For a person who participated in all the NPT Review Conferences since 1995, this is a challenging topic, indeed: what does it mean – “fit”? How should we measure success of the review conferences?
On the one hand, I definitely wish all the success for the forthcoming 2026 NPT Review Conference. Personally, and as part of PIR Center team, I would try to contribute to that in a cooperative way.
On the other hand, food for thought from the previous conferences helps realistically put the forthcoming one in the historical context.
This is how I see where we stand now with each of the three pillars of the NPT.
The disarmament pillar (“the Article 6 pillar”): we have a mixed bag of good news and bad news here; and it would be fair not to forget that there is a little bit of both. Good news here in that regardless of extreme tensions in international relations, the New START Treaty which will expire in February this year, it’s still effective, and continues to be implemented between Russia and the United States. We do not have significant quantitative arms race. We clearly do not have arms race between the major nuclear weapon states, Russia and the United States. We do see certain quantitative increase of nuclear weapons in the United Kingdom and in China.
On the less optimistic note, we clearly see the fact that the reliance on nuclear weapons and the importance of nuclear weapons is still there, both in the doctrines but also in the practical steps.
We also see an increasing risk of further proliferation of nuclear weapons by certain nuclear weapon states (NWSs) towards the territories of non-nuclear weapon states (NNWSs). Just not long ago there was only one NWS, the United States, which deployed its nuclear weapons on the territories of others (in this case, in the territories of its allies – other NATO members). For a number of years we at PIR Center had been suggesting that such practice should be stopped, reversed, and the joint action by all nuclear five, maybe with informal endorsement by other states with nuclear weapons should be implemented clearly stating that nuclear weapons should be concentrated on the territories of NWSs only. But the genie was out of the bottle. United States and their NATO allies were not interested. Some NATO allies were even hysteric about that idea: now we need to keep the nukes on the NATO soil, they claimed. Now there are Russian nukes in Belarus. And this trend may continue and develop.
In my view, the situation with the Treaty on the prohibition of nuclear weapons (TPNW ) does not help either. That treaty, in my view, is counterproductive. It sends the wrong message, it questions the primary role of the NPT. I know the TPNW states would disagree, but altogether the division line between haves and have-nots, between those who are in the TPNW and who are not there in these turbulent times may become even more dangerous.
The peaceful nuclear users pillar (the Article 4 pillar of the NPT), is another mixed bag of recent positive and negative developments.
On the one hand, most of the analysts, including Russian, American, others, agree that this may be one of the common denominators, one of those elements that may provide unity of states parties at the forthcoming NPT Review Conference. Importance of the development of nuclear energy in those places of the globe who want it and who have the right to develop nuclear energy is something which is quite clear and we see more and more developments in various parts of Eurasia (India, China, Kazakhstan), in Africa, in other parts of the world where nuclear energy peaceful developments is in much demand, and will be even in more demand soon. I certainly welcome that. One of the recent potential newcomers is in Europe, is Italy, who is revising a longstanding “no to nuclear energy” policy. Italy as finally realized: nuclear energy is clean energy and if we want to meet the sustainable goals of development (SDGs), this is something the states interested in that and should invest more, not less.
On the other hand, we see the barbaric attacks by two states with nuclear weapons, one legal NWS, and one non-recognized nuclear weapon state, against an NPT member who is a non-nuclear weapon state. I mean US and Israeli attacks against Iran, against Iran’s nuclear infrastructure in June 2025. It does not at all help the cause of fighting nuclear proliferation. It doesn’t help the IAEA and its unprecedented presence in Iran, which is strongly needed. Even more, Israeli-US attacks against Iran may become a major obstacle for a successful outcome of the NPT Review Conference 2026.
In September 2025, Prof. William Potter in Monterey and his colleague Sarah Bidgood wrote an article in Arms Control Today which states clearly that, contrary to the previous conference where politicized issues against Russia on the Zaporozhye Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) were used as a pretext to torpedo the success of the conference, for the next conference it will be, most likely, an issue of attacks against Iran. Obviously the United States has its own view on the issue and we listen to that carefully… but during the conference they should be prepared that attacks against Iran would become a major irritator. Unfortunately, those Europeans who are concerned about the success of the 2026 RevCon, prefer to invest in putting more pressure on Iran and to prepare for a blame game against Iran and its advanced nuclear program. If such counterproductive pressure on Iran continues, it would be a huge mistake and a major damage for the international nuclear nonproliferation regime.
Now, the third pillar: nonproliferation per se. In these turbulent times more states than before express their interest, normally not publicly, some in very low voice, towards obtaining nuclear weapons. Words and practical steps in East Asia (particularly, in ROK) and in the Middle East should be very carefully watched and monitored.
In Russia, voices who support further proliferation of nuclear weapons have become stronger and more articulate. On the website of the RIAC, in July 2025, an article was published by a reputable expert, who claims that “a significant part of the theoretics of international policy in the West, as well as a number of brightest intellectuals in Russia for a long time called for proliferation of nuclear weapons to be not a danger but a contributing factor for improving international security because having nuclear weapons would be a containing, deterring factor against the appearance of new military conflicts and will stabilize the situation and the globe”.
I asked this question to Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov, what he thinks about a potential usefulness of nuclear proliferation for Russia. He reacted that he was definitely not among those bright intellectuals who would support nuclear proliferation. And he challenged those bright intellectuals whether they would be prepared and ready to start a process of total renegotiating of the NPT or how they would suggest to formalize the withdrawal of certain states from the NPT and whether those states would proceed clean or not clean on their withdrawal from the NPT.
In my view, calling for more proliferation is dangerous. Quite the opposite, we need to save the achievements of the NPT when we lost only one state party (DPRK). This is by itself a huge success for the 55-year-old Treaty. We cannot afford to open Pandora box with new withdrawals. This is why the Iran case is critically important.
And finally, about the preparations for the 2026 NPT Review Conference. With some experience here, with six review conferences in my professional and travel bag, I must say that an NPT review conference is just a process where we test the fitness of the nuclear nonproliferation regime and all its pillars. The most important task for the conference is not to adopt a lengthy final document but to confirm that the Treaty is alive, and that all its state parties support the Treaty and each of its three pillars. And to confirm that all the States Parties to the Treaty believe that it is important and valid.
And this is indeed the case. The Treaty is alive, and it is important and fully valid. Here we do have consensus. All the Parties do agree on the key importance of the NPT, as it is, as a cornerstone of international security. as it is. So, this should be the basis for the discussion and, hopefully, for the consensus at the next conference.
Working on a lengthy final document may be a good exercise for a young diplomat. But for the state parties and their delegations, it would be mostly wasting of time, with a bitter result. What the NPT members really need is a very short, concise and consensus-based document to which both haves and have-nots, all the States Parties to the NPT would contribute, – maybe just a one-pager. But it will be a powerful one page which would demonstrate consensus and willingness to support the NPT regime, and it would contribute much better to the longevity of the NPT than painful debates on the text of the final document leading to new frustrations and confrontations of which we had already had too much, both in 2015 and in 2022.
This comment is based on Dr. Orlov’s excerpts from his presentation at the Trialogue Club International session in October 2025.
Keywords: Nuclear Nonproliferation; NPT
NPT
E16/SHAH – 25/12/30
