During the Cold War era, the question constantly arose – how many nuclear weapons one needs to deter a would-be adversary? Accordingly, this issue became a cornerstone of the Wohlstetter-Blackett debate. Generally speaking, Wohlstetter argues that successful deterrence implies large-scale damage, the certainty of one’s intention, and, most importantly, the 2nd strike capability. In other words, the state should aspire to possess as many nukes as possible. Conversely, Blackett’s view entails limited damage, which is primarily a projection of risks associated with the usage of nuclear weapons. Essentially, it means that even if 90% of one’s nuclear arsenal is destroyed, the remaining 10% (even if it is only one warhead) is enough for deterrence.
Fundamentally, Wohlstetter focuses on the security of a state that must be prepared for a range of potential scenarios, including surprise attacks or limited nuclear exchanges. Blackett, in his turn, emphasizes the importance of considering the consequences of a nuclear war for global stability. Even though their debate occurred decades ago, it is still widely applicable to understanding the modern strategic cultures of nuclear-armed states depending on global stability and instability. In other words, at the time of relative stability, nuclear weapon states tend to reduce and limit their nuclear arsenals (Blackett) while instability brings nuclear arms races (Wohlstetter).
The United States and Russia
The nuclear rivalry between the United States and the Russian Federation (previously, the Soviet Union) in frames of the Wohlstetter-Blackett debate can be split into two historical periods. The first stage, which lasted from the end of World War II till the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, was dominated by Wohlstetter’s ideas of enhancing nuclear capabilities. In this respect, even though there was a considerable imbalance in the number of warheads in operation (e.g., in 1961, Soviet warheads, numbering 2,492, constituted just 11.21 percent of the U.S. total of 22,229 warheads), both states were consistently strengthening their respective capacities by creating more and more nukes and nuclear-related technologies. Consequently, it led to the irrational, out-of-control arms race with the United States and Russia, focusing exclusively on their national interests and state survival rather than global stability. Therefore, the world was on the verge of nuclear catastrophe when two major nuclear powers almost crossed the threshold in the face of the Cuban Crisis.
Understanding the existential possibility of a nuclear war and being on the brink of it, the United States and Russia moved away from Wohlstetter’s ideas towards Blackett’s approach. Thus, both states embarked on limiting their strategic nuclear weapons and nuclear-related technologies. The states signed multiple bilateral agreements, such as Strategic Arms Limitation Talks I and II (SALT I and SALT II), the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), three Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START I, START II, START III), and the New START. Eventually, within six decades since the Cuban Missile Crisis, both the United States and Russia have significantly reduced their respective strategic nuclear arsenals (including nuclear warheads, delivery vehicles, etc.) they operate and have been maintaining the concept of Mutual Assured Destruction that diminishes the necessity of creating more nuclear weapons.
Nonetheless, in recent years, amidst the (1) US withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, (2) increasing uncertainty about the future of agreements mentioned above, (3) the emergence of new technologies, and (4) global instability associated mostly with ongoing conflicts (e.g., Ukrainian Crisis), it seems that both the United States and Russia are getting back to the pre-Cuban Crisis period, dominated by Wohlstetter’s ideas.
The United Kingdom, France, and China
It is worth noting that none of the UK, France, or China has ever had capabilities relatively equal to those of the US and Russia. Nonetheless, the three states above experienced similar shifts in their respective nuclear doctrines and postures.
The United Kingdom and France acquired nuclear weapons during the 1950s-60s. At that time, the states conducted multiple nuclear tests and rapidly enhanced their respective nuclear arsenals to 500-600 warheads in operation on the pretext of protecting national interests and maintaining sovereignty. On the one hand, it seems reasonable to state that both the UK and France followed Wohlstetter’s ideas as the US and the Soviet Union did before 1962. However, I would presume that, unlike the US and Russia, the assertiveness of the UK and France in building up more nukes has never been so absolute because they did not face a similar threat to the state’s survival as the US and Russia mutually posed towards each other.
In this respect, the United Kingdom and France understood that there is no clear need to possess more nuclear weapons since the minimum number is enough to project a responsive threat to a would-be adversary. In this regard, the UK and France had reduced their nuclear arsenals twice by the end of the 2000s. Thus, according to their nuclear doctrines, even though they sometimes refer to the 2nd strike capability, which is Wohlstetter’s idea, they are likely to follow Blackett’s approach of deterring the opponent by emphasizing the risks of potential nuclear use.
Saliently, China experienced the same storyline as any of the states mentioned above. However, compared to the US, Russia, the UK, and France, since the 1990s, China has been advocating for Blackett’s views much more than others. In 1992, it joined the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and declared a moratorium on nuclear testing. In the statement issued after joining the NPT, China called on other nuclear-weapon states to commit themselves not to use nuclear weapons first, to support the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, to refrain from deploying nuclear weapons outside the national territory, and to prevent arms race in outer space. These proposals remain crucial to the Chinese non-proliferation agenda to this day.
Nonetheless, everything has changed dramatically in recent years. The ongoing Ukrainian crisis, taking place on European territory, has pushed the United Kingdom and France to reconsider their nuclear doctrines and posture toward Wohlstetter’s ideas of enhancing nuclear capabilities. Furthermore, China has become more assertive in its intentions of building up nuclear weapons amidst the heightened US-China competition in the Indo-Pacific.
As an interim conclusion, it is reasonable to say that all five Nuclear-Weapon States experienced the same developmental patterns in frames of the Wohlstetter-Blackett debate. The Cold War era (especially before 1962) forced them to work diligently on their respective nuclear arsenals due to feelings of insecurity (Wohlstetter). Furthermore, once they were close to the direct usage of nukes, they shifted their policies towards global stabilization and disarmament (Blackett), leaving space for negotiations. Nevertheless, once the tensions increase any of the above starts rethinking nuclear posture towards Wohlstetter’s ideas.
Non-Official Nuclear-Armed States (India, Pakistan, Israel, North Korea, and Iran)
Despite the adoption of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the global community has not managed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and nuclear-related technologies. As a result, another five nuclear-armed states (notably, Iran is a potentially nuclear-armed state nowadays) appeared since the Cold War until recently. Apparently, the emergence of new states possessing nuclear weapons, similar to the officially recognized Nuclear-Weapon States, is caused by the volatile international environment, threats to the state’s survival, as well as global instability. In other words, I would presume that India, Pakistan, Israel, North Korea, and Iran started their respective nuclear development based on Wohlstetter’s ideas of enhancing nuclear capabilities to the greatest extent. Today, according to the Arms Control Association, India possesses 156 nuclear warheads, Pakistan has 165, and Israel and North Korea operate 90 and 40 warheads, respectively. As for the Islamic Republic of Iran, there are rumors occurred in recent months that the state already has from 3 to 5 nukes deployed.
Some may argue that it is visible in numbers that the states above are more likely to follow the ideas promoted by Blackett because they possess fewer nukes than any of the permanent members of the UN Security Council. Apart from that, those who debate in favor of that often refer to the fact that none of these states have ever expressed the intention of creating equally strong nuclear capabilities as the UK, France, China, and especially Russia and the US have. Indeed, this seems reasonable, but I would also presume that nowadays, India, Pakistan, Israel, North Korea, and Iran are somewhere in between the Wohlstetter-Blackett debate. In brief, any of them would be happy to increase their nuclear arsenals due to the instability around them, but, at least for now, they are limited in resources.
Conclusion
In conclusion, I would like to mention that the Wohlstetter-Blackett debate, even today, seems to have practical implications for understanding the current nuclear doctrine and postures of nuclear-armed states. Indeed, as was analyzed, the debate can be presented as a cycle with states going for Wohlstetter’s ideas if they feel insecure or for Blackett’s approach if there is relative global stability, which states want to maintain. Unfortunately, in the last two or three years, there has been a tendency for Wohlstetter-led nuclear development in most of the existing nuclear-armed states.
Key words: International Security; Arms Control
AC
F4/SOR – 24/07/29
