Experts on the NPT Indefinite Extension and Prospects for the NPT 2026 Review Conference

In 1995, the problem appeared much more serious than it seems now. Careful analysis of the document showed that gathering a relatively small group of opponents would have been enough to sink any proposal. The treaty article specified three extension options: indefinite, for a fixed period, and for additional fixed periods. Choosing the second option, a fixed-term extension, would have been a death sentence for the treaty. If it was chosen that, the treaty would have expired in 10 or 25 years. It would have jeopardized the entire non-proliferation system. The solidarity of the five nuclear powers played a key role. Their coordinated action mattered more than the extension itself. This was a turning point, as history has shown that other treaties we relied on – like the ABM Treaty – proved not to be permanent. Without the indefinite extension in 1995, we would be facing numerous problems today that we don’t even consider now. Take AUKUS as an example – it represents precisely the kind of risky gambit that undermines control mechanisms. However, we also missed an opportunity then to strengthen the nonproliferation regime. If we had adopted a stronger universalization resolution rather than focusing narrowly on the Middle East, we might have prevented subsequent crises like the 1998 nuclear tests by India and Pakistan or North Korea’s 2006 test. But crucially, the indefinite extension prevented the immediate collapse of the system. Without it, we’d be living in a far more dangerous world today.

The indefinite extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 1995 marked a cornerstone moment in global nuclear governance. It reinforced the international community’s enduring commitment to preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, promoting nuclear disarmament, and enabling access to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. For the United Arab Emirates, a non-nuclear-weapon state and a strong proponent of multilateralism, the extension was both a reassurance of the NPT’s permanence and universality, and a call for renewed focus on the balanced implementation of all three pillars of the Treaty. Today, that significance is even more evident – the NPT remains an irreplaceable framework underpinning both global and regional nuclear security. While it has faced challenges, including the slow pace of disarmament and cases of non-compliance, its continued relevance is unquestionable. Importantly, the 1995 extension was linked to the commitment to establish a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons. Although progress on this front has been limited, this shortfall should not undermine the Treaty’s value or justify calls to diminish its role in global security architecture.

The NPT indefinite extension was a very important step that confirmed its uniqueness for international security. It eliminated the need to decide every five years whether to keep the treaty or not. It gave us confidence that there is no more proliferation of nuclear weapons in the world. Only specific issues inside and outside the NPT will need to be addressed. Since there are five states outside the Treaty, four of which are nuclear-weapon states, it is obvious that simple co-optation is not the answer. It is necessary to consider this issue on a case-by-case basis. The indefinite extension has provided a long-term reliable basis for maintaining this essential element of international security.

First of all, it should be said that the 1995 NPT Review Conference took place against the backdrop of a fundamental restructuring of the entire system of international relations caused by the end of the bloc confrontation and the emergence of new independent states on the political map of the world in the post-Soviet space. The metamorphoses that took place at that time touched all spheres of interstate interaction, and above all those that directly affected international security. The peculiarity of that time, its distinctive feature, was the desire of the former ideological opponents to reconsider their former foreign policy attitudes, to abandon confrontation and confrontation and to move to a joint search for solutions to long-standing and new problems. Of course, we should not idealize that time, because the processes that took place then had not only positive effects. Many of them were very contradictory, gave rise to new problems and, if you like, had a negative political charge. But nevertheless, the first half of the 1990s was a time of «high expectations» based on the desire of most members of international society for constructive interaction. This was fully true in the field of arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation. It seems that it was then that the NPT came to be recognized as one of the most important pillars of international stability and security. That, in turn, created the condition and opportunity to grant it indefinite status. Such a decision by the States parties to the Treaty in that global political environment was an imperative, on the one hand, and, one might say, an objective inevitability, on the other. In fact, the fact that the NPT was granted indefinite status reflected the international community’s understanding of the need to preserve it as a universal instrument for ensuring international security and, at the same time, the agreement of States parties to undertake efforts to supplement the obligations contained in the Treaty with new measures for the practical implementation of its provisions. Further developments in subsequent review cycles have confirmed the validity and timeliness of the decision to extend the Treaty indefinitely. It has allowed States parties to more thoroughly address the strengthening of the Treaty regime, particularly with regard to the first two pillars – nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. As a result, it was possible to agree on the so-called 13 steps of the 2000 Review Conference (RC), as well as the 2010 Action Plan adopted as a result of the successful conclusion of the next Review Conference. I would like to draw attention to one more point. In the course of the NPT review process, it is now quite often and, it must be said, rightly emphasized that one of the conditions for the indefinite extension «deal» put forward by the non-nuclear-weapon States was the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. A resolution to this effect was adopted at the 1995 Conference, co-sponsored by the Russian Federation along with Great Britain and the United States. Unfortunately, for a number of reasons, primarily political, the provisions of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East remain unimplemented, although a process aimed at establishing a Middle East zone free of nuclear and other types of WMD and their means of delivery has been initiated, largely due to Russia’s efforts. Nevertheless, this resolution is an important achievement of the «NPT community». However, when talking about the indefinite extension of the NPT, one important fact that preceded this event is often overlooked, namely, the accession of China and France to the Treaty in 1992, after which all nuclear-weapon states became parties to this agreement. This was also a result of the transformations in the world that were observed in the early 1990s and a reflection of the desire of states to build security interactions in a new non-confrontational paradigm. In the current context, where many of the previous arrangements in arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation have either faded into oblivion or are undergoing serious erosion, the NPT is proving to be a viable option. This is not to say that there are no serious problems. On the contrary, the recent activities of the Treaty review process have revealed a broad list of issues on which different groups of countries have serious, sometimes insurmountable differences. However, what is certainly not in doubt is the need to preserve the NPT and to make collective efforts to strengthen it, both through strict compliance with its provisions and by implementing the agreements that were adopted by consensus in the review process.

The unconditional and indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995 was a diplomatic miracle, and its significance cannot be overstated. Negotiating such a treaty with the same scope of commitments and verifications would be impossible now.

Let me give you a candid opinion based on facts. The indefinite extension of the NPT relieved all the pressures on the USA, Russia, the UK, as well as on France and China to seriously negotiate on disarmament. It also created permanent nuclear realities which encouraged India and Pakistan to go nuclear. Additionally, the indefinite extension created permanent asymmetries in nuclear nonproliferation obligations in the Middle East, where all states, except Israel, were members of the NPT. It also made Israel more reticent in opposing the creation of a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Middle East. As a result of all this, Egypt has refused to ratify the CTBT. No NPT party wanted to end the Treaty, and the alternative, which was a 25-year revolving extension, would have been much more effective and useful because it would have put the Treaty and the parties under constant review working for Nuclear proliferation. The indefinite extension was a big mistake that was detrimental and testimony that the best can be the enemy of the good.

The parties to the NPT made a vital contribution to international security when they collectively decided the indefinite extension of the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The decision confirmed that the principles of the NPT were strong and fair, and made to last and that all Nations benefited from it, as they continue to do to this day. France and Russia, along with all other Parties, were undoubtedly key contributors to the success of the 1995 NPT Conference.

The indefinite extension of the NPT at the 1995 Review Conference was an important diplomatic achievement. It was controversial, then and now, because indefinite extension reduced the potential leverage of non-nuclear weapon states to press the nuclear weapon states on their Article VI obligation to work toward nuclear disarmament. But time has proven the wisdom of the decision. If the 1995 Conference had, instead, only extended the NPT for another 25 years, I do not believe the NPT would have been further extended in the 2020 review cycle, and the world might now be living with no Non-Proliferation Treaty. It is vitally important to preserve international institutions, even imperfect ones, that restrain nuclear weapons, because if they collapse they are unlikely to be replaced.

The indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1995 holds immense international significance, as it confirmed a global consensus on the importance of nuclear non-proliferation as a permanent regime for security and stability. The Treaty became a cornerstone of global security architecture, strengthened international law, and eliminated the risks of a “legal vacuum” that would have arisen had the Treaty not been extended. The extension reinforced trust and commitments, including review and verification mechanisms for Treaty compliance. The decision to extend the NPT also carried geopolitical weight: it helped sustain the non-proliferation regime after the Cold War and contributed significantly to cementing Kazakhstan’s non-nuclear status. Moreover, it laid the groundwork for future nuclear non-proliferation treaties, such as the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

The indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995 certainly had a stabilizing effect on the Treaty, strengthening its resilience against the risk of mechanical non-extension. To a certain extent, it also helped to consolidate the NPT States Parties around the nonproliferation agenda.

The indefinite extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is an outstanding international legal act, a turning point for the entire world. It guarantees the inviolability of the Treaty’s foundations and, as a result, ensures global strategic stability and predictability for the long term.

When the NPT was extended indefinitely in 1995, the supporters of this decision believed the major challenge had been overcome, and that the nonproliferation regime would persist without end. Thirty years later, two parallel trends are witnessed: a steady erosion of nuclear-weapon states’ readiness to compromise with each other and with non-nuclear states to fulfill the Treaty’s objectives, and the growing frustration of non-nuclear states, which see no meaningful progress in its implementation. What might have happened is better left to the imagination of filmmakers, not diplomats. Imagine if, at the X NPT Review Conference, the nuclear-weapon states had needed to win the unanimous consent of all non-nuclear states to extend the Treaty for another 25 years. I doubt that Western delegates would have so easily blocked the adoption of the final document by promoting language they knew would be unacceptable to Moscow. Beyond formal review sessions, nuclear-weapon states might have shown greater commitment to arms control treaties.

On May 11, 1995, 178 States parties to the NPT agreed without a vote to extend the Treaty indefinitely, in accordance with the Article X.2. The refrain promoted by the Canadian delegation, of which I was a member, was of “permanence with accountability”. That is by making the NPT of permanent or indefinite duration, we would assure accountability for Treaty implementation, especially of nuclear disarmament pursuant to Article VI, through the strengthened review process that was an integral part of the package of decisions and resolution enabling indefinite extension. In the 30 years that have since elapsed, three of the five quinquennial review conferences have failed to deliver an agreed final document on further strengthening the implementation, authority and integrity of the NPT. In fact, no PrepCom has been continuing to negotiate since 2002 regarding the cases of this year’s session.

The 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the NPT marked an important milestone in the history of the Treaty, demonstrating the resilience of the nonproliferation regime and the commitment of its Parties to the objectives of the NPT. The Conference reinforced the Treaty’s legitimacy by adopting the decision on its indefinite extension (without a formal vote) as well as set the course for further development of the nonproliferation regime.

The indefinite extension of NPT in 1995 was of great significance for maintaining international security and stability. First and foremost, we avoided the need for periodic extensions of the Treaty helped strengthen the non-proliferation regime. In addition, the decision to extend the Treaty reaffirmed the importance of its three pillars: nonproliferation, disarmament and peaceful use of nuclear energy under IAEA safeguards.

In my opinion, the main result of the indefinite extension in 1995 was that we still have a nuclear nonproliferation regime. Yes, the regime is under the pressure; yes, new nuclear powers have emerged; yes, things are not going well with nuclear disarmament, nuclear-weapon-free zones, and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, and yes, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons is itself a symptom of serious problems – but the alternative, it seems to me, would have been much worse. Indefinite extension of the NPT means an indefinite entrenchment of the special status of the Nuclear P5.

I had the opportunity to participate as a member of the Russian delegation both in the 1995 Conference itself, and in its preparatory process, and steps to implement its decisions. Among the most significant were the subsequent Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the establishment of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZ), the abandonment of military nuclear programs by a wide range of states, and others. Most significantly, a review process was established that allowed, among other things, to negotiate further reductions and limitations of nuclear weapons, discuss security assurances, and ensure global stability, considering the interests of all NPT member states.

The indefinite extension of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1995 holds immense and enduring significance. States agreed that the core principles enshrined in the Treaty remain relevant, irrespective of temporal constraints, and are essential for maintaining global stability and enhancing security. This indefinite extension ensures the Treaty’s continued existence. While amendments are hypothetically possible, the complexity of modifying multilateral agreements suggests that the Treaty, as it currently stands, will persist. Its significance is further underscored by its focus on nuclear weapons—the most devastating weapons humanity has devised, capable of destroying our civilization. Unlike agreements such as the Chemical Weapons Convention or the Biological Weapons Convention, which prohibit specific types of weapons, the NPT does not ban nuclear weapons but emphasizes the necessity of general and complete disarmament. The deterrent effect of nuclear weapons prevents global conflicts on the scale of the First and Second World Wars. The importance of the Treaty’s indefinite nature is consistently reaffirmed at review conferences since 1995 and is virtually unquestioned by serious politicians and disarmament experts. Therefore, the NPT remains the cornerstone of the global disarmament agenda.

Regarding specifics for NPT Review Conference 2026, I anticipate the usual clashes of positions: some will insist on Middle Eastern issues, others on Far Eastern matters. While it is difficult to provide expert predictions now, I sincerely hope we can replicate the successes of 1995 and 2010 NPT RevCons when final documents were adopted. What seemed like routine achievements then has become increasingly difficult. The main task is to build on decisions made in 1995, including nuclear disarmament principles. Failure to do so will produce hollow instruments like the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons that lack real impact. The tragedy is that by neglecting substantive work at review conferences, we lose much more. The international community’s attention, particularly in the ‘Third World’, shifts to peripheral initiatives that only dilute our efforts. It is essential to keep the NPT at the center of discussions, without distracting alternative frameworks. Regretfully, this is the most we can say today about the prospects for the NPT 2026 RevCon.

The prospects for the 2026 NPT Review Conference are shaped by a complex and challenging international environment, marked by deepening geopolitical divisions and growing mistrust between nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon states. Nonetheless, the United Arab Emirates maintains that the NPT remains indispensable and that its credibility must be preserved through tangible progress. The UAE believes the 2026 Conference presents an opportunity to reinforce the Treaty’s objectives through steps such as nuclear risk reduction, enhanced transparency, and the revitalization of disarmament dialogue. Continued support for peaceful nuclear cooperation under comprehensive safeguards must also remain a priority. While political divergences may make consensus difficult, a forward-looking and balanced outcome document remains within reach, provided there is sufficient political will and readiness to engage in constructive compromise.

Unfortunately, there are no grounds for optimism now. A wide range of new circumstances could lead to a third failure to adopt the final document, which is traditionally considered a thermometer of the state of the NPT regime – normal temperature, or feverish, or on the verge of collapse. In this regard, a number of factors now raise serious concerns. Firstly, the threat to the CTBT. It has not entered into force and is effectively a moratorium on states parties. Nine countries have not ratified it, and the prospects of the CTBT are gloomy, with a number of countries are preparing for resuming nuclear tests. The CTBT is linked to the NPT both logically, – because it is a demonstration of the willingness of the NPT’s nuclear-armed states parties to fulfill Article 6 obligations [by the NPT], – and historically, because the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995 was conditioned on the adoption of the CTBT in 1996. Secondly, the New START between Russia and the United States expires next year, and the prospects for further strategic arms control are dimmer than ever before. It is most likely impossible to conclude a new treaty in the remaining time. Another extension of the New START goes against the Article 14. We may find ourselves without this linchpin, which for half a century has been the supporting structure of the entire nuclear arms control system. Thirdly, local crises are only flaring up with renewed vigor, not subsiding. The problem in the Middle East related to Iran’s nuclear program. The recent armed conflict between India and Pakistan demonstrated that the threat of nuclear war exists despite the NPT, and efforts to increase the participation of other countries are needed. Situation in the Far East. The American relations with its allies. Trump’s policy has, for the first time in history, created a strong momentum within a number of countries in Europe and the Indo-Pacific region in favor of developing their own nuclear weapons in lieu of U.S. safeguards, as a growing number of states consider them unreliable. Unfortunately, if urgent measures are not taken now to at least address these threats, let alone eliminate them altogether, the prospects for the 2026 NPT Review Conference are not encouraging.

When answering this question, I would first like to emphasize that we should not have overly high expectations for next year’s 11th NPT Review Conference. In my opinion, we must start with a balanced assessment of the situation surrounding the Treaty and the balance of forces within the «NPT community». A significant number of issues are interpreted differently by states parties, exacerbating the observed divisions among them. Currently, the main problem appears to be fundamental differences in approaches to nuclear disarmament. The primary source of disagreement is between the nuclear-armed P-5 and developing states, with the latter advocating for the early and unconditional elimination of nuclear weapons. The latter emphasize the humanitarian consequences of using nuclear weapons as the main driver of the process toward a world without nuclear weapons. However, they ignore the military and political situation, the state of strategic stability, and the security interests of nuclear states. In this regard, it is worth noting that, when drafting the NPT, states were guided by security considerations based on an understanding of the risks and threats posed by nuclear proliferation. Humanitarian consequences were one of the main reasons for adopting the treaty, which was ratified by the overwhelming majority of UN member states. Now, advocates of a shortcut to “nuclear zero” are essentially proposing to discard security considerations and be guided solely by humanitarian concerns, which are already reflected in the NPT’s text and its entry into force. Regarding the prospects for the 11th NPT Review Conference, it is important to address the over-politicization of the review process by our Western opponents. Issues related to the Iranian nuclear program and the Korean Peninsula’s nuclear problem are discussed on the NPT platform. This discussion has no added value and often harms attempts to reach a political and diplomatic settlement. The situation in Ukraine, which has nothing to do with the Treaty’s subject matter, remains an extremely problematic issue. These topics have already led to the failure of the 2022 JC and have subsequently had a negative impact on the Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) sessions for the 2026 Conference. One could speculate at length about the reasons behind the position of the representatives of the “collective West,” but even a cursory examination of their actions reveals that they are not interested in strengthening the NPT. Furthermore, it is clear that the Western countries are attempting to deflect criticism for their deviations from the Treaty’s terms. In the context of the dynamic international environment and in light of the outcome of the last Review Conference, as well as the three sessions of the Preparatory Commission for the current review cycle, it is difficult to make any predictions at this point. Nevertheless, the hope for a positive outcome of the 2026 conference is inspired by the fact that a large majority of NPT states parties are committed to achieving meaningful results at the conclusion of the current review cycle. The Russian Federation is certainly among them.

I reckon the 2026 NPT Review Conference will be held on time, and all the necessary procedural decisions will be made there. That alone will be a success.

My hope for the 2026 NPT review conference is threefold: that it will unambiguously highlight the key contribution of nuclear energy to limiting climate change; that it will be in a position to endorse a robust deal on Iran’s nuclear programme; and that it will offer a meaningful opportunity for dialogue between nuclear weapon states and non-nuclear weapon states on nuclear transparency, risk management and reporting on the implementation of article VI of the NPT. Expectations are high for Russia to contribute constructively on all three dimensions.

The prospects for the 2026 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference remain uncertain, given current geopolitical tensions and past failures to reach consensus at previous conferences in 2015 and 2022. Disagreements among member states have repeatedly prevented the adoption of final documents, undermining trust in the process. In particular, geopolitical and sanctions-related confrontations between the West and Russia, regional conflicts – including the Russia-Ukraine conflict, escalating tensions in the Middle East, and the India-Pakistan conflict – have heightened fears of nuclear escalation and complicated dialogue among nuclear powers. Disputes over disarmament, transparency of nuclear arsenals, peaceful uses of nuclear energy, as well as the nuclear programs of Iran and North Korea, further hinder progress. Conflict resolution and confidence-building among member states are essential, and success will depend on the political will of the parties to compromise and engage in constructive dialogue. In this regard, I believe the involvement of civil society and academic experts in the process is crucial.

Given that no major changes occur in the international situation, the 2026 NPT Review Conference is likely to take place and proceed as usual, resulting in the adoption of nominal final document.

Any Review Conference is dominated by topical international issues, primarily crisis issues, relevant for the time of its organization. Thus, the prospects and effectiveness of the RC-2026 will largely depend on the degree of settlement or, on the contrary, the intensity of the current conflict situations – around Ukraine, the Middle East, India, and Pakistan. What else? I hope the list, at least, will not expand.

The problem is that even if a third consecutive Review Conference fails to produce a final document, it is highly unlikely that any state would formally withdraw from the NPT— the consequences of such a course would be deeply destabilizing. But what if that same country were to immediately sign and ratify the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons instead? This treaty is rejected by the nuclear powers, but recognized by the United Nations, which means that — from an international legal standpoint —it would be complicated to legally challenge such a radical decision. Otherwise, if the conflict between nuclear-armed states in Ukraine remains unresolved by the 2026 NPT Review Conference, four weeks in New York risk once again becoming a meaningless ritual, with participants abandoning any optimistic expectations for its future.

Instead of working to bridge differences and building consensus on important substantive matters concerning the Treaty, since 2015 States parties instead have chosen to “fix” the review process and even advance what plainly are silly suggestions. At the last review conference in 2022 and in the subsequent three years, States parties have been behaving much like the orchestra rearranging deck chairs while the ill-fated Titanic was sinking! Present signs point to yet another failed review conference in 2026. A final document covering a review of Treaty implementation during the previous five years and updated principles and objectives for strengthening Treaty implementation over the next five years remains an unequivocal requirement in accordance with the decision package on the indefinite extension of 1995.

Many of the issues that played a key role in reaching a compromise in 1995 remain far from being resolved today. The lack of tangible progress in nuclear disarmament, the deadlock in establishing a weapons of mass destruction free zone in the Middle East, the unresolved issue of NPT universality and the continued failure to bring the CTBT into force continue to fuel dissatisfaction among non-nuclear weapon states. This dissatisfaction makes them increasingly seek alternative ways to influence the review process, including new initiatives and intensified collective pressure on the P5. Nowadays, a year ahead of the Review Conference, the likelihood of reaching a compromise appears low but not entirely absent. It seems that the Parties can come to a mutually acceptable final document; however, the success of the process will require significant political will and effective coordination among the states. Moreover, it should be noted that the negotiation process will largely depend on the global political situation, which could either complicate or facilitate the achievement of an agreement. In the absence of major changes in this area, disarmament, being traditionally the most divisive issue among the participants, is likely to once again become the central point of contention at the Review Conference.

The NPT Review Conference 2026 is critically important for maintaining global security, with several key factors influencing its outcome. First, the escalation of geopolitical confrontation, particularly, in the context of the Ukraine crisis and heightened tensions between Russia and the West, is expected to significantly complicate disarmament dialogue. Second, there is a risk that nonnuclear weapon states will block the adoption of a final document unless tangible progress is made concerning the disarmament issue. Third, several so-called nuclear hotbeds remain: the DPRK continues testing its nuclear weapons in violation of NPT norms; Iran by enriching uranium up to 60% is approaching nuclear threshold status; Turkey and Saudi Arabia have openly proclaimed the possibility of developing nuclear capabilities in response to regional threats. Nonetheless, there are potential areas of convergence. The parties could agree on measures to reduce the risk of accidental use of nuclear weapons and expand cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear energy, particularly, in the development of small modular reactor technologies with the support of the IAEA.

The prospects are still difficult to predict, especially against the backdrop of changes in the U.S. foreign policy. What we can be sure of is continued pressure from non-nuclear-weapon states on nuclear-weapon states due to the deadlock in nuclear disarmament and the general nuclear arms control crisis. One would hope for more active coordination within the Nuclear P5 and willingness to put nuclear nonproliferation issues above the current contradictions, but a continuation of mutual “denunciation” of approaches in the nuclear field seems more likely. A separate interesting question is what will happen to the discussions around nuclear risk reduction; on the one hand, there are contradictions within the P5 on this issue, and on the other hand, some representatives of non-nuclear-weapon states believe that this subject is a “substitute” for real nuclear disarmament.

Unfortunately, the current situation is pessimistic. What is needed? Common sense. Back to common sense and reason.

Predicting the outcome of the 2026 NPT Review Conference is challenging. The results will depend on the geopolitical situation and the positions parties bring to the table. If the conference were held this year, reaching any agreement would likely be impossible. The outcome would probably mirror that of the previous review conference, where parties failed to agree on a final document. One can hope that by 2026, the geopolitical climate will improve, enabling parties to find common ground at the negotiating table. At this moment, further hypothetical speculation is hardly appropriate.