Transcaucasia is considered one of the world’s most vulnerable regions to a serious water scarcity threat. This threat to the region’s water security has been weighing on achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which most countries have set for 2030, as water plays a significant role in people’s livelihood, agriculture, and energy. A decline in water levels in dams and hydroelectric plants means a decrease in the production of electrical energy and is thus a major threat to every sector. This goes to show how critical water is and how grave a threat water scarcity is. The World Economic Forum’s Risk Report has listed the top 5 slots of threats that are all water-related. In addition, Ismail Serageldin, a former World Bank vice president, once said: “In the 20th century, individuals fought for oil; in the 21st century, they will fight for water”. This insight will shed light on the history of the conflict, the water interests of Azerbaijan and Armenia, and the countries that got involved in the conflict. It will also discuss current developments.
Chronology of the conflict in the region
In Transcaucasia, on the border south of the Caucus Mountains, lies the most protracted conflict since the fall of the Soviet Union. The Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast was created by the Soviet Union in 1923. This was home to most ethnically identified Armenians in the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic. In 1988, Nagorno-Karabakh’s regional legislature passed a resolution to declare its interest in joining the Republic of Armenia, even though it was officially located in Azerbaijan. This resulted in armed conflicts between the two republics, which have had a long history of ethnic tension. In addition, the Soviet Union couldn’t be indifferent to such resolutions and votes and was known to be unresponsive to people’s calls for liberation or votes, so it remained a part of Azerbaijan as a semiautonomous territory. In 1991, after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, conflicts erupted between Azerbaijan and Armenia over the region formerly known as the Republic of Artsakh, “Nagorno Karabakh Republic” (NKR). Along with the statehood of Armenia and Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh also declared its independence, leading to a full-scale war.
At least 1 million people were displaced and forced to flee from their homes and villages that were on the borders of both republics, and more than 30,000 people died in that war between 1991 and 1994. The war ended with Armenia declaring victory, and in 1994, the Artsakh Republic, along with some Azeri lands and villages, was absorbed into Armenia. A ceasefire agreement was signed between Armenia and Azerbaijan, which was brokered by Russia, an ally of Armenia back then. Armenia took control of the Nagorno-Karabakh region as per that ceasefire agreement. Russia played a mediator role alongside France and the United States. They tried to find a final agreement and a permanent solution to this conflict, but both Armenia and Azerbaijan refused to agree on terms that would end the war. Instead, Armenia, as the victor, renamed the Azeri-named villages in their newly acquired territory and repopulated those areas with ethnic Armenians.
Furthermore, despite the bilateral agreement for a ceasefire between 1994 and September 2020, there have been sporadic clashes between the Armenian and Azerbaijani troops using shelling, attack drones, and special operation activities. In April 2016, there erupted the fiercest fighting ever witnessed since 1994, resulting in hundreds of deaths in the territories. The opposing sides decided to end hostilities four days after the fighting, but a communication breakdown led both parties to begin accusing each other of violating the ceasefire. The tension was still very high this time. The year 2020 saw the outbreak of the second Nagorno-Karabakh war, which began as border skirmishes and bombings turned into a full-scale conflict.
The long-simmering conflict was sparked when another country intervened. Turkey has been getting more involved in regional conflicts to influence the outcomes in their favor. Thus, Turkey seized the chance presented by the resurgence of hostilities in Nagorno-Karabakh in 2020 and sent troops in support of Azerbaijan. The arms trade in 2020 alone is estimated to have reached over 100 million dollars. These defense and weapon deals included advanced drones, vital in the war. In just a week, Azerbaijan pushed in 20 kilometers in Armenian-held territories and went later on further to areas in Nagorno-Karabakh. Armenia continued to suffer defeats due to the advanced drones and the amount of military investment made by Azerbaijan. It is speculated that this attack in September 2020 had been planned for months in Baku and Ankara. On 8 November of the same year, Azerbaijan won its first victory by capturing the historical city of Shusha, located only 15 kilometers away from the capital of the autonomously occupied region of Stepanakert. This forced Armenia to surrender and agree to a ceasefire agreement.
This agreement significantly altered who would rule over Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijan will retain control over the seized territories plus other parts of Armenia as well, while the ethnic Armenians will continue to govern the central region, which includes the capital, Stepanakert. To protect them, they will have two thousand Russian peacekeeping soldiers and the same number of Turkish peacekeeping soldiers as part of the ceasefire agreement. The involvement of these two major powers, Russia and Turkey, not only ensures the safety of the ethnic Armenians but also signifies a significant shift in the geopolitical landscape of the region. Russia, in particular, has managed to expand its influence by having troops on foot and on the ground. As Azerbaijan rejoiced over its victory and the reclaimed territories, Turkey and Russia were accomplishing strategic goals, while Armenia was in disarray after the devastating loss.
In 2023, Azerbaijan took complete control of the region after launching a swift offensive they referred to as anti-terrorist operations. The region as a whole was under Azerbaijani control, while 100,000 ethnic Armenians living in the area were in a dilemma and fled to Armenia. After this swoop victory, it was decided that Nagorno-Karabakh would be dissolved, and it was. Since January 2024, it has officially dissolved and become a part of Azerbaijan. Talks have been held regarding the official draw of borders and ending the conflict finally after many years, but both sides couldn’t agree on terms while Azerbaijan, as the victor, has the upper hand.
Water security interests of Azerbaijan and Armenia
Many scientists have predicted an alarming decline in water supplies in Armenia and Azerbaijan. Rainfall water is forecast to drop by a staggering 52 percent by 2040, while the decrease in water supply in Azerbaijan is expected to be the reason for a predicted 77 percent decrease in crop yields during the same period. This projected decline of water in Transcaucasia is the worst in the region. Severe effects of climate change have been and will continue to be felt, mainly in the downstream Kura-Aras basin, which has the highest agricultural demand and the lowest water stream level.
A map indicating the river’s tributes and hydro plants in the disputed area that now belongs to Azerbaijan Source: Nareg Kuyumjian/Eurasiane, 2021
How does that relate to the area of conflict? Why is Nagorno-Karabakh important? The Nagorno-Karabakh region is of great significance to both Armenia and Azerbaijan because it holds the tributaries of the Aras, Kura, and Tatar rivers. On the Tatar River specifically, there is the Sarsang Hydro Water Plant and Sarsang Reservoir, which were used to provide irrigation and drinking water to the territory of Nagorny Karabakh and six other close regions of Azerbaijan. However, after the 1994 ceasefire agreement, Azerbaijan could no longer use the Sarsang Reservoir.
In 2013, Nagorno-Karabakh’s Prime Minister approached Azerbaijan, offering to share the reservoir, but Baku turned it down. As far as Baku is concerned, it viewed the area “as a separatist regime and will not negotiate with an occupying force.” On the other hand, for Armenia, Nagorno-Karabakh represented a significant energy source due to its large number of hydroelectric plants, which was expected to rise. The region was one of three places Armenia imported electric energy from, along with Georgia and Iran. Armenia was importing 150 to 200 million kWh from Nagorno-Karabakh. The government of Armenia had also planned to import much more electricity from the region in 2021 — 330 million kWh — but imports from Nagorno-Karabakh had to be replaced with much more expensive energy produced locally due to the impending conflict.
The military buildup was evident between 2008 and 2019. Azerbaijan was planning a resurgence. They never let go of what Azeris considers an occupied region of great significance for hydroelectric plants and water. They allocated $24 billion to the budget for their armed forces. That was six times more than Armenia. They reiterated their claim to Nagorno-Karabakh while doing so. In 2016, following a four-day war between the two countries, it became clear that what many experts were referring to as a “frozen conflict” was a simmering conflict.
The Karabakh war was reignited in 2020, after more than two and a half decades since the conflict was frozen. The turning of Azerbaijan into a gas- and oil-rich authoritarian state and the blame for its forfeiture of Karabakh became the motivating factors. During this time, Baku was convinced that it was the right time from a geopolitical standpoint and spent$2.24 billion in military spending in 2020, a 20% increase over the previous years. By 27 September, Azerbaijan was prepared. It launched a surprise offensive and successfully recaptured the lowlands. It launched a second attack in 2023 and took Stepanakert. Almost every ethnic Armenian fled during this time, the same way the Azeris did three decades earlier.
But what about other water security sources that are strategically important to the area? It is worth mentioning that Azerbaijan has been significantly deepening its relationship with Iran regarding water security. In May of this year, former Iranian President Ibrahim Raisi and Azerbaijan President Ilham Aliyev were both present at the opening of the joint dam project on their countries’ shared borders. The Qiz Qalasi dam regulates two billion cubic meters of water annually between Iran and Azerbaijan. The project was a sign of great hope between the two nations. This joint dam and hydro plant project strengthens the Iranian-Azeri relationship supported by historical and religious ties into further kindship and cooperation to one of this age’s crucial challenges: water security.
The current situation
Since the establishment of a permanent military checkpoint on Lachin in April 2023 by Azerbaijan, all incoming and outgoing traffic was cut off from Stepanakert in the heart of the previously autonomous region. This included the electricity and gas cables in the city, leading to a significant environmental impact. For months, Artsakh largely depended on the Sarsang dam for power generation. The blockage caused the reservoir feeding springs to the Tatar River to drop to significantly low levels, leaving the ground behind bare, infertile, and sticky. The Azerbaijani President, Ilham Aliyev, has promised that the newly constructed hydroelectric dams in the area will have a capacity to generate about 270 megawatts by the close of 2024, in addition to the 240 megawatts expected to be generated from solar farms. New houses are currently fitted with solar panels, climate-monitoring stations, and dams undergoing renovation. Replantation projects are also underway to reforest the area and attract native species, including the Eurasian gazelles, following decades of anthropogenic extinction. Climate concerns and the environment are now a focus, with a net-zero carbon emission commitment by 2050.
The situation in 2024 was promising for correcting the state of affairs that has left Nagorno-Karabakh a conflict zone since the 1990s. While it is time to rebuild and recover from a territorial dispute that has enormously impacted water scarcity in the region, war has stripped the area of its color and life. Officially, in January 2024, the Republic of Artsakh ceased to exist, and Nagorno-Karabakh became under the complete control of Azerbaijan. Today, the area has remained closed to public access and foreign media. Nevertheless, several projects are underway to rebuild the villages, demine sites, airports, and roads, as well as reforestation to accommodate those who have fled due to conflict.
The peace talks that have been going on in Germany since February 2024 showed a lot of promise, and building a great deal of hope will be necessary to find a permanent solution to the lingering conflict. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev have stated that they are ready to solve the outstanding issues between the two countries peacefully. However, Azerbaijan also accuses the EU of pliantly ignoring the facts and demonizing Azerbaijan while taking sides with Armenia. At the same time, Azerbaijan’s President reassured the EU that Baku had no intention of attacking Armenia and only wanted what was rightfully theirs, according to Azerbaijan. Armenia, on the other hand, has lost faith in Russia, which is currently preoccupied with its conflict with Ukraine and has found itself embraced by the EU as a new ally. As of March 2024, there were talks and speculations about Armenia’s potential for EU membership. The two sides have been getting closer and closer in recent dates and events. On April 5th, the EU pledged to Armenia a package of 270 million as it seeks to boost its relations, a significant financial commitment. On July 16th, the EU-Armenia Justice Police dialogue was held in the Armenian capital. On July 22nd, the EU decided to open dialogue regarding Visa liberation with Armenia and 10 million Euros worth of military aid, further demonstrating its support. This was a “milestone,” as described by the Armenian Foreign Minister, in building the relationship between the historically allied nation and Russia while it gets closer to the Western bloc.
Azerbaijan has massive water plans for the territory it gained back. It was announced that at least five hydroelectric power plants will be commissioned in Lachin District in 2024. These plants will generate at least 40 megawatts of electricity for Azerbaijan. To put things in perspective, the Lachin district, which Azerbaijan was able to retake, currently produces 77 million kWh of green energy from hydroelectric plants, equivalent to 18 million cubic meters of gas. There is also a big project at the Qiz Qalasi dam with Iran.
This can be further analyzed strategically to mean that Azerbaijan is seemingly being pushed closer to the Iranian and Russian cluster while Armenia is dancing with the Western one after its disappointment. Azerbaijan has been an essential line for Russia and Iran to share goods and served as a critical link during the heaviest times of Western sanctions. The most challenging role to be fulfilled in Azerbaijan now is balancing the relationship between the two sides without being forced into one relationship over the other and maintaining a good relationship with Russia and Iran while refraining from causing further anger in its direction from the European side as they are fulfilling some of the energy gaps due to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. Russia was left outside the negotiation and mediation table. Still, they might step in after no results and a decline in the previously anticipated hope of a solution. President Putin was on a visit to Azerbaijan that started on the 17th of August. The Kremlin has concurred that discussing a solution for the Nagorno-Karabakh situation is on the agenda. This is expected as Russia should be included in the negotiation table as both areas are historically within the influence sphere of Russia. Some analysts argue that Russia’s role in the negotiation is vital to resolving the conflict. Russia, however, is occupied with its military conflict with Ukraine, but hopes, as I said, are up after President Putin’s recent visit to Azerbaijan and his offer to mediate the conflict in the hope of reaching a final solution that is agreeable by both states.
Conclusion
Despite the urgency of achieving the Sustainable Development Goals set by the United Nations, such as access to clean water and sanitation by 2030, many regions are struggling due to conflicts over natural resources. The Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict in Transcaucasia is a long-standing example of such a crisis. While promising developments are on the horizon, UNEP reports have raised concerns about constructing new towns and villages. The road to recovery for the region is long, with demining alone expected to take several years, and reconstruction and rehabilitation of the landscape are likely to take even longer.
Armenia has lost access to many water sources and hydro plants over Nagorno-Karabakh, while Azerbaijan has repaired seven hydro plants, at least in the gained area. This only serves to emphasize that, although not the driving force of the conflict, water interest was undoubtedly a major contributing factor. Due to the mentioned project with Iran along its border, Azerbaijan is also widening its cooperation circle regarding water sources and energy. On the other hand, Armenia is still looking for solutions to cover the incoming water crisis that grew bigger after losing the disputed territory. They have already implemented drop water irrigation systems to over 5400 hectares of Agricultural lands to combat water shortages and desertification and are looking to transition to a water-saving regime. This shows how severe the loss was and how badly it affected Armenia. The dams that Turkey has been building over the last ten years don’t help either, as they threaten to lower the water levels on the main rivers that flow in Armenia by 50%. Armenia doesn’t have a tremendous diplomatic relationship with Turkey, one of Azerbaijan’s prominent supporters and weapon suppliers to the attack that allowed it to take the disputed area. Thus, reaching an agreement or negotiating with Turkey over dams and water flows will be difficult.
A final solution to the situation has yet to be reached between Azerbaijan and Armenia. The talks held in Germany involved significant optimization, but they failed to produce binding results. This favors the argument that, given its history with the region and sphere of influence, Russia must be one of the primary mediators to solve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
Key words: Armenia-Azerbaijan; Global Security; Water Security
