| National Security Space Strategy (2011) | Defense Space Strategy (2020) | |
| Key objectives | – Strengthen Safety, Stability and Security in Space; – Maintain and enhance the strategic national security advantages afforded to the United States by Space; – Energize the space industrial base that supports US national security. | – Maintain Space Superiority; – Provide Space Support to National, Joint and Combined Operations; – Ensure Space Stability. |
| Key “lines of effort” (approaches) | – Promote responsible, peaceful and safe use of space; – Provide improved US space capabilities; – Partner with responsible nations, international organizations and commercial firms; – Prevent and deter aggression against space infrastructure that supports US national security; – Prepare to defeat attacks and to operate in a degraded environment. | – Build a comprehensive military advantage in space; – Integrate military space power into National, Joint and Combined Operations; – Share the strategic environment; – Cooperate with allies, partners, industry, US Government departments and agencies. |
| Company | Project / Contract | Amount($ billion) | Period |
| Palantir | Project Maven (Maven Smart System) | 1.3 | 2025-2029 |
| Microsoft | HoloLens (IVAS) | 21.9 | 2021 |
| Amazon | CIA Commercial Cloud Enterprise | Dozens | 2020 |
| Google/Alphabet | Joint Warfighting Cloud Capability | 9.0 | 2022 |
| Microsoft | Army Software Contract | 10.0 | 2025-2035 |
| Amazon | Special Operations Cloud | 0.22 | 2024 |
| Oracle | Pentagon Cloud Computing | 2.5 | 2022 |
| IBM | Pentagon Cloud Computing | 2.5 | 2022 |
| SpaceX | Starlink/Stargate Project | 0.5 | 2025 |
| Anduril | UAV Defense Systems | 0.642 | 2024 |
| United States – Total Military Expenditures | 997.0 | 2024 | |
| Missile Name | Type | Range, km | Payload, kg | Status |
| KN-01 | ASCM | 110-160 | 500 | Operational |
| Kumsong-3 (KN-19) | ASCM | 130-250 | 145 | Likely operational |
| Hwasong-13 | ICBM | 5 500 – 11 500 | Unknown | Never Deployed |
| Hwasong-14 | ICBM | 10 400 | 500 | Operational |
| Hwasong-15 | ICBM | 8 500 – 13 000 | Unknown | Likely operational |
| BM-25 Musudan | IRBM | 2500 – 4000 | 500 – 1200 | In Development |
| Hwasong-12 | IRBM | 4 500 | 500 | In Development |
| Taepodong-1 | IRBM | 2 000 – 5 000 | 750 | Obsolete |
| Hwasong 7 (Nodong 1) | MRBM | 1200 – 1500 | 1 200 | Operational |
| Hwasong-9 | MRBM | 800 – 1 000 | 500 | Operational |
| Pukguksong-2 (KN-15) | MRBM | 1200 – 2000 | Unknown | Operational |
| Pukguksong-1 (KN-11) | SLBM | 1 200 | Unknown | In Development |
| Pukguksong-3 (KN-26) | SLBM | 1 900 | Unknown | Operational |
| Taepodong-2 (Unha-3) | SLV | 4 000 – 10 000 | 1 000 – 1 500 | Operational |
| Hwasong-5 | SRBM | 300 | 985 | Operational |
| Hwasong-6 | SRBM | 500 | 700 – 770 | Operational |
| KN-02 (Toksa) | SRBM | 120 – 170 | 250 – 485 | Operational |
| KN-18 (Scud MaRV) | SRBM | 450 | Unknown | Likely operational |
| KN-23 | SRBM | 450 | 500 | Unknown |
| KN-24 | SRBM | 410 | 400 – 500 | Likely operational |
| KN-25 | SRBM | 380 | Unknown | Operational |
| Rank | Terrorist group | 2018 | 2019 | 2020 | 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | Change in %, 2022–2023 | +/- |
| 1 | HAMAS | 102 | 12 | 1 | 20 | 8 | 1549 | +19 263% | ▲ |
| 2 | ADF* (the Allied Democratic Forces) | 282 | 341 | 1422 | 1626 | 1603 | 1520 | -5% | ▼ |
| 3 | Al-Shabaab* | 2086 | 1409 | 1393 | 1040 | 1342 | 1114 | -17% | ▼ |
| 4 | JNIM* (Jama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin) | 106 | 238 | 335 | 560 | 557 | 1102 | +98% | ▲ |
| 5 | ISIS in Western Sahara* | 114 | 931 | 992 | 1004 | 575 | 1003 | +74% | ▲ |
| 6 | ISIS* | 3547 | 1460 | 1371 | 1240 | 1329 | 944 | -29% | ▼ |
| 7 | Boko Haram* | 1311 | 1385 | 1286 | 747 | 586 | 878 | +50% | ▲ |
| 8 | Ansar Allah | 2789 | 715 | 1773 | 325 | 420 | 326 | -22% | ▼ |
| 9 | Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant * | 304 | 930 | 433 | 49 | 139 | 288 | +107% | ▲ |
| 10 | Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS)* | 79 | 30 | 221 | 138 | 878 | 279 | -68% | ▼ |
| The Union State | Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) | Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) | Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) | |
| Russia | Member | Member | Member | Member |
| Belarus | Member | Member | Member | Member |
| Armenia | – | Member | Member* | Dialogue partner |
| Azerbaijan | – | Member | Ex-Member | Dialogue partner |
| Kazakhstan | – | Member | Member | Member |
| Kyrgyzstan | – | Member | Member | Member |
| Uzbekistan | – | Member | Ex-Member | Member |
| Tajikistan | – | Member | Member | Member |
| Moldova | – | Member* | – | – |
| India | – | – | – | Member |
| Iran | – | – | – | Member |
| China | – | – | – | Member |
| Pakistan | – | – | – | Member |
| Mongolia | – | – | Observer | |
| Afghanistan | – | – | Observer | |
| Turkmenistan | – | Associated Partner | – | – |
| Serbia | – | – | Observer | – |
| Georgia | – | Ex-Member | Ex-Member | – |
| Ukraine | – | Ex-Member | – | – |
| Bahrain | – | – | – | Dialogue partner |
| Egypt | – | – | – | Dialogue partner |
| Qatar | – | – | – | Dialogue partner |
| Cambodia | – | – | – | Dialogue partner |
| Kuwait | – | – | – | Dialogue partner |
| Laos | – | – | – | Dialogue partner |
| Myanma | – | – | – | Dialogue partner |
| Nepal | – | – | – | Dialogue partner |
| Saudi Arabia | – | – | – | Dialogue partner |
| Türkiye | – | – | – | Dialogue partner |
| The UAE | – | – | – | Dialogue partner |
| Sri Lanka | – | – | – | Dialogue partner |
| The Maldives | – | – | – | Dialogue partner |
| Name of the mine | Key information |
| Olympic Dam (South Australia) | One of the largest multi-purpose deposits in the world, operated by BHP, it accounts for a significant portion of Australia’s uranium exports and is also a source of strategic metals. |
| Beverley (South Australia) | Deposit developed using in-situ leaching (ISL). |
| Four Mile (South Australia) | Deposit developed using in-situ leaching (ISL). |
| Ranger (Northern Territory) | Historically, one of Australia’s most famous mines, development of which began in the 1980s. For many years, Ranger was the largest exporter of uranium, but production ceased in 2021, and the site is currently undergoing reclamation. |
| Project Name | Location | Primary Minerals | License Status | Joint Venture Partners | Estimated Reserves (tonnes) | Annual Production Capacity (tonnes) | Current Development Stage | Key Challenges | Recent Developments |
| Oyu Tolgoi | South Gobi | Copper, Gold, Silver | Active | Rio Tinto, Turquoise Hill Resources, Erdenes Oyu Tolgoi | 2.7 billion (ore) | 500,000 (copper) | Production (Open pit), Development (Underground) | Power supply, Water management | Underground expansion, Arbitration resolution |
| Erdenet | Orkhon Province | Copper, Molybdenum | Active | Mongolian Government | 1.2 billion (ore) | 130,000 (copper) | Production | Aging infrastructure, Efficiency improvements | Modernization efforts |
| Tsagaan Suvarga | Dornogobi Province | Copper, Molybdenum | Development | MAK, Mongolyn Alt Corp | 240 million (ore) | 40,000 (planned) | Feasibility | Financing, Infrastructure development | Seeking strategic partners |
| Kharmagtai | South Gobi | Copper, Gold | Exploration | Xanadu Mines | 600 million (inferred) | TBD | Advanced Exploration | Resource definition, Project financing | Positive drilling results, Scoping study |
| Bayan Khundii | Bayankhongor Province | Gold | Development | Erdene Resource Development | 3.16 million (ore) | 60,000 oz (gold, planned) | Feasibility | Permitting, Community relations | Definitive Feasibility Study completed |
| Currently Regional | Currently Global | Currently Country specific |
| Cesium (Cs) | Antimony (Sb) | Carbon C |
| Chromium (Cr) | Beryllium (Be) | Fluorine (F) |
| Manganese (Mn) – present | Bismuth (Bi) | Thallium (Tl) |
| Rubidium (Rb) | Cobalt (Co) – present | Barium (Ba) |
| Rhenium (Re) | Copper (Cu) – present | Molybdenum (Mo) – present |
| Tellurium (Te) | Gallium (Ga) | Nickel (Ni) – present |
| Zirconium (Zr) | Germanium (Ge) | Selenium (Se) |
| Scandium (Sc) | Hafnium (Hf) | Arsenic (As) |
| Aluminum (Al) | Indium (In) | Cerium |
| Bauxite | Lithium (Li) – present | Helium (He) |
| Barite (BaSO₄) | Magnesium (Mg) | Neodymium |
| Fluorspar – present | Niobium (Nb) | Potash / Potassium (P) |
| Graphite (natural) – present | Strontium (Sr) | Tin (Sn) |
| Silicon metal (Si) | Tantalum (Ta) | Uranium (U) |
| Boron (B) | Titanium (Ti) – present | And others |
| Phosphorus (P) | Tungsten (W) – present | |
| Coking coal | Vanadium (V) | |
| Phosphate rock | Platinum group metals – present | |
| Rubber (natural) | Rare-earth elements – present |
| Brazil | Russia | India | China | South Africa | The UAE | Iran | Egypt | Saudi Arabia[2] | Indonesia | Ethiopia | |
| Nuclear nonproliferation | |||||||||||
| NPT | + | + | X | + | + | + | + | + | + | + | + |
| CTBT | + | O | X | O | + | + | O | O | X | + | + |
| TPNW | O | X | X | X | + | X | X | X | X | + | X |
| Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (1963) | + | + | + | X | O | X | + | + | X | + | O |
| IAEA mechanisms | |||||||||||
| IAEA Member State | + | + | + | + | + | + | + | + | + | + | + |
| IAEA Safeguards Agreement | + | + | + | + | + | + | + | + | + | + | + |
| Additional Protocol to the IAEA Safeguards Agreement | X | + | + | + | + | + | O | X | X | X | + |
| Export control regimes | |||||||||||
| NSG | + | + | X | + | + | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| Zangger Committee | X | + | X | + | + | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| MTCR | + | + | + | O | + | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| The Australia Group | X | X | + | X | X | X | X | X | X | X | X |
| Nuclear safety | |||||||||||
| Convention on Nuclear Safety | + | + | +* | + | + | + | X | + | + | + | X |
| Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material | + | + | +* | +* | + | + | X | X | +* | +* | X |
| International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism | + | + | + | + | + | + | X | O | + | + | X |
| Countering WMD | |||||||||||
| CWC | + | + | + | + | + | + | + | X | + | + | + |
| BTWC | + | + | + | + | + | + | + | O | + | + | + |
| PSI-WMD | X | X | X | X | X | + | X | X | + | X | X |
| FATF (WMD-Terrorism) | + | X | + | + | + | X | X | X | + | + | X |
| Type of BRICS participation | Name of the Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC) | Technology | Status | Launch date[3] | |
| Brazil | Member state | Digital Brazilian Real (Drex) | DLT | Pilot | 2024 |
| Russia | Member state | Digital Rouble | DLT | Pilot | 2026 |
| China | Member state | Digital Renminbi (E-CNY) | Hybrid | Pilot | 2020 |
| India | Member state | Digital Rupee | DLT | Pilot | 2024 |
| South Africa | Member state | Digital Rand | DLT | Analysis | 2026 |
| the UAE | Member state | Digital Dirham | DLT | Pilot | 2025 |
| Ethiopia | Member state | – | – | Analysis | – |
| Indonesia | Member state | – | DLT | Analysis | – |
| Iran | Member state | Digital Iranian Rial | Blockchain | Pilot | 2025 |
| Egypt | Member state | E-Pound | Hybrid | Analysis | 2030 |
| Bolivia | Partner | Virtual Boliviano | No data | Analysis | – |
| Belarus | Partner | Digital Belorussian Rouble | Hybrid | Analysis | 2026 |
| Cuba | Partner | – | – | – | – |
| Uzbekistan | Partner | Uzbekistan CBDC | Blockchain | Analysis | – |
| Malaysia | Partner | E-ringgit | DLT | Analysis | 2026 |
| Kazakhstan | Partner | Digital Tenge | Blockchain | Pilot | 2025 |
| Uganda | Partner | Uganda CBDC | DLT | Analysis | 2027 |
| Thailand | Partner | Thailand CBDC | Blockchain | Analysis | 2026 |
| Nigeria | Partner | eNaira | Blockchain | Fully launched[4] | 2021 |
| Vietnam | Partner | Vietnam CBDC | DLT | Analysis | 2026 |
| 2005 IC Estimate | 2007 National Intelligence Estimate |
| Assess with high confidence that Iran currently is determined to develop nuclear weapons despite its international obligations and international pressure, but we do not assess that Iran is immovable. | Judge with high confidence that in fall 2003, Tehran halted its nuclear weapons program. Judge with high confidence that the halt lasted at least several years. (DOE and the NIC have moderate confidence that the halt to those activities represents a halt to Iran’s entire nuclear weapons program.) Assess with moderate confidence Tehran had not restarted its nuclear weapons program as of mid-2007, but we do not know whether it currently intends to develop nuclear weapons. Judge with high confidence that the halt was directed primarily in response to increasing international scrutiny and pressure resulting from exposure of Iran’s previously undeclared nuclear work. Assess with moderate-to-high confidence that Tehran at a minimum is keeping open the option to develop nuclear weapons. |
| For Iran’s __ nuclear weapon | It could draw from its stockpile of ___ | It would draw ___ from this stockpile | To make ___ enriched to 90% | It would require ___ of effort | For a total effort of ____ |
| First | 121.6 kg up to 60% U-235 (~54%) | 33.6 kg | 20 kg | 96 SWU | 96 SWU |
| Second | 33.6 kg | 20 kg | 96 SWU | 192 SWU | |
| Third | 33.6 kg | 20 kg | 96 SWU | 288 SWU | |
| Fourth | 20.8 kg | 12.4 kg | 59 SWU | 467 SWU | |
| 535.8 kg up to 20% U-235 (~18%) | 39.8 kg | 7.6 kg | 120 SWU | ||
| Fifth | 104.7 kg | 20 kg | 315 SWU | 782 SWU |
| Enrichment | For 10 years operating centrifuges reduced to 5,060 IR-1 machines, total machines is 6,104 IR-1sExcess centrifuges (over 13,000) dismantled and stored under IAEA monitoringFor 15 years level of uranium enrichment capped at 3.67 percent uranium-235For 15 years enrichment only at NatanzFor 10 years no production of additional IR-1 centrifugesBetween years 11-13 Iran can replace IR-1s with the equivalent capacity of IR-6 and IR-8 machines and limits lasting to years 14-15 | Monitoring and Verification | By 15 October 2015 Iran fully implements PMD “roadmap” agreed with IAEAFor 10 years approval of the purchase of dual-use materials by the Joint Commission working groupFor 25 years continuous monitoring of lran’s uranium mines and millsFor 20 years continuous monitoring of lran’s centrifuge production facilitiesFor 15 years Joint Commission oversight of IAEA access requests to inspect undeclared sitesPermanent prohibition of certain weaponization-related activitiesImplementation and eventual ratification of an additional protocol to Iran’s safeguards agreementPermanent implementation of modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements to its Safeguards Agreement |
| Uranium Stockpile | For 15 years the stockpile is kept under 300 kilograms of 3.67 percent enriched uranium in total (all forms)Excess enriched uranium sold, shipped abroad for storage, or diluted to natural uranium levelsUranium oxide and scrap material enriched up to 20 percent fabricated into fuel for Tehran Research Reactor, blended down, or shipped out | Joint Commission | For 25 years Joint Commission (composed of P5+1, EU and Iran for a total of 8 voting members) will hold quarterly meetings, or by request, to oversee the dealDispute resolution mechanism within 35 days; 15-day dispute resolution mechanism within the Joint Commission, with optional 15-day ministerial review and/or arbitration opinion from a 3-member panel, followed by 5-day review of the arbitration opinion. If there is no resolution and the complaining party sees the action as “significant non-performance,’ the unresolved issue can be treated as grounds to cease performing commitments in whole or part, complaining party will notify UN Security CouncilAny party can go to the UN Security Council to put sanctions back in place if there is noncompliance by vetoing a resolution calling for the continuance of sanctions |
| Fordow | Converted to research facility for stable isotope production with Russian cooperation1,044 IR-1 centrifuges in six cascades will remain here, 328 for production, the remaining 700 are idleFor 15 years no introduction of uranium at the facility | UN Sanctions | UNSC resolution 2231 endorsing JCPOA outlines termination of all previous resolutions targeting lran’s nuclear program — 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1835 (2008), 1929 (2010) —on implementation day.For 10 years sanctions are subject to snapback by veto of a resolution calling for the continuation of suspensionAfter 10 years UN will cease to be seized of Iran’s nuclear fileFor 5 years the heavy arms embargo will remain in placeFor 8 years the ballistic missile restrictions will remain in place |
| Advanced Centrifuge Research and Development | For 8.5 years Iran may conduct research with uranium on a single IR-4, IR-5, IR-6 and IR-8 centrifuge at NatanzAfter 8.5 years test up to 30 IR-6s and 30 IR-8sAfter 8 years manufacture up to 200 IR-6s and 200 IR-8s centrifuges without rotorsFor 10 years Joint Commission review and approval of changes to the research and development plan | U.S. Sanctions | Cease the application of economic sanctions against lran’s oil and banking sector allowing Iranian banks and companies to reconnect with international systemsWill remove designation of certain entities and individualsAllows for licensed non-U.S. entities that are owned or controlled by a U.S. person to engage in activities with lran permitted under JCPOAAllows for the sale of commercial passenger aircraft to IranAllows for license for importing Iranian-origin carpets and foodstuffs into United StatesUnited States takes appropriate measures to address laws at state or local level preventing full implementation of JCPOA – United States will actively encourage officials to adhere to JCPOA policyFor 8 years after Adoption date, or sooner if IAEA concludes that all nuclear activity in Iran remains peaceful, U.S. will seek legislative action to terminate/modify nuclear related sanctionsU.S. sanctions on Iran targeting human rights, terrorism and missile activities remainUnited States can impose additional sanctions for non-nuclear issues (terrorism, human rights, etc.) |
| Arak Reactor | Remove and disable the original core of the Arak reactorReplace the core of the Arak reactor to reduce weapons-grade plutonium output, certified by the Joint CommissionFor 15 years no reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel with an intention to never reprocessPermanent commitment to ship out spent nuclear fuelFor 15 years no heavy-water reactors in IranFor 15 years no accumulation of heavy water in IranConstruction of hot cells or shielded glove boxes of certain specifications subject to approval of the Joint Commission | EU Sanctions | Terminate all provisions of the EU Regulation related to Iran’s nuclear programIncludes: financial and banking transactions; transactions in Iranian Rial; provision of U.S. banknotes to Iranian government; access to SWIFT; insurance services; efforts to reduce Iran’s crude oil and petrochemical product sales; investment; transactions with Iran’s energy and shipping sector; trade in gold and other precious metals; trade with lran’s automotive sectorRemoves individuals and entities designated under sanctionsEU refrains from re-introducing sanctions terminated under JCPOA (Iran views any re-introduction as grounds to cease performing its commitments)Refrain from policy intended to adversely affect normalization of economic relations with IranFor 8 years after adoption day or at the finding of the IAEA broader conclusion EU’s arms embargo and restrictions on transfer of ballistic missiles remain |
| 2009 | 2014 | 2019 | 2024 | |
| G7 | 52.0% | 45.3% | 45.1% | 44.3% |
| incl.: | ||||
| France | 4.4% | 3.6% | 3.1% | 2.8% |
| Germany | 5.7% | 4.9% | 4.5% | 4.2% |
| Japan | 8.7% | 6.1% | 5.8% | 3.6% |
| United Kingdom | 4.0% | 3.8% | 3.2% | 3.3% |
| United States | 23.8% | 21.9% | 24.3% | 26.2% |
| BRICS* | 15.5% | 21.9% | 24.1% | 25.8%* |
| incl.: | ||||
| China | 8.5% | 13.3% | 16.5% | 16.8% |
| India | 2.2% | 2.5% | 3.2% | 3.5% |
| Russia | 2.0% | 2.6% | 1.9% | 2.0% |
| 2009 | 2014 | 2019 | 2024 | |
| G7 | 64.9% | 55.9% | 54.0% | 49.3% |
| incl.: | ||||
| France | 2.8% | 2.6% | 2.6% | 2.4% |
| Germany | 2.4% | 2.3% | 2.6% | 3.2% |
| Japan | 1.9% | 2.0% | 2.0% | 2.2% |
| United Kingdom | 3.8% | 3.4% | 3.1% | 2.9% |
| United States | 51.1% | 43.2% | 41.2% | 36.2% |
| BRICS* | 13.1% | 17.7% | 19.8% | 21.9%* |
| incl.: | ||||
| China | 6.5% | 9.6% | 11.7% | 11.9% |
| India | 2.8% | 3.0% | 3.6% | 3.1% |
| Russia | 2.5% | 3.6% | 3.1% | 5.6% |