National Security Space Strategy (2011)Defense Space Strategy (2020)
Key objectives– Strengthen Safety, Stability and Security in Space; – Maintain and enhance the strategic national security advantages afforded to the United States by Space; – Energize the space industrial base that supports US national security.– Maintain Space Superiority; – Provide Space Support to National, Joint and Combined Operations; – Ensure Space Stability.
Key “lines of effort” (approaches)– Promote responsible, peaceful and safe use of space; – Provide improved US space capabilities; – Partner with responsible nations, international organizations and commercial firms; – Prevent and deter aggression against space infrastructure that supports US national security; – Prepare to defeat attacks and to operate in a degraded environment.– Build a comprehensive military advantage in space; – Integrate military space power into National, Joint and Combined Operations; – Share the strategic environment; – Cooperate with allies, partners, industry, US Government departments and agencies.
Table 1. US National Security Space Strategy (2011) and Defense Space Strategy (2020): a brief comparison
Compiled by the author based on the open sources

CompanyProject / ContractAmount($ billion)Period
PalantirProject Maven (Maven Smart System)1.32025-2029
MicrosoftHoloLens (IVAS)21.92021
AmazonCIA Commercial Cloud EnterpriseDozens2020
Google/AlphabetJoint Warfighting Cloud Capability9.02022
MicrosoftArmy Software Contract10.02025-2035
AmazonSpecial Operations Cloud0.222024
OraclePentagon Cloud Computing2.52022
IBMPentagon Cloud Computing2.52022
SpaceXStarlink/Stargate Project0.52025
AndurilUAV Defense Systems0.6422024
United States Total Military Expenditures997.02024
Table 2. US Companies contracts in the field of AI and smart military systems
Compiled by the author based on open sources

Missile NameTypeRange, kmPayload, kgStatus
KN-01ASCM110-160500Operational
Kumsong-3 (KN-19)ASCM130-250145Likely operational
Hwasong-13ICBM5 500 – 11 500UnknownNever Deployed
Hwasong-14ICBM10 400500Operational
Hwasong-15ICBM8 500 – 13 000UnknownLikely operational
BM-25 MusudanIRBM2500 – 4000500 – 1200In Development
Hwasong-12IRBM4 500500In Development
Taepodong-1IRBM2 000 – 5 000750Obsolete
Hwasong 7 (Nodong 1)MRBM1200 – 15001 200Operational
Hwasong-9MRBM800 – 1 000500Operational
Pukguksong-2 (KN-15)MRBM1200 – 2000UnknownOperational
Pukguksong-1 (KN-11)SLBM1 200UnknownIn Development
Pukguksong-3 (KN-26)SLBM1 900UnknownOperational
Taepodong-2 (Unha-3)SLV4 000 – 10 0001 000 – 1 500Operational
Hwasong-5SRBM300985Operational
Hwasong-6SRBM500700 – 770Operational
KN-02 (Toksa)SRBM120 – 170250 – 485Operational
KN-18 (Scud MaRV)SRBM450UnknownLikely operational
KN-23SRBM450500Unknown
KN-24SRBM410400 – 500Likely operational
KN-25SRBM380UnknownOperational
Table 3. List of DPRK missiles (as for the 2025)
Compiled by PIR Center based on open sources

RankTerrorist group201820192020202120222023Change in %, 2022–2023+/-
1HAMAS1021212081549+19 263%
2 ADF* (the Allied Democratic Forces)2823411422162616031520-5%
3Al-Shabaab*208614091393104013421114-17%
4JNIM* (Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin)1062383355605571102+98%
5ISIS in Western Sahara*11493199210045751003+74%
6ISIS*35471460137112401329944-29%
7Boko Haram*131113851286747586878+50%
8Ansar Allah27897151773325420326-22%
9Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant *  30493043349139288+107%
10Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS)*7930221138878279-68%
Table 4. Terrorist groups with the highest number of fatalities[5]
Based on: Global Terrorism Index 2025 (Vision of Humanity) (https://www.visionofhumanity.org/maps/global-terrorism-index/#/)

 The Union StateCommonwealth of Independent States (CIS)Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)  Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)
RussiaMemberMemberMemberMember
BelarusMemberMemberMemberMember
ArmeniaMemberMember*Dialogue partner
AzerbaijanMemberEx-MemberDialogue partner
KazakhstanMemberMemberMember
KyrgyzstanMemberMemberMember
UzbekistanMemberEx-MemberMember
TajikistanMemberMemberMember
MoldovaMember*
IndiaMember
IranMember
ChinaMember
PakistanMember
Mongolia Observer
Afghanistan Observer
TurkmenistanAssociated Partner
SerbiaObserver
GeorgiaEx-MemberEx-Member
UkraineEx-Member
BahrainDialogue partner
EgyptDialogue partner
QatarDialogue partner
CambodiaDialogue partner
KuwaitDialogue partner
LaosDialogue partner
MyanmaDialogue partner
NepalDialogue partner
Saudi ArabiaDialogue partner
TürkiyeDialogue partner
The UAEDialogue partner
Sri LankaDialogue partner
The MaldivesDialogue partner
Table 5. List of Members, Dialogue Partners and Observers of key security organizations in Eurasia (* a state is in process of leaving the organization), as of October 2025
Compiled by PIR Center based on open sources

Name of the mineKey information
Olympic Dam (South Australia)One of the largest multi-purpose deposits in the world, operated by BHP, it accounts for a significant portion of Australia’s uranium exports and is also a source of strategic metals.
Beverley (South Australia)Deposit developed using in-situ leaching (ISL).
Four Mile (South Australia)Deposit developed using in-situ leaching (ISL).
Ranger (Northern Territory)Historically, one of Australia’s most famous mines, development of which began in the 1980s. For many years, Ranger was the largest exporter of uranium, but production ceased in 2021, and the site is currently undergoing reclamation.
Table 6. Australia’s largest uranium mines
Compiled by the author based on open sources

Project NameLocationPrimary MineralsLicense StatusJoint Venture PartnersEstimated Reserves (tonnes)Annual Production Capacity (tonnes)Current Development StageKey ChallengesRecent Developments
Oyu TolgoiSouth GobiCopper, Gold, SilverActiveRio Tinto, Turquoise Hill Resources, Erdenes Oyu Tolgoi2.7 billion (ore)500,000 (copper)Production (Open pit), Development (Underground)Power supply, Water managementUnderground expansion, Arbitration resolution
ErdenetOrkhon ProvinceCopper, MolybdenumActiveMongolian Government1.2 billion (ore)130,000 (copper)ProductionAging infrastructure, Efficiency improvementsModernization efforts
Tsagaan SuvargaDornogobi ProvinceCopper, MolybdenumDevelopmentMAK, Mongolyn Alt Corp240 million (ore)40,000 (planned)FeasibilityFinancing, Infrastructure developmentSeeking strategic partners
KharmagtaiSouth GobiCopper, GoldExplorationXanadu Mines600 million (inferred)TBDAdvanced ExplorationResource definition, Project financingPositive drilling results, Scoping study
Bayan KhundiiBayankhongor ProvinceGoldDevelopmentErdene Resource Development3.16 million (ore)60,000 oz (gold, planned)FeasibilityPermitting, Community relationsDefinitive Feasibility Study completed
Table 7. Projects in copper mining of Mongolia
Source: Farmonaut (https://farmonaut.com/asia/unlocking-mongolias-mineral-potential-key-developments-in-copper-gold-mining-licenses-and-joint-ventures/)

Currently RegionalCurrently GlobalCurrently Country specific
Cesium (Cs)Antimony (Sb)Carbon C
Chromium (Cr)Beryllium (Be)Fluorine (F)
Manganese (Mn) presentBismuth (Bi)Thallium (Tl)
Rubidium (Rb)Cobalt (Co) presentBarium (Ba)
Rhenium (Re)Copper (Cu) presentMolybdenum (Mo) present
Tellurium (Te)Gallium (Ga)Nickel (Ni) present
Zirconium (Zr)Germanium (Ge)Selenium (Se)
Scandium (Sc)Hafnium (Hf)Arsenic (As)
Aluminum (Al)Indium (In)Cerium
BauxiteLithium (Li) presentHelium (He)
Barite (BaSO₄)Magnesium (Mg)Neodymium
Fluorspar presentNiobium (Nb)Potash / Potassium (P)
Graphite (natural) presentStrontium (Sr)Tin (Sn)
Silicon metal (Si)Tantalum (Ta)Uranium (U)
Boron (B)Titanium (Ti) presentAnd others
Phosphorus (P)Tungsten (W) present 
Coking coalVanadium (V) 
Phosphate rockPlatinum group metals present 
Rubber (natural)Rare-earth elements present 
Table 8. List of Critical Materials
Based on: Mongolian Critical Minerals Association (https://mcma.mn/en/)

 BrazilRussiaIndiaChinaSouth AfricaThe UAEIranEgyptSaudi Arabia[2]IndonesiaEthiopia
Nuclear nonproliferation
NPT++X++++++++
CTBT+OXO++OOX++
TPNWOXXX+XXXX+X
Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (1963)+++XOX++X+O
IAEA mechanisms
IAEA Member State+++++++++++
IAEA Safeguards Agreement+++++++++++
Additional Protocol to the IAEA Safeguards AgreementX+++++OXXX+
Export control regimes
NSG++X++XXXXXX
Zangger CommitteeX+X++XXXXXX
MTCR+++O+XXXXXX
The Australia GroupXX+XXXXXXXX
Nuclear safety
Convention on Nuclear Safety+++*+++X+++X
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material+++*+*++XX+*+*X
International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism++++++XO++X
Countering WMD
CWC+++++++X+++
BTWC+++++++O+++
PSI-WMDXXXXX+XX+XX
FATF (WMD-Terrorism)+X+++XXX++X
Table 9. BRICS countries’ positions on nuclear nonproliferation, arms control, and nuclear safety
Based on: Arov S. International security issues in BRICS activities // PIR Center, 2024 (in Russ.). Updated as of October 2025 (https://pircenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/24-07-22-BRICS-Int.-Security-RUS.pdf)

 Type of BRICS participationName of the Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC)TechnologyStatusLaunch date[3]
BrazilMember stateDigital Brazilian Real (Drex)DLTPilot2024
RussiaMember stateDigital RoubleDLTPilot2026
ChinaMember stateDigital Renminbi (E-CNY)HybridPilot2020
IndiaMember stateDigital RupeeDLTPilot2024
South AfricaMember stateDigital RandDLTAnalysis2026
the UAEMember stateDigital DirhamDLTPilot2025
EthiopiaMember stateAnalysis
IndonesiaMember stateDLTAnalysis
IranMember stateDigital Iranian RialBlockchainPilot2025
EgyptMember stateE-PoundHybridAnalysis2030
BoliviaPartnerVirtual BolivianoNo dataAnalysis
BelarusPartnerDigital Belorussian RoubleHybridAnalysis2026
CubaPartner
UzbekistanPartnerUzbekistan CBDCBlockchainAnalysis
MalaysiaPartnerE-ringgitDLTAnalysis2026
KazakhstanPartnerDigital TengeBlockchainPilot2025
UgandaPartnerUganda CBDCDLTAnalysis2027
ThailandPartnerThailand CBDCBlockchainAnalysis2026
NigeriaPartnereNairaBlockchainFully launched[4]2021
VietnamPartnerVietnam CBDCDLTAnalysis2026
Table 10. Status of central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) in BRICS member and partner countries (as of 2025)
Compiled by: BRICS Expert Council Russia (updated as of October 2025).
Sources:
https://bricscouncil.ru/ru/analytics/perspektivy-formirovaniya-edinogo-kontura-transgranichnykh-platezhey-s-ispolzovaniem-ts-vts-b-v-stranakh-briks
https://bricscouncil.ru/ru/analytics/razvitie-ts-vts-b-v-stranakh-prisoedinivshikhsya-k-briks-v-2024-g

2005 IC Estimate2007 National Intelligence Estimate
Assess with high confidence that Iran currently is determined to develop nuclear weapons despite its international obligations and international pressure, but we do not assess that Iran is immovable.Judge with high confidence that in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program. Judge with high confidence that the halt lasted at least several years. (DOE and the NIC have moderate confidence that the halt to those activities represents a halt to Iran’s entire nuclear weapons program.) Assess with moderate confidence Tehran had not restarted its nuclear weapons program as of mid-2007, but we do not know whether it currently intends to develop nuclear weapons. Judge with high confidence that the halt was directed primarily in response to increasing international scrutiny and pressure resulting from exposure of Iran’s previously undeclared nuclear work. Assess with moderate-to-high confidence that Tehran at a minimum is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons.
Table 11. Key differences between the US National Intelligence Estimate about Iranian nuclear program issued in 2005 and in 2007
Source: Arms Control Wonk (https://www.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/202469/2005-iran-nie-details/)

For Iran’s __ nuclear weaponIt could draw from its stockpile of ___It would draw ___ from this stockpileTo make ___ enriched to 90%It would require ___ of effortFor a total effort of ____
First  121.6 kg up to 60%
U-235 (~54%)
33.6 kg20 kg96 SWU96 SWU
Second33.6 kg20 kg96 SWU192 SWU
Third33.6 kg20 kg96 SWU288 SWU
Fourth20.8 kg12.4 kg59 SWU467 SWU
535.8 kg up to 20% U-235 (~18%)39.8 kg7.6 kg120 SWU
Fifth104.7 kg20 kg315 SWU782 SWU
Table 12. Iran’s Nuclear Timetable: The Weapon Potential (as of September 21, 2023)
Source: Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control (https://www.wisconsinproject.org/irans-nuclear-timetable-the-weapon-potential/)

EnrichmentFor 10 years operating centrifuges reduced to 5,060 IR-1 machines, total machines is 6,104 IR-1sExcess centrifuges (over 13,000) dismantled and stored under IAEA monitoringFor 15 years level of uranium enrichment capped at 3.67 percent uranium-235For 15 years enrichment only at NatanzFor 10 years no production of additional IR-1 centrifugesBetween years 11-13 Iran can replace IR-1s with the equivalent capacity of IR-6 and IR-8 machines and limits lasting to years 14-15Monitoring and Verification        By 15 October 2015 Iran fully implements PMD “roadmap” agreed with IAEAFor 10 years approval of the purchase of dual-use materials by the Joint Commission working groupFor 25 years continuous monitoring of lran’s uranium mines and millsFor 20 years continuous monitoring of lran’s centrifuge production facilitiesFor 15 years Joint Commission oversight of IAEA access requests to inspect undeclared sitesPermanent prohibition of certain weaponization-related activitiesImplementation and eventual ratification of an additional protocol to Iran’s safeguards agreementPermanent implementation of modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements to its Safeguards Agreement
Uranium StockpileFor 15 years the stockpile is kept under 300 kilograms of 3.67 percent enriched uranium in total (all forms)Excess enriched uranium sold, shipped abroad for storage, or diluted to natural uranium levelsUranium oxide and scrap material enriched up to 20 percent fabricated into fuel for Tehran Research Reactor, blended down, or shipped outJoint CommissionFor 25 years Joint Commission (composed of P5+1, EU and Iran for a total of 8 voting members) will hold quarterly meetings, or by request, to oversee the dealDispute resolution mechanism within 35 days; 15-day dispute resolution mechanism within the Joint Commission, with optional 15-day ministerial review and/or arbitration opinion from a 3-member panel, followed by 5-day review of the arbitration opinion. If there is no resolution and the complaining party sees the action as “significant non-performance,’ the unresolved issue can be treated as grounds to cease performing commitments in whole or part, complaining party will notify UN Security CouncilAny party can go to the UN Security Council to put sanctions back in place if there is noncompliance by vetoing a resolution calling for the continuance of sanctions
FordowConverted to research facility for stable isotope production with Russian cooperation1,044 IR-1 centrifuges in six cascades will remain here, 328 for production, the remaining 700 are idleFor 15 years no introduction of uranium at the facilityUN Sanctions        UNSC resolution 2231 endorsing JCPOA outlines termination of all previous resolutions targeting lran’s nuclear program — 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), 1929 (2010) —on implementation day.For 10 years sanctions are subject to snapback by veto of a resolution calling for the continuation of suspensionAfter 10 years UN will cease to be seized of Iran’s nuclear fileFor 5 years the heavy arms embargo will remain in placeFor 8 years the ballistic missile restrictions will remain in place
Advanced Centrifuge Research and DevelopmentFor 8.5 years Iran may conduct research with uranium on a single IR-4, IR-5, IR-6 and IR-8 centrifuge at NatanzAfter 8.5 years test up to 30 IR-6s and 30 IR-8sAfter 8 years manufacture up to 200 IR-6s and 200 IR-8s centrifuges without rotorsFor 10 years Joint Commission review and approval of changes to the research and development planU.S. Sanctions        Cease the application of economic sanctions against lran’s oil and banking sector allowing Iranian banks and companies to reconnect with international systemsWill remove designation of certain entities and individualsAllows for licensed non-U.S. entities that are owned or controlled by a U.S. person to engage in activities with lran permitted under JCPOAAllows for the sale of commercial passenger aircraft to IranAllows for license for importing Iranian-origin carpets and foodstuffs into United StatesUnited States takes appropriate measures to address laws at state or local level preventing full implementation of JCPOA – United States will actively encourage officials to adhere to JCPOA policyFor 8 years after Adoption date, or sooner if IAEA concludes that all nuclear activity in Iran remains peaceful, U.S. will seek legislative action to terminate/modify nuclear related sanctionsU.S. sanctions on Iran targeting human rights, terrorism and missile activities remainUnited States can impose additional sanctions for non-nuclear issues (terrorism, human rights, etc.)
Arak Reactor    Remove and disable the original core of the Arak reactorReplace the core of the Arak reactor to reduce weapons-grade plutonium output, certified by the Joint CommissionFor 15 years no reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel with an intention to never reprocessPermanent commitment to ship out spent nuclear fuelFor 15 years no heavy-water reactors in IranFor 15 years no accumulation of heavy water in IranConstruction of hot cells or shielded glove boxes of certain specifications subject to approval of the Joint CommissionEU Sanctions        Terminate all provisions of the EU Regulation related to Iran’s nuclear programIncludes: financial and banking transactions; transactions in Iranian Rial; provision of U.S. banknotes to Iranian government; access to SWIFT; insurance services; efforts to reduce Iran’s crude oil and petrochemical product sales; investment; transactions with Iran’s energy and shipping sector; trade in gold and other precious metals; trade with lran’s automotive sectorRemoves individuals and entities designated under sanctionsEU refrains from re-introducing sanctions terminated under JCPOA (Iran views any re-introduction as grounds to cease performing its commitments)Refrain from policy intended to adversely affect normalization of economic relations with IranFor 8 years after adoption day or at the finding of the IAEA broader conclusion EU’s arms embargo and restrictions on transfer of ballistic missiles remain
Table 13. Key Requirements and Actions Mandated by the JCPOA
Source: Arms Control Association (https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/JCPOA-at-a-glance)

 2009201420192024
G752.0%45.3%45.1%44.3%
incl.:
France4.4%3.6%3.1%2.8%
Germany5.7%4.9%4.5%4.2%
Japan8.7%6.1%5.8%3.6%
United Kingdom4.0%3.8%3.2%3.3%
United States23.8%21.9%24.3%26.2%
BRICS*15.5%21.9%24.1%25.8%*
incl.:
China8.5%13.3%16.5%16.8%
India2.2%2.5%3.2%3.5%
Russia2.0%2.6%1.9%2.0%
Table 14. Share of selected states in global GDP (*Due to the enlargement of BRICS data for 2024 incorporates shares of new members – Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran and the UAE)
Compiled by the author based on: World Bank Database (https://data.worldbank.org/)

 2009201420192024
G764.9%55.9%54.0%49.3%
incl.:
France2.8%2.6%2.6%2.4%
Germany2.4%2.3%2.6%3.2%
Japan1.9%2.0%2.0%2.2%
United Kingdom3.8%3.4%3.1%2.9%
United States51.1%43.2%41.2%36.2%
BRICS*13.1%17.7%19.8%21.9%*
incl.:
China6.5%9.6%11.7%11.9%
India2.8%3.0%3.6%3.1%
Russia2.5%3.6%3.1%5.6%
Table 15. Share of selected states in global military expenditures. (*Due to the enlargement of BRICS data for 2024 incorporates shares of new members – Egypt, Ethiopia, and Iran; the numbers of the UAE are unavailable for that year)
Compiled by the author based on: SIPRI military expenditures database (https://milex.sipri.org/sipri)