Hot Topic
On April 27 New York saw the start of another Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference of the which will last until May, 22. The details of its preparation is a story for a narrow audience of experts; and although both authors belong to it, for the purposes of this conversation let’s place such specific stories outside of the scope of this article, as this time the real preparation was carried out with bombs and missiles targeting nuclear facilities in the Middle East. Thus, the tone for a four-week diplomatic session at United Nations headquarters on the East River is clearly set.
The discussion is now no longer about coining smooth diplomatic wording that would reconcile the irreconcilable, namely: the calls from many states of the global majority for nuclear disarmament and the objective need to preserve nuclear weapons as a stabilizing factor in international relations. Uncertainty around Iran’s nuclear program and notorious acts of aggression against the Islamic Republic of Iran. The spread of extended deterrence practices in Europe and Asia, and the stance of anti-nuclear activist states, who generally do not care where the root cause lies and where legitimate countermeasures are.
The question now is the effectiveness of the entire nuclear non-proliferation regime. The developments of the recent four years (after the previous 2022 “review” which ended nowhere) show that the situation in nuclear non-proliferation has taken a threatening turn.
The United States – the NPT’s depositary state – has returned to a policy of counter-proliferation by force, showing total disregard for diplomacy, with American nuclear weapons covertly returning to the United Kingdom.
France, at least nominally, has begun to develop nuclear partnerships with European states.
A number of countries are openly discussing the possibility of acquiring nuclear weapons or rethinking their non-nuclear principles. Among those are South Korea, Japan, Ukraine, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Germany, Poland, and Brazil. At the expert level, similar discussions are picked up by other countries. In these circumstances, it is justified to speak of risks of at least three states coming to official and unofficial possession of nuclear weapons within the coming ten years. Another seven to nine will be on the nuclear “threshold” or near it.
The situation around these states, their political will to develop nuclear weapons and scientific and technological capabilities, as well as “nuclear umbrellas”—existing or emerging—are the subject of a new monograph report by the PIR-Center, which is being prepared for release [1]. However, the dynamics of international life prompts sharing right now some key findings—both on individual countries [2] and from the standpoint of organizing the fight for non-proliferation resilience.
South Korea
At the doctrinal level, Seoul adheres to the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Reservations from South Korean officials regarding the creation of its own nuclear arsenal are mixed [3]. In December 2025, the President of the Republic of Korea, Lee Jae Myyung, emphasized that his country does not plan to develop nuclear weapons (NW) [4].
At the moment, the Republic of Korea does not in fact have the necessary capabilities. There is no domestic uranium mining, nor are there enterprises for its enrichment or reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel. Thus, the key task of obtaining a sufficient amount of fissile material for the implementation of nuclear weapons program is not solved. The creation of appropriate stages of the nuclear fuel cycle is “hobbled” by the provisions of the US-South Korean 123 Agreement of 2015. There is also no reliable information about the conduct of theoretical work on nuclear weapons or the development of non-nuclear components of special munitions.At the same time South Korea technically has the foundation for a quick launch of such a project. The country possesses 26 nuclear power units, has established nuclear fuel production, and possesses its own technological developments in the field of uranium enrichment and radiochemical plutonium extraction from spent nuclear fuel. There are tens of thousands of nuclear specialists trained, with scientific-technical reserves shaped including for fabrication of conventional explosive lenses and authomatics suitable for special munitions.
Worth being mentioned separately are delivery means, including a wide range of missile systems, even submarine-based. In 2021, Seoul convinced the US to lift restrictions on ranges of nationally produced missiles . Open sources indicate that the most powerful South Korean missile now has a strike radius of about 3,000 km and a is able to carry a payload up to eight tons.
Seoul skillfully exploits its “threshold” nuclear state image to secure US preferences and additional security guarantees. A good example is the 2023 Washington Declaration, confirming the unshakable nature of the US nuclear umbrella and new nuclear interaction formats, primarily in the form of joint nuclear operations planning against the DPRK. Thus, the US-South Korean alliance has essentially acquired NATO Nuclear Planning Group functions.
Seoul’s attempts to gain US support for developing its own nuclear submarine and gaining uranium enrichment technology for fueling such nuclear submarine, as stated, do deserve attention. The November 2025 US-South Korean summit saw the agreement on the substantive consultations reached. Negotiations were announced on lifting restrictions on the aforementioned South Korean nuclear fuel cycle programs. Success would pave the path for Seoul to obtaining the fissile material necessary for nuclear weapons development.
The target is clear — the DPRK. Real dynamics of Seoul’s advances toward a strategic arsenal development will not depend on specific Pyongyang actions, but on perceived reliability of the US “nuclear umbrella”. According to the 2023 Washington Declaration, the US-South Korea alliance already has nuclear status, with potential evolution toward deeper extended deterrence formats following the pattern of NATO joint nuclear missions.
Public opinion polls show that about 76% of South Koreans support creating national nuclear weapons. However, these figures reflect rather emotion than substance. The survey of South Korean academic and expert elites shows real support, taking into account the risks related to the alliance with the US, at 30-40%. Fears of US restrictive measures, however, seem weaker than before. Given the bilateral alliance’s importance, there are no guarantees the US would take any effective steps to prevent South Korea from acquiring nuclear weapons or punish it for such attempts.
Japan
Despite statements by Japan’s right-wing political figures, including Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, Japan remains far from the idea of creating its own nuclear weapons. Anti-nuclear sentiments in Japanese society and lack of a need for strategic deterrence – as acute as South Korea’s – still keep Tokyo in the non-nuclear camp.
Opinion polls show that most Japanese remain anti-nuclear. For example: in 2020, three-quarters of respondents favored Japan joining the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (with 17.3% against); 51.8% polled by the Japanese Red Cross (June 2025) opposed acquiring nuclear power status, though 28.3% saw it as inevitable for self-defense, while 27.3% esteemed NW as a effective means of deterrence.
Japanese society still lives in the shadow of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, with no clear demand to abandon the three non-nuclear principles ( not to possess, not to produce and not to import nuclear weapons). Yet the topic is no longer taboo and is increasingly invoked by the right-wing experts and politicians to draw attention. This trend advanced under Takaichi, who calls for a more assertive defense policy and seems ready to sacrifice those principles.
Technically, Japan has everything needed for nuclear weapons development. In this regard the planned 2027 launch of the Rokkasho spent fuel reprocessing plant and expected US Tomahawk missile supplies are to be be mentioned.
The main scenario now is maintaining non-nuclear status while expanding US presence and possibly strengthening trilateral nuclear coordination with Seoul and Washington. In case of complications in relations with those countries, the real indicator of change in Japanese leadership plans would be further fueling public opinion toward abandoning the three principles and attempts to repatriate plutonium stocks from France and the UK—perhaps under the already existing MOX fuel fabrication pretext for expanding the national atomic energy program.
Australia
Given Australia’s absent of uranium enrichment potential, NPPs, and spent fuel reprocessing capabilities, prospects for a military nuclear program are not visible. However, transferring large HEU amounts to a non-nuclear state under nuclear submarine construction agreements challenges the non-proliferation. The missile component already provokes an arms race in Asia-Pacific region. Yet, the AUKUS’s main impact lies in ideology/ The nuclear submarines transfer practices may spread on other allied states, potentially undermining restrictive approaches to selected technologies.
In all fairness, implementation speed of the plans for Canberra acquiring nuclear submarines and missiles should not be overestimated. US and UK main production capabilities’ constraints render delays inevitable.
Ukraine
In 2024-2025, Ukraine continued to probe public opinion on creating its own nuclear weapons. One could stress Zelensky’s statements on the need for a strategic arsenal should NATO reject Kyiv, as well as experts’ claims of Ukraine’s serious potential for nuclear-weapon production.
Kiev’s real capabilities to play the nuclear card are far from numerous, as it lacks national uranium enrichment facilities, making the plutonium path lookmore tempting. taking into consideration that Ukraine’s spent fuel contains about 7.4 tons of reactor-grade plutonium. However, no industrial plutonium extraction facilities exist in Ukraine, while building them would require 2-3 years and several billions of USDs. Delivery means’ situation is slightly better, e.g., the use of “Flamingo” cruise missiles for potential nuclear warhead delivery (although their deployment status pending) is quite possible.
From the point of view of Russian interests, any flirt with nuclear weapons by the state posing an acute threat and turned into a bulwark to wage war against Russia is unacceptable. Any research infrastructure suitable for a Ukrainian bomb development shall be destroyed within the special military operation.
Poland
Recent events have formed public demand for militarizing foreign policy. Poland is yet unable create national nuclear weapons. It has only one research reactor, which is insufficient for a full program, yet official Warsaw has publicly favored acquiring nuclear weapons or at least taking part in NATO joint nuclear missions.
Polish air forcealready practices conventional support for NATO nuclear operations. To enhance its NATO-related capabilities, contracts for latest US F-35A fighters — intended for nuclear arming — have been signed. French dual-capacity aviation alredy masters Polish airspace, so it cannot be ruled out that potential for hosting special munitions on Polish territory is forming via “temporary” French nuclear force aircraft visits. For the Russian Federation and the Union State of Russia and Belarus this is the most acute security threat.
Germany
The start of Russia’s special military operation in Ukraine shocked German military-political elites of Germany, leading to a fundamental shift (Zeitenwende) in German defense policy. After several decades of pacifism, so prominent among the population, the notion is overshadowed by new, military agenda, which seems to bea long-term trend. Ex-Chancellor Scholz’s decision to purchase F-35A cements Berlin’s participation in NATO nuclear missions.
With Trump’s second Administration and especially amidst controversial US-Israeli aggression against Iran, Berlin revived discussion on plans in case Washington leaves the European theater of war. Among the options mentioned: own nuclear weapons development or joining collective European nuclear deterrence—based on French and possibly British arsenals. Germany’s announced participation in Macron’s “forward deterrence” is a step in that direction.
When it comes to an independent military nuclear program, such scenario is now purely hypothetical in Berlin. German leadership is expected, due to strategic culture conservatism and 20th-century experience, to delay undertaking such a decision until the last moment. But if decided, it could be implemented relatively fast given weel-developed technical infrastructure (e.g., Germany has a uranium enrichment plant), powerful supercomputer base for warhead design calculation, and domestic high-efficiency explosives production.
Saudi Arabia
The Saudis’ ‘starting positions’ are far from those necessary for the development of a military nuclear program. Speculations about a secret atomic project diverge from the actually observable technological situation and require additional verification.
There is no political decision by the Saudi elites, nor any signs of its preparation, and the threat, ever-present in the recent years, to take symmetrical steps should Iran acquire nuclear weapons is extremely rarely raised in the official discourse. Nor are there any attempts (except for statements by unnamed courtiers to the foreign press) to emphasize that the defense pact with Pakistan has a nuclear component to it.
The core of contemporary Saudi nuclear policy is a sober evaluation of the costs and benefits of a hypothetical creation of nuclear arsenal, with negative consequences overwhelmingly outweighing any potential gains.
Türkiye
Despite periodic attempts by Turkish elites to explore public opinion on the issue of acquiring a nuclear arsenal, technologically Turkey does not measure up to a military nuclear program. The country lacks the most sensitive elements of the nuclear fuel cycle, which are uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing. Given the Additional Protocol still in force, it is extremelyunlikely that Ankara has an ability to covertly create such infrastructure.
Diplomatic constraints also work effectively, too. If Türkiye decided to create its own nuclear arsenal, it would almost certainly find itself in diplomatic and economic isolation. Given its heavy dependence on foreign trade and the instability of its financial system, this would guarantee a sharp decline in living standards and a surge of social tensions. Recep Erdoğan’s government is clearly uneager to take such risks.
On the other hand, however, Erdoğan does not forget about nuclear populism. He responds to the emerging Turkish society’s demand for expanding the toolkit for deterring regional adversaries. For now, this task is being accomplished through the development of the missile arsenal, including hypersonic systems. Obviously, the nuclear weapons issue will be used more to attract voters rather than for a real escalation.
Iran
The data available to the expert community as of February 28, 2026, is insufficient to conclude that the Iranian authorities have made a political decision to abandon the exclusively peaceful nature of the atomic program. The situation over the former JCPOA, Iran’s reduction of its commitments under the deal, and the final shift of the conflict with Israel into a phase of existential confrontation blurred the line between signs of coercion toward peace and the start of a military nuclear program at that time. Resistance to IAEA inspection activities was consistent with the logic of responding to the US actions, while the strengthening of measures to protect nuclear physicists was driven by risks of sabotage.
Open sources, including satellite imagery, show that in June 2025, U.S.-Israeli strikes caused significant damage to facilities that could have played a critical role in Iran’s obtaining the material enriched to a level sufficient for creating a nuclear explosive device. Key scientific personnel, who, according to several assessments, led weapons-related scientific directions, have been put out of action. Their restoration is currently virtually impossible amid the harsh military counteraction by Israel.
The Rubicon has been crossed. Attempts to maneuver through latent nuclear-weapon potential have resulted for Tehran in armed aggression and an attempt to dismantle the country’s existing political regime. Iran’s delicate, excessively measured response to Israel’s June 2025 operation not only failed to deter West Jerusalem and Washington, but actually spurred them on, making them believe they could achieve their goals. As a consequence, the policy of coercive counterproliferation – moreover, co-implemented by a state not party to the NPT – has prevailed.
We do not undertake to predict which course the new leadership of the Islamic Republic of Iran will follow. Apparently, the fatwa of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei prohibiting the development of nuclear weapons will become no obstacle to making decisions on the issue.
But for all other states in a delicate security situation, Iran’s lesson is that half-measures fail. Only one method of ensuring military security remains viable – the North Korean model: talk less about the bomb while faster and better producing the device.
What is to be done?
Technically, nonproliferation still works. Since the last successful, in the sense of adopting the final document, Review Conference in 2010, no new state has acquired nuclear weapons. IAEA safeguards are still being applied, the export control system is functioning, and the safety of atomic energy facilities is largely ensured.
Two NPT Review Conferences in a row (2015 and 2022) ended without adopting a consensus final document. Following the third session of the Preparatory Committee for the 2026 NPT Review Conference, it was also impossible to reach agreed recommendations on the operation of the Treaty. The Vietnamese chairmanship of the forum has faced the nearly impossible task of finding a common denominator.
But even if the conference fails to approve a consensus final document on May 22, 2026, no state will withdraw from the NPT next day. However, outright discord in New York would certainly send a dangerous signal to those eyeing the nuclear option, specifically it would create the impression that there will be no coordinated international community response to such states.
In any case, the 2026 Review Conference and subsequent multilateral political and diplomatic work will be driven by five trends.
Trend 1. The interaction between nuclear weapon states sliding into a state of conflict. The “Nuclear Five” as a format is split into the Russia-China tandem and the Western triple. In the absence of constructive engagement, the United States, France, and the United Kingdom are trying to shift responsibility for the dire state of strategic stability onto Moscow and Beijing. Public squabbling is exacerbated by the unwillingness of Western countries to hold substantive discussions behind closed doors. The problem is not in a divergence of positions, but in a lack of will to maintain the non-proliferation acquis communautaire, which is impossible without constructive dialogue.
Attempts to somehow simply bracket out nuclear topics from the overall confrontation, as the Biden Administration proposed, cannot in themselves offer a solution. The crisis of the multilateral international security architecture is complex. Hypothetical agreements on individual issues, torn from the overall context, will not work. Measures proposed in the context of the NPT to reduce nuclear risks and strengthen the “accountability” of nuclear states in the eyes of non-nuclear radicals could be a nice gesture – but only in theory. In practice, their implementation does not involve eliminating the key risk factors that increase the likelihood of nuclear conflict. Promotion of such initiatives by Western states is intended to create an illusion of vigorous activity and shifts the focus away from actions taken by Washington, London, and Paris that run counter to the spirit of Article VI of the NPT.
Trend 2. Growing rejection by non-nuclear states of the current situation in nuclear disarmament. The active discussion around the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) allows anti-nuclear forces to advance arguments about humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons use and unacceptability of nuclear deterrence as a concept. The currently elaborated narrative about the crisis of the NPT, the failure of nuclear states to fulfill their disarmament obligations, the creation of an alternative “for the selected ones” embodied by the TPNW undermines faith in the nonproliferation regime and its intrinsic value. Proposals in response to introduce some extended reporting obligations within the review process resemble an attempt to concoct a bureaucratic formula to simulate activity.
Trend 3. Attempts to use nonproliferation as a pretext for pursuing narrow political ambitions. This is not a new phenomenon with the example of Iraq in 2003 still being fresh in memory. The U.S.-Israeli attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities only confirm the gravity of the problem.
It is necessary to state clearly and unambiguously that operations lacking genuine international legal grounds do a disservice to non-proliferation. The main lesson for “threshold” states is that one cannot delay the implementation of a weapons scenario, because the opponent will seek to launch a preemptive strike. This is at least fraught with proliferation of nuclear and other kinds of “umbrellas” in the most security‑sensitive regions – the cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Pakistan being a case in point.
Trend 4. Alongside with the Iranian case, it should be noted that the collective West has embarked on a path of fragmenting the “world atomic family,” isolating its own space from fair competition in the peaceful use of atomic energy. This involves both a set of “petty dirty tricks,” such as visa denials, as well as higher‑order actions. These include sanctions impeding current and future nuclear projects in third countries (the blocking of funds for the construction of the Akkuyu NPP in the Republic of Türkiye is a textbook case). another examp;e is unfair attempts to disrupt the Paks‑2 NPP project in Hungary by administrative means, as well asimposing regulatory requirements and nuclear fuel solutions at any cost, just to squeeze Russian suppliers out of the nuclear fuel market for European NPPs. The list could go on – Iran’s case also fits here.
The consequence of such steps is undermining the letter and spirit of Article IV of the NPT, which envisions the fullest possible international cooperation in the field of peaceful atom.
Finally, Trend 5. The emergence of a third category of states – those that cannot be allowed to acquire nuclear weapons, but can be allowed to “touch” them. In essence, certain Western countries have been elevated to a cohort for which leniencies and even exceptions in the non-proliferation sphere are permissible due to their unblemished reputation.
An example is the continuation and expansion of NATO’s joint nuclear missions and the options being considered for replicating them in the Asia‑Pacific region. Scenarios we have discussed before are also being implemented. In particular, amid the AUKUS context, South Korea is announcing plans to build its own nuclear submarine. And there is essentially no doubt that this, too, will be declared an exception to the rules.
Finally, the most egregious example is Ukraine, which effectively gets away with attacks on nuclear power plants, despite the presence of IAEA specialists there. Essentially, this is a deliberate disregard of the risks of a man‑made nuclear catastrophe that Kiev is provoking.
Against this backdrop, a simple question should arise: is the NPT and its review process needed at all? Is there a hidden meaning behind three consecutive preparatory conferences that lead nowhere, unable to formulate recommendations for a patently fruitless NPT Review Conference?
To answer it, we must act in the original, basic logic of Article VIII of the NPT – “to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realised.” The point of the conference is not non-proliferation written exercise in the form of a final document with near zero real impact, but the affirmation that the Treaty is needed, that it is being implemented – even if only to the lowest common denominator. This, in turn, will allow, thoughinformally, to set the agenda for further measures to strengthen this regime.
The main conclusion we draw is that proliferation is around the corner, and the risks associated with it to Russia’s security are real, substantial, and concrete. In this context, the very idea of the struggle for non-proliferation is more relevant than ever. From the perspective of Russia’s interests, the spread of military and technological capabilities across foreign states in middle and near range is a direct threat, especially when it comes to unfriendly or hostile states: Ukraine, Germany, Poland, Japan, and South Korea.
We cannot offer a ready‑made answer to the question of how to return to constructive cooperation with the other side to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The reference to the Cold War times when such cooperation was possible is only good as a rhetorical exercise but insufficient as a recipe. Back then, the nuclear sphere was excluded from the overall context of the bloc confrontation. The spread of nuclear capabilities was seen as a specific and real threat, and the other side’s assistance was critically important to contain it.
Now the situation is different. Russia’s opponents in the United States and Europe are enamored not with negotiated solutions but with military and technical “aids” against proliferation: “umbrellas” and coordination groups; extended deterrence and preemptive strikes. But these are measures that do not strengthen international security as such, but salvage its crumbling US‑centric version. As a result, on the one hand, additional demand is created for new formats of friendship with nuclear benefits. New “AUKUSes” and “strategic dialogues” will emerge, which will ultimately lead to the transfer of sensitive information about nuclear weapons and their means of delivery to formally non‑nuclear states.
On the other hand, the value of the NPT is eroding for those states who failed to acquire nuclear weapons before January 1, 1968, and found themselves on the wrong side of geopolitical barriers. If an object under IAEA safeguards is struck by bunker‑busting bombs, what is the value of such non-proliferation?
There are no recommendations in any expert publication to build a non-proliferation architecture on an equal footing, as it was in the days of Roland Timerbaev and George Bunn. Russia is only blamed: for deploying nuclear weapons in the Republic of Belarus; for cooperation with the DPRK, with many more cases to come.
Nonproliferation as a thing in itself does not particularly interest Russia. It is a tool for ensuring the national security of the Russian Federation. If it is used only as a formal pretext to put pressure on our partners, then we do not need such non-proliferation. Especially if, under the guise of preserving the NPT, changes in the security landscape along Russia’s borders force us to take harsh military and technological measures.
Yet it is still better to try to come to agreement. At least, a serious and substantive discussion is needed about where the current trends in nonproliferation might lead within next decade. The prospect of a world with a “new nuclear nine,” as our previous study showed, inspires no one. And now, just three years after the release of our first report, we have to speak – so far as of a hypothesis – of a “new nuclear dozen», which includes nine states (South Korea, Japan, Ukraine, Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Germany, Brazil, Poland) and three “umbrellas” – the American, the French, and that of the Union State.
The threat of undermining nuclear non-proliferation regime is quite tangible. Therefore we should at least avoid aggravating the situation. Throughout the history of the NPT our country has acted as a technical and intellectual leader of non-proliferation, and if there are reciprocal signals of a readiness to move away from lecturing, Russia will not be the one to drag things down.
References
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[2] The format of this article does not allow for a detailed discussion of nuclear proliferation risks in all twelve states covered in our report. Therefore, we will confine ourselves here to a ‘shortlist,’ drawing attention also to those ‘newcomers’ that we have not discussed before.
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[21] Germans Debate the Once-Unthinkable: Do We Need Nuclear Weapons? // The Wall Street Journal. 27.02.2024. URL: https://www.wsj.com/world/europe/germans-debatethe-once-unthinkable-do-we-need-nuclear-weapons-13fa7e68 (дата обращения: 14.04.2026); Germany a Threshold Nuclear Weapons State, Could Develop Bomb in “Matter of Months” – IAEA // Military Watch Magazine. 10.07.2025. URL:
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[22] Saudi Arabia Could Convert Civilian Nuclear to Military, Israeli Expert Warns // The Times of Israel. 02.08.2023. URL: https://www.timesofisrael.com/saudi-arabia-could-convert-civilian-nuclear-to-military-israeli-expert-warns/ (дата обращения: 14.04.2026).
[23] Саудовский принц предупредил о «войне со всем миром» в случае ядерного удара // Российская газета. 21.09.2023. URL: https://rg.ru/2023/09/21/saudovskij-princ-predupredil-o-vojne-so-vsem-mirom-v-sluchae-iadernogo-udara.html (дата обращения: 14.04.2026).
[24] Saudi Arabia, Nuclear-Armed Pakistan Sign Mutual Defence Pact // Reuters. 18.09.2025. URL: https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/saudi-arabia-nuclear-armed-pakistan-sign-mutual-defence-pact-2025-09-17/ (дата обращения: 14.04.2026).
[25] Bu mel’un amacı nasıl engelleriz [Как нам помешать этой подлой цели?] // Yeni Şafak. 08.09.2024. URL: https://www.yenisafak.com/yazarlar/hayreddin-karaman/bu-melun-amaci-nasil-engelleriz-4643524 (дата обращения: 14.04.2026); Fatwas as Tools of Religious Populism: The Case of Turkish Islamist Scholar Hayrettin Karaman // European Center for Populism Studies. 01.09.2024. URL: https://www.populismstudies.org/fatwas-as-tools-of-religious-populism-the-case-of-turkish-islamist-scholar-hayrettin-karaman/ (дата обращения: 14.04.2026).
[26] Poll: 71% of Turks Want Nuclear Weapons as Security Concerns Mount // Caliber. 18.07.2025. URL: https://caliber.az/en/post/poll-71-of-turks-want-nuclear-weapons-as-security-concerns-mount (дата обращения: 14.04.2026).
[27] Turkey’s Roketsan Opens New Production Facilities, Delivers Missiles to Armed Forces // Breaking Defense. 08.04.2026. URL: https://breakingdefense.com/2026/04/turkeys-roketsan-opens-new-production-facilities-delivers-missiles-to-armed-forces/ (дата обращения: 14.04.2026).
[28] Семенов С.Д., Цуканов Л.В. Ядерная программа Исламской Республики Иран: оценка нынешнего состояния и возможностей. Доклад ПИР-Центра № 48. М.: ПИР-Центр, 2026. 42 с.
[29] “I Want You to Panic” // NPT News in Review. 2025. Vol. 20. No. 2. URL: https://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/NIR2025/NIR20.2.pdf (дата обращения: 14.04.2026).
[30] Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons – Eleventh Review Conference // United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. 2026. URL: https://meetings.unoda.org/npt-revcon/treaty-on-the-non-proliferation-of-nuclear-weapons-eleventh-review-conference-2026 (дата обращения: 14.04.2026).
[31] Турция помогает освободить заблокированное в США финансирование для АЭС «Аккую» // ТАСС. 04.12.2025. URL: https://tass.ru/ekonomika/25811709 (дата обращения: 14.04.2026).
[32] Court Dismisses Austrian Lawsuit Against Paks II // World Nuclear News. 01.12.2022. URL: https://www.world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/Court-dismisses-Austrian-lawsuit-against-Paks-II (дата обращения: 14.04.2026). Для вытеснения российского ядерного топлива с европейского рынка под руководством Westinghouse (США) и при поддержке ЕС реализуется программа APIS (англ. Accelerated Program for Implementation of Secure VVER Fuel Supply). См.: Accelerated Program for Implementation of Secure VVER Fuel Supply // APIS. URL: https://apis-project.eu/ (дата обращения: 14.04.2026).
[33] Орлов В.А., Семенов С.Д. Постамериканский мир и ядерное нераспространение // Россия в глобальной политике. 2023. Т. 21. No. 1. С. 72–87.
[34] Орлов В.А., Семенов С.Д. (ред.) Новая ядерная девятка? Оценка угроз распространения ядерного оружия в мире. М.: ПИР-Пресс, 2023. 230 с.
Keywords: International Security; Nuclear Nonproliferation; NPT RevCon
NPT
E7/AST – 26/05/20
