want the Republic of Korea to be involved in the Ukrainian conflict.” [11]
In the framework of this topic, it is appropriate to note a number of assessments expressed in an interview on April 2 this year by the Russian Ambassador to the ROK G.V. Zinoviev: It is also important that the Republic of Korea refrained from supplying lethal weapons to Ukraine. Those Western countries that are actively pumping arms into Ukraine have spoiled relations with Russia for many years to come.
The Russian Ambassador emphasized the importance of the task of restoring direct bilateral dialogue. We are now communicating constructively enough with the Korean side both through our Embassy in Seoul and through my colleagues, the Embassy of the Republic of Korea in Moscow.
(As you know, the South Korean Ambassador to Moscow, Mr. Lee Do-hoon, may be the only one among representatives of “unfriendly states” who has not been restricted in his ability to meet both in the Russian Foreign Ministry and in other agencies officials, to travel around the country, and he has recently visited Tyumen city and Murmansk, among other places).
Unfortunately, other channels of communication, such as the work of the Intergovernmental Commission and the Interregional Cooperation Forum, which we used to hold earlier, as well as inter-parliamentary contacts now remain frozen. The restoration of a full-fledged dialog would contribute to solving the existing problems. In addition, I would like to see the direct air service between our countries resumed as soon as possible.
As for our relations with the DPRK. I know that our partners in the Republic of Korea and I have diametrically opposed views on this matter. Russia always emphasizes that our co-operation with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is consistent with the norms of international law and is not directed against the security of the Republic of Korea. Moreover, it contributes to strengthening peace and stability on the Korean peninsula and does not, as we believe, contradict the interests of the Republic of Korea. I would like to draw your attention to the fact that Pyongyang is showing great restraint against the background of both the well-known domestic political developments in the ROK and the recent large-scale Freedom Shield maneuvers with the United States. We urge you to change your perspective and see our engagement with the DPRK not as a crisis and threat, but as an opportunity. [12]
For more information about the Trialogue Club International please visit the official website of the Club: www.trialogue-club.ru.
References:
[1] Kim Myung Chol. What the current situation in Ukraine shows. KCNA, Pyongyang, 23 February 2023. Available at http://www.kcna.kp/kp/article/q/671327b553252807403a3440e35d4028.kcmsf. [2] Statement by Kim Yo Jong, Vice Chairman of the Department of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea. KCNA, 27.01.2023. Available at http://www.kcna.kp/kp/article/q/5d8e1c0cbb0d7d5830c453c815fd28f4.kcmsf. [3] The DPRK became the fifth country to recognise the DNR and LNR. 13 July 2022. Available at https://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/15207891?utm_source=yandex.ru&utm_medium=organic&utm_campaign=yandex.ru&utm_referrer=yandex.ru. [4] Press statement by Cho Chol Su, head of the DPRK Foreign Ministry’s Department of International Organizations, Pyongyang, October 4, 2022 /KCNA/. Available at http://www.kcna.kp/kp/article/q/4a0d9f84e39656021be7603d93d75fe4.kcmsf. [5] North Korea recognised the results of the referendums in Donbass, Zaporozhye and Kherson, 4 October 2022. Available at https://news.rambler.ru/world/49452235-severnaya-koreya-priznala-rezultaty-referendumov-v-donbasse-zaporozhe-i-hersone/. [6] DPRK has officially recognized the DNR and LNR. KCNA, Pyongyang, 14 July, 2022. Available at http://www.kcna.kp/ru/article/q/970eb63f8c98ea8643ac5d1d65d76aa7abafa3e78868f11ddff588f5d7f6ef24f64079380e866f8e76b656cddde82b3719399f72ddca9ea05508eeb7be2d699e.kcmsf. [7] Press statement by Cho Chol Su, head of the DPRK Foreign Ministry’s Department of International Organizations, Pyongyang, October 4, 2022 /KCNA/. Available at http://www.kcna.kp/kp/article/q/4a0d9f84e39656021be7603d93d75fe4.kcmsf. [8] North Korea recognised the results of the referendums in Donbass, Zaporozhye and Kherson, 4 October 2022. Available at https://news.rambler.ru/world/49452235-severnaya-koreya-priznala-rezultaty-referendumov-v-donbasse-zaporozhe-i-hersone/. [9] Response of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation S.V. Lavrov to a question from the Russia Today news agency, New York, 26 September 2024. Available at https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1971804/. [10] Rudenko says relations with DPRK have reached a qualitatively new level, 24 October 2024. Available at https://tass.ru/politika/22211493. [11] Putin commented on the article of the Russian-DPRK treaty on military assistance. 25 October, 2024. Available at https://tass.ru/politika/22226531. [12] Statement by Permanent Representative Vassily Nebenzia at UNSC Briefing on Ukraine. Available at https://russiaun.ru/en/news/nebenzia_unsc_ukraine_301024. [13] Интервью Посла России в Республике Корея Г.В. Зиновьева телеканалу “Channel A” Посольство Российской Федерации в Республике Корея. 02.04.2025. Available at https://korea-seoul.mid.ru/ru/press-centre/news/ambassador-250402/.Key words: Russia-Korean Peninsula; Regional Security
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F14/KOS – 25/05/05
